INTRODUCTION

It is possible to say, perhaps, that the defining aspect of the history of philosophy is thinking truth in terms of the intelligibility of the presence of Being. This intelligibility would be capable of comprehending truth as that which is present, as that which can be disclosed and that of which it is possible to synchronize into a whole. The equation of truth with presence assumes that however different terms of a relation might appear and however dispersed over time they might seem, in the end, they are rendered commensurate; an expression of unity.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel could be named as the representative of the concern with the deployment of truth as a comprehension of that which is present. Hegel claims that philosophy's entire history is to be thought as the development of truth. He writes in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*: “The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development.”¹ It means for Hegel that truth is the movement of reason, which is the history of philosophy itself. For Hegel, thus, there is an intrinsic relation between the history of philosophy and philosophy. This relation implies that different philosophical systems throughout history can be read as the progressive unfolding of truth, since they are moments in its realization.

Hegel suggests that the movement of reason manifests itself both in and as difference.² It implies that any identity already presupposes difference, as identity is affirmed both through and as difference. Philos-

1. PG, 24/trans., 11.
osophy is able to grasp or comprehend the movement of differentiation by revealing itself as the identity of different entities. According to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to gather and recollect the essence of the truth of Being, which means nothing other than as the foundation from which difference can arise. This essence, manifesting itself as difference, is the foundation for thinking, because thinking can think the recognition of difference as identity and simultaneously identity as difference. Since thinking is capable of recognizing identity in difference and difference in identity, there is never an alterity that remains outside the movement of thinking, as any alterity is comprehended within this movement itself.

This book seeks to trace both Martin Heidegger's and Emmanuel Levinas's attempts to break open and disrupt thinking inherited by the philosophical tradition as represented by Hegel. Understanding the task and essence of philosophy in terms of the comprehension of all that is, is, according to Heidegger and Levinas, incapable of relating to alterity. Therefore, Hegel's philosophy would be a reduction of difference as difference. Heidegger and Levinas, both heirs to the phenomenological method as developed by Edmund Husserl, take up Husserl's account of intentional subjectivity, which highlighted the fundamental question of relation in the service of their own respective projects. Problematizing traditional accounts of relationality, both Heidegger and Levinas suggest, contrary to Hegel that the task of thinking or philosophy does not consist in thinking truth as the absolute concept, but in thinking difference. In order to do so, both Heidegger and Levinas engage in a rereading of the history of philosophy. But whereas for Hegel, the engagement with this history takes place in terms of a conversation with that which has been thought, for Heidegger and Levinas, this rereading is about disclosing a difference that has remained unthought throughout this history, yet has been supposed by it.

Heidegger begins with thinking difference as the difference between Being and beings—the ontological difference. This difference has, claims Heidegger, remained unthought by the history of philosophy, including Hegel, because this history has always understood Being as presence and the truth of Being as the comprehension of that which shows itself as and in presence. However, Heidegger claims that Being, understood as that which gives the gift of presence, cannot be reduced to a being—to the dominion of presence. He suggests that the understanding of Being as presence, prevailing throughout the history of philosophy, conceals this
ontological difference. Heidegger’s rereading of the history of philosophy intends to lay bare the ontological difference and will eventually lead to attempting to think the truth of Being itself.

For Hegel, the progressive unfolding of reason leads to a gathering of the idea of truth in the sense of a gradually developing certainty. Heidegger on the contrary advocates not a progression but a “step back” from the history of philosophy, and points to the domain that has been overlooked and from which the essence of truth becomes “first of all worthy of thought.” This step back goes from what is unthought: the ontological difference, and into what gives thought. That is, the oblivion or concealment of the difference, which, as such, gives the history of philosophy. Therefore, for Heidegger, the ontological difference is the realm within which philosophy can be what it is. To take a step back, however, from the history of philosophy means for Heidegger that to think the truth of Being is to think both presence, as the oblivion of the difference as given throughout the history of metaphysics, and its other, namely Being, as that which withdraws behind its gift of presence.

As noted, Levinas agrees with Heidegger’s criticism that the history of philosophy has been incapable of thinking difference. Levinas applauds Heidegger’s gesture of thinking of the ontological difference in an explicit manner and affirms that it would be impossible to return to a thinking that would be unable to relate to the difference between Being and beings. However, he claims that although Heidegger criticizes the understanding of the truth of Being as presence, he does accept a subtle, complex, and dynamic understanding of presence. Thus, although Heidegger criticizes the history of philosophy, he ultimately is incapable of breaking away from the dominance of presence that he rejects. It means that for Levinas, Heidegger never truly departs from the history of philosophy. Because Heidegger’s project, riveted to the truth of Being, affirms the history of philosophy in the sense that truth, as a comprehension of that which is present, has always been its project.

Levinas finds that philosophy as a search for truth is incapable of thinking difference as difference. For him, to think difference as difference means to think ethical difference as the difference between the self and the other person. This ethical difference, he claims, has remained unthought yet supposed by the history of philosophy, including

3. ID, 57/trans. 49.
by Heidegger. Assuming this difference leads Levinas to a rereading from within philosophy itself in order to open it to another, hitherto unthought meaning and reveals what animates the history of philosophy. Ethical difference, however, contrary to Heidegger’s understanding of difference, is not concealed by the history of philosophy but remains absolutely foreign to it. Yet, this does not mean that he renounces this history. It is, rather, the case that Levinas’s project of thinking ethical difference entails the explication of the relationship between the history of philosophy (as the history of the deployment of the truth of Being) and that which remains different from philosophy within its very history. This rereading involves a thinking in which the fundamental and primary question is for Levinas no longer the truth of Being in the Heideggerian sense, but rather the question to what responsibility Being is awoken. The answer Levinas offers to this question is justice. As such, Levinas’s gesture of thinking ethical difference can be read as an attempt to render justice to the history of philosophy.

Heidegger’s influence on the early Levinas is well known. Under the direction of Jean Hering, professor of Protestant theology at Strasbourg, Levinas traveled to Freiburg in 1928 to study phenomenology with Husserl. In Freiburg, Levinas became impressed by Heidegger and his critique of Husserl in Sein und Zeit and in the lecture courses of the late twenties. He was present at the famous debate in Davos in 1929, where Heidegger and Cassirer argued about the Kantian notions of rationality and freedom. Following the debate, the students staged a play and Levinas impersonated Cassirer in a mocking way (the failure to attend to the face of Cassirer that moment was something Levinas would later regret). Heidegger’s influence is reflected in Levinas’s doctoral thesis, published in 1930 as Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl [The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology]. Here, Levinas employs Heideggerian accounts of transcendence, historicity, and life to reformulate Husserl’s notions of intuition and intentionality. In the early articles written by Levinas after his thesis, the problematic of transcendence is already announced, yet still articulated in Heideggerian fashion.

But there is a departure that proves to be decisive. Levinas’s manner of describing transcendence changes, with fundamental implications, to a language of ethical difference. Now it is no longer the transcendence of existence, but the transcendence of the alterity of the Other that becomes central to his thinking. Although the thinking of alterity is already announced in De l’existence à l’existant and Le temps et l’autre,
these works “lacked the originality to which Levinas wished to lead us back,” as Derrida notes in “Violence et Métaphysique: un Essai sur la Pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas.”

It is in Totalité et infini that the language of transcendence of alterity reappears in full force. This work is not only a criticism of Heidegger (and Husserl), but just as much an indictment of Hegel and his system. In Totalité et infini, Heidegger is viewed as being close to Hegel in the sense that they are both incapable of respecting ethical difference because they view the question of the truth of existence as the essence and motivation of philosophy. Levinas accuses both thinkers of the following:

To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom. (45)

It is therefore that a departure is necessary. The departure from Heidegger can be explained by different events in Levinas’s life: the encounter with the work of Rosenzweig and other Jewish thinkers such as the mysterious “monsieur Chouchani” as well as the Jewish sacred texts is important. Moreover, Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism cannot be ignored: in 1933, he accepted the rectorate of the University of Freiburg and became a member of the Nazi party shortly thereafter. His inaugural address, titled “De Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universität [The Self-Assertion of the German University],” is often read as a gesture of endorsement of Nazism by Heidegger. He resigned from the rectorate a year later, but remained a member of the party until its dismantling at the end of the war. Much later, in the essay “To the Other,” the first of the Nine Talmudic Readings, published in 1968, Levinas would admit: “One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger. If [in the Talmud] Hanina could not forgive the just and humane Rab because he was also the brilliant Rab, it is even less possible to forgive Heidegger.”

Already in *De l’exsistence à l’existant*, Levinas had commented on the necessity of leaving Heidegger’s philosophical project. In this book, he expresses the “profound need to leave the climate of that [Heidegger’s] philosophy.” But this climate cannot be left, as Levinas continues, in favor of a thinking that would be pre-Heideggerian. In this sense, and as Levinas himself agrees, is thinking always thinking *after* Heidegger. It thus becomes clear that the break with Heidegger cannot be viewed as merely a refusal of his thought, but that, however heavily Heidegger is criticized by Levinas, his trace cannot be ignored.

Levinas engages with Heidegger’s thought throughout his philosophical career; an engagement that has a number of characteristics that remain the same. Firstly, the criticism is almost only limited to *Sein und Zeit* and Heidegger’s early project of fundamental ontology. Secondly, for Levinas, the links between fundamental ontology and National Socialism are evident. As Levinas explains in an interview: “There is in Heidegger the dream of a nobility of the blood and the sword.” And a little further on, he notes: “The absence of concern for the other in Heidegger and his personal political adventure are bound up together.” Thirdly, and this is related to the second point, Levinas views Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as representative of the entirety of the history of philosophy in the sense that it is totalitarian, the movement of egoism, and that it is concerned with truth and therefore an injustice. In presenting Heidegger in this way, Levinas does not engage with the alterity and the complex movement of the withdrawal of Being in Heidegger.

Some words must be dedicated to the relationship between Levinas and Jacques Derrida in this introduction. It is generally acknowledged that Derrida’s commentary on Levinas was the start of a peculiar dialogue that would not be interrupted until the death of Derrida in 2004.

This commentary started with Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics: an Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in his book *Writing and Difference*, from 1967. Published only three years after *Totalité et infini*, Derrida, although critical of Levinas, recognized straight away the philosophical importance of Levinas’s project. Derrida praises Levinas’s attempt to question the entirety of the philosophical tradition beginning from its Greek inception—which we are urged not to understand merely

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6. EE, 19/trans. 4.

as an empirical place, but as a system of categories and concepts, born in Greece and structuring the entire philosophical discourse throughout history. The reservations that Derrida expresses in this essay do not so much concern Levinas’s desire to open philosophy to a source that is different than its Greek origin, but are situated at the question of which strategy must be followed in order to render this opening effective and meaningful.

Much of Levinas’s later work is shaped by Derrida’s criticisms. Robert Bernasconi notes that in *Autrement qu’être*, the second major book, Derrida is the main interlocutor, although his name is mentioned no more than once throughout the book. Derrida’s last two texts addressed to Levinas after his death deal with the question of responding to Levinas. The moving eulogy that Derrida gave at Levinas’s funeral was published as “Adieu” in 1996. “A Word of Welcome” is the opening lecture for a conference held in Levinas’s honor a year later. Both essays deal with the silent absence of Levinas. Unfortunately, the scope of this book is too limited for a proper treatment of the philosophical relationship between Levinas and Derrida. I will, however, point out certain aspects of this relationship when relevant to my discussion.

At present, there is no scholarly engagement that deals with the question of the relation between truth and justice in either Heidegger’s or Levinas’s works. Yet, the philosophical relationship between Levinas and Heidegger is much commented upon. This is done especially by Levinasians, who discuss the philosophical background to the claim of ethics as first philosophy. These readings are rarely nuanced or even-handed; they often take over the harsh rhetoric that Levinas uses when discussing Heidegger. Heideggerians, on the other hand, never had a profound interest in Levinas. These two facts make it appear as if the relationship between the thinkers is about two opposing camps who have very little in common. Ethics or ontology: it seems as if a choice must be made. Francois Raffoul in his book *Origins of Responsibility*, for example,
questions Levinas’s attempt to open the question of ethical difference according to an alternative to the thought of Being. Raffoul finds this a superfluous attempt. He notes: “To Levinas, who asks us to think not ‘being otherwise, but otherwise than being,’ we could respond—not otherwise than being, but otherwise as being, the otherness of Being.”

If Heidegger has already taught us to think Being in its difference from beings, why would we need Levinas’s ethical difference?

Moreover, the discussion on the question whether there is a relationship between thinking Being and ethics has been going on for many years. It is a fact that Heidegger never wrote a work on ethics and did not think ethics in a traditional way: in terms of a discipline of philosophy and as a moral code. Besides, Heidegger’s notorious political affiliation, as well as the publication of his private notebooks (the Schwarze Hefte) in 2014, could easily lead one to conclude upon a lack or neglect of ethics in his work. The notebooks make it more difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the man and the thinker. In here, Heidegger writes that, while distancing himself from the racial theories endorsed by Nazi intellectuals, “Weltjudentum” is one of the main forces of Western modernity, which he did not view in a favorable light: “Weltjudentum is ungraspable everywhere and does not need to get involved in military action while continuing to unfurl its influence, whereas we are left to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people.”

He also notes the “worldlessness” of Judaism. According to Heidegger, Jewish people do not only lack a homeland, they are considered “worldless.” In the collection of essays Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism, we find a reply. Here, both Eduardo Mendieta and Bettina Bergo remind of the fact that, according to Heidegger, even animals are not “worldless”; they are considered world-poor in a 1929 lecture. This comment amounts to a complete dehumanization of Judaism: the Jews do not have a place in the world. In this, we can also discover, as both scholars argue, that the idea of Being-in-the-world, so central to Sein und Zeit, can take on the meaning of a discriminatory term with an anti-Semitic intention. It thus can be argued that anti-Semitism, which Levinas called “the same

hatred of the other man,” 14 actually touched on the core of Heidegger’s philosophy, which makes the question of ethics in Heidegger’s work both an urgent and controversial one.

Many scholars find that thinking Being and its meaning always and already means thinking ethics. Heidegger himself has commented on this relation, most notably in his 1946 “Brief über den Humanismus.” Here, he comments on why he never wrote an ethics. He points out that the term ethics, in accordance with the basic meaning of the term ethos means nothing else but that original ethics is thinking that thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man. The only result of this thinking is that it satisfies its essence in that it is, and, and this way, “lets Being be.” It is, however, no longer a possibility to call this thinking ‘ethics,’ since it is the “essential task” of thinking. “The thinking that inquires into the truth of Being and so defines the human’s essential abode from Being and toward Being is neither ethics nor ontology.” 15 Heidegger thus rethinks the notion of ethics in terms of the relation between Being and man. It means, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, that Heidegger seeks to think the ontological source of ethics, by situating it in the event of Being and factual existence itself. 16 In this sense, “being displays its own ethicality, notes Raffoul, and does not need to be ‘ethicized’ from above.” 17 This is a point also emphasized by Nancy in Etre singulier pluriel [Being Singular Plural], who insists that Being and the Other are indissociable. Nancy notes that what Levinas names otherwise than Being must be viewed as that which is most proper to Being. 18 It is in this vein that Heidegger scholars argue that Heidegger’s thinking does not represent the forgetfulness of ethics, and the other is not “opposed” to Being, but the thought of Being itself allows for the development of an ontological ethics of responsibility.

The “original ethics” that Heidegger describes in “Brief über Den Humanismus,” finds its practical determination in Dasein’s very definition

14. AQE is dedicated, “To the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism.”
17. The Origins of Responsibility, 226.
18. [Etre singulier pluriel], 52, n. 1/trans. 199, n. 37.
as put forward in *Sein und Zeit*, because Dasein’s care for its own being always and already includes the care for the being of the other. We find here that, because of its authentic relation to its finitude, Dasein can let the other be in its own potentiality for being. The determination of Dasein as being-with leads Raffoul to claim that the ethicality of Heidegger’s thought of Being takes a central place, as implied in the relation to Being is implied “the relation to the other, to the other Dasein, to the other than Dasein, and to the otherness of Dasein.”¹⁹ Because Being is right from the beginning a relation with alterity, Raffoul finds that being-with is not an accidental phenomenon, but an irreducible feature of Dasein. He writes: “The ‘with’ is coextensive with being, so that the ethical is coextensive with the ontological.”²⁰

If it is the case that Being is always and already that what is different and beyond, what does it mean, to go beyond being, as Levinas wants to? And how can the thought of Levinas’s Other be different from or prior to Heidegger’s thought of Being, instead of being included in it? This is how Francoise Dastur puts the problem: “Do we really have to choose between Levinas, who asks us to contemplate the otherwise than Being, and Heidegger, who leads us to another way of thinking about Being?”²¹

In this book, I trace the complex and nuanced rapport between Heidegger and Levinas regarding their thinking on the relationship between truth and justice. I argue that, first of all, the issue at stake between the two thinkers is, despite Heidegger’s silence, and Levinas’s polemical tone, not simply one of “opposition.” In other words: Levinas’s articulation of ethical difference is not opposed to the thought of Being in Heidegger’s sense. Tracing the relation between truth and justice neither reveals a possibility nor a necessity of a choice between

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²⁰. *The Origins of Responsibility*, 206. A point also emphasised by Nancy in *Être singulier pluriel* [Being Singular Plural]. Nancy also insists that Being and the other are indissociable. Nancy finds that what Levinas names otherwise than Being must be understood as that which is most proper to Being. *Être singulier pluriel*, 52, n. 1/ trans. 199, n. 37).

Heidegger or Levinas, as suggested by commentators and as described above. Furthermore, portraying the relationship either from a Levinasian or a Heideggerian standpoint does not do justice to the fact that Levinas and Heidegger, in many ways, share a phenomenological heritage and a number of common influences: Kant, Hegel and Husserl, to mention the most important.

As I seek to show in this book, the truth of Being as articulated by Heidegger must be thought for the ethics of its justice in the Levinasian sense. This means that Levinas's ethics of the other person, who invokes the deployment of truth, and thus the history of philosophy, but who cannot be reduced to it, transforms the essence and task of this very history in its entirety, as it shifts the priority of philosophy from a search for truth as ultimate ground or principle to a modality of justice, which occurs in the realm of Being and its truth, yet cannot be reduced to it. This account of justice interrupts yet invokes Being and its truth, makes it possible while suspending its movement. Levinas's prioritization of justice over the truth of Being as understood by Heidegger implies, as this book seeks to demonstrate, that philosophy is no longer the deployment of truth, but answers to the call for justice. As a consequence, the task that philosophy calls for is no longer to think Being's truth, but the ethics of its justice.

The tracing of this relationship between truth and justice in the thought of Heidegger and Levinas takes as its point of departure Heidegger’s early work Sein und Zeit [Being and Time], published in 1927. The first chapter of this book consists of a critical engagement with Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology as articulated in Sein und Zeit. It is the aim of this chapter to clarify how and why a restating of the fundamental question of the history of philosophy—the question of the meaning of Being—is a necessity in order to think the question of truth in an explicit manner. I seek to show how and why this “new beginning” in the history of philosophy embraces the phenomenological method and takes Dasein, the human being for whom Being is an issue, as its point of departure. Furthermore, I seek to clarify how the existential analytic of Dasein reveals the primordial phenomenon of truth of which the traditional understanding of truth as affirmed by the history of philosophy is derived. An explication of finite temporality, temporalizing itself through Dasein, shows time to be the transcendental horizon for the question of the meaning of Being and reveals that in the temporalization of time, presence occurs, however, temporality itself cannot be reduced to the
present. It is in this realization that Dasein discloses its truth of existence, a truth that is always historical.

Although Levinas expresses his admiration for Heidegger’s thinking as articulated in *Sein und Zeit*, he nevertheless claims that a departure from the thinking of Being and its truth as found in Heidegger’s project is needed. The second chapter of this book seeks to discuss Levinas’s critical relation with Heidegger’s thought as found in his early works *De l’existence à l’existant* [Existence and Existents], “Martin Heidegger et l’ontologie [Martin Heidegger and Ontology],” “l’Ontologie est-elle fondamentale? [Is Ontology Fundamental?].” In this chapter I clarify that although Levinas’s departure from Heidegger’s thinking is not yet attached to an explicit metaphysics of ethical difference, he is already seeking for a meaning different from the meaning of Being and finds the originary signification of transcendence in the other person. I argue that the attempt to liberate beings from the meaning of Being as articulated by Heidegger is the first gesture in the direction of thinking ethics beyond Being. Therefore, I suggest that Levinas’s early works serve as a preparatory investigation, laying the foundation for an ethical metaphysics as radical transcendence in terms of a thinking directed toward justice through a relation with alterity.

In Levinas’s first major work *Totalité et infini* [Totality and Infinity], Levinas’s thinking concerning ethical difference is further developed and made explicit in terms of an ethical metaphysics as radical transcendence. In the third chapter of this book I seek to show how Levinas’s understanding of ethical transcendence constitutes a radical disruption of the history of metaphysics as represented by Hegel in his *Phénoménologie des Geistes* [Phenomenology of Spirit]. Moreover, I make clear how Levinas’s thinking initiates a rethinking of this history in order to reveal its unthought understood as ethical difference. This means that I seek to show why and how Levinas asserts the priority of justice over truth and its deployment through an elaboration on an alterity that remains irreducible to the domain of a Hegelian totality. As a consequence, Being is to be understood of time and sociality and is always and already fissured.

Since Levinas understands Being in this way, he is on the one hand very close to Heidegger, yet on the other hand, goes beyond him. This move beyond Heidegger is not be understood as only departing from Heidegger’s early thinking as articulated in *Sein und Zeit*, but also of his later works. It is therefore the aim of the fourth chapter to discuss the essays “Zeit und Sein [Time and Being],” “Brief über den
Humanismus [Letter on Humanism],” “Was Heißt Denken [What Is Called Thinking],” and “Der Weg zu Sprache [The Way to Language]” in order to explicate why and how Heidegger's search not only for the truth of the human being for whom Being is an issue, but the truth of Being itself, undermines the primacy of presence as affirmed in the history of philosophy in favor of a thinking of nearness in which man pertains to its essence as belonging to Being and standing in its truth. Furthermore, I will discuss why and how thinking serves as the place in which Being comes to language. In addition, I seek to clarify how for Heidegger, thinking Being is related to ethics, although it can no longer be designated by this name. Consequently, I seek to explain, with reference to the works of Jacques Derrida, why Levinas's criticisms concerning alterity and ethics of the history of philosophy, which includes Heidegger, might be misplaced.

It is the aim of the fifth chapter of this book to give an account of how and why Heidegger's thinking of Being is related to justice. More precisely, I will explain how Heidegger subordinates justice to Being. It is my intention to show the necessity of this subordination by discussing Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, as found in his Nietzsche lectures, which were published as Nietzsche's Metaphysik and Nietzsche's Lehre vom Willen zur Macht (both translated as Nietzsche Vol III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics). I show that it is problematic to put thinking of Being second, replacing its primacy for a notion of justice, because when justice is presented as the essence of the truth of Being, one ends up in oblivion of Being and a culmination of what Heidegger calls “metaphysical thinking.” Being’s truth remains concealed in this thinking and thus remains unthought. Furthermore, I will discuss Heidegger's “Identität und Differenz [Identity and Difference]” with the aim of clarifying that in order to think the truth of Being in an explicit manner, a revelation of the primordial essence of thinking is needed. This implies that thinking identity in terms of representation, as exemplified by Nietzsche, is derived from the primordial essence of thinking. In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss Heidegger's “Der Spruch des Anaximander [The Anaximander Fragment]” in order to clarify how for Heidegger the primordial essence of thinking implies a reversal of the relation between truth and justice as articulated by Nietzsche. This means for Heidegger, as I attempt to point out, that justice does not determine or circumscribe truth, but instead is understood as the law of Being, designating the donation of Being as presence, entity. I suggest
therefore that Heidegger assigns justice a second place in favor of thinking the event of Being and its truth.

In the sixth chapter of this book I will explain Levinas’s articulation of justice in relation to Being as found in his second major work Autrement qu’être ou au-delà l’essence and the essays “La trace de l’autre,” and “Diachronie et representation.” I make clear how Levinas reverses the relationship between Being and its truth as thought by Heidegger in the sense that Levinas’s thinking prioritizes justice over the truth of Being and shows that justice, unconditioned by Being, interrupts yet ensures Being. This thinking, however, does not imply a disagreement or renouncement of the truth of Being as thought by Heidegger. Rather, it changes the orientation of thinking and the task of philosophy: not to think the truth of Being, but the ethics of its justice.