From Logos and Muthos to . . .

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Logoi and Muthoi: Further Philosophical Essays in Greek Literature is a second volume of essays devoted to exploring philosophical themes in Greek literature. The first volume, Logos and Muthos: Philosophical Essays in Greek Literature, accomplished more (I hope) than to make the present title more or less inevitable. Its aim was to build on the now well-established recognition that the term pair logos/muthos is not equivalent to once common oppositions such as reason vs. myth or rational vs. irrational, while providing compelling alternatives to what once was called the Greek Miracle and the old opposition’s narrative of progress from benighted credulity to at least the dawning of some form of critical enlightenment.

Given that Logoi and Muthoi has the same goal as the first volume, it is worth repeating the more expansive statement of purpose from the first volume’s introduction:

The title conveys the collection’s two main intentions. First, not from muthos to logos, but logos and muthos, implying a whole range interactions, reactions, tensions and ambiguities arising between different forms of discourse. Scholarship in recent years has moved decisively beyond old assumptions of a simple progression from myth to reason, and the collection takes full advantage of that work. But the full emphasis of Logos and Muthos becomes apparent in the subtitle. All of the volume’s chapters explore philosophical dimensions of
literary authors—Homer, Hesiod and the Archaic poets, the tragic playwrights . . . figures and works not usually central to histories of ancient philosophy.

The purpose of the collection is not, then, to mount another challenge to the old opposition, or to search for the ‘beginnings of philosophy,’ or to seek anything like a comprehensive definition of myth. . . . Rather, it intends to consider philosophical issues and ideas as they arise from or can be applied to literary, usually poetic, texts, to muthoi in one sense of the Protean term.1

The present volume has the same aim: to consider philosophical themes and ideas in works not ordinarily included in the canon of Greek philosophical texts, both to shed light on canonical philosophical authors and also for their own sake. In this case, twelve essays are written by an entirely new list of contributors (the only exception being the editor’s contribution). Each contributor explores in some way what various and competing muthoi and logoi meant for those whose thought they shaped and who in turn shaped them and what they mean to us—the implications of a chosen form of writing, how influence and reception reached across what we mark as different genres, and what answers to these questions reveal about the nature of the ancient intellectual enterprise. Taken together, the essays offer new approaches to familiar texts and open up new possibilities for understanding the roles and relationships between muthos and logos in ancient Greek thought. A second volume is justified both by the philosophical richness of the works under consideration and by the hope that these further examples of philosophical scrutiny of texts and issues falling outside philosophy’s traditional purview will contribute in a meaningful way to the growing body of work that crosses current disciplinary boundaries in order to explore such connections. Which is another way to put the purpose of both volumes: to reinforce, at least implicitly, the recognition that current disciplinary boundaries are our own, and that much fruitful work remains to be done by crossing them.

Story vs. Argument

The Protean nature of myth provides a useful jumping off point. As is obvious from even a cursory survey of recent work in ancient philosophy,
the term ‘myth’ can be used in quite different senses by different scholars. Depending on how it is used, differences between *muthoi* and *logoi* range from weaker to stronger and from more precisely to less sharply defined. This does not mean that any and every approach to *muthos* and *logos* is valid—one could hardly reject the old opposition if that were the case. So while contributors to both this volume and its predecessor were allowed to operate with their own conceptions of *muthos* and *logos* rather than being asked to conform to a single governing sense, most identify a closer relationship between *muthos* and *logos* than the old opposition could ever have accommodated, and even when they do not, the exceptions recast the opposition in quite different terms.

Given the range in which the term ‘myth’ is used, it seems helpful to posit an initial definition of myth against which other senses can later be marked. A myth in this initial sense is a traditional story, involving personages (typically gods or heroes), formulated and handed down orally over many years, often by nameless creators and retellers, which is taken as true and authoritative by a large portion of a culture’s population. As such, a myth shapes and even defines that culture’s values and expectations, explaining and justifying features of the social and natural order that are taken to be essential, and may at the same time prescribe or imply structures and rituals that maintain and reinforce that order.

Given the conditions of their origin and transmission, key parts of the story are fixed, though other elements may show a remarkable degree of variation. When there is more than one version of a traditional story, one is not taken to refute the other, even though they are inconsistent from a logical point of view. Often, a culture’s governing mythology displays a strong syncretistic tendency to absorb conflicting accounts into a larger whole. Much of what is found in Homer and Hesiod originated as stories of this sort, so that the two poets are often taken (at least in textbooks on ancient philosophy) to represent a mythic way of thinking.

In contrast to myth in this sense, a *logos* is the result of a deliberate inquiry by a nameable individual (e.g., Anaximander, Heraclitus), involving forces and material entities rather than personages (*to apeiron*, fire). No part of a *logos* is fixed in that every element may be challenged, and where rival accounts are logically inconsistent with one another, at most only one can be true. Its authority therefore depends on its ability to refute rivals and supplant them by offering a more comprehensive explanation of a given set of phenomena. Rather than reinforcing cultural norms, a *logos* is often viewed as challenging them, directly or indirectly. The theories of the pre-Socratic philosophers are typically taken as *logoi*
in this sense, accounts deliberately formulated to contrast with traditional *muthoi* and in critical reaction to one another. Crucially, it is communicated in its authoritative form not orally but in writing, whether poetry or prose, so that only a small part of a population—primarily those who are literate—may be influenced by it.

The opposition between *logos* and *muthos* as defined in these ways has often seemed sharpest to scholars considering the origins of philosophy and science. How did the world come to be as it now is? What was the origin of human beings? What is thunder? Myths offered stories or tales to account for such things. Early rational thinkers, by contrast, formulated scientific accounts of nature based on evidence; indeed, the very concept of nature is said to be one of their chief discoveries. Put in this way, the roots of the old opposition go back at least as far as Aristotle. Despite a seemingly generous nod to lovers of myth at *Metaph.* 1.2, 982b18−19, Aristotle typically sought to reduce myth to *logos* by clarifying what he took mythologizing predecessors to have said obscurely (*Metaph.* XII.8, 1074a38−b14). Nor is Aristotle's attitude without its contemporary adherents. Thus, in a generally positive review of a recent collection of essays challenging the old opposition, the reviewer nevertheless insists on a fundamental difference between *muthos* and *logos* expressed in terms of story vs. argument. There is, he says, “a distinction between 'traditional' or ‘just so stories’ and rational expositions that can be checked, revised, and amended in a methodical way.”

Whether the distinction can be maintained in this way without question-begging or circularity is not the issue here. What is important is that, while scholars reject the old opposition and its simplistic narrative of progress, many seek to preserve some meaningful distinction between *muthos* as story on the one hand and *logos* on the other even if boundaries can be difficult to draw in practice. Much recent scholarship has sought to do so by identifying nascent “logical” or “rational” elements in mythologists on the one hand, and mythic holdovers and nonrational features in Milesian and other early cosmologies on the other. To what extent, for instance, does Hesiod’s account of the generation of the gods display rational or logically sequenced stages? What do early Greek thinkers like Thales and Anaximander retain from earlier creation myths, including Hesiod’s but also those of the Babylonians and Egyptians? This approach goes back to the groundbreaking work of Cornford. At least with regard to early theories of cosmology and natural science, work
on such questions has played a major role in undercutting any sharp opposition between logos and muthos even while striving to maintain a difference between the two concepts.14

Beyond Cosmology: Pedagogy and Authority

While the engagement by early natural philosophers with mythic accounts of the cosmos is important, a full treatment of the relationship between logos and muthos must include myth’s shaping of ancient Greece’s social, political, and moral realities. The influence exerted by traditional stories extended far beyond questions of origins, and led in at least one respect to the rhetoric of muthos vs. logos we still contend with.

If Plato’s claim that Homer was the teacher of the Greeks was decidedly ambivalent, it was nevertheless largely true, and was true in virtually every area of daily life, not just in accounts of natural phenomena. The poetic tradition was pedagogical, a point explicitly recognized by both Aristophanes and Plato. Greek poets, preeminently Homer and Hesiod, taught the Greeks how to be Greek—how to live, marry, worship, plant, trade, and die.15

At a minimum, ancient stories of origins carried multiple implications about the place of human beings in a world not of their making. This is clearly the case in Hesiod, whose account of the origin of the cosmos and the triumph of Zeus as its ruling deity is also an account of the origin of nomos and the human political community (see, e.g., Theogony 81–93). As such, it became an essential starting point for many later logoi, whether philosophical or otherwise.16

Besides what cosmologies may have implied, many traditional stories functioned as morally instructive in more direct ways. One immediately thinks of the lessons derived from destructive rage of Achilles, the dependency of both Odysseus and Telemachus on the support of others, and the courage of Priam.17 But stories did more than simply hold up positive and negative role models. Greeks growing up with Homer especially were exposed to rich explorations of moral dilemmas, problems of political authority, and the power and peril of language.18 Such stories provided instruction in ways that were subtle, complex, and pervasive.

Myth’s pedagogical function leads to a further dimension of the relationship between logos and muthos, namely a competition for authoritative
status. Already among the early poets a competition for honors and aristocratic patrons was apparent. Hesiod, for instance, claimed superiority over his rivals in virtue of the special quality of his inspiration from the Muses (Works and Days 646–63). With the emergence of philosophy and science other rivals arose, including philosophers, lawgivers, historians, and physicians, so that by the Archaic period, competition for authority became a conspicuous feature of the entire Greek intellectual landscape.19 Xenophanes, for instance, positions himself as a superior authority to his poetic predecessors both by contrasting his own sophie over those who celebrate athletic victors (B2) and by criticizing the moral impropriety of Homeric and Hesiodic stories.20

It was the competition for authority that gave rise to the rhetoric of muthos vs. logos in the first place. Greek culture, especially in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, was highly rhetorical, with both public debates and written controversies. The distinction between logos and muthos originated in the context of these debates as a rhetorical device used to gain points against a rival: so-and-so’s account was “merely” a muthos.21 From the perspective of competing pedagogical authorities, the relationship of logos and muthos is at least as oppositional as that pictured in the old narrative.

The rivalry between competing authorities was often reflected in the deployment of literary form. Plato made his character Protagoras treat the difference between logos and muthos as a matter of mere form, willing to choose one over the other according to the preferences of his audience (Protagoras 320C). But for Plato himself and many other Greek intellectuals, the form employed represented a choice. The form in which a thinker expressed his ideas carried direct implications for one’s claim to authority within a tradition or as a rival to it, pointing at the same time to the identity of one’s intended audience. Plato’s deliberate construction of myth in the dialogues will be treated in the final section of this introduction; two seemingly opposite strategies of deployment can be mentioned here. One thinker might adopt epic meter in order to assume the mantle of authority conveyed by that form and to speak to an audience versed in its subtle cues, even as he sought to undercut or contradict the authority of his poetic forebears.22 Another thinker targeting a different audience might signal a new authority by rejecting the epic form altogether.23 In other words, the use by a thinker of one form of writing over another may reflect a deliberate stance with regard to authoritative muthoi.
Reception and Revision

A worldview based in muthos did not suddenly wither away with arrival of the logoi of Anaximander, Anaxagoras, or Aristotle. No doubt many Greeks continued to adhere to the more irrational elements of myth—Euthyphro and Strepsiades must have had many real-world counterparts. But for the population as a whole, including the intellectuals, muthos remained a constant presence, permeating Greek culture and society in civic and religious observations, in public and private art, and in theater.24 Myths of all sorts—local or Pan-Hellenic, cosmogonic/cosmological, those with a more or a less direct pedagogical import—became material to be contended with and material for reworking. As noted above, Hesiod and Homer already show signs of deliberately manipulating mythic materials to suit their purposes. By the classical period, dealing with the mass of story and legend could not be avoided by any serious thinker. The question of reception became urgent.

Properly understood, ‘reception’ pertains to how materials from one culture or period are incorporated into and appropriated by a later one. One can certainly say that the emergence of the polis created a very different cultural reality from that in which Greek myths arose. Viewed in this light, the question of reception underlies every issue raised in this and the previous volume.25 But even for the intellectual elite, reception did not mean rejection. Much of what critical thinkers encountered was at least on its surface unsystematic and contradictory. But the task they assumed was not primarily one of making myth consistent. It would be better to say that intellectual elites began to reorient themselves toward both the content and the forms of expression of myth.

Many mythic assumptions were never abandoned even by the intellectuals. The limits of human knowledge and existence, for instance, were always understood within the framework of the distance between mortals and the gods.26 We have already seen that the stories of Hesiod and especially Homer exerted a profound influence on early moral psychology. Their continuing influence was felt just as strongly in later moral philosophy. Ethical terminology employed by Homer and Hesiod persisted and continued to give shape to later debates about values even as the authority of these two foundational poets came increasingly to be questioned.27 So too in theater, where tragic playwrights worked to adapt traditional stories to new conditions of civic engagement in the polis. The playwright Sophocles serves as an especially apt illustration of
this aspect of reception. As several contributors to this and the previous
volume show, he takes over traditional stories to turn them into powerful
parables of the realities of his own Athens as he saw them. Equally
important are continuities of formal expression: the epic cadences of
Homer and Hesiod and the gnomic utterances of the oracle at Delphi
provided familiar forms to express various ponderous topics, persisting
in essential ways in philosophers, playwrights, and others, along with a
continued emphasis on public display and performance. Such continuities
count as some of the strongest evidence against the old narrative of a
displacement of μυθος by λόγος. In its place, one can recognize a selective
incorporation, revision, and appropriation of mythic elements into larger
schemes by its many and various inheritors.

Myth as Narrative Construction

Incorporation and appropriation lead to a final sense of myth, a sense
that takes us altogether beyond myth as traditional story. In this sense,
a myth is a fictional narrative deliberately created by a single author. It
may or may not incorporate traditional elements. It may make up an
entire work or appear as an episode within a larger whole. Though a
myth of this sort shares many elements with myth as traditional story,
the ground has shifted. Μυθος becomes compatible with λόγος, though
with the gain (or perhaps at the cost) of making it subordinate to the
rational purposes of a given author. Crucially, a myth in this sense is
meant by its creator to be recognized as literally false.

This is a sense of myth employed frequently—though sometimes
carelessly—in speaking of myth in Plato. In contrast to those who
handed down traditional stories, Plato created “myths” consciously and
deliberately, sometimes incorporating old elements into a story of his
own devising, but in other cases composing his myths out of whole
cloth. More precisely, Plato constructed myths. Plato is not, of course,
the first or only ancient author for whom this sense of myth is relevant,
and both why Plato chose to employ myth and the nature and variety
of his mythmaking raise questions that fall outside the scope of this
volume. But this much can be said. Some of the myths Plato created
were cosmological, others were moral, political, or eschatological; often
these purposes were served simultaneously by a single mythic construc-

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Many of Plato's myths were, it seems, constructed to appeal to an interlocutor—and by extension, to a reader—for whom muthos might hold rather more appeal than logos. Not all of Plato's myths were given to Plato's Socrates—some were put in the mouths of characters such as Protagoras or Aristophanes. Indeed, in the sense of myth as a deliberately created fiction, every Platonic dialogue is itself a myth. Further, both Plato and his readers knew his stories were literally false (with the unfortunate exception of those hermeneutically hopeless hunters for the "lost" continent of Atlantis). This is another contrast with those who transmitted traditional stories, who did so because they regarded those stories as true. One could add that, unlike traditional stories, myths in this sense were from their inception written down and were therefore not dependent on oral transmission, regardless of traces of oral culture and performance they may retain.

Finally, myth as a narrative construction offers a possible advantage over argument. The advantage—though it might not seem so to anyone insisting on analytic clarity—might be called narrative indeterminacy. A narrative, unlike deductive argument, may have the posing of a question as its primary aim. It may, in other words, be constructed so as to pose moral and philosophical questions and dilemmas while deliberately leaving them unresolved. This seems especially relevant to the tragic poets. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides couch their arguments in what particular characters say over the course of an unfolding story. In reading their plays, one must be prepared for the posing of incompatible options without any final resolution, or a surface meaning undercut by the dramatic action. Euripides in particular staged sophistically inspired debates as integral parts of his dramas—imbedding logoi within his muthoi, as it were—while leaving them without clear resolution. The construction of muthoi containing logoi points to how sophisticated the relationship between the two became and how carefully any account of them must proceed.

Here one should recall that the deliberate posing of questions and quandaries without resolution has many parallels in ancient philosophers. There are the shorter Socratic dialogues, which typically end with Socrates (though perhaps not Plato) in aporia. There are the aphorisms of Heraclitus, the paradoxes of Zeno, the inconclusiveness of Metaphysics Zeta, and the arguments leading to a suspension of belief in Pyrrho. All have been taken to intend a deliberate lack of resolution. An indeterminate
outcome or ambiguous resolution is in fact common in both narrative and nonnarrative contexts, and so may count as a final, profound continuity with mythic forms of expression.

What I hope this introduction has made sufficiently clear is that though the old opposition is deservedly cast aside, useful distinctions between logos and muthos can still be made, and indeed must be made if the full extent of their ancient interactions are to be understood. But those distinctions are multiple; no one way of distinguishing between logos and muthos is adequate. By making and refining such distinctions, the old progressive narrative of an almost miraculous progress from irrational myth to rational philosophy can be replaced with more nuanced accounts of various and varied interactions. To provide several compelling examples of such accounts is the ultimate purpose of this volume.38

Notes


2. An excellent brief but wide-ranging survey of contemporary approaches to myth in fields ranging from psychology, sociology, science, and philosophy to religion is provided by Segal 2004. Greek myth is “anatomized” into three chronological stages in Herron 2017, with an amusing riff on myths as Protean on page 1.

3. The opposition of logos to muthos was probably formulated in its sharpest terms in Nestle 1940, a book Most 1999b, 31 calls “astonishingly influential” despite its weaknesses and racist undertones. The Greek Miracle is a phrase often attributed to John Burnet in his Early Greek Philosophy (e.g., in Waterfield 2018, 69), but I cannot find it in any of the book’s four editions. (A miraculous appearance of philosophy is spoken of by Frankel 1962/1973, 255.) Burnet does say “a new thing came into the world with the early Ionian teachers” (Burnet 1930, v), a claim with which many later scholars would agree, even as they all deny the miraculous origins of whatever that was. A Greek miracle was first spoken of with a quite different intent in the nineteenth century by the French linguist Ernest Ronan; see the illuminating history in Laks 2018, 54ff; and also note 13 below. It is worth remembering that Burnet was himself working to discredit two former orthodoxies few modern scholars would wish to revert to: a Hegelian reading of the history of the ancient thought on the one hand, and a Christian Apologist reading that denied Greek originality by
attributing essentials of Greek thought to a “Mosiac philosophy” on the other. Finally, I would note that the phrase “Greek miracle” persists in publications aimed at a more popular audience, e.g., in the title for the catalog of an exhibit of Greek sculpture staged in the first flush of optimism after the fall of Communism that celebrated the birth of humanism and democracy: Buitron-Oliver 1992. The New York Times review of the exhibit in its Metropolitan Museum incarnation (March 12, 1993) heaps scorn on its “jingoistic promotional title.”

4. In what follows I shall speak of the essays as broadly genetic, complementary, synthetic, or competing with regard to the relationship they identify between logoi and muthoi, recognizing that more than one label may be applicable (I thank one of the publisher’s anonymous referees for the terms used in these comparisons). I should also note that the wide range of figures and themes covered in the essays makes more than one ordering of the volume’s contents possible. The arrangement here is loosely chronological, based on the earliest figure mentioned (e.g., Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles) or on the figure who is an essay’s main focus (e.g., Anaximander, Aristotle).

5. The definition is my own, based on definitions—and cautions about offering any single comprehensive definition—in Segal 2004, 4–6; Burkert 1979, 1–34; and Kirk 1974, 13–29.

6. Less important here is that a traditional story is a narrative. While traditional stories are narratives, that is not what makes them traditional. The final section of the introduction will consider myth as narrative in a sense quite different from that of a traditional story.

7. As Kirk puts it, a story has “succeeded in becoming traditional” (Kirk 1974, 27; his emphasis).

8. The tendency to identify myths with the poems that contained them and therefore to view the poets as mythmakers was widespread in ancient Greece; see Herron 2017, 4. Already in both poets, however, one can see a movement beyond the simple retelling of traditional stories toward sophisticated manipulations of mythic materials. We shall return to this point in a later section.

9. One should not fail to notice, however, that the syncretism evident in traditional stories springs from a felt need for a kind of consistency, even if not that of the philosopher.

10. Burnet, for instance, consistently speaks of the origins of science and "scientific men."

11. Aristotle harshly dismisses Hesiod’s mythical subtleties at Metaph. III.4, 1000a11–20. For a more accommodative view of myth in Aristotle, see Johansen 1999. Plato could be just as critical of his poetic predecessors, especially in their capacity as educators, but unlike Aristotle he gives mythmaking an important place in the philosopher’s toolkit. The very different sense of myth spoken of in connection with Plato’s philosophical practice is considered in the final section of the introduction.
12. Mansfeld 2000, 343. And though I hesitate to mention it, a more recent book operates fully—though hardly competently—within the framework of the old opposition (though without citing Nestle, Cornford, or indeed many other important parties to the debate). For a review of this curious effort, see Wians 2016.


14. A version of this strategy is pursued by several contributors to this volume, who trace genetic continuities between myth and the non-mythic accounts that emerged from them. Thus, Robert Hahn shows how a rational approach to nature emerged through a process of trial and error as Anaximander and others worked to develop a new and more rational calendar out of a problem already posed in mythic accounts of the cosmos. Luc Brisson uses an explicit genetic metaphor, saying that philosophy grew out of “the loam of tradition.” Examining mythic accounts of the origins of human beings, Brisson shows that humans in Greek myth are not the product of an intentional creative act but the distant result of a process that originates in chaos, in contrast to the myths of the origins of human beings in Genesis. For both Hahn and Brisson, a recognizable philosophical stance emerges out of a progressive engagement with mythic predecessors rather than as a discontinuous break marked by unwitting holdovers or partial anticipations.

15. The many ways in which the poems of Homer and Hesiod were didactic are detailed in Herron 2017, chapter 1, and how they came to be authoritative in his chapter 2.

16. Brisson’s genetic account makes precisely this point: the origin of the human condition as described in Greek myth had fundamental ethical consequences, demanding “that the place of human being be defined, on the one hand with regard to the gods, and on the other with regard to animals.” Lawrence S. Hatab, in a hybrid genetic/competitive account, traces similar consequences for human existence arising from Hesiod’s creation story to the tragic values that figure prominently in Sophocles. Similarly, Most 1999a, 343–44 points to the importance and magnitude of their themes for the fundamental conditions of human existence.

17. In the first part of his essay, William Wians shows how the catalogue of ships in *Iliad* 2 subtly draws attention to the withdrawal of Achilles and so prefigures the moral consequences of his destructive rage. Concentrating on *Odyssey* 1–8, Kevin Robb offers a complementary account that shows how the stories of Odysseus and Telemachus taught the values of *hiketeia* and *xenia*. Marjolein Oele shows how the suffering of Priam in *Iliad* books 22 and 24 provided a paradigm of courage arising out of the universal emotions of fear and hope.
20. According to Wians, Xenophanes reveals the competitive nature of his claim to poetic authority by developing a morally motivated logical criticism: mythic cosmological accounts must be wrong, because they attribute shameful actions to divine beings, even as he insists that any account of the gods must fall short of “clear knowledge.”
21. On the rhetorical dimension of *logos* vs. *muthos* as part of the larger competitive intellectual landscape, the work of Geoffrey Lloyd stands out. See, for example, Lloyd 1987, and Lloyd 1999, 154–55.
22. Xenophanes’s criticism of his poetic predecessors from within the poetic tradition has already been mentioned. Most 1999a, 335 makes the same point more broadly, taking in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. In his far-ranging essay in this volume exploring how poetry and philosophy may coexist in a few exceptionally rich texts, Long argues that Parmenides deliberately chose poetic hexameter rather than prose to marginalize his poetic predecessors through a parody of traditional epic style and diction. For a different account of how poetry and philosophy function together in the poem of Parmenides, see Rose Cherubin in the first Logos/Muthos volume. She, like Long, sees the use of poetry by Parmenides as much more than window dressing, transforming the poet’s traditional duty to promulgate *aletheia*.
23. Hahn’s genetic account considers the choice of prose by Anaximander from this perspective.
24. On the pervasive presence of myth in Greek life and thought, see Buxton 1994.
25. In the first *Logos and Muthos*, Catherine Collobert explores three types of philosophical receptions of Homer, one that finds an implicit philosophy in Homer, a second that finds the grounds for a philosophy, the third that investigates the supposed intentions of the poet; Ramona Naddaff traces the permutating image of Helen, who as an Everywoman is always an object of desire and so is never herself, from its first presentation in Homer, through revisions in Sappho, Gorgias, and Euripides.
26. Oele, for instance, shows how the depiction of suffering and courage in the *Iliad* provides a lesson in human finitude, a point reinforced by reference to hope in Hesiod and Aeschylus, particularly in its deceptive form. In the first Logos/Muthos collection, James Lesher shows how the earlier poets were always mindful of the admonition to “think human things”; William Wians in his paper in that collection shows how the *Agamemnon* probes the limits of human as opposed to divine knowledge; C. D. C. Reeve shows the persistence in Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles of the tragic wisdom that recognizes the inescapable vulnerability of human virtue.
27. Robb lays particular emphasis on how Homeric emotive language displayed in quasi-formulaic moral words and phrases became the source for later ethical terminology. Hatab shows how the tragic values in Sophocles had their origins in Homer and Hesiod. In the first Logos volume, Fred Miller, Jr. expresses this as the challenge posed by Homeric psychology.

28. In addition to Hatab’s study of tragic values just mentioned, Marina Marren underlines the relevance of tyranny of Oedipus for Sophocles’s Athens. Through the image of a character who combines being and seeming and conflates *muthos* to *logos*, the playwright spurs a sophisticated fifth century imperial audience to reflect on the necessary role of *muthoi* in their own lives and in the life of their city. Roslyn Weiss shows how Sophocles’s depiction of Antigone builds on the self-righteous, single-minded persona of the Homeric hero, with all of its contradictions, consequences, and ambiguities, and then how many of these same traits are practically reversed in the depiction of Socrates in the *Apology* in his service to Athens. In the first Logos volume, Sara Brill argues that Aeschylus crafted a similar adaptation of a suppliant story appropriate for the justification of authority in democratic Athens.

29. Ruby Blondell makes a special point of the importance of public performance, even as a background for written argument. She traces out a complicated pattern of reaction, revision, and incorporation of the “divine defense” of Helen as found in Homer, Gorgias, and Euripides by picturing each defense being delivered publicly in fifth-century Athens. In the first volume, P. Christopher Smith argued for a rejection of abstract philosophical *logos* in favor of the lived communication of sung poetic speech through an analysis of Cassandra’s remarkable speech in the *Agamemnon*.

30. Two papers explore the persistence of mythic elements in Plato. Marina McCoy examines Plato’s manipulation of earlier material from Homer, Hesiod, and Herodotus in the story of Gyges that opens *Republic* II, while Pierre Destréé shows how the myth of Er critically incorporates and revises the *Nekuia* from *Odyssey* 11 (along with one of Pindar’s odes). The phrase “Plato the mythmaker” becomes the title of Brisson 1994/1999.

31. See here Collobert, Destrée, and Gonzalez 2012, which both in its introduction and in several contributed papers carefully delineates the sense in which one may speak of myth in Plato.

32. Destrée sees the myth of Er as a final appeal to the *thumos* of the still poetry-loving Glaucon, and claims more generally that Plato intends by his myths to provide the deep persuasion and forceful motivation that can be provided only by engaging both reasoning and the emotions (Long makes the same point about Plato’s writing style generally). McCoy argues that, through the use of *muthos* in *Republic* II, Plato gives his audience a way to identify mimetically with the shepherd Gyges and to explore their reactions to his actions as a means to self-knowledge.
33. The *eikôs muthos* Plato has delivered by Timaeus should be put in a different category, as it is not challenged or undercut as are the myths of Protagoras and Aristophanes.

34. Hatab, for instance, calls the *Republic* as a whole “essentially an anti-tragic muthos.”

35. The literal and recognized falsity of myths takes us back to the possibility of allegorical intent and a corresponding need for allegorical interpretation, a strategy Plato has Socrates refer to and dismiss with reference to the abduction of Oreithuia by Boreas at *Phaedrus* 229B–E. Such interpretations were motivated by a desire to “save” myths by reducing them to a nonnarrative, rational level. Properly interpreted, it was believed that *muthoi* were not in all cases incompatible with *logoi*, so long as myth submits to supposedly rational constraints. Gerard Naddaf devotes his contribution in volume one to the use of allegory as a rational attempt to save myth.

36. Weiss’s analysis of the *Antigone* shows how the playwright raises without necessarily answering a host of questions about the heroine and her motivations—Is Antigone genuinely pious? Is she truly loving? Is her single-minded commitment to her cause meant to be admirable?—with how we are to respond to this larger-than-life character left unclear. Marren emphasizes that the failure of Oedipus to gain self-knowledge can perhaps best be appreciated by interpreters who begin with the ambiguities of the play in performance. In Euripides’s *Trojan Women*, Blondell finds the dramatic action undercutting Helen’s speech in her own defense, in which Helen claims to be blameless. In the first volume, Paul Woodruff uses the enigmatic action of the plays of Sophocles to reveal a profound reverence for the gods that at the same time expresses a new humanism in the face of divine silence.

37. This is the theme of Michael Davis’s paper in volume 1, which explores the seemingly disjointed structure of the *Helen*, the action of which depends on perpetually challenging what characters believe they see and recognize.

38. I want to thank SUNY Press’s two anonymous reviewers for their extensive comments and many helpful suggestions, and Larry Hatab for saving me from an embarrassing error.