Editor’s Introduction

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This collection was convened to mark, via scholarly engagement with some of its key concerns, the incredible career of the prolific, pioneering, and wide-ranging scholar Fred Dallmayr. It was spurred by the milestone of Dallmayr’s ninetieth birthday on October 18, 2018. Dallmayr has been an active scholar for more than fifty years. During that half-century, he has published about thirty books. He has edited or coedited another seventeen. He has published more than 130 book chapters and about 190 journal articles. Just as, if not more, remarkable than this profuse output is the range of topics he masters. Dallmayr’s research interests range across modern and contemporary political theory and include some of the most formidable and theoretically demanding figures and movements within that: Heidegger, Hegel, hermeneutics, phenomenology, Frankfurt School writers (Adorno and Habermas), continental political thought (Derrida, Foucault, Ricoeur), democratic theory, multiculturalism, environmentalism, cosmopolitanism, comparative political thought, and non-Western political thought. His work on non-Western political thought encompasses Chinese political thought, Islamic political thought, Indian political thought, Latin American political thought, and Buddhist political thought. In fitting tribute to and reflection of the interdisciplinary and international character of Dallmayr’s scholarship, the twelve contributors come from an array of disciplines and countries.

In “Philosophy of Hope,” Edward Demenchonok observes, as do so many of Dallmayr’s commentators, how deeply and sensitively his philosophical work engages with manifold pressing contemporary social, ethical,
and political problems across the globe. But Demenchonok’s chapter also highlights Dallmayr’s efforts to change the ways in which philosophy is done in order to grapple with those challenges. He characterizes Dallmayr’s work as “dialogic, intercultural and cosmopolitan . . . invok[ing] religious, spiritual, and ethical resources for positive global transformations” (12). His chapter draws out Martin Heidegger’s influences on Dallmayr’s distinctive philosophical approach, accentuating the deep respect for the individual and her agency that lie at the core of the Heideggerian approach. (Which is not, of course, to suggest that Heidegger is the only source for the regard for the individual and her agency that marks Dallmayr’s thought.) This focus on agency in turn opens up new vistas for positive and innovative action, inspired by care, to address urgent contemporary problems. In unfolding Heidegger’s legacy for Dallmayr, Demenchonok also highlights Dallmayr’s distinctive reading of Heidegger. He then goes on to underscore the central and multifaceted role that dialogue plays in Dallmayr’s philosophical work. Dallmayr’s dialogical engagement with many different cultural and religious traditions has, in turn, enabled him to elicit a convergent concern with the Heideggerian notion of care for the world from many of them. Demenchonok’s chapter culminates in a discussion of Dallmayr’s signature brand of cosmopolitanism, which convenes such concepts as care, being in the world, world maintenance, relationality, democracy as relational praxis, and spirituality.

Exploring “Fred Dallmayr’s Spiritual Cosmopolitanism,” Richard Falk effectively echoes Demenchonok’s appreciation of the wide and deep reach of Dallmayr’s philosophy and its continuous engagement with such practical issues as nuclear war, climate degradation, and growing socioeconomic inequalities within and across nations. And like Demenchonok, Falk provides a synoptic overview of Dallmayr’s work. Although he believes it to be powerfully motivated by emancipatory intent, Falk also poses some questions about how realistic or realizable Dallmayr’s elevated vision of the future is. He concludes that light and dark, optimism and pessimism, are equal but dueling dynamics in Dallmayr’s assessment of the global situation. And Dallmayr readily acknowledges that the quest for a better future is bound to take place within an ambience of uncertainty. But to nourish the hopeful side of Dallmayr’s outlook we find his writings peppered with positive examples of action for change from such historical figures as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama, and Pope Francis. Whereas Demenchonok imputes to Dallmayr a “philosophy of hope,” Falk effectively calls attention to a complementary praxis of hope. Falk also points to the
ways in which Dallmayr's cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on humanity's wholeness and solidarity, stands against the regressive nationalism and xenophobia currently in evidence in too many countries. A globalization that has liberated capital flows across national borders, either to the neglect or the detriment of the well-being of many, must be kept in mind when explaining this regression to a defensive and nasty nationalism. Falk imputes to Dallmayr a spiritual cosmopolitanism but, as much as Demenchonok, he insists on the dialogical nature of Dallmayr's cosmopolitanism. And while Falk also agrees with Demenchonok about Heidegger's seminal role in shaping Dallmayr's perspective, he also shines a light on the influence of American philosopher John Dewey and in particular his insistence that democracy is an ethical, as much as it is a political, conception. Dallmayr claims that he came late to Dewey's work, but when he got there found “a rich source of political reflection.”

This Dewey-inspired ethical approach to democracy is taken up by Sungmoon Kim's chapter, “Anticipating Ethical Democracy in East Asia.” As Kim insightfully points out, Dallmayr adduces a view of democracy that is not structured by the binary oppositions that dominate contemporary political theory. Dallmayr's approach is therefore neither individualist nor communitarian, elitist nor populist, secular nor religious. Kim briefly surveys these reigning approaches, eliciting the problems in each from Dallmayr's perspective. Kim also provides a succinct but compelling account of the attractions of the Deweyan alternative. Dallmayr's understanding of democracy is, moreover, informed by non-Western as much as by Western theories and practices. And just as his work has been significantly shaped by non-Western sources, so Kim puts Dallmayr's thought to work in evaluating some recent attempts to develop a Confucian form of democracy for East Asia. Surveying briefly some of the political appropriations of Confucianism currently on offer, Kim concludes that none satisfies Dallmayr's definition of democracy because in addition to being, or perhaps because they are, too elite-focused, they neglect Confucianism's capacity for self-transformation through openness to non-Confucian traditions. Whatever progress has been made so far in these directions, an ethical Confucian democracy remains a democracy to come.

The ethical resources contained within the Confucian tradition are also the subject of Chenyang Li's reflections. In “Toward a Mega-Humanism: Confucian Triadic Harmony for the Anthropocene,” Li insists that when it comes to the environment, we live in a brand-new epoch. This new epoch calls, in turn, for a new form of humanism. The Anthropocene
thus provides a generative context for rethinking the possibility of a new humanism, for which Li borrows the term “mega-humanism.” In this new variant, humanity is accorded substantial value and status, as is the case with all humanisms, but humanity’s unrivaled capacity to do both harm and good is also acknowledged. This recognition brings in its wake a deep sense of responsibility rather than of entitlement. This new humanism must promote well-being, prosperity, and harmony for all while synthesizing two key themes. First, it must reflect a productive and effective response to environmental challenges. Second, it must have cultural roots. Even a humanism with a universal character needs to connect with particular cultural traditions. Li proposes that the Confucian philosophy of the triadic harmony of Heaven-Earth-Humanity provides a departure point for a humanist philosophy suitable for the Anthropocene. It accords a significant creative role to humanity while recognizing human entwinement with both heaven and earth. However, Li is clear that this new humanism could not be exclusively Confucian: its proponents do not have to accept an entire Confucian metaphysic. Indeed, this new humanism will be more viable if those proponents can find its philosophical foundations in their respective cultural traditions.

In his reflections on the problems of secularism, Ronald Beiner brings Dallmayr’s ideas about the appropriate relationship between religion and politics into conversation with those of John Rawls and Charles Taylor. Beiner stimulates this conversation by outlining the Rawlsian compromise, which places limits on the ways in which any comprehensive doctrine—religious or not—can be brought into the public sphere. The aim here is, of course, state neutrality, so that no citizens are discriminated against because of their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. But as Beiner insists, the liberal state cannot be neutral about certain fundamental liberal values such as citizen equality, liberty, reciprocity, and so on. Conceptions of the good might be buried within, but they are never thoroughly banished by, political norms. So although Beiner agrees with Rawls that no citizen should be able to impose his or her religious beliefs on any other, he does not accept that Rawls has found the most effective way to convey this commitment to citizen liberty and equality. Underscoring the moral commitments that underlie and inform liberal citizenship in this way is for Beiner in part a legacy of the liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s, and in particular the contributions to that debate by Taylor. For this reason, Beiner is surprised by Taylor’s Rawlsian turn when it comes to thinking about the right relationship between religion and politics. Beiner is also dismayed by this turn because
of the inadequacies he perceives in Rawls's treatment of the question. Yet the unexpected, and for Beiner unwelcome, convergences between Rawls and Taylor on this question serve to highlight the distinctiveness of Dallmayr's contribution to this conversation. Dallmayr joins Rawls and Taylor in their commitments to religious liberty, citizen equality, and repudiation of any form of theocentrism. But Dallmayr does not expel comprehensive doctrines from the domain of the political. Inspired by the work of Raimon Panikkar, Dallmayr eschews binaries of the spiritual and the political, the sacred and the secular, the immanent and the transcendent, the human and the divine in this domain. No matter how admirable Dallmayr's more inclusive and synthetic vision might be, Beiner articulates the secularist fear of an unintended theocratic potential of such collapsed dichotomies. Such fear of religious domination has, after all, been the bête noire of the liberal tradition since its inception in the seventeenth century.

Herta Nagl-Docekal's engagement with Dallmayr's work also takes place on the terrain of Western political theory. “Between Berlin and Königsberg: Toward a Global Community of Well-Disposed Human Beings” takes up one of the problems Dallmayr has long wrestled with, which she characterizes as “the inner tension of the modern world” (83). This refers to the erosion of community and social ties in the pursuit of individualism—either in terms of rights protection or economic interests. She reminds us that in Hegel, Dallmayr (like Charles Taylor) found a fecund resource for addressing these questions and for the possibility of mediating between the individual and her community in a way that respects the individual and her liberty while also countering atomism without taking recourse to premodern nostalgia. Picking up on a positive but passing remark from Dallmayr, Nagl-Docekal sets out to show that Kant is also a highly valuable resource for imagining a truly human, cosmopolitan, ethical community. She maintains that authors within the orbit of the Frankfurt School, such as Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Rainer Forst, remain wedded to a concept of morality that is tied to contractualist logic, whether they realize this or not. The underlying vision seems to be one of individuals in conflict who resolve their differences via contractual means. Yet this dominant image of colliding individuals contracting their social relations is untrue to our experience. Nagl-Docekal advocates a return to Kant for clearer guidance on these questions, with particular attention to the concepts surrounding his idea of a universal ethical community. As Kant points out, a contractualist approach to morality can gain little traction on the all-important internal perspective of the agent. In this vein, he also reminds us of the power of conscience in guiding or
constraining action. Cultivating an awareness of how our actions might affect others is also key, and it is especially important to ascertain when those others need help and support. In this context, the duty to assist might fall unequally. But for Kant, reciprocity is a long-term social goal, not a short-term calculation determining whether I should help others. In short, Nagl-Docekal strives to demonstrate that solidarity is very much a Kantian good, and that his manner of theorizing this, while also entrenching a commitment to moral individualism, remains valuable today. She thus offers a friendly corrective to Dallmayr’s view of Kant, which although respectful and admiring of the accent on duty, remains frustrated by “Kant’s division between inner and outer domains and the insufficient attention . . . to the cultivation of dispositions needed for the performance of duty.”

The quest for a humanist, cosmopolitan ethos also lies at the heart of Asma Afsaruddin’s chapter, but she traces its lineaments in the Islamic tradition, with particular emphasis on the value accorded to knowledge and education therein. Afsaruddin briefly maps the social and institutional history of some key educational institutions in the first five centuries of Islam—viz. from the seventh to the eleventh centuries of the Common Era. She outlines a typical Madrasa curriculum, with the caveat that the personal proclivities of the instructors also shaped the learning students received. As this intimates, Afsaruddin’s survey of Islamic education remains cognizant of more than just the formal public institutions and practices and stated programs of learning, striving, where possible, to acknowledge its more informal and unstructured sources. She also recognizes the role of female educators and students in this tradition. Quite early in this period we witness Islamic interest in Greek, Persian, and Indian learning, with some of the seminal texts from these traditions being translated into Arabic so as to foster their wider dissemination. Just as the Christian tradition did, so Muslim scholars had to struggle to assimilate so-called pagan Greek learning into their own monotheistic outlook. As a consequence of such exposure to non-Islamic cultures and traditions, a more cosmopolitan multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious Islamic identity became available. Afsaruddin also discerns the evolution of a specifically Islamic humanism based on the concept of adab, defined as “the total educational system of a cultured Muslim who took the whole world for his object of curiosity and knowledge” (105). This period gave birth to a diversity of humanistic strands—philosophical, intellectual, literary, religious, legalistic—within Islam. Afsaruddin concludes that “[a]t its best and most confident, medieval Islamic civilization came the
closest to the modern conception of a vibrantly diverse, multicultural, and tolerant society as was possible in the premodern period” (107).

Ahmet Okumuş’s chapter also focuses on the Islamic tradition, taking the idea of the political regime from Plato and Aristotle and seeing if it has any traction within the Islamic tradition. The regime refers to the entire form of the shared life of a people, and so includes but goes beyond its political structure. As Okumuş explains it, “A regime serves as an ethical framework, facilitates ethical formation, and is thus a context of habituation into a form of life guiding and guided by its characteristic set of excellences” (116). The breadth and significance of the idea of the regime has, according to Leo Strauss, been eclipsed by the modern Western social sciences, and so turning to the Islamic tradition, which has been untouched by those developments, seems fruitful. Dallmayr himself draws attention to the value of the classical idea of the regime and laments that it has been somewhat forgotten in modern Western scholarship about democracy. He discerns, however, a sub-tradition within this scholarship that has kept the importance of the idea of the regime alive. At first blush it appears that there is no equivalent to the idea of the regime in the Islamic tradition of political thought. The prominent role that sharia, or revealed law, has played in Muslim thinking about politics could perhaps explain this because it is believed that sharia would give rise to, and sustain, authentic justice. The candidate for Islamic political thinker most likely to harbor some conception of the regime is Al Farabi, writing in tenth-century Baghdad, who coined the term for political philosophy in Arabic. Okumuş does indeed detect some evidence for a version of the idea of the regime in his work, particularly with regard to his attention to “mores, customs, and the ethical dispositions prevailing in different cities” (115). He concludes his inquiry into “Where to Explore the Political in Islamic Political Thought” with some reflections on how past thinking can invigorate the present.

Just as Afsaruddin writes of the exposure that Islamic scholars had to non-Muslim traditions, so Michiko Yusa recounts a later encounter by the Christian thinker Nicholas of Cusa with a Latin translation of the Koran in the fifteenth century. She contends that this opening to a world of new, diverse, and vibrant ideas informed the development of his concept of learned ignorance, which encapsulates a humble and respectful awareness of the limits of human knowledge. Coming to accept this important concept allows humans to “intuit the reality of the living universe” (129). Yusa goes on to compare this idea with Dōgen’s belief that some things remain
beyond knowledge. Dogen was a thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master whose dialogue between a monk and a Zen master about the relationship between thinking, non-thinking, and beyond thinking has been interpreted in a number of different ways by scholars. Yusa further compares these ideas with Nishida Kitarō’s insistence that there is always something that remains beyond the reach of the knowable. Nishida wrote in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yusa’s chapter demonstrates from these three cases a cross-cultural convergence on the tension between the ineffable and that which can be said (or the apophatic and the kataphatic) that transcends particular historical and cultural conditioning. Her speculation that Dallmayr should find kindred spirits in these three thinkers is supported by his own remarks about “an insight gleaned from personal experience . . . that one can cherish and even love a person without fully knowing or being able to define that person in every way. Religiously, it is acknowledged that one can love God or the divine without epistemic cognition or comprehension.”

Shortly after, he describes Cusanus as an exemplary voice and had already expressed his excitement at being introduced to the thought of Nishida. Like Yusa, Marietta Stepanyants looks across three cultural traditions to see in each what it means to be human. All three of her resources are non-Western, however, for she looks to Indian, Chinese, and Muslim reflections on this topic. In the ancient Hindu tradition, for example, she finds that the word for human is often synonymous with the verb to think. What distinguishes humans from animals there is the former’s ability to follow the moral law. The belief in reincarnation has given rise to an imperative not to injure other humans or animals. Like Chenyang Li, she considers that status afforded to the human being in the Confucian tradition. She also points to that tradition’s emphasis on the individual in relation with others and to the quest for harmony between individual and society. Like Afsaruddin, she accords some attention to gender, asking to what extent these traditional paradigms of the perfect human apply equally to women as to men. Yet in full recognition that sources this large and complex could not be univocal, Stepanyants discerns within each what she calls a “normative social” strand (including cosmocentrism and theocentrism) and a more individualistic strand. The latter manifests itself in Buddhism rather than Hinduism in India, in Taoism rather than Confucianism in China, and within Sufism in Islam. Stepanyants closes her chapter with some considerations about the benefits and challenges of adducing a global ethos from both religious and nonreligious viewpoints. She ends up effectively agreeing
with Li that even if there are universal values, they must get their “fillings” from particular cultures.

Whereas Stepanyants draws from some of the ethical traditions available within Indian civilization, Ananta Kumar Giri zeroes in one of these classical Indian sources to explore what it means to uphold the world in our contemporary context. In a similar vein to Stepanyants, this ethos provides an exemplary, but also accessible and attainable, way for humans to live within themselves, with one another, and with their natural environment. Giri maintains that these wider implications of the Purusartha pathway have rarely been explored, yet they provide invaluable guidelines for ethical living. Dallmayr himself writes about how in later life the central issue for him has become “how to live one’s life and how to live it peacefully and properly with other human beings in a community.” Giri even portrays Dallmayr as the embodiment of such an ethos, which seeks to improve the world for all its inhabitants—human, animal, the natural environment—without subscribing to a dogmatic progressivism or linear, European notions of development.

Giri explains that upholding the world within this non-anthropocentric framework requires right living and conduct at the individual and social levels, the ethical generation and distribution of wealth, and the nonviolent expression of desire. With these resources, Giri opens up the possibility of a multifaceted yet integral concept of development that eschews strict binary oppositions and is especially needed in the current era, which has witnessed such massive environmental degradation. His chapter concludes by gesturing toward some of the ways in which this classical Indian ethos could intersect with comparable concepts in other cultures.

Walter Mignolo’s contribution exhibits the interest in comparative philosophizing that marks the chapters by Li, Kim, Afsaruddin, Okumuş, Yusa, Stepanyants, and Giri, although his chapter at the same time problematizes what we mean and what we are doing when we call something philosophy. The organizing principle of his discussion is the colonial difference, viz. the way in which systems and practices of thought in non-Western contexts have been deemed inferior to the Western tradition of philosophy. Indeed, in some cases these systems and practices of thought have not even been recognized as philosophy at all. In addition to asserting a hierarchy among ways of life and civilizations, the colonial difference makes such differences appear as ontological and thus conceals their true source in the operations of power. Against this, Mignolo advocates and tries to enact a type of decolonial thinking. His project of decolonizing philosophy (which can also be
extended to other intellectual disciplines) requires seeing philosophy in the narrow sense as a discipline that is modern, Western, and colonial. The sort of meaning-making activity it embodies is, however, a human universal that can be identified, albeit in different shapes and forms, over time and across cultures. Not all such activities have, moreover, sought abstract and universal truths; in some cases they have aimed for more pragmatic principles for living. Mignolo goes on to connect the project of decoloniality with that of border thinking, which avoids abstractions and rejects any either/or dichotomies. His chapter, “Philosophy and the Colonial Difference Revisited,” draws, as is only appropriate for its theme, from a diversity of contexts and cultures around the globe to illustrate both the existence of the colonial difference in these different contexts as well as lines of resistance to it. I am hopeful that Mignolo would see in all the comparative chapters of this volume, influenced and inspired as they are by Dallmayr’s example, scholarly work that is not defined by, but instead actively defies, the colonial difference.

Any volume inspired by Dallmayr must comment on the remarkable life he has lived, a life that both reflects and consolidates his intellectual and ethical convictions. In 2017 Dallmayr published On the Boundary: A Life Remembered, which records the fusion of academic research and global travel that have marked his long, rich life. It provides great insight into the thinkers and events that have shaped his outlook. This short but thoroughly engaging text adds another layer to those who seek to understand Dallmayr’s thought. The current collection closes with Dallmayr’s thoughtful response to each of these chapters. He finds his own way of ordering the contents and, as he responds to each author, draws connections between his life and thought.

Notes

2. Ibid., 74.
3. Ibid., 75.
4. Ibid., 73.
5. Ibid., 74.
6. Ibid., 67.
7. Ibid., 72.