1. Ethics: Its Immediacy and Importance

In that body of studies which presently continue to be grouped under the head of philosophy, it is ethics which has the widest and readiest appeal, and in which one who would attempt any special investigation can be surest that he makes contact with interests which are common and public. Ethics might also claim to be the oldest study. Too, it could hardly fail to be the case that something which is moral in significance is recognizable within, if indeed it is distinguishable from, what comes earliest in, and is even identifiable as, tradition. What is moral in significance represents that community of attitude and of conviction by which a human group is able to remain together and cooperate in action.

Ethics occupies this position of Paramountcy as a branch of learning because it addresses itself to the most general and most exigent of all problems, the problem, namely, of what one should choose to do. That question is universal to men and to all occasions on which it is necessary to decide and what is decided upon will make a real difference. The only other kind of
problem which is thus all-pervasive of our living is the question of what one should think, the question of fact or justified belief, and that manner of question becomes peremptory to determine only when and if it becomes necessary to do something affecting it or in the light of it. It is the choosing to do which is the crux of what has to be decided. Whatever one may think, it will harm no one, nor, indeed, do anybody any good, so long as nothing is done about it. By the same token, if we think awry, we may have a chance to think again. But once action is initiated, the matter is out of our hands; our commitment is made and the consequences of it are already on their way to happening. Thinking is, mainly at least, for the sake of guidance of our doing. Except for satisfying our curiosity, thinking has no point unless it bears upon our doing: one might as well wait and see what comes about. When we feel ourselves unable to do anything to alter what may happen, we often take this waiting attitude and adjourn any problem of what to expect as one which does not have to be settled. But problems of doing can have their peculiar exigency, often absent in the case of determinations of belief, because the question what to do may have to be settled now; otherwise the opportunity to do anything about them may pass. Doing has a time limit, and the decision to do nothing now can be as decisive of consequences as any wrong decision we could make. But apart from such exigency of what to do, the question of what to think can always be put over to another day. As problems of merely believing, they have no built-in time limit. And later we may have more light on them.

In consequence, if logic, understood broadly as principles directive of our thinking and concluding, also represents a type of problem which is universal and unavoidable, it nevertheless takes second place rather than first. And this second question, that of commitments of belief, is likewise universal and unavoidable because some question of fact to be acknowledged or found out must be involved in deciding what to do. There can be no occasion on which what one should choose to do is independent of the circumstances of the case and of what, under these circumstances, the act considered will bring about. Indeed, to act in the human sense of considered and intended doing is impossible without reference to what lies within our
cognizance, to what we take to be the present fact and what we can expect to happen as a result of what we do. Whatever is done in the sense of choosing to do is something determined in the light of what we think and believe, something done deliberately. And without that ground of it in what we already know, whatever we might be said to do would lack the significance of an act: it will be attributable to us only in that same sense in which we also say that flowers bloom and the wind blows and a compass points to the north. Without the significance of our thought behind it, it may be our behavior but we shall not acknowledge it as anything for which we take responsibility. To be sure, we can say this same thing the other way around: whatever we may believe to be the case, if our so thinking should exercise no influence on any decision, physically, to bring about, then that thinking will be inconsequential—literally. Doing without thinking is blind; but thinking without doing is idle. Thinking is mainly for the sake of doing; it is the doing which is final in significance. What a man responsibly brings about is all he counts for: it represents his total impact on the world he lives in; except for his encumbering the earth, it is all the difference he will ever make.

Let us now remark a consideration which is further indicative of a perennial and necessary interest in the ethical.

Though it is his doing only which the individual can himself directly govern, and take the responsibility for, still it is not with the consequences of that only, or even preeminently, that he finds it necessary to be concerned. Each of us must be equally and pervasively concerned with what others do, do with results which are of concern to us. Man is a social animal, and whether he survive or perish, prosper or be condemned to misery, depends as much upon what his fellows do to him as upon what he can achieve by his own agency and assure by his own directed doing.

2. Ethics: Its Legitimacy and Autonomy

What we have so far said, tending to found ethics in the business of self-government as a whole, suggests a significance of
‘ethics’ which is broader than what the term most frequently connotes, namely, that it is to be confined to principles of what we justifiably do to others, though we will now put that in the reverse form—what others—any other—will be justified in doing to us. And it now becomes implicit that in speaking of “principles,” it is the intention to refer to such directives or rules only as we assume to be of universal force, imperative for everybody, ourselves included, to find. (That the reader will have taken for granted without mention of it.) But perhaps our inverted way of thus taking it for granted may be expressive of a general fact: we take “rules” to be binding on us, obligatory for us, only if and when we have recognized that universal character by way of observing that we always desire that others conform to them, and so we should adhere to them ourselves, a conviction which, in any particular instance, may go against the grain, since it is not a psychological verity that we wish, automatically, to do what we wish all others would do when their doing has an effect on us. It is one great merit of that simple formulation which expresses the oldest of acknowledged moral insights—the Golden Rule—that it directly commands just that: Whatever you would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them. Without that adjuration, we should be left free to follow a frequent inclination: though I wish other people would always do thus and so when their doing affects me, there is something about me which is different, and no valid reason for my doing thus and so just on that account when it is my doing which is in question. In other words, the Golden Rule announces just what moral skeptics repudiate, namely, that there are principles both universal and universally binding, and moral precepts are exactly such: whoever denies that there are universally valid imperatives of doing, and alleges that whatever is, here and there in the world, taken to be such has always some merely provincial and parochial explanation—denies the first and essential premise of ethics. He denies what is precisely the first required presumption for there being any such thing as ethics at all. It is exactly that issue answer to which any supposed foundation of ethics must elicit, even if it may be the last question to be answered, clearly and fully, and decisively, in any such investigation.
Consonantly, it must be a first step, in such an investigation, to ask, “What are the premises which the skeptic presumes, and which he takes for granted, as generally admitted facts, which are the support for his adverse conclusion?” Unfortunately for us, there are such generally admitted facts, as of now, which he can take as the premises of his argument, and one of these is to be found in a common usage of the word ‘ethics’, a usage which is at least as well justified as any other, and which is indicative of important facts about ethics, taken in any sense, but nevertheless can operate to confuse the question of ethics in that sense in which ethics calls for some validation of its contentual moral principles.

Any “principles” which are to be adjudged normative demand some ground of their validity, and of their character as imperative.

But first, let us observe some impressive facts—facts which are independent of any usage of the word ‘ethics’—facts which are definitely pertinent to, but can confuse, the question: Do moral principles actually have any validity as normative and imperative to heed?

Man is a social animal, and social in a special sense peculiarly relevant to ascribing to him any sensibility to the morally imperative. Many other species are social, have the gregarious bent and habit, and exhibit the phenomenon of group cooperation. But we ascribe moral sensibility to men only. Presumably all gregarious species are subject to some instinctive urge which moves them to associate in groups, whose members behave “imperatively” on occasion, in response to behavior on the part, initially, of a member or members of their group and observable to others. Frighten one crow, and the whole flock flies away. Let one sheep jump the fence, and they all do. Let one cow smell salt, and they are all fighting for a chance at it. Let one member of an audience be startled and the whole audience may panic. Monkey see, monkey do, and all men are part monkey. But they are only part monkey, and that is not what we have in mind by human cooperation, incident to the human social habit. There are peculiarities in the human kind of “social behavior”: it is discriminative in its response to group-incited stimulation, and the more intelligent, the more so. This animal
social phenomenon could not explain why men have morals and monkeys do not. We must attempt to elicit what is peculiar to the human sociality, and may here be in point.

Human sociality is distinctive in several ways, perhaps each of them a matter of degree, when compared with that of a different form of life, but adding up to a difference of kind. Let us first try to elicit the differential resultants which are pertinent, and then add any explanatory afterthoughts which seem relevant.

It is characteristic of any human social order that it has traditions; it has a group memory, as distinct from the merely personal recollections of its various members in any generation. Members of each generation come by what is thus traditional by being told by members of the preceding generation. And they pass it on in the same way. This depends on language, and man is the only animal with any properly so-called language habit.

Among distinctive features of true language is a capacity to convey what is absent—distant in time and space and perhaps presently unobservable—including what the hearer or reader may never have seen, heard, tasted, or smelled, and what may not now exist and may never have existed, but may ensue upon something which is a “here-and-now” factuality. Animal cries and behavioral “gestures” are mainly of the “here-and-now,” that portion of it which is capable of being sensed, and are characteristically emotive or instigational, rather than “ideational.” This ability to “describe” and “understand,” in the human sense, results in the capacity to warn of, predict or direct to, what the recipient may never have experienced, for example, to “educate” the immature and inexperienced about matters which they have never encountered and to enable them, accordingly, to orient themselves to what may now and as yet be unfamiliar. If this be a matter of degree as between ourselves and other creatures, it is a degree of it which makes all the difference. It also includes the capacity to convey and impart an understanding of things like atoms, which no human or other animal can ever sense but may be explanatory of what he observes and of importance to what he had better do, and perhaps do before long. A tradition is distinctively significant.
of what may be so informational and advisory of such matters to the otherwise inexperienced, to those who would otherwise be unprepared. What any man knows and grasps, or has found out about, the whole group may come to command. And no items of human learning need ever be lost and forgotten. Tradition represents some selective and cumulative body of the useful to impart, carried forward in the group memory. What is traditional and so carried forward is likely to include whatever has “a lesson,” a reason to note and give heed to. It will bear upon occasions of choosing which those to whom it is imparted are likely to meet. That is the raison d’être of the traditional as such. Other animals, lacking language, have no tradition; they can’t learn by being told; they must learn a little by imitation, or learn the hard way, each by his individual experience. Each generation of them begins at the same point the preceding one did. The only propagation of behavioral habits runs with the biological inheritances, and does not alter so long as such instincts and the general environment remains the same.

The human form of sociality is distinguished, for one thing, by having traditions, cumulative in character, being characterized in process by adding a bit, dropping a bit, according as those bits appear important for transmittal. As a continuing entity, a tradition is—and traditionally so after a while—both cumulative and selective according to the ascribed importance and value of the bits. Let us pause here, briefly, to remind ourselves of the contrasts, of which we are aware, merely in the West, between the period preceding the Industrial Revolution, the period of the Industrial Revolution, and that of our own time, that of the “Scientific Revolution,” the effects of which are observable, and obvious, in every phase of our current civilization. These are products of something learned. Presently, too, we observe the necessity of a new international ethics.

It is unnecessary to spell out the consequences for human history of what is so newly learned. Having traditions is a tremendous economy. Largely, it accounts for human “progress” and for “civilization.” What one generation learns the hard way, later ones may come by without the initial grief and frustrations incident to finding out. Having the same strictly biological inheritance as their stone-age ancestors, and perhaps
being in an unaltered geographic environment, those of the new
generation may nevertheless be, in virtue of a more effective
contemporary social order, in almost every way that concerns
them, much better off. They know better what to aim at, and
how to get it at lower general cost. If that should not be the
case, they must be less intelligent than their ancestors were—
incapable of learning anything from history, and so wasting
time and energy repeating it. And as we may observe, this kind
of phenomenon must be reflected in laws and in any general
rules or maxims directly applicable to our ways of behaving
and held to be such as must be thus socially mandatory if a suf-
ficient social amity is to be preserved, and if disastrous politi-
cal and economic consequences are to be avoided, such as the
intolerable social disruptions involved in moving from cottage
to factory industry, or the demoralization of large numbers of
youth who become delinquent because they are insufficiently
educated to find a job in an increasingly more automated, more
sophisticated economy.

But all the while the ethic of any social order—that part of
its tradition which comprises the principles of general conduct
and whose precepts will receive general approval and support,
even to the extent of being enforced upon any who repudiate
or contravene what they dictate—this ethic is the cement which
holds society together. If these laws and precepts are not con-
formed to generally, disruptive and intolerable behavior among
its members will dissipate or preclude any desirable effects of
what is now newly learned and would otherwise work for a
better life for society at large.

Every social order has, and must have, its ethic; otherwise
disorder will become endemic and its civilization will at best be
unprogressive and at worst the society itself may be wiped out.
And this body of socially supported and even enforced precepts
of conduct is of course what we shall recognize as the positive
ethic of any society, anywhere and at any time. And that kind of
social phenomenon is what we shall mean by ‘the ethics of—’.
What other term is appropriate for that? Comparative study of
this topic in the case of various societies and those larger social
groupings referred to as “cultures” is a highly desirable—neces-
sary even—branch of learning, for the purposes of any society
or any culture obliged to some self-criticism of its own ethic or wishing to obtain some advantage by observing the socially desirable or undesirable consequences of the ethics of other societies, societies which have, or do offer us, the findings of “social experiments,” experiments in the way of an ethic or feature of an ethic which it would be costly and hazardous for us to come by the hard way, through our own adoption of like modes of directing and governing our own social institution. Such study and learning—comparative ethics—is a branch of cultural anthropology, and what it so seeks out and collates is a general body of fact as determinate and fixed as those collated by the scientists in any other branch of study. Not to be interested in such a study and in the collated results of the investigation of such historical and comparative facts must, for the members of any society at any time, and particularly when faced by problems of such self-criticism as now beset us, would argue them, and, if pertinent, us, to be more stupid than one need be, and more lacking in just that kind of capacity mainly responsible for human progress generally, the capacity to learn from the experience of others instead of repeating their experimental, wasteful, costly, trial-and-error manner of finding out.

So what do we mean, “Ethics”?

One thing we mean is that body of general accepted doctrine which is to be found in any social group which ever lasted long enough to be singled out and named as a social order or a culture.

And one large lesson to be learned from “Ethics” in this sense, and one hardly needing mention, is that any such body of general accepted doctrine, any such particular “ethics,” is relative. We are no longer naive enough to suppose our own such positive doctrine is the ethics, and that any departure from it must be an anomalism and a total misapprehension on the part of barbarians or primitive societies. There will be reasons for such an ethics, considerations explicative of it, considerations both specific and general, specific considerations particular to the time and place and the social circumstances, and the consequent such tradition of any time and place, and of any historic antecedents and other pertinent factualities, and considerations
as general as those involving the outstanding necessities of any identifiable social order whatever. What it is morally right to do is, even in the most critical sense, always so relative, and always will be. What we might look for, and perhaps eventually find, is some higher order of generalization about “what it is thus right to do,” in any time and place in any social order. If we can eventually discover some such generalities, that will be the moral to be drawn from such a study for our own society and the critical determination of our problems of a like kind.

But on the other hand, if there is nothing in the way of such a critical “moral” to be drawn, a useful lesson to be so learned, why study cultural anthropology? Do the specialists in that subject pursue it, and pursue information of the phenomena pertinent to it, for the same kind of reason that men risk their lives on Mt. Everest, because these facts “are there”? If so, the anthropologists might do well not to let the rest of us find that out. We might cross off their subject in any curriculum of learning. That any ethic is, and even must be, relative, that we should hardly need to be told. That there is no lesson having some significance for our own to-be-adopted attitudes of a like kind would be an equal stupidity and an even sillier “disillusionment” for any who should claim intelligence. There is a “good reason” for this relativity of positive ethics as an identifiable feature, and some “moral” to be drawn from that—some counsel applicable to the problems of our own mores, whatever our own time and place, and to our particular problems, those now confronting us and requiring to be met and resolved, those in our own positive and social ethics which are now in question or which would better be—some social confluence to judgment as to what we ought now socially to resolve upon for our own social guidance. But, beyond this, if there is any such thing as what we now ought generally to approve and conform to as directives of our own conduct as affecting others than ourselves only, then this whole business of cultural anthropology seems likely to be nugatory and a waste of time. If the only “lesson for life” to be obtained in that quarter is that any positive ethics is relative, then let us abandon such ethical relativists to their own ivory tower, there to amuse themselves in their own way, and not bother others about their special kind of occupation any longer. What we ought, here and now and
in view of our present social circumstances and resultant social problems, to resolve upon as our own positive rules for the direction of our socially significant self-government may be as relative as those social circumstances and those social problems which characterize our social order. But so what? So nothing, if there is nothing which we would best to resolve upon, and promulgate and ourselves conform to. But there will be, and there will be something, in our tradition, pertinent to, or meeting, unanticipated problems of this general sort. If our social scientists have anything bearing on that to offer, then let them, whether as scientists or as citizens, advise us of it. And otherwise—? If they should tell us that that is not their own special kind of problem—well, they are still members of our own body politic. Let them now take off their anthropological hats, and take a hand in addressing themselves to our present and exigent problem, that of the to-be-approved moral view, here and now to be determined. There will be something in the body of the past experience of men in societies at large which will be relevant. And they are our social repository of this store of wisdom, gathered from social experience, from past experiments and the consequences of them. If so, this is the pat occasion for bringing it forward, and, if not, what is their special branch of learning good for? Is the comparative study of cultural anthropology something pursued just for fun—if you find it fun—or is it a serious and responsible vocation having a social function to exercise, and general social purposes to meet? If there be nothing in the way of such social utility of a branch of learning, then devotees of such a sport can form their own sport club and solicit funds for it amongst those who are taken that way. What good is any science? That question will answer itself. If it does not, why this waste of time at the general expense? As with philately, let those who are interested in it pursue it, and, as for the rest of us, let us take it or leave it, according to whether we find it a diverting recreation or a bore.

Cultural anthropology is a science, a highly important one, socially useful as perennially bearing on problems likely to be current at any time. But if, right now, with an exigent policy decision to be determined, there should be no answer nearer to right than alternatives, would this science have anything to say to us, or would there be any excuse for them to interrupt our
earnest effort to meet this problem as it will later prove desirable to have met it, if what they have to tell us is that there is nothing in particular which will be appropriate and to be recommended, that questions of rightness and justified deciding are just questions of what you happen to be bent on approving and propagating, so let everybody just follow his nose, without critical comment? If that is the case, then let us tell those who so respond that we do not invite them to persuade us. Do they have on hand anything that will be convincing? If not, let them hold their peace; it is no time for idle chat; we have something at stake, and as of now. The next time any Bay of Pigs episode comes up, we shall know who not to summon to our aid.

If there be no lesson of critique, of the advisable or inadvisable, to be drawn, then the pursuit of cultural anthropology is a waste of time.

Any suppositious scientist who indulges in that kind of sophistry discredits himself and his vocation. Cultural anthropology is a branch of learning peculiarly apposite to meeting problems of social policy. Any such scientist should take note, and be a little careful in what he says about right or wrong mores—social policies which have sometime and somewhere been approved and followed, and the desirable or undesirable results of such social experiments, results which are a matter of experimental fact.

But our principal interest here and now, in this digression, is a quite small point: it concerns a common use of the word ‘ethics’, in reference to mores—ones which are actual or have been actual. Any such body of fact, and the finding out of it, is not itself a question of any rightness or wrongness of the referred-to mores—or is only a question of right or wrong in the reporting of such fact. We look to the cultural anthropologists to be responsible for that kind of rightness or wrongness in their science at least; and they recognize this and behave accordingly, with no persuasion from the rest of us. Let them take the moral of that, and not say things about the moral in general which will make them out to be silly or perverse in the pursuit of their own business, and which would belie the responsibility they accept for conclusions they publicly announce. We do not, of course, attribute this type of inconsistency to cultural
anthropologists: it is would-be philosophers or dabblers in both anthropology and ethics who may exhibit this particular brand of unself-conscious foolery. There is a right and a wrong about everything to be decided and about every commitment taken. And ‘right’ is a synonym for ‘that which it is imperative to be, so far as in you lies, in any decision taken’. Any who should speak in contravention of that surely can make no claim to be right in what he says. He must be a culprit or some kind of undiscerning blockhead. If he says anything worthy of deciding about, it must be overlooked as accidental. That kind of accident happens: “Out of the mouths of fools—.” But, praise be, it does not happen too often.

But let us cease this digressive interlude. Our present point to which it is relevant is a quite small one: one respectable and common meaning of ‘Ethics’ is to refer to “ethic-s” in general, mores which sometime and somewhere have prevailed. And the question of anything to be so referred to involves a kind of fact, the determination of which is something to be found out, independently of any question of rightness in the content of any such ethics. But there is such a question about any such ethic and anything comprised in it—the question of actual rightness. This last question—the question of actual rightness—is not one included in the determination of the historical fact of any ethic, which is the peculiar vocational pursuit of cultural anthropology. That second sort of question, that pertaining to a second sort of fact—actual rightness, or such—falls under the peculiar business of ethics. Ethics is not the examination of historically factual ethic-s, other than in the sense of concerning itself with the actual rightness or wrongness of items contentual to such ethic-s.

But we hardly need so much warning concerning possible confusions over the uses of words. The point is obvious. We turn now to matters which call for a little more concern.

3. Some Hints as to Horizons to Come

Ethics proper concerns only questions which are normative in character. But not every question of the normative is one
of ethics. We have so far suggested that ethics proper is confined to questions of the right to do, to bring about. But we have not, however, so far even asked the question, “Does ethics extend to what may be “right” in any and every sense of ‘right’?” We have implicitly suggested the answer, “No, only to the right to do; the “right to think” is another kind of question and falls under logic.” But is that answer—that ethics is limited to questions of the right to do—exactly right? As will have occurred to the reader, it is not, or at least the sufficiency of it is dubious. Better, ethics, as most strictly and commonly understood, namely, as a normative discipline, is limited to questions of what it is right to do toward others: right when others will be affected by what one decides to do. When nobody but the doer will be much affected, what is done may be prudent or not, but still fail to be of moral import. And what a carpenter does in his carpentering will be either right-carpentering or wrong-carpentering, and depending on whether it is his own house or somebody else’s, it will be either morally right or prudentially right, and possibly both, but the question “right carpentering?” is not exactly a prudential question or a moral question, since the correct answer does not ipso facto imply “moral rightness” or “prudential rightness,” though it must have some kind of “rightness-import” or it will not be a question of right doing at all; it would not even be a normative question. We can answer the question “right carpentering” without implying either moral or prudential rightness. And a piece of “right carpentering” could be prudentially right—such as will save the carpenter money—but morally wrong—such as will cost the owner money for repairs. How—according to prevailing usage—do “morally right,” “prudentially right,” and “carpentry-right” stand related?

We presently observe that common usage implies that moral rightness concerns only “right toward others.” This is a quite obvious reason for our setting off “right to do to others” from “right to do because I shall find the results gratifying to me”—the “prudentially right to do.” Smith and all the rest of us have a personal interest in what Jones puts in the class of “gratifying to do but to do merely”—the “prudentially right for Jones to do.” What Jones does because it is prudent for him to do may
or may not do us any harm. But what Jones puts in the class “right for Jones to do toward others,” and does or does not do accordingly, is a matter of personal interest to the Smiths and all the rest: we may be the “others” in question. We all have a personal interest in Jones’ precepts of morality; apart from that, we have no personal stake in his precepts of prudence. So there is this good reason for the two classifications, moral precepts and prudential precepts, even if almost any rule of doing, followed by anybody, is likely to be classifiable in both ways, and classifiable as moral and prudent, moral but not prudent, prudent but not moral, or neither prudent nor moral.

But this general fact being obvious, and our tentative decision being to apply ‘moral’ in the narrower sense of ‘right to do toward others’, there is another question, a semantic question which must interest us: In the case of acts which are, for any one of us, morally right but not prudent to do, or prudent but morally wrong, what do we do? We are generally agreed about that: What is finally right to do is what is morally right, whether it is also prudentially dictated or not. But do we really accept that, whether we act conformably to it or not? None of us conforms to it strictly, and occasionally when we fail to do so, we are not affected by any sense of sin.

It is, we agree, an important and sound and often pertinent moral precept that promises made should be kept. We accept that as being a moral rule. But if I promised yesterday to meet somebody today at eleven, and now I find myself in bed and my doctor tells me to stay there, I don’t go. Nobody in his right mind would. And nobody who has good sense will think the worse of anyone on that account.

So what about that?

Do we abandon the notion that there are any moral rules universally imperative to follow? Or do we say about sound moral rules, as about other rules, “Every rule has its exceptions”? Or do we say, “Moral rules, as a rule, overrule prudential or any other kind of rules when rules of two different kinds apply, but that that rule also has its exceptions”? Or do we say there are, among rules properly called moral, little rules—“maxims”—and more general rules which are rules for applying those lesser rules; and the overarching moral principle—or
one such—is “Follow the big rule; that’s the final arbitrament of the morally right to do.”

It is not the case that the moral consideration always overrules any also pertinent prudential or otherwise nonmoral consideration. So the moral dictate allows or even requires working in the merely prudential dictate. But supposing that this is true, is there a “higher” general rule for such weighing of—? And, if so, then this higher rule is the moral rule which would apply and be the rule for the final arbitrament of the question, “right to do?”

So much for initial remarks.

Obviously a great many subtle and complex issues and problems are involved in these matters. To this point we have done little more than provide a hasty, abrupt, and crude summary of some of them. And one is observant, of course, that there are many further issues and problems involved, each of them deserving, and requiring, extended and judicious consideration. At this point we have done little more than recognize, or precipitate an awareness of, an entire “snaggle” of such issues and problems.

We now address ourselves to the process of sorting things out, examining them, and attempting to relate them, each to the other.

We begin with the consideration of something without which ethics would be inconsequential, if not impossible, a consideration of the good and bad in experience.

This is where making sense of ethics begins.