Chapter One

In Defense of Hatred

Citizen discontent with politicians and a lack of faith in the normal channels for addressing grievances and bringing about political change seems to be at an all-time high. As liberal democracy and global capitalism are touted as the only viable programs for ordering our political and economic lives, this best of all possible worlds depends on the repressive apparatus of the state to secure access to natural resources and markets, export permanent war, squash internal dissent, terrorize poor people into submission via prolonged economic insecurity, militarize the US-Mexico border, and incarcerate a growing percentage of the US population. If a total transformation of economic and political relations seems unrealistic given the lethal power that props them up, holding political and economic elites accountable to the people for their actions may be a promising first step to challenge the economic and political status quo. But how can political and economic elites be held accountable to the people?

Elections normally serve as an accountability mechanism and shut-off valve that citizens could pull when they have had enough. Unfortunately, elections today are more of a meaningless spectacle than a substantive means to control the arrogance, corruption, and criminality of the ruling class. The distortions caused by the private fortunes needed to run for/stay in office and staggered reelection timelines make it nearly impossible for the people to replace/oust elected officials when they break the public’s trust. Combine this with the fortress lifestyles of the ruling class (e.g., private security systems, gated communities, bodyguards), and you have astounding levels of elite nonaccountability, social prominence in the media combined with material invisibility, and political untouchability. Tack on what Sheldon S. Wolin calls “the political demobilization of the citizenry,” and we are stuck in something worse than an American nightmare.

How can elites be held accountable to the people they represent? The answer is simple: via enmity/hatred. Popular hatred of corrupt elites
signifies the unsurpassable rupture in political orders between rulers/ruled and rich/poor and can lead to resistance against oppression. When power is in play and regimes are only more or less legitimate in the eyes of citizens, popular discontent will drift toward extreme forms of animosity for political leaders. While hatred clearly has its dark side, hatred also represents a way to reactivate social antagonism, create collective solidarity, and increase political accountability between elites and the people.

A variety of political thinkers have emphasized the centrality of hatred as a political category. However, it is not Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) who deserves recognition as the main theorist of hatred (even though Schmitt famously reduced the concept of the political to the distinction between friend and enemy), but Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). Machiavelli makes a strong case for the productive role that popular hatred can play in political regimes. Power generates hatred. Hatred, though, can be enlisted for positive political ends. For Machiavelli, an antagonistic political culture based on extra-institutional manifestations of popular hatred and violence against elites ensures the preservation of liberty and the accountability of leaders to the people. Despite the central role hatred plays in Machiavelli’s work, Machiavelli has yet to be recognized as a major theorist of hatred. Hatred at a more general level has also not received the attention it deserves as a productive political force. The reasons are clear.

First, hatred is an ugly word and an uncomfortable topic. I hesitated defending hatred because I did not know how it would be received. Everyone is understandably squeamish when it comes to hatred, given hatred’s tendency to spiral out of control, generate cycles of revenge, and lead to vigilantism. Why would anyone want to defend hatred? Hatred is linked to everything that is wrong with the world today, including violence against young people at schools, genocide, white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. For these reasons, hatred is either ignored, is viewed with disgust, or is conceived of in a legalistic way (e.g., “hate crimes”), as opposed to seeing hatred as a complex political phenomenon.

The reason why hatred is overlooked or downplayed in Machiavelli is related to the dominance of the civic republican interpretation of Machiavelli. This view, which has come to be known as the Cambridge School, emphasizes love for patria, wisely designed political institutions, rule of law, and civic virtue, but arguably tames radical moments out of Machiavelli’s thinking by downplaying evidence of popular agency and intense passion. Leo Strauss and interpreters influenced by Strauss
are also prone to miss the central role played by hatred because their interpretations are premised on the break Machiavelli represents with the premodern and the absence of a broader theory of democratic power in Machiavelli’s work. Hatred, finally, has also been overlooked by radical interpretations of Machiavelli that emphasize the people as political agents of violent contestation of oppression or read Machiavelli as an advocate of a conception of freedom as nonrule.

In what follows, I chart Machiavelli’s view on the origin, causes, and control of hatred to address an oversight in the scholarly literature. Next, I present two examples of the appeasement of popular hatred against elites. In order to clarify my defense of political hatred, I distinguish productive political hatred for elites with hatred for the other in Carl Schmitt and Samuel P. Huntington’s work. Finally, I analyze the political implications of different types of hatred. Naming the proper object of hatred emerges as a key component in the fight against oppression and is a central aspect of confrontational citizenship.

Hatred

Machiavelli accords hatred a central role in political life in his most advanced reflections on politics in the *Prince* and the *Discourses*. Hatred as a defining feature of politics is also apparent in many of Machiavelli’s other writings too, including “The History of Florence” and his poems. Unlike a tradition of political thought predicated on replacing hatred with reason, Machiavelli argues that hatred cannot be eliminated and, more importantly, hatred can play a positive role in politics. For Machiavelli, hatred serves a variety of productive roles, especially in terms of policing the behavior of arrogant elites and punishing them.

Hatred tends to be interpreted as an irrational and apolitical force. This is an oversimplification grounded on a bias against hatred. For Machiavelli, hatred possesses, as Louis Althusser correctly puts it, “a class signification.” The poor have good reason to hate the rich. The ruled have good reason to despise rulers. For Machiavelli, hatred is not a private emotion but is an essentially political feeling. Nor is hatred more of a problem in one type of regime than in others. Hatred is an issue in both principalities and republics.

Machiavelli does not define hatred. The closest Machiavelli comes to defining or providing a genealogy of hatred can be found in “Tercets on Ambition.” There, Machiavelli states,
A hidden power which sustains itself in the heaven . . . sent two Furies to dwell on the earth. . . . Each one of them has four faces along with eight hands; and these allow them to grip you and to see in whatever direction they turn. . . . Envy, Sloth, and Hatred are their companions, and with their pestilence they fill the world, and with them go Cruelty, Pride, and Deceit. . . . These drive Concord to the depths. To show their limitless desire, they bear in their hands a bottomless urn. 14

A mysterious power sent Furies to the earth to “deprive us of peace and to set us at war.” Envy, sloth, and hatred have otherworldly origins, and are Ambition’s companions who fill the world with their pestilence, to “take away from us all quiet and good.” One human climbs up on the back of another: “To this our natural instinct draws us.” Ambition, if unchecked, will burn down towns and farmsteads if “grace or better government does not bring her to nought.” 15 The management of hatred was not explored in “Tercets on Ambition,” but was treated systematically in Machiavelli’s political writings.

Throughout these writings, hatred is posited as an explosive and unpredictable feeling. 16 Leaders find out that they are hated too late, or simply presume they are hated and take the necessary security precautions. Even though Machiavelli states that “men do you harm either because they fear you or because they hate you,” hate is more problematic than fear. Fear may trigger a response to something threatening, but fear can also paralyze and stupefy. In contrast to fear, hatred empowers. 17 When someone is filled with hate, their energy is directed back at the despised object. As we shall see, Machiavelli’s presentation of how to hold onto power receives its contours from Machiavelli’s advice on how to avoid being hated.

In his discussion of the methods used to acquire and retain principalities, Machiavelli advises leaders as to how they can avoid being hated. This is an important subject because the downfall of a leader is caused by “hatred or scorn.” 18 Although eliminating hatred is impossible, prestige can protect you from hatred. 19 Prestige is wrought by “great campaigns and striking demonstrations.” 20 Princes must also work to retain “the friendship of the people” and “avoid being hated by the people.” 21 Grounding one’s rule on the favor of the people makes princes powerful and secure. Princes who are not hated by the people are more difficult to attack. The lack of hatred of the ruler is the index of the internal strength of a
principality. If you are hated, fortresses will be needed for protection but will become your prison: “The best fortress that exists is to avoid being hated by the people.” The best safeguard against conspiracies is “to avoid being hated by the populace.” For Machiavelli, “a prince can never make himself safe against a hostile people: there are too many of them.”

What causes hatred? Laying “excessive burdens on the people,” being “unarmed,” “severity,” and “extraordinary vices” cause the people to hate leaders. The prince should also avoid “ferocity and cruelty.” Being from “the lowest origins” can make the prince hated, while being old leads to “scorn.” Disarming your subjects will cause them to hate you because your actions communicate that you distrust them. No definite rule, though, can be given as to how a prince can win the people over. Buying people will not work. Generosity practiced over the long term will make you despised and hated since you will be compelled to take back what you have given.

In chapter XIX of the *Prince*, Machiavelli yet again advises leaders to avoid the hatred of the people. As Machiavelli states, “princes cannot help arousing hatred in some quarters.” Even good deeds can lead to being despised: “One can be hated just as much for good deeds as for evil ones.” The prince must nonetheless endeavor “to avoid anything which will make him hated and despised.” For this reason, sometimes it is necessary to “delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures.”

Hatred of a leader can also be the result of the character of political leaders, as well as how they are perceived. For Machiavelli, the prince will be despised “if he has a reputation for being fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, irresolute; a prince should avoid this like the plague and strive to demonstrate in his actions grandeur, courage, sobriety, strength.” The leader will be hated above all if “he is rapacious and aggressive with regard to the property and the women of his subjects.” The ruler lives in constant fear of secret conspiracies, and for good reason: “Princes cannot escape death if the attempt is made by a fanatic.” Even if a ruler plays his harp perfectly and appeases the populace with rhetorical melodies, there will always be malcontents but they are much more likely to come from the nobility who are easier to contain. If the malcontent comes from the people, an outlet must be provided: “Every city should provide ways and means whereby the ambitions of the populace may find an outlet.”

For Machiavelli, the management of hate is the essence of politics conceived of as an essentially volatile practice in the realm of mirrors,
shadows, and echoes. Since elite political accountability to the people is always a problem, leaders begin their first day in office despised by those who opposed them, despised by those whom they injured to obtain office, and despised by those who stand to lose from their reign. When the coercive apparatus of the state is deployed against political enemies, this exacerbates the hatred. As time goes on and politicians are perceived as corrupt, popular hatred will grow and trigger a revolt. 39 For Machiavelli, hatred is the main political problem linked to holding onto power but, as we shall see in the following examples, it can also serve as a way to hold elites accountable to the people.

Hatred and Accountability: Two Examples

Two examples of extra-institutional violence as accountability measures are instructive for understanding Machiavelli’s view on the political value of hatred. The first indicates the dark side of extra-institutional appeasement of popular hatred. The violence in this example is used to justify the rejection of extra-institutional appeasement of popular hatred. 40 The second example illustrates how the humiliation of an authority figure can reestablish the public’s trust in leaders. The second example also demonstrates that the populace needs to be reassured that arrogant and scheming elites will get what they deserve if they violate the public’s trust.

Spectacular Violence

The political agent must be human but also an animal as the situation requires. The priest’s garb should be worn by political leaders to pacify the people and project an image of gentleness and priestly asceticism. But this is only a costume, that is, a form of deception that masks the violence of political life. In the Discourses, for example, Machiavelli recounts an instance where Clearchus did not dismember one person but “he cut to pieces all the nobles to the immense satisfaction of the popular party and satisfied the demand for vengeance.”41 Even if a political actor dutifully and effectively serves their political superior, they can still be annihilated as the need to appease popular hatred dictates. In the Prince, Machiavelli discusses the case of the successful but ill-fated ruler Remirro de Orco.
As this point deserves close study and imitation by others, I will not leave it out. Now, the duke [Cesare Borgia] won control of the Romagna and found that it had previously been ruled by weak overlords, quicker to despoil their subjects than to govern them well. They had given them cause for anarchy rather than union, to such an extent that the province was rife with brigandage, factions, and every sort of abuse. He decided therefore that it needed good government to pacify it and make it obedient to the sovereign authority. So he placed there messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel, efficient man, to whom he entrusted the fullest powers. In a short time this Remirro pacified and unified the Romagna, winning great credit for himself. Then the duke decided that there was no need for this excessive authority, which might grow intolerable, and he established in the centre of the province a civil tribunal, under an eminent president, on which every city had its own representative. Knowing also that the severities of the past had earned him a certain amount of hatred, to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely he determined to show that if cruelties had been inflicted they were not his doing but prompted by the harsh nature of his minister. This gave Cesare a pretext; then, one morning, Remirro’s body was found cut in two pieces on the piazza at Cesena, with a block of wood and a bloody knife beside it. The brutality of this spectacle kept the people of the Romagna at once appeased and stupefied.\(^{42}\)

As the citation makes clear, Remirro de Orco was a hated man, and this was used as a justification to eliminate him. Since Remirro de Orco was hated, eliminating him appeased the people of the Romagna. In order to intensify the impact of the violence, the deed was not done in front of the people but was orchestrated so that Remirro de Orco’s dismembered body would be found in public. Hence, the people were spectators of the violence after the fact as opposed to being perpetrators of the violent act. The shock value of the act was also intensified by the absence of the agents of the violence so that the violence itself would be center stage. Even though it satisfied the people, this violence could support the case for institutional protections against intra-elite conflict. For John P. McCormick, the temptation to forsake institutions for controlling elites should be resisted.\(^{43}\)
But this overlooks the effectiveness, at least from Machiavelli’s perspective, of the extralegal dismembering of Remirro de Orco.

The image of a politician chopped in half is horrifying. Clearly, the dismemberment of Remirro de Orco or any politician is not the ideal path for satisfying popular hatred. Machiavelli implies, though, that some politicians may deserve to be treated in this manner given Machiavelli’s unconditional endorsement of Cesare Borgia who orchestrated the violence: “I know no better precepts to give a new prince than ones derived from Cesare’s actions.” I will comment on this in greater detail shortly. Let’s move on to the second example.

“An Excellent Example”

Machiavelli’s view on violence and politics is believed to be encapsulated in his statements about fortuna, who as a woman, it is necessary to “beat and coerce.” As Hanna Fenichel Pitkin puts it, “Machiavelli’s image of fortune embodies his central teachings about the human condition.” Based on Machiavelli’s advice, the leader asserts his will and gives form to raw matter. Since fortuna is a female goddess, Machiavelli is arguably promoting an understanding of politics as sexual conquest. As does the violence against Remirro de Orco, Machiavelli’s feminization of fortuna and advice about dominating her makes readers of Machiavelli justifiably uneasy. In these instances, Machiavelli is seen as too violent and possibly as a psychopath. Although there may be grounds for interpreting Machiavelli in this manner, I hope to complicate the picture.

An important, albeit overlooked, example pertaining to the relationship between violence and politics is contained in a story about the beating of a schoolmaster. In the following example, I suggest that fortuna, in addition to being a woman, is also a schoolmaster.

The second example of extra-institutional violence as an accountability measure is from the Discourses. The subtitle of the section is “A SINGLE ACT OF COMMON HUMANITY MADE A GREATER IMPRESSION ON THE FALISCI THAN DID ALL THE FORCES OF ROME.” This example is significant because it demonstrates how extra-institutional punishment of elites appeases popular hatred, but this violence does not necessarily spiral out of control. Indeed, public humiliation of elites can play a significant role in ensuring accountability to the people. Moreover, this example displays, in the words of Machiavelli, “common humanity
and kindness, continence or generosity.” Violence was not only lesser violence in this case but ironically a form of humanity and kindness.

A schoolmaster claimed to be leading his students to the countryside for physical exercise. The schoolmaster actually intended to hand over the students to Camillus, who was invading the city. The schoolmaster’s offer was refused by the powerful general:

When Camillus and his army lay before the Faliscan city, which he was besieging, a schoolmaster who taught the most noble youths in the city, thinking to ingratiate himself with Camillus and the Roman people, went with his pupils outside the town ostensibly to give them exercise, led them to where Camillus was encamped, and offered to hand them over, saying that, if they were used as a lever, the town would place itself in his hands. Camillus not only rejected the offer, but had the teacher stripped, his hands tied behind his back, and to each of the boys gave a rod with which to beat him often and hard on his way back to the town. When the citizens saw this, they were so pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus that they no longer wanted to go on with the defense, but decided to hand over the town. This authentic incident affords us an excellent example of how a humane and kindly act sometimes makes a much greater impression than an act of ferocity or violence.

The schoolmaster was stripped, his hands were tied behind his back, and then he was surrounded by the students who beat him with rods. Clearly, the schoolmaster’s fortuna had run out. Machiavelli regarded the public beating of the stripped teacher as a humane and kindly act because Machiavelli was able to see it from the vantage point of the students and the Roman people. A reversal of expectation adds to the humor and power of this example. The schoolmaster was expecting to be rewarded by Camillus and the Roman people for betraying the students. As opposed to rewarding the schoolmaster, Camillus sided with the betrayed students, arguably the popular element, and punished the schoolmaster.

In contrast to the dismemberment of Remirro de Orco where the assassin was not observed during the murder, the schoolmaster’s punishment was a participatory symbolic act staged in front of the people on the long walk back to town. Participatory in the sense that the students’ agency
is called upon to beat the schoolmaster, but symbolic because it is only through Camillus’s refusal of the schoolmaster’s offer that the students are empowered to punish the teacher. The students did not contest the power of the teacher from a sense of collective agency that they acquired on their own but as a result of the direction of Camillus. Even so, the student’s inclusion in the punishment of the schoolmaster gave them a taste of redemption insofar as the students were able to avenge being betrayed by the schoolmaster.

The schoolmaster incident is not as spectacular and violent as chopping a public leader in half but it nevertheless sends a powerful message to leaders who abuse their power. For Machiavelli, the public staging of violence against elites is a necessary component of effective governance. To generalize from the example of the schoolmaster’s beating to the larger political context is precisely what Machiavelli has in mind. Arrogant elites should be publically humiliated by the people when they violate the public’s trust. If an authority figure is hated, once the hatred passes a critical limit, this hatred should be appeased. The leader must keep the people satisfied or he will suffer their wrath. As we saw with the beating of the schoolmaster, localized popular violence did not turn into a bloodbath and spiral out of control but contained comedic aspects apparent in the reversal of relations of power between students and teacher, the rods used by the students to beat the teacher, the nakedness of the teacher, and the staging of the beating in front of the entire population of the city. More importantly, humor in this example emerges as a means to build collective solidarity against oppression. This renders it superior to the violence imposed on Remirro de Orco by Cesare Borgia that was arguably too extreme and had the effect of stupefying the people, which has dubious political value. The violence against the schoolmaster, in contrast, created a sense of collective solidarity against a corrupt member of the elite because it settled the score, it was effectively staged in front of the Roman population, and the beating of the schoolmaster by the students contained humor.

It could be objected that elite in-fighting in the Remirro de Orco and schoolmaster examples are only a source of distraction to the real project at hand, namely, the consolidation of state power. I disagree. In the Remirro de Orco example, one elite massacred another. In the second example, the punishment of the teacher is mainly about public humiliation. Including the students in the teacher’s punishment opens the possibility of the liberation of the demos from their exclusion from state power. That is to say, it lays the groundwork for future resistance to oppression.
We might call it a pedagogical moment in the fight against oppression. Camillus, not the schoolmaster, was the real teacher of the students.

Popular violence against elites is often depicted as irrational and of limited value, especially by interpreters who adhere to the civic republican interpretation of Machiavelli. The fear is that hatred of elites could easily morph into a popular dictatorship. Class enemies could be massacred. This fear is unfounded. Machiavelli has a much more nuanced understanding of popular violence. As Yves Winter puts it in his article on the Ciompi uprising, “violence functions not merely as an instrument of coercion but also as a way to mobilize popular support in a manner that appeals directly to popular demands for redress against oppression.” Machiavelli adds an important qualification to his endorsement of popular violence against elites, though. Popular violence should be used to mend, not to spoil. The violence against the schoolmaster mended the public’s trust. Nothing was spoiled.

Against Carl Schmitt and Samuel P. Huntington

As we have seen, Machiavelli’s interpretation of the political significance of hatred is connected to the problems of elite accountability to the people, violence, preventing oppression, and avenging injustice. In order to illuminate the role that hatred plays in Machiavelli’s thinking and to develop further my defense of hatred, I compare Machiavelli’s view on hatred with two other theorists of hatred, namely, Carl Schmitt and Samuel P. Huntington.

Hatred emerged in twentieth-century politics as an ideological weapon to consolidate state power and ward off a series of crises in political legitimacy. Through propaganda techniques and mass rallies, the demos were enlisted via hatred to support the political projects of an arguably criminal political class. Both Schmitt and Huntington can be situated within this context because they advised the managerial-political class on the most effective practices to ward off the crisis of political legitimacy and consolidate the power of the state. The former for Weimar Germany and the Third Reich, the latter for the American imperial empire in the face of a crisis of authority stemming from rising expectations and, what Huntington notoriously penned, an “excess of democracy.” For Schmitt and Huntington, the answer to the crisis of the state was found in the politics of hate.
To be more specific, Schmitt and Huntington mobilize, manipulate, and redirect hatred to obfuscate social and economic antagonism between elites and the people as a way to manufacture consent and increase the power of the state. Fused with an increasingly sophisticated propaganda apparatus that incorporated communication technology (e.g., loudspeakers, megaphones, radio, and television) for explicitly political means, hatred for Schmitt and Huntington serves as an ideological tool to build national (Schmitt) and civilizational (Huntington) collective identity. Political rallies and mass sporting events also serve as means to mobilize the masses into a unit where national symbols (e.g., flags, the national anthem) and displays of military strength (e.g., bombers flying overhead) produce patriotic outpourings of support. For both Schmitt and Huntington, the target of mass hatred was shifted away from the problem of elite political accountability to the demos and redirected to the formation of political identity.

This move to construct a homogeneous political identity simultaneously constitutes the new body politic as well as the political enemy. In a Hobbesian manner, hatred as a tactic to form political identity defines the collective “we” and gives birth to “them,” the political enemy. As Schmitt states in *The Concept of the Political*, “the political enemy is the other, the stranger.” Schmitt continues: “He is existentially something different and alien.” With a definition of the enemy as vague and broad as this, anyone could qualify as an enemy.

Like Schmitt, Huntington also deploys a politics of hate. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996/2011), Huntington quotes and agrees with Michael Didbin who states that “unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are.” Huntington then goes on to state: “For peoples seeking identity . . . enemies are essential.” And, finally, Huntington states “we know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.” For Huntington, hatred and an oppositional stance to the other emerge as the epistemological conditions for stable self-identity insofar as it purifies the self of foreign contamination: “America cannot become the world and still be America. Other peoples cannot become American and still be themselves.” As opposed to directing a critical eye toward rulers who only serve a limited segment of the population with favorable legislation at the expense of the majority, hatred of the enemy/other is used as a tool by Huntington to distract the demos and keep the ruling class in power.
There is an important difference between Schmitt and Huntington, on the one hand, and Machiavelli, on the other. Machiavelli argues that hatred is caused by an oppressive ruling class. Hence, the proper object for political hatred is the political-managerial class. In contrast to Machiavelli, Schmitt and Huntington depoliticize hatred of the enemy/other. That is, they divorce the target of hatred from social and economic divisions perpetuated by the ruling class. By creating new targets for hatred, Schmitt and Huntington arrest the crisis of the state originally identified by Machiavelli and enlist popular hatred in the project of building state power, while simultaneously excluding the demos from real political participation. Clearly, the legacy of Schmitt and Huntington lives on today. It is no wonder that we are constantly directing our attention to new enemies to hate, whether it is terrorists, drug addicts, welfare recipients, homeless people, or illegal immigrants. The existence of an infinite number of internal and external enemies justifies expanding military spending and an increase in executive prerogative. Cast in this light, US domestic and foreign policy emerges as an ideological weapon against the home population insofar as it forces the demos to fixate their gaze on the wrong objects of hate.

Schmitt’s ties to National-Socialism are well known. Huntington also risks going in a troubling direction. If one combines Huntington’s view of hatred in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996/2011) with his book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (2004), where he argues that Mexican immigrants are unassimilable, the danger to Huntington’s thinking and use of hatred as a way to obfuscate class antagonism and build white national identity against brown Mexican immigrants is clear. Since Huntington believes the language of class no longer fits the contemporary situation (despite staggering evidence suggesting otherwise), Huntington turns to culture as the marker for new forms of political conflict. This move deflects attention away from the current corrupt ruling class and to the amorphous Islamic and/or unassimilable Mexican cultural other. Huntington’s appeal to culture as an access point and justification for increased security against external and internal enemies leads to, as Michael Shapiro has put it, the “ontological grounding of the political.” At the end of the day, Huntington’s appeal to culture is only a ruse to enlist the demos in the project of consolidating state power at their own expense. Identity politics grounded in hatred is a tool used by Huntington to deflect attention away from the real object of hatred,
namely, the ruling class and the crisis in political legitimacy caused by excluding the *demos* from real political participation.

Machiavellian hatred is superior to the ontological hatred of Schmitt and Huntington because Machiavellian hatred is essentially political, that is to say, it is the people’s response to political oppression. For Machiavelli, political hatred is a result of the material conditions of political life. Hatred is not a weapon used against the people to shore up state power. As a result of its connection with identity formation, hatred as Schmitt and Huntington conceive of it risks transforming anyone into a domestic foreigner, especially for those others who are cast as unassimilable and become permanent scapegoats and targets for white resentment.

When the political order is grounded in a static ontological foundation, political life becomes a stage of sacrifice for the internal others who are unable to make themselves act, look, and think like the true American peddled by authors like Huntington. These internal foreigners become targets of state violence in the form of racial-profiling, police harassment, confinement in ghettos, disproportionate incarceration, preferential unemployment, and criminalization. The failures of these internal scapegoats are then linked to “their” culture of poverty, “their” culture of criminality, and “their” lack of initiative and motivation, which, in turn, confirms “their” genetic degeneracy and need for added police and state surveillance. Huntington’s message is both horrifying and hypnotizing. So hypnotizing, in fact, that Huntington can advance these arguments and still state that he attempts to engage in “as detached and thorough an analysis of the evidence as I can.”

Apparently, keeping a watchful eye on these internal enemies and cultural others is satisfying for a dwindling, resentful, and economically deracinated white working and middle-class, precisely the audience Huntington targets as most receptive to his message which he whispers into the ears of the ruling class who can then appeal to this conditioned population for political support. The oppression of marginalized and powerless groups becomes the fundamental condition of this angry electorate’s freedom, identity, and values. If a net or cage needs to be dropped on internal enemies, so be it. After all, “they” deserve it. The marginalization and punishment of scapegoats reaffirms the correct and pure form of national and civilizational identity. Ironically, identity empowerment corresponds to economic and political impotence. Through the persecution of dehumanized scapegoats, they get the satisfaction that someone else is lower on the food chain. A pyrrhic victory is still a victory, I suppose.
It could be objected that I have overstated the difference between Machiavelli, on the one hand, and Schmitt and Huntington, on the other, given that all three wrote for the ruling class and see the management of hatred as a fruitful way to consolidate state power. I disagree. Unlike Schmitt and Huntington, Machiavelli exposes the original dilemma of elite accountability to the *demos* and thereby names the proper object of hatred. Machiavelli destroys the illusion that leaders serve the common good. By naming this rupture, Machiavelli foregrounds the problem of elite accountability to the *demos* as a fundamental political problem. Machiavelli’s *Prince*, then, is a dangerous book in the hands of the *demos*. Machiavelli’s message is simple. Do not be duped by leaders directing your attention to enemies. Your leaders are the real problem. Schmitt and Huntington, in contrast, tell us to look away from the ruling class and toward a never-ending list of powerless enemies to hate, who the state will then pound into oblivion which, in turn, serves the function of creating political identity and simultaneously strengthens state power at the expense of democratic accountability. The real target of ontological hatred for Schmitt and Huntington is the home population, because the intent is to disempower the *demos* while giving them the illusion that the state is on their side. The target of hatred for Machiavelli, in contrast, is the ruling class.

Conclusion

As the first part of this chapter demonstrates, hatred occupies a central place in Machiavelli’s thinking. The second part illustrates that hatred can play a productive role in the political realm. In the case of Schmitt and Huntington, hatred can also pave the way to a living hell. In contrast to Schmitt and Huntington, Machiavelli’s fundamental goal is to increase elite accountability to the *demos* and generate collective solidarity against oppression via a radical populist politics (but without forgetting or abandoning the rule of law), based on the humiliation of arrogant and corrupt elites.77 For Machiavelli, antagonism between antithetically positioned groups ensures the preservation of freedom: “The nobility vomit forth against the plebs the poison hid in their hearts.”78 The plebeians strike back through the popular hatred of elites.79 Extra-institutional means to secure elite accountability are not advanced by Machiavelli as a panacea, but Machiavelli argues that they are effective for venting popular hatred, building collective solidarity, and rebuilding public trust in shared governance.80 When Leo Strauss claims that “noble rhetoric”
should be wielded against the multitude to bridge the gulf between the masses and elites, this conclusion seems to be precisely what Machiavelli is arguing against.81 When the people find out that they have been duped, the people will avenge the wrong.

As long as political hatred is directed at its proper target (the ruling class), Machiavelli shows that hatred can provide a valuable political check on the arrogance and criminality of elites and lead to social transformation. But political hatred can do more. It can be a permanent force of insurrection and condition of a mass popular movement against a corrupt political order. Hatred can also prevent leaders from oppressing the people and abusing power. In the words of the Florentine political sage: “For all do wrong to the same extent when there is nothing to prevent them doing wrong.”82 And, the people only wish “not to be oppressed.”83

In these final quotes, resistance to oppression is cast as the necessary counterweight to political domination. Political hatred, and the collective solidarity it can trigger, names the beginning and the end of the fight against oppression. Given that hatred is both a problem linked to the formation of political identity and simultaneously a possible solution to political oppression, the repudiation of hatred as a topic worthy of investigation in favor of empathy, hope, and recognition might just turn out to be a symptom of the depth and hold that the reigning ideology has on us. Like it or not, hatred is here to stay. The question is whether hatred will continue to be used as a means to provide the empty solace of petty identity superiority to the masses at the price of real democratic accountability or whether hatred against the proper enemy (e.g., the ruling class) will be mobilized for greater political accountability and progressive political ends. Cast in this light, the Occupy Wall Street movement is a positive example of the deployment of political hatred via the identification of the 1 percent as the political enemy. The language of the 1 percent has fundamentally changed our political discourse and understanding of the role of the financial sector and corporate power play in determining the outcomes of political elections, policy choices, and the imposition of starvation on the people via debt, unemployment, and low wages. As the Occupy movement consolidated popular hatred against corporate elites and their puppet politicians, it also created relations within the movement that contested the hierarchical and increasingly unequal ones in the society via transparency, community, participatory democracy, and equality.