Early medieval China was a time of profound change.¹ The fall of the Han dynasty altered drastically the Chinese political and intellectual landscape. Leaving aside changes on the political front, which fall outside the scope of the present work, questions about “heaven” and the affairs of the world that seemed to have been fully resolved under the once sure and confident guide of Han Confucianism resurfaced and demanded fresh answers. In this context, new currents in philosophy, religion, and other domains clamored to the fore and left an indelible mark on the subsequent development of Chinese thought and culture. Although continuity is never entirely absent in historical and cultural change, early medieval China saw the rise of xuanxue (learning of the mysterious Dao), the establishment of religious Daoism, and the introduction of Buddhism that fueled major renovation in Chinese tradition. The eleven essays presented here address key aspects of these developments. In the companion to this volume, Interpretation and Literature in Early Medieval China, also published by SUNY Press (2010), a different team of scholars examine some of the equally important changes in hermeneutic orientation and literature and society.

The first five studies in this volume are devoted to xuanxue, the principal philosophical development in early medieval China. Xuanxue is complex and merits an introduction.² The word xuan depicts literally a shade of black with dark red.³ In the Shijing (Book of Poetry), for example, xuan is sometimes used to describe the color of fabrics or robes.⁴ Xuan is tropically paired with huang (yellow),⁵ and the two have come to be understood as the color of heaven and
earth, respectively. The *Yijing* (Book of Changes), indeed, explicitly states that “heaven is xuan [in color] and earth is yellow.” As the noted Eastern Han *Yijing* commentator Xun Shuang (128–190) explains: “Heaven is yang and starts from the northeast; thus its color is dark red. Earth is yin and starts from the southwest; thus its color is yellow.” Without going into the cosmological underpinnings of this reading, it should be clear at least how xuan has come to be invoked as a general emblem of heaven in later usage.

Chapter 1 of the *Laozi*, in its received eighty-one chapter form, as is well known, speaks of the Dao as xuan (cf. chapters 6, 10, 15, 51, 56, and 65). The question is, of course, What does it mean? An Eastern Han interpreter might not unreasonably consider xuan as referring to heaven here as well, as the *Heshang gong* commentary to the *Laozi*, for example, did, given the established meaning of the word. However, Wei-Jin scholars in the main saw much more in it than a direct reference to heaven. In engaging the *Laozi* anew, they contended that xuan harbors a deeper significance, signifying the utter impenetrability and profound mystery of the Dao, both in its radical transcendence and generative power. In a general sense, then, xuanxue denotes philosophical investigation of the unfathomable, profound, and mysterious Dao, although the term itself did not come into currency until later.

During the fifth century CE, xuanxue formed a part of the official curriculum at the imperial academy, together with Ru or “Confucian” learning, “literature” (wen) and “history” (shi). The subject matter of xuanxue (or better, “Xuanxue,” capitalized and without italics, as it is used as a proper noun) in this narrower, formal sense revolves especially around the *Yijing*, *Laozi*, and *Zhuangzi*—then collectively called the “three treatises on the mystery [of the Dao]” (sanxuan)—and selected commentaries to them. Later historians traced the origins of this scholarly tradition to the third century, or more precisely to the Zhengshi reign era (240–249) of the Wei dynasty, and applied the term xuanxue retrospectively to designate the perceived dominant intellectual current of Wei-Jin thought as a whole. This focuses attention on the general orientation of Wei-Jin philosophy, but it may give the wrong impression that xuanxue professes a single point of view. In traversing the world of thought in early medieval China, it is important to bear in mind that xuanxue in the general sense—as distinguished from a branch of official learning, which reflects political interest and is the result of a long process of intellectual distillation—encompasses a broad range of philosophical positions and does not represent a monolithic movement or “school.”
In the past, xuanxue was commonly translated as “Neo-Daoism” (or rather, “Neo-Taoism,” as most scholars then followed the Wade-Giles system of romanization). The idea was that as Han Confucianism lost its commanding appeal—deemed not only incapable of effecting order in a fragmented world but more damagingly as part of the problem that led to the downfall of the Han dynasty—a revival of Daoist philosophy came to the rescue in charting new intellectual directions for the elite in early medieval China. “Neo-Daoism” often came to be associated with a kind of “escapism” as well. Because celebrated scholar-officials (ningshi 名士) were frequently implicated in the incessant power struggles at court and more than a few suffered violent deaths as a consequence, they turned to, as it were, according to this view, “purer” pursuits in Daoist metaphysics and ontology away from political criticism.

There is little doubt that some scholars at the time considered the teachings of Han Confucianism problematic. In some respects, the ethos of the age embraces an iconoclastic counterculture movement, against the Confucian orthodoxy or “teaching of names” (mingjiao 名教), that is, the whole structure of rituals and morality sanctioned by Han traditions and justified as having their roots in the teachings of the ancient sages. There is also no reason not to believe that some were totally disgusted with the politics of the day and yearned for a life of simple quietude. Reclusion, indeed, was a major theme in the story of early medieval China, as Alan Berkowitz reminds us in his contribution to this volume. However, just as reclusion is far more complex than running away from a troubled world, the important point to note here is that neither “anti-Confucian” nor “escapist” captures the outlook of the majority of xuanxue scholars.

Most of the leading intellectuals in early medieval China remained committed to the quest for order, to finding ways to restore peace and prosperity to the land. They may have been interested in metaphysics and ontology, but as many of the authors assembled here emphasize, their philosophical investigation is not without practical aim. Indeed, one might venture that it is political philosophy and ethics that inform xuanxue. Moreover, although Wei-Jin scholars disagreed on many issues, almost all agreed that Confucius was the highest sage. The problem is not Confucius, in other words, but distortions of his teaching. From this perspective, xuanxue is fundamentally concerned with unlocking the profound mystery of the Dao by reinterpreting the teachings of Confucius and other sages, which are seen to have been eclipsed by the excesses of Han Confucian learning. Properly understood, the teachings of Confucius, Laozi, and other sages and near-sages converge in varying
degree in a deep understanding of the Dao as not only the *arche* and *telos* of heaven and earth but also the paradigmatic model or way of individual and political action. In this context, different interpretations of the one “Dao-centered” teaching vied for attention, which captured the imagination of the literati throughout early medieval China.

During the early years of the Wei dynasty, through the reigns of Emperor Wen 文 (Cao Pi 曹丕, r. 220–226) and Emperor Ming 明 (Cao Rui 曹叡, r. 227–239), a measure of order was restored. Political reform promised much-needed change and created an air of optimism. Emperor Ming was succeeded by Cao Fang 曹芳 (r. 240–254), who ascended the throne when he was still a young boy. His reign was initially named Zhengshi, “right beginning,” perhaps reflecting the hope that the Wei Empire would now flourish after a firm foundation had been laid. During the Zhengshi era, politics was dominated by two powerful statesmen: Cao Shuang 曹爽 (d. 249) and Sima Yi 司馬懿 (179–251), who were entrusted with guiding the young emperor and advancing the interests of the Wei ruling house. Cao Shuang proved the stronger of the two at first, until he was ousted by Sima Yi in a carefully engineered takeover in 249, which brought to a close not only the Zhengshi era but also effectively the rule of the Cao family, although the Sima clan did not formally abolish the reign of Wei and establish the Jin dynasty in its place until 265. During the Zhengshi era, new ideas blossomed, which sought to reclaim in different ways the perceived true teachings of the sages and worthies of old, as expressed in such classics as the *Yijing*, *Lunyu* (Analects), *Laozi*, and *Zhuangzi*. Later scholars often looked back to the Zhengshi period nostalgically as the “golden age” of a new kind of learning that has come to be remembered as *xuanxue*.

Whether or not there was in fact a tight Confucian “orthodoxy” during the Han dynasty may be open to debate; there is little disagreement, however, that there were attempts at forging one. Regardless of its content, orthodoxy seeks intellectual closure, a clear demarcation of the critical space in which a dialogue with tradition may be engaged. Toward the end of the Han period, critical challenges to certain elements of the Confucian edifice had already emerged. This gathered pace in the uncertain world of post-Han China. While it would be a mistake to conclude that early *xuanxue* scholars started with a completely blank slate, in which Confucian culture and learning had been obliterated, during the early years of the Wei dynasty, intellectual discourse flourished in relatively open surroundings, in which a thorough interrogation of tradition not only became possible but was also deemed a matter of urgency for the educated elite.
“Pure conversation” (qingtan 清談) debates were one main channel through which Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties intellectuals questioned tradition and shared their ideas. Qingtan was the distinctive mode of intellectual activity in early medieval China, in which men of letters gathered socially and debated on major philosophical issues of the day such as the relationship between “words” (yan 言) and “meaning” (yi 意) and that between a person’s “capacity” (cai 才) and inborn “nature” (xing 性). Almost without exception, the scholars later recognized as major xuanxue proponents were virtuosi in the art of argumentation. They also engaged in debates through writing—the many treatises or “discourses” (lun 論) they composed on these and other topics such as “nourishing life” (yangsheng 養生) and whether human beings are by nature inclined toward learning (ziran haoxue 自然好學) were expected to and often did attract spirited criticism, which in turn provided a platform for rejoinders and further debate. The most important medium of philosophical renewal, however, remained the composition of commentaries on key classical works, at which xuanxue scholars excelled and through which they bequeathed a lasting legacy to later scholars.

Prior to the Wei dynasty, the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, though certainly not unknown, were perhaps somewhat marginalized in a world dominated by Confucian learning. To the extent that these Daoist classics now took center stage, it is justified to speak of a revival of interest in philosophical Daoism. Inasmuch as xuanxue seeks to unveil the truth of the Dao, it is not entirely inappropriate to describe it as a kind of “Neo-Daoism.” The difficulty, of course, is that “Daoism” does not sufficiently distinguish the concept of Dao from the “Daoist” school. Brook Ziporyn, indeed, felt compelled to coin a term, “Daoishness,” precisely to mark this distinction in his presentation here (e.g., p. 109). Modern Chinese studies of xuanxue often characterize it as an attempt in interpreting Confucianism through the lens of Daoism. This presupposes a sharp partisan divide and seems less preferable to approaching xuanxue as a broad philosophical front that seeks to lay bare the ideal order of a Dao-centered world, which the sages not only understood but also embodied. Again, metaphysics and ethics merge in an effort to provide a new blueprint for order, which transcends narrow partisan concerns.

Recognizing that “Neo-Daoism” may not be a fitting translation of xuanxue, recent studies often favor the term “Dark Learning” or “Learning of the Dark”—the latter to emphasize that xuan functions as a noun in this construction. “Dark Learning” may be able to avoid the ambiguity that “Neo-Daoism” faces, but it is not without difficulty,
for while it highlights the ineffability of the Dao, it does not immediately convey the sense of profundity and sublimity that is part and parcel of the meaning of xuan in this context. More important, while the subject of the discourse may appear “dark,” the discourse itself is not. “Learning of the Dark” is grammatically clearer, but it may give the sense of something sinister. It is also not exactly economical and fares little better, in my view, than alternatives such as “learning of the mysterious Dao” or “learning of the profound” in stylistic terms. One should not forget that there are critics of xuanxue in early medieval China and later ages, who would employ the term xuan in a pejorative sense, as a type of discourse that is “dark,” obscure, and insubstantial, high-sounding but empty words at best, and at worst, a deliberate obfuscation, which if allowed to grow would spell doom to good government. To avoid misunderstanding, xuanxue may be better left untranslated, though not unexplained.

A full discussion of xuanxue will have to be undertaken separately in a different venue. These introductory remarks should suffice to place the five studies on xuanxue that follow in a general context. A leading political and intellectual figure of the Zhengshi era was He Yan (d. 249). Though widely recognized as one of the “founding” figures of xuanxue, his contribution to early medieval Chinese philosophy has not been adequately examined. Focusing on the surviving fragments of He Yan’s “Discourse on Dao” (“Dao lun 道論”), “Discourse on the Nameless” (“Wuming lun 無名論”), and other writings, I argue that He Yan offers a coherent account of the Dao and its ethical embodiment in the sage, based on a particular construal of the concepts of “namelessness” and “harmony.” The Dao is nameless and may be described as “nothing” (wu 無), as the Laozi especially has made clear, but this does not entail that it is “lacking” in any way. On the contrary, for He Yan, the Dao is nameless not because it is ontologically empty but because it is complete, an integral fullness in its pristine state that does not admit of distinctions. This has important ethical and political implications. As little of He Yan’s writings have been preserved, any reconstruction of his explication of Dao cannot but involve a relatively heavy dose of conjecture. In my paper, I refer at some length to the Renwu zhi 人物志 (An Account of Human Capacities) by Liu Shao 劉邵, a senior contemporary of He Yan, which may be compared with Zong-qi Cai’s discussion in his essay, “Evolving Practices of Guan and Liu Xie’s [劉勰, ca. 465–ca. 532] Theory of Literary Interpretation,” in the companion volume.

Zhengshi xuanxue is represented especially by He Yan and Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249). The two studies by Jude Chua and Tze-ki Hon are
devoted to the latter and complement each other well. Wang Bi’s influence on the subsequent development of Chinese philosophy is immense. Though politically a protégé of He Yan, Wang Bi proved more than the former’s equal in philosophical accomplishment. Wang broke new ground in radically reinterpreting the *Yijing* and the *Laozi*, and in so doing, perhaps more than anyone else had, brought into focus some of the key questions that shaped philosophical discourse in early medieval China. In his study, Chua focuses on the semiotic and political roots of Wang Bi’s interpretation of the *Laozi*, whereas Hon undertakes a detailed analysis of the political dimension of Wang Bi’s *Yijing* commentary.

For Chua, fundamentally it is Wang Bi’s analysis of the relationship between “names” (*ming* 名) and “forms” (*xing* 形), or more precisely the priority of forms over names, that provides a basis for his larger philosophical enterprise. “All names arise from forms,” as Wang Bi declares; “never has a form arisen from a name” (53). This finds a ready parallel in the relationship between moral substance and reputation—without the former, Wang Bi is saying, the latter would be empty, which is also to say that the promise of fame and the benefit that goes with it will not yield genuine moral order. For this reason, the sage-ruler abides by the “nameless” and “nonaction” (*wuwei* 無為) in realizing peace and order, the desired political outcome. It is this and not any metaphysical logic that guides Wang Bi’s new interpretation of Dao as “nothing” or “nonbeing” (*wu* 無). In other words, the move from a theory of language to ethics and politics and finally to metaphysics is facilitated not so much by philosophical means as by literary “equivocation.” Seen in this light, Chua also argues, some of the main differences in current Wang Bi scholarship can be resolved.

For Hon, a close reading of Wang Bi’s *Yijing* commentary shows how Wang carefully negotiated a view of government that reflects the political realities of his day, seeking a delicate balance between the need for centralized control and local collaboration, and between decisive reform and prudence in implementation. Importantly, Hon compares Wang Bi’s understanding of the *Yijing* with that of several Eastern Han commentators, a subject that has not been addressed in any detail by Western scholars previously. Whereas Eastern Han scholars typically focused on the images of the trigrams or hexagrams and devised elaborate techniques to allow the interpreter to map out fully the perceived system of hexagrams and their cosmological references, Wang Bi took a different approach in arguing that the hexagrams are symbols that depict concrete situations and affairs, bringing into view the dynamics of change. Applied to politics, what is critical is how the ruler understands and responds to
each situation, and how he is able to employ the different elements at
play, such as the six lines of a hexagram, to contribute to the good of
the larger whole.

Together with Wang Bi, Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) helped to secure
the place of xuanxue in the history of Chinese philosophy. A brilli-
ant interpreter of the Zhuangzi, Guo Xiang earned the praise of his
contemporaries as being “second only to Wang Bi.” Indeed, Guo’s
commentary on the Zhuangzi, notwithstanding its possible indebtedness
to the earlier effort of Xiang Xiu 项秀 (ca. 227–280), was instrumental
to the transmission of the Daoist classic itself. Brook Ziporyn puts
forward a provocative interpretation of the concept of li—"the under-
lying ‘pattern,’ ‘principle,’ or ‘coherence’ of things and affairs"—in
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.

The concept of li figures centrally in early medieval Chinese intel-
lectual discourse and has impacted strongly the development of both
Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. The general scholarly
consensus is that whereas Wang Bi traces all phenomena to a single
ontological principle, Guo Xiang locates the meaning of Dao in the
plenitude and diversity of beings. In direct opposition to this view,
Ziporyn argues that it is Wang Bi who developed “a theory of distinc-
tive individual principles of things” (97 and 127), and that for Guo
Xiang there is only one “principle” that underlies the phenomenal
world—namely, that of "naturalness" or "self-so-ness" (ziran 自
然). Whereas for Wang Bi, a “mini-Dao,” so to speak, informs each
conge concrete situation—a point that recalls Tze-ki Hon’s analysis of Wang
Bi’s reading of the Yijing—for Guo Xiang, ziran signifies an entity as
such—its “true self” and “the very process of its becoming” (120).

In this sense, while it would be appropriate to speak of “principles”
in Wang Bi’s new account of Dao, Guo Xiang’s li signals but the
facticity of being, prior to the arising of value distinction, emotional
attachment, and other “traces” of experience; as such, li is no principle
at all, if we mean by it an underlying, immanent structure that sets out
the particular meaning, value, or raison d’être of a thing. If accepted,
this would change considerably the way in which the history of Chinese
philosophy has been written. Ziporyn also distinguishes between an
“ironic” and “non-ironic” sense of Dao and li, which form the back-
ground to not only the philosophy of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang but also
xuanxue as a whole.

With the close of the Zhengshi era and the passing of He Yan and
Wang Bi in 249, as studies of Wei-Jin thought often assert, the first
phase of xuanxue also came to an end. The next chapter of the xuanxue
story is usually given to the “Seven Worthies (or Sages) of the Bamboo Grove” (zhulin qixian 竹林七賢), a remarkable group of intellectuals who were gifted not only philosophically but also artistically, and who enjoy extraordinary recognition even today. Among them, Xi Kang 稽康 (or Ji Kang in modern Chinese pronunciation, 223/224–262), Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210–263), and Xiang Xiu are generally recognized as particularly important for their contribution to Chinese music, poetry, and philosophy.

In terms of age, they were contemporaries of He Yan and Wang Bi; as such, they do not constitute a second generation of xuanxue scholars. However, they did have to contend with the harsh political realities that appeared after the Zhengshi era, when the Wei government came under the control of Sima Shi 司馬師 (208–255) and Sima Zhao 司馬昭 (211–265), the two sons of Sima Yi, who were more than keen in eliminating any opposition to their dominance. Xi Kang was related to the Cao family by marriage and died at the hand of the Sima regime. Ulrike Middendorf, in her study of Xi Kang’s famous essay, “Sheng wu aile lun” 聲無哀樂論 (Discourse on [the nature of] sounds [as] not having sorrow or joy)—a work deemed so important and of such influence that no self-respecting intellectual in early medieval China could afford to ignore16—seeks to bring out its structure and political undertones.

Middendorf first provides a concise account of the Confucian view of music and shows how the concept of “harmony,” or more precisely “harmonious sound” (hesheng 和聲), undergirds Xi Kang’s musical theory and political philosophy. Harmony captures more than a musical ideal; it brings into view a conception of the nature of the sage, as Xi Kang plays on the “paronomasia” (143) of the two Chinese words, shēng 声 (sound) and shèng 聰 (sage), and a vision of political order—a vision that, perhaps surprisingly, has a “Xunzian ring” to it (153). Furthermore, as Middendorf argues, Xi Kang’s essay should be understood in the context of the political turmoil of his day. This study connects well with the chapter on He Yan and Tze-ki Hon’s discussion of Wang Bi. The relationship between “names” and “actuality” and the concept of li (principle or coherence) also feature centrally in Xi Kang’s essay, which invites comparison with the studies by Jude Chua and Brook Ziporyn. Sharing basically the same philosophical vocabulary and grappling with the same fundamental issues in ethics and politics, xuanxue discourses understandably strike a similar pose. Family resemblances, however, do not translate into uniformity. What these studies show is that xuanxue is richly complex. As opposed to being a homogeneous school of thought, one could say it constitutes, rather, a
field of contested meaning, in which different interpretations of Dao, especially their application in ethics and politics, are put forward for debate. Middendorf’s paper also contains extensive references to the secondary literature, which should prove useful to students of Wei-Jin thought and culture.

The Jin dynasty came to an end in 420, followed by a series of short-lived dynasties in both north and south China. While “pure conversation” continued with undiminished rigor, debating old xuanxue favorites such as “nourishing life,” “words and meaning,” and “sounds not having sorrow or joy,” it did not produce too many new ideas. No doubt, xuanxue was made a part of the official curriculum, but it was religious Daoism and Buddhism that saw the most exhilarating development.

Religious Daoism has deep roots, but as an organized religion its historical beginnings may be traced to the Eastern Han dynasty, with the establishment of the “Way of the Celestial Master” (Tianshi dao 天師道). As is well known, the founding of the Tianshi dao is predicated on a new revelation of the Dao given to Zhang Ling 張陵 (or Zhang Daoling 張道陵, as he is also called, in recognition of his achievement in Dao) in 142 by the “Most High Lord Lao,” that is, the divine Laozi. A crucial issue in the study of early religious Daoism is the relationship between the Way of the Celestial Master and local, “popular” religious beliefs and practices. This is the issue that Chi-tim Lai examines in his contribution to this volume.

In particular, drawing from a large number of religious Daoist sources, Lai focuses on the ritual of submitting “personal writs” (shoushu 手書) to the divine officials of “heaven, earth, and water”—an act of confession for the expiation of sin, which is understood to be the direct cause of diseases and calamities—as a unifying thread that binds the various strands of early Celestial Master Daoist beliefs and rituals together. The “Three Officials” (sanguan 三官) are seen to be the very “emanations of the qi of the Dao” (187), who represent the “correct law” (zhengfa 正法) and with whom the devotees enter into a solemn covenant (182). While the early Tianshi dao cannot but be indebted to certain local religious traditions, as a comparison with some of the Han “apocryphal” literature (chenwei 詩緯) and “tomb-quelling texts” (zhenmu wen 墳墓文) demonstrates, it distinguishes itself through its conception of the divine administration of justice and the promise of redemption through confession and petition to celestial officials. Many of the examples that Lai cites show vividly not only the pervasive concern with disease and morality but also the centrality of the family
in the early medieval Chinese religious imagination, a theme Stephen Bokenkamp examines closely in his study here.

During the Eastern Jin dynasty, the rapidly growing religious Daoist tradition was ripe for reform and expansion. Two new sects emerged—namely, the Shangqing 上清 (commonly translated as “Highest Clarity” or “Highest Purity”) and Lingbao 靈寶 (Numinous Treasure). Bokenkamp’s essay focuses on the latter, especially its alleged borrowings from Buddhism. “Influence” is never simple. Rather than seeing the Lingbao masters simplistically as “surrendering” to Buddhist insights, Bokenkamp argues cogently that they “explicitly manipulate them in ways that served to reassert traditional Chinese values, to answer certain questions, or solve certain problems” (204). The central notion of “rebirth” in Lingbao scriptures may have been taken from Buddhism, but the way in which it is interpreted in the light of family ties and concerns, including the fate of one’s departed ancestors, renders it distinctively Chinese. The hermeneutic thrust of Bokenkamp’s approach brings into sharp relief the need to take into account the intended audience of Daoist scriptures, and what matters to them. If the Tianshi dao of the Eastern Han can be seen as a “reformation” of Chinese popular religion, as Lai suggests, resulting in a new religious Daoist identity, Lingbao Daoism saw its mission as reforming existing Daoist practices, directing its numerous injunctions not at Buddhism or local cults but at the Daoist community itself. The two essays by Lai and Bokenkamp both bring out important ethical issues that confronted the development of religious Daoism in early medieval China. Bokenkamp’s may also be profitably compared with the essay by Robert Campany, “Narrative in the Self-Presentation of Transcendence-Seekers,” in the companion volume.

Regardless of when Buddhism was first introduced into China, by the late Eastern Han dynasty it was beginning to make its presence felt. The period of disunity that followed proved conducive to the flourishing of new ideas and practices, and yielded fertile ground for Buddhism to sink its roots in China. There was then an urgent need to explain Buddhist doctrines and to translate Buddhist terms and concepts into Chinese. One important hermeneutical tool that emerged in this context was geyi 格義, usually translated as “matching concepts” or “matching meanings.” By means of geyi, as it is generally understood, individual Buddhist terms and concepts were matched with existing Chinese, especially Daoist, terms, which then made it possible for the new foreign religion to find ready acceptance in early medieval China. But is this really what geyi meant?
Victor Mair challenges the conventional understanding of *geyi* and argues that it “was not a translation technique at all but an exegetical method” (227), designed specifically to handle the large supply of numbered lists of concepts such as the four noble truths and the twelve links of dependent origination in Buddhist texts. It did not work, according to Mair, and was phased out quickly, for unlike the Indian tradition, the Chinese evidently did not invest nearly as much in organizing and presenting their ideas in enumerated lists. How, then, did *geyi* come to be understood as “matching concepts” and assigned a central role in the story of the Buddhist “conquest” of China? Mair traces this also in his analysis, which is certain to ignite debates among students of Chinese Buddhism.

The development of Buddhism in early medieval China is nothing less than spectacular. Both in the north and the south, Buddhism gained fervent following by a large number of elite clans, including royal families, and began to spread widely among the populace. Royal patronage was instrumental to the success of Buddhism then. Emperor Wen of Song (Liu Yilong 劉義隆, r. 424–453), for example, is well known to have been a staunch supporter of the Buddhist faith. During the Southern Qi dynasty, the devotion of Xiao Zilang 蕭子良 (460–494), Prince of Jingling 竟陵, to Buddhism is equally well known. In the north, although twice, in 446 and 547, Buddhism came under the attack of the state, it flourished throughout the Northern Dynasties. Of all the royal patrons of Buddhism during this time, probably none was more devout and influential than Emperor Wu 武 of Liang (Xiao Yan 蕭衍, r. 502–549) in the south, who was not only a generous benefactor but also a member of the sangha, who several times “gave himself” (*sheshen* 捨身) to the Buddhist order; that is to say, surrendered his status as emperor and lived as a monk.

Emperor Wu is often praised in Buddhist sources as the “emperor bodhisattva” par excellence. Indeed, the Emperor took to identifying himself as the “Pusajie dizi huangdi” 僧伽戒弟子皇帝, “Emperor-disciple of the bodhisattva precepts,” as Kathy Ku points out in her study. Moreover, Ku argues that in this case the “emperor bodhisattva” ideal should be understood more finely in terms of the Indian tradition of *Buddha-rāja*, that is, someone who is Buddha and rāja (king) at once (275). Even more specifically, on the basis of not only textual but also iconographic evidence, Ku suggests that Emperor Wu looked to the tradition of the *Buddha-rāja* Maitreya in his attempt to fashion an exemplary Buddhist kingdom in southern China. This goes beyond clarifying a technical point in the history of Chinese Buddhism, but brings into
view both religious and political motivation in the spread of Buddhism. Like Mair’s study, this, too, should provoke some debate.

Religious Daoism and Buddhism are large topics, but the four essays outlined above should give some insight into the lush religious landscape of early medieval China. Several essays in the companion volume also touch on religion—besides Campany’s contribution referred to earlier, Timothy Wai-keung Chan’s study of “Jade Flower’ and the Motif of Mystic Excursion in Early Religious Daoist Poetry,” Cynthia Chennault’s “Representing the Uncommon: Temple-Visit Lyrics from the Liang to Sui Dynasties,” and Mu-chou Poo’s “Justice, Morality, and Skepticism in Six Dynasties Ghost Stories” should be of particular interest.21

The two essays that close this volume address larger themes, cutting across different domains of the Chinese intellectual world. As mentioned, Alan Berkowitz scrutinizes the widespread phenomenon of reclusion in early medieval China. The ideal of reclusion can hardly be reduced to a kind of one-dimensional “hiding” from political turmoil, although there is no denying that politics was fraught with peril at that time. Those who turned to reclusion did so for a variety of reasons, as Berkowitz points out after a historical introduction, including what we would call today lifestyle choices. Nor should reclusion be branded simplistically a partisan “Confucian” or “Daoist” pursuit. Significantly, whereas in ancient China reclusion entailed sociopolitical withdrawal, many early medieval Chinese recluses remained deeply engaged both socially and politically, though they might have renounced public office. Indeed, there is little reason why “high-minded” or worthy individuals should not be “allowed to freely transition between reclusion and office, office and reclusion” (307). “Reclusion within the court” (307) and “noetic reclusion” (308), that is, reclusion as a state of mind, further added to the complexity of the tradition. As reclusion became an integral part of mainstream high culture, embraced by the scholar-official class as a whole, it found expression in a range of forms and contexts. This study makes a strong case for a “thick” analysis of early medieval Chinese culture, probing beyond abstract ideological motivation to uncover the contexts and conditions that mattered to real individuals.

The concept of “destiny” (ming 命) is probably one of the most powerful concepts in the history of Chinese thought. Its presence in Chinese culture is virtually ubiquitous, from antiquity to the present. Yuet-Keung Lo surveys ideas of destiny and retribution in early medieval China. The concept of ming, of course, has a long history; but the decline of the Han dynasty threw into question earlier assumptions
and compelled reinterpretation. Does *ming* entail a kind of “hard” determinism that precludes human intervention, or could a “softer” rendition of *ming* accommodate the efficacy of moral pursuits?

Framed this way, Lo examines the concept of “retribution” (chengfu ӵᾱ㠵) in the *Taiping jing* 太平經 and the *Xiang’er* 想爾 commentary on the *Laozi*, both important scriptures of early religious Daoism, and how it negotiates between “hard destiny” and “soft destiny.” The religious Daoists were certainly not alone in this effort; as Lo goes on to show, the concept of destiny plays an equally important role in early medieval Confucian learning and *xuanxue* philosophy. In particular, the concept of *ziran* in Wang Bi and Guo Xiang reflects different attempts at coming to terms with the perceived reality of *ming*. “Hard” destiny proved difficult to refute, giving rise to a widely shared and deeply felt “romantic spirit of general despair” (336) among the literati. Finally, Lo turns to the Buddhist concept of karma, arguing that its success “lies in its removal of the contradictions inherent in the chengfu theory by introducing the idea of individual karma and rejecting the worldview of hard destiny” (337), thereby opening “an optimistic vista” to “a sustainable belief in human ability to mould a person’s destiny” (342).

The studies by Berkowitz and Lo both bring into view the intricate terrain of early medieval Chinese philosophy and religion, which probably no single book could exhaust. The present volume makes but a modest effort in focusing attention on it, from an interdisciplinary perspective, which we believe offers significant methodological advantage. One consistent message that emerges from these studies, besides the richness of the field, is that the world of philosophy and religion in early medieval China was preoccupied with practical concerns. Even *xuanxue*, which can soar into abstract heights, with its interest in fathoming the roots of all things and affairs in the Dao, proves decidedly “earthbound,” strongly tied to the world of ethics and politics. Philosophers, just as recluses, scholar-officials, princes and emperors, Daoist adepts and Buddhist monks, could not but respond in different ways to the challenges that marked early medieval China, even if some were captivated by the mystery of the Dao or the promise of “otherworldly” transcendence. Together with the nine essays on interpretation and literature in the companion volume, the studies here hope to provide a ready point of departure for further research.

No attempt has been made to standardize the translation of Chinese terms in this or the companion work. For example, whereas Chua emphasizes that *xuanxue* should be understood particularly in the sense of “Studies of the Profound,” Mair opts for “Dark/Abstruse/Mysterious/
Metaphysical Learning” (243), to bring out the different connotations of the term xuan. Translation is ultimately a form of interpretation. Some differences, admittedly, are essentially stylistic—for example, whereas Stephen Bokenkamp and I translate “Tianshi dao” as the “Way of the Celestial Master,” Chi-tim Lai prefers “Heavenly Master,” in agreement with a number of other scholars of religious Daoism. Nevertheless, the principle of authorial judgment takes precedence. The different translations on offer serve to invite a fuller exploration of the world of philosophy and religion in early medieval China.

Chinese characters are provided for important terms and extended quotations, so that the reader can engage the primary sources directly. The characters for the Chinese dynasties, however, will appear only in the Introduction and are not repeated in the essays. Transliterations are omitted generally for phrases that exceed four characters. The Chinese texts cited are punctuated in the way the authors understand them. All Chinese terms are given in Hanyu pinyin, except for the names of some authors who publish in English (e.g., Wing-tsit Chan), titles of books and articles, and some proper names (e.g., Taipei, Yangtze). Wade-Giles transliterations are also kept in quotations, to preserve the integrity of the original, with pinyin equivalents given in parenthesis.

Research for this volume was supported by a grant from the National University of Singapore (R-106-000-010-112), for which we are grateful. This allowed two consultations in Shanghai and Singapore, at which the majority of the contributors presented their initial findings. The authors would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of SUNY Press for their helpful comments, as well as the editorial team at SUNY, under the leadership of Nancy Ellegate. Rosna Buang was more than helpful in keeping our research account in order, and Bendick Ong and Chuen-hwee Kam provided much appreciated help in preparing the manuscript for publication.

Alan K. L. Chan  
Singapore

Notes

1. “Early medieval China” is not an exact term. It is now generally used by Western scholars to refer to the period of Chinese history that spans between the fall of the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and the founding of the Sui 隋 dynasty (589–618), corresponding to the period known as “Wei Jin Nanbeichao” 魏晉南北朝 (Wei, Jin, and the Southern and Northern Dynasties) in Chinese historiography. However, few would
Introduction

object if the term is stretched fifty or so years at either end; that is to say, from the last years of the Eastern or Later Han dynasty (25–220) to the early years of the Tang 唐 (618–907), after which China may be said to have entered its high Middle Ages.

For readers who may not be familiar with early medieval China, the Wei (220–265) followed the Han in official Chinese “dynastic” histories, although it had to share the “Central States” (zhongguo 中國) or more generally the “world under heaven” (tianxia 天下) with two rival kingdoms—the Shu 蜀 (221–263) in the Sichuan area and the Wu 吳 (222–280) south of the Yangtze River. The term “Three Kingdoms” (sanguo 三國) is thus also used to designate this period of Chinese history. The Jin (265–420) succeeded the Wei and reunified China for a short time. Beset with internal struggles and external threats from the start, however, it suffered a major defeat in 311 by the Xiongnu 匈奴 under Liu Cong 劉聰 (d. 318), who captured the Jin capital Luoyang 洛陽. The Jin ruling house rallied around Emperor Min 悯 (Sima Ye 司馬郕, r. 313–317) in Chang’an 長安; but the respite was temporary and the Western Jin dynasty (265–316) soon came to an end. The Jin court was reconstituted in Jiankang 建康 (modern Nanjing), east of Luoyang, south of the Yangtze River, under Sima Rui 睿 (276–322), who assumed the title King of Jin in 317 and a year later, Emperor Yuan 元, the first emperor of the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420).

The Eastern Jin enjoyed a period of relative peace. The large-scale migration of especially upper-class families from the north transformed not only the political scene but also the southern Chinese cultural milieu. After the Eastern Jin, a series of four dynasties ruled the south; namely, Song 宋 (420–479), Qi 齊 (479–502), Liang 梁 (502–557), and Chen 陳 (557–589). These are the “Southern Dynasties”; the Song is often referred to as “Liu-Song” 劉宋, as the authors here do, after the name of its rulers, to distinguish it from the later Song dynasty (960–1279). In discussions of post-Han developments in the south, the term “Six Dynasties” (liuchao 六朝) is also generally used, as it is in some of the essays here, which refers to the Kingdom of Wu, the Eastern Jin, and the four Southern Dynasties. All six had their capital in Jiankang (or Jianye 建鄕, as the city was called when it served as the capital of Wu). In the north, from the start of the fourth century to 439, some sixteen kingdoms were founded, mainly by members of the Xiongnu, Qie 羌, Xianbei 鲜卑, Di 氐, and Qiang 羌 ethnic groups, collectively called “Hu” 胡. There were more than five such groups, and more than sixteen kingdoms rose and fell during this period; nevertheless, traditional Chinese history, written from the ethnic Han perspective, uniformly laments the invasion of the five Hu “barbarian” groups and the “Sixteen Kingdoms” that “ravaged” the north. In 439, the Northern Wei 北魏 (386–534) under its Xianbei ruler Tuoba Tao 拓跋道 triumphed over its rivals and largely unified the north. This marked
the start of the Northern Dynasties. The Northern Wei eventually was split into two and succeeded by the Northern Qi 北齊 (550–577) and the Northern Zhou 北周 (557–581). For a historical introduction to early medieval China, see Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, fourth edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chapter VII.

Though “early medieval China” is now widely used, we are aware that some scholars may consider the label “medieval” inappropriate, for a significant divide separates post-Han China from medieval Europe in political, economic, and other terms. “Early imperial China” may be a less problematic alternative, according to this view, although it does not quite distinguish the Han from the period of disunity that followed; or, to avoid the debate altogether, “Wei Jin Nanbeichao” or “Six Dynasties” should be used. This is not the issue that the authors in this project set out to resolve. What is not in dispute is that the period of Chinese history in question is important and perhaps has not been given sufficient attention in Western scholarship. The excellent essays in *State and Society in Early Medieval China*, edited by Albert Dien (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), focusing primarily on social and political history, provided a much needed impetus for research in this field. The recent arrival of Zong-qi Cai’s edited volume, *Chinese Aesthetics: The Ordering of Literature, the Arts, and the Universe in the Six Dynasties* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004) hopefully signals renewed interest in early medieval China. Between 1990 and 2004, there are fine collections and individual studies such as Charles Holcombe’s *In the Shadow of the Han: Literati Thought and Society at the Beginning of the Southern Dynasties* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), Robert F. Campany’s *Strange Writing: Anomaly Accounts in Early Medieval China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), Alan Berkowitz’s *Patterns of Disengagement: The Practice and Portrayal of Reclusion in Early Medieval China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), and Scott Pearce, Audrey Spiro, and Patricia Ebrey, eds., *Culture and Power in the Reconstitution of the Chinese Realm, 200–600* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001). This is not an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, there remains much room for further, especially interdisciplinary research in English on early medieval China.

Introduction

1. The Han dynasty lexicon, *Shuowen jiezi* gives two meanings for the word “xuan”: (1) “hidden and far” (*youyuan*), and (2) “black with dark red” (黒而有赤色); see Xu Shen (fl. 100), with commentary by Duan Yucai (1735–1815), *Shuowen jiezi zhu* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1988), 159.

2. For example, see the poems “Qiyue” 七月 (Mao no. 154), “Caishu” 采菽 (Mao no. 222), and “Hanyi” 韓奕 (Mao no. 261). In some poems, it may be more generally rendered “dark”—e.g., “xuan niao” 玄鳥 (Mao no. 303 “Xuan niao”) and “xuan wang” 玄王 (Mao no. 304 “Changfa” 長發) may be taken to mean “dark bird” and “dark king,” respectively, although the former has also been more specifically identified as the swallow. See Arthur Waley, trans., *The Book of Songs* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), 275–77.

3. The poem “He cao bu huang” 何草不黄 (Mao no. 234) opens with these lines: “Every plant is yellow [huang]; everyday we march (何草不黄, 何日不行) . . . / Every plant is purple [xuan]; every man is torn from his wife (何草不玄, 何人不矜) . . . .” As translated in James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, volume 4, *The She King* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 424. Cf. Waley, *The Book of Songs*, 121.

4. The sixth or top line of hexagram #2, “Kun” 坤, reads: “Dragons war in the wilds; their blood, dark-red and yellow” (戰龍於野, 其血玄黄). The “Wenyan” 文言 commentary to this hexagram explains, “Now, ‘dark-red and yellow’ refer to a mixture [of the color] of heaven and earth. Heaven is dark red [in color], and earth is yellow” (玄黃者, 天地之雜也, 天玄而地黃). See Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574–648), *Zhouyi zhengyi* 周易正義, in *Zhouyi zhushu ji buzheng* 周易注疏及補正, *Shisanjing zhushu* 十三經注疏 edition (Taipei: Shijie, 1968), 1.7a–7b.


6. Heshang gong, or the “old master by the river,” is a legendary figure who is said to have taught and transmitted his commentary on the *Laozi* to Emperor Wen 文 of Han (r. 179–157 BCE). I would date the commentary to the Eastern Han period, although some scholars are of the view that it is a later product of the Southern Dynasties; see my *Two Visions of the Way*, chapter 3, and “The Formation of the He-shang Kung [Heshang gong] Legend,” in *Sages and Filial Sons: Mythology and Archaeology in Ancient China*, ed. Julia Ching and R. W. L. Guisso (Hong Kong:
Chinese University Press, 1991), 101–34. Consistently, the Heshang gong commentary renders “xuan” as “heaven” (e.g., commentary to Laozi chapters 1, 6, 15, and 65). See Zheng Chenghai 鄭成海, Laozi Heshang gong zhu jiaoli 老子河上公章解理 (Taipei: Zhonghua, 1971), 9, 40, 93, and 397. The Xiang’er 想爾 commentary to the Laozi, a religious Daoist document that is generally traced to around 200 ce, likewise interprets xuan as heaven (chapters 10 and 15); see Rao Zongyi 饒宗頤, Laozi Xiang’er zhu jiaozheng 老子想爾注校正 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1991), 13 and 18. The influential Eastern Han commentator Gao You 高誘 (fl. 205–212) also understood xuan to mean heaven in his commentary to the Huainanzi 淮南子 (e.g., chapter 1, “Yuan Dao xun” 原道訓); see Huainan honglie jijie 淮南鴻烈集解, Xinbian zhuzi jicheng 新編諸子集成 edition (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1989), 23 and 36.

9. See, for example, the Song shu 宋書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 93.2293–94; cf. Nan shi 南史 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1975), 2.45–46. Also see Nan Qi shu 南齊書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 16.315. For a discussion, see Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 3. References to the standard “dynastic” histories in this book are all from the modern Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 punctuated edition and will be cited by their juan 卷 and page numbers.

10. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 7, discusses the earliest references to this term in Chinese sources.


12. These two debates have been translated in Henricks, Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China, 21–70 and 135–43.

13. For example, see Xu Kangsheng et al., Wei-Jin xuanxue shi, 27; and Gao Chenyang 高晨陽, Ru Dao huitong yu Zhengshi xuanxue 儒道會通與正始玄學 (Ji’nan: Qi-Lu, 2000), chapter 7.


16. Xi Kang’s “Sheng wu aile lun” and Zhong Hui’s 鍾會 (225–264) treatise on four views of the root relationship between capacity and nature (“Caixing siben” 才性四本), according to Wang Sengqian 王僧虔 (426–485), were standard fare for debaters during the Southern Qi dynasty; see Nan Qi shu 南齊書, 33.598.
17. According to Shishuo xinyu, 4.21, “when Chancellor Wang Tao [王導] emigrated south of the Yangtze River, he conversed on only three topics: ‘Musical Sounds Are Without Sorrow or Joy’ (Sheng wu ai-lo [Sheng wu aile]), “Nourishment of Life” (Yang-sheng), and ‘Words Fully Express Meanings’ (Yen chin-i [Yan jinyi 言盡意]), and nothing else.” As translated in Richard Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-yü: A New Account of Tales of the World, 102; cf. Yang Yong Shishuo xinyu jiaojian, 162.


19. See the studies by Isabelle Robinet on the “Shangqing—Highest Clarity” and Yamada Toshiaki on “The Lingbao School” in Daoism Handbook, 196–224 and 225–55, respectively.


21. Zong-qi Cai’s study on Liu Xie has been mentioned earlier. In addition, the companion volume also features the following: David R. Knechtges, “Court Culture in the Late Eastern Han: The Case of the Hongdu Gate School”; Jui-lung Su, “The Patterns and Changes of Literary Patronage in the Han and Wei”; Michael Nylan, “Wandering in the Ruins: The Shuijing zhu Reconsidered”; and Daniel Hsieh, “Fox as Trickster in Early Medieval China.”