The Unfolding of the Task

THE FIRST TWO sentences of the work read:

Philosophical investigations concerning the essence of human freedom can in part concern the right concept of freedom, for although the feeling of freedom is immediately stamped in each, the fact of freedom lies in no way so near to the surface that merely to express it in words would not require a more than usual purity and depth of sense; in part the investigations can concern the connection (Zusammenhang) of this concept with the whole of a scientific (wissenschaftlichen) world-view. Since however, no concept can be determined separately, and the demonstration of its connection with the whole also first provides the final scientific completion, this must especially be the case with the concept of freedom since, if it is to have reality in general (überhaupt Realität), it must be no mere subordinate or incidental concept, but rather one of the governing central points (Mittelpunkte) of the system: therefore, both these sides of the investigation here fall together into one (fallen . . . in eins zusammen).1 (336)

Like the long, dense opening sentence of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Schelling’s first words invite and require much unpacking. In them, the entire problematic of the Freedom Essay is traced out. These first words contain neither declarations nor theses, and they are as far as possible from being arbitrary assertions. Rather, they are provocations. As philosophical provocations, they are not just external spurs to thought. Rather, provocation itself belongs to the nature of Schelling’s thought. As I will attempt to show in what follows, such provocations drive the movement
of this text from a necessarily unresolved matter to its subsequent plane. The essay even concludes with a further provocation.

In service to the task of unpacking Schelling's introductory words, I offer the following:

1. Philosophical investigations, properly understood, do not occur in parts, the sum of which comprises a whole. Rather, the whole provides and pervades parts. Together with fellow students Fichte, Hegel, and Hölderlin, Schelling shared a passion for Spinoza and the ambition to fashion a unified system of philosophy. Their motto was "hen kai pan," "the one and the all," which recalls the "hen panta" ("one is all") of Heraclitus. For Schelling, one and all, part and whole, are the same. The demonstration of the connection of parts with the whole first provides the final (letzte) completion. Thus, whereas philosophical investigations are presented in parts and successively, in the ultimate sense part and whole are simultaneous. One can speak of the sameness of first and last. But how? This is the first provocation that will lead into the Freedom Essay proper.

   It is worth noting that Schelling begins the first sentence by speaking in the plural ("investigations") and concludes the second by speaking of sides of a (singular) investigation. This suggests that the task of philosophical investigation itself involves gathering a many into a one, gathering parts into the whole, serving as the place where they show their sameness. Another provocation: How can mere investigation accomplish such a task?

2. Philosophical investigations are by their nature bound up with science and system. "Science in general—its content may be whatever it will—is a whole that stands under the form of unity. This is only possible insofar as all parts of it are subordinated to one condition; each part, however, is determined by another only insofar as it itself is determined through that one condition." System comes from the Greek sunhistamai meaning "to stand together" (sun- "together", histemi, "stand"). In Greek, the word we normally translate as science, episteme, also includes histemi. In attending to the Greek, one can discern the kinship of science and system for Schelling more easily.

The German, Wissenschaft, might best be rendered in English as "state of knowing" (Wissen-schaft). One would therefore miss the core of Schelling's thought by reading in our contemporary understanding of science, either as a nominal heading for the natural (and/or human) sciences or as a particular disciplinary method of inquiry. Philosophy as system of science means that philosophy articulates the unity of the whole as such. The system of science is the presentation of hen kai pan.
3. Philosophical investigations require an unusual purity and depth.
“The realm of the sciences is not a democracy, still less an ochlocracy, but an aristocracy in the most precious sense.” For Schelling, philosophy is esoteric by nature. While this most certainly implies the division of the many and the excellent few, hoi polloi and hoi aristoi, nothing may be concluded concerning the personal superiority or authority of the philosopher. The philosopher is philosopher by virtue of being gathered into philosophy, “called” by philosophy. One cannot reverse this and say that philosophy is what philosophers choose or produce. Philosophy itself is the measure, dividing the few from the many.

The name of that unusual insight that the philosopher has been granted is intellectual intuition: “the point... in which the object (Objekt) and its concept, the object (Gegenstand)6 and its representation are originally, absolutely and without all mediation one.” Although Kant insisted that for human beings intuition must be sensuous and not intellectual, his followers Fichte and Schelling both placed intellectual intuition at the heart of their systems. The following might serve as way of access to this notion: Think as if the duality between the sensible and the intelligible elements of our knowing were suddenly to disappear, such that we behold the source of their unity in an instant. Schelling remarks: “Why by this intuition something mysterious (etwas Mysteriöses)—a special sense only amidst several—there is no ground except that in many this sense is actually lacking, which however is without doubt no stranger than the fact than other senses are lacking in many others, the reality of which can just as little be brought into doubt.”

In other words, an artistic sense may be present in few but lacking in many. The same can be said of a mathematical sense, or even an athletic one. Thus the lack of intellectual intuition is no reproach of any kind, any more than its presence redounds to the credit of its possessor. These various “senses” are meted out, and should be seen as partial articulations of the whole, of the system of science. Nevertheless, the aforementioned citation implies that the realm of the sciences is ordered hierarchically.

Something of this hierarchy presents itself already in the first sentence, where Schelling points to a split within the showing of freedom. Freedom is given in feeling, and given to each, immediately. Thus, there is no hierarchy with respect to the feeling of freedom. However, the fact (Tatsache) of freedom is distinguished from the feeling. The feeling announces the fact, but gives nothing determinate regarding the fact. The feeling is given on the surface, immediately available to all. The fact lies deeper. Thus, in the feeling of freedom, the fact of freedom is at once
made manifest and concealed. To say this another way, in feeling freedom is brought to light as dark. Its presence is given immediately, but its essence, what it is, lies concealed.

Thus an investigation, a deed, an undertaking is necessary in order to bring the essence of human freedom to the fore. The task is to bring freedom to words, so that what freedom is becomes manifest in speech, in logos. In other words, the task is to articulate the inarticulate feeling and so unite the that of freedom with its what. This is why philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom concern the right concept: The right concept is the one in which freedom is brought out of the realm of feeling, and into the realm of logos. For such investigations, the special philosophical sense is required.

Several issues present themselves: What is the relation of the threefold of feeling, fact, and concept? Does the feeling serve as a mere clue to the concept, or perhaps does the movement from feeling to concept occur for the sake of the fact? Also, in what sense, if at all, is the bringing to articulation of the inarticulate feeling of freedom itself an act of freedom? Or in other words, insofar as philosophy involves articulation, involves bringing matters to logos, in what way is philosophy involved with freedom? And, since the expression of the fact of freedom in words is not immediate as the feeling is but requires mediation, how does the character of the mediation belong together with the movement from mute feeling to articulate concept? Further, if the bringing to logos of freedom is the task of philosophical investigations, through what will this “bringing” occur?

Some indication of the direction toward which one might look in order to grasp these issues can be found in the other “part” of philosophical investigations mentioned in the first sentence, together with the second sentence. The concept of freedom must be connected with the whole of a scientific worldview, but for this concept to have “reality in general” it must be “one of the central points” of the system. Looking aside for a moment from the provocation of suggesting that a unified system has more than one central point, why must the concept of freedom belong to the center of the system? Reality, with its Latin root res, roughly means “thinghood,” what belongs to an actual thing. The essence of freedom requires its absolute presence in and throughout the system (i.e., überhaupt), because if at any point it was absent (that is, thwarted in its being), this would contradict its very nature: Freedom would not be freedom, which is impossible.

Returning to the aforementioned provocation of plural centers, this provides a glimpse of the struggle that will be required to attain the right
concept of freedom, and so to complete the whole of the scientific world-
view. In other Schellingian language, the articulation of freedom is bound
up with the articulation of system. And since the two are not parts in the
sense of distinct, heterogeneous elements of an aggregate whole, but are
rather both ultimately the same, the articulation of freedom is nothing but
the articulation of system. And as system is as far as possible from being an
ordering frame externally imposed upon material that is somehow separate
from it, for Schelling the articulation of freedom is at once the articula-
tion of the world.

To articulate freedom, that is, to bring freedom to *logos*, requires
mediation. But in light of the intellectual intuition of the philosopher, it
is not at all clear why such mediation is required. Given the immediate
connection of concept and object, why can’t the essence of freedom sim-
ply be asserted, in the manner of much more mundane analytic proposi-
tions in which the predicate is contained immediately in its subject? The
key to this riddle is that these investigations have in view human freedom.
In human freedom, the clue to the articulation of the world is present,
since it is freedom and since the articulation of freedom is one with the
articulation of the world. Since it is human and therefore given over to
finitude, this freedom stands at a distance from the complete articula-
tion of the world.

The assertion that freedom must be one of the dominant central points
arises from intellectual intuition. However, “We cannot properly prove
the essential identity of the real with the ideal even in philosophy. . . . All
that can be proven is that without it there can be no science, and in every-
thing that is a claim to knowledge, this identity or this entire process of
the real into the ideal (and of the possibility of the full translation of the
ideal into the real) is sighted.”10 With respect to freedom, this means that
what is *thought* in its very concept implies its central position in the world.
However, more than this implication is required, since the connection,
because it is antecedent to all proof, cannot itself be proven. This *more*,
this mediation that is needed to bring freedom and the world to *logos*, is
the work (*ergon*) of philosophy.

Thus the world is to be disclosed in human freedom, and freedom is
to be disclosed in the world—through the human being. The human being
is therefore at once subject and object, and is such by virtue of freedom. It
might therefore be said that the feeling of the fact of freedom shows man
to himself as the sign of the world, a sign that requires an interpretation.
To say that the human being is at once sign and interpreter of sign provokes the question of the relation of the human being to himself. A way of access to this question that silently animates the entire Freedom Essay, as well as a beginning of the presentation of its inner appropriation of Kantian and Platonic philosophy, will be provided at this point.

Kant’s first critique, the Critique of Pure Reason, limits knowledge, including self-knowledge, to appearances. The endeavor of the human being to know itself in its singular essence meets with frustration. It may seem that the transition of the thinking “I” of transcendental apperception through the categories to the thought-about “I” would make self-knowledge not only possible but also robust. We would know ourselves as substance (permanent), as simple (indissoluble), as personal (self-identical), and as immediately given to ourselves. Accordingly, we would have epistemological assurance of our real and meaningful immortality.

However, all these conclusions rest upon a transcendental illusion, which Kant calls “the subreption of the hypostasized consciousness”:

> We can thus say of the thinking ‘I’ (the soul) . . . that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) as knowledge is to be distinguished from its object.¹¹

Pure reason itself judges that human reason is incapable of providing us with the means to know ourselves in our essence. We can know ourselves only as given to ourselves from a distance, that is, through inner sense ruled by the categories. Self-ignorance belongs, then, to the essence of humanity. To say the very same thing from another perspective, something crucial is indeed known about humanity, namely that a certain measure of irremediable ignorance belongs to our essence. In the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant reaches this conclusion regarding rational psychology, the metaphysical doctrine of the soul now humbled by the critique:

> But though it furnishes no positive doctrine, it reminds us that we should regard this refusal of reason to give satisfying response to our inquisitive probings into what is beyond the limits of this present life as reason’s hint to divert our self-knowledge from fruitless and extravagant speculation to fruitful practical employment.¹¹
Thus, although abysmally removed from ourselves with respect to knowledge, we are given back to ourselves with respect to action, in the moral realm. By means of free obedience to a law which human reason gives each human being, we have the means to live in a dignified manner befitting our finite nature. The moral law provides no theoretical knowledge. But its status as a necessary presupposition for morality allows it to serve both our possibilities and our limits. Regarding our possibilities, it offers us access to a realm beyond appearances. Regarding our limits, it acknowledges our finite nature both as self-ignorant and as subject to pathological needs. Both of these aspects are captured in one of Kant’s most provocative observations, made in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*: “It is in fact completely impossible by experience to discern with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action . . . rested solely on moral ground . . .” (IV, 407). For Kant, the law-governed moral disposition, in its striving to determine human action, is the proper celebration of our rational nature, and this striving to bring our disposition into harmony with the demands of the moral life constitutes the appropriate relation of humanity itself.

Much of this echoes Socratic ignorance. A deep inner kinship exists between Kant and Plato regarding the necessary limit attaching to human knowledge. However, within this kinship an epochal distance asserts itself that will play a major role in Schelling’s creative synthesis. In the *Apology*, Socrates speaks to the citizens of Athens of the oracle at Delphi that riddled that Socrates was the wisest of men. “Whatever does the god say, and whatever does he riddle about? I know that I am not wise, neither in great things nor in small things” (21b3–5). In service to the god Socrates sought to puzzle out the riddle, only to find all those whom he questioned in still more ignorant straits, possessing no more wisdom than that of the admitted ignorance of Socrates, but professing wisdom of the most glorious kind. Socrates concludes: “Oh men, I venture to say that the god is wise in reality, and that in this oracle, he says this—that human wisdom is worthy of something paltry and nothing at all. And it appears to me that in saying this, he means Socrates . . .” (23a5–7). The bridge from Socrates’ ignorance to his wisdom is the god who has provided a “certain divine guide (*theion ti kai daimonion*)” (31c5–d1), which restrains him from crossing when such crossing is not well-fated, but which does not motivate action.

Thus followed Socrates’ tale to his fellow Athenian citizens concerning the source of his activity. I am tempted to use a broad brush and to paint the Socratic *logos*, including the reference to his service to Apollo and his appeal to the *daimonion*, as an account in myth of what Kant, some
two thousand years later, would demonstrate rationally. Despite having a
measure of justification, such a conclusion fails to hear what peculiarly
belongs to each account, and assumes that the matter is something inde-
pendent of its expression. That is, it incorporates an underlying assump-
tion, entirely unjustified, that language, logos, is a means. This assumption
must be set aside if the Freedom Essay is to speak. Rather language, logos,
is primarily speech as showing, presentation (Darstellung). It is important to
note that in his tale, Socrates sees himself mythically. Immediately after say-
ing that he did not think the god thought him wise, Socrates speaks in the
voice of the god!

. . . using my name, making me into a paradigm, as though he would say
to men, "He among you is the wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his
wisdom is really worth nothing at all." (23b2–4)

This self-inclusion in the myth goes beyond rhetoric. Socrates, as para-
digm, is the one who understands himself mythically. The dialogue offers
Socrates as a paradigm. But Socrates declares his own very peculiar para-
digmatic statue within a myth. Socrates’ activity in Athens is logos. The
citation above, then, serves as a muthos of logos: as mythology. The para-
digm of the relation of a human being to himself is not prescribed by law
but shown in an image. Insofar as the image of Socrates attracts and
delights human beings, inviting their vicarious participation, it can be
called a beautiful image of humanity.

One of the earliest and most revealing of German Idealism writings
insists upon the combination of rationality and mythology. Its title is “The
Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” and its authorship is a mat-
ter of controversy. Different scholars have attributed it variously to
Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel. Apart from the scholarly question, how-
ever, one can consider the document as a clue to and expression of one of
the underlying impulses of the era. That Schelling could well have writ-
ten it is supported by the subsequent quotations, as well as by his work as a
whole:

Until we have made the Ideas aesthetic, i.e., mythological, they are of
no interest to the people; and conversely, until mythology has been
made rational the philosopher can only be ashamed of it.13

The “Platonic Idea of Beauty” is to serve as the ultimate, with the
highest act of reason "an aesthetic act."14 According to this document, the
task of philosophy is nothing other than the unification of reason and mythology, or in other words, the articulated exhibition of this unity. In his Philosophy of Art—General Part (1802), a work written in the manner of Spinoza's Ethics, Schelling explicitly works out the relation of mythology to the whole of philosophy. Socrates as a beautiful image of humanity?

This peculiar claim can be better understood in light of Proposition Twenty, which reads: “Beauty and Truth are in themselves, or according to their idea, one.” In a crucial passage contained in an apparently minor note, Schelling explains, “Truth and beauty, just as goodness and beauty, never relate to one another as purpose and mean. . . .” Therefore, beauty is no mere device by which the truth is presented in an enticing form. Rather, beauty is truth made intuitable. Truth is beauty made rational. The Socratic myth and the Kantian critiques occur successively, millennia apart. Schelling’s logos, his “Proposition Twenty,” gathers them into a simultaneous unity.

These remarks provide entry into Proposition Thirty-eight: “Mythology is the necessary condition and the first material of all art,” the proposition to which “everything previous serves as proof. The nervus probandi lies in the idea of art as presentation of the absolute, of the beautiful in itself through particular beautiful things. . . .” Therefore, mythology belongs essentially to the whole, the absolute. Through beauty, we apprehend the absolute. Through truth, we think it. The division of the two is merely apparent and ultimately illusory. It is a division that modern philosophy, conceived by Schelling as the presentation of the system of the whole, must overcome. In his System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling writes, “What the intellectual intuition is for the philosopher, the aesthetical is for his object.” The two intuitions are essentially one. However, the modern interpretation of logos as reason, exemplified by Kant, seems to exclude mythology from the activity proper to a rational being. Rather, Kant’s moral thought seems to require a radical split from everything that would motivate desire. The demand of reason for systematic completeness of its science seems far removed from the fashioning of images. Certainly, beauty plays a major role in Kant’s third critique, the Critique of Judgment. This role, however, provides much provocation.

I will list and give brief comments on some of its major features: (1) the Critique of Judgment has the feeling of pleasure and pain as its realm. (The cognitive faculties constitute the realm of the Critique of Pure Reason; the faculties of desire constitute the realm of the Critique of Practical Reason.) (2) Beauty harmonizes reason and imagination without any concept, and so gives disinterested pleasure that is available in principle to all.
(3) However, the aesthetic judgment is a reflective and not a determinant judgment. It claims nothing about any object, but merely concerns the subject’s self-relation. (4) Accordingly, beauty is quite separate from either the determinant judgments of science or the determinant judgments of morality. Kant calls the relation of reflective judgments to determinant judgments symbolical. Unlike the determinative relation of concepts, which he calls schematical, the symbolical relation is only indirect and analogical. Therefore, beauty and truth, also beauty and goodness (morality), exist on entirely different planes for Kant. Accordingly, so too do reason and mythology.

These observations bear directly on the essence of humanity as determined thus far. Our relation to ourselves with respect to knowledge, that is, our knowing ignorance, sets the task of seeing ourselves as we are and of determining ourselves appropriately, and of accomplishing both in the face of this ignorance. In this way, Schelling’s philosophical deed of bringing reason and mythology together arises from the divided condition of humanity as revealed thus far. It stems from the ignorance to which we are given over. It attempts to remedy this lack that separates us from ourselves by presenting the ultimate unity of the rational and the aesthetic that Kant at least seemed to deny.

The human being is a sign, but a sign of what? Schelling’s unification of truth and beauty reinterprets the Kantian critiques and Socratic activity, in order to refresh the basic puzzle that was first sounded in the Delphic oracle.

The first matter addressed threatens the entire enterprise. Freedom and system are held to be inconsistent (unverträglich). The unity and totality that are bound up with the concept of system exclude freedom by their very nature. This alleged inconsistency provides the provocation for the introduction and for the first of the investigations.

On the most fundamental level, the apparent clash of freedom and necessity is not a logical problem, nor is this clash something that can be treated from a distance. The clash is by its very nature provocative, calling forth a response that itself belongs to the meeting of freedom and necessity. “Τι λέγει;” is the Socratic question. What about this apparent inconsistency? An account, a logos, must be provided. The apparent clash of freedom and necessity therefore calls forth philosophy. Clearly, philosophy is not merely a doctrinal academic discipline for Schelling. Rather,
philosophy issues from an existential anomaly that is fundamental to being human: (1) the co-presence in the human being of necessary laws of nature (of the systematic whole) to which the human being is bound and on which the human being depends, and (2) of freedom that signals a liberation and independence from these same necessary laws. Thus another way of saying that the human being is both sign and interpreter of sign is the following: The human being is both the question and the questioner.

Schelling notes that those who hold that freedom and system are inconsistent with one another might do so for any number of arbitrary reasons; he asserts that if indeed the two are mutually repugnant “... it is strange (sonderbar) that, since individual freedom is in some way connected with the world-whole... some system must be present, at least in the divine understanding, with which freedom coexists” (336–37). His explanation of this remark prefigures the intertwining that will manifest itself throughout the discourse, namely the essential togetherness of myth, science, and life:

But whoever takes the theory of physics as his point of departure and knows that the doctrine “like is recognized by like” (supposed to come from Pythagoras but found in Plato and still earlier in Empedocles) is wholly ancient, will understand that the philosopher maintains such (divine) knowledge because he alone, keeping the understanding pure and undarkened by evil, conceives the god outside him with the god within him. But those unfriendly toward science... understand by this knowledge something entirely abstract and lifeless. ... (337)

The knowledge that would establish the coexistence of freedom and system falls alone to the philosopher, in whom science and life are gathered in a special way. The unfolding of the relation of freedom and system in the divine understanding makes itself manifest in the unfolding of philosophical knowledge. However, this provocation also calls for a response. How can the finitude of the philosopher, even gifted with intellectual intuition, attain the relation of freedom and system in the divine understanding? Since the presence of the divine guide is something given, unaccountable (as with Socrates, who proclaimed a “theion ti kai daimonion” [divine daimonic sign] but who claimed its rarity and/or uniqueness at Republic 496c2–4), the account of the philosopher must be mythological, must be a “likely account.” Taking Schelling’s thought beyond the context of these remarks, it suggests that in mythology, science and life receive their most appropriate expression. Though it may seem strange to
root science in mythology, such great scientists as Heisenberg have done so in their own way. 21 Even the contemporary philosophy of science has lowered its voice to a whisper on the ultimate rationality of science. 22 Closer to the matter here, the togetherness of freedom and system must be told in a tale.

In no way, as Schelling will show, does putting freedom and system together imply logical incompatibility. Rather, even if they were logically compatible (which they are: see Kant’s third antinomy and its modest solution), 23 this compatibility is insufficient to establish their togetherness. Schelling distinguishes philosophy from abstract and lifeless science, a class to which formal logic belongs. He specifically presents conventional geometry as his example. While the geometry of Euclid certainly can claim its measure of truth for the domain in which it holds away, that is, ideal objects in three-dimensional space in accord with its axioms and postulates, its objects are separated off from actual objects. The same, of course, is the case with logic. Modus ponens is surely valid, but its abstraction from actual objects means that infinitely many valid arguments can be constructed that do not correspond to anything encountered in the world. Geometry has long and often been regarded as exemplary for thinking, although it stops short of the highest thought for both Plato and Kant. 24

For Schelling, geometry is insufficient and weak for one who would philosophize, not because it is wrong or even because it is limited, but because it is cut off from life. Freedom and system, then, must show themselves as occurring in and through life. They are expressed in a science that is a living science. Gradually, life will move to the center of the Freedom Essay. Schelling writes “... always, however, reason pressing towards unity as well as the feeling consisting of freedom and personality is denied only by decree . . . which finally must perish” (337). By implication, the yoked living forces of reason and feeling overcome the obstacles that have been placed in their way by prior developments in the history of thought that turned philosophy away from engagement with life.

At the end of the first paragraph, the relation of philosophy and life is more vividly presented. Not only must freedom and system show themselves in life; the clash of freedom and system calls forth life: “For this great task alone is the unconscious and invisible mainspring of all striving after knowledge, from the lowest to the highest; without the contradiction (Widerspruch) of freedom and necessity not only philosophy, but every higher willing of the spirit would sink to the death which is peculiar to those sciences in which this contradiction has no application” (338). Here, necessity (the necessity of the whole) and freedom are called contradictory.
However, the contradiction is necessary for living science, and serves as the concealed inspiration without which life could not first come forth. With an expression of the need to undergo this “business,” the first paragraph of the Freedom Essay draws to a close. One might see in this most dense and condensed introduction not only preliminary remarks but also a presentation of the problematic of the Freedom Essay. Yet these matters, including that of the centrality of the contradiction of freedom and necessity, are given at some distance. They announce rather than enact what will come, in a matter befitting an introduction. In chapters II, III, and IV, Schelling will tacitly unfold the problematic as it flows from the unity of the threefold of feeling, fact, and concept, just as he expressly unfolds the necessary agon of freedom and necessity here. In chapter V, the results will be gathered up explicitly with regard to the aforementioned threefold, after which the interpretation will take up the deeper investigation into the essence of human freedom. This will also involve further “clarification” of that which resists being brought to clarity, namely the contradiction of freedom and necessity.

Since the contradiction of freedom and necessity serves as the goad for the Freedom Essay, surveying the contradiction from a distance is impossible by its very nature. In this regard, the conclusion of the first paragraph gains significance. One cannot opt for either freedom or necessity, although, if they are contradictory, one seemingly must opt for one or the other. Yet, “to withdraw from the conflict by foreswearing reason looks more like flight than victory. Another would have the same right to turn his back on freedom . . . without there being any cause for self-congratulations on either side” (338). Thus, the philosopher must undergo the contradiction of freedom and necessity, in order to arrive at the unwavering “concept of freedom, without which philosophy would be completely without value” (338). Schelling calls this a “necessary task.” One can therefore say that in the task of philosophy freedom and necessity are bound, and that only by undergoing the deed, by doing the work of philosophy, by foreswearing flight, can one conceive freedom: *pathei mathos.*

(“Learn by suffering/undergoing.”)