CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Pragmatism’s Passport—Dewey, Democracy, and Globalization

SOR-HOON TAN AND JOHN WHALEN-BRIDGE

Much has been written about John Dewey and democracy, but very little has been said about Dewey’s understanding of the intimate relationship between democracy and culture. One misinformed critic even suggests that “Culture was not one of Dewey’s strong suits,” when on the contrary, as many authors in this volume will argue, it is impossible to appreciate Dewey’s understanding of democracy apart from those aspects of life we typically call cultural rather than political. Deweyan democracy is less usefully understood as a political system than as a way of life, “a set of practices, attitudes, and expectations, which, in an ideal society, would pervade every aspect of human interaction” (Tiles, Democracy as Culture 121).

We also miss the mark if we attempt to locate “Deweyan democracy” as if it were one static set of relations, since Dewey is a cultural pluralist. By examining the implications for conceiving of democracy as culture, rather than as something that precedes or follows from cultural formations, the essays in this volume consider Dewey’s adumbrations of democracy as one face of globalization. The word globalization is now used so frequently that one is tempted
to say, after Bruno Latour, that “we have never been global.” Yet Dewey’s approach to the intrinsically social nature of the individual’s quest for growth at the very least anticipates the utopian voices in the globalization chorus. On the other hand, Dewey’s high standards regarding what should really count as democracy anticipates the dystopian ranges of opinion as well. The contributors to this volume both explore Dewey’s constructive ideals of democracy as culture and contrast them with the extracultural façades of democracy that mask the international actions of the world’s one superpower.

While some would argue that the universalization of democracy is an integral aspect of globalization, the latter process closes gaps between distinctly different cultures by bringing them into frequent and intensive contact in ways that facilitate the spread not only of cultural goods but also of threats of various sorts. Politics and culture have become so intertwined in these debates that pragmatic discussions of democracy cannot ignore culture. The “guns instead of butter” approach that passes for pragmatism in journalistic usage has very little in common with the classical pragmatism of John Dewey, who certainly did not propose the imposition of a prefabricated democracy on peoples not lucky enough to be born in the benighted modern metropitan centers. A pragmatist approach to globalization, rather, will be pluralistic and experimental as it asks what notion of democracy, if any, could provide a criterion for judging and reconstructing all “habits, customs, and institutions” across cultural differences. To ask whether or not a culture is conducive to “democracy” as experienced, say, in the United States bespeaks a nondialectical relationship between cultural activity and political system that will, from a Deweyan point of view, be profoundly antidemocratic no matter how such a formation gets labeled. Instead of an essentialistic definition of democracy that will, intentionally or not, reify the liberal democratic notions of mid- to late twentieth-century America, the Deweyan notion of democracy that can be applied to international exchanges will describe social arrangements that can lead to “liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common” (LW.2.328).1

At this point we can ask those questions that arise so often in globalization talk: Are specific cultural changes preconditions for democratization? Would a universalization of democracy be a form of cultural homogenization or hegemony? If our sense of democracy is reconstructed along Deweyan lines, the discussions that follow from such questions will be markedly less melodramatic. Samuel Huntington has suggested that the major fault lines in post–Cold War global politics will coincide with civilizational-cultural divides, and it is clear that the interethnic violence of the last two decades leaves no
room for complacency. If we were to conceive of globalization as a janiform phenomenon—one face looking toward a market-oriented “McWorld” and the other toward an antimodern “Jihad”—we would be implicitly acceding to the sort of Manichean division that conceives of identities apart from the dynamic social exchanges through which selves not only create but sustain themselves. Dewey is the cure for intellectual melodrama. Unless our notion of democracy is reconstructed accordingly, “democracy” will always be bundled (as is Explorer with Windows) with Western political systems. Headlines in Europe and America have debated whether the imposition of such values and structures is a “least worst” alternative for countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This hubris increases resistance, not only to Western-style modernization but also to “democracy” in the other senses here considered, in ways that make a “clash of civilizations” a self-fulfilling prophecy. If democracy really has a global destiny, it must grow out of, rather than replace, the values of different cultures, for any democracy promoted by the West that is constructed as culturally hegemon will be a democracy in name only.

The renewed interest in Dewey among philosophers, largely due to the influence of Richard Rorty, gathered momentum quickly because of a continuously growing body of high-quality monographs and collections of essays on Dewey’s thought. These resources exist thanks to the sustained and steady scholarship of many others who have studied Dewey and continued his pragmatic reconstruction of philosophy and culture even when he was “out of fashion.” Outside philosophy, Dewey had remained influential in some disciplines, especially in education. Does Dewey still have anything relevant to offer to the present times? Many ask this question even as pragmatism, and especially Dewey’s philosophy, has enjoyed something of a revival in recent decades. Many will still wonder if he has much to say in the globalization conversation, especially regarding the complexities of “culture.”

At home Dewey was no stranger to multicultural social environments or to the shortsightedness of attempting to impose a way of life on citizenry and then calling it “democracy.” Furthermore, his own ideas had gained international currency far beyond “the West” even while he was alive. Deweyan thought is again experiencing a resurgence abroad following the neopragmatism boom partly because of long-term interest in Dewey among certain intellectuals in various countries. While globalization in some sense is not entirely new, it took Dewey several weeks to sail from California to Japan in 1919, and although commercial air travel was available before his death in 1952, it was nowhere as common as today. Of course, globalization involves much more than inexpensive plane fares. New technologies and forms of
social interaction, such as e-mail, blogging, and teleconferences, have transformed the lives of many people all over the world. Someone in 1952 might have thought the “digital divide” referred to the space between the fingers rather than the technological gap between the developed North and the yet-unplugged countries of the South or between the rich and poor in individual countries. New problems have emerged that demand new inquiries, and Dewey bequeathed to us a pragmatic concern and method for reconstructing experience in the light of such new problems. Insofar as legacies of the past, including Dewey’s own legacy, enter our present experience, they must in turn be reconstructed.

New centers for Dewey studies continue to be established in different parts of the world. One at Fudan University in Shanghai, China, is currently translating Dewey’s *Collected Works* into Mandarin, as only a few individual works by Dewey had been translated previously. Translation of Dewey’s works continues all over the world. For example, the Dewey List recently received an enquiry from a Brazilian publisher who is interested in translating Dewey’s works into Portuguese. The last few years have seen works published on Dewey’s influence outside the United States and on the affinities between Dewey’s philosophy and other philosophical traditions, such as Chinese philosophy. To this prima facie evidence of Dewey’s timeliness this volume adds the work of scholars from a number of different disciplines and countries, who reconsider the Deweyan tradition—including writers such as Jane Addams, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam, who have made significant contributions to the pragmatic tradition—in light of problems arising from the relation between democracy and culture. By insistently approaching culture as a rich ecosystem that includes law and politics, industry and commerce, science and technology, fine arts and communicative patterns, and not least morals, values, and social philosophy in relation to the debates about globalization, the chapters in this volume re-examine Dewey’s cross-cultural experience and affinities with thinkers one would not normally associate with pragmatism. These juxtapositions open the way for unexpected reconstructions of Dewey’s own recommendations that have the potential to expand pragmatism across both traditional and newly articulated boundaries.

Section One, “Universalizing Democracy Pragmatically,” designates the foundational concerns for those who wish to consider the significance of worldwide democratization. How can Deweyan democracy be “universalized,” the first two chapters ask, without succumbing to either the sins of ethnocentrism or a cultural relativism that undermines the global intercultural aspiration of democracy? Entering the debate over how to justify, maintain,
and advance democracies, Larry Hickman compares Dewey’s experimentalist democracy with Chantal Mouffe’s “agonistic” model of democracy, which claims to offer a third way between “universalist-rationalists” such as Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and early Jürgen Habermas on one side and contextualists such as Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty on the other. Hickman points out that Mouffe’s “new style of theorizing,” attributed to Wittgenstein and Hanna Pitkin, is not so new after all. Mouffe’s examination of “the craving for certainty” and her attempts “to accept and live with the illusionless human condition” are in fact present in Dewey’s works, in particular *How We Think*, *The Quest for Certainty*, and *A Common Faith*. Comparing Mouffe’s “third way” with Dewey’s naturalistic view of the genesis of political norms, Hickman shows that both reject the privileging of religious institutions vis-à-vis other constituting publics within democracies. The two also share an interest in the relation between the ethical and the political. Dewey would agree with Mouffe that a strong sense of community as the basis of political venture should recognize the “dark side” of human sociability. Where they differ, Hickman criticizes Mouffe’s appeal to controversial psychoanalytic theories that treat the self as an object of analysis in terms of intersubjectivity and speech. Dewey’s more fluid and flexible psychology recognizes the self as comprising various “me’s” that are “historically constituted in a broad cultural sense.”

Dewey’s conception of democracy avoids the problems associated with the contextualist reliance on “solidarity” more successfully than Mouffe’s, which still views democratic norms as the result of “a manifold of practices and pragmatic moves aiming at persuading people to broaden the range of their commitments to others, to build a more inclusive community.” In contrast, Dewey’s naturalism provides a processional rather than a static understanding of ethical or political norms. Hickman delineates Dewey’s approach, whereby democratic norms are generated from ethical or political practice through an experimentalism that “involves active, systematic, and controlled attempts to determine, for example, *which* forms of life—*which* language games and *which* pragmatic moves—are best positioned to achieve the desired balance between the goals of freedom and equality.”

The development of a participatory way of life dedicated to “the liberation of the potentialities of [its] members” requires processes by which different cultures (and groups within a given culture, and individuals divided by innumerable other differences) can cooperate to solve problems, which in turn requires ways of saying what a “problem” is in a world where one man’s ceiling is another man’s floor. How can we begin to think of a universalist or
robustly cross-cultural notion of democracy when our first move is always to suspect the motives of any historically specific speaker’s discourse? By replacing the rationalist account of universalized norms with a notion of objective norms which are, in Hickman’s terminology, “universalizable” under certain conditions, a Deweyan philosophy of democracy can leave plenty of room for cultural differences. By not jettisoning “truth” in a wholesale manner, a Deweyan approach will also temper the acceptance of historical-cultural contingency with a belief that norms are not merely subjective preferences or symptoms of hegemonic totalization but can be based on a “knowledge of things as they are” which is acquired through experimentalist inquiry. Such an approach to norms avoids the contextualist descent into aimless and endless “conversation” at the expense of politically engaged actions contributing to the reconstruction of “cultures of democracy.”

Chapter Three enters the discussion of Deweyan paths between universalism and relativism through an examination of antidemocratic culturalism, which Sor-hoon Tan locates within the justifications deployed by antidemocratic societies in terms of their respective cultures. Drawing on research in the social sciences, she notes that adherents of culturalism tend to adopt a reductionist, essentialist, static, totalizing, and hegemonic conception of culture, which results from seeing culture as the answer to questions rather than a problem that needs solving. She takes up the task of reconstructing the concept of culture, begun in Dewey’s philosophy, to show that democracy is a cultural problem in the sense that its different components and their interconnections must be reconstructed in ways most appropriate to itself, not in the sense that some inherited (Western) culture must be imposed on all.

Tan begins by reviewing Dewey’s conception of culture, which eschews the elitism of seeing culture as past heritage with limited access and the dualism of seeing culture as opposed to nature. With the Deweyan antidualist conception of culture in mind, we can see that democracy may still refer to the political institutions that facilitate such open-ended processes but that this is the least inspiring understanding of democracy. Deweyan democracy is distinctive in being a way of life as well as a set of institutions. Democracy is culture, for it is also “a dynamic open-ended humanizing process that liberates individuality even as it nurtures sociality.” For Tan, the processes by which social groups negotiate demands between larger groups and subgroups is not limited to any particular cultures, and so Tan extends Hickman’s argument that Deweyan democracy is not ethnocentric despite being rooted in American experience. An ideal is not a replica of that experience, but rather a representation of the positive elements of that experience “carried to its final
limit, viewed as completed, perfected” (LW.2.328). More importantly, the ideal is to be revised through further inquiries when put into practice in new contexts. Democracy is a universal ideal in the sense that it is universalizable under certain conditions. A (Deweyan) democratic ideal, for example, does not justify Americanization or Westernization, because “government by the people” will take different forms in different cultures. Accommodation of cultural diversity must extend to contesting the meaning of the democratic ideal. Such a contest will be resolved only through social inquiries into varied experiences, and its resolution will expand and enrich both the ideals and the experience.

Section Two, “Imposing Democracy,” reviews the charges against universalist democracy with more attention to particular worldly contexts. It considers the imposition of Western values upon other cultures under the aegis of democracy, and it reconsiders the struggles within pragmatic thought to account for the introduction of hegemonic values into a discussion dedicated to government (and culture) “by the people.” The discussion moves from a defense of Dewey’s theoretical framework to the use of a Deweyan conception of democracy in understanding international politics and its usefulness across international borders, both in the past and the present.

If President Bush were able to tell the story his way, global democracy would be a veritable slam-dunk extension of American liberal democracy from sea to shining sea. Needless to say, Bush’s certitude that he has the right model of democracy for the whole world is fundamentally opposed to pragmatic fallibilism. Criticizing the Bush administration’s own fallible assumptions from a Deweyan perspective in Chapter Four, Sun Youzhong measures how far the United States, in its current vulgar understanding of democracy, has strayed from Deweyan democratic commitments. From a Deweyan perspective, democracy cannot be globalized by imposing any existing political system on the world. As Jan Aart Scholte remarks, “the shape of global democracy would need to be subject to more intercultural negotiation and adjustment than it has been to date.” A Deweyan global democracy would be a way of living “to be cooperatively constructed and constantly ameliorated by the peoples of all nations according to their particular historical, economic, cultural and political contexts.”

While democracy may be a “universalizable” ideal, Sun points out that for various reasons the Western liberal model is not well suited to many currently nondemocratic countries. For democratic empowerment to succeed, self-empowering groups will need to devise cultural infrastructures according to their own needs and culturally specific priorities. Democratic ends can only
be achieved through democratic means—this is something Dewey learned but which has escaped the notice of the Bush administration, which, in its zeal to discharge America’s “responsibility to promote human freedom,” sees “no need for free communication between America and the undemocratic nations of the globe.” Sun concludes with a suggestion that the Bush administration learn from Dewey’s experience in China. During his visit between 1919 and 1921, Dewey saw a China struggling to build a republic on imperial ruins. His advice to his fellow Americans at the time was to refrain from meddling and to give China time to deal with her problems. To equate Iraq in 2006 with China in 1920 would be committing the fallacy of neglecting context, and it might be too optimistic to assume that only time is needed to clear up the present debacle. However, Dewey is probably right that the people must not only be consulted but must have the time and other resources to participate in creating democratic solutions to their problems if democracy is to take root anywhere in the world.

In chapter five, Scott Johnston also draws on Dewey’s writings on China to defend Dewey against critics who accuse him of ethnocentrism. By focusing on education, Johnston extends Sun’s argument about the undemocratic tendencies of current attempts to globalize democracy. Not only is it contrary to Dewey’s philosophy to impose a Western political system on other countries, neither Deweyan democratic inquiry nor its techniques, attitudes, tempers, or methods can be imposed. To be truly democratic, inquiry must develop out of the shared problems, concerns, and issues of the publics that it serves. Johnston further argues that those who portray Dewey as “exporting” Western methods and practices to places such as Japan, China, and Turkey miss the point; “It is not that Dewey wants to make these available: they are already available and are being taken up. The point is, rather, how they are taken up is fundamental to the question of associated living—of community life.” Where Dewey’s influence has had positive results, invariably those who have “adopted” his philosophy did not fall victim to one-sided appropriation of Western methods and practices but were able to use these in creative ways to augment the authentic traits of their own existence to broaden and deepen their own unique experience. Dewey’s ideas work for them only when appropriately adapted to their own unique contexts. Such adaptations introduce new perspectives and enrich Dewey’s philosophy in ways that Dewey could not have anticipated and thus ensure its continued relevance.

The critique of “imposing democracy” also has analogues within post-structuralist and feminist thought, as Judy Whipps demonstrates in Chapter Six. Jane Addams and Hull House, a settlement house providing social services
and support to the poor industrial immigrant population of Chicago, were significant influences on John Dewey during his years in Chicago. His philosophy of democracy and education developed from the experience of that period. Whipps looks at Addams’s pragmatist-feminist philosophy in the postcolonial global context. Addams’s conception of democracy and education is broadly Deweyan in contours; one might even say it developed jointly with Dewey’s thinking in the same experiential context of the Hull House project and the social movements of the Progressive era. Addams’s experience convinced her that democracy copes better with cultural differences than any other political system or way of life, because diversity is the key to democratic growth. Her experiential and dialogical methodology enabled her, like other feminists, to appreciate “the necessity of empathic imagination, to relate to and include the voices of many others through their stories” in working toward the survival of democracy. Addams herself was a powerful storyteller who developed her ideas more often in literary narratives than in philosophical treatises. Whipps argues that Addams’s conception of democracy stands up well to postcolonial feminist critiques of global capitalism, such as Mohanty’s, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining “ideologies of masculinity/femininity, technological superiority, appropriate development, skilled/unskilled labor, and so on” in the so-called third world. Indeed, Addams made similar criticisms of capitalism in her own time. The postcolonial critique of democracy as a Westernizing force also does not pertain to Addams, who shared with Dewey “a lifelong commitment to marginalized people.” They both recognized that “democracy cannot be done to people—they must actively be creating the process in order for it to be ‘worth having’.” Whipps notes that “this understanding of democracy flies in the face of current American projects of ‘bringing’ democracy to other nations in the world.”

In Chapter Seven, Bruce Robbins takes up the issue of pragmatism and war in the context of Louis Menand’s story of American pragmatists. The United States has gone to war more than once to promote democracy, or at least it says it has. Robbins reinforces the importance of storytelling mentioned in Whipps’ account of Addams’s conception of democracy. Stories are not told to an unengaged audience from a value-neutral standpoint, and so we must also consider the narrative imposition of democratic values alongside militaristic and economic strategies to obtain compliance. While Addams played a prominent role in the international peace movement, Dewey reversed his initial opposition to the First World War to support Wilson’s attempt to “make the world safe for democracy.” In Robbins’s reading, Menand’s story “has at its center the strangely topical issue of American military intervention.”
Beginning with the Civil War experience of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Menand portrays a growing movement within pragmatism that turns on war and the decision to go to war. Robbins shows how the story “has an obvious and acute value as an anticipatory critique of the Bush administration’s case for war based on God-given certitude.”

Noting the conundrum in Menand’s story, which begins with why (as Holmes belatedly realized) it was wrong for the North to enter the American Civil War, yet ends with why (so Dewey thought) the United States was right to enter World War I, Robbins narrates the failure of pragmatism to resist war even when pragmatism “makes it harder for people to be driven to violence by their beliefs.” War could be waged without belief and, instead, simply out of solidarity with one’s community. Rather than focusing on the antifoundational denial of certitude and beliefs, we would do better to look to Dewey’s idea of publics as central to democracy if we hope to locate resources with which to resist the martial imposition of “democracy.” As “a form of conversation or storytelling in which, as Dewey wanted, the input from all speakers would matter,” publics cross national boundaries, especially on the question of war. The problem of a public that is global in scope and complexity offers a much greater challenge to pragmatists today than that faced by Dewey in The Public and its Problems. Robbins concludes that “democracy at the level of the nation is not enough to stop wars. The only sort of democracy that would have a chance of stopping war is a truly global democracy.”

Section III, “Decentering Dewey,” discusses Dewey’s thought in the wake of the contextual factors of its time and place. Some chapters examine Dewey’s ideas in relation to constructions and reconstructions of philosophy as a specifically Western discipline, and other chapters reorient readers in relation to Dewey at the dawn of what some have called “the Pacific Century,” focusing on Dewey in relation to his Chinese interpreters and to Chinese philosophical traditions. That Dewey sometimes finds more sympathetic and sensitive hearing outside his own native land indicates for some supporters that Dewey was not an ethnocentric thinker. The chapters in Section III foreground some surprising affinities between Dewey and both Eastern and Western thinkers who are not normally associated with pragmatism, offering a glimpse of what “diasporic pragmatism” might look like.

A consideration of movements and shifts within Deweyan studies must consider the impact of Richard Rorty’s revival of pragmatist thought, which is the focus of discussion in Chapter Eight. John Holbo, extremely skeptical of the pragmatist attempt to reform philosophy, examines Rorty’s and Hilary Putnam’s turn away from analytic philosophy. For Holbo, pragmatists do not
seem to have a distinctive experimental method that is anything more than the good old Socratic method. Arguing that pragmatists praise Platonic method while deploring Platonic ends, he urges readers to back up and notice that “it’s hard to have one without the other pragmatically.” Through an analysis of Putnam’s *Ethics without Ontology*, this chapter tries to show that pragmatic philosophy might turn out to be the kind of consequence at which one can never directly aim. Rejection of an indefinite cluster of realist and foundationalist metaphysical and epistemological doctrines in favor of conceptual pluralism appears redundant in contemporary academic culture, leading Holbo to remark that “a great deal of incidental, interdisciplinary comedy results from the fact that philosophers take Plato seriously, and no one else does.” Putnam might have employed the resources of analytic philosophy against the traditional analytic game while losing faith in the ability of this game to achieve insight into ethics, but in Holbo’s assessment, Putnam has not really found a new game.

Even if Rorty is right in asserting that analytic philosophy cancels itself out, that in itself is not sufficient to impart to philosophy any distinctive pragmatic impetus, which, Holbo insists, makes poor cultural politics. However edifying Rorty might be about philosophers and writers, his literary criticism, storytelling, and expressions of hope do not amount to an argument for the kind of ideal community he wants. Holbo criticizes Rorty for an implausibly narrow view of the principal function of vocabularies—“to tell stories about future outcomes which compensate for present sacrifices.” Moreover, Rorty’s pragmatic call for meliorism through literature is bound for failure because common vocabularies are not “the sorts of things one can work to achieve; not directly, anyway.” If aiming at common vocabularies is pragmatically self-defeating, aiming at a common culture is worse, since such an attempt is arguably even more of an unanticipated by-product than is the attempt to form a common vocabulary. In Holbo’s view, “if democracy is culture, it might turn out that democracy is nothing you can aim at.” Can pragmatism stand up to such critique?

One could defend Dewey by pointing out that it is not necessary for pragmatism to claim that it has discovered a completely new method. Why reinvent the wheel? Dewey’s call for the reconstruction of philosophy is rather an insistence that the new game must treat philosophy as a method for solving real problems of real men and women, while the old game was to solve “philosophers’ problems.” If it has indeed been difficult to “recover Dewey” using analytic methods, it is because these methods have once again driven their practitioners into the maze of “philosophers’ problems.” The test of whether
the philosophy of someone like Rorty or Putnam lives up to pragmatism’s promise must be sought not in academic philosophy but in the extent to which the conceptual tools they have fashioned or modified and the stories they tell succeed in helping ordinary people reconstruct their associated living.

We are told to drive our cart and plow over the bones of the dead, which philosophical reconstructionists are only too eager to do, but this invigorating if rough approach may lead us to overlook the correspondences between supposed opponents. Chapter Nine, in a completely different way, stresses the commonality between purportedly disjunctive philosophical traditions. Cecilia Wee’s examination of Descartes’ philosophy reveals some unexpected affinities with Dewey, despite Dewey’s attack on the Cartesian legacy within Western philosophy. Wee rejects the common interpretation of Descartes’ ethics as egoistic, a consequence of his metaphysical dualism of mind and body. She also finds evidence that Descartes’ metaphysics both recognize the individual as part of a universal order created by God and support an ethics that values sociality while acknowledging the claims of individuality. Despite their different religious views, Descartes’ account of how the individual’s consciousness of her place in the larger whole is consonant with Dewey’s understanding of how the individual relates to the community in a democracy. Wee argues that if Descartes’ religious and metaphysical commitment to a universal order could support Deweyan democracy in practice, then the latter could also be nurtured in East Asian and other cultural traditions with similar metaphysical and religious commitments.

According to Wee, Dewey’s view of the democratic process as active and interactive, never final in its structures and claims, was shaped by his view of human psychology, especially the role of intelligence in human action and interaction with the environment to bring about knowledge. She argues that Descartes’ account of reason in practical deliberation bears some resemblance to Dewey’s understanding of intelligence and knowledge, despite Dewey’s rejection of the Cartesian notion of reason. According to Wee, the Cartesian reason that Dewey rejects applies only in the quest for metaphysical truths; reason functions quite differently in practical deliberation, where it functions not in isolation but together with the physical senses. Practical judgments are revisable in the light of experience, and others’ views could play a positive role. In this respect, Descartes’ pragmatism rests on a dualism of metaphysical reason and practical reason, whereas a Deweyan would be tempted to press the point that metaphysical reason is as useless (and perhaps harmful) as metaphysical truths, and Cartesians would be better off just deliberating practically.
Much as Descartes specialists would emphasize quite rightly that there is more to Descartes’ philosophy than mind-body dualism, this remains the most notorious legacy associated with Descartes. This dualism is at the center of John Whalen-Bridge’s analysis of the American writer Charles Johnson, among whose works is a short story about Descartes. Alongside it is a story about a strip-mall martial arts dojo where a black man, belatedly experiencing his mid-life crisis, goes to a martial arts school and reconstructs himself. Johnson’s story illuminates Deweyan aesthetics of art as experience and experience as art. A consummatory moment, in which the protagonist performs a physical movement no one thought possible, clarifies and transforms a web of experiences in a dramatic and retrospective manner.

Chapter Ten reiterates the point Chapters Six and Seven made about the power of storytelling, as stories shape and reshape our vocabularies as well as providing the medium through which these vocabularies shape our experience. More generally, Whalen-Bridge considers the use of literature in Rorty’s reconstructed pragmatism to promote the virtue of self-fashioning, which necessarily operates in specific social contexts. In the particular context of “achieving our country,” Rorty criticizes the American Left for withdrawing into self-righteous paralysis instead of actively working for change. Because telling the right kind of stories is central to the task of fulfilling social hope, Rorty’s attempt to recapture patriotism, piety, and confidence through literature and literary criticism is seen by Whalen-Bridge as an attempt to recover the religious component of democracy. Comparing Rorty with Dewey from this perspective uncovers the democratic contours of Dewey’s “ecology of art, politics and religion.”

Whalen-Bridge contrasts Rorty’s presentation of literature, as a power to defend embattled selves both at individual and state levels, with Dewey’s aesthetics, which understand “consummatory experience” in a way similar to Buddhist experience of nonduality, or a release from self-hood. This chapter compares the pragmatic rejection of “the common dualism of nature and spirit” with the Buddhist nonduality of body-mind, mind-world, and world-nirvana as explored by Charles Johnson’s stories and more explicitly discussed by Zen masters such as Lin-chi. It argues that pragmatists would do well to reconsider Dewey’s dismissal of nirvana as a transcendent escape that rejects experience, which might have been too hasty or based on an inadequate understanding of Buddhism.

The theme of intercultural exchange is developed further in Chapter Eleven. Jessica Wang compares two readings of Dewey’s *Democracy and Education*, one based on a review in the 1920s by Liang Shuming (1893–1988),
who is probably best known in the West through Guy Alitto’s intellectual biography, *The Last Confucian*, and the other a more recent (1981) liberal critique of Dewey by Eamonn Callan. Wang argues that Dewey’s view of democracy as culture and as an art of life has lessons for today’s globalizing world, as we face, perhaps even more than in Dewey’s own time, the problem “that much of the intimate social connection is lost in the impersonality of a world market.” Wang’s comparison highlights the emphasis on active and interactive life in Dewey’s philosophy of education and democracy. This emphasis is bound up with his rejection of any dualistic opposition between individual and society and his conception of the individual as social, which is the target of attacks on Dewey by liberals who subscribe to a radically individualistic understanding of autonomy that is by no means essential to liberalism *per se*. In contrast, Liang Shuming found resonance between Confucius’s teachings and Dewey’s philosophy and understanding of social individuals. Liang’s sympathetic reading of *Democracy and Education* is not uncritical, for his own metaphysical commitments lead him to criticize Dewey for missing the essence of morality. However, Wee’s arguments in Chapter Nine, reconciling pragmatism with Cartesian metaphysics, may encourage readers to reconsider the question of whether Dewey’s pragmatism can ever be compatible with neo-Confucian metaphysics.

Lest one jump to the conclusion that Dewey was praised by Liang and attacked by Callan because only the Chinese value sociality, Wang’s assessment of the two contrasting reactions to Dewey is complemented by an account of her personal experience in a small Midwestern town’s museum, which provides a concrete example of individuality grounded in human sociability. Claims about what it is to be human aspire by their very nature to cross cultural boundaries. While cultural particularities ensure that the forms individuality and sociality take will vary, and while such variety should be valued for enriching human existence, an assumption of commonality that enables communication is arguably the starting point, at the level of philosophical reflection on experience, for understanding others and expanding our horizons. This is not a matter of simply assuming that others are like us, but rather involves conscientious, open, and sensitive attempts to understand our common humanity and construct common ideals in the light of different cultural expressions of humanity.

Chapter Twelve reinforces the view that Dewey’s philosophy is a “radical disjunction within the Western philosophical narrative” and deepens the comparison between pragmatism and Confucianism. Examining the works of Tang Junyi (1909–1978), an important figure in the modern New Confucian
movement who can profitably be compared with Dewey, Roger Ames finds a parallel between Tang’s “idea” of Confucianism and Dewey’s “idea” of democracy that can “enable us to anticipate the core values if not the specific contours of a Confucian democracy.” The exploratory play between Dewey’s vocabulary on the one hand—redefining experience, habits, liberty, equality and democracy itself—and Tang’s propositions of Chinese natural cosmology on the other—of ceaseless procreativity with no fixed substance and no fixed fate, wherein “nothing advances but to return,” and there is “continuity between determinacy and indeterminacy, motion and equilibrium”—elucidates how Confucian democracy would resemble Dewey’s communitarian democracy in being “resolutely hierarchical, historicist, particularist, and emergent” but differ from it in emphasizing the family as the organizing metaphor for human experience.

Comparable cosmological assumptions about persons, relational efficacy, and the world in Tang’s and Dewey’s philosophies seek to promote similar conditions in the continuing process of democratization. However, they also differ due to their different cultural environments. Dewey is culturally revolutionary in confronting the inertia of democratic forms that might have outlived their usefulness; Tang is known as a cultural conservative for his attempt to keep Confucianism alive against the onslaught of Western modernity. The building of a Confucian democracy will require forward-looking, imaginative envisioning and reconfiguring of existing models of democracy as well as an intelligent appreciation and use of tradition in the transformative process. Rather than simply accepting democracy as a Western import, democratization in China will succeed only if “living Confucianism as the cultural aspirations of a given population” plays a determinative role in the democratization process. If successful, the process will also expand and enrich our understanding of democracy as a human ideal.

The ideas of Dewey have traveled around the world and been well used, and at various points his passport has been renewed. If globalization has become a fact of material existence, directly influencing job markets, the commodities one may find on supermarket shelves, or the air one breathes, it has also impressed itself on the metaphors through which we understand and, to some extent, construct ourselves in the world. To be a global citizen of the postmodern bourgeois liberal sort one must have a literal passport, but ideas also must have their own official papers if they wish to travel. A passport assumes some commonality regarding laws, notions of personhood, and so forth—a
commonality if not a universality. Even though some people on Earth have passports and some do not, all will perforce face the same questions when approaching those cultural and political lines we call borders.

Whether or not citizenship and democracy are universal or universalizable, in the global context the advice given in the American Express advertisements holds: “Don’t leave home without it.” What is a passport? What is a citizen, and on what does such a notion depend? Does it have rights, and are those rights transferable between contexts? Should they be the same in all places? Hickman and Tan discuss the clarifications available in Dewey’s texts regarding these kinds of questions. Holbo also takes up foundational questions. What does it mean to challenge a way of doing philosophy? Does challenging philosophy philosophically put one outside philosophy? If one tries to philosophically oppose philosophy, will one wind up trapped in an airport, like Tom Hanks’ character in The Terminal?

One might hope for a globalized world in which passports, metonymic for national identity, no longer exist, as Bruce Robbins and, in some of his writings, Richard Rorty might want. Others might want an exchange that is genuinely fair, a two-way street of sorts between one culture and another. Sun, Johnson, Whipps, Wang, Ames, and Whalen-Bridge describe foreign exchanges that work well and enrich our understanding of both democracy and culture by drawing our attention to migrations across the borders that order our experience of intellectual space. Some identities have an either/or construction, as though one could not simultaneously be a citizen of both the United States and North Korea or be, at once, both a Cartesian and a Deweyan, but Cecilia Wee suggests that we look very closely at some of the assumptions generated by our mapping of philosophical territories.

This volume considers some of Dewey’s passport, though certainly not all of its pages, for his ideas have traveled further than this account could indicate. However, incompleteness in no way precludes beauty: Dewey’s notions about democracy as culture have in the past been faulted for being partial, but these authors show that those ideas are attractive to thinkers from diverse countries and cultures precisely because they do not presume a predetermined historical end point or political ideal.

NOTES

in three series as *The Early Works* (EW), *The Middle Works* (MW), and *The Later Works* (LW).

2. These include James Tiles, Larry Hickman, Thomas Alexander, Hilary Putnam, Richard Shusterman, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, James Campbell, Raymond Boisvert, Joseph Margolis, Tom Burke, John Stuhr, Susan Haack, Michael Eldridge, and William Gavin, to name only a few.

3. For information on the 10-hour PBS program on “The Pacific Century,” see http://www.pomona.edu/pbi/pacificcentury/.