The Image-Thinking of Ancient People, East and West

The Four Archai and the Human Soul

The [Greek] philosophers in the ancient period used the term archē in order to explain the origin of nature. Archē means the beginning or first cause of thing-events. In the Milesian school [of natural philosophy], earth, water, fire, and air came to be cited as four archai. In this case, it may be easier to understand if we translate archē as primary element, because these philosophers had in mind raw material (stoicheia) that makes up the natural world. The theory of the four primary elements was later to be incorporated into Aristotle’s physics. However, among archai, there are also those of a character different from raw material. [For example,] it is difficult to maintain any concrete image of Anaximander’s to apeiron (the infinite, or the unlimited), Democritus’ atom (indivisibility), and so forth, because they are intellectually conceived neologisms. Furthermore, Parmenides took on (being) to be the archē, but this is something like a fundamental principle of the cosmos rather than a raw material. This was the reason why Aristotle criticized the natural philosophers for being unruly in regard to the definition of terms.

The theory of the four elements reveals a characteristic of image-thinking [imējishikō]. A quotation survives from Thales that “[a]ll things are full of gods [daimon].” In fact, this has become known through the testimony of Aristotle. He states that “[c]ertain philosophers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods.” (De Anima/On the Soul, 411a) The philosophy of this period is commonly referred to as hylozoism. This holds the view of nature according to which matter is unified with life or
spiritual activity. Although it does not consider the natural environment as a collection of mere matter as in contemporary science, this view is comparable to what is referred to as animism or pantheism in the study of religion. Today it is often referred to by the word *panpsychism*, and this term is more appropriate. It designates the idea that the activity of *psychē* (i.e., spirit or soul) fills up the cosmos. Such a view indicates the stance of recognizing the activity of divinity within nature. In other words, even though these philosophers refused to regard gods according to anthropomorphic images, they still retained the feeling of the sacred that people of the mythological age felt toward the great nature. To put it differently, what Thales called “water” was not [just] the water we see in our everyday life, but was a symbolic expression designating the invisible power that operates within nature. Therefore, image-thinking may be understood to be a unique form of thinking that emerges at the stage when intellectual thought develops to replace the images that were chiefly based upon the intuitive feeling of the mythological age. As I will show later, in the period of transition from the mythological age to the historical period in the East as well, there emerges a stance of image-thinking very similar to that of Greece. At this juncture, what we need to take note of is that a change occurred in the methodology for cognizing the world.

I will not give an exposition in this chapter of the entirety of natural philosophy. [Instead,] I would like to narrow the topic to what I think is significant, while referring to the research of contemporary scholars and the commentaries left by ancient scholars. Among the Milesians, let us first consider Heraclitus. According to Hirokawa Yōichi, Heraclitus had used the term *psychē* the most among the philosophers of the early period. While his usage of the term *psychē* newly incorporates [within it] the meaning of the seat of thinking and perception, he [also] thought deeply about the divinity immanent in nature. There is a famous episode handed down by Aristotle. When visitors to Heraclitus, noticing that he was warming himself by an oven, were hesitant [to enter], he remarked that there is no reason to hesitate, for “divinities are present even here.” ([On the Parts of Animals, A5, 645a17] We may discern in this episode a panpsychic sensibility. In the case of the East, an idea emerges on the basis of this sensibility that grasps the human essence as a microcosm corresponding to the activities of the macrocosm. I will take this up later [see also chapter four]. Heraclitus regarded fire to be the most important *archē*. [According to him], all things are products transformed from the eternal “fire” through condensation and rarefaction, and change into various elements. Fire changes to water and further changes into earth through condensation, and then changes in reverse through rarefaction. The characteristic of Heraclitus’ thinking is that he regarded as important the process wherein the various elements undergo generation and extinction through change. To
characterize his thought, people of later generations used the well-known statement that “everything is in flux (panta rei).”

However, this theme of change among the elements contained, at the time, a difficult theoretical problem, which touched upon the foundation of the cosmology of the entirety of their natural philosophies. This is because the archē was originally assumed to exist eternally and permanently in nature. Heraclitus’ thought was apparently famous from that period on for being recondite. [For this reason,] Aristotle mentions that people describe him as if he was denying the principle of contradiction (Metaphysics, Book IV, chapter 3, 1005b20). Parmenides of the Eleatic school held the eternal on (being) as the archē. But, according to researchers, this may have been an idea that surfaced as a critique in response to Heraclitus. In short, it is an important issue in regard to how to think of the relationship between eternity and change, which touches on the cosmological foundation of natural philosophy. [As an example that sided with the idea of eternity, we may mention] Plato’s theory of Ideas [that] has received the influence of Parmenides, who pursued eternal unchangeability.

A COMPARISON WITH THE IMAGE-THINKING IN ANCIENT INDIA

The issue of the use of images employed in intellectual thought has received attention and has become a theme even within contemporary philosophy under the stimulus of linguistics. Saussure’s linguistics question the relationship in linguistic expression between “that which signifies” (signifiant) and “that which is signified” (signifié). Language and words are “that which signifies;” that is, they are “signs.” In this case, images other than language and words can [also] take on the role of signs. The issue of metaphor probably comes to have a bearing on this point. In the foundation of such thought, not only intellectual logic, but intuitive psychological factors are in operation. In the research of recent years, the view is becoming prevalent that at the foundation of cognition by means of metaphor, there is the psychological relationship of self and world that is based upon mind-body integration. However, I will not enter into this theoretical issue at present. [I will take it up in chapter two in connection with Saussure’s idea of “associative” meaning, and in chapter six in connection with “Space-Time and Mind-Body Integration.” For now,] I would like to investigate cases of image-thinking in ancient philosophy [of the East], while undertaking a comparative examination with that of Greece.

In the process of moving from the mythological age to the historical period, the methodological attitude of understanding nature by employing sign-images [kigōteki imēji] appeared in a variety of cultural
spheres. Let us take note of the fact that cases similar to the ancient Greek theory of the four primary elements can be found in India and China in the ancient period. The idea of the “five mandala rings” [gorin, 五輪] is a well-known case in India, which spread even to East Asia through Esoteric Buddhism. The five mandala rings refer to the five elements designating earth (prithivi), water (āp), fire (agni), wind (vāyu), and sky (ākāśa). Of the five mandala rings, earth, water, fire, and wind bear an image pretty similar to those conceived in Greece. While the fifth element, “sky,” appears to be unique to India, there was in Greece, after Plato, a movement to think of a fifth element. I will deal with this later. The Indian idea of understanding nature in light of the five elements dates as far back as the Upanisads of the sixth century BCE. It states that everything existing in the cosmos is made out of a combination of the five elements of earth, water, fire, wind, and sky. These images eventually become associated with the yogic theories of self-cultivation and Indian medicine [āyurveda], and gave rise to the idea that divides the body into five parts to correlate the human body with nature. While the Esoteric Buddhist theory of the five mandala rings incorporated such ancient ideas of India, it identified the fifth element with the “emptiness” [śūnyatā] that Mahāyāna Buddhism thematizes. The term “rin” [ring] is derived from the mandala. Although the mandala is usually taken to mean the essence of the mind, it is necessary at the same time to take note of the fact that it is a symbolic sign designating the fundamental structure of the cosmos. Mahāyāna Buddhism’s view of dependent origination, as represented by the [Heart Sutra’s] statement that “form is emptiness,” is originally based upon the view that takes the psychological cosmos and the physical cosmos as one. In this case, the theory of self-cultivation plays a methodological role for the purpose of cognizing the world. The five mandala “rings” of earth, water, fire, wind, and sky, are made to correspond respectively with the knee, navel, chest, face, and apex of the human body. It is thought that the practitioner becomes one with the activity of the cosmos through his experience in meditation. Because the stance of taking physical nature as an object of observation comes to the surface in the Greek theory of archē, it is easy to overlook that at its basis is the projection of the human psyche that is the epistemological subject. However, as we stated in connection with Heraclitus, at the foundation of image-thinking in regards to nature there is concealed a panpsychic attitude that takes the interior soul into consideration. His thought of eternal movement is similar to that of the East.

Let us note that there arose a move toward thinking of a fifth primary element in the history of Greek philosophy as well, just as in India. As concepts often used in medieval alchemy, there are terms such as quintessence and prima materia [designating] a fifth element. While these are ideas that emerge from neo-Platonism during the latter part of the Hellenistic period, they originally
The image-thinking of ancient people can be traced back to Plato's *Timaeus*. Plato raises the question that if the various elements such as water, earth, air, and fire were things that change and come into being, none of them could be considered to be the ultimate element (*archê*). By assuming a situation where various things are made out of gold, he states: "If we were asked what each of them are, the proper reply would be to say that it is gold." Therefore, he concludes as follows:

"[T]he same account, in fact, holds also for that nature which receives all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the *same* term, for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression upon and it is modified, shaped, and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different times." *(Timaeus, 50B–C)*

Furthermore, Plato says that this is the imitation of the highest *Idea*. That is, the eternal Idea, which is the highest being, is contrasted with that which is assumed at the base of the different material alterations. This is how the idea of prime matter originated. In other words, it is the idea that there is some sort of corresponding relation between the Idea positioned highest in the investigation of the *psykhê* (i.e., spirit or soul), and that which is positioned lowest and assumed as the ultimate of the material world. Plotinus (205–269 AD), adopting this idea [of schematization,] interprets "that which is positioned lowest" as signifying to mean the true state of "matter" [*hylê* or prime/pure matter] that is contrasted with "form" (*Idea* [*eidos*]). Consequently, what Plotinus means by matter bears no stipulation at all in regard to its mode of being. It is a state like that of nothingness without even spatial characteristics. He says that when this [i.e., prime or pure matter] receives the illuminating outflow of the Idea from the highest position of being, the cosmos comes to be formed, consisting of the hierarchy of various beings [i.e., his theory of emanation (*emanatio*)]. Plotinus named the highest *Idea* "the One" (*to hêến*), which, we might say, expresses "God" in an abstract and intellectual concept. If we see Plotinus's theory from the perspective of a worldview, various stages of being that range from "the One" to prime matter are distinguished. We ought to take note of his meditative experience as the precondition for such a theory of hierarchy regarding being. This is, it presupposes a process of experience that involves so-called *ek-stasis*, going out of one's self (ex-istence). [According to the account given by his student, Porphyry (232–304),] it is said that
Plotinus has had the experience of seeing God four times in his life. In other words, meditation signifies the method of knowing the world with the mind-body theory as its foundation. Accordingly, in the stance that understands the ontological state of thing-events in the world in light of the subject's inner experience, there is something comparable to the thought of ancient India that thinks of the correlative relationship between human beings and the cosmos on the basis of the mandala.

In Aristotle as well, there is an idea comparable to Plato. In Chapter Five of Book Four of *On the Heavens* (*De Caelo*), he explains the concept of the four elements and matter as follows. "Fire" that constantly moves upwards (the lightest element) and "earth" that constantly moves downwards (the heaviest element) are two elements that bear an absolute mode of being. In contrast, because both "water" and "air" move up as well as down, they have a relative kind of being. Consequently, this means that matter has four ways of being. If we hold the view that the four elements change and develop in correlation, despite the fact that their ways of being variously differ, it is necessary to assume one common matter [among them]. [He states:] “The kinds of matter, then, must be as numerous as these bodies, i.e., four, but though they are four there must be a common matter of all—particularly if they pass into one another—which in each is in being different”11 (*De Caelo*, 312a–b).

Aristotle called what ought to be considered the prime matter (or the fifth element), aether (ether), and postulated it as the basis of the four elements, wherein the essence of the heavenly bodies can be found. The simple material that constitutes the heavenly bodies must be distinguished even from the lightest among the four primary elements, "fire." The movements of the heavenly bodies are without beginning or end, without increase or decrease, changeless and ceaseless, and eternally the same. In the heavenly bodies that make perfect circular movements, there is neither lightness nor heaviness. The material that constitutes the heavenly bodies bearing such a characteristic must be something different from the four primary elements. [Arguing in this way, Aristotle states:] “[t]hese premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the (four) formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they”12 (*De Caelo*, 269a30).

Although reference to the term aether itself is scattered among the legends relating to the early philosophers, this idea of Aristotle exercised an influence upon the alchemy that emerged in Egypt toward the end of the Hellenistic period (third to fourth century CE). During this period Alexandria was a place that was spearheading learning and culture. I would like to note that the practice of meditation was developed there, and that it can be commonly found in neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, Eastern Christianity, and so on. Although one usually tends to think of alchemy as fashionable from the Middle Ages to the
Renaissance, here we ought to take note of the idea of ancient alchemy that emerged in the Roman Empire. It is what was born upon the legacy of Egyptian civilization from a time prior to Greek philosophy, and resulted from the syncretism between the traditions of Egyptian religious science and the thought of neo-Platonism. The following is a point different from the tradition of Greek thought. While the Greeks made nature into an object of observation (*theōria*), they did not take the attitude of technically or experimentally relating to nature. In contrast, Egyptian civilization, as symbolized by the pyramid, erected its foundation upon engineering rather than theory, and various technical skills relating to matter had been developed since ancient times. While the Greeks placed Egypt under its dominion after the time of Alexander the Great, they reinterpreted the legacy of Egyptian science in accordance with the Greek philosophical view of matter centered in the theory of the four primary elements. The idea of a mysterious and ultimate matter, that is, the fifth primary element (or the prime matter), thus emerged there. Accordingly, it became the goal [to be achieved] in a technical investigation of nature, instead of being merely a theoretical idea. The experimental work of the alchemist has, as its purpose, the extraction of this mysterious fifth primary element. In this way, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle that attempted to overcome the theoretical difficulty in the theory of the four primary elements came to receive attention. When it was connected with the practice of meditation, it came to assume the character of a new method of cognizing the world. Here we can discover something common with the ancient East.

The reason for our allusion to alchemy is that Jung had thematized alchemy from its connection with Eastern thought. When Plato and Aristotle conceived of prime matter, they arrived at the idea of a spiritual matter by thinking through the theoretical difficulties in the theory of the four primary elements. Alchemy began its technical work with the purpose of extracting this mysterious matter. Although this project undoubtedly ended in failure, there is something that became clear to Jung when he investigated its history. This was the stance of viewing nature and matter from the psychological viewpoint. What Jung took note of was that the alchemists were hermit-like practitioners. They engaged in the practice of prayer and meditation as a precondition for their work, and interpreted the meaning of their work through the inner images they experienced [in their practice]. At this juncture, I would like the reader to take note of the fact that the reason why Jung became aware of the psychological aspect of alchemy is through his contact with the meditation methods of Daoism. In the practice of Daoism, there is the "inner elixer" that includes primarily meditation methods, and the "outer elixer" that has, as its purpose, the manufacture of medicine and chemical products (e.g., gunpowder), wherein the two are held in an inseparable relationship. In other
words, practical techniques were being developed in the tradition of Daoist philosophy on the basis of a standpoint that views the regions of mind and matter by integrating them. While Western alchemy eventually entered a cul-de-sac, Eastern meditation methods and medicine have been transmitted to the contemporary period, and research with new perspectives is beginning to be developed today. In short, by taking the viewpoint of psychology, we may be able to think about the common terms found in the historical traditions of the East and the West. For we can experience therein the common experience of prayer and meditation.

THE CHINESE VIEW OF NATURE BASED ON QI-ENERGY [JAP., KI: 氣]

Let us now take up the ancient Chinese view of nature. Because it shows a stark contrast in character when comparing it with the Greek view of nature, we may discover an issue of research significant for us, in thinking through the traditional modes of thinking of the East and the West.

We may mention the theory of five “goings” [Jap., gogyō; Chin., ḫǔháng: 五行] as a case of ancient Chinese image-thinking. “Going” [行] signifies something that moves and flows. This is a theory that considers the events of the human and natural worlds in light of the relationships among the five sign-images: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. This theory has left its impact not only on the view of nature, but on medicine and self-cultivation methods. The theory of five goings originally had no relation to early Confucianism and Daoism, as exemplified respectively by Confucius (552–479) and Lǎozǐ (fifth century BCE). This is something that the people called the Yīn-yáng [Jap., Inyō: 陰陽] School—one of the One Hundred Schools that arose toward the end of the Warring States period (third century BCE)—began to advocate, and it enters into the mainstream of the history of philosophy due to its adoption by Emperor Shì, when the Qín established a unified dynasty. The Yǐjīng [“The Book of Changes”; Jap., Ekikyō: 易經] came to be emphasized in the world of Chinese philosophy ever since this period, and came to be considered as a foundational classic in ethics and in the investigation of nature. While the present Yǐjīng was compiled by a Confucian scholar in the Hàn dynasty (202 BCE–8 CE), its origin dates as far back to the Lexicon of Divination [Chin., báci; Jap., bokuji: 占辞] of the Yīn dynasty (ending in the twelfth century BCE). The Lexicon of Divination refers to the language for divination employed by the people of the mythological age. We may say that this language held the same psychological meaning as the oracle received by the ancient Greeks.

When comparing ancient Greece and China, we come to understand that they took extremely different attitudes toward the way human beings
relate to nature. China developed the stance of viewing nature while stressing practical techniques. This sharply contrasts with that of Greece, which put emphasis on observation (theōria). Needless to say, observation was also being conducted in China, but it was always connected to practical purposes. The period from the end of the Warring States to the Hán (early third to the later second century) was a time when China made remarkable progress in scientific technology. To take an example from astronomy, the observation of the sun’s black spots began there for the first time in the world, and furthermore a new calendar based upon Jupiter’s period of revolution (about twelve years) was constructed during the time of Emperor Wǔ (reigning 140–87 BCE). The system of naming eras was instituted during this time. The utilization of magnets as well began at the end of the Warring States along with the creation of artificial magnets for their practical application. The Yellow Emperor's Inner Medical Treatise, a classic of acupuncture medicine, was compiled during the later Hán (second century), and the chapter on “The Spirit-Sheath” [Chin., lìngshānbiān; Jap., reikuben: 竜枢編] explains that there is a relationship between the moon’s waxing and waning and the ocean tide. In fact, the intellectual reason why the ancient Chinese succeeded in such discoveries and technologies is that they took the stance of emphasizing practical application. That is, their ideas bore the characteristic of technical thinking.

One other concrete difference that draws our attention when we compare Greece and China is that the Chinese understanding of nature was founded on the wave model. For this reason they came to notice, early on, an agency of action in the distance between spatially separate things (e.g., magnetic force, the relationship between the moon’s waxing and waning, and the high and low tides of seawater, etc.). The relation between the moon and seawater is something that was discovered when measuring the speed at which “qi” [Jap., ki: 氣] energy travels throughout the interior of the human body. That is because qi was thought to flow in the interior of the human body in accordance with rhythmic changes in space-time. [I will return to the topic of space-time in chapters four and six] This is one example of a stance that looks at all that is in the world, including the human being, in accordance with the model of flowing motion. In Greece, Democritus explained movement and change by conceiving of a new concept, the atom (indivisibility). This is a view of nature based on the particle model. However, since Aristotle did not adopt this notion, the idea of the atom did not develop. It was only after the rise of modernity that the wave model and the particle model came to compete with one another. 16

As is seen, the fundamental relationship between nature and human beings was grasped from the viewpoint of the flowing qi motion in ancient China. If we schematize it from a theoretical viewpoint, the dào is placed here
as the origin that gives life to all things while nurturing them. Its activity is manifest in the ceaseless change of the function of yin \textsuperscript{3} and yáng qì \textsuperscript{4}. Because the "yi" \textsuperscript{5} of Yijing means "to change," the title is translated into English as The Book of Changes. Yin and yáng are not a theoretical distinction that can be clearly demarcated from each other, but rather they are signs playing the role of metaphor. The phases of yīn and yáng are changing at every moment. This is because the essence of qi lies in flowing motion. Moreover, the yin and yáng qi are divided into the "five goings" and control the natural and human worlds. A clear and simple schematization of this sort of relationship is seen in the diagram of the Great Ultimate [Chin., Tàijítú; Jap., taikyoku; 太極図], which the lǐ-qi philosophy of Neo-Confucianism employed during the Sung Dynasty (tenth to thirteenth century) (see figure 1). The circle at the top of the figure signifies the dào that is the primordial

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\caption{The Diagram of the Great Ultimate}
\end{figure}
origin. The circle below that is distinguished in black and white signifies that the qi issuing from the dào operates by segmenting into yīn and yáng. The network drawn below designates the state of the circulation of yīn and yáng that are divided into the five goings of wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. On both sides of the circle below the network, it is inscribed: “The way of kan completes the masculine” [Chin., qiándàochéngnán; Jap., kandōseidan: 乾坤成男] and “The way of kon completes the feminine” [Chin., kūndàochéngnu˘; Jap., kondōseijyo: 坤道成女] where “kan” designates Heaven and “kon” designates Earth. In other words, they are based on the idea that what nurtures all things under Heaven and on Earth is the activity of masculinity and femininity in which qi is divided into the yīn-yáng five goings. The circle at the very bottom of the figure is what is called in Lǎozǐ’s Dàodéjīng the “gate of the female ox,” that is, the “grounding place” wherein is hidden the activity of the “mysterious maternal nature” that is the origin of all life.

Although this diagram of the Great Ultimate is what the philosophers of neo-Confucianism had employed to designate the fundamental structure of the cosmos, it was originally an illustration for images used [as part of visualization training] by the practitioners of Daoism. In the case of meditation method, this diagram signifies the activity of qi in the interior of the human body. Neo-Confucianism reinterpreted it as expressing the activity of nature vis-à-vis images. While the method of the Daoist’s self-cultivation reads the diagram from the bottom up, that is, from the interior of the human body, neo-Confucianism’s cosmology reads the diagram from top to bottom. In this diagram, the viewpoint of cosmology (i.e., the theory of the flowing out of qi) that conceives of the origin of the world, and the experience of ascension based on the incarnate subject’s psychological transformation (i.e., qi meditation methods), are held in an inseparable relationship, wherein is conceived the so-called correlativity of Heaven and human beings [Chin., tiānrén xiāngguān; Jap., tenjin sōkan: 天人相関], that is, the inter-resonating relationship between the activity of the macrocosm and the activity of the human body as a microcosm. Here we can surmise a point commensurate with the Plotinian worldview discussed above.18

THE STUDY OF “THAT WHICH IS ABOVE FORM” AND METAPHYSICS

If I may be permitted to comment a little on intellectual history, the period when the traditional pattern of the history of Chinese philosophy becomes settled is during the Hán dynasty (second century BCE to third century CE). As the most ancient literature in the history of philosophy, there are the classics called the Six Books [Chin., liúshù; Jap., rokukyō: 六経] that deal with
religious rituals, politics, ethics, poetry, and so on that have been transmitted since the Zhōu Dynasty. These precede the time of Confucius. The Spring-Autumn, and Warring States periods after the end of Zhōu (eighth century BCE to third century CE) was a long period of disorder without any intellectual unity, and the so-called One Hundred Schools of Learning emerged. It was after the period of Emperor Wù of the second century BCE that the policy of adapting Confucianism as a foundational thought for the sake of national polity became accepted. The one who proposed this policy to the emperor was a person named Dōng Zhòngshū [Jap., Tōchūjo: 儘仲舒]. He was a mysterious character who, it is said, frequently performed magic for starting or stopping rain, as he was famous as a sorcerer. After this period, many new literatures called the wìishū [Jap., isho: 緬書] were produced in contrast with the jìngshū [Jap., keisho: 经書] that were written prior to them. This [group of] books investigates nature, and it bears as its background the development during this period of astronomy, and so on, as stated above. (However, because scientific theory continuously develops with its content ever-changing, the wìishū was hardly read in the succeeding generations.) Dōng Zhòngshū expressed the relationship between human beings and nature with the phrase “the correlativity of Heaven and human beings” [Chin., “tiānrén xiāngguān”; Jap., “tenjin sōkan”: 天人相関]. It is the idea that the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth interresonates with the human heart/mind in prayer. Between the great cosmos (i.e., macrocosm) and the small cosmos (i.e., microcosm), there is a connection by way of the flowing motion of “qì” acting within nature. To know this connection is the activity of the human mind. The idea of Daoism (the Daoist) that regards the relationship between nature and human beings as important gradually developed under such epochal circumstances.

It was also from the Hán period on that the Yìjīng came to be emphasized. The book called Zhōujīcāntóngqī [Jap., shūekisandōkei: 周易参同契], written by Wèi Báiyáng [Jap., Gi hakuyō: 戰伯陽] of the later Hán period (first to third centuries), laid the foundation for the kneading technique (i.e., method of meditation), in which the Yìjīng was placed at the center, and below which Confucianism and Daoism were positioned. And the method of meditation (i.e., technique of kneading) is regarded as an experiential foundation that intellectually supports the integrative relationship of the three. This book, the Yìjīng, while highly regarded from ancient times, is the foremost of the classics in respect to the difficulty of understanding. Jung sought the key to comprehend the essence of the Chinese cultural tradition in this book. As the course of the history of philosophy shows, the thought of “changes” [yì] has become the principle that unifies the study of nature as represented by Daoism and the tradition of ethics as represented by Confucianism. The
practitioners of Daoism [道士] in Chinese history were actually the ones who had become the important bearers of scientific technology. This is a fact that has been made clear since Needham’s research. By contrast, the study of nature and ethics were separated in the tradition of the Western history of philosophy into theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. This distinction became clear after Aristotle. It is difficult to think, even in modern philosophy, of the issues of theory and practice, cognition of nature and ethics, by treating them as one. This seems to indicate that there is a significant difference in the traditional modes of thinking between the East and the West. [I will address this topic in chapters two and four.]

If we investigate the origin of the term keijigaku [形而上学], we will find a clue for considering this point. While this term has come to be used as a translation for Aristotle’s "Metaphysika" in contemporary Japan and China, the text where this term appears is in one of the commentaries of the Yijing, collectively known as the “Ten Wings,” “Commentary on the Appended Judgments” of the Yijing [xícízhuàn: 繹辞伝]. In this commentary, there is a famous saying: “[w]hat is above form is called dào [way: 道]; what is under form is called tool [Chin., qì; Jap., ki:].”19 (Although this commentary was believed to have been written by Confucius, and therefore has been esteemed since ancient times, today it is regarded as having been written by a Confucian of the Hán dynasty. We know for a fact that Confucius regarded the Yijing as important, but it was not until the Hán dynasty that the Yijing was established as a text.) According to the li-qì philosophy of neo-Confucianism that I mentioned earlier, “that which is above form” is interpreted to be “li” [patternment], whereas “that which is under form” is interpreted to be “qì.” (The reason why this phrase became known is due to the fact that neo-Confucianism regarded it as important.) If that is so, it would come to mean that while “li” designates the domain of a transcendent principle that goes beyond experience, “qì” designates the domain of experience. In the case of Aristotle, Metaphysika is an ontology, while the realm of experience is relegated to his physics (Physika). What is called ontology has the purpose of clarifying the mode of being of everything that exists in terms of its form (rather than its content). Ontology takes as its theme so-called being qua being (on hé on). Although this is a difficult way of putting it, among existing things there are a variety of things such as physical things, living things, spiritual things, and so on, and ontology deals with the form of their being without distinguishing their content or characteristics insofar as they are all considered “to be.” This is the purpose of Metaphysika as ontology. In contrast to this, Physika (physics) clarifies the being of the various beings in their modalities that are discovered within physical nature. To put this concretely, Aristotle’s physics holds the purpose of systematically cognizing the various
natural phenomena occurring on the earth as its center, by using the Milesian theory of the four primary elements. By contrast, *Metaphysika* introduces a system of four causes in addition to the four elements that are physical substances. This is the theory of four causes. To begin with, he recognizes the two principles of form (*idea*) and matter (*hylē*) that Plato postulated. These are the formal cause and the material cause. In addition, Aristotle postulates two other principles: efficient cause (moving cause) that moves things, and final cause toward which movement tends. These four causes become the formal principles that control nature. Accordingly, because *Metaphysika* and *Physika* designate the form and content of that which is, they are held in a theoretically inseparable relationship. In this sense, *Metaphysika* comes to play the limited role of clarifying the theoretical foundation of *Physika* (nature), and has nothing whatsoever to do with the ethical matter pertaining to the human world.

By contrast, “that which is above form,” according to the *Yijing*, is the activity of the *dào*, and all things (i.e., “that which is under form”) are the receptacles that receive its activity (i.e., *qì*). “That which is under form” is not limited to natural objects. In this scheme, the cognition of nature and the cognition of human nature fundamentally coincide. As is seen from the analysis of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate discussed earlier, the cognition of physical nature and ethical practice investigating human nature, that is, the original human nature, are held in a relationship of oneness, two sides of the same coin. The reason for this can be found in the fact that the psychology of the subject is placed at the root connecting the two. For Aristotle, there is no such psychology of subjectivity, but instead the form of an objective logic controls nature. In other words, he observes the state of nature from the outside in light of theoretical form. Therein we can discern a standpoint that emphasizes the knowledge of *theōria* (i.e., theory or observation). Aristotle makes this explicit.

There is a famous passage in Lāozi’s *Dàodéjīng* that explains the *dào*:

> There is a thing confusedly formed, which arose before [the opening of] heaven and earth. Silent and formless, It depends on nothing and unchanging, It operates everywhere and yet does not weary. . . . For now, I call it ‘dào’. If forced to give it a name, I call it ‘great.’ Being great, it is receding, Receding, it is far-reaching, Far-reaching, it returns to its former origin. 20

It would appear that the phrase cited earlier from the “Commentary on the Appended Judgments” [xìcìzhuàn; 繍辞伝] of the *Yijing*, “what is above form is called *dào*,” had in mind this quote from the *Dàodéjìng*. “That which is above form” is usually interpreted as transcending form, and is used to
translate the *meta* of *Metaphysika*. But in the case of the *Yijing*, it seems more accurate to interpret this to mean temporarily *prior to* form.21 The above passage taken from Làozi addresses the image of "chaos" in flowing motion prior to its separation into Heaven and Earth. Its primordial activity is called *dào*. Because the activity of the *dào* nurtures and rears all things, it is not the case that it completely transcends the domain of experience. The "*dào*,” which is “that which is above form,” is contrasted with the "receptacle,” which is “that which is under form.” “Receptacle” [Chin., *qi*; Jap., *ki*] signifies a tool or the container that receives activity. While “that which is under form” refers to all things containing form, it is generated by the flowing motion that emerges from chaos prior to form. In another place of the "Commentary on the Appended Judgments," it is stated that “one *yīn*, one *yáng*, this is the *dào*,” and it explains that the activity of the "*dào*" concretizes through the interchange of the *yīn-yáng* activity. This explains the flowing motion of *qi*. The fundamental idea is that the state of all things is understood to go through generation and change by means of *qi*, that is, from chaos to order. This sort of an idea is at times called body-function theory [Chi., *tiyònglìlún*; Jap., *taiyōriron*]. *Ti* [body: 休] has the meaning of “original body” [Chin., *bènti*; Jap., *hontai*] or “real body” [Chin., *shíti*; Jap., *jittai*],22 and *yōng* [use: 用] has the meaning of function or faculty, but the two are related like water and wave, and in actuality cannot be distinguished. In other words, this view [can be explained as follows: it] is not that the thing has the activity, but rather that the activity makes the thing what it is. That is, the change in the *qi’s* flowing motion is the foundation whereby all things are made to be the things that they are. This sort of image-thinking of ancient China shows a character that is in contrast with the case of ancient Greece, wherein is postulated an eternally unchanging *archē*.

**LOGIC AND BEING: "WHAT IS" AND "THAT IT IS"**

The activities of the Elesians arose much later than those of the Milesian school. Pythagoras was the progenitor of this school and established a religious community in Kroton in southern Italy in the sixth century BCE. As it was destroyed under the attack of the natives, people belonging to this community moved to Elea and their activity marks the origin of this school. Parmenides is the one who laid its foundation. He is known to have claimed on (being) as the *archē*. This word became the etymological origin of *ontology*, and it is commonly recognized that Parmenides had a great influence on Plato. Given this idea, it appears that Parmenides’ thought played a significant role in the development of Greek philosophy. Nevertheless, Parmenides is an extremely difficult philosopher for the beginner to understand. I myself
have the memory of having no clue as to Plato’s *Parmenides* when I read it. His thought may initially give the impression that it is [too] difficult to handle and grasp, as Plato’s *Parmenides* is filled with arguments [too] convoluted for the reader not familiar with philosophy. However, one would find it interesting once one starts making sense of his thought.

It is easier for the beginner to understand the *archē* when it is explained in terms of concrete images such as water or fire as the Milesian school did. But what does it mean to say that *on* (being) is the *archē*? It seems that what Parmenides problematized was probably something like an inquiry after the fundamental principle of the being of the world. To start, the term “*on*” is usually translated as “what is” [*aru mono*]. This word is the noun form of the [Greek] be-verb “*einai*.” There are often cases in which the present participle *eon* is used synonymously with *on*. Then, how should “*einai*” be translated? We may, for now, translate it as “that it is.” However, this in fact leads to several problems. Suzuki Teruo’s great work, *The Study of Parmenides’ Philosophy*, has a long, explanatory subtitle, “On being and its subject, what is (or that it is),” 23 When we think of Parmenides’ “*on*,” it becomes an important issue of how to think of the relationship between “what is” and “that it is.” The Chinese compound “*sonzai*” [being: 存在], carries meanings of both “what is” [*aru mono*] and “that it is” [*aru koto*].24 If we attempt to correctly express the content of the meaning, the Japanese word “*aru*” ["to be" in the sense of both “there is . . .” and “it is . . ."] used in our daily lives is more accurate than the Chinese expression. [I will delve into an analysis of this word “*aru*” and its implications for understanding “being” in chapter two.] Now, what would then happen if we are to replace this distinction with the modern languages of the West? Heidegger called “what is,” *Seiendes* (entity), in contrast to this “that it is,” *Sein* (being), when he attempted to revive ontology and replace the modern epistemological paradigm with it. However, *Seiendes* is a term that is not ordinarily used in German, and perhaps we may say that this is his neologism. That is, we need to first distinguish “what is” [*aru mono*] and “that it is” [*aru koto*] in order to think about the issue of “being” [*aru*]. Heidegger was thinking that, unless he constructs a new terminology for this sake, it would be difficult to adequately explain the meaning that this situation signifies. Now, how about the case in English? While “what is” can be translated as *being*, how ought one to translate “*that it is*” in distinction from the former? If we follow Heidegger’s distinction, it might be translated as “beingness,” but it would no longer be an ordinary English expression. This is where we encounter a difficulty of comprehension and interpretation. This is because in the Western languages, the be-verb carries the meaning of both the [existential] judgment of being (i.e., “there is . . .”) and the *copula* ("it is . . ."). The problematic point that led Heidegger to create a new terminology, that is, the point of dispute concerning
the distinction between “what is” and “that it is,” can directly be applied to
the interpretation of Parmenides. I wonder if what is being questioned here is
the form related to linguistic expression, that is, the relationship between the
problem of logic and the existence of thing-events.

Fragment Two of Parmenides insists that the way of truth and of error
[i.e., appearance] must be clearly demarcated. I will quote Mr. Hirokawa’s
translation.

The one, that \([\text{it is}]\), and that \([\text{it cannot not be}]\), is the path of \([\text{the goddess of}]
Persuasion (for she attends upon truth); The other, that \([\text{it is not}]\) and that
\([\text{it needs must not be}]\), That I point out to you to be a path wholly indiscern-
ible. For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible), Nor could
you point it out.\(^{25}\)

Parmenides says that the way of “is” \([\text{aru}]\) is a way that is in accord with truth,
and “is not” \([\text{aranu}]\) is a way that cannot know truth. What is translated as “is
not” is \([\text{me on} \text{[nonbeing]}]\) in Greek in its nominal form. If all that had to be
done was to reject the way to error, it should be sufficient to juxtapose “not”
(i.e., a pure logical negation) in contrast to “is,” instead of speaking in such
terms. If we look it up in the dictionary, the adverb, \([\text{me (men)}]\), has the mean-
ing of \(\text{not}\), but it also states that it is used only when a thing-event does not
exist under a certain condition. In contrast to this, it states that the adverb
\([\text{ou (o)}]\) is used in cases when a straightforward negation is intended. That is,
the phrase \([\text{me on} \text{carries the sense of a logical negation (i.e., not)}\],
while at the same time implies the negation of being. Accordingly, to put this in reverse,
Parmenides is asserting that one should not think of negating what is \([\text{on}]\),
because it leads to erroneous knowledge when it is seen logically. Being and
logic are not separate from each other. Here is the reason why his philosophy
is difficult to understand for the beginner.

We will not enter into the details of the analyses of scholars specialize-
ing in Greek, for we amateurs would not be able to follow them in terms of
linguistic ability, and because there are many different opinions regarding
the interpretation of individual fragments. What interests me are the fol-
lowing three issues. The first point is that Parmenides’ thought developed a
thorough logical reflection, and this is the singular reason why Parmenides’
thought had a strong influential impact. I am led to think that among the
natural philosophers he was probably the one who most thoroughly thought
through the role that \(\text{logos}\) plays. The second point I want to bring to attention
is the relationship it has with Plato’s theory of Ideas. This is a view that is
nearly unanimously agreed upon among research specialists. They state that
Parmenides proceeds from a critique of Anaximander and Heraclitus of the
Milesian school. Anaximander’s idea, to *apeiron* (i.e., the indefinite), is apparently an assertion that is conceived of in consideration of the emergence and generation of the cosmos. (When Nietzsche was a young scholar of Greek, he insisted that *to apeiron* be interpreted to mean indefiniteness.26 Put in an Eastern way, this would be taken to be *chaos*. I wonder if Anaximander’s idea is similar to Zhuāngzì’s idea that the cosmos emerged out of chaos.) If that is the case, it will lead us to think that the cosmos was generated in time, but Parmenides dismissed such ideas. As I stated in the previous section, Heraclitus placed a strong emphasis on change among the primary elements. Change also presupposes time (as its precondition). By contrast, Parmenides’ basic claim is that there exists something eternally unchanging (i.e., *on*) in the fundamental structure of the cosmos. Although he was critical of thinking about generation and change, this was probably connected with his stance that emphasizes logical form. This is because it is thought that logical form is unrelated to time. At the foundation of Plato’s theory of Ideas is inherited this stance of conceiving of the eternal and unchanging.

A third issue that interests me as well is the question of whether Heidegger’s investigation of *Sein* (being [aru]) might not be useful for clarifying the meaning of Parmenides’ argument concerning “*on*.” This is because this [route] enables us to discover a point of concern connected to the issue confronting contemporary thought and philosophy. I will therefore state next my view in regard to this point.

Aristotle’s ontology is a theory that classifies all that exists in the world, while conceiving of their ways of being. *What is questioned here is the state in which a thing-event exists, that is, the mode of what exists.* Although we have no recourse in this case but to express it by using the term “*to be*” [aru] (being [sonzai]), what sort of meaning does the word “*to be*” [aru] have? Heidegger quotes a passage from Plato’s *Sophist* at the opening of his *Being and Time*. It is the following line: “manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression *being* [aru]. We used to think we understood it before. But now we are perplexed about it”27 (244a). This is a line appearing in a scene when a visitor to Athens from Elea is having a dialogue with Socrates and his companions. This quotation symbolically shows the intention that Heidegger entrusted in this work. He thinks that when resurrecting the paradigm of ontology, one must consider the meaning of being “*what is*” (*Seinsinn* [the meaning of being]), instead of considering, as Aristotle did, the way (mode of being) of “what is.” That is, Heidegger’s fundamental claim is that when philosophy considers “*being*” [aru] as an issue, what is important is not *what is* [mono, thing] but that it is [koto, event]. Therefore, *Being and Time’s* examination of the human being (being-(t)here [Dasein]) becomes an analytic concerning the meaning of the fact that a human being is living (being [aru]) in
this world. When this [stance] is laid down as the foundation, the meaning of
the being of everything else besides human beings (i.e., the fact that they are)
will come to be clarified. His basic structure emerges from here, namely, that
Being and Time is the fundamental ontology that leads to the foundation of a
general ontology.

While the discussion becomes somewhat complicated, if we first inves-
tigate the periods of Plato’s work, The Sophist is a work that belongs to
the beginning of the period of his later dialogues. By contrast, Parmenides
belongs to the dialogues of the middle period, like The Republic and Pha-
edrus. Now, in what way are these two works different? The Sophist is known
to have, since olden times, the subtitle “A Dialogue on the Logic (logos) of
Being (on).” An interpretation on this point has appeared among research-
ers that Plato is perhaps distinguishing in this work between “being” [aru]
as copula and “being” [aru] as designating reality, and this has generated
many disputes. 28 It is easier to state this problem in the Japanese language.
In regard to the word (or expression) “aru” [being], there is the distinction
between “ . . . de aru” [“it is . . .”] and “ . . . ga aru” [“there is . . .”]. “It is . . .” in
which “is” is used as a copula, is connected to the logic of linguistic expres-
sion, while “there is . . .” designates the judgment of being in regard to an
object that really exists. The former connects to the issue of “that it is” and
the latter links to the issue of “what is.” If we proceed to think by taking this
perspective, it would come to mean that this distinction was not yet made in
Parmenides, which is a dialogue preceding The Sophist. That is, it means that
logic and being cannot be separated. This is indeed the fundamental conten-
tion exhibited by Parmenides’ philosophy.

THE PASSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF “BEING” [ARI]

Next, after Fragment Two cited above, there is a short fragment (Fragment
Three), of merely one line. Let us quote Mr. Suzuki’s translation: “[t]his is
because the same thing is there for knowing (noein) and for being (einai).” 29

There are also many people who translate noein as “to think” [as opposed
to “to know”]. If we translate this phrase accordingly, we can interpret it as
asserting that thinking and being are in agreement. Even though this fragment
is short, it is quite well known, and there are many interpretations and
disputes over it. This is reportedly because the scholars interpreted noein
to mean, as it were, a harbinger of the epistemological paradigm; this inter-
pretation was in turn motivated by the strong tendency, arising in modern
times, to take noein to mean intellectual inference. In other words, this is an
interpretation that expands on the agreement between consciousness and the
real. Herein is concealed, it is said, the influence of modern idealism, such as
from Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. The fundamental standpoint of idealistic philosophy is sometimes designated by such Latin phrases as *adequatio intellectus et rei* (the correspondence between intellect and existence), and it would seem that Parmenides’ statement accords well with this statement. However, among contemporary researchers, there are many who question such a modern interpretation. Mr. Suzuki reads *noein* to carry the strong meaning of *sudden intuition*, while also weighing the views of Western scholars regarding the meaning of *noein* that appears in Fragments Two and Three. He maintains that it ought to be basically interpreted as the *intuitive understanding* of the truth of being [*sonzai (aru)*], even though he recognizes that the character of logical reasoning is added to this meaning (Suzuki, 154ff).

I also think that such an understanding may be appropriate, but what I would like to point out here is the fact that the idea of the “understanding of being,” placed as a foundation of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, was triggered by this phrase of Parmenides. While there are not a few places in this book that allude to Parmenides, almost all of them are related to the above Fragment Three. For example, after mentioning Aristotle’s famous phrase, “all men by nature desire to know,”30 to indicate that it designates the origin of learning, Heidegger makes the following statements: “[t]his Greek interpretation . . . brings to an explicit understanding what is prefigured in the statement of Parmenides: ‘for the same thing is there for thinking and for being.’ Being is what shows itself in pure, intuitive perception [*Vernehmen*], and only this seeing [*sehen*] discovers being. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure intuition” (sec. 36).31 “From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and being. The first discovery of the being of beings [that it is] by Parmenides ‘identifies’ being with the perceptive understanding of being.”32 Therefore, it comes to mean that thinking and being are identical (sec. 44).33

As is seen, Heidegger states that the understanding of being [*sonzai (aru)*] is an activity of passive and intuitive reception prior to intellectual thinking. What then, in this case, is in any way here understood as “being” [*aru*]? It is none other than an understanding of the “being” [*aru*] concerning world, nature, or cosmos. On the basis of living in the world, human beings are always within such an understanding of being. At this point Heidegger was first thinking that the task of *Being and Time* as a fundamental ontology was to clarify the meaning of the facticity that the human being him or herself (*Dasein*) is in the world, and that through this a path toward a general ontology will be opened up that would clarify the meaning of “that it is” regarding all that is. What may be thought of here as the final goal of the investigation is the *meaning of the “being” [aru]* of the whole world. However, because he relied in *Being and Time* on the theoretical methodology of