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Solidarity
The Adventures of a Concept between Fact and Norm

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F all the concepts that form the constellation of modern political thought, surely “solidarity” is a strong candidate for the most challenging. At once influential and undertheorized, the concept of solidarity appears to function across a startling range of discourses. At the core of the difficulties involved in using the concept of solidarity for illuminating contemporary political problems is an ambiguity between normative and descriptive uses of the concept itself. The goal of this introductory chapter is to offer a reconstruction, in part intellectual-historical and in part analytic, of the normative-descriptive ambiguity in our current usage of the concept of solidarity. This ambiguity between fact and norm shouldn’t be taken as an unfortunate outcome of a history of misinterpretations, or as an example of a muddy concept in need of clarification. Rather, we should view the fact-norm ambiguity as a dialectical tension, in the sense that a degree of undecidability between normative and descriptive moments (in Hegel’s sense) of solidarity is itself the core meaning of the term—a tension that can be turned to highly productive use, as the subsequent chapters will attempt.

In contemporary political theory solidarity can be invoked as a synonym for community, as the political value against which the freedom of individuals must be balanced and without which freedom becomes hollow. In this context, solidarity effectively translates the eighteenth-century republican ideal of “fraternity,” intended as a sibling to the ideal political norms of liberty and equality. It is a strange sibling, at that: while much political theory over the past decades has been dedicated to the question of the primacy of liberty or equality, solidarity has often remained marginalized. In the “liberal versus communitarian” debates of the 1980s and 1990s, communitarian criticisms of political liberalism often appealed to an abstract conception of community that seems roughly equivalent to solidarity. On the other hand,
the core idea of a “shared sense of the good” or a substantive ethical consensus on how a group ought to live, indeed the idea of a shared identity, is quite different from the meanings normally attached to solidarity, which seems in many respects as willfully abstract, as open to ongoing contestation, as personal liberty and social equality. The ideal of fraternity itself embodies these tensions insofar as it connotes both a pre-political blood-based or kinship bond while simultaneously appealing to a transcendence or expansion of just those highly local, ascriptive ties toward fellow-citizens beyond the bonds of clan or family belonging. To the extent that solidarity translates the older, republican ideal of fraternity, it continues to embody this tension between premodern and specifically modern ideals of belonging, bonding, and inclusion.

In a different register, in moral philosophy and normative ethics, solidarity can refer to the concept of membership in a moral community or the collective, intersubjective bonds that hold autonomous moral agents together, both engendering and limiting their capacities for solitary moral reflection. We can therefore speak of a “moral solidarity” as an important entailment of moral deontology. To be an autonomous moral agent is only possible insofar as one thinks of oneself as included in an abstract set of all those who count as free and equal actors; a member in a set of all equally constituted moral agents whose mutual recognition forms the interwoven fabric of a moral point of view. The Kantian kingdom of ends transcends all possible political solidarities. But it is nevertheless constitutive for moral practice, in the sense that moral solidarity, the acknowledgment and recognition of inclusion in a universally constituted moral group, is a necessary condition for the possibility of morality. In Habermas’s post-Kantian moral philosophy, as we will see, the notion of a moral solidarity as the “obverse side” of justice is the effort to argue for just this point.

Modern political and moral solidarity express belonging or mutual ties beyond contingent and ascriptive bonds. But solidarity can also be a phenomenologically highly rich term, referring to any number of greater or lesser forms of belonging or bonding. We can speak of national solidarity whose particularist features (ethnic descent, a natural language, specific national histories, and so on) enter into tension with the universalist principles of modern constitutional democratic states; of local or subnational, religious, ethnic, or racial solidarities that jostle for primacy within an overdetermined cultural-political landscape; of shifting, contingent, and multiply determined solidarities engendered by the dynamics of complex societies.
Solidarity can have widely disparate political-moral connotations as well. In its moral-universalist reading, as well as its Enlightenment, republican variant in the civic ideal of fraternity, it seems to demand an unconditioned social and political symmetry not just between individuals in a social group but between social groups overall. Solidarity evokes the dream of freedom and equality reconciled. But in other, principally nineteenth- and early twentieth-century usages, solidarity specifies a strong bonding between members of subordinated groups in a condition of sociopolitical asymmetry. In its usages in actual political and moral struggles for the past one hundred and fifty years, “solidarity” was, of course, a central term in the tradition of socialist theory and practice from the middle of the nineteenth century to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s, a span through which the core intuition—the preparedness for mutual aid and sacrifice of an oppressed group in opposition to an otherwise hegemonic oppression—remained the same even as the opposition itself changed radically. And as a secular version of an older monotheistic, predominantly Christian conception of bonds of love and aid that transcend particular and contingent attachments, solidarity has been widely “resacralized” over the second half of the twentieth century by various Christian congregations exercising advocacy for, and supplying aid to, populations of the poor and oppressed in the developing world.

We can thus distinguish between an Enlightenment, universalist reading of solidarity, surviving in various forms to the present, in which the abstract and voluntarist claims concerning the inalienable freedom and equality of persons might itself generate, or demand, a form of social cohesion or intersubjective bonding based upon these very rational attributes. Solidarities between persons and between groups presuppose a basic norm of symmetrical conditions of mutual inclusion in this abstract sense. On the other hand, specifically in the nineteenth century, in both socialist and nationalist thought solidarity was normally taken to presuppose an asymmetrical relation between an in-group and its hostile other; an intense intergroup bonding in response to external threats.

These powerfully normative usages of the concept of solidarity, comprising more of a family resemblance than a consistent definition, also have to be squared with the descriptive usages of the term in discourses within contemporary social theory. For the founders of modern social theory—Emile Durkheim and Max Weber—the fundamental question of social theory was the task of explaining the distinctive features of modernity on the levels of culture, society, and personality. Solidarity, most famously in
Durkheim’s *The Division of Labor in Society*, lay at the heart of this task. In its various forms, the founding generation of sociology attempted to answer the question of modernity by explaining how the transition from traditional to modern societies entailed a transformation of social solidarity as a mode for integrating new members into social institutions and practices. Traditional modes for the validity and legitimacy of social codes, norms, and approved practices or normed behavior become devalued. The old, obligatory normative consensus carried by metaphysical-religious worldviews collapses, and with it the most familiar and most effective mechanism for social integration and cohesion, namely, discourses of individual and collective identity and belonging, paired with strongly motivating, normed behavior, connecting social institutions and practices, cultural values, and personality structures.

In modernity, the creation and maintenance of legitimate social institutions and practices increasingly shift from preestablished normative consensus to the shoulders of social members themselves, who must undertake the work of social integration through their own participation in largely disenchanted procedures and institutions. Durkheim sees this shift in the transformation from mechanical to organic solidarity; Weber sees the process of disenchantment interwoven with the dissemination, differentiation, and institutionalization of instrumental rationality. In both cases, the descriptive account of solidarity enters into a complex and productive relationship with a normative version. Both Durkheim and Weber were guided by powerful moral and political convictions. Social theory is itself also a form of social praxis, and modern sociology is a discipline that speaks from, and appeals to, the very phenomena it attempts to explain: the modern, secular worldview. Durkheim’s writings on the need for the establishment of a postreligious mode for social bonding, like Weber’s ethics of fraternity beyond the “iron cage” of means–ends rationality, deliberately blurs the distinction between a functionalist, descriptive account of solidarity as social integration—a function that *any* society must perform if it is to reproduce itself successfully—and a normative account of how *our* society ought to be in solidarity, how we ought to include one another, on what basis we ought to recognize one another, what we owe to one another as social members, or as human beings.

This tension between normative and descriptive accounts of modern forms of social solidarity is, as I hope the following chapters will show, not a problem to be solved. Instead it ought to be taken as definitive for modern social and political thought—as it is in so many of Jürgen Habermas’s
The distinction between normative and descriptive accounts of solidarity is ultimately itself referred to ongoing social practices insofar as the very idea of such a distinction—what counts as an “ought” statement, what doesn’t—is reflective of actual practices of justification, practices that are deeply socially and institutionally embedded. If we probe deeply enough into the relation between the descriptive and the normative uses of solidarity, we ultimately confront the status of those intersubjective processes that themselves are constitutive for the very possibility of a distinction between normative and factual claims in a social context. Such processes are not solitary. They are themselves processes that consist of including persons into discursive relationships.

Indeed it is the loss of the distinctive tension between normative and descriptive conceptions of modern social solidarity, in the development of functionalist sociological theories, that is more problematic, and more typical. As we will see, the sociological conception of solidarity supposes that a certain kind of agency has to be invoked to explain how increasingly complex societies are able to integrate and include new members, and thereby meet the ongoing and increasing need for legitimation. A collective agency of this kind, of course, supposes a very great deal about how modern societies function. It presupposes that functional accounts of modern societies are incomplete as long as they remain silent on how the dynamics of integration and legitimation involve the attitudes, norms, and beliefs of social subjects themselves, rather than the performance of social institutions. Another way to put this is that social solidarity, as the mode of integration for modern, posttraditional societies, demands a sociological explanation at both macro and micro levels—both at the level of large and complex social systems and at that of the lifeworld.

Putting the matter in this way reminds us of just how ambitious Habermas’s *Theory of Communicative Action* truly is. The theory is, among many other things, an attempt at a definitive resolution of the century-old dispute between macro and micro sociological approaches, a dispute that, notwithstanding the *Theory of Communicative Action’s* many virtues, appears to continue unabated to this moment. For the present context, the point I am offering is relatively simple: the project of reconciling macro and microsociology, or functionalist and phenomenological-interpretive approaches in social theory is in large measure provoked by the need, over the course of Habermas’s theory, to return to the foundational question of modern social theory, and explain how the shift from traditional to modern societies is made possible by a transformation of solidarity, a shift from tradi-
tional resources to ongoing, rational, error-prone human agency as the mode for the creation and maintenance of social integration and legitimacy.

This theoretical need is met by a theory as vast, complex, and demanding as any that social theory has seen. But one core claim should be articulated: the *Theory of Communicative Action* places a new conception of modern social solidarity at its heart. This conception embodies a tension between normative and descriptive accounts of intersubjective inclusion and bonds; this tension is transferred from social theory to moral philosophy, to political theory and the philosophy of law, and finally to occasional writings on contemporary politics and culture, without being lessened. Finally, the tension between normative and descriptive accounts of solidarity—“between fact and norm”—is not a problem to be solved or reduced, but is constitutive for contemporary theory as such.

As we use the term “solidarity” in the present, we appropriate a term whose origins trace back to Roman law, in which *obligatio in solidum* defines the status of joint liability for a financial debt. In an illuminating intellectual history, Andreas Wildt examines how this narrow legal-financial term acquires (in a quintessentially Roman fashion) the added connotation of a moral virtue. To be in solidarity means that a man is good for his debts and stands up to his obligations to others even when he has not benefited from them directly. To be the cosignatory of a loan means that one is liable for the reversals of fortune of another; that one’s own economic well-being is no longer completely in one’s own hands. The original scope of inclusion into the circle of those who found themselves in such solidary obligation would have been the extended family, and it is worth lingering a moment on this older conception of solidarity as *fraternité*. The bonds of fraternal recognition—to the circle of those whom we recognize as family—are not blood bonds in this Roman conception, nor are they affective. Neither genes nor love, but liability is the bonding force. We are bound together with those with whom, like it or not, our own fates and our own well-being are interwoven. That, and not a sum of money to be repaid, is the sense of the acknowledgment of debt.

Wildt’s candidate for the earliest modern example of a usage of the term “solidarity” is French. While “solidarity” translates the older revolutionary conception of “fraternity” as the third element of the republican tricolor, this translation—with the added connotation of shared liability from the older Roman word—is as late as 1840, in Pierre Leroux’s *De l’humanité, de son principe, et de son avenir*, a work in which *solidarité* is evoked as the founding
creed of a secular-humanist ersatz religion. For Wildt, it is a conception affiliated with, and roughly contemporary with, other early concepts of secular humanist faith, most notably the idea of Gattungswesen or “species being” in Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums and Marx’s 1844 manuscripts. Solidarity based on the cognition of shared humanity and the affect of filiation and friendship is meant to replace the Christian ethic of duty. Likewise it is August Comte who introduces the conception of solidarity into academic discourse. “He uses the term to refer to social and economic interdependencies—just as liberal economists do—without losing sight of the universalist-moral and affective dimensions of the concept.”

From this beginning in the discourse of secular humanism, republicanism, and revolutionary ethics, as a nineteenth century translation of the Enlightenment-revolutionary ideal of fraternity, solidarity is thus, via Marx, taken into the socialist tradition, where it reaches the zenith of its political currency in the last decades of the nineteenth century up until the German revolutions of 1918. In its migration from the French communards to the German communists—from solidarité to Solidarität—the term now effectively trumps liberty and equality, and stakes its claim as the highest political value. “The concept of general human solidarity,” Karl Liebknecht claimed, “is the highest cultural and moral concept; to turn it into reality is the task of socialism.” Or, in Eduard Bernstein’s version of the same claim, “It can be said that no principle, no idea, exerts greater force within the working class movement than the recognition that it is necessary to exercise solidarity. All other great principles of the social law pale by comparison—whether it is the principle of equality or the principle of liberty.”

Normative and descriptive determinations of the concept appear beside the point in emphatic claims such as these. The fact of the shared interests, values, and fate of the working class, while constituted by the condition of oppression under capitalism, provides a sufficient account of the norm of an ongoing political practice, as in this earlier, highly Hegelian claim by Lassalle from 1862: “The ethical idea of the working class is that the unrestricted, free exercise of individual powers by the individual is not sufficient by itself, but that in an ethically structured community the following has to be added to it: the communality and reciprocity of development.” Of special significance in this social-revolutionary, Marxist appropriation of the older republican ideal is, perhaps not surprisingly, an insistence on completing the work of disenchantment on the way to a “scientific” political science and practice: the dissolving of the last admixture of romantic sentiment from the concept of solidarity as a political norm. Insofar as the situation of the working
classes, and the solution to that situation, must be diagnosed from unimpeachable scientific principles, the political value that characterizes this struggle must be equally unsentimental, equally “scientific.” Solidarity, on this German Marxist reading, must be expunged of its vestige of affect. A longer and absorbing quotation from Kurt Eisner, speaking in 1918, can summarize the special timbre of this social-revolutionary appropriation of the older republican ideal.

No, no more talk of love, pity, and compassion. But the cold, steely word solidarity has been welded in the furnace of scientific thought. It does not appeal to floating, gliding, sweetly shining, perishing sentiments; it trains the mind, fortifies the character, and provides the whole of society with an iron foundation for the transformation and renewal of all human relations in their entire scope. Solidarity has its cradle in the minds of mankind, not in the feeling. Science has nurtured it, and it went to school in the big city, between the smokestacks and the streetcars. Its apprenticeship is not yet completed. But if it has become mature and omnipotent, then you will recognize how, in this cold concept, the burning heart of a world of new feelings and the feeling of a new world passionately beats.

For all its bombast, this quote is so evocative and arresting because it says more than it intends. The image of a solidarity anthropomorphized precisely as posthuman, having put away its recognizably human attributes in the interest of fighting for truly human conditions, ought to remind us of one last inheritors of the Marxist tradition of solidarity, Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, who would surely have been quick to recognize in Eisner’s evocation of the power of “coldness” the same principle of the bourgeoisie, renunciation of life in the name of its continuation, that Eisner’s socialism was meant to oppose. Not just the renunciation of affect but the establishment of group identity through opposition—bitter, cold, and indefinite in duration—is what unsettles. Behind the evocation of coldness, the “new world” whose heart burns so hotly is not one, I suspect, in which the question of the extension of solidarity beyond existing sociopolitical and economic antagonisms is ultimately open. The socialist version of solidarity effectively denies the contribution of agency in the formation of new kinds of social solidarities insofar as the claim to objectivity of its diagnosis of the contemporary “conjuncture” extends to prognosticating the future of solidarity as well.
The historical discourse of solidarity offers two troublesome alternatives, then. In the first instance, a conception of solidarity concentrates on affect and sentiment, on the principle of likeness. Such a conception has an apparently inevitable shortcoming. Its concentration on affective or ascriptive factors such as “shared identity,” fellow-feeling, friendship, or empathy tends to undermine the basic and productive sociological claim that there is a qualitative difference in premodern and modern forms of engendering social solidarity, and that this qualitative difference entails both mechanisms for inclusion into social groups, and also the scope of possible inclusion, or the capacity to move mechanisms for inclusion beyond contingent and ascriptive, morally arbitrary features of human beings. Theorizing solidarity as affect thus risks occluding the very phenomenon most in need of explanation. In the second instance, a conception of solidarity abstracts entirely from the normative dimension and offers “scientific” explanations for how highly advanced and hypercomplex societies manage the ongoing task of social integration. Such conceptions—shared both by liberal political theorists and functionalist sociological approaches such as systems theory—have the inevitable effect of foreshortening the agency of social actors in the task of creating and maintaining their own social world.

As this brief genealogical reconstruction shows, any effort to derive an unambiguous definition of the concept of solidarity across a broad spectrum of disciplines and histories is bound to run up against some persistent (it’s tempting to say dialectical) limits to explanation. More promising is the effort to construct a family resemblance across this spectrum, in order to attend how the concept changes and translates itself. Solidarity refers, first and foremost, to the status of intersubjectivity, in which a number of persons are bound together, whether by the facts of their existing needs or their interpretations of their own interests, into definite relations. The status of mutual relationships of interdependence seems to be a necessary but not sufficient characterization; for in the normative reading of solidarity, subjects—whether self-reflexively aware of this normativity or not—are in solidarity with one another insofar as these very relations of reciprocity and interdependence are identified as a resource for the provision of need or the successful mastering of challenges. In this sense, conceptions of social solidarity, as in the socialist tradition, often construct the norm of social solidarity as cohesion of a subaltern group in a situation of asymmetrical power. To be in solidarity in an oppressed group is to resist oppression by
sticking together. The shared experiences of injustice and deprivation both generate a sense of shared fate and shared identity for the subaltern group, and provide a weapon in its struggle insofar as these experiences themselves strengthen the group's resolve. This conception of solidarity in the context of asymmetrical power is of course most clearly articulated in the labor and union movements of the twentieth century, and indeed "solidarity" understood as intersubjective cohesion of union members—mutual aid and support during strikes or in times of contentious labor-management negotiations, for instance—remains a core concept of the labor union movement in the developed world to this day. In more recent Christian appropriations of solidarity, this presumption of asymmetrical conditions acquires an unusual twist, as solidarity between, say, an affluent Christian congregation in the United States and an impoverished parish in a developing country presupposes multiple asymmetries (both between the two congregations and the larger global asymmetries that generates the relationship in the first place) and demands that the rich "stand up for" the poor prior to the articulation of any concrete obligations.

The consciousness of one's status as a member of a set of persons whose needs and interests are intertwined highlights the norm of bonds and debt, a normative core that seems deeper than, even prior to, the bonds of family or of fellow-feeling, love, or friendship. It also foregrounds the element of belonging. The status of belonging to a group in solidarity is not derivative from a calculation of the benefits that membership grants to the individual person, as in some version of rational choice. Rather, the fact of membership, of belonging, is primary, and extends to cover both the benefits and the costs. To be in solidarity, in this sense, is to be committed, to belong fully, precisely through the consciousness of vulnerabilities, of possible harms and liabilities, that have to be assumed collectively even if—perhaps especially if—dissociation from the group would circumvent them. To belong is to share troubles; to make oneself, at least potentially, more vulnerable than one might be otherwise.

Finally, this conception of a norm of belonging—the status of membership as a rule on which norm-conforming behavior of one kind or another is expected to follow—can connect us back once again with the discourse of social solidarity derived from the tradition of modern sociology, a tradition in which social solidarity is understood primarily as the outcome of any successful process of social integration. In its functionalist inflection, of course, this sociological understanding is rigorously descriptive and disavows any normative evaluation of whether a given group ought to be solidary, let alone

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whether the basis of a group’s solidarity is itself normatively desirable. There are plenty of social groups that come readily to mind that one would want very much to have less, not more solidarity, and there are plenty of sources of social solidarity, now as before, that one might very much want to see disappear. Still, for any society or social group to function, in the sense of perpetuating itself by the creation and integration of new members and the maintenance of the validity of norms and the legitimacy of institutions, a social theorist interested in the use of the term “solidarity” will have to assume that a successful, “solidary” process of integration has already occurred.

If we register the various points in this constellation, or the various iterations in this family resemblance, we can perhaps construct a model for further discussion, if not a tidy definition. For the following chapters I propose the model of inclusion. The word itself is not quite satisfactory, since by “inclusion” here I mean a rendering into English of the German Einbeziehung, not coincidentally the word that Jürgen Habermas chooses for his collection Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, “The Inclusion of the Other.”

That title was intended to evoke the specifically modern challenge of solidarity. Modern norms of community, whether abstract moral communities, postnational democratic polities, or identity-based social groups, must all negotiate mechanisms for inclusion that allow for the subject’s agency, and that are different from absorption. In Habermas’s often-used formula, “inclusion does not imply locking members into a community that closes itself off from others. The ‘inclusion of the other’ means rather that the boundaries of the community are open for all, and most especially for those who are strangers to one another and want to remain strangers.”

This deceptively simple formula is meant as an encapsulation of the shift from premodern solidarities based on the principle of likeness, where “to be like” is normally achieved only via ascriptive differences of family, clan, ethnos, or nation to modern solidarity, in which the nation-state had to find an effective mechanism for the inclusion of large numbers of persons independently of traditional symbolic resources. These “strangers”—people we don’t know, and never will—“remain” strangers: they will retain traditional-cultural differences, they will maintain separate agendas for loyalties, and will have different, often inscrutable tastes, preferences, and ambitions. To integrate different people into one democratic polity, to come to see different people as “one of us” on the basis of abstract, voluntarist principles and attributes, is, for Habermas, the basic challenge that the Westphalian
nation-state system had to solve, as we will see in a subsequent chapter. “Inclusion” in this specific sense means this modern and challenging mode in which differently situated people are brought into a larger fold—whether an unlimited moral community, a nation-state whose conceptions of citizenship as political belonging rest (uneasily) on universalist normative grounds, or a postnational polity such as the European Union—without making the erasure or suppression of their differences a condition for inclusion.

In its German original, _The Inclusion of the Other_ bore an essay whose subtitle read, “Einbeziehung oder Inklusion?,” one of those insoluble dilemmas that Habermas’s translators wisely chose to omit altogether rather than render, in exact English, “Inclusion or Inclusion?” _Inklusion_ connotes assimilation or consumption of the part into the whole; _Einbeziehung_ would literally mean “to draw in,” but with its close etymological connection to relation or relationship, _Beziehung_, retains the connotation of building a relationship between an individual and a group, with accommodation as a process _involving_ someone in a group or practice, a discussion or debate.

Inclusion in this sense entails the entry of a person or persons (whether by birth or voluntary choice) into an intersubjective group defined in terms of intertwined needs, vulnerabilities, interests, and expectations for mutual recognition and obligations. Inclusion in the sense of involvement, or the establishment of relation, implies that the act or procedure of inclusion will inevitably have a transformative effect on _both_ the person or persons involved _and_ the including group itself. To include by establishing a relationship, to involve, implies that the solidary group may not (and may not expect to) exercise unilateral control over the consequences of inclusion. As I hope to explore in the coming chapters, this core conception of inclusion emerges again and again as the normative kernel of Habermas’s political ethics—the discourse principle—translates, in various registers, into a normative foundation for political projects, governmental policy, innovations in postnational constitutional law, ethical debates over the rights of future persons, even debates about the meaning of the shared past and the status of vanished subjects. That principle states that norms are justified according to how well they can be understood as approved by, or hypothetically approvable by, all those who are likely to be significantly affected by their implementation. Solidarity in its modern sense, as _Einbeziehung_, rests on norms or rules for inclusion. Such norms can no longer be unproblematically appropriated from a taken-for-granted reservoir of shared tradition; they must be reflexively reappropriated in an ongoing fashion. To include according to a publicly accessible norm or rule presupposes that all those
whom the rule significantly affects—including those who are excluded by it—are at least in principle authorized to participate in normative discourses on the rule’s validity. And this means that the only normatively legitimate way to exclude someone according to a rule, whether that exclusion is from an identity-political or cultural-minority group, a community of the faithful, a democratic polity, or the community of moral agents, can sometimes be also, to include them: anyone excluded by a public rule is also owed a justification if that exclusion is likely to affect them significantly. And to be owed a justification is, in a broader sense, to be included.

To understand inclusion as a model for discussion of solidarity is not the same as defining solidarity as inclusion. By offering inclusion as a model, I am hoping to provide a useful tool for highlighting the relevant features of continuity as the analysis in the following chapters shifts from discourse to discourse, examining the problems of the limits of solidarity in various registers and different magnitudes. How do we include, for example, in a democratic polity? What are the limits of inclusion for democratic polities whose boundaries are determined largely by territorial claims, as national-state democracies still are? Must inclusion in a solidary group be voluntary? Insofar as all acts of inclusion also presuppose acts of exclusion as well, what, if anything, does a solidary group owe to those whom it excludes? If we understand moral obligation in the Kantian sense of inclusion of a person in a “kingdom of ends” composed of all those who ought to expect recognition as an autonomous moral agent, how ought we to reconcile the solidarity of inclusion in a universal moral community with exclusion from a particular democratic polity? Is there a human solidarity based on inclusion in a single species with its own natural history and future, or are all solidarities constructed by agents themselves? How do we rank-order the successive magnitudes of solidary inclusion, from the universal solidarity of a moral community of “ends in themselves” down through polities all the way to the very contextual, “thick” solidarities of contingent and highly exclusive subsocial groups? What kind of solidarity counts most; which ought we to dedicate our energies to protecting, expanding, making more inclusive? Is there a crisis of solidarity? How best to speak of it, how best to act against it?

The German sociologist Ulrich Preuss has observed that the concept of solidarity occupies a distinctive and peculiar place within modern social theory. On the one hand, it still refers to the archaic and traditionally secured power of social bonding that pre-modern societies were capable of
generating precisely because of the close connection between social system and lifeworld. In this sense, premodern social solidarity is both intense and specific; its strength is connected to its weakness in resisting pressures toward expansion, differentiation, and reflexivity. On the other hand, solidarity also refers to the highly secular and universalistic political and social ideals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as a modern translation of the Enlightenment, republican ideal of fraternity as the third element of the revolutionary tricolor. “The concept of solidarity unites two seemingly contradictory elements,” Preuss writes.

On the one hand it includes duties of care which are essentially based on personal feelings of sympathy, and hence to Gemeinschaft-like types of communities; on the other, these duties area directed toward impersonal addressees, be they individuals or groups. Solidarity exacts duties of brotherhood vis-à-vis aliens.12

In describing this paradox, Preuss also identifies the chief explanatory task of modern sociology itself: how modern, complex, differentiated and rationalized societies manage to reproduce themselves successfully—to solve the simultaneous problems of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization—without the traditional resources of social bonding in premodern societies. Modern solidarity is the structural solution to the problem of connecting abstract moral and legal duties, impersonal social institutions, and mass democracies with the older notions of mutual belonging and interpersonal bonding such that even wholly impersonal social systems can still count on the ongoing participation of new members, hence their own legitimacy. Moreover, if we accept that a key to social theory’s outlook on modernization is the increasing differentiation between lifeworld and social system, then, as Preuss observes, solidarity is also the crucial bridging principle between two otherwise increasingly distant mechanisms for social function.

If we consider for a moment the familiar distinction between social integration and system integration or between lifeworld and system, solidarity can be regarded as a combination of the two opposing types of integration: it is nurtured by the sources of the lifeworld, but it is implemented by the main elements of system integration, namely bureaucracy and law. In other words, solidarity is one of the few aspects of moral reasoning which have proven to be fully compatible with the statist model of political community.13
Social solidarity understood as successful social integration bridging the divide between lifeworld and system is the basic explanatory position of Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action*. In terms of political theory, the communicative accomplishments of citizens inhabiting a specific dimension of the lifeworld—civil society—are also the key for Habermas's understanding of how the democratic constitutional state under the rule of law accomplishes an ongoing maintenance of legitimacy between state system and popular will. For these reasons, it is crucial to understand three phenomena, from the beginning, as inextricably linked: *first*, the social-theoretical position that modernity consists in the construction of new forms of social solidarity that replace older, traditional sources of interpersonal moral bonding with ones tailored to modern conditions; *second*, that the production of modern forms of social solidarity consists in the inclusion of persons and groups in society based on the communicative accomplishments of social agents themselves, rather than appeals to traditional explanations rooted in a lifeworld; and *third*, that modern solidarity accomplishes the major link or bridge between disarticulated system and lifeworld in modern societies. Here the central question would appear to be whether modern forms of solidarity expand or further the modes of inclusion and bonding accomplished by traditional societies, or, conversely, whether modern solidarity constitutes a transformation of social integration so that it is better to speak of a new mode of solidarity entirely. Preuss's quote indicates that we ought to think beyond this either/or, however, and one major project of the *Theory of Communicative Action* is to document this.

At the very beginning of the history of this question, Durkheim himself remained ambivalent. Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* presupposed what seems to have been the outcome of much debating between “liberals” and “communitarians” in the 1980s and 1990s: under conditions of social modernity, solidarity cannot be coherently understood as antinomically opposed to the dynamics of complexity, differentiation, and individualization since it cannot be regarded as only the product of pre-political commonalities, shared ascriptive traits, or inherited norms. The same social dynamic that renders the problem of individuation increasingly urgent and difficult also makes this problem soluble through an alternative mode of social solidarity. Hence Durkheim's account of the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity in *The Division of Labor in Society* functions both as the expression of the basic problem of modernity and its solution.

The transition from mechanical to organic solidarity is, for Durkheim, part and parcel of the broader task of the normative integration of society. He
proposes a descriptive account of the moral “function” of social differentiation. Mechanical solidarity is generated according to the principle of likeness; organic solidarity on the principle of articulated differences, of cooperation and coordination of differentiated complex tasks. The transition is registered indirectly for Durkheim via the empirical analysis of accessible social institutions, specifically law. The transition of solidarity thus appears most clearly in the differentiation between criminal and civil law; at its core, the former still reflects the archaic element in mechanical solidarity. Shared norms constitute a we-consciousness of inclusion based on shared identity, and violations of this normative we-consciousness require punishment to restore stasis. Contract law, on the other hand, embodies the distinct principle of differentiation and mutual accommodation of differences, a sense of nonviolent “fit” of multiple individualities and a corresponding ideal of justice as restitution rather than retribution. While mechanical solidarity binds individuals directly to the social whole, organic solidarity does so only indirectly via the coordination of differences; while mechanical solidarity presents an image of society as a holistic set of norms and practices putatively common to the group, organic solidarity proposes a coordination of unlike functions and actors. And while mechanical solidarity is at its strongest when a collective consciousness envelops that of individuals, organic solidarity demands that the quintessentially modern task—of becoming ever more an individual—be taken as a condition for, not an obstacle to, the solidary life of the social whole. The production of a schedule of abstract rights, as a specification of how individual differences are referred to and encompassed by a social whole, becomes the distinctive expression of this task. As a negative social bond, the schedule of basic and political rights devalues social bonding on the basis of acknowledged similarities. The division of labor, differentiation, assumes its “moral” character in the functional capacity to include under the conditions of difference.

Durkheim remained keenly aware of the dysfunctional potentials of this transition, and one important undercurrent in the argument of The Division of Labor in Society is the advocacy of a pan-European, cosmopolitan mode of social and political organization, as forms of differentiation between European societies came increasingly to outweigh differentiations within them. The description of new solidarities is also the diagnosis of social crises. The threat of social anomie—the loss of legitimacy of the specifically modern normative foundation of political institutions—rests in the end in the failure to realize and institutionalize organic solidarity, and this is
the failure of the “moral function” of the division of labor: “to create in two or more persons a feeling of solidarity. In whatever manner the result is obtained, its aim is to cause coherence among friends and to stamp them with its seal.”18

For Durkheim, the question of solidarity asks how the normative coordination of society is effected; hence the question is also one of secularization. In the wake of the collapse of “metaphysical worldviews” or the normative consensus of monotheistic religion, how are norms concerning inclusion, belonging, action, and meaning generated? What is the source of social normativity in the secular age? Durkheim did not remain content with the arguments of The Division of Labor in Society that the moral force of organic solidarity could be plausibly explained by analyzing the changed social division of labor itself. His insistence on the reality of something like a collective consciousness, however, made the task of explaining the binding force of moral norms ultimately circular. The capacity for moral rules to command obedience independent of sanctions must derive from older forms of obligatory religious community, in some way or another. The bonding effect of reciprocal moral ties traces back to the sacred; indeed, for Durkheim “morality would no longer be morality if it had no element of religion.”19

But in his insistence that religious consciousness in turn derives from the experience of a unified, supra-individual collective consciousness—consciousness of the collective, by the collective—Durkheim effectively answers the question by re-posing it.

This position leaves Durkheim no resources left to explore how specifically modern forms of social cohesion can bear a normative consensus and yet be rational in the specific sense of open for the reflexive understanding, and conscious shaping, by agents themselves. In Habermas’s reconstruction of Durkheim’s position in the second volume of the Theory of Communicative Action, the latter’s gradual abandonment of the idea that the normativity of modern solidarity arises from the processes of social differentiation themselves obliged Durkheim to come ever nearer to Weber’s project. Modernization is to be taken in the final analysis as rationalization, and rationalization is the adoption of modes of intersubjective interaction less and less dependent on the pre-interpretive resources of a traditionally secured lifeworld, and more and more dependent on the interpretive accomplishments of social actors themselves. In this way, both Durkheim and Weber inaugurate the discipline of social theory by postulating “a new form of solidarity,” as Habermas writes, “that is no longer secured by prior value
consensus but has to be cooperatively achieved by virtue of individual efforts. In place of social integration through belief, we have social integration through cooperation.”

The Theory of Communicative Action, notwithstanding its enormous scope, is at heart a theory of social modernity. It is an attempt to answer the question of “what happened” to differentiate modern from traditional societies over the course of the second half of the last millennium. The answer to this question is essentially Weberian. It proposes a differentiation between social system and phenomenological lifeworld, and argues that modernity can best be characterized as an intricately intertwined transformation of both, in which social systems, generated from out of a traditional lifeworld, become increasingly complex, while the lifeworld becomes increasingly rationalized.

In this account, the conception of social solidarity plays a crucial role. Habermas offers the idea of social solidarity as the connecting point between small-scale intersubjective interactions and social cohesion and coordination in modern lifeworlds overall; in addition, he suggests that social solidarity is the only possible “uplink” between the lifeworld and otherwise nondiscursive elements of the social system, namely, bureaucratic political administration and regulated market economy. Given this role, one might have expected a lengthy analysis of solidarity in the Theory of Communicative Action. Somewhat bafflingly, this is not the case. Solidarity is a term often invoked but notably undertheorized in the theory itself. Why this should be the case is not a subject that speculation here will probably do much to clarify. “Rationalization” determines how Habermas will introduce a revised version of the origins and birth of modern solidarity in ways that avoid the pitfalls of Durkheim’s approach. Durkheim’s macrosociological account of the transformation of mechanisms of social coordination has to be supplemented with George Herbert Mead’s theory of the transformed conditions of individual social ontogenesis. System and lifeworld, developed side by side in a single theory, provide the framework for an explanation of the new theory of solidarity.

The most basic methodological premise of the Theory of Communicative Action is the inadequacy of the philosophical model of the isolated, autonomous subject, and the demand instead that any successful theory of rationality be based on an intersubjective model of reason and agency. The second premise is the demand that such a model, in turn, be based upon a philosophy of language—understood as speech, in the performative sense—
rather than a philosophy of consciousness. Habermas draws on his extensive work in the areas of speech act theory and the philosophy of argumentation from the 1970s. Focusing on the basic features of any successful intersubjective communication, Habermas developed a universal pragmatics that specifies the conditions for the communicative competence of persons. In addition to the material content of linguistic communication, successful communication requires that speaker and hearer are able to coordinate their mutual expectations according to the illocutionary force associated with an utterance. Such force is the normally implicit aspect of a speech act, in which a speaker associates a given speech act with a form of validity claim. An illocutionary force attaches to any utterance, implying that the speaker “promises” to a hearer that the utterance is valid—that is, that it makes a (normally implicit) validity claim. And validity claims, in turn, serve as promissory notes that the speaker can, if required, satisfy challenges to her utterance’s validity by giving reasons.

An utterance can raise a validity claim, however, in four distinct ways. Speech act theory distinguishes, first, the logical coherence or the formal-syntactical correctness of an utterance; second, the truth of an utterance or its claim to refer to a state of affairs in an objective world open to intersubjective disagreement; third, the rightness of an utterance or its conformity to intersubjectively valid norms; and, fourth, the truthfulness or authenticity of an utterance or its claim to represent the authentic internal state or disposition of the speaker. Thus, the modalities of illocutionary force—above all the last three—correspond to the different forms of validity claims, demarcating three different modes for redemption of validity claims by the giving of reasons. And these modes of justification, finally, imply three distinct kinds of argumentative demand, related to three pragmatically constituted “worlds”: an objective world about which we may expect (and challenge) claims to factual truth, an intersubjective world in which we may raise claims to normative rightness, and a subjective world in which we may raise claims concerning the truthfulness or sincerity of a subject’s linguistic representation of an internal state.

Habermas thus argues for an internal connection between meaning and validity. The capacity to understand the meaning of an utterance is the ability to take a yes or no position in an argument, real or imagined, in which a speaker gives reasons for the validity of her utterance, and in which such validity can be asserted in the forms of truth, rightness, or sincerity (or, more normally, some admixture of all three that can in principle be disaggregated analytically).
Habermas’s adoption of speech act theory leads to a theory of communicative reason, which attempts to reconstruct the basic intuition that rationality as such is principally characterized by the capacity to give and take reasons as a mode for coordinating actions. Rather than attaching primarily to a subject, rationality is reconceived as an attribute, chiefly, of forms of communicative interaction. And such a reconception of reason is to be seen in sharp contrast to strategic or means–ends rationality. The theory of universal pragmatics that grounds the universal character of communicative reason also endows it with a strongly idealizing element, one that, in turn, is meant to capture the essentially normative intuitions caught up with the notions of practical reason characteristic of modern deontic moral theories. Unlike teleological action, communicative action is guided by processes of communication in such a way that success can be registered only through the ideal of a rational consensus among agents as a result of a discursive process. Hence the reconstructible idealizations that constitute such a situation—the universal pragmatic conditions for the possibility of a violence-free consensus, in which each discourse participant is capable of speaking and hearing, taking unforced and unmanipulated positions of yes or no on contested claims, and so on—serve as claims about the universality of reason. The pragmatically unavoidable elements of any successful process of coming-to-agreement about contested claims to factual or normative validity turn out also to be accurate reconstructions of the basic moral thrust of the tradition of Western Enlightenment, in which intact procedures of collective will formation define both the normative character of the well-run democratic polity and the inherently social dynamic of even the most individualistic notions about the autonomy of the rational agent.

Much of the Theory of Communicative Action is perhaps not surprisingly occupied with the attempt to show the relevance of this highly idealizing notion of communicative reason for a modernity characterized above all by secularization and the pluralism of worldviews. In the transition from a theory of rationality to a reconstruction of the problem of reason for the basic tasks of sociology, Habermas claims that his theory of communicative reason offers resources for settling intractable problems of a theory of modernity, the rationality problem, and problems of sociological methodology better than any competing model insofar as it can link under one theory the bases for teleological, normatively guided, and dramaturgic action.

The interlocutor of the first volume of the theory is for the most part Weber: Habermas accepts much of Weber’s basic orientation. Social and cultural modernity in the West have been characterized above all by the