Introduction

Sport History and Postmodernism

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In our contemporary or postmodern world, history conceived of as an empirical research method based upon the belief in some reasonably accurate correspondence between the past, its interpretation and its narrative representative is no longer a tenable conception of the task of the historian.

—Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History

In Deconstructing History, Alun Munslow offers a critique of the empirical research method that provides a direct challenge to sport history and a glimpse into the wider turmoil in the historical profession. Disagreements, dissention, and controversy are certainly nothing new to the historical profession, but the last couple of decades have witnessed a growing critique of fundamental historical practices that have characterized the discipline. The creation of specific journals, such as Rethinking History, and an increasing range of books from the 1980s by prominent historians and philosophers indicate both an expanding interest in and, as Munslow mandates above, a growing skepticism of historical practices. As E. H. Carr was more than well aware, the perennial question “what is history?” refuses to go away.1

What is specifically pertinent for this book is that the interest in historical practices has not been reflected in the subdiscipline of sport history. An analysis of English-language historical journals including Sport History Review, the Journal of Sport History, The International Journal of the History of Sport, and Sporting Traditions illustrate minimal interest in critiquing the ways in which sport history has been created and produced.2 As Table 1.1

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indicates, these attempts to evaluate, summarize, or critique the subdiscipline in the major journals have been miniscule in comparison to the total number of published articles. In addition to these articles, there are synopses in other discipline-based journals, several chapters in books and at least four books that have examined methodological issues or problems in sport history. This survey, over three decades of the life of sport history, indicates that the cupboard is not bare in terms of internal analysis, but it seems reasonable to conclude that self-reflection has not been a defining characteristic of the subdiscipline.

The relatively small number of articles, chapters, and books written about the “state of the subdiscipline” are informative in a number of ways. They show that sport history has not been a stagnant or static subdiscipline. New topics, issues, and methodologies have arisen. Topics have ranged from Greek and Roman sports, to medieval tournaments, to Communist sporting activities, to college and professional sports, to Olympic history as well as historical analysis of specific sports and sportspeople. Some of these topics have been examined with specific focus on class, commercialism, ethnicity, gender, imperialism, nationalism, race, and regionalism, and a small number of sport historians have employed Eliasian, feminist, Marxist, modernization, Gramscian and Weberian theories in their work. In this regard sport history, as several authors have indicated, has taken “its philosophical, theoretical, and methodological cues from social history.”

As informative as the state of the subdiscipline synopses are, with the exception of a few instances, they do not raise questions about the fundamental practices of producing sport history. Precious few of these state of the subdiscipline articles critique the underlying assumptions on which sport his-
tory has been built or, as Munslow has contended, “the foundational way historians ‘know’ things about the past has been unchallenged.” Very rarely do sport scholars, for instance, modify the perennial question, “what is history?” to ask, “what is sport history?” or extend this question, following the insights of a range of historians and philosophers, to ask, “what are the methodological, epistemological and ontological premises of sport history?” Nor have scholars queried why sport historians are failing to engage with debates that have questioned practices in many historical disciplines or, for that matter, the issues that have unsettled, destabilized, and reconstituted much of the humanities. The limited acknowledgement of these issues in sport history has been the catalyst for this collection.

SPORT HISTORY’S MOMENTS

One of the few sport historians who has addressed the methodological, epistemological, and ontological foundations of sport history is Douglas Booth. In his chapter in this collection, entitled “Sport Historians: What Do We Do? How Do We Do It?,” Booth dissects sport history according to both models of historical inquiry and the popular explanatory paradigms. He identifies seven major explanatory paradigms that have included traditional narrative, advocacy, contextual, comparative, causal, social change, and linguistic. Providing rich examples from the sport history archives, he discusses specific objectives and epistemologies pertinent to the range of explanatory paradigms. As diverse as these objectives and epistemologies are, Booth concludes that sport historians “structure their work to place sport within a broader social, economic or political context, or to explain some issue of social change.”

In terms of models of historical inquiry, Booth has utilized Munslow’s framework and identifies three basic models of historical inquiry: reconstruction, construction, and deconstruction, which conceptualize history in accordance with different objectives, epistemologies, and modes of presentation. Booth’s application and summary of Munslow’s framework, particularly Table I.1, are detailed, precise, and informative. I will not replicate Booth’s analysis but for the purposes of this introduction point to some key fault lines between the basic models of historical inquiry: reconstruction, construction, and deconstruction.

Reconstructionist history promotes a rational, objective, and purportedly impartial investigation of the past that focuses on resolving historical issues by examining unique events. This form of history is evidence based, and it is overtly nonphilosophical and atheoretical. Reconstructionist historians reject the use of social theory or any form of preconceived theories
of explanation. It is on this point that reconstructionist and constructionist history diverge. Constructionist history attempts to understand historical events by placing them in preexisting frameworks, which involves a range of theories, ideologies, and social categories, in a way that still allows for human agency, intentionality, and choice. Constructionist histories have often been ideologically selfconscious advocating the political agendas of marginalized groups from women to blacks to immigrants to colonized peoples to the working classes. Deconstructionist histories are distinct from reconstructionist and constructionist histories on at least two issues. First, the emphasis on the divinity of the sources in reconstructionist and constructionist history is undermined because deconstructionists understand sources as “texts” that potentially provide a range of realities and possible alternatives. Second, deconstructionists argue that historians do not automatically discover a narrative story in the past; rather they have no choice but to impose a narrative on events that is intended to resemble the past. Textuality of the sources and the unavoidable, impositionist role of the historian create a relativism of meaning and elevate the importance of form, a neglected issue in both reconstructionist and constructionist history, over content.9

This synopsis of the key fault lines between the different forms of history are considerably expanded by Booth in his chapter. Munslow’s model of historical inquiry can also be used to create a temporal map of the contours of the subdiscipline of sport history. By adapting Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln’s concept of “moments,” a heuristic term used to depict the emergence of new paradigms in research, it is possible to recognize reconstructionist, constructionist, and deconstructionist moments in sport history. The reconstructive history moment (1974 onwards) for sport history typified the early years of subdiscipline. Booth sees Gerry Redmond’s history of women’s golf in Canada as a typical example of reconstructionist history, and a glance at the early editions of all the major journals reveals the subdiscipline was replete with historians attempting to be nontheoretical, nonphilosophical, and representing the past “as it was.”

The constructionist historical moment (1978 onward) was initiated by Allen Guttmann’s *From Ritual to Record* (1978) which evaluated Marxist, Neo-Marxist, and Weberian theories in the context of American sport and explicitly utilized Weberian “ideal types” to differentiate modern from premodern sport.10 Guttmann’s work was followed by Richard Gruneau’s *Class, Sports and Social Development* (1983), Melvin Adelman’s *A Sporting Time* (1986) and John Hargreaves’ *Sport, Power and Culture* (1986).11 As Booth points out, these sources are exceptional as most sport historians have not been heavily involved in theory development, preferring instead to utilize organizing concepts such as “urbanism,” “nationalism,” “gender,”
“class,” “race,” “ethnicity,” and “hegemony.” Sport history, like history more generally, came under the methodological and theoretical influence of the social sciences. The deconstructive history moment (1998 onwards) is represented by Synthia Sydnor’s “A History of Synchronized Swimming.” Using the work of Walter Benjamin, Sydnor’s history of synchronized swimming provides the readers with fragments, snapshots, and montages with little explanation, minimal analysis, and no closure. As she suggests to her readership: “You can swim in circles, above and below, without having to gulp a linear argument.” There is little doubt that Sydnor’s original presentation at the North American Society for Sport History and the article subsequently published in a special edition of the Journal of Sport History received a less than welcoming reception. Her article, however, remains the best example in sport history of the “disobedient” postmodern attitude “which disregards convention, disobeys the authoritative voice and which replaces any definitive closure with an interminable openness, any exhaustive ending with an et cetera, and any full stop with an ellipsis.”

In many ways, the above classifications are artificial and selective creations as I grafted Denzin and Lincoln’s concept of moments in qualitative research onto the subdiscipline of sport history. No doubt other historians would see sport history differently, perhaps objecting to the inclusion of Gruneau and Hargreaves on the grounds of discipline boundaries between sociology and history. Sydnor’s piece could be rejected for failing to abide by established historical practices with her work pigeonholed in some other academic discipline, outside history, perhaps cultural studies. Other problematic issues with Denzin and Lincoln’s concept are that new moments imply the replacement of earlier moments. However, it is important to recognize that the emergence of constructionist history does not indicate that reconstructionist history has ceased. New moments do not signal the demise of previous moments. Taking all these problematic and relativistic aspects into account, moments help create a temporal map of the subdiscipline and enable me to make this crucial point: the deconstructive moment in sport history is relatively recent, and the contribution is extremely modest. There have been major works that have utilized some selective aspects of deconstructive history—through discourse analysis as in Patricia Vertinsky’s The Eternally Wounded Woman, through multiple voices and perspectives as in Michael Oriard’s Reading Football and King Football, through monument and memory as in Patricia Vertinsky and Sherry McKay’s Disciplining Bodies in the Gymnasium, through representation, narrative and collective memory as in Daniel Nathan’s Saying It’s So—but I am hard pressed to find examples that sit alongside Sydnor’s journal article. This book explicitly seeks to add to the limited understanding of the deconstructionist approach in sport
history, or what I will refer to as “postmodern sport history,” and in the process provide examples from historians who challenge the assumptions that underpin reconstructionist and constructionist history.

SPORT HISTORY AND POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernism should be embraced critically and with great caution. Acerbic criticisms of postmodernism are easy to find. Protagonists contend that postmodernism is constructed in a way that represents it as popular, chic, and even heroic; whereas modernism is portrayed as outdated, contaminated, and even tyrannical. As Mats Alvesson argues, modernism “is easily constructed in ways that make postmodernism the option for anyone but bad and boring people.” Similarly, postmodernists assail the grand narratives and totalizing discourses of modernism yet, in their places, provide a different intellectual imperative with other grand narratives. Postmodernism is also seen as negative, condemning, and antithetical to knowledge creation, offering instead a pluralism leading to anarchic nihilism. Finally, postmodernism’s lofty ideals are both self-contradictory and self-defeating. How, for example, can scholars contribute to our understanding of the social world, if language does not reflect an extra linguistic reality?

In sport history circles, I have certainly witnessed rejections of postmodernism at a number of conferences where the term has been used to deride challenges to “traditional” history, to mock theoretical approaches to the historical process, or to jibe at the apparent pandering to contemporary trends in other academic disciplines. Sport historians are not alone in these negative reactions to postmodernism. Beverley Southgate cites a raft of prominent historians from either side of the Atlantic including G. R. Elton, Richard Evans, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and Elizabeth Lasch-Quinn who have all rallied against postmodernism. He contends they suffer from “pomophobia” which “is quite literally a dis-ease—an unease, or lack of ease with postmodernism, an anxiety about it, or . . . an actual fear of it.” Fox-Genovese, for example, contends that postmodernism actually “repudiates the idea of history as an intellectual practice or a collegial profession.” Some historians have gone as far as drawing parallels between postmodern analysis and the Nazis. Holocaust historian, Deborah Lipstadt, has contended that postmodern history “fosters deconstructionist history at its worst. No fact, no event, and no aspect of history has any fixed meaning or content. Any truth can be retold. Any fact can be recast. There is no ultimate historical reality . . . Holocaust denial is part of this phenomenon.” Lipstadt raises an incredibly important point: does postmodernism lead down the path to anarchic nihilism? No it does not. I agree with Mun-
slow who contends that postmodernism does not “open the flood gates to historians who lie and cheat. Such arguments are merely the last refuge of historians who can’t respond openly to epistemological scepticism.” This issue will be addressed in more detail in the conclusion to this book.

All of this negative critique is heavy baggage for any term to wear, but I will persist with postmodernism and hope readers do not turn off at this point, because the term serves some useful purposes. I will use the general rubric of postmodernism because it encapsulates a wide range of beliefs that have challenged traditional history over the last three decades. What has variously been referred to as the “cultural turn,” the “rhetorical attitude,” the “linguistic turn,” the “poetics of history,” “relativist history” or “deconstructive history,” and the “narrative-linguistic character of history,” have all critiqued the “traditional” model of history as an examination of the past for “its own sake.” Even though these approaches critique traditional history from slightly different vantages, postmodernism encompasses many of them as Munslow argues:

Postmodernism as an approach to understanding thus produces, among other things, tentative beliefs, playfulness, style and vogue, neo-pragmatism in philosophy, the linguistic turn, presentism, relativism, the reality-effect, deconstructionism and self-reflexivity in history and literature, doubts about referentiality, and the ultimate failure of narrative as an adequate model of representation.

As this definition indicates, there are many strands of postmodernism, and it is probably more accurate to discuss postmodernisms in the plural rather than in the singular. Genevieve Rail has identified five postmodernisms: a style typically found in artistic representation, an artistic practice in performance arts, an epochal transition, a method centering on literary theory, and, finally, postmodernism as theoretical reflection. Andrew Sparkes is astute when he suggests that one does not have to buy into every dimension of postmodern positions to extract something useful from them.

The central virtues of postmodernism that are grasped with both hands in this book are in line with those expressed by Laurel Richardson:

The core of postmodernism is the doubt that any method or theory, discourse or genre, tradition or novelty, has a universal and general claim as the “right” or the privileged form of authoritative knowledge. Postmodernism suspects all truth claims as masking and serving particular interests in local, cultural, and political struggles. But it does not automatically reject conventional methods of knowing and telling as false and archaic. Rather, it opens those standard
methods of inquiry and introduces new methods, which are also, then subject to critique.34

Postmodernism is essentially a way of critiquing the methodological, epistemological and ontological status of sport history. I do not employ postmodernism in the same way as Jenkins who argues that postmodern insights can not be grafted onto traditional history and that the difference between modernity and postmodernity is insurmountable, incommensurate and permanent.35 My application of postmodernism is in the optimistic, and perhaps naïve according to Jenkins, spirit of encapsulating the varieties of aforementioned approaches—the cultural, rhetorical and linguistic turns, the poetics of history, and relativistic, deconstructive and narrative-linguistic history—employed by philosophers and practitioners of history.

The emphasis on doubt, as stressed by Richardson, is precisely the thrust of Steven W. Pope’s chapter entitled “Decentering ‘Race’ and (Re)presenting ‘Black’ Performance in Sport History.” Pope, like several other scholars, recognizes that sport historians have modeled themselves on social history and, as a consequence, have endorsed, championed and practiced the empiricist tradition. Sport historians have privileged archival research, “data” and “facts” over the postmodern self-reflexive model of historical production. Pope challenges sport historians to consider adopting a postmodern sensibility and provides his own comparative analysis of stylized performances of black basketball players and jazz musicians. Following Richardson’s interpretation of postmodernism, Pope raises epistemological questions. He discards the notion of “race” on the basis that there is more difference within “racial” groups than between them, in favor of a “more nuanced, interdisciplinary, cultural aesthetic” and concludes “that we can theorize such embodied practices without resorting to the essentializing concept of ‘race.’” From Foucault, Pope takes the idea of historicizing history in terms of analyzing the production of history of basketball and jazz. From Bourdieu he utilizes concepts of “capital” and “habitus” to understand the embodied practices that exemplify these activities. He concludes: “the future of a more vibrant scholarship mandates a more active (less insular, defensive) engagement with postmodern methods and sensibilities.” Pope’s chapter exemplifies the key postmodern dimensions that characterize this collection.

SPORT HISTORY AS TRADITIONAL HISTORY

Before the doubts that are raised by postmodernism are more fully addressed, it is important to define what postmodern history most commonly critiques—traditional history. As much as both Michael Oriard and Robert E.
Rinehart in their chapters warn against establishing false dichotomies in analyzing sports historiography, I will use traditional history as an “ideal type” in a Weberian sense for two reasons. First, it is against this model that the postmodern position on history is revealed at its starkest. Second, presenting two ends of the spectrum—traditional versus postmodern—is a deliberate device employed here to push the key issues for debate to the forefront. In essence, creating a false dichotomy is intended as a heuristic aid to reflect upon popular, contemporary practices and new, challenging approaches to the production of sport history.

What constitutes traditional history, or what others have referred to as “modernist,”36 “normal,”37 “proper,”38 or “reconstructive”39 history, or studying the past “as it was,”40 or examining the past “for its own sake”41 or the “empirical-analytical approach,”42 is as slippery as defining postmodernism. Traditional history displays many features of the nineteenth-century novel: stories with clearly articulated beginnings, middles and ends presented in a linear fashion—usually centering on cause and effect—and narrated in the third person.43 As Keith Jenkins continues with a specific epistemological focus, traditional history has several defining features:

- it promotes realism, empiricism and documentarism all under the supervision of the objective, impartial historian
- it is anti-theoretical, anti-a priori and non-present centered
- it employs a commonsense, communication style of historical writing that attempts to avoid rhetoric.44

Admittedly Jenkins’ synopsis does fall into the trap of painting traditional history in a dark and gloomy hue and postmodernism in bright, vivid colors. Nevertheless, its value to this introduction is that Jenkins identifies the prevalent characteristics of traditional historical assumptions.

Realism is the ontological position many sport historians assume as they purport not only to have access to the past, but what they describe is the knowable reality of the past rather than impressions constructed by historians.45 As Robert Berkhofer summarizes, “realism enters historical practice to the extent that historians try to make their structure of factuality seem to be its own organizing structure and therefore conceal that it is structured by interpretation represented as (f)actuality.”46 Realism is often conflated with empiricism in historical practice. Detailed, meticulous and critical examination of the evidence, usually in the form of the document, is used inductively to provide access to the past. Fuelled by the correspondence theory of truth, the content of the past allows historians “to discover the most likely cause(s), the hidden story and, hence, the most likely meaning.”47 As Jenkins suggests, all this is achieved under the careful scrutiny of
the unified, rational, and knowing historian who acts in a disinterested, even-handed, and unbiased way by prioritizing the sovereignty of the sources and letting “the facts speak for themselves.”48 Content defines form in historical work, not the other way around.

Catriona M. Parratt in her chapter “Wasn’t It Ironic? The Haxey Hood and the Great War” directly challenges realism, empiricism, and objectivity in history by explicitly weaving her personal experiences into her work. She explains her family’s ironies: the expected death of an uncle on or near Parratt’s birthday and the annual mourning that frequently flowed into the deaths of other relatives, including her great uncle who was killed in the Great War and whose body, like those of many other young soldiers, was never recovered. These personal ironies of the Great War live through her analysis of the Haxey Hood, a version of folk football played annually in the Isle of Axholme.

By exploring her family’s personal Great War experiences, Parratt works against the grain of established practices in history by writing herself into the story.49 Under the influence of the heroic model of science, traditional historians have taken themselves out of their work by positioning themselves as dispassionate observers writing in passive voices or in the third person. Historians have produced what has been termed “author evacuated texts” where they are simultaneously nowhere, but everywhere. The analogy is made with Victorian school children: “to be seen (in the credits) but not heard (in the text).”50 Historians writing themselves out of their work have been a deliberate attempt to provide the aura of objectivity, truthfulness, and realism.

By explicitly placing herself in her work, Parratt builds on the insights of Hayden White. White is a central figure in postmodern history and has had a similar impact on the theory and practice of the field, as did Clifford Geertz on anthropology.51 White’s position is that history is essentially a literary or poetic enterprise in which all historical texts are framed by deep-seated tropes, and more superficial modes of emplotment, modes of argument, and modes of ideology.52 Parratt explores how her personal experiences determined her troping of the folk football of the Isle of Axholme: irony of her family’s experience of the Great War prefigured her ironic troping of the Haxey Hood. She concludes her chapter with one final irony: “the Great War was exactly the right event at the right moment in history for keeping the Hood safe and ensuring its longer term survival.”

Parratt’s chapter also questions those who believe that history can be written from antitheoretical, anti–a priori, and antipresent centered positions. Letting the “facts speak for themselves” may be an admirable goal, but postmodern historians and sport sociologists alike recognize this as unattainable. Sport sociologists have chastised the antitheoretical basis of sport
history and have recommended that historians move beyond their apprehensions and reservations to include theory in their work, especially if they wish to avoid antiquarianism. Sport historians have retorted that theoretical approaches suffer from making the empirical evidence fit the theory and from applying arbitrary theories to the past. Other detractors argue that historians do not have the option of either buying into or out of theory, that they are intermeshed in theoretical propositions. Even if historians do not borrow theories from disciplines such as anthropology, cultural studies, geography, economics, or sociology, they engage in theoretical work. All historians make assumptions about the historical process. What constitutes common knowledge? What questions are asked of the evidence, and how do these questions shape the story? Where do historians look, and what do they look for? Who are the key historical actors, and what are the seminal historical events? These are all questions that historians have to answer. As Mary Fulbrook argues: “These often hidden, implicit assumptions are as much bodies of theory as are the concepts and strategies of those operating within an explicitly theoretical ‘-ism.’” In essence, historians—antitheoretical, atheoretical, and theoretical—all work with theoretical assumptions whether they acknowledge it or not.

Explicitly theory-laden history also grates against traditional history because it frequently works against the communication model of historical writing. Tony Mangan, one of the most prominent figures in sport history and long-time editor of The International Journal of the History of Sport, in his contribution to the “End of Sport History?” debate highlights the importance of jargon-free writing. Citing the work of Peter Gay on the importance of “style,” Mangan contends that the historian must “appreciate elegance and depreciate clumsiness, to decipher obscure passages, to expose verbal ambiguities” Mangan adds that “too much writing in the history of sport, as more than one journal editor can bear witness, is clumsy, simplistic, turgid and unclear. It earns brickbats rather than wins esteem. Clarity of exposure, elegance of presentation, subtlety of perspective are worthy ambitions for the new millennium.” As this influential sport historian mandates, clear and lucid writing has been a benchmark on which the quality of sport history has been assessed.

As admirable and worthy as the desire to write clearly and lucidly in the communication style is, it eschews the poststructuralist-inspired crisis in representation. Poststructuralism has drawn attention to the unproblematic way in which many sport historians have assumed that the written word represents reality. Very rarely have sport historians asked questions related to the representational status of the written word. For example, does language directly reflect the world? Or is language a self-contained set of signs with
internal coherence only that does not reflect an external reality? Douglas Booth in his analysis of discourse, textualisation, and narrative in sport history contends that most practitioners have uncritically accepted language as a transparent medium, a few have pursued discourse analysis as a supplementary analytical tool, and even fewer have treated language as an epistemological issue.58

One of the few writers in sport studies, and a contributor to this collection, who has at least approached the epistemological issues of language and representation is John Bale. In *Writing Lives in Sport*, Bale and collaborators Mette Christensen and Gertrude Pfister examine (auto)biography with a critical eye focused on literary analysis dealing with, in specific chapters, layers of “truth,” discourse, poetics, voice, textualization, and reality.59 With a similar orientation on representation, Bale and Mike Cronin examine sport histories through the lens of postcolonialism. They point out that written and photographic representations are neither copies of the original text nor transparent replicas of reality nor accurate and unambiguous. Instead representations are nothing more than metaphors of what they purport to portray. From the postcolonial perspective, issues of representation encourage the evaluation of the complexity of sport, sporting experience as resistance, interrogation of those engaged in colonial representations of sport and body cultures, and the discovery and recovery of hidden sporting spaces.60 Like many postmodern historians, postcolonial studies see the ambiguity of language as both challenging and liberating, opening up new ways of examining the past in all its complexity.

Brett Hutchins in his chapter “Sport History between the Modern and Postmodern” adds some additional components to Jenkins’ dimensions of traditional history. In a very informative, comparative table contrasting “ideal types” of traditional with postmodern history (see table 2.1), he contends that Enlightenment project ideals have driven traditional history into representing the past as a linear master narrative built around progress, reason, and rationality. Furthermore traditional historians, in contrast to structuralist and poststructuralist views of language, see language as directly reflecting the world or an extralinguistic reality. Language in traditional history is an effective vehicle to create the past. Finally, the concept of “power” is mostly neglected in the production of traditional history. Power is downplayed in the way professional historians work in institutional settings under regimes imposed by governments, universities, publishers, and funding agencies. The world according to “white men, privilege and cultural domination” is promoted as the perspective of history at the expense of the “experiences of subordinated, ethnic and gendered groups.” Power is also deemphasized through the concept of the unified, rational and knowing subject, a central
figure in Enlightenment humanism, that enables historians to not only control the past but ensures knowability of that past.61

The issue of power is the central theme in Patricia Vertinsky’s chapter entitled “Time Gentlemen Please: The Space and Place of Gender in Sport History.” Vertinsky is skeptical of postmodernism and its application to history on a number of grounds. From her perspective, postmodernism has not comprehensively theorized agency, has not developed strategies commensurate with feminist ideals, runs the risk of excluding the lives of real women, and, most alarmingly, remains within a patriarchal framework: “in the current debate about modernism and postmodernism, feminists cannot help but point out how both modernism and postmodernism remain so frequently, so unimaginatively, patriarchal.” This is a point well made. Even taking these well grounded concerns into account, Vertinsky values the postmodernist contribution to historical analysis. Postmodernist thought has resulted in a more reflexive sport history that embraces previously banished topics such as women, gender, and the body. Sport history has moved from writing women into the sporting record, to gender studies, to depictions of the body in action. In particular, the conflation of postmodernism and feminism has stimulated interest in the construction of the gendered subject, investigation of plural viewpoints of women and multiple gendered identities, and analysis of the representations of the sporting body. The consequences, according to Vertinsky, are marked: “... the inclusion within sport history of a focus on gender—which in turn forces a focus on the body and bodily practices—has pressed an increasing number of sport historians to pay attention to a much wider and deeper version of the history of sport and physical education.”

While Vertinsky is wary of some dimensions of postmodernism, she sees more positives than negatives. What Vertinsky values in the postmodernist contribution to history is the “... potential of incorporating multiple voices and perspectives into the study of sport history and encouraging challenges to the long standing notion of science and society as a patriarchal hierarchy with a claim to truth.”

Hutchins, like Vertinsky, values postmodern history because it exposes epistemological and ontological issues with the result encouraging and forcing “critical reflection on the processes and methods involved in writing about the past.” His main contention is that a growing band of historians situate themselves between traditional and postmodern history. Donald Bradman, the famous Australian and international cricketer, is the case study that Hutchins uses to negotiate postmodern issues of meaning and representation. Employing cultural sociology, particularly the concepts of “collective memory,” “articulation,” and “dialogic reading,” Hutchins promotes a practical approach to the modern-postmodern conundrum. The
major ideological sites of power in the representation of Bradman are examined to highlight that while meanings are not permanently fixed or untested, dominant or preferred meanings are still evident. In the case of the iconic cricketer, dominant and competing constructions of Bradman included “the relentless run-machine, the boy from the bush, the brave fighter facing up to bodyline bowling, the businessman and administrator, the nation-builder, the devoted husband, the apolitical sportsman, the solitary man, the trademark, the unseen hero living in retirement, and the deceased Australian hero.”

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAGILITY OF SPORT HISTORY

So what are the doubts that are raised by postmodernism about traditional history? These doubts are both epistemological and ontological. Postmodernism raises specific epistemological doubts about the nature, theory, and foundations of how traditional history creates knowledge and ontological doubts by questioning the assumptions of the traditional historians who contend that the past is a knowable reality. Jenkins states the epistemological and ontological link exposed by the postmodern position: “Epistemology shows we can never really know the past; that the gap between the past and history (historiography) is an ontological one, that is, in the very nature of things such that no amount of epistemological effort can bridge it.”62

Jenkins’ point is that the past/history distinction is a key issue in the postmodern position. Postmodernism clearly recognizes that the past/history distinction cannot be diminished. The past is what actually occurred in some previous era; history is the stories we tell about the past. The two are related but are not the same for a number of well-acknowledged reasons. History cannot cover all of the past because of its sheer enormity and, therefore, can only represent a selection of the past. The past is not an account as is history, but it is simply events, situations, and reactions, and these qualities of the past make it very difficult to evaluate histories. We cannot, as Eaglestone illustrates, check a history like we can a map of a city by walking out the areas it covers.63 Sure sources can be checked, or other historical accounts can be compared, but because the past is gone, “there is no fundamentally correct ‘text’ of which other interpretations are just variations; variations are all there are.”64 Another fundamental difference between the past and history is that the events of the past happened forward, yet history happens in reverse by analyzing, explaining, and representing the past backward. History is created retrospectively. Related to this retrospective reading, historians know far more about the past than those who lived in it. They not only know the ending of specific events of the
past; they have access to new documents, ideas, and concepts. Because of these insurmountable differences between the past and history, as well as a number of other issues as postmodern historians argue, the epistemology of history is extremely fragile. Even the magic of empiricism cannot transform the past “as it was” onto the page.

Both Jeffrey Hill and John Bale in their chapters in this book highlight the fragility of the epistemology of history by critically examining different types of evidence: newspapers and photographs. Hill in “Anecdotal Evidence: Sport, the Newspaper Press, and History” reiterates the crucial role of the newspaper in sport history: “Press reports have become a staple—perhaps the staple—source in the task of reconstructing the history of sport and games.” His critique, however, questions the “correspondence theory of truth” in which newspapers, as well as other sources, such as press reports, personal letters, and government minutes, are seen as providing untrammeled access to the past. Hill advocates replacing the term source with that of text, as the latter implies that the traces of the past can be “read” in a number of ways as opposed to uniformly consumed, understood, and controlled. By taking into account the poststructuralist critique of language, Hill maintains that sources are not simple reflections of the past. His case study is the 1914 Cup Final played at Crystal Palace, London, when a visitor from the North, after seeing the famous glass edifice at the venue, claimed “By gum, aw wouldn’t like to go and mend a brokken pane up thee.” Hill argues that this statement can be read at many different levels and concludes sources are not passive texts as they work on the historian as much as the historian works on them. This sporting example makes the larger point “that any meaning the historian ascribes to ‘the past’ can only be achieved through the imaginative and representational process characteristic of narrative discourse.”

As much as written sources can be read in a number of ways, John Bale’s chapter, “Partial Knowledge: Photographic Mystifications and Constructions of ‘the African Athlete,’” makes a very similar conclusion in respect to another historical text, the photograph. Bale’s focus is on one particular photograph taken in the small central African nation of Rwanda in 1907 of the body-cultural activity of *gusimbuka-urenkaramende* by the anthropology party led by the Duke of Mecklenburg. The major theme of this chapter is the ambiguity of the photograph in terms of what it both denotes and connotes. Bale contextualizes the photograph, deconstructs its spatial aspects, and interprets the incorporation of the photograph in a range of historical discourses. The photograph is examined as a European production, and its spatial dimensions on a macro level—as a sport photograph in travel writing and in track and field magazines—and on a micro level, in terms of the composition of the photograph. Another focal point of this chapter is the
construction of meanings of the photograph influenced or dictated by the captions and the juxtaposition with other photographs and texts. Bale concludes that the photograph of the body-cultural activity of gusimbuka-wukiri-ranende portrayed the “Tutsi” male as a European high jumper, and this image contributed to the construction of the athletically superior “black athlete” as well as stereotyping the Tutsi in Rwandan history. These conclusions, however, should be seen in the context of Bale’s explicit message that stresses “the instability of visual images and considerable slippage in the ways in which a photograph may be used and read during its existence.”

Hill and Bale’s contributions are very important because they expose the epistemological attachment to evidence in traditional history. Three central aspects of traditional history—realism, empiricism, and documentarism—are all reliant on evidence, and it is evidence that is used to show the inadequacies of theoretical history, to highlight historians do not work with a-priori or present-centered practices and to evaluate historical narratives. With these notions in mind, evidence is gathered, sifted, and analyzed by the unified, rational and knowing historian, and the reliability of the evidence is assessed by attempting to understand the perspective of the author of the source and is used inductively to provide the best possible explanations for events or the purposeful actions of people in specific circumstances. Evidence provides the bond between history and the past. Munslow sums up the epistemological significance of evidence to traditional history: “Without evidence, therefore, history would be just fiction.” He challenges historians to consider: “Can we write proper history, or non-fictional history if we reconsider the nature of this bond?”68 Both Hill and Bale’s analysis of newspapers and photographs highlight the problematic dimensions of the bond between the past and history.

Michael Oriard also challenges this bond in his chapter, “A Linguistic Turn into Sport History,” by examining the past, in his case American football, as a cultural text that, he argues, provides multiple and often conflicting meanings. Unlike many sport historians, Oriard is prepared to concede that his work involves a considerable amount of a priori deductive reasoning rejecting specific theoretical approaches—including the myth-and-symbol school as well as those who contend sport is a microcosm of society—in favor of a textual analysis of sport history. Summarizing his approach to his recent major works, Reading Football and King Football, Oriard does not accept the poststructuralist argument that words are so removed from an extralinguistic reality that any meanings are possible. The textual analysis he practices, similar to Hutchins’ approach, contends that producers and consumers within material, social, political, and economic contexts create meanings. A real recoverable past exists, according to Oriard, even though “sport history at its best can only be an art of approximation.” Where his approach differs again
to many sport historians is that he prefers dialogic over monologic readings of evidence. Oriard eschews allegorical or totalizing readings of American football, such as interpreting the specific, brutal practice of the “flying wedge” as an allegory for American imperialism, preferring multiple readings reflecting class, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and community interests among other issues.69 Football, as presented through the lenses of the mass media, is understood as a cultural text capable of different interpretations by its audiences. In this way, Oriard’s work clearly emphasizes meaning rather than causation epitomizing, as David Cannadine has recently recognized, the major recent shift in historiography.70 As Oriard summarizes: “the textual approach to football attends to the full range of often conflicting narratives that are attached to the game.”

ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS FOR SPORT HISTORY

The solution put forward by Synthia Sydnor in her chapter entitled “Contact with God, Body, Soul” is the postmodern theological approach “radical orthodoxy.” The philosophically grounded, radical orthodoxy has been clearly articulated since the 1990s and is understood to have emerged out of the postmodern world, extending postmodern themes and fulfilling the postmodern project. It provides, according to Sydnor, a theological sensibility and stresses the centrality of the sacred to all knowledge, including sport history: “I think that sport history, any discipline—all earthly activities and practices for that matter—can only aim toward honoring God, of journeying toward God and the sacred.” Sydnor recognizes that sport historians have critiqued the nihilism in contemporary sport practices but contends that the subdiscipline has been obsessed with empty transcendental yearnings and urban mythologies such as the cult of superstar athletes, Eastern and Western bodily practices, and immortality through extreme sports and back-to-nature sports. Sport historians have rarely pushed their analyses to “the level of theological reflection, which have redemptive qualities and build analogical worldviews.” Drawing on postmodern and postcolonial theory, central concepts including “nothingness,” “voidness,” “liminality,” the “other,” the “hymen,” and “alterity” are used to envision sport history as a cultural site with transformative sacramental qualities. For Sydnor, sport history is an avenue that “humans voice, become conscious of, and journey to union with the infinitely perfect God.”

What is striking about Sydnor’s contribution is that she explicitly states her worldview: a postmodern theological trajectory for the subdiscipline of sport history. Many sport historians, I assume, will object to her position that radical orthodoxy provides the future pathway for sport
history. Nevertheless, one of the many important issues that Sydnor brings to the forefront is the importance of worldviews or ideology, as Hayden White has articulated, to the production of history. If Sydnor’s promotion of radical orthodoxy worries sport historians, the pressing question that follows is: can history be written free from the philosophical worldview or ideology of the historian? Can, for example, those who use empiricism as their guiding methodology/epistemology guarantee an ideologically pure historical process? Certainly Fulbrook makes a strong case that those historians using empiricism as their guiding methodology/epistemology are staking out some ideological turf.71 Similarly, postmodern historians answer this question in the negative: “History is always history from a certain worldview.”72 As Eaglestone explains: “A Marxist historian is a Marxist because he or she believes that Marxism is the best way to bring about social justice; liberal historians believe that tolerance is the greatest virtue; a conservative believes that traditions can teach us how to live best.”73 If all history is written from either an implicit worldview, which has characterized a great deal of sport historiography, or from an explicitly stated worldview, as in Sydnor’s contribution, is there such a thing as an objective worldview? Again postmodernists answer in the negative: “If there were, everybody would share it, and philosophers would stop arguing.”74

If an objective worldview and an ideologically free historian are illusions, if narrative is not simply a transparent form of communication, if words do not necessarily reflect an extra-linguistic world, and if the past/history divide highlights the epistemological fragility of history, then many of the taken-for-granted assumptions underpinning traditional history seem precarious. Cumulatively these issues seriously challenge traditional history. Nevertheless, as Rosenstone summarizes, “no writers have clung more firmly (desperately, even) to traditional forms than those academic historians whose professed aim is to accurately reconstruct the past.”75

Robert E. Rinehart addresses some of these challenges in his chapter entitled “Beyond Traditional Sports Historiography: Toward a Historical ‘Holograph.’” He is very critical of the subdiscipline of sport history that suffers from historical nostalgia, dwelling in fond remembrance rather than critical analysis, and most disturbingly for Rinehart, suffers from a static, unchanging, and uncontested approach in the tradition of the historical grand narrative. The alternative according to Rinehart is to represent history as a “holograph” in which its production is understood as self-conscious, reflexive, relativist, malleable, and contested. Accordingly, a “historical holograph” is a “more amorphous, fluid descriptor that comes closer to what my worldview sees as the reality of sport history research.” Like Sydnor, Rinehart realizes the centrality of the historian’s worldview to what they produce.
The holograph highlights the personal, subjective nature of historical production initially from the research questions asked, to the types of answers pursued and the modes of reporting the final product. The questions asked not only drive the research process but the final form of the writing, and the issues selected for investigation are shaped by the richness of sources, the presumed audience, and the predilections of the historian. This is a far cry from history as grand narrative. Borrowing from sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies, Rinehart challenges us to encourage new experimental ways to find a voice for historical actors and their experiences in the form of poetic representations, ethnodrama, and fictional representations. These are certainly approaches rarely used in sport history, and his rationale is that "experimentation with different genres does ensure a re-look at fundamental questions of research, at point of view, at representational practices (both failures and successes), at verisimilitude and authenticity, and at a variety of research problems that many traditional researchers learn in graduate school and then rarely interrogate again." Rinehart seeks historians to realize the conscious choices made in their work from the initial research questions to the finished work, and to develop some semantic control over the process and production of history. The analogy of the holograph fits neatly with a central tenet of postmodern history: "neither the past nor its traces can present themselves as history, historians do it for them; if ‘the before now’ is to enter—transformed—into our consciousness as a history then . . . it has to do so by way of a textual substitution, a simulacrum."

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

In soliciting contributions for this collection, I gave the authors a very broad brief to write something that examines and/or challenges the production of knowledge in sport history. As indicated in my synopsis, the responses to this brief vary considerably from narrow and penetrating analyses that address specific issues to wider critical analyses of the methodological, epistemological, and ontological basis of sport history. The contributions also vary on their applications of the tenets of postmodern history, and it would be inappropriate to categorize all contributors as postmodern writers. What I have chosen to amplify in this introduction are the dimensions of the contributors' work that illustrate postmodernist approaches to history. My rationale is that because sport historians, as indicated by the major journals and books, have rarely articulated postmodernism, because its key tenets have only been selectively debated, because the postmodern "moment" is relatively recent in sport history, some extended analysis of postmodernism is needed even if it only serves as a stance for historians to rationalize their own future work.
Organization of the authors’ contributions in this book was difficult. Topics, writing styles, emphases, and interests all differ among the contributors, but I positioned the contributions under the following headings: “On Theory,” “On Practice,” and “On the Future.” Booth’s, Hutchins’, and Oriard’s chapters are positioned in the section “On Theory”; Bale’s, Hill’s, Parratt’s, and Pope’s chapters are collated under the section “On Practice”; Rinehart, Sydnor, and Vertinsky are in the final section “On the Future.” This is obviously a very subjective division. As has been argued previously, all history is underpinned by theoretical paradigms, all contributors discuss practice either implicitly or explicitly, and each chapter has implications for the future of sport history. My division is based on my reading of their work: Booth, Hutchins, and Oriard deal with more theory than practice; Bale, Hill, Parratt, and Pope more practice than theory; and Rinehart, Sydnor, and Vertinsky explicitly address future directions for the subdiscipline of sport history.

NOTES

My thanks to John Bale, Brett Hutchins, Gary Osmond, and Richard Tinning for their constructive comments.


2. Since the inception of the Canadian Journal of Sport History in 1970 (renamed Sport History Review) there have been nine articles published that have examined the state of the subdiscipline. Since its incarnation in 1974, the Journal of Sport History has published two special editions (1983 and 1998) as well as five articles, a total of twelve articles. (Not included in this total are special editions on specific issues like sport and race, gender, or class). Tackling similar issues, the British Journal of Sports History (renamed The International Journal of the History of Sport) has published twenty articles, and Sporting Traditions produced one special edition in 1999 that contains ten articles focusing on general issues in sport history.


7. See ihr.sas.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Whatishistory/.


19. Alvesson, Postmodernism and Social Research, 37–43.


33. Sparkes, Telling Tales in Sport and Physical Activity, 11.
35. Jenkins, Refiguring History, 60–70.
41. Jenkins, The Postmodern History Reader, 2.
44. Jenkins, The Postmodern History Reader, 16.
49. See, for example, “Round Table: Self and Subject,” Journal of American History 89, no. 1 (2002) (my thanks to Steve Pope for directing me to this debate).
50. Sparkes, Telling Tales in Sport and Physical Activity, 89.
51. Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 2.

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56 Booth and Jutel, *Sporting Traditions*.
58. Booth, “Escaping the Past?”
73. Eaglestone, *Postmodernism and Holocaust Denial*, 34.