The labyrinths of exemplarity take a number of forms and operate on a number of levels in the text of *Emile*. In order to begin to elucidate these pluralities we will separate, for epistemological rather than ontological purposes, the usage, functions, and structures of exemplarity from the thematized, explicit, formalized, and formulated “theories” of exemplarity for Rousseau concerning the issue of pedagogy in particular. That pedagogy, for him, is tantamount to a theory of human nature, culture, and capacity will be explored as well as the connections he establishes between pedagogy, rhetoric, and philosophy itself. That the philosophical enterprise is necessarily discursive, therefore, rhetorical and communicative, makes it necessarily framed by the issues of pedagogy. Thus the pedagogical theories articulated in *Emile* form a framework for his understanding of philosophical discursivity itself.

With respect to the usage of exemplarity, which we will call its threads, following a metaphorics of textuality, texture, weaving, threading, and stitching, we will begin by analyzing Rousseau’s explicitly *marked* moments of exemplarity. This is not simply an issue of when or where he says, “for example,” but rather of where his multiple notions of exemplarity infiltrate and inform his own text as he moves from what he calls the “illustrations” to the “theory” and back again. These threads are multiple and form many tapestries here, not simply one, unified whole. Initially, the way exemplarity is used to frame Emile’s experience—from infancy to adulthood—will be traced, through his relations to nature, to his tutor, to the idea of property, and to the “necessity of things.” In addition, and not without interweaving, his relations to others will be traced via the thematics of pity, history (Plutarch’s *Lives*, in particular), fiction (*Robinson Crusoe*), the transition from Telemachus for Homer¹ to Télémache for Fénélon,² and the transformation of his travels into descriptions of sociopolitical and economic issues in general. What is at stake

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¹ For Emile

² For Emile
here will be the way Rousseau frames the frames for Emile to see (and consti-
tute) himself through and in turn be framed (and constituted) by. Educa-
tion thus will be understood through this process of “going through,” under-
going, being framed, and framing in turn. These are only the first threads of
exemplarity in our project. Following this, we will focus on Sophie’s educa-
tional process—from infancy to her meeting Emile, her future spouse—as this
is again mediated by exemplarity itself. Her relations to herself as well as to
others will be traced at each stage. Finally, the third level we will examine here
will be the usage of exemplarity “for us”: the stated “we” of Rousseau’s text. At
this level, the “we” is both the reader (outside of the text) and the tutor (inside
of the text), though later these two audiences will be separated, and the rela-
tions of exemplarity for each will be discussed individually. At the level of per-
formance and usage, that is, the practice of rhetoric and discourse, Rousseau
combines the two “we’s” so that he gives the tutor/reader examples concerning
how “we” are to understand and see the pedagogical/philosophical project
itself. These frames will be elucidated via the fabrics of Emile (for us), Sophie
(for us) and, of course, their relations (for us). The shifts in these three sets of
relations will be explored as one structure of exemplarity shifts almost imper-
ceptibly into another.

The labyrinths of vision and hence action for Rousseau here indicate a
rather complex relation to the traditional “metaphysics of presence.” That
Rousseau is framing exemplarity itself as a way of enframing and thereby
constituting vision, experience, and, hence, thought and understanding will
be clarified in what follows. In turn, that he does not abide by nor submit
to, constitute or reconstitute the so-called “metaphysics of presence” also will
be argued. “Presence” is always already a result for Rousseau, in everyday life
as well as epistemologically and ontologically, as we shall see. The tradi-
tional Cartesian notion of the “self” will thus be challenged here inasmuch
as Rousseau is thought by some’ to adhere to a notion of self-identity based
on “the metaphysics of presence.” The desire for presence will be shown to
orient neither Emile nor the tutor, but rather a certain relation to desire
itself that is constitutive of experience as thrown, as cast out, cast away, and
as casting in turn. That Emile thereby illustrates the _fort/da_ structure of
writing, as Derrida’ calls it, also will be shown here. In turn, his experience
of repetition in and through and only as a result of exemplarity will be
shown to be a relation to iterability’ so that Emile’s identity, at any particu-
lar stage, will be _constituted_ and thereby _ruptured_ by this structure. Again, far
from explicating a notion of personal identity as Cartesian, certain and pre-
sent-to-itself, Rousseau’s _Emile_ will provide evidence for just the reverse,
that is, a notion of the postmodern self or subject that is always already
thrown from itself, toward itself and this for the most part and necessarily,
unbeknownst to itself. We are not reading a Heideggerian _Dasein_ into the
text of *Emile*, but rather claim to be finding it there in and via the issue of exemplarity as it organizes the very texture of Emile’s life.

From the “threads of exemplarity” we will pursue Rousseau’s “theories of exemplarity” as he provides a metanarrative “for the tutor,” on the one hand, and the reader, on the other hand, concerning the essential place of exemplarity in pedagogical theory and practice. These moments, which occur throughout the text and life of *Emile*, provide a network of explicit, thematized claims for what one might call Rousseau’s theory of exemplarity. However, the many claims, contexts, and references for the theoretical eruptions of exemplarity do not cohere or collapse into a unified theory. Thus we will search beyond this level of sporadic though obsessively repeating metanarrativity to consider what we will call the “unthematized” theories at work in Rousseau’s discourse itself. This will return us to the detail with which we began, but at a different (neither higher nor lower, but other) level. That usage (or practice) is the expression or manifestation of theoretical assumptions will be our principal assumption here, a metaphysical one to be sure, indeed, the metaphysical assumption par excellence, but that the underpinnings of Rousseau’s multiple levels of usage with the recurrent issues of iterability, nonpresence of the self to itself, the framing and enframing of experience and vision, will necessarily shift our focus from one unthematized guiding assumption to a plethora of unthematized networks, allowing for the usages as we find them. In turn, we must think the relation between usage, thematized expositions of exemplarity, and the unthematized other imposition, implicit but operative, within the usage.

Rather than predict or foretell in advance what these relations will be, we will aim toward whatever they are, to reveal step by step on site rather than prescribe the findings here. Thus we will not say in advance any more than the direction in which we will begin to analyze the text of *Emile*. Precisely what the notions of exemplarity—in place, in usage, thematized, and unthematized—will be revealed to be cannot be stated in advance as such, and the reasons for this will emerge as the analysis proceeds.

Emile’s “own experience” is never truly his own, nor is it separable from relations to “the other” as manifest by the tutor, Robinson, and Telemachus, to name just a few. What is at stake thus in distinguishing here between Emile’s “own experience” and his “knowledge of others,” which is based upon and constitutes his knowledge of himself, and, hence, “his own” experience, is the structure of the text, *Emile* itself. Rousseau seeks to take “us,” the reader, through the experiences of Emile as much as he places Emile in specific situations to provoke certain particular experiences. Thus Emile’s journey from himself (via the other) to the other via himself will form our path here in the analysis of the same. That the self-other relation is a nondialectical one will be
established in what follows, as well as the fact that exemplarity—via a multiplicity of foundations—organizes Emile’s relation to himself and thus his “own” experience. It is to these structures that we will now turn in order to begin our analysis in a sense where Rousseau begins his (of Emile) and Emile begins his (of himself, and life in general). Our aim here also will thus be pedagogical, inasmuch as all philosophy has the form of pedagogy, and thus all philosophical discourse is pedagogical discourse.

EMILE’S “OWN” EXPERIENCE

Rousseau opens the “case of Emile” with a few remarks concerning the difficulties of his own method and project here, insofar as the function of the tutor will be central to the constitution of Emile’s experience. How can one find a tutor suitable for such a project? How can one find a model, an example for Emile, which ultimately will be a model of Emile himself—as a result or product of himself? In short, how can we create or envision the infant Emile being educated by the future and adult Emile? How can Emile be both the subject and the object of his own pedagogical, developmental, and transformative process? He is the arché and telos of himself here, yet Rousseau recognizes that this structure, which organizes the “case as a whole,” which will mirror itself and allegorize itself through each and every stage, cannot be explicited, articulated, or lived through, except by violating itself. In short, he will presuppose the tutor (Emile) as a result of the very process yet to be experienced by Emile (the infant). These two are not related, not tied by blood; the tutor is not to be Emile’s father, for reasons that are essential, as we shall see. What this avoidance avoids also will be examined in due time.

At this juncture, we have the infinite regress of beginning confessed by Rousseau as he at once manifests it and states its impossibility. He simultaneously insists upon it and violates it as he says the following:

It would be necessary that the governor had been raised for his pupil, that the pupil’s domestics had been raised for their master, that all those who have contact with him had received the impressions that they ought to communicate with him. It would be necessary to go from education to education back to I know not where. How is it possible that a child be well raised by one who was not well raised himself? But let us suppose this marvel found.

What is necessary here is precisely the impossible situation of having Emile-the-adult precede Emile-the-child in order to be sure that Emile, the growing youth, will become himself, the adult. This would ensure the process,
close the circle, and confine and restrict the uncertainties of the example/Exemplar, and this cannot be done a priori. Thus the Exemplar—to be known as the tutor—entails the possibility of his own failure, of the nonexemplarity within the Exemplar, or better, of what is not-supposed-to-be-exemplary but can always become so. This contamination as prescribed within the structure of exemplarity itself of the always possible detour—away from the telos, away from the destination—will surface repeatedly in the stages of Emile's education. For now it is necessary to show that from the beginning Rousseau recognizes the impossibility of his own demands, and his response to them is to create a fiction that would be what he ought to be—that can be controlled through and through, though he has no history, no past, and a fortiori, no education. Such is the frame in which Rousseau situates his introduction to our/Emile's tutor. We shall return to this mirroring relation that has distortion prescribed within it from the beginning, but first let us make a detour through the issue of masks as they exhibit another aspect of exemplarity in the constitution of Emile's “own experience” and the experience of this “ownness” as a self and as his world.

Very often Emile's pedagogical process takes the form of repetition, which does not itself repeat but shifts the form of itself over time. We might call this “iterability,” to use the Derridean vernacular, but let us not be too hasty to introduce the closure of names, let alone proper names here.

Rousseau claims that all children have a “fear of masks” (and a love of the truth, one might argue). It matters little whether the mask itself (whatever this might mean) is pleasant or fearful (itself) in this regard; young children fear them all. Notice the role of “itself” here as a mark of the narrator, not the tutor and not necessarily Rousseau. What is a fearful thing in itself, or a pleasurable one? What can a fearful thing-in-itself be, if one does not ask fearful for whom, since a “thing,” in this case, a mask, clearly does not produce its own relation (indeed, emotion) to itself. Or does it, for Rousseau?

The place of fear in Rousseau's thinking—throughout his corpus—allows him to generate a theory of the origins of language, society, culture, and the political. Thus it is not surprising that he uses this issue in his description of the infancy of Emile as well, to begin to illustrate (exemplify) Emile's relation to himself and his world. This fear is not to be enhanced, however; it is to be overcome—in every case—in order to create language, society, and the political as well as the successful pedagogical process. Thus “fear” serves metonymically to connect the “case of Emile” with the “other” cases of language, society, and the political. It also serves here synecdochically to stage the issue of the transformation of the natural into the cultural (from the pleasure principle to reality, for Freud, though the content is reversed, from pleasure to something less than pleasure), the transformation of pain into pleasure—whether the mask is pleasurable or painful, we should recall. Fear, then, as an example here is the first in a possible series (though infinite, if listed) of emotions to be
“transformed,” not out of the emotional realm but from natural emotions to cultural ones. In addition, fear is to be overcome by a process now called “habituation” in behavioral psychology. Repetition of the fearful, if associated with pleasure, will gradually shift to a pleasurable experience by the internalization of what was once, in the beginning, external. Thus fear is taken in, inverted, and subsumed, absorbed by the self but behind the mask of pleasure—the pleasurable or painful masks. Is fear, then, as an example here, a particular that would signify a general, for example, emotion in general, or pedagogy in general, or Emile’s nature in general? No. None of these types of generals apply here or are relevant to the situation in question. Rather, fear can be seen as a law of the series’ (not given but supposed). It can be seen as having a metonymic structure insofar as it relates the case of Emile and pedagogy to the “other” uses and cases in the corpus of Rousseau. It also can be understood as staging a relation of synecdoche so that this part (fear) substitutes for, represents, and preempts the whole it stands in for. Thus the role of fear here is to teach teaching, or to teach learning to Emile; that is, “fear” becomes the part-object for repetition itself. This repetition that alters both the “object” and the “subject” by altering simultaneously their relations is the whole that is both invoked by fear and preempted by it. This repetition is what allows for the destruction of fear (its repression, perhaps) and the outward manifestation of its ingestion. This repetition is thus a whole that is not a whole, a completion that destroys itself, if successful, which Rousseau tells us, it is. Furthermore, we are not presented en bloc with Emile’s fear of masks but rather introduced first to the general issue: children’s fears of animals in general, and following this frame, of masks (one could presume of animals, but Rousseau does not say as much).

From the general issue, Rousseau zooms the lens in to the case of Emile, as syllogistically belonging to this issue and problem and, hence, the general procedures of pedagogy introduced by “children in general,” “animals in general,” and “masks in general.” But the syllogism is interrupted and left incomplete with the insertion of the “example” of Astyanax in his relation to Andromachus and Hector. One might quickly metaphysically conclude that Astyanax will serve here for the example of fear, on the one hand, and of Emile, on the other hand. But the situation is not so simple. Let us return first to the fears of Astyanax at the moment of saying “goodbye” to his father. As Hector reaches for the child (his son), the boy (Astyanax) manifests two complex reactions. First, he shows a fear of the helmet with plumes, etc., and second, he (Rousseau tells us) does not recognize his father while bedecked with this same helmet. The father’s response is that he takes off the helmet (a for/da situation, perhaps), presents himself (as the child usually sees him) to Astyanax, and caresses the child. Gradually he introduces the child to the plumes, which evidently please the young boy as he begins to play with them.
In addition, the nurse, also waiting in the wings here, places the helmet on her head, all the while “laughing” at the situation. Which situation? We cannot be sure here, but what is at stake in this “case” for Rousseau for Emile is that the laughter and the gradual process of coming from the known “father” to the unknown “father” transforms Astyanax’s relation to the “fearful object”: his father.

What is not mentioned here, either by Homer or Rousseau, is the possibility that little Astyanax is not at all fearful of the “plumes on the helmet” but cries when he sees his father so bedecked for the same reason Andromachus is not at all pleased with the same scene. That Hector is off to war, in battle dress, and may never return home is assumed to be “beyond” the awareness and comprehension of little Astyanax. He is not afraid of his father’s possible death or of the dangers than are immanent for him but merely of the plumes on the helmet. That the plumes please him is thus not accounted for in this story, since they serve to link the transition from fear of helmet/father to the overcoming of the same fear, if not the outright pleasure from the same scene. The nurse’s laughter and, indeed, the nurse herself are not the central part of the original Homeric rendition but are made so by Rousseau. In fact, the issue of laughter is what turns the tide in Rousseau’s rendition of this pedagogical example. As he says, returning to Emile and the issue of masks: “I will laugh, everyone will laugh, the child will laugh.” That the contagion of laughter at the repulsive/fearful object will change the fear into pleasure is not seen by Rousseau as a problem but rather as a solution to the problem of a child’s natural fears. These natural fears are unnatural fears inasmuch as they will not adapt the child to sociocultural-political life but rather separate, isolate, and hermetically seal him off from the same. But Rousseau’s reading of Homer, in an effort to use Astyanax as an example, transforms the Homeric instance in a profound and not insignificant manner.

Once Hector removes his helmet, Homer tells us, Astyanax is not encouraged to play with the plumes, but instead he takes the boy in his arms and prays to Zeus “grant that this boy of mine may be, like me, pre-eminent in Troy; as strong and brave as I; a mighty King of Ilium.” With these words uttered, he hands over the boy not to a laughing nurse but to his wife Andromachus, herself in tears for fear of the fate of her husband now going off to war. Again, that Astyanax is not following the example of his mother here, and hence is not experiencing fear due to either understanding the pathos of the situation, or by simply being open to the contagion of feeling expressed by his mother—fear—would seem to make this case less than or at least other than one of an example.

Of what is Astyanax an example if he is one? How can one distinguish the fear he expresses seeing the helmet on his father (whom he presumably does not recognize) from that of his mother seeing the same spectacle who
presumably does recognize the warrior as her husband? What is at stake for us is not so much an examination of Homer’s understanding of Astyanax’s fear but rather of Rousseau’s reading of this fear and of his usage of the fear to follow the general claim that “all children fear masks” (here Astyanax fears the mask of his father), and in turn to precede the particular solution to Emile’s fears—the syllogistic fears resulting from the major premise/ minor premise conjunction. Again, what is at stake here is the place of the Example—Astyanax—though misread, indeed, due to this misreading by Rousseau. Astyanax is taught to love his father, or the latter’s plumes at least, via the laughing nurse, in Rousseau’s rendition, rather than an appeal to an outside intervention from Zeus to “make the [cowardly and fearful] boy brave,” “like his father,” “with plumes.” Why is the nurse laughing here, in Rousseau’s account? Because “he will laugh, everyone will laugh, [and hence] Emile will laugh,” as we cited earlier. Thus the result here, the case of Emile, in this instance in relation to his “own” fears, which will have been transformed into pleasure (not the pleasure of fear, but presumably real pleasure, though Rousseau leaves this strangely ambiguous) will inform the reading of the “example” (Rousseau’s Astyanax) to make it follow rather than precede Emile’s experience as a victory over fear. The battle will be won therefore without Hector and especially here without Zeus. This is not exemplary for Rousseau, in that these aspects of the story nullify the translatability—analogy, allegory, and translation—that Rousseau aims to establish here between Emile and Astyanax and, by implication, himself and Homer, though this is not our issue yet. Homer will surface again with the emergence of Emile’s sexual desires and the control of sexuality itself, for both Emile and Sophie, as we shall see later.

The issue here can be summed up in the following way: how can the example precede what it actually follows? That is, how can Astyanax precede Emile, when it is Emile’s fear that will eliminate Astyanax? It is the laughing from Emile to Astyanax that will transform Astyanax into Rousseau’s Astyanax rather than Homer’s. Thus the exemplarity relations here multiply themselves as allegories allegorize themselves. More specifically, Rousseau’s reading of Astyanax via the fearless Emile, in order to show in advance how Emile’s fears can be conquered by analogy to the ways that Astyanax’s were (always already) overcome (by Rousseau), shows also that the relation between Homer’s Astyanax and Rousseau’s Astyanax is precisely analogous to the pairs of Astyanax (with fear) and Astyanax (without fear), on the one hand, and Emile with and Emile without fear, on the other hand. In this case, as in many others to come, less is more for Rousseau, later is earlier, and the exemplified is in truth the exemplifier. To ask who came first, Emile or Astyanax, is thus a nonsensical question here, since we have more than one Emile and more than one Astyanax, plus we have this duplicity doubled by the descriptions of Rousseau and Homer as they replay the “experienced” fear for us.
Exemplarity as it emerges here takes on the forms of allegory, analogy, enframing, contamination, parasitism, and center/margin valorizations, to name a few. What it decidedly does not do in this “case” of the case, at least, is simply translate a general into a particular or a particular into a general via the ladder (simultaneously going up and down) of the syllogism. What we have framed here is the disruption of the syllogism in the very attempt to put the ladder in place. Rather than simply multiple syllogisms, or a double ladder, a stepladder, we have revealed structures operative here that are simply other than syllogistic. The ladder of philosophy thus has no privilege here; indeed, it is shown to be an epi-phenomenon, constituted by the erasing of these other multiple, overlapping, and interacting structures.

From the issue of “masks” and the means of masking, if not transforming, the original fears of Emile, Rousseau moves to the “place” and the “placing” of the boy’s experience in the context of nature. He moves Emile, in short, to the country, though not to the wilderness. From the evils and vices of bad examples in the city, we turn with the tutor, the narrator, Rousseau, and Emile to the “good examples” of “country people,” namely, peasants and, in particular, peasant children. The first reason Rousseau offers us for their positive contextual exemplarity concerns the realm of language acquisition. Peasant mothers, since they often are absent or at least at-a-distance (fort) from their children (i.e., in the fields and hard at work) thereby induce their children to speak clearly and loudly. Peasant children learn, by necessity, to enunciate letters and sounds in general more clearly than do city children. An added absence in this picture is the lack of a governess or nurse for the poor peasant children and hence again the advantage of having to “speak for themselves.” The theory is, Rousseau suggests, that by being-in-this-context, Emile will, “by example,” pick up these same traits of “better pronunciation.”

Exemplarity is at work here in the matrix of contiguity, which is manifest as absence and distance (fort), on the one hand, and proximity or closeness (da), on the other hand. The fort/da here of Emile’s relation to peasants will take on a double relation to their children. He is not to become a “mere peasant,” not to follow their example as a model, but rather to speak as they speak with regard to two aspects in particular of their speech. This “example” too, of speech, does not take the form of a model to follow for Emile but rather a partial object to repeat: a fetish. What Emile is not to copy, repeat, or ingest from the peasant children’s speech is their tendency to always speak too loudly, too exactly, too roughly. Thus Emile’s relation to these children also is structured by a fort/da relation; he is not to merely do what they do, though he is to be “influenced” by them, by their own existential fort/da relation to their parents-in-the-fields. Emile is to keep a distance from these children (fort) while at the same time allowing himself to be contaminated by them (da). How he is to mark the distinction here, between what he is to withstand and what he is to
be influenced by, cannot be accounted for by Emile himself or his own relation to others yet. In turn, the paradoxical plan of the tutor enters in order to establish the possibility of the *fort/da* in its proper place for Emile's earliest experiences and relations to and from—of contamination and distance—the other children. As Rousseau says, “if children are left to themselves, they set a bad example for each other. They will use only the easiest of syllables to pronounce.”12 Thus if Emile is left alone with the other children, he will learn poor pronunciation, Rousseau now suggests, rather than good—clear and distinct—pronunciation. The difference here between *fort* and *da*, between Emile and the others, is thus to be determined (implicitly) by the tutor. The tutor will, it seems, be able to control the contagion of the bad examples offered by the “presence” of and interaction with peasant children. But the issue now becomes how the peasant children can be both a good example and a bad example at the same time, and further, how they can be “models” for good and bad pronunciation at the same time. One might think a choice between these values would be necessary here. According to classical metaphysics, such would be the case in order to “make sense” of Rousseau here (and, by implication, eliminate the hints of contradiction surfacing). But let us bracket out the “law of non-contradiction”13 here for a moment and analyze the double roles of exemplarity as they emerge here prior to submission or repression by the law. The peasant children exhibit a usage of language that Rousseau deems useful and valuable for Emile to learn. In addition, he suggests that Emile himself cannot judge what is good, useful, and valuable for himself, since he is governed, as all children are, by necessity and pleasure—including their conflicts and interlacings. Thus Emile's pleasure would be to learn the “easiest” syllables and to never learn what he should from the “examples” before him. In short, he has not yet learned to read examples or to read from examples. He simply absorbs, copies, and mimics at this stage whatever is around him. He determines nothing but is determined. He submits to laws that he has no awareness of as yet. Thus it befalls the tutor to frame the “examples” of peasant children's speech for Emile. What is to be copied must be framed as what their speech is, and what is not to be copied, namely, the coarseness, roughness, and monolithic volume without discrimination of context, is to be concealed from Emile. In short, Emile as an example is framed for us here by this foregrounding and backgrounding (the foundations of perception itself, according to Merleau-Ponty)14 by Rousseau, and in turn the peasant children as an example for Emile are framed by the tutor so that only part of their speech is “audible” to Emile, reaches Emile, and is perceptible by the absorbing, mimicking Emile. Such is the way he learns and experiences the world at this stage. Examples are at the same instant, in-themselves both good and bad; or better, neither good nor bad. That is, they are, as Nietzsche might put it, “beyond good and evil.”
What is not “beyond good and evil” is the framing, the enframing around them, in this case by the tutor (for Emile). The contagion of examples is the condition of the possibility (and impossibility) of education for Emile and thus framing—foregrounding, backgrounding—becomes the central issue. This can now be understood as the hermeneutical aspect of exemplarity, but not in any traditional theory of hermeneutics. That examples can always be read otherwise is what is at stake here, and that examples to be examples must be framed as such; that is, examples always make their appearance as partial, as exceeding whatever determination is given to them from the hermeneutical standpoint. Thus they cannot be accounted for by a hermeneutical formulation but nonetheless exhibit a hermeneutical structure that allows them to be seen as examples as such.

Returning to Emile, we thus find that the fort/da relation that makes possible the peasant child’s exemplary speech, which is in turn organizing Emile’s relation to those children, is in addition organizing and structuring Emile’s relation to himself via those examples. The tutor’s role in framing Emile’s experience as exemplary (contagious) is thus of necessity concealed. He is fort, from Emile’s point of view, but necessarily da by enframing what Emile takes to be his “own experience.” This structure will surface again and again as we proceed here, but for now let us note that exemplarity is presented here—in the frame of the peasants, in the frame of Emile—as allowing the fort/da structure to manifest itself. Revealing and concealing at the same instant, this notion of exemplarity is reminiscent of what De Man calls “textuality” itself and what Derrida calls “arche-writing.”

Yet exemplarity is manifest here in this case in only one of its many modes. This is not the center of exemplarity, nor is it the margin. This is not the law of exemplarity, nor is it a mere example (in the sense of a particular). It is one of the threads of exemplarity, rather, and as such it is one of the many structures that we are seeking to elucidate here. It has no privileged place but is one of a multiplicity that as yet we have no name for, no concept of, and may ultimately suggest as a multiplicity as such—without closure. Returning to the peasant child’s speech example, there is one further issue that Rousseau insists must be taken into account, as it will affect Emile’s “own experience.” This is the problem of a child repeating words that he or she has simply heard spoken but does not (yet) understand the meaning of. Rote learning—merely external copying—is acceptable concerning the phonetic but not the semantic side of speech. It is acceptable for the letter of speech to be copied directly (in its best case, good pronunciation and clear enunciation) but not for the letters as such to be copied as such. That is, “a child,” Rousseau says as a general rule of thumb here, should only use words that he or she understands the meaning of. In other words, utility itself is to be the guide in learning vocabulary, not mere access via contagion of the auditory faculty. Again, the proximity to
utility is the issue here, and again Rousseau takes Emile out to the country—the country of peasants. Peasants, contrary to the city bourgeoisie and aristocracy, are, we should recall, the people who work, for Rousseau. They “truly work,” and they work at the world’s oldest (and in a sense, noblest) profession: agriculture. We shall return to Emile’s first encounter with agriculture as such—planting beans—but for now his relation to this issue is decidedly fort. For Rousseau, the peasant children’s speech contains “few ideas,” their vocabulary is more limited (than city folk), and thus they know less, but they know it well. This, then, is the semantic example for Emile: to have few ideas, a small vocabulary, but to be able to use it appropriately. What is at stake here is propriety and its constitution, not semantics as such. Later it will be acceptable, indeed encouraged and necessary, for Emile to leave the country, the peasants, and their limitations behind. Only now he must learn, by their example, the connection between the spirit and the letter, and it is the peasants, Rousseau insists, who have more true spirit, that are plus juste than city folk, and this spirit is exemplified by their relation to language, limited though it is.

This spirit of peasants that Emile is to learn is thus the inseparability of the spirit and the letter in language use itself, to never use the letter without also using (controlling) the spirit that inhabits that letter. In other words, one might say: do not send anonymous letters, but rather sign them always. In learning to sign his letter, to inhabit his words, to keep body and soul together, Emile thus learns the functions of language and language use itself as functional: useful. He learns, in short, the value of utility—the necessity of incarnation (body and soul, spirit and letter) and thus has the tools for further reflection concerning his own relation to himself as linguistic; that is, as spirit and letter, and ultimately, how to be plus juste than city folk. All of these examples and structures of exemplarity are present in Emile’s “own experience” only as seeds of things to come. They are the “not yet” of the “always already,” and they have their origins in the excess of exemplarity, the shadows that of necessity are attached to the manifestation of the light, the other side of spirit/letter that will threaten this connection, this incarnation. The trinity (and its disruption) is at this stage still waiting in the wings, though prescribed by Rousseau here in Emile’s “own experience.”

One might well ask, why privilege the country and indeed the peasants here in Emile’s linguistic pedagogy? Rousseau seeks to justify this privilege by using yet another structure of exemplarity. He argues that “what he himself has experienced” in the country can represent the “country as such” and thus the “country as such” can serve as an example for Emile. It is not that Rousseau himself grew up in the country. On the contrary, he only moved to the country much later as an adult, and not in the company or context of peasants. Thus the exemplary relation here between Rousseau’s experience and
Emile’s experience is not an autobiographical repetition. Rousseau instead suggests that his partial (necessarily partial as one man, one life, one time, place, etc.) experience of the country can signify (exemplify) the country as such. This partiality here in standing for the whole—the fiction, as Hume would have it—takes the form via exemplarity of synecdoche. The part-object is now seen as the whole and is extended to fill the space—conceptual—for the complete object (which does not exist). Thus Emile is situated in a fantasy of the country as such as a totality that is based on an extension of the letter of Rousseau’s experience beyond its meaning (or referent in experience), beyond the actual, to another realm. In short, the synecdochal structure of exemplarity here that allows Rousseau to speak of the country as such—in a clear and distinct way—violates the very principle that he aims to inculcate into Emile by being-in-the country (the fiction) himself. Rousseau’s violation of the letter of his text, via exemplarity, to an extension beyond all possible experience, far from being useless, defines utility for him, though it is precisely this extension of the letter beyond the spirit (usage beyond meaning and understanding) that defines proper usage for Emile. In other words, the laws that are to organize Emile’s “own experience” are neither adhered to by the tutor, in constituting and enframing the same, nor are they adhered to by Rousseau, in constituting and enframing the same. What Emile is to learn—namely, propriety—must conceal, to be effective and useful, the very foundations of that propriety—namely, impropriety. We shall, of course, return to Rousseau’s own improprieties, but first we must address those of the tutor as he plays into Emile’s experience—framing it, constituting it, and concealed by it. The relations of exemplarity hereby invoked will be allegorized by the story of the magician, as we shall see.

A third matrix of exemplarity relations emerges concerning the issue of mimesis between the child and the tutor. Far from being a unidirectional flow of influence, Rousseau sets up the mimetic exemplarity relations as “mirroring” processes that move in both directions: from tutor to child and from child to tutor (to child). We will thus begin with the former and follow Rousseau’s order of presentation of the latter, where we will find that Emile’s actions are to be repeated step by step by his tutor. How exemplarity operates in both cases, and between these apparently reversed processes, will form our focus of investigation here.

Rousseau is renowned for his examples of fear, pain, and suffering as they relate to the origins of society, but these also are the dominant motifs in his theories of pedagogy. Consistent with his general notion of the imagination, as more powerful than actual (empirical) experience, he suggests that the occasions of accidents—necessary but accidental—in Emile’s childhood can serve as examples (for “us”—the tutor and reader) of pain, and in turn the example of pain can serve to reveal or illustrate the “proper” way to teach
Emile to “properly” feel and hence interpret that same pain. In short, Rousseau claims, “It is less the blow than the fear that torments, when he is hurt.”23 Fear here concerns the meaning of his (Emile’s) pain when he hurts himself in play. Pain and fear connect in an exponential relation, due to the amplificatory capacities of the imagination. The fear is more painful than the pain itself, or at least in principle this is true. But the way to tame and restrict the imagination from turning a small pain into a deep fear of serious injury is to have the tutor intervene to mediate this relation (now “internal” for the child) between his pain and his fears (of the meaning of that pain). Rousseau adds, “He [Emile] will judge his pain as he sees that I [the tutor] judge it.”24 In turn, the tutor becomes an example for the process of judging itself. Insofar as Emile’s judgment will automatically follow that of the tutor, Rousseau supposes here in the painful example that the relation between the two judgments would seem to be one of mimesis—plain and simple. But there is another judgment being made here by Emile that is not a result of nor a copy of the tutor’s judgment. It is the judgment that allows for mimesis in the first place. It is the judgment that is in this situation “without example,” as Derrida might say.25 Being-without-example here involves the capacity of Emile to judge that the judgment of his tutor is to be followed (i.e., to be seen as an example). Rousseau notably does not mention this proto-judgment and presumably, since he denied rational capacities to children prior to the magical age of twelve, would insist that children are simply incapable of judgment as such, since they cannot yet “rationally deliberate”—the antecedent condition for all judgment, according to Aristotle.26

Yet why does Emile repeat the tutor’s judgment of his own pain? Why and how this is possible must still be asked. At this stage, Emile still has no “pity,” no empathy for others, and hence in turn he could not begin to understand the empathy of others for him (i.e., the tutor). So the question remains, what is the source of the tutor’s authority here over Emile so that the latter judges that the former is a good judge of the latter’s situation? The authority here, Rousseau insists, comes from “the necessity of things” that the tutor is supposed to both display and represent for Emile by his absolute stance: say no and mean it, Rousseau tells him absolutely. We shall return to this. At this point, we have the tutor presented for Emile as the correct interpreter of the latter’s experience. In itself, it has no meaning, and for himself, Emile’s experience provides no meaning—not without example. In short, the example of the tutor’s judgment in the case (for Emile) itself turns Emile’s actual experience—this pain here—into an example. The tutor’s judgment—it is not serious—thus operates in two different economies at the same time. The first is the productive relation to Emile’s judgment so that the first judgment (by the tutor) is an example for the second judgment (by Emile). Thus a form of rote learning, mimesis, external repetition seems in process here. Yet in giv-
For Emile

ing this pain a meaning, limiting the fear, giving it a name, in short, the tutor transforms the experience prior to interpretation into a representation. The meaning of the experience thus comes from the outside for Emile, and he accepts and adopts it. Insofar as the latter takes place, Emile now is able to “interpret” his own experiences—to truly feel pain not simply actually feel it. Hence, the truth and the actual are forever divided by the exemplarity relation exhibited by the tutor/external, which becomes internal/sovereign over the subject/Emile.

The third exemplarity relation here between the actual and the true must be analyzed in these terms now. On what basis does Emile follow and judge the judgment of the tutor? On what basis does he allow the actual to be transformed into the true? Clearly this other frame of exemplarity is neither “actual” (an experience per se) nor “true” (given that this is the domain of the tutor’s/sovereign judgment). What status and what structures can Emile’s judgments of judgment (meta-judgments) thus take or have here? Let us tentatively call it the erotic matrix of exemplarity governed, if governed at all, by the laws of transference, as Freud described them.27 Emile cedes authority (his own) to the tutor only and on the basis of these laws of transference. The tutor is thought to know more and know better (than Emile’s imagination) due to the delusions of transference. These imaginary attributes include an assumption of omnipotence and omniscience, and in general the inflated virtues of perfection itself. Thus the tutor cannot be wrong, cannot err (yet) for Emile. Thus Emile is wise to judge against his own judgment and follow that of his tutor. In short, this relation to the tutor, as structured by exemplarity, since the tutor is said to be the Exemplar for Emile here, retains the fundamental ambivalence that so characterizes transference itself. Namely, Emile rejects himself as he sees, experiences, and feels himself (via his imagination) concerning pain and fear, in this case, in the name of the tutor’s version of how he should/must see himself, his experiences, and his pain. He has substituted the other’s judgment for his own, yet this on the basis of his own judgment. What sort of paradox is this? Placed in the register of feelings, which is the framework for the expression of transference relations, we would have a love/hate relation set up here so that Emile now hates (rejects) himself (his own judgment) and loves (accepts) that of his tutor, and this is done via his own judgment. The erotic nature of turning away from oneself toward the other is thus already in place here, and always already in place, one might argue, insofar as one finds the “true meaning” of the “actual.” Hegel, of course, describes precisely this process as he rejects sense certainty at the outset of the Phenomenology of Spirit.28

To recap these structures of exemplarity in place here, we find that what organizes the possibility of Emile taking the tutor as an example, and in turn substituting the latter’s judgment of his pain for his own, is that he does not
cede all judgment to the tutor. He holds back a part of his own judgment—indeed, he conceals it from the scrutiny of the tutor, which he must do in order to retain it—in order to appear to follow, by example, the judgments of the tutor. This double relation is itself an expression of another structure of exemplarity operating within the first and indeed making it possible. This other structure is that of transference, so that exemplarity of the first type becomes possible and yet also and ultimately impossible at the same time.

It is the necessary ambivalence of transference that allows Emile to follow the tutor (his example) but also ultimately to resist him (and his example). It is transference, then, that organizes the mimetic order of exemplarity, and yet it also is a structure of exemplarity that is organizing what we understand by the term transference. This idolization of the other as loved/hated object to follow and reject is itself unconsciously constructed in this process as a substitution (for what never existed in the first place), namely, the ideal parent as all-knowing, all-powerful, and so forth. In short, what is transferred in the transference is the fiction (from the unconscious imaginary desire) of the perfect parent onto, in this case, the tutor. Hence, Emile’s first-order exemplarity relation to his tutor (when he follows the latter’s example of judgment) functions only because unconsciously the boy attributes qualities (by transference) that originate in his unconscious imagination. Hence, we can attribute the order of the meaning of the actual experience, its truth, now to a fiction that allows this claim to be taken/seen/experienced as truth. This meta-frame will of course break down, yet its breakdown also is prescribed as part of the meta-frame itself, namely, negative transference. But we are ahead of ourselves here.

At this point, the tutor does indeed function as an example for Emile, in particular for the judgment of the latter’s pain that functions (for us) as an example of Emile’s experience as such and its interminable mediation by structures of exemplarity. To put the matter bluntly, Emile’s experience is not in the order of presence, it is not to be trusted, nor left as such, but is always already disordered and reordered to appear as it does via structures of exemplarity. And this at the earliest stages when the only names that can be given to the child’s experience of pain are those of degree. How much it hurts is thus determined by the other.

Yet the exemplarity relation between tutor and child is not so simple. Rousseau insists in addition that the tutor should follow the child’s examples, repeat what the child does, present the child to himself, in effect. As he says, “one must find in himself [the child] the examples that one should then propose to him.” Furthermore, if we look inside the block of marble, we find that “Each spirit has its proper form, according to which it should be governed.”

What is at stake here is a mimesis that would operate in the reverse manner from the first-order exemplarity described above, namely, the tutor should now not set or be the example but rather should simply repeat what Emile (his example) now does. He (the tutor) should be a friend to the boy (as distinct from a
parent figure); he should be his partner, his playmate, and his accomplice. And, indeed, the criminal metaphor is not without relevance, as we shall see. In short, the tutor is now expected not to lead Emile but to follow him. And Emile is still a boy here, indeed a young boy in Book II. He is still at the stage prior to the ability to be “reasoned with,” according to Rousseau.

This reversal is only apparent, however, and does not change the order of exemplarity that we discussed above in the slightest. Instead, it operates on a more clandestine level—a further betrayal of Emile, one might argue—in that the tutor is anything but sincere in all of this with the boy. The notion of following the “spirit’s proper form” is what guides the guided guide here—seemingly. That is, the tutor is expected to judge, indeed, foresee, the true nature of the child and to govern that child accordingly. In short, he is to follow the form of the child, not the actual content, or so it would appear. But how is he to learn or know what this form is except by the actions of the child? Thus the tutor is now instructed to see the child’s actions as examples of the form hidden though organizing the spirit of the child. The actions-as-examples are to guide the guide here, and hence the child is an example for the tutor to be an example for the child. The child’s form—spirit—is made accessible, presented or staged, one might call it, for the child via the tutor who is to be his example. Thus the ego ideal is presented by the tutor here for the actual ego and the exemplarity relation takes the form of what Lacan calls “the Imaginary.”

To see this more clearly, Rousseau suggests that the tutor “teach” Emile about “the oldest profession”: agriculture. The procedure to be used here—to present the image of Emile to Emile—is to follow, indeed, copy, what Emile himself does. Emile is thus led to the plot of land and allowed to plant beans in it with the help of his accomplice/tutor. Emile leads, the tutor follows—does what Emile does, after Emile does it. He represents Emile, or so it would appear. But why is this representation, or simple mimetic action on the part of the tutor, a presentation of Emile’s ego ideal rather than a simple repetition of his actual ego? What is at stake is what takes place in the act of staging, in the process of repetition, in the manifestation of exemplarity itself. In the process of doing what Emile does, the tutor only partially presents what Emile actually does but aims (at least) to fully present what Emile is. What is at stake is what Emile’s own action itself exhibits, and it is this that the tutor seeks to express in his exhibition of the only apparent mimesis here. Hence, what the tutor presents of Emile is what Emile cannot see in himself—the truth of himself—as distinct from his actual self. Again, the actual is substituted here for the truth, and the truth then rebounds to substitute for the actual. What is seen as actual is thus already contaminated by the nonreversible reversing/entrelacement of exemplarity.

Emile is to learn, first and foremost, according to Rousseau, from “the necessity of things.” He is to take lessons from his experience with the things
of the world, in particular, the “things” of nature as an example of the nature of things. That his experience is “framed” by the tutor is not to be seen or recognized by Emile (yet) nor to be revealed to him (explicitly). Instead, he is to be thrust into situations in which he will return to the tutor “with questions.” As Rousseau says:

Let the child come to you impressed by what he has seen, he will not fail to ask you questions.33

Emile’s earliest experiences of things are designed to provoke him, to challenge him, to produce the wonder in him about his world that returns him to the tutor. The particular example that Rousseau offers “us” here is the case of the “angry man.” Show him a man in a fit of rage, Rousseau suggests, let him experience the anger of the other, directly, and he will come back to you with questions. At this moment, Emile’s experience is framed and will be reframed as a citation in a larger text that he is not writing, nor can he write. Nor is this larger text simply written by the tutor. It will have been written “by necessity,” and this is the necessity of things, of nature, Rousseau tells us. Hence, he instructs the tutor to interpret the experience for Emile:

Tell him calmly, without affectation and without mystery: this poor man is sick; he is in a fit of fever.34

In short, the tutor names the experience for Emile and tells him why the man is as he is. The tutor is thus the source of the source here, and by so “presenting” the angry man as an appresentation,35 Rousseau suggests that this occasion can lead to the presentation of an idea of the sick. As he says:

On this basis you can find occasions to give him, but in a few words, an idea of illnesses and their effects, for that, too, belongs to nature and is one of the bonds of necessity to which he should feel himself subjected.36

Let us examine those structures of exemplarity in place here in order to make Emile’s experience of this angry man as such possible. First, the translation is made from Emile’s question, implied though not stated: What is wrong with this man? From the question, we are given the name of this man’s situation: he is angry. Yet, in turn, this anger is translated into illness, indeed, a sign for the idea of illness. In addition, this idea is itself “turned into” what it is not, namely, a natural effect, which then leads us to the lines of necessity by which Emile should feel himself subjected. Thus what is at stake in the angry man’s anger as displayed for Emile, or at least as experienced by Emile? We must
consider the direction of the movement of exemplarity here that circles around Emile and ultimately leaves the angry man untouched. Each example, or each level of transition of meaning, hermeneutical example, exceeds itself and blossoms further into yet another level. One might well ask what motivates this incessant, transitional movement of exemplarity here? In what respect is the economy an unstable or a transitory one?

The most evident structure to notice here entails intentionality, as described by Husserl, in particular, in relation to consciousness itself. He insisted that consciousness is always and by necessity situated ahead of itself; that is, consciousness is always and necessarily “consciousness of something.” In this respect, he called it “intentional.” Another motif we might use is excess and incompleteness. Consciousness always and necessarily exceeds itself, moves beyond itself, and this is its ontological structure as movement.

Turning back to Emile’s experience here, we find that the angry man is to be seen as an example of something else, namely, of being sick, and initially of his being sick in particular—he is in the throws of a fever, hence, he appears angry. In addition, this exemplary structure itself is to be turned into an example of something else: the idea of the sick, and so forth. At each turn, then, the economy moves and seems to come to rest on the basis of an intentional structure. An example is always and necessarily an example of something (else). Exemplarity thus exceeds itself inasmuch as it partakes of an economy that in turn organizes its transitions. These transitions are not simply from particular to general, since at each moment the “general” turns into another “particular.” In the end, where does this process lead? In this case, which is our focus of analysis for the moment, it leads us back to Emile, and necessarily so. What is at stake here, via the detour of the economy of exemplarity—via the world, via experience—is Emile’s knowledge of himself, not the world as such. He is not concerned (yet) with the other, with the pain and suffering of the other, though he might have been as a consequence of the example “we” are given by Rousseau. Rather, what he is to see here in and through the multiple structures of exemplarity, which the particular angry man gives Emile access to, are the lines of necessity that impinge upon him, not the other. Indeed, the result of this experience and its labyrinthine exemplarity is to be, should be, a feeling produced in Emile, in particular, the feeling of being subject to necessity, governed by and restricted to necessity. Ironically, the type of necessity here is the necessity of things, not of his own necessity, nor of the freedom that arises from this recognition. All of this comes later. Thus Emile is returned to himself only to find himself displaced, subjected, overcome by “the necessity of things.”

An ironic narcissism is in place here, due to the structures of exemplarity that “intentionally” lead him through an exhibition, to its name, to its idea, and ultimately, to a feeling. Thus the power of the “proper feeling” that Emile is to have in such a situation also is mediated by exemplarity. At this point,
without such mediation, the experience of the angry man would presumably lead him neither to pity, empathy, or sympathy for the man, nor to identification by resemblance to himself, at least not directly, but to the feeling of necessity itself. One might well ask, how does the idea of the sick, which also is that of nature, lead Emile to feel subjected, rather than a subject of these necessities? What is necessary here about the man’s anger and sickness in relation to Emile? Nothing. The event is a staged event. The man’s illness, too, could not have been necessary but a “chance” event, from Rousseau’s point of view. Hence, how and why should Emile begin to feel the necessity of things from such a chance encounter of chance? It is the necessity expressed within the economy of exemplarity here that is at stake, not the sources of it, which are indeed to be concealed from Emile by the tutor. It is the necessary relation between his anger and the illness that makes it necessary that Emile is to realize here. It is, in short, the causality inherent in natural relations that he is to begin to feel here, though not necessarily understand. In addition, it is the man (as angry and, hence, sick) as himself subjected rather than subject that Emile is to recognize here, or at least to feel. It is the subjection of the subject—beyond his control—that is exhibited here for Emile, and it is supposed to produce the same feeling in Emile.

What is that feeling of subjection and necessity for Rousseau’s Emile? What name could one give to it given Rousseau’s definition of happiness as entailing the capacity to satisfy all desires? Emile’s feeling here via the anger-sickness idea of necessity must be, ironically, anger. The anger of the man thus is transmitted to Emile, not through empathy but through a chain of exemplarity that in the end (at this age) does not result in identification with the man as being sick but rather with being “equally” subject to such laws of necessity that fundamentally subject the subject to the laws of nature. Thus Emile’s feeling for the man is a feeling for himself and his own sickness, indeed, the idea of sickness as restricted by laws of necessity beyond his control. Exemplarity operates here in a circular fashion via the structure of intentionality that exceeds each finite manifestation of itself and results in an ironic narcissism at this point that via an identification with the other’s pain one feels pain for oneself, not for the other. The other is used here, by the tutor, as an example (in multiple ways and senses) as a detour for Emile to see himself as subject to, not the subject of, the laws of nature. He is thus shown an angry man in order to feel anger, not the other’s anger, but his “own” as produced by the recognition of the sources of the anger of the other. The other in this case could have been a non-human, indeed, non-animate “thing,” but for the need to produce in Emile the feeling of subjugation to a necessity he does not command.

Ultimately, Emile is to take his lessons as a young child “from nature itself,” though the above instance begins to illustrate just how mediated this notion of “nature” will become for Emile. As Rousseau says: