Chapter 1

Global Event, National Prisms

What the fireworks of international news illuminate or leave in the dark is the historic panorama beyond them.

Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.
—George Orwell (1954: 177)

A thin massive event: a small pellet of fish food being attacked by 8,000 piranhas.
—Chris Wood, a Canadian journalist, on covering the handover of Hong Kong

It is often claimed that media discourse represents “a site of symbolic struggle,” but what are the processes, significance, and limits of that struggle? As a global “media event” (Dayan and Katz, 1992), the transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997 provides such a site and moment for opposing national media communities to express, and thus reinforce, their enduring values and dominant ideologies. More than 8,000 journalists and 778 media organizations from around the world reportedly congregated in this bustling city to witness an event of presumed global significance. The political periphery of Hong Kong stands in sharp contrast to its status as a core hub of global capitalism. Yet journalists are far more interested in China than in Hong Kong. They are interested in China not so much as an ideologically benign site of geography, as it is a rising economic power, a security risk, and an ideological foe in the post-Cold War era. They participate in the embedded ideological struggle among various modern -isms: East versus West, capitalism versus socialism, democracy versus authoritarianism. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman puts it vividly, Hong Kong’s return to China is “not just a
slice of the West being given back to the East,” but also “a slice of the future being given back to the past” (December 15, 1996). What marks for China national triumph over colonialism is, in the eyes of most western journalists, “a menacing, authoritarian Chinese government, its hands still stained by the blood of Tiananmen Square, riding roughshod over freewheeling, Westernized Hong Kong” (Chinoy, 1999: 394). The world media had worried about brutal Communist China turning Hong Kong into Tiananmen II. When that scary scenario did not come to pass, their interest in Hong Kong quickly faded away after the handover. In view of Hong Kong’s relative stability, the world media cast all but a casual glance at the neighboring Macau (a big casino showcasing capitalist vices) when it returned from Portugal to China two years later.

In the shadow of cultural and technological globalization (Braman and Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996; Featherstone, 1995; Featherstone and Lash, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999; Waters, 1995), we wish to show in this volume that international newsmaking remains inherently ethnocentric, nationalistic, and even state-centered. Globalization may have brought the world “closer” in many ways. But global news continues to acquire paradoxically domestic, local, and above all national significance. The same event may be given distinct media representations by various nations, through the prisms of their dominant ideologies as defined by power structures, cultural repertoires, and politico-economic interests. Journalists try to illuminate complex and ambiguous political realities in remote foreign places through the process of “domestication” (Cohen et al., 1996). If international news is a state-centered enterprise, Hong Kong’s sovereignty transfer explicitly foregrounds this nation-state problematic.

News is about the unexpected, the extraordinary, and the abnormal, but it can only be understood in terms of the expected, the ordinary, and the normal. As an event must be understood in relation to a whole stream of previous causes, collating selected facts into certain relationships is based on embedded cultural and national perspectives. van Ginneken (1998: 126) puts it so well: “What the fireworks of international news illuminate or leave in the dark is the historic panorama beyond them.” In general, these media frames coincide with, echo, and support elite consensus within the established order. Moreover, the state, as a repository of “national interest,” is a major contestant in international news discourse. As the media foreground the sovereignty reversion of Hong Kong as historical ruptures, lurking in the background are the ideological continuities of their nations toward China. Major western media do not recognize their quasi-consensual ideology but naturalize it as common sense. They emphasize the facts, but disguise the underlying ideology.

Nevertheless, the ceding of the “capitalist jewel” to a Communist regime, against the grand narratives of “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992) and “the clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1993), is a rallying cry for national media resources to reinforce their core values and reaffirm the power structure.
Tional journalism is in this sense an ideological war, a discursive contestation, or a symbolic struggle. From the perspective of comparative sociology of news-making, we wish to show how international journalists take part in a post-Cold War ideological discourse through making sense of a “media spectacle” (Edelman, 1988). The handover of Hong Kong is a media event that undergoes a transformation—thus robbed of conflict, suspense, and theatrical appeal. This does not prevent the world media, cum various national cultural arms, from plunging into discursive struggles to promote the legitimacy of their national regimes. The media utilize a set of rhetorical strategies from the entertainment-based media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979) to articulate their ideological themes. The collusion of national interests and foreign policy goals on the one hand and the media interests in enthralling large audiences on the other brings the world media together to stage a global media spectacle in collaboration with their domestic authorities. It is illuminating to note that these international journalists come all the way to interview a small (probably no more than fifty) and highly overlapping set of people, mostly from the elite but with some token “ordinary folks” to put a “typical” face on the news. But different national narratives enable journalists to insert the present into a highly ideological perspective on the past and the future. In most foreign policy issues, media differences across the ideological divide within a nation tend to be dwarfed by media differences between nations. Such national perspectives interact with the sociological arrangement of the theater of the handover events as well as the rhetorical strategies of the media logic, making it appropriate to talk about the handover as a global media spectacle fitted with varying national themes.

**International News and Discursive Struggles**

Discourse is at the heart of a nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983). It reproduces the society as a coherent unit of culture, allowing its members to envision a sense of belonging and identity vis-à-vis other units. A discursive community comprises a group of people who feel bound through shared interpretations and representations of their everyday experiences within a common cultural, political, and economic environment (Fish, 1980; Lincoln, 1989; Wuthnow, 1989). The discursive binding of such a community shines particularly at critical moments when certain events of historic proportions inspire a wealth of symbolic resources to solidify cultural values. These events force members of a society to form their self-conceptions through cultural practices and thus renew their shared identity.

The ceding of Hong Kong to a Communist regime in the post-Cold War era represents one of those “hot moments” to different national communities in varying degrees. In this study, as said above, we start with the premise that
on the global scale, different national communities will construct different media discourses about an issue of such momentous ideological import. It is true that globalization of modern media has made the symbolic bond of a community often more dependent on mediated representations than on territoriality (Appadurai, 1996), but international news about distant events happening in faraway places must be “brought home” via discursive means. Cultural representations of a “discursive community” are closely related to the activities and artifacts of their producers in concrete social and historical settings. Media discourse, in Wuthnow’s words (1989: 16), occurs within “the communities of competing producers, of interpreters and critics, of audiences and consumers, and of patrons and other significant actors who become subjects of discourse itself.” This sociological grounding calls for an examination of how different media discourses invoke their cultural symbols on behalf of their national interests, and how they articulate enduring values of the society often in support of the power authority.

Put otherwise, mass media stand at the forefront of institutional venues through which each national community acts out its shared experiences and the underlying cultural premises (Edelman, 1988; Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1994). Events of historic importance absorb the “attention resources” of the public arena (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), which “tames” a distant event through selective domestication in tandem with core social values. Global news must be filtered through the domestic system of commonsense knowledge (Berger and Luckman, 1967) or “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1993); media texts are constructed in the multilayered organizational, cultural, economic, and political frameworks. We aim to achieve some understanding about the discursive contestation of national media systems in the international terrain over tensions between cultural particulars and transcendent values. These tensions sharpen the continuities and ruptures between national interests in the world order.

The handover of Hong Kong forms a concentric circle of relevance and vested interests to various national discursive communities and is thus open to divergent media construction. International newsmaking follows the same logic of domestic newsmaking, but under different political conditions. It is widely accepted that the media produce and reproduce the hegemonic definitions of social order. There are four general claims to this overall thesis. First, “news net” of the media (Tuchman, 1978) corresponds to the hierarchical order of political power and the prevailing belief system that defines this order. Occurrences outside the centralized organizations or standard genres would not be recognized as news. Secondly, even in a democratic society, news production must inevitably epitomize the capitalist mode of production and serve the financial-ideological structure and interests of the dominant class, race, and gender (Mosco, 1996; Thompson, 1990). Thirdly, the ideology of journalistic professionalism, as enshrined by the creed of objectivity, is predicated on an
unarticulated commitment to the established order (Gitlin, 1980; Said, 1978; Schlesinger, 1978; Tuchman, 1978). News media “index” the spectrum of the elite viewpoints as an essential tool for domestic political operation (Bennett, 1990; Cook, 1998). In a similar vein, Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1995) maintain that the media perform as a sentry not for the community as a whole, but for groups having sufficient power and influence to create and control their own security systems. Fourthly, when elite consensus collapses or is highly divided, or when there is strong mobilizing pressure from social movements, the media may have to reflect such opinion plurality (Chan and Lee, 1991; Hallin, 1986; Page, 1996). Such plurality does not, however, question the fundamental assumptions of power in society.

The international order being more anarchic, the state—rather than specific individuals, classes, or sectors within a country—acts as the repository of “national interest” (Garnett, 1994), as the principal maker of foreign policy, and as a contestant in international news discourse (Snyder and Ballentine, 1997: 65). Operating as “little accomplices” of the state (Zaller and Chiu, 1996), the media rely on political authorities to report foreign policy cum national interest. Moreover, the media, the domestic authorities, and the public tend to perceive the international news reality through shared lenses of ideologies, myths, and cultural repertoire. The media resolve around the head of state, foreign ministry, and embassies to make news because these institutions are assumed to have superior if not monopolistic access to knowledge about what national interest is abroad. Foreign news agendas are even more closely attuned to elite conceptions of the world than domestic news agendas. The U.S. media therefore tend to “rally around the flag” in close alliance with official Washington (Brody, 1991; Cook, 1998), especially when the country is in conflict with foreign powers. By this process of “domesticating” foreign news as a variation on a national theme (Cohen et al., 1996), the media serve to sharpen and legitimize national perspectives embedded in the existing order of power and privilege (chapter 3). Gans (1979) maintains that in the U.S. media, foreign news stories are mostly relevant to Americans or American interests, with the same themes and topics as domestic news; when the topics are distinctive, they are given interpretations that apply to American values. Media domestication is an integral part of the international political economy.

News media participate in a broader discursive process in constructing the domestic elite’s images of “the other” and legitimizing the state’s effort in safeguarding geopolitical interests abroad (Said, 1981, 1993). They produce a local narrative of the same global event through employment of unique discursive means of rhetoric, frames, metaphors, and logic. In “tangling” with distant contestants in the game of international newsmaking, they impute different causes and effects to reality to advance national interest and promote national legitimacy. During the Persian Gulf War, CNN became a stage for the U.S. and Iraqi
governments to verbally attack each other, paving the way for and extending
the eventual armed conflict (Kellner, 1992). Unlike the institutional struggle in
which central authority allocates tangible material resources (Jabri, 1996: 72),
the discursive struggle wins or loses symbolically in terms of expression of pre-
ferred values and orders. The latter may be mobilized into an institutional
struggle, while the former may derive its legitimacy from a discursive struggle
(Edelman, 1971; Gamson, 1988; McAdams, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). Dur-
ing the Cold War, superpowers contested over intangible public opinion, im-
ages, and rhetorical discourse in order, ironically, to prevent the hot wars of
guns and missiles (Medhurst, 1990).

The Making of a Media Event

The arrival of the world media turns Hong Kong into a theater of perfor-
mance. Although the basic script for the event was long written in the Sino-
British Joint Declaration in 1984, the actual staging of its performance had
been in serious dispute between the two principals (Lee, 1997, 2000a). The
handover is thus a long anticipated and carefully scripted event that unfolds
with real and potential drama of conflicts. The predictability of its presched-
uled nature facilitates “calendar journalism” (Tuchman, 1978). Following the
meticulously scripted events may neither require much enterprising journalis-
tic effort (Sigal, 1973) nor satisfy the “entertainment logic” of television age
(Altheide and Snow, 1979). Yet, given the logic that bad news is good news and
given the rancorous diplomatic skirmishes and war of words between Britain
and China until the final moment, the world media had committed considerable
resources to covering an event of presumed worst-case scenarios under Com-
munist takeover. But the handover turns out to be smooth and peaceful, not as
bad as previously envisaged. Somewhat disappointed, the large presence of in-
ternational journalists in a crowded island becomes a story—a media specta-
acle—more important than the event itself. A Canadian journalist compares this
“thin massive event” to “a small pellet of fish food being attacked by 8,000 pi-
ranhas.” Newsweek’s bureau chief, when asked, agrees that thousands of com-
petitive egos probably end up talking to the same set of 20 to 50 people in town,
but the Daily Telegraph reporter defends this practice as an inherent logic of
journalism not different from covering South Africa or Bosnia. The logic of
making news is hijacked by the logic of staging a media spectacle.

According to Dayan and Katz (1992), a media event may fall into one of
three categories: a contest, a conquest, or a coronation. In spite of consuming
efforts made by the dismayed international journalists, the handover story did
not seem to rise to various qualifications of a spectacular media event. As it
began, the event seemed to contain all the exciting elements of a conquest or
those of a contest. As the event went through a process of transformation during its life cycle, elements of a contest and conquest receded, and the media began to focus on it more as a coronation.

First, a contest “pits evenly matched individuals or teams against each other and bids them to compete according to strict rules” (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 33). Media events of this type should generate much excitement over the process of competition and reduce the uncertainty about its outcome. The Sino-British rows over sovereignty negotiations and Governor Patten’s democratic reforms (Dimbleby, 1997) began to fade in significance as Hong Kong inched toward the handover.

Second, a conquest refers to great men and women with charisma who “submit themselves to an ordeal, whose success multiplies their charisma and creates a new following” (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 37). Indeed, all of China’s official and media proclamations hail Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader, as the ingenious author of the “one country, two systems” idea, through which the previously impossible task of reclaiming Hong Kong becomes a reality. Thus, Chinese patriotic heroes roundly beat British imperialist villains. China’s official television constantly shows a picture of Margaret Thatcher falling on her steps in front of the Great Hall of the People, almost as a favorite icon that “provides an occasion for journalists and their sources to refigure cultural scripts” (Bennett and Lawrence, 1995). The Prime Minister had just emerged from her first excruciating encounter with Deng, during which he lectured her that China would not take humiliation from foreign powers any more. That showdown forced both sides to embark on painful negotiations leading finally to the handover. This icon was coined in 1982, and by 1997 Thatcher had retired from public life and Deng was already dead, but the image lives on as a soothing symbol of conquest for China’s injured national psyche. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) media are also fond of flexing military icons to relish the story of national strength in front of the doubting world. To counter this, the world media depict that the small and efficient Hong Kong will play the role of a “Trojan Horse” to subvert the huge and clumsy Communist China from within. This story of conquest is, however, set in the future, and its confirmation requires a time horizon that goes far beyond the drowning ritual ceremonies.

A coronation, a third kind of media event, deals in “the mysteries of rites of passage” which “proceed according to strict rules, dictated by tradition rather than by negotiated agreement” (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 36). Media coverage of a coronation serves to pledge allegiance to the political center and to renew contract with it. Persons of authority are signified and dignified by costumes, symbols, titles, and rituals. Media presentation, which tends to be reverent and priestly, enacts the tradition and authority that are usually hidden from everyday life. A prime icon of Hong Kong’s handover coronation is a picture of the brief moment at the midnight of June 30, seemingly frozen in
history. The Union Jack is being lowered, and the Chinese flag being raised. All principal actors—including Prince Charles, President Jiang, Governor Pat-ten, and Chief Executive Tung—are solemnly arrayed on the stage to com-memorate a change in the authority structure and to usher in formal absorption of Hong Kong into the motherland. In spite of its historical significance this still moment produces no lively journalism.

The media event thus transformed, journalists must do something to save the integrity of their paradigmatic structure. They repair part of the assumptions, cull more supporting data, dismiss contrary evidence, or try to fit their stories into generic narrative structures of media events (Bennett, Gressett, and Haltom, 1985; Chan and Lee, 1991). Above all, they must “hype” up the event in hopes that their domestic audiences may find reasons to participate in the media rites and rituals. Through the display of repetitive, familiar, and exaggerated images often out of the context, hyping creates a mythical ritual that is confirming of the dominant ideological framework (Nimmo and Combs, 1990). The media are not passive reflectors of the media event, but active participants in its making. The media not only provide a stage for an event scripted by authoritative agencies outside of media; they also “coauthor” the event with event organizers and their own domestic authority structure. They rescript the event to fit their respective national narrative and annotate the performance of the principal actors with reverence. They add their own “star performers”—the celebrity anchors and famed correspondents—to share the stage with, if not take over the title role from, the actors of the official script. They hype the elements of the event in resonance with the domestic audiences.

**Methodology**

This study interweaves (a) indepth interviews with international jour-nalists, (b) a content analysis, and (c) a discourse analysis of elite newspapers and television networks from eight countries or regions. The main body of evidence comes from a discourse analysis of media representations. The re-sult of content analysis provides information about the basic parameter and orientation of media coverage. Interviews with journalists are indispensable to understanding the sociology of news regarding their professional biographies, organizational resources and strategies, news competition and collabor-ation, and the cultural map on which they draw to cover the handover. These interviews generate important insights for formulating and confirming the “ideological packages” in our constructionist discourse analysis. Published documents, press reports, the proceedings of media fora and symposia, and our field notes fill the background gaps in terms of the motives, actions, and behind-the-scene maneuvers of various key individuals and regimes, thus
piercing through the surface of media content. Needless to say, all of them are to be interpreted in light of the insights we have built up over two decades as critical analysts of the media in Hong Kong and elsewhere (Chan and Lee, 1991; Lee, 1997, 2000; So and Chan, 1999). Without doubt, our comparative framework sharpens our interpretation of media accounts.

Countries and Media Outlets

To investigate the national prisms through which the handover of Hong Kong is inflected, we select for examination eight “national” media systems that form a concentric circle of relevance and vested interest: the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Within the immediate circle of relevance are the primary constituencies of “Cultural China” (Tu, 1991)—namely, the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—fraught with conflicting identities and historical memories. (Strictly speaking, Hong Kong is not a “nation” but a British colony returning to the PRC’s possession, while Taiwan has de facto but not de jure nationhood, constantly struggling against the PRC over issues of national sovereignty. To avoid repeated references to more accurate yet cumbersome “nations or regions,” we shall treat Hong Kong and Taiwan as if they were “nations.”) In broader circles of relevance, the PRC seems ideologically at war with the outside world at large, in what appears to be an extended East-West conflict. Not only has the outgoing Britain marshaled possible moral, political, and media resources to fend off assaults on its legitimacy from the PRC. The United States, particularly, has led a western ideological united front in support of Britain against China in this power game of words and images. Incorporated as junior partners in the western camp are Canada, Australia, and to some extent, Japan, which display different national interest within the common western ideology.

We set out to select a sample of 32 newspapers, four news magazines, 14 television channels, and seven news agencies from the eight countries (Table 1.1). The criteria for selection include:

- Influence in terms of circulation and the perceived status.
- The range of ideological variation with a national media system.
- Level of operation: International, national, regional, and local.
- Modes of financial operation: Official organ or private enterprise.
- Type of medium: Newspapers, magazines, television, and news agencies.
- Type of audience: General interest or specialized interest.
We compile media content of the sampled organizations from two weeks before the handover and one week after it, thus covering the period between June 16 and July 5, 1997. We ask many professional colleagues in various locales to collect the sampled newspaper issues and to tape sampled television programs (including regular evening news, special programs, and live coverage on June 30). It should be noted that we decide not to include the endless stream of wire stories in further analysis, although we do incorporate insights from interview with wire reporters. We are also confident that the “discursive packages” of news agencies do not differ markedly from those of print media and television.

Table 1.1
The Sample of Media Outlets

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Print Media</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>News Agencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRC (n = 8)</td>
<td>People’s Daily*</td>
<td>CCTV*</td>
<td>Xinhua</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic Daily</td>
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<td>People’s Liberation Army Daily</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guangming Daily</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou Daily*</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA (n = 11)</td>
<td>New York Times*</td>
<td>CBS*</td>
<td>AP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Washington Post*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wall Street Journal*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chicago Tribune*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Los Angeles Times*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Des Moines Register*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>San Jose Mercury News</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Newsweek (magazine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain (n = 8)</td>
<td>The Times*</td>
<td>BBC*</td>
<td>Reuters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guardian*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Telegraph*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Independent*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hong Kong (n = 10)</td>
<td>Ming Pao Daily News*</td>
<td>TVB*</td>
<td>(GIS)*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South China Morning Post*</td>
<td>CTV</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apple Daily*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oriental Daily News</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yazhou Zhoukan (magazine)</td>
<td>CTN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Far Eastern Economic Review (magazine)</td>
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We compile media content of the sampled organizations from two weeks before the handover and one week after it, thus covering the period between June 16 and July 5, 1997. We ask many professional colleagues in various locales to collect the sampled newspaper issues and to tape sampled television programs (including regular evening news, special programs, and live coverage on June 30). It should be noted that we decide not to include the endless stream of wire stories in further analysis, although we do incorporate insights from interview with wire reporters. We are also confident that the “discursive packages” of news agencies do not differ markedly from those of print media and television.
Interviews

Based on this media sample, we interview a total of 76 journalists (Table 1.2), including 37 from the print media, 29 from the broadcasting media, and 10 from news agencies. The country distribution is, except for Australia, fairly balanced. (See Appendix II for a complete list of interviewees.) Most interviews are based on a detailed, semistructured protocol (Appendix III), each lasting 30 to 180 minutes, fully taped and transcribed. A small number of interviews take the form of more casual conversation to validate our inferences from more formal interviews. Many of the interviewees are Hong Kong-based, others on special assignment for the occasion.

We aim to discern patterns of professional journalists at work within various organizational and cultural milieus. We probe journalists on (a) their professional biography; (b) their working conditions in relation to the sources, editors, competitors, and audience; and particularly (c) their discursive activities—namely, invocation of themes, frames, images, and metaphors to narrate the story. This thick description of their professional world later comes to life, enriching our interpretations of the stories they produce. We ask them to name a story they think would

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Print Media</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>News Agencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td><em>China Times</em></td>
<td>TTV*</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>(n = 7)</td>
<td><em>United Daily News</em></td>
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<td><em>Central Daily News</em></td>
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<td><em>Liberty Times</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Mingzhong Daily</em></td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Asahi Shim bun</td>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>Kyodo</td>
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<td>(n = 7)</td>
<td>Yomiuri Shim bun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sankei Shim bun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nihon Keizai Shim bun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>The Australian*</td>
<td>ATV*</td>
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<td>(n = 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Globe and Mail*</td>
<td>CBC*</td>
<td>Canadian Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 5)</td>
<td>MacLean’s (magazine)</td>
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<td>Southam News</td>
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Notes:
1. All print media and television outlets listed in this table are qualitatively examined in the discourse analysis. Only those with * are also content-coded. We do not examine the news agencies in either study. For further information, see Appendix I-IV.

2. The Government Information Services serves the international journalists by providing press releases, briefings, field trips, and other assistance.
capture the essence of Hong Kong. This would lead to a better understanding about how they draw on certain political ideology and cultural repertoire in the process of “translating” foreign reality for their home audiences. We also ask them about their game plan for covering a series of competing events situated in the web of time and geography on the day of the handover. It is important to know how they construct the news net, divide the labor, and cope with intense competitive pressure under the punishing deadline.

At first glance, the interviews seem to suggest the emergence of a “global” culture of professional journalism. Rooted in western origins of market economy and liberal polity, this professional culture seems to have been widely accepted as general if not universal norms of journalistic conduct and judgment (Schudson, 1978; Weaver, 1998). All journalists profess their commitment to the pursuit of fact and “truth,” in their capacities as avowed observers, transmitters, and interpreters of reality, and they take offense at being viewed as partisan activists with an ideological ax to grind. Even Communist journalists from the PRC seem no longer to hold their Leninist teachings with deep conviction (He, 2000; Pan, 2000; Zhao, 1998). This general impression is superficial and shallow at best, for what constitutes the fact or truth is culturally relative and ideologically indeterminate. Despite being professional cynics, journalists usually do not defy the assumptions of the power structure in their work (Gans, 1979; Manoff and Schudson, 1986; Schlesinger, 1978; Tuchman, 1978). Media discourses in the international terrain, in particular, tend to possess strong national personalities that sharpen the us-against-them boundaries in reductive and limiting categories (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Lee and Yang, 1995; Said, 1981). Notwithstanding claims to the contrary, this reliance on national ideology is also true of such global-scale media outlets as the BBC or CNN that speak in perfect English to the elite in the rest of the world.

Table 1.2

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<th>National Origins of Journalists Interviewed</th>
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<td>Print Media</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Content Analysis

Of the sampled media outlets, we perform a content analysis of a subsample of 26 outlets totaling 3,883 stories, across seven media systems except Japan (Table 1.1). The main purpose is to set the basic comparative parameter of media coverage, but content analysis does not yield a deep understanding of the discursive structures. Appendix IV provides a more detailed description of the research procedure.

Three general points deserve initial remarks here. First, all eight media systems have covered the handover extensively (see Appendix IV for statistics). In terms of newspaper space, Hong Kong and the PRC rank highest, followed by Taiwan, Australia, and Canada. The United States ranks lower because the “local” papers devote a smaller space to the handover, but the elite papers produce large amounts of long interpretative stories. The pattern of television coverage differs only slightly: CCTV (China) ranks the first, followed by TVB (Hong Kong) and TTV (Taiwan), and Australian, British, and U.S. networks.

Second, the handover, as a prescheduled calendar event, has a clear life cycle. Media coverage peaks on June 30 and July 1. During the prehandover preparatory period (June 16–29), daily media coverage is only 11% to 33% of the amount produced in the peak period. The posthandover coverage (July 2–5) tapers off to range from 7% to 39% of the amount produced in the peak period.

Thirdly, as will also be clear (Table 3.1), the PRC faces a doubting world. The PRC media see no negative change will take place after the handover; in fact, everything in Hong Kong will look brighter under the loving care of the motherland. But those from the four English-speaking countries—the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada—predict that profound negative change is likely to occur in political, if not economic, areas. Hong Kong and Taiwan media, concerned with self-survival, are also negative but not as negative as the western media. The content analysis confirms and sharpens the results of our discourse analysis.

Discourse Analysis

For the most important part of our work, we take a constructionist approach to discourse analysis as developed by William Gamson and his associates (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, 1989; Gamson et al., 1992) in an effort to link media texts and broader ideological underpinnings of national prisms. We first deconstruct stories that comprise each national media account into what Gamson and Lasch (1983) call “signature matrix,” a device that lists the key frames and links them to salient signifying devices. We then reconstruct their major theses into genotypical categories—or what Gamson calls “ideological packages” or “discursive packages”—replete with metaphors, exemplars, catch
phrases, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences, and appeals to principle. These frames serve as an organizing scheme with which journalists provide coherence to their stories and through which some critical issues can be discussed and understood. Gitlin (1980: 7) writes, “Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports.” These frames relate media texts to overall social and ideological contexts.

This analysis involves examining the text along the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions (Fiske, 1982). The former calls for an examination of the choices of textual units and their interrelationships within a news paradigm. We focus on “macro” and “midlevel” units in terms of journalists’ choice of story details, quoted statements, metaphors, images and exemplars, as well as their source dependence. The syntagmatic dimension concerns the placement of textual units in a syntactic structure according to certain linguistic rules or the “story grammar” of an event (Pan and Kosicki, 1993; van Dijk, 1988). This dimension entails three levels of abstraction, each forming a template for storytelling:

1. At the level of the story, we must first analyze the “macro structure” (van Dijk, 1988) or “story grammar” (Franzosi, 1989) of news items—how signs are put together according to certain rules. A regular news item consists of the headlines, the lead paragraph, and the story (or event)—woven with actors, actions, and consequences.

2. We must analyze how official event organizers author a “mega-story” composed of a series of activities and events (with a cast of actors and roles) leading up to the sovereignty transfer. This is an analysis of the “superstructure” or “global structure” (van Dijk, 1988).

3. We must analyze how, within this “global structure,” journalists bring certain professional norms, journalistic paradigms (Bennett, Gressett, and Haltom, 1985; Chan and Lee, 1991), and organizational routine (Tuchman, 1978) to make sense of the events.

In sum, we examine the narrative structure (headline, lead, main body, and sources), the thematic structure (rules of citing sources and evidence to support a theme), and the rhetorical structure (rules and conventions of using certain symbolic resources to create meanings and cultural resonance) of media discourses (Pan and Kosicki, 1993).

We examine the texts of all sampled media organizations (Table 1.1), with an estimated total of 7,600 print stories, hundreds of hours of television coverage, and supplemental magazine stories. Two of us on the team are responsible for analyzing a country to achieve cross-verification. Frequent—initially, almost
daily—communication is conducive to furthering our common understanding about the framework for scrutinizing the discursive packages of each media system. We develop “country reports” based on cross-examining and traversing media texts, interview transcripts, our “other knowledge,” and theoretical concepts. We make back-and-forth attempts at proposing alternative and supplemental interpretations to settle some conflicting hypotheses. For example, given our understanding of the general literature, we were initially skeptical about a claim made by a prominent CNN correspondent that his network is an objective international entity not tied to U.S., or any, ideology. We nonetheless treated it as a plausible hypothesis and reminded ourselves to pay special attention in the discourse analysis to determine if there is a significant difference between the ideological structure of CBS and CNN. We found little differences between them and hence rejected his claim (see chapter 3). Painstaking and disciplined cross-fertilization between theoretical concepts and different facets of data has led to the development of thematic outlines as herein presented.

Framework for Analysis

News has to come from somewhere and somebody. It does not reveal itself without human construction. Our framework for analysis, as sketched in Figure 1.1, highlights the following points:

1. International news is a series of complex processes that involves making political, economic, and cultural choices.
2. Each of these news processes is constrained by the political economy of the home country, as well as its role and place in the larger international political economy.
3. Event organizers, often the authorities, produce the first-order script to structure the universe of news activities.
4. Professional journalists, working for and within media organizations, write the second-order script as narratives based on their observations and interpretations—within the constraints mentioned above.

In essence, this volume consists of two major parts: chapters 2–4 deal with the sociological, cultural, and ideological processes and strategies in the making of a global media event, while chapters 5–8 analyze the very stuff of life in discursive contestation. The first part—the sociology of international media—is important in its own right, but it also paves the way for the second part, where national prisms are the central site of ideological wars.
*News Staging and News Agendas*

The authorities outside the media set the news stage—ranging from the controlled access, facilities and the infrastructure, to schedules and arranged activities—that have a decisive influence on the news flow (chapter 2). The nature of the event—whether prescheduled, conflict-ridden, or fast-paced—varies. The first injunction of journalists is to stay with the facts; they cannot portray a peaceful march as a bloody crackdown. Next, the configuration of domestic and international forces shapes the parameters of potential news topics within which journalists construct their narratives. Journalists transform occurrences into news agendas according to professional norms, orga-
nizational constraints, national values and orientations, and the law of the market. The stronger nations tend to have a stronger media presence. The media enjoy less latitude in setting the agenda if the organizers minutely script the stage. All centralized authorities and dominant nations attempt to control the flow and rhythm of news, even though they cannot completely monopolize it.

**Domestication and Globalization**

Global news, about events happening in distant places, has to be brought home through the process of “domestication” to make it familiar and intelligible to home audiences (chapter 3). The conversion of a global agenda into a home agenda—that is, treating foreign news as an extension of domestic news—starts out with selective framing of issues or topics through the lens of professional norms, national interest, cultural repertoire, and market dynamics. As the public is generally apathetic to international news, foreign correspondents must go to extra length in imparting relevance or adding entertainment value to the story. This “domestic” perspective tends to be state-articulated “national” perspective, suppressing subnational, local differences. The extent to which the global-scale media outlets (such as CNN and the BBC) can be free from national ideological constraints bears further analysis.

**Hyping and Essentialization**

Hyping and essentialization are two processes by which news is domesticated and globalized (chapter 4). Hyping is a strategy for the media to reduce the gap between what is expected of a media event and scripted reality, thus bringing to the forefront (and to make up for the lack of) theatrical elements (such as conflict, competition, suspense, and emotion) to electrify the audience. The resultant media product tends to portray a reality that is larger than life. Intensified media competition in the commercial market has made hyping an imperative in today’s news business. Essentialization means stripping an event to its core properties as if they were invariant and immutable; the reductive and frozen narratives, often manifested in crude us-against-them cliché, conceal many complex and contradictory contexts of reality. We present a case analysis of essentialized narratives about nationalism and colonialism in chapter 7.

**National Prisms: Frames and Narratives**

Another core concern is to analyze international newsmaking as a form of ideological contestation (chapters 5–8). As the end product of the news process, these frames and narratives provide journalists with organizing coherence to
their stories, through which some critical issues can be discussed and understood. These frames help organize the world of events both for those who report them as journalists and for those who consume such reports as audience. We shall examine four outstanding discursive battles, each with internal skirmishes.

The first discursive battle is fought between the United States and the PRC over grand ideologies and conflicting systems (chapter 5). The PRC finds itself becoming the chief villain of the U.S. media in the post-Tiananmen era and in the post-Cold War order. Seeing Hong Kong through the ugly mirror of the Tiananmen crackdown, they proclaim that the United States, as a “new guardian,” will prevent Hong Kong’s fragile democracy and existing freedoms from China’s abuse. Hong Kong will also play the “Trojan Horse” role to subvert China’s authoritarian system. Television networks are particularly blatant.

Britain and the PRC, the two sovereign powers involved in the handover, join the second discursive battle over the interpretations of colonialism and nationalism (chapter 6). China’s media essentialize British colonialism as inherently evil while touting Chinese nationalism as inherently supreme; this narrative, while partially valid, loses sight of several key complex and paradoxical historical developments. The British media largely ignore their inglorious colonial beginnings. Instead they de-essentialize the evilness of colonialism by emphasizing that Hong Kong is Britain’s creation as a free, stable, and prosperous enclave against relentless turmoil in the PRC. They personify Governor Patten as democracy’s apostle who stands up to Communist bluster. These selective historical depictions, while partially valid, typify what Said (1978, 1981, 1993) portrays as the imperial construction of Orientalism.

The third discursive battle occurs within “Cultural China” over the meaning of Chinese nationalism, China, and Chinese (chapter 7). The state-controlled PRC media approach the handover primarily as a domestic issue with global implications for national glory. Relying exclusively on domestic and friendly sources, they construct China as a unified nation-state centered in Beijing yet supposedly inclusive of global Chinese communities. The handover is a “national ceremony,” marking an end to western colonialism and a beginning to national reunification. On the receiving end, Hong Kong media treat the handover as the unfolding of a crucial chapter in local history, praying that global watch will keep the place out of Beijing-inflicted harm’s way. A thriving democracy in search of identity, Taiwan media focus on “what’s next” for the island nation.

The fourth discursive struggle concerns a supporting cast of the western camp who seems to fight against the PRC and the United States at the same time over the primacy of ideology and national interests (chapter 8). Both Canada and Australia have become Hong Kong’s new diaspora, while Japan has enormous economic interests in Hong Kong. Australia and Japan also em-
phasize their “Asian identity.” This means that the “minor three” not only play ideological variations on the western themes of democracy and human rights, but also seek to advance their own economic and security interests that require certain struggle against the U.S. policy.

Finally, we shall conclude this volume in chapter 9 with focused discussions on the implications—the structures, processes, consequences, and limits—of this discursive contestation in relation to media events in the age of globalization.