INTRODUCTION

Nationalism's Challenge
to Political Philosophy

Ronald Beiner

— Try to be one of us, repeated Davin. In heart you are an Irishman but your pride is too powerful.

— My ancestors threw off their language and took another, Stephen said. They allowed a handful of foreigners to subject them. Do you fancy I am going to pay in my own life and person debts they made? What for?

— For our freedom, said Davin.

— No honourable and sincere man, said Stephen, has given up to you his life and his youth and his affections from the days of Tone to those of Parnell, but you sold him to the enemy or failed him in need or reviled him and left him for another. And you invite me to be one of you. I'd see you damned first.

— They died for their ideals, Stevie, said Davin. Our day will come yet, believe me.

Stephen, following his own thought, was silent for an instant.

— The soul is born, he said vaguely, first in those moments I told you of. It has a slow and dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.

—James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man

Both of these points of view are in some respect humanly attractive.¹ The problem, philosophically, is that they are radically incompatible. The challenge that nationalism poses to political philosophy is to retain a sensitivity toward the power of these two ideals of life, those of Davin

© 1999 State University of New York Press, Albany
and of Stephen, without in any way diminishing the radicalism of their philosophical opposition.

The contributors to this volume occupy different positions along the spectrum ranged between these two poles, Davin’s nationalism and Stephen’s antinationalism. Some of the contributors, no doubt, believe that it is possible to mediate the nationalism–antinationalism debate in a way that allows one to preserve the best of both worlds. My own sympathies tend more in the direction of Stephen Daedalus’s impulse to “fly by those nets.” But I am far from thinking that the human desire for a sense of belonging, rootedness, loyalty, and collective memory, as well as the desire to seek political support and protection for these feelings, can be easily dismissed. Moreover, I appreciate the efforts of liberal theorists to give full weight to these human desires, and to try to defend the nationalist impulse in a way that is entirely faithful to liberal principles. These arguments, too, need to be taken very seriously. If the essays gathered together in this volume prove anything, it is that the liberal–nationalist debate remains an open-ended dialogue (as do all living debates in political philosophy).

Why has it taken philosophers so long to rise to the normative challenges posed by nationalism? As many students of nationalism have remarked, there is an amazing disproportion between nationalism’s political importance as one of the leading social phenomena of the modern world, and the virtual lack of intellectual endeavor at the highest level either to vindicate or to rebut its normative claims.\(^2\) There have, of course, been lively and intellectually challenging debates about the history and sociology of nationalism that have been unfolding for several decades, and show no sign of abatement; this has not been matched, however, by an equally serious engagement with the philosophy of nationalism, at least until very recently. Nor has nationalism been a prominent topic within the established tradition of grand theorizing that defines the history of political philosophy. As Benedict Anderson has observed: “unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbes, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers.”\(^3\) Bernard Yack puts the same point even more bluntly: “there are no great theoretical texts outlining and defending nationalism. No Marx, no Mill, no Machiavelli. Only minor texts by first rate thinkers, like Fichte, or major texts by second rate thinkers, like Mazzini.”\(^4\) This absence of master theorists of nationalism may explain why nationalism has been largely neglected by philosophers and theorists, for political philosophy and theory are to a large extent tradition-bound disciplines. But this really isn’t an answer, since it simply raises in turn the question: Why hasn’t the tradition of political thought generated towering philosophers who could do for nationalism what Locke did for liberalism and Marx
did for socialism? It may be that the business of nationalist politics involves too much local mythmaking to be conducive to the kind of more panoramic and universalistic reflection that yields a comprehen-
sive articulation of a coherent political philosophy; this is more or less
the view of critics of nationalism such as Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest
Gellner. As Conor Cruise O’Brien has noted, there is something pecu-
liar about the very idea of “theorizing” nationalism, since theory aims
at what is general, namely universal conceptions of moral and political
validity, whereas nationalism exalts the particular: its practitioners are
invariably preoccupied with satisfying the grievances of this or that
national group, not with vindicating the legitimacy of national aspira-
tions as a matter of general principle.6

One should not overstate the point. There are, of course, significant
texts in the history of modern political thought that one must read in
order to think normatively about nationalism: the writings of Herder;7
Fichte’s *Addresses to the German Nation*;8 the Mill–Acton debate;9
Renan’s famous lecture;10 Julien Benda’s *The Treason of the Intelli-
cutals*;11 and perhaps a few others.12 In any case, even if there were no such
intellectual landmarks in the history of modern thought, this would cer-
tainly not relieve contemporary intellectuals of the responsibility to
engage in normatively serious reflection on the philosophical meaning of
nationalism. Historians and sociologists have already made notable con-
tributions, and continue to do so; the question now is what philosophers
and political theorists can contribute to clarifying the political appeal
and normative status of nationalist claims. This volume is intended to
help answer this question.

It is impossible within the limited compass of an introductory essay
to do any kind of justice to the vast range of interesting and important
normative questions that arise in considering the philosophical problem
of nationalism. Let me propose five problem-areas, simply as a way of
highlighting the kinds of issues that have begun to attract the attention
of leading contemporary theorists and philosophers of nationalism. I’ll
list them here, and then comment briefly on each of them in the remain-
der of this essay:

1. Do nations have a theoretically demonstrable “right” to collective
   self-determination?

2. What is the relationship between nationalism and “modernity”
   (comprising our experience of modern social life and the political
   principles by which that experience has been theoretically articu-
   lated), and what is the normative significance of debates concerning
   the modern or premodern character of nationalism?
3. Can nationalism and liberalism be reconciled, at least at the level of theoretical principles, or are they, in their very essence, conflicting visions of the human good?

4. Is there a theoretically legitimate distinction between so-called "civic" and "ethnic" versions of nationalism, or is such a distinction, as Bernard Yack among others charges, merely the product of (unwarranted) liberal self-congratulation?\textsuperscript{13}

5. Is nationalism "existentially" attractive, that is, as a choice of how to live one's life?

**NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION**

I think it is beyond question that the legacy of European colonialism, and by consequence, the process of decolonization as one of the major political phenomena of this century, has done much to legitimize nationalist principles. When one reflects on the great movement of postcolonial independence in the middle of the twentieth century, it is impossible to think of nationalism as an ideology of the right, for left-nationalisms have been no less conspicuous, perhaps more conspicuous, in our century; just as the movements of national liberation from the dominant empires of nineteenth-century Europe make clear why liberal nationalism was a coherent and attractive creed for nineteenth-century figures like Mazzini (and Mill). To make no concessions to the normative force of nationalist thought would entail not only embracing the nineteenth-century empires within Europe (as Lord Acton seems to do), but also denying the moral legitimacy of the politics of anticolonialism in the twentieth century. For this reason, one can applaud Elie Kedourie for the theoretical consistency of his critique of nationalism, for Kedourie suggests, at least implicitly, that anticolonialism is theoretically dubious, to the extent that it rests upon nationalist principles. As he puts it in a crucial formulation: "[in judging whether a change of rulers is to be welcomed or regretted,] the only criterion capable of public defence is whether the new rulers are less corrupt and grasping, or more just and merciful, or whether there is no change at all, but the corruption, the greed, and the tyranny merely find victims other than those of the departed rulers."\textsuperscript{14} By this he means: the nationality of the new rulers is not a legitimate criterion of moral-political judgment. Again, this way of thinking cannot be faulted for theoretical inconsistency, but I think it can be faulted for failing to take sufficient account of the kinds of moral intuition that have bestowed on this century's movements of postcolonial independence more-or-less-universal approbation. The kind of moral intuition to which I'm referring has been nicely expressed
by Isaiah Berlin as follows: "men prefer to be ordered about, even if this entails ill-treatment, by members of their own faith or nation or class, to tutelage, however benevolent, on the part of ultimately patronising superiors from a foreign land or alien class or milieu."

So I presume that we can agree with Berlin rather than Kedourie that in a world of colonial empires, the principle of self-determination has an undeniable normative force. But what happens when we leave the world of empires behind? Is it theoretically coherent to try to apply the self-determination principle to all multinational or multiethnic states? (Admittedly, any national-secessionist movement will portray its relation to the majority culture as quasi-colonial, and will therefore present its claims as being on a moral par with those of postcolonial independence movements.) Carried to the logical limit, the theoretical consequences are somewhat catastrophic; for hardly any states today would be immune from having their legitimacy normatively subverted. As many students of nationalism have highlighted, the "nation-state" in any rigorous sense is not the norm today; the norm is multinationality. As Gellner has put the point: we live in a world that "has only space for something of the order of 200 or 300 national states." That leaves a vast number of potential nations, certainly many thousands, that could in principle claim statehood according to an ambitious application of self-determination principles. If each of these potential nations put in its bid for full self-determination, only Iceland, South Korea, Japan, and perhaps a few others would be politically secure. Imagine a hundredfold multiplication of the kind of interethnic chaos we witnessed with the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. It seems a strange kind of normative principle that relies for its coherence on the willingness of most national groups not to cash in the moral voucher that the principle gives them.

NATIONALISM AND MODERNITY

The question of whether nationalism is a radically modern construct or whether it draws upon authentically premodern experiences of nationhood has been hotly contested by historians and sociologists of nationalism, and there is no reason to anticipate an early resolution of these debates. A related though somewhat different question is: Does the sense of nationhood precede, or is it the product of, nationalist politics, and what hangs, normatively speaking, on one's answer to this question? Kenneth Minogue offers one very forceful answer to the latter question: "Nationalist theory accords with the famous remark by Péguy: Tout commence en mystique et finit en politique. In the beginning is the nation, an unselfconscious cultural and linguistic nature waiting like

© 1999 State University of New York Press, Albany
Sleeping Beauty to be aroused by the kiss of politics.”21 Minogue very clearly regards this Sleeping Beauty conception of nationhood as an utter mystification. A radically opposed view is formulated by Roger Scruton: “to suppose that we [Englishmen] could have enjoyed [our] territorial, legal, and linguistic hereditaments, and yet refrained from becoming a nation, representing itself to itself as entitled to these things, and defining even its religion in terms of them, is to give way to fantasy. In no way can the emergence of the English nation, as a form of membership, be regarded as a product of Enlightenment universalism, or the Industrial Revolution, or the administrative needs of a modern bureaucracy. It existed before those things, and also shaped them into powerful instruments of its own.”24 It should be obvious that Scruton is responding here not just to Minogue but to all those modernist sociologists, such as Gellner, who see nations as mythic entities fashioned by nationalist intelligensia.25 Anderson, for instance, quotes from a history of Hungarian nationalism an extremely blunt formulation of this latter view: “A nation is born when a few people decide that it should be.”26

In the debates we have just quickly reviewed, a radically modernist view of nations serves to debunk nationalist mythmaking, whereas the view that national sentiment is linked to authentically premodern cultural resources helps to legitimize these sentiments of national belonging. But the normative argument can go the other way: portraying nationalism as a fully modern political phenomenon can help in vindicating nationalist ideas over against the cruder depictions of nationalism as sheer atavism.27 Charles Taylor’s chapter in this volume offers an excellent example of how nationalism can be vindicated by stressing the emphatically modern character of nationalist consciousness. For a liberal defender of nationalism like Taylor, it is essential to show nationalism’s inextricable dependence on modern notions of popular will and popular sovereignty because this will at least serve to demolish the most unflattering images of nationalism, as a relic of primitive forms of social life, or as a reversion to ancient tribalism.28 Taylor’s basic idea is that once we come to see how central the quest for identity is within characteristically modern experience, and what frustration is generated if the various identities are not given public recognition at the political level, we will have a much better appreciation of the reason for the prominence of nationalism (and much else in contemporary political life) in the modern political world.29

I don’t think one can get as much normative mileage out of this idea of identity as Taylor thinks one can. No one can deny that struggles over identity are central to modern politics. But the sheer possession of a given identity confers no normative authority on the kind of politics that goes with that identity. To answer the normative questions that interest
us, it doesn’t suffice to recognize the centrality of identity; we have to go on to ask which identities survive normative scrutiny. To dramatize this point, let me refer to a terrific film by Mira Nair that came out several years ago called *Mississippi Masala*. The film is basically a love story about an interracial romance set in Mississippi in the early 1990s. But the central pathos of the film revolves not around the clash of identities in the United States but rather the clash of identities in Uganda two decades earlier. The heroine of the film is an East Indian named Mina who falls in love with a black carpet-cleaner, but the romance is a scandal because of the trauma suffered by her family at the hands of Idi Amin’s thuggish nationalism. The film opens with a passionate exchange involving Mina’s father on the day of Amin’s expulsion of the Ugandan Asians (in 1972), and it defines the central drama of the whole film. He says, “Uganda is my home,” to which he gets the plaintive response (offered not as a political affirmation but simply as an acknowledgment of the prevailing realities), “Africa is for Africans . . . black Africans.” The question for a political philosopher here is not the relevance of identity, but how to assess the normative claims embodied in conflicting visions of identity—in this case, the claims of African-nationalist identity on the one side and the claims of transethnic Ugandan identity on the other. The appeal to identity by itself gives us no reason to favor the distinctively nationalist way of conferring identity, as opposed to other possibilities, such as a determinedly nonnationalist civic identity.

**LIBERAL NATIONALISM**

It is not hard to see what motivates the political-philosophical project, shared by Yael Tamir, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Will Kymlicka, and others, of vindicating a liberal-nationalist vision of politics. This project offers a dual attraction: first, the prospect of taking the illiberal sting out of nationalism, by liberalizing it, and secondly, helping to combat unthinking and dogmatic rejections of nationalist politics *tout court*, thereby facilitating (sometimes necessary) accommodation with nationalism. On the one hand, it is clear that there is no shortage in the world of poisonous versions of nationalism for which no good normative case can or ought to be made. On the other hand, it seems to many that liberalism, especially in its more individualist versions, allows too little place for legitimate expressions of group identity, and moreover, that its attenuated conception of communal membership weakens the cultural resources necessary for a sustainable political community. It would be unreasonable, however, to imagine that liberal ideas of membership allow no place for collective identity, since every significant liberal polit-
ical philosopher that we can think of presupposes a world of discrete states that claim the allegiance of their members. Rather, the liberal ideal is to get as far from ideas of national exclusivity as would be consistent with the continued existence of these states. This universalistic aspiration of the liberal idea of citizenship is nicely summarized by Stephen Holmes in an essay commending “Liberalism for a World of Ethnic Passions and Decaying States.” Classical liberals, he writes, were not driven by Enlightenment universalism to reject the pluralism of modern nation-states and to embrace the unrealistic dream of a single, worldwide liberal community. But it did lead them to support the definition of exclusive citizenship which most closely approximates universalism. Citizenship, in the pluralistic world of nation-states, can never be universalistic. But it can be based on accidental territorial coexistence rather than ethnic homogeneity or ascriptive community. The *jus soli* is a liberal principle of state-formation, which allocates citizenship according to birthplace, and it stands in sharp contrast to the *jus sanguinis*, which identifies co-nationals by bloodline and “constitutive attachments” rather than by historically accidental coexistence on the same (arbitrarily demarcated) piece of land.31

Is it possible to “beef up” liberal conceptions of citizenship short of embracing nationalism? This is clearly Jürgen Habermas’s aim in developing his notion of “constitutional patriotism” (which is basically a Habermasian synonym for what others have labeled civic nationalism).32 But as critics of Habermas have complained, it is not clear how Habermas’s conception, with its strong aversion to more robust appeals to cultural identity, can offer much beyond a new name for liberalism.33 Hence the attraction of trying to liberalize nationalism.

How well does the liberal-nationalist project succeed? Since Yael Tamir has done the most to put this on the agenda of contemporary political philosophy, let me start with a few comments on her version of the project.34 My main response is that in Tamir’s statement of the liberal-nationalist case, the nationalist side of the equation is so watered down that the nationalism in her political theory is barely detectable.35 What nationalists want, typically, is not a vaguely defined “public space” for the display of their national identity, but rather, control over a *state* as the vehicle for the furtherance of national self-expression.36 No real nationalist would say what Tamir does, namely, that the “ideal of the nation-state should . . . be abandoned.”37 She refers to the idea of the homogeneous national state as “a pipedream,” and she anticipates that new options, neither conventionally liberal nor conventionally nationalist, will present themselves once the obsolete nation-state ideal has been renounced: “Liberal nationalism advocates taking cultural and national
differences into account." It seems to me quite misleading to call this a version of nationalism; a more accurate description of her position is: liberalism, with an attention to the ways in which people care about national identity and wish to see it expressed in some fashion. To be sure, Tamir sees allegiance to national community as intrinsically valuable. This may at least distinguish her liberalism from that of an ardent liberal individualist like George Kateb. Even Kateb concedes that strong group identity and membership should not be condemned "when the cultural group has been or is now being victimized and is struggling to overcome its victimization or the remains of it. Solidarity is needed." But he immediately goes on to insist that "cultural group solidarity is not intrinsically valuable, only provisionally and tactically and instrumentally so." However, one can see group membership as intrinsically valuable without embracing any of the tenets of characteristically nationalist politics. And it seems that this is true of Tamir's position: what it is, really, is not any kind of nationalism, but rather, a form of liberalism that is not indifferent to concerns about national identity.

In pursuing my critique of nationalism as an alternative to liberalism, let me focus on what I see as the decisive problem; if this problem is as intractable as I think it is, then any attempt to synthesize liberalism and nationalism theoretically will be forced to drop either the liberalism or the nationalism when it comes to the crunch (or at least a serious philosophical wedge will be placed between one's liberalism and one's nationalism). The problem, in a nutshell, is how to privilege the majority cultural identity in defining civic membership without consigning cultural minorities to second-class citizenship. To simplify the argument, let us limit ourselves to discussion of Zionist nationalism, though the same analysis could be applied to any state conceived in nationalist categories. Let us leave aside Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and what justice toward them might require, and think only about Arabs who aspire to be citizens within a state that defines itself officially as a "Jewish state." What qualifies Zionism as a classic form of nationalism is not that it involves a celebration of Israeli nationality or Israeli citizenship, but rather, that it provides an ideology that specifies the properly nationalist content of this citizenship, namely Jewish national belonging (notwithstanding the fact that who counts as a Jew for this purpose is far from uncontroversial—so that eligibility or ineligibility under the Law of Return is sometimes hotly contested).

Consider the following descriptions of Jewish statehood and what it means for the content of Israeli citizenship:

Israel's founders dreamed of, and its people have fought for, the creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land. The blue and white Israeli flag
features the quintessentially Jewish symbol, the Star of David, and the national anthem proclaims that for 2,000 years its people have longed to return to and be free in Zion. None of this includes or even makes much sense to Israeli Arabs, most of whom are Muslim and have family histories on this land extending back hundreds of years. Moreover, while Israeli Arabs exercise many of the rights enjoyed by the Jewish majority, no one suggests all Israelis are equal. A small minority of Israeli Arabs focus their demands on achieving individual equality, but most demand collective or national rights, and by equality they mean that Israel should become either bi-national or declare itself the state of all its people.  

All of the state’s symbols, national holidays, holy days, language, myths, and a great deal more, are drawn from Jewish history and experience. Israel was conceived in specifically Jewish memory.

“Hatikva” . . . is exclusively Jewish. The national anthem of the state of Israel is one that 18 percent of Israeli citizens do not and cannot share.

Similar issues are debated in a very lively exchange between Michael Walzer and James Rule occasioned by the original publication of chapter 11 of this volume. Rule argues for the unmitigated antinationalist position that Israel’s self-conception as an officially Zionist state is morally intolerable. In response, Walzer writes: “There can’t be a political community of any sort that doesn’t favor some particular people, members of the community over all others. This is what it means to share a common life.” This is beyond dispute, but it doesn’t address the crucial issue here, which is whether it is morally proper for the state to favor one tribe over another within the boundaries of a shared civic life. To the latter challenge, Walzer answers: “There are also, obviously, internal discriminations—as when we choose what language to privilege, what history and civics to teach in the public schools, what holidays to celebrate. In every nation-state in the world, choices like these turn national minorities into the wrong kind of people. . . . If [Rule] really wants to abolish national and cultural favoritism root and branch, he won’t be able to accommodate any of the tribes.” But Walzer here presumes that every civic community conceives itself as the political expression of membership in a tribe. This isn’t clear to me. It is indeed true that even “civic” nations like Canada and the United States privilege particular languages, holidays, cultural traditions, and so on. But does this prove that these political communities are just as tribal as states that define themselves in a more straightforwardly nationalist way? This surely cannot be the case with Canada at least, which at the moment is a binational state. But suppose Quebec does decide to leave in order to pursue its own “tribal” destiny. Will the residual Anglo-
Canada be a political tribe like Israel? A Canadian state minus Quebec would overwhelmingly privilege English, and to some extent would reflect a residual Anglo-Canadian culture; but does that mean that Canada would then be a uninalional state in any meaningful sense? Would common ethnonational identity define citizenship for the Anglo-Canadians, Greek Canadians, Italian Canadians, aboriginals, West Indian Canadians, and so on, who would compose such a political community after the departure of Quebec?

If citizenship in Israel means citizenship in an expressly Jewish state, non-Jewish citizens are unavoidably second-class citizens in some sense, even if the state doesn’t go out of its way to oppress them or to crush their minority culture. In a new state founded on the principle of Québec pour les québécois, anglophone Montrealers and aboriginals in northern Quebec will likewise be second-class citizens in some sense (at least until they assimilate to the francophone majority culture), even if the state of Quebec respects minority rights and affirms universal citizenship within its territorial boundaries. Nonnationalist conceptions of citizenship, by contrast, aspire to a transethnic definition of political community (even if in practice they fall short of this ideal). There are immediate existential choices here (precisely the kinds of dilemmas that prompt one to embrace political philosophy as a quest for first principles): for Jews, citizenship in Israel versus citizenship in (say) a multicultural Canada; for Scots, citizenship in an independent Scotland versus citizenship in a trinational or quadrantational Britain. For thoroughgoing nationalists, there must be something suspect about the desire to house different ethnonational communities under the umbrella of a shared civic community (which is precisely what defines binational Canada or trinational Switzerland or quadrantational Britain).

Liberal nationalism, it seems to me, seeks to blur the sharpness of these existential choices. Any principled nationalist would have to consider it foolhardy and perhaps incomprehensible for a Jew to live in Canada when emigration to Israel is an available option; and consider it demeaning and perhaps a self-betrayal for a Québécois to abide continued subordination within a federation populated by an anglophone majority when self-determination is so readily within reach: simply voting oui in a referendum. Of course, it is possible to opt for citizenship in a nationalist polity without embracing illiberalism, oppression of others, and violent conflict (contrary to what strident antinationalists sometimes suggest); in this respect the liberal-nationalist thesis is true. If I trade in my Canadian citizenship for citizenship in a nationalist Republic of Quebec, or for citizenship in a Zionist Israel, I will still be a citizen in a relatively liberal political community. Nonetheless, the possibility of liberal nationalism in this sense doesn’t mean further normative
scrutiny of the alternatives is unnecessary. There remains a normatively
weighty choice of principle between, on the one hand, citizenship in a
deliberately multinational or multicultural society, and on the other
hand, citizenship expressly devoted to embodying "the passionate desire
of men to be only with their own kind"; and political-philosophical
debate ought to be able to illuminate our engagement with such alter-
natives.

To be sure, not every nationalist is a Milan Karadzic or Louis Far-
rakhan. There are more liberal and less liberal nationalists. There are,
for instance, a great many liberal Zionists who not only have no symp-
athy for Jewish chauvinism but also considerable solicitude for the
plight of Palestinians within a Jewish state (just as there are many lib-
eral nationalists in Quebec who felt ashamed and sullied by the ethno-
centric ranting of Jacques Parizeau on the night of October 30th, 1995).
On the other hand, I think there is some risk that liberal defenders of
nationalism, in trying to take the illiberal sting out of nationalism, will
remove from it some of the very things that make nationalism philo-
osophically interesting. It is very important for the philosopher of nation-
alisn to keep in mind that the national idea has been such a potent force
in the modern world, and opens up a far-reaching philosophical alter-
native to liberal conceptions of the meaning of life (one that may or may
not be vindicated at the conclusion of a fully developed philosophical
interrogation of its claims), precisely because it involves profound ideas
of national belonging, national destiny, rootedness in a community of
experience, memories of a shared past, and so on. These are powerful
notions, and I am not sure that one is able to do justice to them by seek-
ing to split the difference between liberalism and nationalism.

THE ETHNIC/CIVIC QUESTION

A good example of the liberal-nationalist defense of nationalism is Kai
Nielsen's argument in chapter 6 of this volume, which very vigorously
opposes the depiction of Québécois nationalism as a form of ethnic
nationalism. My own view is that Nielsen is too quick to conclude that
Quebec nationalism is entirely benign and innocent. Perhaps his account
of cultural nationalism in Quebec would be more compelling if it were
obvious that the French language and Québécois culture would be more
secure in an independent Quebec than it is in binational Canada as it
presently exists. But this is not obvious: maybe language and culture
would be more secure; maybe not. There are plausible arguments on
both sides of the question. At least the most militant Québécois nation-
alisists seem driven by something else: namely, the ambition to turn a
sovereign Quebec into a state of the (ethno-)Québécois, similar to what Israel, defined as the “Jewish state,” is for Zionists, and what Croatia, defined as the “state of the Croats,” is for Croatian nationalists.49 No doubt, it is unfair for Quebeckers who are not ethno-Québécois to assume that all Quebec nationalists are ethnic nationalists of the vicious sort: most are, as Nielsen argues, more liberal cultural-nationalists.50 But those living in Quebec who are fearful of ethnic nationalism are not merely hallucinating, conjuring up ghastly phantoms that are, in reality, entirely absent from the scene. Thus Nielsen is being a bit too charitable in maintaining that the problem with Quebec nationalism is limited to a few “loose cannons.”51 (It surely says something about the less savory side of Quebec nationalism when it turns out that one of these “loose cannons” happens to have been premier of Quebec, and hence titular leader of the nationalist movement—namely Jacques Parizeau: when Parizeau says nous, it is difficult to purge this of all ethnonational associations.) The issue here is not whether every nationalist movement will turn into a Rwanda-style bloodbath or a Yugoslav-style free-for-all of ethnocentric hatred. The issue is whether it is morally and politically attractive to give political priority (as nationalists do) to questions of national sovereignty and cultural self-affirmation. For instance, what are the broader consequences for the quality of political life in a multina
tional society of this politicization of cultural identity?

As Bernard Yack and Will Kymlicka rightly argue in their contributions to this volume, the state can never be culturally and linguistically neutral, and therefore one should be careful not to oppose nationalist myths by positing the countermyth of a liberal state that achieves a state of pure abstinence in relation to national concerns. However, that said, it would be unwarranted to conclude that, explicitly or implicitly, all politics are nationalist politics. Being concerned with the preservation of a language and cultural identity does not suffice to make one a national-
ist, for if it did, one would be required to call Pierre Trudeau a Québécois nationalist, which would be absurd. Trudeau is an antinationalist because, for all of his desire to preserve French culture in Quebec (and elsewhere in Canada!), he does not believe that the self-affirmation of the Québécois nation ought to trump all other political concerns or be definitive of one’s ultimate political commitments.52

What defines nationalism is precisely the idea that concern over the national question trumps every other social-political concern. As Eric Hobsbawm rightly observes:

[The relationship between nationalism and, for instance, the choice between capitalism and socialism] is of no significance to nationalists, who do not care what this relationship is, so long as Ruritanians (or whoever) acquire sovereign statehood as a nation, or indeed what hap-
pens thereafter. Their utopia—by now at least as shopsoiled by prac-
tice as some others—consists precisely in the achievement of Rurita-
nian (and if possible Greater Ruritanian) independence and rule, if
need be over the non-Ruritanians in their midst.  

It goes without saying that, for instance in Quebec, there are all kinds
of nationalists, more liberal and less liberal. But this fact doesn’t lessen
my inclination to say that for the “real” nationalists, nationalists in the
strict sense, the issue is not adequate protection for the French language
and culture, for which there is, arguably, already ample provision in the
existing federation. Instead, the issue for them is Quebec’s desire for a
nation-state in the strict sense (“to be a normal country” is the standard
nationalist formulation). This would not be too much of a problem, nor-
matively speaking, if the citizens of Quebec were, like those of Norway
or Japan, more or less ethnically homogeneous. But the minorities in
Quebec justifiably perceive this ambition for a nation-state as an
attempt to diminish their citizenship.

What motivates some critics of nationalism to distinguish “ethnic”
and “civic” conceptions of nationhood is not the absurd notion that lan-
guage and cultural identity are politically irrelevant. Rather, what ani-
mates the “civic” conception is the vision of a shared citizenship and
civic identity that would be in principle capable of transcending these
cultural preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in a political
community where linguistic and cultural identities are in potential con-
flict. It doesn’t require any blindness to the importance people place
upon their linguistic and ethnic heritage to say that the Czechoslovak
and Yugoslav federations embodied a noble impulse, and their collapse
in the face of nationalist agitation in each case conveys a real tragedy,
not just for the peoples concerned but for all human onlookers. If the
Canadian federation succumbs as well, the same may be said of it. So I
think that the ethnic nationalism/civic nationalism distinction, robustly
criticized by some very acute theorists, or some version of that distinc-
tion, is still worthy of philosophical defense.  

THE EXISTENTIAL QUESTION

This, in many ways the most interesting of the questions surveyed in this
introduction, is the one least addressed in the recent philosophical
debates about the problem of nationalism. There is a reason for this
neglect; the main explanation for it has to do with the dominance of lib-
eralism within Anglo-American political philosophy and its strong pre-
ference for questions of the right (what is normatively permissible) over
questions of the good (what are the most desirable ways to live a human

© 1999 State University of New York Press, Albany
life).\textsuperscript{57} Let me illustrate this contrast in reference to Michael Walzer's argument in chapter 11 of this volume. In his essay Walzer offers a persuasive case for accommodating nationalist aspirations. But even if one fully accepts Walzer's argument, it may be asked whether that argument exhausts the task of philosophical reflection on nationalism. Here one should distinguish between two quite different kinds of argument, namely:

1. The argument that if there is a clear desire on the part of a national community (Slovaks or Palestinians or Québécois) within an existing state to give political expression to its feelings of national belonging, it should be allowed by the majority culture to separate or to be otherwise accommodated in its national aspirations.

2. The argument that it is existentially or politically desirable for the individuals composing this community to have these nationalist or separatist aspirations in the first place.

Accordingly, one can look at the problem from two different standpoints: that of a member of the majority confronted by the (already existing) national demands of a minority (should we concede to their nationalist demands? resist? compromise?); or, that of a member of that minority, confronted with the moral-political question of whether to embrace nationalist politics (should I be a nationalist? should we as a community commit ourselves to this set of political goals rather than some other vision of politics?). It seems entirely coherent to give pro-nationalist and antinationalist answers to these two different questions. For instance: to the question of whether to accommodate nationalist demands (say in the case of Czechoslovakia), one could see the reasonableness of answering: "Yes, of course they (i.e., the Slovaks) should be allowed to have their divorce, if national divorce is what they want"; but to the question of whether life in a uninational state is in principle preferable to a binational state (which is, so to speak, a "marriage" of nations residing under a shared political roof), one could still answer "no" (say, from the standpoint of a Slovak who must decide upon his or her own political commitment). Philosophical liberals will be reluctant to extend the reach of political philosophy beyond questions of the first kind for fear of presuming to second-guess how individuals choose to conceive their own ends of life. For me, on the other hand, it seems unreasonable to stipulate that the former question, but not the latter, falls within the competence of political-philosophic reflection. Both questions, it seems to me, are legitimate concerns of political philosophy. To express the point once again in the Rawlsian vocabulary of right and good: it doesn't suffice to answer the question of whether accommoda-
tions with nationalism comport with what is right (what is normatively permissible); one must also address the more ambitious question, is nationalism (as a way of shaping the conception of how one should live) good?

Political philosophy as an intellectual engagement, going back to Socrates, is at bottom an attempt to answer the question of how to live ("the good for human beings" is the classical formulation of this existential question). Philosophical reflection on nationalism must therefore seek somehow to offer an answer to the problem of how to orient oneself among the diversity of life's possibilities. Here, I think, Kedourie's critique of nationalism, notwithstanding the compelling criticisms of it made by Gellner and others, retains a considerable force. What Kedourie captures is the aspect of nationalism that entails not just sentiments of national belonging, as a matter of spontaneous feeling, but, so to speak, the ideologization of these sentiments (what one might call the "ismness" of nationalism: the politicizing of prepolitical bonds of membership). According to a nationalist vision of the world, it doesn't suffice to feel a sense of attachment to one's national group; these feelings of attachment must be made a matter of ideological commitment, and enforced by political mobilization. From a consistently nationalist point of view, the noblest employment of political energies consists in striving to establish a one-to-one correspondence between ethnic-cultural identity and political identity. For me, being a nationalist would mean having to become a Zionist (therefore emigrating?), so as to align my (fairly attenuated and more or less assimilated) ethnic identity with a corresponding political identity. But in fact my political identity is completely different, defined by the idea of Canadian citizenship (which is itself imperiled by nationalist agitation). For a thoroughgoing nationalist, there must be something anomalous about this condition of non-coincident cultural and political identity (something "abnormal," in the terminology of Quebec nationalists), whereas for a nonnationalist like myself, this disjunction between cultural identity and political identity seems entirely legitimate and proper.

To return to the Joycean dilemmas broached at the beginning of this essay: all nationalists offer some version of Miss Ivors's challenge to Gabriel Conroy (in "The Dead")—namely, her insistence that he make national identity central to the understanding of his own life (why go for holidays on the Continent instead of "visiting your own land"? why learn French or German when you have "your own language to keep in touch with"?), and, concomitantly, her charge that failure to do so constitutes being a traitor to one's people. It may well be that philosophical defenders of nationalism are able to show that some forms of national aspiration are reconcilable with human rights,
liberal principles, interethnic good will, and so on. It is much more
doubtful that any political philosophers have offered, or ever can offer,
a theoretical vindication of Miss Ivors's challenge in the fullness of its
existential ambition.

NOTES

1. James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Har-
dialogue on nationalism, see "The Dead," in James Joyce, Dubliners (New
York: Penguin, 1968), pp. 187–90. One easily gets the impression that the story
was intended to express simple revulsion on Joyce's part toward the völkisch
ideology conjured up in the figure of Miss Ivors, but this might be going too far.
For a fine elaboration of the complexities in Joyce's position, see Conor Cruise
O'Brien, Ancestral Voices: Religion and Nationalism in Ireland (Dublin: Pool-
beg, 1994), pp. 44–49. O'Brien emphasizes that Joyce was not thoroughly alien-
ated from the claims of Irishness, but rather felt the inner tension between the
impulse to yield to Irish nationalism and the (ultimately prevailing) impulse to
resist it.

2. See Benedict Anderson, "Introduction," in Mapping the Nation, ed.
vast role that nationalism has played over two centuries of world-politics, why
have so many seminal thinkers of modernity—Marx, Nietzsche, Weber,
Durkheim, Benjamin, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, Keynes, Gramsci, Foucault—had so
little to say about it?" Cf. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca,
"the disproportion between the importance of nationalism and the amount of
thought given to it."


4. Bernard Yack, "Ethnos and Demos: A Political Theorist Looks at the
Idea of the Nation," manuscript, pp. 1–2. This is an earlier draft of chapter 5 of
this volume.

5. Cf. Anderson's reference to "the 'political' power of nationalisms vs.
their philosophical poverty and even incoherence": Imagined Communities,
p. 5. Also: Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp.123–24: "Their precise doctrines
are hardly worth analysing. . . . [T]he prophets of nationalism were not any-
where near the First Division, when it came to the business of thinking." Also:
"nationalism as an elaborated intellectual theory is neither widely endorsed, nor
of high quality, nor of any historic importance." It is a little misleading to call
Gellner a "critic" of nationalism. To be sure, he is certainly no friend of the ide-
ologies that propagate nationalism; but strictly speaking his view is that nation-
alism is a matter for sociological explanation rather than normative judgment,
since it is pointless to bemoan something that is a sociologically determined
requirement of the modern world.


11. Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, trans. R. Aldington (New York: Norton, 1969). For a contemporary work inspired by Benda, see Alain Finkielkraut’s The Defeat of the Mind, trans. Judith Friedlander (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); part 1 offers an excellent account of some crucial episodes in the history of nationalist thought. Of particular interest is Finkielkraut’s reconstruction of a dialogue between Herder and Goethe that directly parallels the dialogue between Davin and Stephen cited at the beginning of this introduction: again, the issue is whether the human spirit flies most freely when it has been liberated from its cultural roots to participate in a wider humanity, or whether this supposed liberation is in fact mere deracination, therefore spiritually deadening. For an eloquent restatement of the Herderian side of this debate, see Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Nationalism,” New York Review of Books, November 21, 1992, pp. 19–23 (p. 22: “Like Herder, I regard cosmopolitanism as empty. People can’t develop unless they belong to a culture”).

12. There have been some interesting debates about whether to add Rousseau and Hegel to this list. See, for instance, Anne M. Cohler, Rousseau and Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, 1970); John Plamenatz, “Two Types
of Nationalism,” in Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), pp. 24–25; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 28–29n1; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 130; and Neil MacCormick, chapter 10 of this volume, p. 195. Certainly both Rousseau and Hegel believed that attachment to a national community would contribute in very important ways to attachment to the state. But for both of them the point is not to foster national feeling for its own sake (as would be the case for a nationalist); rather, the point is to draw upon it as a cultural resource in strengthening the civic community (the community of citizens holding membership in the state). In Hegel’s case, I think we have decisive evidence of his nonnationalism. As Roger Scruton notes, it was Fichte’s “experience of the helplessness of Germany before the Napoleonic armies that inspired” his nationalism (“In Defense of the Nation,” in Scruton, The Philosopher on Dover Beach [Manchester, U.K.: Carcanet, 1990], p. 325). This is certainly true, and it proves at the same time that Hegel, with his great enthusiasm for Napoleon, could not possibly have been a nationalist.

13. This volume, p. 105. Yack’s charge of Western-liberal self-congratulation against the civic/ethnic distinction ought to be taken seriously. Yet it is possible to defend the distinction without reference to politics in the West: for instance, there is all the difference in the world between the pan-Indian nationalism championed by Gandhi and Nehru and the Hindu nationalism that is presently gaining ground in India. Here, at least, is a case where it is a question not of celebrating “Western” nationalism relative to “Eastern” nationalism (Yack has in mind terms introduced by John Plamenatz), but of comparing two Asian nationalisms—one that is normatively attractive and another that is normatively repugnant (e.g., the Hindu militancy of the Bharatiya Janata Party). In fact, I am tempted to write: Nehru’s pan-Indian “nationalism” versus the Hindu nationalism of the B.J.P., since it is not obvious to me or to other critics of nationalism that nationalism is the right term to describe a movement of transtheistic civic emancipation, whereas it does seem obvious that Hindu nationalist politics is an instance of nationalism in the purest and most odious sense.


16. However, as Walker Connor points out, calling this national self-determination is not unproblematic: “Although [the African and Asian independence movements] had been conducted in the name of self-determination of nations, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not in accord with ethnic distributions, but along the essentially happenstance borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administrative zones of former colonial powers. This fact combined with the incredibly complex ethnic map of Africa and Asia to create, in the name of self-determination of nations, a host of multinational


20. For Gellner’s interesting reflections on potential nationalisms, see *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 44–45.

21. This problem would not be so intractable if one could at least determine clear criteria for establishing in principle the range of legitimate claimants to statehood. But this is impossible, as Hobsbawm explains: “To assume that the multiplication of independent states has an end is to assume that 1. the world can be subdivided into a finite number of homogeneous potential ‘nation-states’ immune to further subdivision—i.e. 2. that these can be specified in advance. This is plainly not the case” (“Some Reflections on ‘The Break-up of Britain’,” pp. 12–13). The problem is further compounded by the fact that the open-ended character of national self-determination as a moral-political principle does nothing to constrain ambitious political elites, provided they have a sufficient degree of political creativity, from contriving new national identities (on the contrary, it virtually invites them to do so, by promising moral sanction): “‘ethnic’ identities which had no political or even existential significance until yesterday (for instance being a ‘Lombard,’ which is now the title of the xenophobic leagues in North Italy) can acquire a genuine hold as badges of group identity overnight” (Eric J. Hobsbaum, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Balakrishnan, p. 260). There is little reason to think that Umberto Bossi’s dream of a republic of Padania is anything other than a cynical fabrication. But nothing prevents Mr. Bossi from invoking the morality of self-determination in pursuing his state-busting and state-inventing designs: all one has to do is invent a previously imaginary “people,” give it a flag, and stir it up with a suitable amount of demagoguery until it starts to believe that its national rights have been violated, and presto, a new “nation” is born.


24. Roger Scruton, this volume, p. 288. This may be a suitable place to correct what I now regard as a somewhat misleading characterization, which I offered elsewhere, of Scruton’s position. In my introduction to Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), I labeled Scruton a defender of “nationalism,” whereas a more careful reading of his writings on this subject shows that he would certainly reject this as an appropriate category by which to describe his view. In his essay, “In Defense of the Nation,” pp. 304, 311–13, and 318, Scruton distinguishes nationalism as an ideology used to “conscript” people to an artificial unity associated with the state, as opposed to the unconscripted bonds of national loyalty that are, presumably, by contrast quasi-natural; he even speaks of the “doctrine” of nationalism as something that “perverts” or “pollutes” the idea of the nation. It goes without saying that Scruton, in writing in celebration of national identity, must deny that it is any part of his purpose to conscript anyone to a redoubled devotion to waning national attachments.

25. For another interesting challenge to the modernist view, this time on behalf of Scottish nationalism, see chapter 10 of this volume, by Neil MacCormick.


28. Cf. Brian Barry, this volume, pp. 249, 260. A similar understanding of the strong linkage between nationalism and modern political principles is implicit in the following statement by Shlomo Avineri: “Nationalism is a two-headed animal. It is, on the one hand, a great emancipatory force, based as it is on ideas of liberty, self-determination and people defining their own culture and memory. But it also has the potential of turning xenophobic, intolerant of minorities, repressive of dissent” (“A Fate Worse Than Communism?” The Jerusalem Post, Sunday, September 8, 1991).


30. It is striking that even as vehement a critic of nationalism as Elie Kedourie concedes that any decision concerning “whether nationalists should be conciliated or resisted . . . is necessarily governed by the particular circumstances of each individual case” (Nationalism, p. xix). For some sensible suggestions concerning ways to accommodate and pacify nationalism in practice, see Elizabeth Kiss, “Five Theses on Nationalism,” in Political Order: NOMOS XXXVIII, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 288–332.


© 1999 State University of New York Press, Albany
33. See, for instance, Perry Anderson, "Nation-States and National Identity," *London Review of Books*, May 9, 1991, pp. 7–8: "[What interests Habermas is] merely a generic parliamentary order as such . . . such constitutional patriotism is vacuous. . . . [W]e can be sure we have not heard the end of the quest for German identity." Also relevant here is David Miller’s challenge to Maurizio Viroli’s idea of patriotism as an alternative to nationalism: "nationalism helped to form an inclusive political community from people divided by attributes such as class and religion. Since that is still our predicament today, it may seem that a direct attempt to get back to republican patriotism is anachronistic: we need the cement of a common culture to underpin our democratic politics" (review of *For Love of Country* in *American Political Science Review* 90.4 [December 1996]: 886). For an acknowledgment by Habermas of such challenges, see "The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Its Limits," pp. 289–90.


35. For a similar response to Tamir, see Sanford Levinson, "Is Liberal Nationalism an Oxymoron? An Essay for Judith Shklar," *Ethics* 105 (April 1995): 626–45 (p. 629: "Tamir is considerably more liberal than she is nationalistic"; p. 633: "It should be clear that zealous political nationalists will find relatively little attractive in Liberal Nationalism").


38. Ibid., p. 145.


40. As far as Israel’s Law of Return is concerned, Tamir’s position is that it "would only be justified if the largest minority in the state, namely, the Palestinians, would also have a national entity in which they could enact a similar law" (*Liberal Nationalism*, p. 160). This is fine for Palestinians who become citizens of a Palestinian state, if and when such a state comes into existence; but it is hard to see how this stipulation elevates the civic status of Arab citizens within Israel.


42. Alex Weingrod, "Palestinian Israelis?," *Dissent*, Summer 1996, p. 110.

43. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, "Liberalism and the Right to Culture," *Social Research* 61.3 (Fall 1994): 495. Margalit and Halbertal tell the story of a Peace Now demonstration following the massacre in Hebron. Organizers decided that the demonstration should end with a minute of silence rather than the usual singing of "Hatikva" because it was felt "that a national anthem intended solely for Jews could not be sung at a joint demonstration of Jews and Arabs" (ibid., pp. 494–95).

44. James B. Rule, "Tribalism and the State" (with a reply by Walzer), *Dissent*, Fall 1992, pp. 519–24; "Letters," *Dissent*, Winter 1993, pp. 127–28; "Let-


46. Ibid.

47. It seems to me uncontroversial that Britain is a political union of (at least) the English, the Scottish, and the Welsh. It is obviously more complicated how the citizens of Ulster (with their divided identities) figure in this union, but even if one leaves them to one side, one can perhaps count the Cornish as a fourth (quasi-)nation.


49. For a very powerful vindication of the idea of the multiethnic state as a “political community of all of its citizens,” and, correspondingly, a powerful indictment of the ethnic state (for instance, the kind of ethno-Croat state created by Franjo Tudjman), see Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

50. On the other hand, it is interesting how tricky it can be, even for a resolute federalist like Charles Taylor, to avoid getting drawn into an ethnic definition of Quebec’s nationhood. For instance, in Taylor’s brief to the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (December 19, 1990), he took as his starting point the following two facts: “1 Quebec is a distinct society, the political expression of a nation, and the great majority of this nation lives within its borders. 2 Quebec is the principal home of this nation, but branches of it have settled elsewhere in Canada and North America” (Reconciling the Solitudes, ed. Guy Lafont (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), p. 141). In other words, those individuals who live within the territorial boundaries of “Quebec” (= civic) yet who do not belong to the relevant (francophone) nation cannot be counted as full citizens of “Quebec” (= ethnic) defined as “the political expression of a nation.” Taylor would surely resist the idea that Quebec should be defined as an ethnic state, yet that is precisely what his own statement asserts. As Walker Connor emphasizes throughout his book *Ethnonationalism*, even if nationalists want to purge their nationalism of “ethnonationalist” connotations (or at least want it to be seen that they want this), one shouldn’t be surprised to find implicit appeals to *ethnos* lurking somewhere in the background. Cf. Yael Tamir, “The Enigma of Nationalism,” *World Politics* 47.3 (April 1995): 420: “the more we learn about the emergence of nations and about the origins and the development of nationalism, the less credible is the nationalist image of nations as homogeneous, natural, and continuous communities of common fate and descent. Yet, it is precisely this image that nurtures the unique power of nationalism.”
51. This volume, p. 127.
52. This should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Trudeau’s politics with respect to the national question in Quebec. On the contrary, my view is that Trudeau’s interventions in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown debates in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s helped decisively to defeat possible political compromises between federalists and nationalists, and therefore contributed to the present polarization in the debate concerning Quebec. I have discussed these issues in “Citizenship and Nationalism: Is Canada a ‘Real Country’?” in Citizenship after Liberalism, ed. Mark Denham and Karen Slawner (New York: Peter Lang, forthcoming).
54. One must hasten to add that normative questions are not absent even in the case of the homogeneous nation, since, for instance, in the Japanese example, the national homogeneity is acquired by keeping out immigrants. There is also, of course, the issue of ethnocentric attitudes in Japan toward the (numerically very small) ethnic Korean minority.
55. Again, Kymlicka replies very effectively to those who would postulate the linguistic and cultural “neutrality” of the civic-national state: “national minorities are no different from the members of majority nations [in regard to attachment to their own language and culture]. Anglophones in Ontario (or Illinois) are as deeply attached to their language and culture as Francophones in Quebec or the Flemish in Belgium. If the demographics were reversed, and Anglophones in the United States were outnumbered by Francophones or Hispanics, then they, too, would mobilize to gain official recognition and support for their language and culture. The only difference is that Anglophones in North America can take their national identity for granted. As Seton-Watson put it, national identity is ‘passively treasured by nearly all citizens of modern societies, even if they do not know it,’ since they take it for granted. But were their identity to be threatened, national majorities would mobilize in just the same way as minorities. [Note:] Or as George Bernard Shaw put it, ‘A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation’s nationality, it will think of nothing else but getting it set again.’” Will Kymlicka, “The Sources of Nationalism,” in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 62, 65n11.
56. A big part of the problem in pursuing this project is that different people use the term “civic nationalism” for radically different purposes (nationalists use it to fend off accusations that their nationalism is exclusionary and ethnocentric, whereas critics of nationalism use it to cast a moral cloud over “real” nationalism, that is, ethnic nationalism). Wayne Norman rightly points out that when someone like Michael Ignatieff describes himself as committed to civic nationalism, it suggests, misleadingly, that this is a particular species of nationalism, whereas Ignatieff himself, of course, intends it as a reproach to all forms of nationalism strictly speaking (“Les paradoxes du nationalisme civique,” in Charles Taylor et l’interprétation de l’identité moderne, ed. Guy Laforest and Philippe de Lara (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1998), pp. 162, 168). Therefore it might clarify the debate somewhat simply to drop the term
“civic nationalism” and replace it with references to citizenship (or Habermas’s constitutional patriotism).

57. John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) did more than any other work to establish and define this constricted philosophical agenda within liberal political philosophy.

58. See note 1 above.