CHAPTER 1

ZONES OF PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

International relations scholars have traditionally focused their efforts in explaining war rather than peace, both in dyadic and in systemic terms. As a result, different explanations for peace have been understudied or underemphasized, with the exception of normative approaches (see Rummel 1981; Rapoport 1992; Galtung 1964, 1975; Smoker 1981; Stephenson 1989; and Johnson 1976). Most of the research on security issues has focused upon the genesis of peace (i.e., war termination), or the termination of peace, escalation of international crises, and conflict eruption (i.e., the beginning of wars). By contrast, in this book I explain the maintenance of extensive periods of international “negative” peace—defined as the absence of international wars—in two regions of the Third World: South America and West Africa. Unlike other studies of peace and war, the unit of analysis moves here from the dyadic level to the subsystemic or regional level.

Terms such as “long peace” and “zones of peace” have been respectively associated with the absence of war in Europe during the Cold War period (1945–89), and with the separate peace among democracies progressively developed throughout the last two hundred years (see Gaddis, 1986; Doyle, 1986). As mentioned in the preface, in this study I consider the theoretical and historical relevance of these two terms in the context of the Third World, beyond the original, Eurocentric scope. More specifically, I argue that zones of peace, characterized by the absence of interstate war, have developed in South America since the 1880s and among the West African countries since their independence in the early 1960s. Instead of the usual focus upon Europe, North America, and the “zone of peace” among the advanced, industrialized democracies, therefore, this book devotes attention to the neglected fact that there have been long periods of regional peace in disparate regions of the Third World. This regional peace has persisted in spite of the fact that most of the countries in those regions, most of the time, have not been democracies.

In the last two decades there has been a lively academic and empirical debate around the lawlike association between democracies and peace. While
democracy supports and enhances peace by increasing its quality, it is not a necessary condition for all types of peace. This book aims to explain why this is so. In the following chapters I suggest different, even competing explanations and conditions for different types of peace at the regional level. There are several types or gradations of peace, as there are several gradations of conflicts, crises, and wars. The conventional theories of international relations (i.e., realism, liberalism) do not provide a comprehensive explanation for the phenomenon of zones of peace, so that they should be complemented by a more complex, eclectic, and original explanation that links international and domestic politics. Around this explanation I design a theoretical framework that defines the maintenance of zones of peace in terms of necessary, sufficient, and favorable conditions, by differentiating among the three types or gradations of zones of peace: negative peace, stable peace, and pluralistic security communities. According to this framework, democracy is one (sufficient) explanation, among several others.

**Why Study Zones of Peace in the Third World?**

A study of zones of peace in the Third World can be justified on the following grounds:

1. As a revision and extension of the liberal explanation for a separate and exclusive peace among democracies. Specifically, I suggest that if all the political regimes of a region are democratic, then it is a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition for the existence and maintenance of a zone of peace. In other words, they can include nondemocratic regimes as well. Hence, I offer both a critique and a refinement of the “democratic peace” theory in its theoretical and empirical formulations.

The effects of democracy and democratization upon regional peace are rather complex. Non-democracies, as well as mixed groups of states, can establish and maintain peaceful relations among themselves, including possible zones of stable peace. Nonetheless, regional democratization seems to be crucial in defining the quality of the peace, and democratic dyads may enjoy a more stable peace. Thus, the democratic peace theory may help to explain how stable peace and pluralistic security communities evolve, while
it may be less helpful in explaining other, previous gradations of peace, such as the emergence of a peace that is characterized simply by the absence of war. In short, whether democracy reduces international conflict depends not only on the way we define democracy and war, but also on the way we think about peace.

2. As a test of major theories in international relations and comparative politics in the context of the Third World. Zones of peace encompass a synthesis between international relations theories dealing with peace and war, and the need to focus upon the domestic structure of states and the state-society nexus, emphasized by the literature on comparative politics. In turn, this convergence allows an analysis of the possible links among different types of states and political regimes and international behavior in the Third World, an analysis that addresses the more general issues of conflict management and resolution. In this book, I combine both approaches to address the theoretical and empirical phenomenon of zones of peace.

3. As a critique and update of Deutsch's (1957) seminal study of pluralistic security communities, by assessing its relevance in the context of the Third World. The concept of pluralistic security communities remains a powerful analytical tool to explain and to understand the dynamics of regional peace. It is also a policy-relevant framework that transcends the narrowness of the national domain of sovereign states, without being entrapped in the irrelevant utopia of world government. In its original formulation, the empirical examples of these communities were confined mainly to the North Atlantic area, where historically the full-fledged democratic states have been geographically located. Thus, Deutsch and his associates did not refer to the possibility of forming security communities in the emerging Third World, which was characterized until recently by authoritarian and transitional regimes. In this book, I show a possible implementation of the concept of pluralistic security communities for the South American case and its current irrelevance for the West African case.

4. As an empirical study of the intraregional international relations of South America and West Africa, focusing upon the phenomena of long periods of negative peace. From the perspective of peace research, the study of the historical processes by which regional peace developed has been generally neglected by historians (Boulding 1991, 110). The empirical chapters of this book trace the diplomatic history of both regions as zones of negative peace.
THE PHENOMENON OF ZONES OF PEACE

The genesis of a zone of peace can be attributed to the last war and its aftermath, or to decolonization processes. Conversely, its decay and disruption is the product of a growing dissatisfaction with the status quo, due to nationalistic forces, including secessionist or irredentist claims, and/or changes in the distribution of power, or changes in the perception of that distribution. What remains to be explained and assessed, moreover, is why and how zones of peace persist over long periods of time.

In this book, my major intellectual concern is to link different types or gradations of peace to different regions of the world that have been characterized by the absence of international wars for extended periods of time ("zones of peace"). More specifically, I want to explain the phenomenon of "zones of peace" (negative peace) in the Third World by comparing South America and West Africa, and by developing a model that can be applied to other regions as well, such as ASEAN in Southeast Asia. I want to show the importance of the predisposition of states to accept their existing borders as a foundation for regional peace and as an explanation that transcends the conventional inventory of international relations theories.

The two main questions formulated in this book are: (1) How can we explain the preservation of peace at the regional level in general, and in South America and West Africa in particular? and (2) Can regional peace be maintained among states that do not sustain democratic regimes? In other words, is democracy a prerequisite for the existence of peace?

These two questions are relevant both in theoretical and empirical terms. From a theoretical point of view, it is important to emphasize the regional perspective, as opposed to a dyadic or a systemic one. Moreover, the second question directly addresses and criticizes the liberal explanation for a separate and exclusive zone of peace among democracies.

From a policy-oriented point of view, governments are concerned with transcending the mere absence of war, reaching stable peace, and consolidating and stabilizing it vis-à-vis their neighbors (Wolfers 1961, 138). Interestingly enough, these practical questions have been almost ignored by scholars of international relations. Through the empirical examination of long periods of peace in two disparate regions of the Third World, we can draw some interesting lessons about how to "upgrade" the degree of
regional peace from the mere absence of war (negative peace) all the way up to the establishment of pluralistic security communities.

To answer these two questions I examine alternative explanations for the maintenance of regional peace in the Third World, and I assess the necessary, favorable, and sufficient conditions for its resilience. The first question is addressed in chapter 2 through a literature review of the conditions of peace and the causes of war, according to realist and liberal approaches. Since realists still consider international relations as the realm of international anarchy and as a state of war, the persistence of peace represents for them an anomaly or a puzzle. For realists, the paramount question remains how to prevent war, rather than how to expand and deepen peace. Conversely, from a liberal perspective, this question addresses a more “normal” situation by which many neighboring states have coexisted over long periods of time in peaceful relations, without any expectations that they might be involved in war (see Miller 1985, 85). While realists are mainly concerned with the origins of peace, liberals focus their analysis upon its expansion and “deepening.” From this literature review nine hypotheses are distilled to explain the maintenance of regional peace, as follows:

1. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when a state within or outside the region assumes the role of regional hegemon and induces or imposes a peaceful regional order among the countries of the region;

2. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when the states of the region develop and maintain a regional balance of power;

3. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when the states of the region confront a common threat emanating from a third party;

4. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when the states of the region are isolated from each other by geographical and natural factors, and by technological means that favor defense over offense. Moreover, institutional and political/economic constraints create a condition of impotence that favor the maintenance of regional peace;

5. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when all the states in the region sustain liberal democratic regimes;

6. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when all the states of the region are prosperous and economically developed;

7. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when the states of the region establish relations of economic interdependence and integration at the interstate level, and transnational links among their peoples;
8. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained when the states of the region sustain a normative consensus regarding the rules of international law to be implemented in the management and resolution of their international conflicts. This normative consensus is sometimes facilitated by a common cultural framework.

9. A zone of peace is more likely to be maintained if most, if not all, of the states of the region are satisfied with the territorial status quo.

Obviously, there is not a single explanation for the creation and persistence of zones of peace, contrary to some claims of the “democratic peace” argument, but rather a myriad of alternative explanations that are not mutually exclusive. In conceptual and empirical terms, these explanations somewhat overlap and reinforce each other. Logically, this leads to a problem of overdetermination: there seem to be several reasons why peace has been kept in different regions of the globe at different times. To overcome this problem, and based on these alternative hypotheses, I have built a model stating the necessary, sufficient, and favorable conditions for the different types of regional peace. Consequently, the second question can be answered in an affirmative way. Peace can be indeed preserved among non-democratic states, though there is a direct relationship between the quality of their regional peace and their type of political regime.

Among the nine hypotheses presented in chapter 2, I particularly emphasize the last one—satisfaction with the territorial status quo. The vast majority of international wars appear to arise from territorial disputes (see Boulding 1978, 109–10; and Vasquez 1993, 7). This hypothesis implies that a zone of peace will be maintained when states are “conservative” in territorial terms. Thus, democracies and nondemocracies might be satisfied with the status quo, though for very different reasons.

**Defining Peace, Zones of Peace, Democracies, and Strong/Weak States**

To cope with the two questions formulated above, we should first clarify a series of concepts that are crucial for the understanding of the phenomenon under study. One of the pitfalls of the recent literature of democratic peace has been precisely its failure to define its core terms in clear and simple ways. The key concepts for this study are: “peace,” “zones of peace,” “democracies and well-established democracies,” and “strong and weak states.”
Peace

What is peace? Probably the most significant quarrel in the field of peace studies relates to a proper definition of this term. A major debate, carried out by Johan Galtung and Kenneth Boulding since the 1960s, has been whether to define peace simply as the absence of war ("negative peace" in my own terms), or as a more encompassing concept, which includes also social and economic justice, and some kind of world order that meets the needs and interests of the human population as a whole ("positive peace"). For instance, Johan Galtung juxtaposed negative and positive peace by relating them to his notions of personal (physical) versus structural (socioeconomic) violence. The absence of personal violence constitutes negative peace, while the absence of structural violence means the achievement of positive peace. Absence of violence should not be confused with absence of conflict; thus, the achievement of peace does not necessarily imply the elimination of conflict. Therefore, the concept of peace has both positive and negative connotations. On the positive side, it signifies good management and even resolution of conflict, harmony, gentleness, love, and the integration of human society. On the negative side, it is understood as the absence of "something"—the absence of turmoil, tension, and war (see Galtung 1975; Boulding 1977, 1978; Dedring 1976, 20; and Stephenson 1989, 10).

For the purposes of this study, I am interested mainly in the explanation of negative peace, conceived as the absence of systematic, large-scale collective violence between political communities. Furthermore, my research focuses mainly upon international negative peace; that is, the absence of war between independent states. This negative conception of peace as the absence of interstate war implies that peace is something to be "maintained" or "restored." This narrow definition of peace could be criticized on the grounds that it serves the interests of the status quo at the expense of social change and distributive justice (see Kelman 1981, 101; and Johnson 1976, 19). My normative assumption (or even prejudice) is, however, that a condition of negative peace is a prerequisite for achieving a better, positive peace. As Herbert Kelman (1981, 105) suggests, "granting that peace is not necessarily the highest value at all times, we are still right in insisting that the preservation of human life and the avoidance of violence and destruction are extremely high values."
Regions or Zones of Peace

An international region, zone, or subsystem can be broadly defined as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Accordingly, for each state in the region, the activities of other members of the region (be they cooperative or antagonistic) are significant determinants of its foreign policy (Nye 1968, viii; and Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 1). Regional subsystems are characterized by clusters of states coexisting in geographical propinquity as interrelated units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations (see Wriggins 1992, 4; Kaiser 1968, 86; and Buzan 1991, 188).

One of the difficulties in dealing with any region is the problem of delineating its exact spatial borders. Although many regions are denoted by obvious geographic or cultural boundaries, there is always some arbitrariness in their definition. The major criteria remain geographical contiguity, interaction, and subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive community and having a collective identity (see Russett 1967, 7; Michael Haas 1970, 101). In addition, several common characteristics can be suggested, such as: (1) a certain degree of social and cultural homogeneity; (2) similar political attitudes or behavior toward third parties; (3) common political institutions, as an expression of political interdependence; (4) a certain degree of economic interdependence; and (5) a common behavioral criterion, such as the identification of norms pertaining to conflict management and resolution (see Russett 1967, 11; Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 2; Michael Haas 1970, 101; and Modelski 1961, 149).

This focus on regions or subsystems suggests an intermediate level of analysis located between the dyadic (interactive) level and the entire international system as a unit of analysis. In this way, we reduce the number of units to be analyzed, as compared to the dyadic level, while we lessen the generality, abstractness, and complexity of our research, in contrast to the system level (see Berton 1969, 330). Thus, a regional analysis allows us to define several zones of peace instead of just one democratic zone, taking into consideration the geographical and historical contexts of different clusters of states at specific points of time. Moreover, it should be emphasized that many of the insights embedded in a regional perspective are particularly relevant for the post-Cold War world, in which regions are likely to have
much more autonomy from the major powers as compared to the 1945–89 period. Hence, the indigenous or region-specific (intraregional) causes of war and peace have become especially significant.

I define then a zone of peace as a discrete geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years—a generation span—though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crises between them. This definition refers strictly to the international relations domain. Moreover, no particular type of political regime is a prerequisite for membership in a zone of peace.¹

This minimalist definition should be distinguished from the broader concept of zone of peace as general disarmament and dismantling of military systems, as commitment to social justice and human rights (positive peace), and as the basis for a more radical social transformation on a global scale (Boulding 1992, 76). In terms of international security and international law, another current usage of zones of peace is associated with the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone concept. There is some logical and empirical overlap between this usage and mine, although not all the zones of peace I have traced are nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs).²

It is my contention that zones of peace in the international system develop when states are conservative in their territorial claims—in other words, when they are usually satisfied with the territorial status quo of their international borders and of the region in general. Within these zones of peace we should expect no international wars among the state-members of the region, though domestic and international conflicts might still persist. We can differentiate among three different gradations or categories of zones of peace in an ascending order of quality and endurance, as follows:

1. A zone of negative or precarious peace (mere absence of war), in which peace is maintained only on an unstable basis by threats, deterrence, or a lack of will or capabilities to engage in violent conflict at a certain time. The possibility of war remains tangible and real. In a region of negative peace, most of the states are at least passively satisfied with the status quo, to the extent that they do not attempt to change the territorial status quo by force. In this zone, civil wars, domestic and international conflicts and crises, and even limited military interventions (below the level of international war) are still possible.³

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2. A zone of stable peace (no expectations of violence), in which peace is maintained on a reciprocal and consensual basis. In this zone the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the parties involved. The essential conditions for the development of a zone of stable peace include: (a) that territorial changes are removed from national agendas, except by mutual agreement and peaceful means; (b) that there is a minimum of nonmilitary intervention by each nation in other nation’s internal affairs; and (c) in terms of perceptions, the countries of the region sustain an economic, rather than romantic or heroic, attitude toward their national states (Boulding 1991, 108). Unlike negative peace, stable peace requires a permanent condition of peace both in international relations and within the borders of the states involved. Thus, a zone of stable peace is a community or society of nation-states satisfied with the status quo, in which domestic and international conflicts might occur, though they are kept within nonviolent limits.⁴

3. A pluralistic security community of nation-states, with stable expectations of peaceful change, in which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, sustain an identifiable common identity, and are deeply interdependent.⁵ The concept of a pluralistic security community is directly linked to the notion of integration. According to Ernst Haas (1971), the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbors so as to lose several factual attributes of sovereignty. A successful integration is reached when states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another. At a more subjective level, integration is achieved when there is a prevalence of mutually compatible self-images of the states participating in the process up to the point of developing a common identity and mutual expectations of shared economic gains.

Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957) draw an important distinction between integration and amalgamation. While the former has to do with the formation of communities, the latter refers to the establishment of formal organizations, associations, or political institutions. This distinction is crucial. In logical terms, we can envision a situation of amalgamation without integration (i.e., without a sense of community), as in a nation-state torn apart by civil war. Conversely, there exists the possibility of integration without amalgamation, which is the case with pluralistic security communities that keep both the regional peace and the political sovereignty of
the integrated members of the community. The shared expectations of peaceful change are a function of shared values, mutual responsiveness and trust, and the abandonment of war as a policy option to resolve conflict. In this sense, pluralistic security communities represent the highest form of zones of peace.

According to this categorization, stable peace and pluralistic security communities greatly overlap with one another. The former is a broader category of zones of peace than the latter, since by definition while every pluralistic security community implies a zone of stable peace, not every zone of stable peace has to be a security community intersubjectively defined by the emergence of a common regional identity. Thus, the main distinction seems to be that a security community encompasses a higher sense of community and institutionalization through the sharing of a similar political system (such as democratic regimes), political institutions, and economic interdependence. Although these two types of zones of peace are logically linked, I would refer to pluralistic security communities as zones of institutionalized stable peace with a common regional identity.6

Although there is a serious problem of aggregating the relationships of a number of peaceful dyads within a specific geographical region into one single characterization of that zone of peace as negative, stable, or pluralistic security community, a regional pattern can be nevertheless traced that encompasses more than the sum of the dyads in a given region.7 Moreover, the geographical characterization of zones of peace does not rule out the possibility that a member state in a given zone of peace might participate in an extraregional war beyond its immediate borders (i.e., the United States in Vietnam in 1965–75; the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982). Thus, membership in a zone of peace does not necessarily imply a pacifist or even a peaceful attitude toward international relations in general.8

Democracies and Well-Established Democracies

Another key term essential to the understanding of zones of peace is “democracy.” As Schmitter and Karl (1993, 39) point out, “we are ‘stuck’ with democracy as the catchword of contemporary political discourse.” In fact, the manner in which democracy is defined and assessed partly determines the validity of the democratic peace explanation.
There are several problems related to the attempt to define democracy in a proper way. First, the concept is usually confused with related though different terms, such as “prosperity,” “capitalism,” “liberal regime,” and “stability.” Second, there is a tendency to see democracy in binary terms (states are either democratic or nondemocratic), rather than as a continuous concept (states are more or less democratic). Third, any operationalization of democracy implies several underlying assumptions about its measurement that are not spelled out in clear terms. Fourth, different scholars use different terms to identify a similar phenomenon—such as “democracy,” “liberal regime,” “libertarianism,” and “polyarchy.” Conversely, different authors use the same term to identify quite different phenomena. For instance, “democracy” might imply political liberties, economic equality, and social justice. For the purpose of this book, democracy will be examined essentially in political, rather than social or economic, terms.

Political democracy can be defined as “a system of government in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1993, 40). Three conditions are deemed essential for the existence of political democracy: (1) meaningful and extensive peaceful and recurrent competition among individuals and political parties for all effective positions of governmental power; (2) a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections; and (3) a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Diamond 1989, 142-43).

According to this definition, the concept of political democracy focuses upon the procedural aspects of the phenomenon rather than on the outcomes that it is supposed to bring about, such as stability, peace, prosperity, and efficiency (Ray 1993, 256). Furthermore, this concept of political democracy should be kept apart from “economic” or “social” democracy, so that the political system should be analytically distinguished from its economic and social milieu (Diamond et al. 1990, 6).

Political democracy should be examined in the context of several zones of peace, both among the developed countries and in the Third World. At this point, it is useful to distinguish between continuously democratic Third World democracies since independence and recently established Third World democracies (see Rothstein 1992, 35). In other words, we can com-
pare the simple concept of “democracy” to that of a “well-established democracy.” According to James Ray (1993, 256–59), a well-established democracy is a “constitutionally secure” regime in which at least one peaceful transfer of power has already taken place between contending political groups through fair and competitive elections. Similarly, one can classify a political regime as a well-established democracy if the regime in power has existed long enough (for at least three years), to demonstrate its stable and legitimate character.

Strong and Weak States

In addition to the definition of democracy we should also refer to the concept of “strong” and “weak” states (see Nordlinger 1981; Buzan 1983; Migdal 1988; and Holsti 1996). According to Samuel Huntington (1968, 1), the most important political distinction among states concerns not their form of government (such as democratic or autocratic), but rather their degree of political institutionalization. In this sense, the weak state/strong state continuum—measured by state autonomy, degree of legitimacy and institutionalization, and state capabilities vis-à-vis its own society—is essential to understand the resilience of zones of peace. Specifically, the strength or weakness of the member states in a region seems to affect their predisposition toward satisfaction with the status quo, and thus the quality of their regional peace.

A state’s strength and weakness are associated with the institutional capacities of the state turned inwards, vis-à-vis its own society (Job 1991, 20; Migdal 1988, xiii). The strength of a state neither depends on nor necessarily correlates with its international power and status. In theoretical and empirical terms, we can find strong states that are weak international powers (such as the small democratic states of Western Europe) or, conversely, weak states that have been considerable regional powers (such as Argentina until the mid 1980s in South America, or Nigeria in West Africa).

When the state is strong vis-à-vis its society, the idea of the state, its political institutions, and its territory are all clearly defined and stable (Buzan 1983, 67). Hence, any threat to the state tends to come from its external environment rather than from within. Strong states are characterized by the recognition of their international borders, the assimilation of most social groups into their polities, and the civilian control of their militaries. In
addition, many (but not all) of the strong states are ruled by democratic regimes and sustain liberal economic policies (see Holsti 1993, 13-14; Holsti 1996).

When the state is weak, the idea of the state does not coincide with that of the nation and/or the civil society. According to Barry Buzan (1983, 67), the main feature of the weak state is its high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of its political regime and government. Hence, weak states are characterized by multinational societies, the proliferation of primordial loyalties, the seizure of the government apparatus by an exclusive and restricted group at the expense of the rest of society, and the lack of legitimacy of its political regime, which relies on patrimonialism, violence, coercion, and intimidation.

In many parts of the Third World, the typical state has been a notoriously weak, rather artificial entity lacking both social cohesion and social capabilities (Job 1991, 12). The security dilemma confronted by the weak state in the Third World tends to be primarily internal: the sense of insecurity emanates in the first place from within its boundaries, rather than from without.

Several authors have distinguished between strong and weak states on the basis of different time trajectories available for them to complete the twin processes of state-making and nation-building. According to this argument, strong (usually First World) states have benefited from a gradual and long process of accommodation between the state and the nation, leading to the identification of the people with the state (legitimacy) and of the people with each other (integration). In contrast, weak (usually Third World) states have had to reach legitimacy and integration in decades rather than in centuries. This argument is plausible, but not entirely valid. We can find in Latin America a peculiar variant of semiweak (or semistrong) states that are relatively old in terms of years of independence in which states developed and consolidated into homogeneous nation-states, without reaching a sufficient level of legitimacy for their political regimes. Thus, as with the concept of democracy, we can then establish a gradual scale of weak and strong states ranging from “quasi states” (usually in Africa), to weak though established nation-states (as in Latin America), to strong states in East Asia and especially in Western Europe. When one combines the type of political regime or government (democracies, autocracies) with the type of state (weak or strong), it becomes possible to understand why different states and regimes have been satisfied with the territorial status quo.
OVERVIEW OF ZONES OF PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

According to the definitions elaborated above I have identified the following historical and geographical zones of peace since 1815: (1) Europe, 1815–48; (2) Europe, 1871–1914; (3) Western Europe, since 1945; (4) Eastern Europe, 1945–89; (5) North America, 1917 to the present; (6) South America, 1883 to the present; (7) West Africa, 1957 to the present; (8) East Asia, since 1953; (9) Australasia, since 1945; and (10) the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, since 1967. In the description of these zones, I ask the following questions: How many democracies and nondemocracies are in the zone? How many international conflicts and civil wars have taken place, if any? Is the region considered an area of negative peace, stable peace, or pluralistic security community?

Historical Zones of Peace

(1) Zones of Peace before 1815
The phenomenon of zones of peace in the international system historically predates the European Concert of 1815–48. Peaceful societies in which political entities coexisted in peace for more than a century have been traced by Matthew Melko (1973) back to the ancient times. These peaceful societies were characterized by the lack of physical conflict either with their neighbors or with their own people (Melko and Wiegel 1981, 2).

Among the ancient peaceful societies at least two could be characterized as international zones of peace: the Phoenician Peace (1150–722 B.C.) among five city-states (Aradus, Berytus, Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre); and the Roman Republic Peace (203–90 B.C.) among several members of the Latin Confederation, with the clear predominance of Rome.11

Among the peaceful societies in the Western World prior to 1815, the Scandinavian states established among themselves a zone of peace for extensive periods of time: Iceland has been at peace since 1262 without interruptions; Norway, between 1371 and 1612 and 1814 to 1940; Denmark, between 1660 and 1801; and Sweden, since 1721 (Melko and Hord 1984, 66).12 In most of these long periods of peace, Scandinavia remained geographically marginalized from the main centers of European action. Small countries such as Norway, Finland, and Iceland remained under the protection
of larger powers and channeled their energies toward trade and shipping. The Scandinavian countries found ways of satisfying the demands for resources by their populations without turning to territorial acquisitions and military buildups (see Choucri and North 1972). Moreover, their relative isolation from the major power struggles was an important force for preserving their regional peace.

(2) Europe, 1815–48

After the Napoleonic Wars of 1803–15, a more refined and institutionalized balance of power emerged in the form of the European Concert (see Elrod 1976; Jervis 1985; Lauren 1983). The Concert of Europe marked a growth of cooperation and consensus among the European powers; it aimed at the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the status quo. The European Concert was a loose international institution that grouped together satisfied status quo powers. The rules of the Concert established that changes in the territorial status quo were deemed legitimate—and peacefully instrumented—only when Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had assented to them, often by holding an international conference. An equilibrium was sought and found between the forces of change and the preservation of peace within the European system, through a sophisticated exercise of preventive diplomacy. The five great powers managed to establish a stable zone of peace that included both themselves and also Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, Sardinia, Sweden and Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands (after the Belgian war of secession against the Netherlands in 1830–33), Spain, Piedmont, Naples, and Greece (after the successful revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1821–28). Among the sixteen members of this European zone of peace only four were democracies: Switzerland, France between 1830 and 1849, Belgium (after 1830), and the United Kingdom (after 1832). The Netherlands, Piedmont, and Denmark became democracies after 1848. Greece was a constitutional monarchy after 1844 but became a democracy only after 1864.13 All the members of this zone of peace had a vested interest in keeping the status quo both domestically and internationally.

In the earlier years of this period, there had been brief military expeditions sent by one or another of the great powers into Naples, Piedmont, Spain, and Greece to suppress or support liberal and nationalist revolutions. In addition, there were civil wars and domestic violence in Greece (1821–
28), Spain (1820–22), Poland (1830–31), and Portugal (1831–34). Yet, there were no major wars or even military crises of any kind between two or more of the great powers. This zone of stable peace, which was considered as a European community or society of satisfied nations, did not include the Ottoman Empire.

3) Europe, 1871–1914

After the Crimean War of 1853–56 and the wars of national unification of Italy and Germany, a balance of power was reestablished. The five great powers, if not reunited into a homogeneous Europe concert as before, managed to reestablish a zone of peace among themselves that also included all the smaller European powers, with the exception of the Balkan states (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Romania) and the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this period, all the international wars occurred in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, which were on the periphery of this zone of peace, due to nationalist and revisionist forces opposed to the status quo of the multiethnic empires (Austria-Hungary and Turkey). Widespread domestic violence was restricted to Spain (the Carlist War of 1872–76). The territorial status quo was kept by the Bismarckian system of alliances (1871–90) and by the subsequent balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente during 1907–14.

Among the fifteen members of this region, ten were democracies (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, France, Norway after 1905, and Luxembourg after 1890). Among these democracies, only France and Italy made revisionist claims. The French wanted to regain their territories of Alsace and Lorraine that were lost to Germany, though they sought territorial compensations through their colonial enterprises in Africa and Asia. Moreover, they were deterred from initiating a war against Germany because of their relative weakness. The Italians, for their part, initiated a war against Turkey in 1911 in pursuit of their colonialist claims in North Africa.

This second period of European peace in the late nineteenth century was a zone of negative peace only. The sense of a society of states deteriorated and was replaced by a balance of power between two hostile armed coalitions, which ultimately clashed in World War I (see Craig and George 1990, 35–47; Taylor 1971).
Contemporary Zones of Peace

The contemporary zones of peace in the international system include: (1) Western Europe, since 1945; (2) Eastern Europe, between 1945 and 1989; (3) North America, since 1917; (4) South America, since 1883; (5) West Africa, since 1957; (6) East Asia, since 1953; (7) Australasia/Oceania, since 1945; and (8) the ASEAN countries, since 1967.

(1) Western Europe, 1945 to the Present

After World War II the European continent became a zone of peace. During the Cold War, there was a precarious negative peace between the two blocs in Europe. Some realist writers attribute the peacefulness of the post-war era in Europe to the bipolarity of the distribution of power, the rough equality in military power between the United States and the Soviet Union and the presence of nuclear weapons with their deterrent effect (see Gaddis 1986; Mearsheimer 1990). We can identify in Europe two distinctive zones of peace: Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

If we exclude Turkey and Cyprus from the membership in the Western European zone of peace, we can define this region as a zone of stable peace and as a pluralistic security community with stable expectations of peaceful change. The nineteen states of this region—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany/Germany—are all democratic (Portugal, Spain, and Greece having experienced successful democratic transitions in the late 1970s). Interestingly enough, with the exception of West Germany until the German reunification of 1990, Ireland vis-à-vis Northern Ireland, and Spain vis-à-vis Gibraltar, they have all sustained a common interest in maintaining the status quo both domestically and internationally. There have been no international wars and even no serious international crises in this region. A civil war took place in Greece between 1946 and 1949. In addition, domestic violence has been widespread in Northern Ireland since 1969, and to a lesser extent in the Basque region of Spain and in French Corsica. Overall, this region has become the most pristine example of a democratic zone of peace. Besides being democratic, all the nations of this
region are economically developed and highly interdependent in economic and social terms. As Raymond Cohen (1994, 220–22) suggests, their democratic structures have also been nurtured by their continuous peace since 1945, a peace created by the bipolar structure after World War II and maintained by nuclear weapons and the presence of a third-party threat (the former Soviet Union) until recently.

(2) Eastern Europe, 1945-89
Between 1945 and 1989 the central and eastern half of Europe constituted another zone of peace, though qualitatively different from its Western counterpart. All the nine members of this zone—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—were authoritarian or totalitarian (Communist) regimes until 1989. The Soviet Union, as the regional hegemon, was in charge of keeping the status quo among the Eastern European countries both within and across their borders. On two occasions—the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—the Soviet Union intervened militarily in order to keep the domestic status quo. In addition, revisionist and irredentist claims by states like Poland, Hungary, and Romania and nationalist demands by subnational groups in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and different parts of the Soviet Union were repressed by the overarching political and military presence of the Soviet Union and its Communist ideology.

Since the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, domestic violence and international wars are currently replacing the negative peace maintained by the Soviet hegemon. While territorial claims and changes were “frozen” during 1945–89, they are currently thriving in the former Soviet Union, ex-Czechoslovakia, and former Yugoslavia through both peaceful and violent means. Since 1989 Albania, the ex-Yugoslavian republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia–Herzegovina), Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Russia, and several other former Soviet republics, are all experiencing transitions toward democracy from a previous Socialist or Communist regime. It is unclear whether these new and fragile democracies will be able to maintain a new zone of peace to replace the old hegemonic negative peace, established and maintained by the Soviet Union since World War II up to the end of the Cold War.
(3) North America, 1917 to the Present
Since the Mexican-American war of 1846-48 there has been no international war in the North American region, which includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Moreover, since the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in 1917 there has been no international crisis or serious dispute among the three countries of the region. Instances of domestic violence and civil wars have occurred in the period between 1848 and 1917—the Mexican civil war of 1858–61, the American civil war of 1861–65, and the Mexican revolution of 1911–17. While the United States and Canada are considered well-established democracies, Mexico can be classified at best as a new democracy, a "quasi democracy," or a "partly free" regime. These three countries have been satisfied with the status quo in North America, despite (or perhaps because of) the lopsided power distribution in favor of the United States. This satisfaction with the territorial status quo on the part of the United States contradicts its revisionist ambitions in other parts of the Americas and the world, as expressed by the U.S. war against Spain in 1898 and by numerous U.S. interventions in Central America ever since. Overall, this area can also be considered as a zone of stable peace and even as a pluralistic security community, at least in terms of U.S.-Canadian relations.

(4) South America, 1883 to the Present
Since the end of the Pacific War between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in 1883, the South American region has been another zone of peace, with the exception of two international wars: the 1932–35 Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay and the war between Ecuador and Peru in 1941. There have been a number of long-standing territorial disputes that eventually escalated into international crises, such as the "tug of war" between Argentina and Chile over their Patagonian border in 1902 and again in 1978 over the Beagle Channel Islands. The vast majority of border disputes in South America have been resolved peacefully, however, leading to some cession or exchange of territories. The basis for a peaceful settlement of these disputes was established through the principle of uti possideit, according to which the South American countries recognized the colonial borders as their postindependence international frontiers (see Child 1985; Ireland 1938).

While South American armies have rarely been involved with one another, they have frequently intervened in the domestic affairs of their own countries. The peaceful relations among the South American coun-