Introduction and Overview

Philosophers have always been concerned with educational matters, but as an academic specialty, the study of educational philosophy is a twentieth century phenomenon. Though its roots in the United States can be traced to the nineteenth century, the emergence of educational philosophy as a field of study parallels the development of schools and colleges of education in the modern American university. The intent of this study is to both examine and interpret the roots of the field and to chronicle its development during this century.

James Kaminsky suggests that educational philosophy as we know it began with the establishment of the John Dewey Society at the Hotel Traymore in Atlantic City, on Sunday, February 24, 1935. To others it began in 1941 with the founding of the North American Philosophy of Education Society. According to this view, the discipline of educational philosophy “did not begin until the genius and literary style of philosophy by a ‘learned guild’ (was established) for the purpose of supplying a specific research program consistent with the intellectual ambitions of said ‘learned guild’.”1 Such a narrow view of educational philosophy and its origins not only confines the field to a limited, professional role, but, ironically, denies the creative and integrative role that John Dewey envisioned for this emerging field of study. In embracing this narrow, more professional role—in preferring what Harold Rugg labels “the conforming way” to the “creative path”—the field chose academic respectability over social relevancy.
In The Teacher of Teachers, Harold Rugg suggests that in choosing the "conforming way," those responsible for preparing prospective teachers, including educational philosophers, became apologists for the status quo rather than leaders of a creative citizenry building a genuine democratic society. As Rugg argued more than four decades ago, educational philosophers and others responsible for fashioning university programs for the training of teachers became "the spokesman for the Practical Men and got their education as worshipful students of the Victorian exponents of the liberal arts." As educational philosophy emerged as one of the last social sciences evolving out of the old moral philosophy course, this new discipline retained much of the conservatism associated with this capstone course of the "old time college." With the emergence of the university as the dominant form of higher education in the United States, this Victorian liberal arts tradition—what Laurence Veysey labels as liberal culture—and advocates of a seventeenth view of science joined together in support of the "conforming way."

As a result, educational philosophers and other educators have yet to fulfill their potential as change agents, responsible for guiding the "culture-molding process." Aware that the concepts of a more creative way had been outlined by John Dewey and other late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers, Rugg remained optimistic. Recognizing that his predecessors chose not to take advantage of the opportunity to follow the "creative path," Rugg believed that the time had come for educational philosophers and others responsible for the training of teachers to assume their rightful place as the true creative leaders of a genuine or strong democracy. It is difficult to share Rugg's optimism in light of educational philosophers' continued reluctance to marshal their considerable knowledge and skill to the task of fashioning prospective teachers as society's change agents committed to and capable of building a strong democracy. It may be too late, but, since the future is not preordained, I choose to remain optimistic that there is still time to revive a largely moribund field. In concert with Rugg's vision of what educational philosophers could and should be, this examination and interpretation of the study of educational philosophy will hopefully contribute to the renewal of the field.

Speaking in the midst of the Cold War, Rugg suggests that for democracy to survive and prosper, "the schools and colleges must become public forums on public issues." To conduct these forums, the talents of those imbued with the spirit of the creative path are required. Teacher trainers committed to the creative path must use their imagination, "based on their encyclopedic knowledge of the new university dis-
ciplines,” to assist the public in resolving common problems. Only such trainers of teachers have or can attain the integrative knowledge and experience to achieve these goals. Only liberally educated but vocationally oriented educational philosophers are capable of performing this very public educational role.

Rugg’s vision of the role that trainers of teachers should play in a democracy provides educational philosophy with a model worthy of emulation. Just as Rugg thought of his work as a mirror to reflect what the teacher of teachers could become, it is my hope that this work on the study of educational philosophy encourages current and future educational philosophers to reflect on what the field can and should be.

In constructing this image of the field of educational philosophy, the nineteenth century origins of this twentieth century academic discipline are explored. As part of this exploration, the role that philosophy played both in the “old time college” and the modern American university is explained. Not surprisingly, educational philosophy has been largely and understandably derivative of philosophy in general. To illustrate this dependency, a historical explanation of the “implicative” and “applicative” views of educational philosophy is presented. To the extent that the identity of educational philosophy remains associated with the parent discipline, the professionalization of one meant the professionalization of the other. With the professionalization of philosophy and educational philosophy, enlightenment thought reached its zenith. In more recent times, the triumph of enlightenment thought has been condemned by the postmodernists. Both this drive toward professionalization and the postmodernist critiques of it are significant themes developed in this work.

Following this historical discussion of the past and present status of educational philosophy, suggestions for reconstructing the field into an autonomous, expansive discipline are offered. While no blueprint for such a transformation is possible, John Dewey’s ideas are mined for clues for reconstructing the implicative and applicative versions of educational philosophy into philosophy as education. After discussing the Philosophy for Children approach as a possible exemplar of what philosophy as education could be, the work continues by suggesting that as long as educational philosophy remains parasitic upon the parental discipline, it will be forever susceptible to the perils of discipleship, i.e. mimicking the insights of the great thinker or uncritically accepting the truths of a particular philosophical system or approach. When this occurs the philosophic spirit is denied and critical and creative thinking ceases. As an alternative to discipleship, the concept of philosopher as pilgrim is introduced. Like a pilgrim, the autonomous philosopher as educator pursues a never-ending
quest for meaning. Each of these themes is developed more fully in one
or more of the following seven chapters. Offered below is a brief overview
of each of these chapters.

In chapter 2, “Nineteenth Century Origins of Educational
Philosophy,” a brief discussion of the nineteenth century “educational
philosophies” that provided the foundation for this emerging field is
offered. J. J. Chambliss suggests that the writings of the inductive empiri-
cists, rationalists, and naturalistic empiricists provide us with a small body
of literature that indicates that by 1913 the discipline of educational phi-
losophy was firmly established in the minds of serious students of educa-
tion.’ The purpose in examining these nineteenth century foundations for
this twentieth century academic discipline is to increase our understand-
ing of not only what educational philosophy has been or currently is, but
what it might become.

One can find in each of these educational philosophies the necessary
elements for a new synthesis in educational thought, but as Cornel West
explains, the roots for such a synthesis can be found in the thought of
Ralph Waldo Emerson. If the philosophical pieces were in place to estab-
lish educational thought into what several contemporary authors refer to
as philosophy as education, the question becomes why did the emerging
field of educational philosophy deny this Deweyian and Emersonian
vision for the more conservative “conforming way.” In search of an
answer to this and related questions, the impact of the old-time college’s
capstone course in moral philosophy is discussed.

Defined “as the science that teaches men their duty and their rea-
sons for it,” the moral philosophy course aimed at assisting young men
in distinguishing right from wrong and at illustrating, through reason and
revelation, the inherent unity of all knowledge. As the new social sciences,
including educational philosophy, evolved out of this course, the ques-
tion became whether the ethical and unifying elements of this once pow-
erful course would or could be carried on by its successors.

The capstone course in moral philosophy disintegrated as the mod-
ern university emerged as the dominant form of higher education in
America. In discussing the origins of educational philosophy, the linkages
to social and moral philosophy must be considered, but the emergence of
the social sciences and their relationships to the social reform movements
of the late nineteenth century cannot be ignored. During the latter half
of the nineteenth century social science and social reform movements
joined forces in an attempt to solve the problems brought on by the
forces of industrialization and urbanization. While the relationship
among and between these emerging scientific, social disciplines and
extant social reform movements is both subtle and complex, it con-
tributed to educational philosophy, along with various social sciences, 
finding its "way into U. S. universities.""

While the bureaucratic structure of the modern university was well 
established by the end of the nineteenth century, schools or colleges of 
education housing departments of social foundations, including educa-
tional philosophy, did not emerge until the opening decades of the twen-
tieth century. As this occurred and to the extent that educational philos-
ophy retained its ties to the old moral philosophy course, it is not 
surprising that educational philosophers and others responsible for devis-
ing programs for the training of teachers chose what Harold Rugg calls 
the "conforming way."

From the collective perspective of these prominent educators, the 
purpose of education was to pass on to each new generation the best the 
western world had to offer. Of particular significance for the field of edu-
cational philosophy is the role that Nicholas Murray Butler played in 
teaching educational philosophy at Teachers College, Columbia in the 
1890s. Butler's graduate level Principles of Education course, in conceiv-
ing of education as "the adjustment of the individual to the world," was 
representative of the field of educational philosophy from its development 
in the 1890s up to World War I. The philosophers and educators involved 
in creating new fields and new professional programs did not share those 
advocating the "creative path" view of education as a process of recreating 
and rebuilding the world into a better place for all humankind. A genera-
tion later, as discussed in chapter 3, the ideas associated with the "creative 
path" would be briefly considered, but eventually educational philosophy 
joined its parent and other social sciences in becoming just another spe-
cialized and professionalized academic discipline.

Chapter 3 focuses on educational philosophy during the first three-
quarters of the twentieth century. In this century educational philosophy 
emerged as a distinct discipline, developing in tandem with the schools 
and colleges of education in the modern American university. It is ironic 
that, during its infancy, educational philosophy ignored the warnings of 
Dewey and mimicked its parent at a time when philosophy itself was 
experiencing an identity crisis. Barrett and others characterize philosophy 
in the early decades of the twentieth century as rebelling against the clas-
sical rationalism of the previous century. With rationalism on the wane 
and pragmatism unable to replace it as the dominant philosophical trad-
tion, the academic study of philosophy focused temporarily on a compar-
ative study of the "isms." Following the lead of the parent discipline, 
many educational philosophers taught courses and published texts intro-
ducing students to various and often competing philosophical systems or “isms.” John S. Brubacher, of Yale University, championed this comparative approach as the corrective for the professional astigmatism resulting from a too narrow view of educational philosophy.  

The “isms” and related approaches dominated the field of educational philosophy until midcentury and are still common in many less research-oriented institutions. Giarelli and Chambliss characterize this approach as the “implicative” or “philosophic positions” view of educational philosophy. From this perspective, educational philosophy serves two masters; the community of academic philosophers on the one hand and the community of practicing educators on the other. In short, this is philosophy of education.  

By midcentury, there was general agreement that there was not enough philosophy in the philosophy of education. With philosophy in general embracing logical and linguistic analysis as the philosophical method, the call by Harry Broudy and others prominent in the field for more philosophy in the philosophy of education contributed to this still embryonic discipline “shifting its attention to the logical and linguistic analysis of educational concepts and problems...” In embracing what Giarelli refers to as the “applicative” approach to educational philosophy, the field did not free itself from its dependency upon philosophy in general. This philosophy and education approach, when done well, has much to offer the field of educational philosophy. When done poorly, scholasticism, not increased understanding, is the result.  

As the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches are explored, G. Max Wingo’s Philosophies of Education: An Introduction, and Jonas Soltis’s An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts are discussed. To explain my preference for the Wingo approach to the study of educational philosophy, Kieran Egan’s suggestion that learning “is the dialectical process of forming opposites and mediating between them” is introduced. “For example, in learning the temperature continuum, children tend to learn binary opposite concepts of ‘hot’ and ‘cold.’ Next they mediate between these and learn the concept ‘warm.’” Students using the Wingo text encounter increasingly complex variations of the conservative-liberal binary opposite. As students enter the dialogue between those championing the principles of educational essentialism and its challengers, they begin to relate the conflicts discussed in the text to their personal and professional problems and begin to develop their own unique perspectives on the key questions.  

While recognizing that the analysis of educational concepts is an important and worthy objective, Soltis’s claim that philosophical analysis
needs to precede the study of “isms” is challenged. It is suggested that such a claim is akin to the notion refuted by Egan that children learn best by proceeding from the concrete to the abstract, from the simple to the complex, and from the known to the unknown. This chapter concludes by suggesting that for educational philosophy to achieve its full potential, it must abandon the notion that it is a hierarchical and specialized field.

As explained in chapter 4, educational philosophers continue to view their field as a rather elite and somewhat distinct discipline. Their embrace of professionalism can be traced, suggests Bruce Wilshire, William Barrett, and others, to the organization of the American university around a seventeenth-century conception of knowledge. If philosophy, the field that traditionally knew no boundaries, could be professionalized, then it could happen to any field. The modern American university, in organizing itself in accordance with a Cartesian view of knowledge, committed itself to the specialization and professionalization of academic disciplines as the divisions of knowledge follow “inexorably and rapidly” from “the broad outlines of Cartesian psycho/physical assumptions.”

This move toward professionalism swept the United States in the late nineteenth century. Americans, more so than any other modern society, embraced professionalism for it allowed them to distinguish between individuals and groups without relying on traditions or barriers common in Europe and other more traditional societies. As the emerging middle class in America embraced professionalism as the replacement for the ‘jack of all trades’ amateur, they looked to the university to train and credential these new, scientific experts. Lacking or rejecting traditional forms of authority, Americans readily embraced science as their new metaphysics. Since professionals routinely justified their actions by appealing to scientific fact, the function of the university became one of discovering or producing “universal scientific standards credible to the public.”

With the demise of the old moral philosophy course, most academic philosophers, in an effort to survive in the scientifically oriented university, chose to emulate the sciences by professionalizing the disciple. As illustrated by the development of the American Philosophical Association, this drive toward professionalization triumphed during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. What began in 1902 as an intimate association between fifteen colleagues evolved into an 8,000 member organization where hundreds of papers are presented at the national meeting each year. What J. E. Creighton and others envisioned as a collegial, albeit tough-minded discussion among a relatively small group of professional philosophers has evolved into a cold, lifeless process more
concerned with advancing the prestige and credentials of the participants
than in contributing to the educational goal of fostering greater under-
standing of truth or meaning.

During the 1930s and 1940s, educational philosophers ignored the
warnings of John Dewey and mimicked the parent discipline by estab-
lishing learned guilds "for the purpose of supplying a specific research
program consistent with the intellectual ambitions of said 'learned
guild'."\(^{18}\) The first of these organizations, The John Dewey Society, has
survived for almost six decades by vacillating between the social activism
advocated by many of its original founders and by mimicking other pro-
fessional associations promoting academic disciplines. If, as suggested
here, The John Dewey Society reluctantly succumbed to the pressures of
professionalization, the Philosophy of Education Society (PES) willingly
embraced professionalization as the vehicle that could bring this emerg-
ing field academic respectability. This desire for academic credibility
became an obsession to some, resulting in rather peculiar sessions at the
annual PES meetings. As many members sought to outdo the "pure"
philosophers, Ernest Bayles recalls "few programs dealing directly and
forthrightly with problems of education."\(^{19}\) Throughout its history, the
Philosophy of Education Society has been an exclusive and somewhat
arrogant group. In its attempt to raise educational philosophy to equal
status with real or "pure" philosophy, PES has become an almost text-
book example of a national association advocating the professionalization
of a field.

There is some evidence that these philosophical/professional asso-
ciations are interested in reestablishing the connection between philoso-
phy and pedagogy. While this is a welcomed step in the right direction, it
is not the panacea for the problems associated with professionalism. What
is needed, suggests Ernest Boyer, is a reconsideration of the priorities of
the professoriate. Specifically, Boyer recommends that universities recog-
nize the scholarship of integration, application, and teaching as equal to
that of discovery or traditional research.\(^{20}\) While philosophy proper and
educational philosophy are well suited for the scholarship of integration
and application respectively, the scholarship of teaching is natural to both
fields. Teaching that is done well, that is, teaching that involves trans-
forming and extending as well as transmitting knowledge, is scholarship of
the highest order.

Structural changes within the university are required if the scholar-
ship of integration, application, and teaching are to be valued, but edu-
cational philosophers must reorient themselves more toward the schools
if they are to satisfy their reason to be. Their "reason to be" is to con-
tribute to the development of teaching as an honorable profession. The ultimate irony is that for educational philosophers to fulfill their field’s potential, they must abandon efforts to develop their field into a distinctive and professionalized academic discipline.

If twentieth-century philosophy is a revolt against rationalism, chapter 5 is concerned with the extension of that revolt to rationality itself. In a sense, these “Postmodernist Critiques of Philosophy and Educational Philosophy” represent a revolt against the excesses and arrogance often associated with twentieth-century manifestations of Enlightenment thought. At its most basic, it is a “distrust of Metanarratives” that defines the postmodernists attitude. The question of central concern here is: after effectively deconstructing the modern world and its institutions, do postmodernist have the energy and vision to reconstruct that which they demean and despise? It has been suggested that postmodernists are traveling along a path blazed by John Dewey, but it remains to be seen whether these postmodernist critiques lead to revival of the critical pragmatism of Dewey or serve as an apology for contemporary bourgeois liberalism. These questions are fleshed out in this and the following chapter.

To illuminate the significance that postmodernism has for philosophy and educational philosophy, the thought of Richard Rorty is discussed. With the publication of his seminal work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, postmodernist themes entered the philosophical mainstream. Rorty is critical of modern philosophy’s infatuation with science. This infatuation has resulted in epistemology assuming an increasingly significant role in the field of philosophy. In short, this infatuation with science has resulted in “the desire for a theory of knowledge (which) is a desire for constraint—a desire to find foundations to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which could not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid.” Rorty’s critique of this desire for constraint is reminiscent of Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty, but, unlike Rorty, Dewey offers a reconstructive vision to go along with his criticism of the world as it is.

Rather than thinking of philosophy as foundational, Rorty prefers to think of it as a poetic, edifying enterprise “designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply him a new philosophical program.” Unlike more systematic philosophers who construct arguments designed to prove or persuade, edifying philosophers employ the tools of artists, offering satire, parodies, and aphorisms to help others to learn from their own as well as from the mistakes of others. At their best, Rorty’s edifying philosophers approximate the Socratic philosopher helping others to improve by learning from past
mistakes. At their worse, edifying philosophers, in failing to develop a vision of what could and should be, become apologists for the status quo.

Rorty suggests that "staying on the surface, philosophically speaking" promotes political freedom. Rorty speaks with pride of our (presumably western democratic) culture's reliance on the mechanics of procedural justice in handling sticky moral and legal problems. Since no one has or can have a God's eye view of such matters, the best we can do is to muddle-through, relying upon procedures that have been developed and revised over time. Rorty is on target in cautioning against philosophers' tendency to seek the God's eye view, but provides the philosopher with only two options; either become a cynic convinced that progress is impossible or become a playful amateur, content with illustrating the absurdities of our modern existence. Rorty favors the latter role, but in either case the edifying philosopher is impotent, incapable of inspiring humankind to create a better future.

In chapter 5, the ideas of Richard Rorty and other postmodernists are compared to those of John Dewey. In chapter 6, it becomes clear that Richard Rorty is no John Dewey. To Dewey, philosophy could and should do more than just "keep the conversation going." Still, Dewey was not pleased with the direction modern philosophy, including educational philosophy, had taken. Dewey believed professional philosophers "spent too much time trying to perfect their techniques or arguing about philosophical systems of the past."

In the decades following World War II, the field of educational philosophy grew dissatisfied with the "isms" approach and began searching for the philosophy of education. Rather than embracing Dewey's view of philosophy as "the general theory of education," the field as a whole mimicked the parent discipline and adopted the analytic approach to educational philosophy. Dewey's notion that serious young men would use philosophy more in the study of "indirect sociology" than professional philosophers do suggests something was seriously wrong with his chosen field.

Born in 1859 in puritan New England just as Darwin's Origins of the Species was being published, Dewey died in 1952 as the nuclear age and the Cold War emerged full blown on the global scene. As suggested by his autobiographical "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Dewey gradually recognized that his commitment to democratic principles could be sustained by grounding them in experience. Attaining his undergraduate degree from the University of Vermont and later his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University, Dewey began his academic career at the University of Michigan and concluded it at Columbia University. But it
was his years at the University of Chicago that saw his thought reach maturity and his reputation established. Here he created his famous “Lab School,” a living, self-correcting community as a testing ground for his evolving educational ideas. Here he emerged as one of the founders of that uniquely American brand of philosophy known as pragmatism.

Dewey was a prolific scholar, publishing scores of books and pamphlets, and hundreds of articles for scholarly and popular journals. He was the author of innumerable speeches and lectures on topics ranging from Hegelian metaphysics to women’s suffrage. Dewey’s works are often misunderstood, but as John Novak explains “Dewey is like the Bible—often alluded to but seldom read...”26 Though he does not always write well, one must read Dewey to understand him. Key to this understanding is Dewey’s response to the question: what is philosophy? Dewey resisted the conception of philosophy as “some sort of superscience,” or “the foundational discipline of culture...” In different ways and in varying degrees, both the “implicative” and “applicative” views of educational philosophy embrace the Kantian notion of philosophy as foundational. Both approaches are wrongheaded because philosophy, for Dewey, is not a search for certainty, but an attempt “to gain critical perspective, to locate, specify, and clarify problems...”27 Implicit in Dewey’s vision is the idea that philosophy, in any meaningful sense, and education are one.

The key to understanding this intimate relationship between philosophy and education can be found in the term “philosophy” itself. Literally meaning the love of wisdom, Dewey explains that “whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life.”28 Though facts may be helpful, wisdom moves beyond worldly facts to a general attitude or disposition about the world. Wisdom so defined is not a fixed entity which once found is to be routinely applied to all of life’s questions, but a disposition or habit of seeking and creating connections among the disparate aspects of life. Philosophy, viewed in this way, loses its elitism and professional status. As Dewey explains “any person who is open-minded and sensitive to new perceptions, and who has concentration in connecting them has, in so far, a philosophic disposition.”29

Dewey’s philosopher is a critic, but more than criticism is needed. For example, in The Public and Its Problems, Dewey joins Walter Lippman in criticizing voter ignorancy and apathy, but Dewey goes further by offering a vision of what democracy can and should be. The problem, suggests Dewey, lies not in an inherent weakness of democracy or human nature, but in the failure of our institutions to promote democracy. Suggesting that such weak democracies stem from our founding fathers
rather limited vision of what democracy could or should be, Dewey moves beyond the analysis of the past to suggest ways of transforming these weak or thin democracies into genuine or strong democracies.

As individuals become human, as they learn that communities are experimental and that they can and should contribute to their development or demise, the seeds of democracy are planted. To aid in this development of genuine democracy, that is, to assist every individual in learning how to become human, is the moral, political, and educational task of philosophy. As such, the major problem for the philosopher is communication, that is, making possible for the public at large to “acquire knowledge of those conditions that have created it and how those conditions affect the values of associated life.” If democracy is to survive and improve, progress must be made not only in the presentation of new knowledge as it is discovered and created, but also in the process of inquiry that lead to the creation and/or discovery of this new knowledge. To Dewey, the philosopher is not the expert who frames and executes policy but the wise amateur capable of assisting the development and dissemination of the procedures through which the masses can frame and execute policy. Fostering this kind of wisdom or intelligence is or should be the goal of all philosophers, especially educational philosophers.

The Dewey chapter concludes with a warning against reifying Dewey’s vision into the educational philosophy and with the suggestion that we approach Lipman’s claim that Philosophy for Children “is the only valid representative of Dewey’s education put into practice” with skepticism. As explained in chapter 7, Matthew Lipman has struggled for more than twenty years to make philosophy more accessible by turning it inside out. In developing philosophical novels for and about children and youth, Lipman has implemented the Deweyian principles that “presentation is fundamentally important” and that democracy begins in the “neighborly community.” The result is the Philosophy for Children program which combines the pedagogical and dialectical aspects of philosophy.

Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery was Lipman’s first attempt to dramatize philosophy so as to make it accessible to children and youth. Though Lipman’s ideas about dramatizing philosophy have evolved in the almost quarter of a century since he wrote Harry, one can still find in this work the essential ideas found in all of the Philosophy for Children materials. Lipman has improved in his struggle to master the craft of dramatizing philosophy, but “Harry’s” persistent struggle to figure things out—in Bruner’s terms, “to go beyond the information given”—is a thread that permeates all of the Philosophy for Children materials. A fictitious fifth grader caught in the act of daydreaming in class, Harry attempts to rea-
son himself out of a predicament. Experiencing embarrassment as a result of his failure, he turns his reasoning inward and tries to figure out his mistake. Through such reflection, along with a little help from his friends, he begins to unravel the mysteries of thought and subsequently to apply his discoveries to his everyday world. In *Harry* and in other novels written for and about children, Lipman offers children and youth an essentially Deweyian model of how to think.

Common to all the Philosophy for Children material is the goal of transforming the classroom into a self-corrective community of inquiry. Key to such a transformation is the appropriate use of dialogue as a teaching strategy. While Lipman acknowledges his indebtedness to Dewey, he takes this emphasis on dialogue from Socrates. Socrates, as portrayed in the dialogues of Plato, personifies the role that philosophy should play in our lives. In these dialogues, Socrates provides us with an excellent model of how discovery and understanding are enhanced through dialogue. In emulation of these Socratic dialogues, Lipman has developed stories, told from a child or youth’s point of view, to dramatize the content and skills of philosophy. To the extent that students connect with the characters in the novels and their problems, they can be encouraged to discuss the philosophical dimensions embodied in these characters and problems. In the process, students contribute to the creation of a community of inquiry in their classrooms.

Lipman has devoted the past third of his life to turning philosophy inside out and to restoring its natural connection to education. Rather than considering philosophy the capstone or culminating discipline in the educational hierarchy, philosophy, suggests Lipman, is best suited to serve as introductory discipline for it prepares students to think in the other disciplines. Philosophy dramatized can serve as a model, demonstrating for other fields of study how to dramatize themselves. Such dramatization is necessary if philosophy is to do what Dewey suggests it should do, that is, deal with the problems of humankind. In dramatizing philosophy, Lipman has provided us with an important, albeit imperfect model for reconstructing educational philosophy. It is perhaps the ultimate irony that an individual who purportedly trusts neither philosophers nor educators has shown us how philosophy can make peace with education.

In suggesting that those of us involved in the Philosophy for Children movement guard against reifying this approach or becoming a disciple of Lipman, the conclusion to chapter 7 anticipates the theme of the final and eighth chapter, “Educational Philosophy: Discipleship or Pilgrimage?” Once the philosopher embraces a particular system or
approach as the one correct perspective, that person ceases to be a philosopher. For philosophy, including educational philosophy, to flourish, it needs to reconceptualize itself as a pilgrimage that is never consummated, rather than as the fountain of knowledge from which only a few are allowed to drink.

Traditionally, one of the roles of the philosopher is to develop conceptual schemes that seemingly “knit the disparate...tag end of things into clear and consistent wholes...” While this quest for a unifying schema or theory is understandable, even commendable, a problem occurs when the products of such a quest are reified. Whenever an individual or group believe that such an ultimate unifying scheme has been discovered or developed, the philosophic quest ends and dogma, discipleship, and authoritarianism begins.

Contrast this to the philosopher as pilgrim. It is the rare individual who chooses the faith of the pilgrim, a faith characterized by “the commitment to the unending quest in which one’s way is enlightened by all systems of thought but not fully directed by any one of them.” Such a faith leads “not to an ultimate dogma but to wisdom.” With such wisdom comes a kind of humility for “in a state of wisdom (the pilgrim) discovers that, in all his knowledge, he does not finally know.”

If philosophers are to be more like pilgrims than disciples, the question becomes: is it possible to develop a defensible moral vision without that vision evolving into a domineering and imposing dogma or metanarrative? The ideas of such contemporary thinkers as Cornel West, David Purpel, and the late Kenneth Benne suggest than a moral vision grounded in process rather than in some foundational metanarrative is both possible and desirable.

The issues revolving around what West labels prophetic thought are not new. They are similar to what John E. Smith characterizes as “America’s Philosophical Vision.” Although it manifests itself in a variety of ways, the overarching theme permeating this vision is the uniquely American emphasis on “the promise of the future over the significance of the past.” For a variety of historical, political, and geographic reasons, the many cultures that comprise what is known today as the United States have generally been concerned with what tomorrow will bring than what happened in the past.

Smith considers the American philosophical vision to be largely a pragmatic one, and prophetic thought as conceptualized by West, Purpel, and Benne is compatible with this pragmatic perspective. While some may challenge this perspective as a too narrow characterization of the American philosophical spirit, it is the perspective that is being advocated
in this work. At its best, the Philosophy for Children program exemplifies this spirit and other exemplars of this prophetic perspective are discussed in this chapter.

Much of the final chapter, indeed much of this entire work, criticizes the past and present state of educational philosophy. While it is clear that field is not healthy, educational philosophers cannot afford to wallow in pessimism. Educational philosophers need to realize that their field is in jeopardy, but we must not lose hope for, to paraphrase Cornel West, the future is not preordained. While it is not possible for anyone to offer a sure cure for what ails the field, the purpose of this work is to encourage educational philosophers to embrace the prophetic vision that many of their mentors rejected earlier in this century. What we need is not more disciples of Dewey, but serious students of his thought who extend, reconstruct, and apply Dewey's insights in light of the educational and social problems facing humankind today. What we need is more of the kind of scholarship that the recent works of Gerald Grant and Nicholas Burbules exemplify.38

In facilitating the emergence of a hopeful vision of what Hamilton High could and should be, Grant exemplifies the prophetic thought of West and others. In helping others to develop a positive vision of the future, Grant exemplifies public philosophy in the Deweyian tradition. In contributing to the creation of a better world at Hamilton High and in analyzing the factors that contributed to such a creation, Grant provides us with a model of educational philosophy worthy of emulation. In his work, as in that of Burbules, the process or dialogue is emphasized. In this sense these two exemplary cases of scholarship in educational philosophy illustrate what is meant by the philosopher as pilgrim. While both Grant and Burbules demonstrate a commitment to a vision of what should be, theirs is a faith in dialogue as a process or processes that enable humankind to create and recreate their worlds. Such a vision allows, even compels one to act, but the process is a self-corrective one that must never be reified.

In keeping with West's fourth element of prophetic thought, I choose to conclude this work on an optimistic note. The field of education is at a crossroads. In its present form, it will likely fade away, or, at best survive as a relatively marginalized discipline in the modern university. For it to fulfill its potential and become an imaginative and integrative discipline contributing to the development of educational leaders committed to creating and sustaining strong democracy, educational philosophers need to follow the lead of Lipman, Burbules, and Grant and return to Dewey's prophetic vision as the starting point for reconstructing the field.
As Rugg suggested more than four decades ago, educational philosophers must be liberally educated but vocationally oriented. Educational philosophers must reorient themselves more toward the schools than the university if they are to satisfy their reason to be. As educational philosophers, along with our colleagues in the other social foundations of education, our "primary reason-for-being," as Steve Tozer explains, "is vocational preparation and development." Perhaps it is the ultimate irony that for educational philosophy to achieve its potential and fulfill its reason to be, that is, to take a leadership role in developing teaching into an honorable profession, it must abandon its efforts to become a distinctive and academic discipline. For this to occur, those of us in the field need to think of educational philosophy, not as philosophy of education nor as philosophy and education, but as philosophy as education.