Introduction: Why the Soul?

This volume is an attempt to expand the discourse of the social sciences about the self by reintroducing the word soul. 'Reintroduction' is the right word to use; there was a time when such usage was rather ordinary. Very few professional sociologists or anthropologists use the term, despite its currency in the days of Levy-Bruhl and Raymond Firth. Of course, a few therapists like Thomas Moore define their work as the cure of the soul, and the psychiatrist Leonard Shengold (1989) does not hesitate to speak of the loss or even the murder of the soul. Even the therapeutic community, however, has needed to be reminded about the importance of the soul. Bruno Bettelheim contended that, especially on the American side of the Atlantic, a great deal of Freud's meaning was lost in translation. What was lost was not only the notion of a soul, but also all that the term implies: myth, mystery, essential being, and the common, ordinary, human struggle for a real, even an essential self. As the essays in this collection by David and Bernice Martin indicate, however, much of that meaning is still accessible on the other side of the Atlantic, and a number of our contributors are mining their own traditions for a comparably rich semantic vein. It is Daniel O'Keefe who has made perhaps the most persuasive and thorough-going case for studying the soul and soul-loss in his unparalleled work in the sociology of religion, Stolen Lightning. As Bernice Martin puts it, in a footnote to her contribution to this volume:

The word 'soul' suggests to me the possibility of recognizing—hinting at—a level of discourse which accords some ultimate significance to the person beyond what can be said by the expert social scientific disciplines. The metaphysical and theological connotations of 'soul' suggest a dimension of the integrity of persons, which is not fully captured by the vocabulary of 'self' and 'selfhood.' The death of the soul is of greater
moment than the death of the self. The poetic language of love and its corruption says more than, and different from, the scientific analysis of ‘the self in relationship.’

We are not alone in discerning a void in the language of the social sciences where the person, in his or her depth, should be. Take, for example, Mary Douglas’s comment that “The first source of our troubles as anthropologists is that we have no adequate conception of the individual,” (1978, 5). She agrees with those who criticize both sociology and anthropology for seeing the individual as a mere outcropping of an underlying social granite. The bedrock of social life may be thought to be rules, roles, and relationships, or beliefs, values, and general conceptions of what it means to be a good person in a variety of specific contexts. In any event the individual ends up as a case in point, a more or less serious or tongue-in-cheek performer of a script that has cast each and every one in some part or another. Unfortunately, as we shall have occasion to point out, Mary Douglas herself seems precisely to reduce individuals to points on a social grid.

In this volume we are proposing to use the notion of the soul as an end-term: a word that comes at the end of a series of terms like the individual, individuality, the person, personality, self, selfhood, and even beyond the inner or essential self. The soul represents a hypothetical point in the individual’s subjectivity: the point from which it is possible to become aware of the existence of an essential self or of its possible loss and corruption. Standing at the end of a series of such terms the notion of a soul points both backwards along the semantic range thus travelled and forward into an uncertain terrain of meaning and significance. Pointing backwards, the notion of a soul suggests that there is something about an individual that cannot be subsumed under the headings either of ‘nature’ or of ‘society’: something beyond sheer vitality and relatedness. Pointing forward into uncertain territory, the term ‘soul’ taps the mythic and philosophical meanings that inhere, for instance, in Freud’s use of the term psyche. Applied to Western societies the notion of the soul speaks to a dimension of social character that has embodied and endured often untold suffering.

The notion of the soul, then, opens the possibility of going beyond conventional discussions of alienation. It raises new questions about the costs and possibilities of social life and about the limits and potential of selfhood in modern societies. Thus we agree with Bernice Martin’s insight on the function of the term, the soul,
to indicate "the possibility of recognizing—hinting at—a level of discourse which accords some ultimate significance to the person beyond what can be said by the expert social scientific disciplines."

If social scientists think of individuals as social creatures or products, the soul (if they think of it at all) is precarious and ephemeral: laboriously created through social interaction and far too easily either crushed by social pressures or starved to death for lack of social nourishment. Take, for example, Susan Nelson's contribution to this volume. There one will find the soul struggling to survive either in a sterile environment devoid of affection and response or in an atmosphere polluted by abusive, intrusive, and demeaning relationships. The notion of sin simply adds cultural insult to such injuries to the soul, Nelson suggests, by creating a climate in which the victim is easily blamed. If the notion of sin transfers to the individual a sense of personal failure and responsibility for the failings of others on whom the individual has necessarily depended for sustenance and for life itself, would it not be better entirely to discard the notion of sin? Nelson addresses that question directly. For social scientists who think of the soul as moth-like and ephemeral, the soul is far too easily either enthralled by the products of its own social imagination, confused by a multiplicity of ambiguous and conflicting images and symbols for the self in society, or surfeited with a glut of meaning. Thus the fate of the soul depends on the individual's willingness to surrender the projections, identifications, and delusions that have given the illusion of quality and depth to social life.

In this collection we wish to use the term soul to point toward a mystery at the heart of social life. By 'mystery' we mean to say more than that the natural and social depths of the individual need to be explored if we are to understand the consuming passions and the capacity for relatedness of the individual. Like the black hole around which neighboring galaxies slowly revolve, but which emits no light of its own, the soul can only be hypothesized. It is the immaterial substratum of social life that can only be imagined at this stage, like the hypothetical matter of the universe, most of which still remains to be seen. In this book we are inquiring into depths within the individual which are only partly understood or coded by communities and societies but which remain crucial to the interpretation and explanation of the individual and of social life itself.

To speak of the soul it will be necessary to rescue the term from too close an association with notions of 'spirit' or 'heart.' Capps's contribution to this volume vigorously defends the notion of the soul
from the encroachments of the spirit, and he argues that the soul has
claims of its own which the spirit can neither successfully preempt or
deny. Furthermore, heart and soul are not two words for the same
thing even in Western societies; neither are they identical for a wide
range of so-called “primitive” communities. Some societies see only
a body and a source of animation within; others, however, believe in
a protective genius that guards one against danger over time. At the
very least, we have to account for what it is that renews the person
from within (a mystery, as Capps points out, that is often expressed in
folklore as stemming from that self-regenerating organ, the liver.)
The soul is thus a residual category, but it is not composed merely of
the residues of convention and desire, object-relations and fantasies.
The soul is implicit, suppressed, or even buried in social life, waiting
for the discerning eye of the anthropologist. Even within the self, its
presence, like a black hole, can only be inferred from its effects, since
it cannot be seen directly.

For some sociologists, like Mary Douglas, it is clear that the
individual is largely a social product: merely a subset of social
residues. Within such Durkheimian assumptions, indeed, the indi-
vidual is only a little animal unwittingly adding a small increment to
the coral reef without which the animal itself would hardly exist. For
Durkheim, and for those writing from Durkheimian presuppositions
about the derivative character of the individual, societies are prior to
the individual in every sense of the word: that is, in moral as well as
causal, in ontological as well as in epistemological priority.

For others, however, social life itself is only a screen invented
by the individual in order to have something on which to project
the unexamined and intolerable aspects of the self, which otherwise
cannot be seen at all. The clue to this thinking is the notion of the
double: a chimera, a mere fantasy, which nonetheless has very real
effects indeed. Social life takes on the quality of a double for the
soul simply because the individual is fundamentally unsure of, and
frightened by, the shadow of his or her own existence. Freud, too,
found the individual to be frightened at the prospect of losing the
self: a fear that could easily become attached to particular organs
like the eyes or the genitals. “Castration anxiety” is not only the fear
of losing one’s genitals; it is the fear of being “cut off” from the land
of the living—the fear, that is, of extinction. That fear can take the
form of what later analysts have called “persecutory” or “depres-
sive” anxiety. In either event, the prospect of not-being drives the
individual to make a double of himself or herself: anything, quite lit-
erally, that will stand the test of time.
Thus, for social scientists of the latter, non-Durkheimian persuasion, social life is composed merely of doubles—in the Rankian sense—of the individual. The ‘double’ may take the form of a divine or ancestral spirit, or it may take a more animistic form, as in the case of the burning bush. The double may become an ideal, in relation to which the individual acquires selfhood and confidence in his or her own being. The double inevitably, however, becomes a rival: like Abel to Cain. Such a rival comes to stand for one’s own mortality, the very thing from which the double was initially supposed to protect the self. In the long run, as in the Portrait of Dorian Grey, the double becomes recognizable as death itself, and the mask is dropped. For social scientists who see the individual as real and social life as an extension, projection, and effect of individual consciousness in action, the psyche or the soul is the mystery which lies buried in the heart of social life.

While not seeking to mystify discussions of the individual in relation to society, we do intend to point to elements of mystery yet to be explored in social scientific discourse about the self.

For instance, one of our authors, Owe Wikstrom, indeed finds a mystery to be plumbed: the interaction of autonomy and spirituality, the unpredictable and the socially constrained, in the depths of the self. It is out of this mystery, he argues, that anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists must gather their data, and by that mystery their work is judged:

I see in modern psychology a risk that the individuality of man can be reduced to metanarratives like physical laws, semantic structures, psychodynamic forces or social processes. The necessary methodological reduction can—if unobserved by the researcher—be translated into ontological reductionism. The consequences are professional loss of soul.

Note that it is the researcher who is hurt by this reductionism. Wikstrom takes his point from Dostoyevsky, who finds the criminal killing himself in the act of murdering others. Reductionism is a two-edged sword and pierces to the heart of the reductionist. Technicians may be without a soul, as Weber put it, precisely because they have ignored or lost track of the soul in those whom they study, (and, of course, vice versa). Unless social scientists respect what Wikstrom calls “man’s longing for the unseen,” they will not know what it is that they are missing in their pursuit of knowledge about human beings.
Not all of our contributors, however, are convinced that the social sciences will be improved by extending the semantic range of our words for the individual, the person, and the self to include the soul. Contrast Wikstrom's interest in the mysterious aspects of the self, related to the divine, for instance, with Kwilecki's understanding that religious experience and belief are both curative and pathological. With friends like the gods, she implies, individuals do not need enemies, and yet many individuals, like the two in her case studies, have found their innermost selves realized, for good or ill, in struggle with or surrender to powerful, supernatural presences. At the very least, as I argue in the first essay, these dramas of the soul can be observed, and the place to observe them is in ritual. It is in ritual that one can observe the movements of the galaxy of personal and social factors, so to speak, around the putative black hole which is the psyche or the soul.

Not all our contributors, therefore, would agree that a quasi-scientific vocabulary for speaking of the self has deprived professional discourse of access to what is essential about the being and development of the individual. For Kwilecki, as we have noted, there is no use in talking of a soul, except perhaps as a metaphor for aspects of the self for which psychoanalysts in fact already offer relatively clear and useful concepts. Self-object theory, she argues, helps to explain why some individuals see and experience the divine in one way or another: the divine being a more or less transparent version of their own inner dynamics, repressions, and self-images. The linkage between the images of self and of God, she notes, is often precarious and idiosyncratic, but in the confusion of the self and its ideas she discerns patterns that have helped individuals to make sense of themselves and their experience of the world, even if that sense is an unhappy one. Much depends on whether one is examining hysteria or neurosis, of course, but in her view nothing really stands in the way of a fairly clear psychoanalytic version of the individual's mental economy. As for the soul, she argues, the notion itself does not have the flexibility or specificity of psychoanalytic concepts and is a bit of conceptual baggage that we would be better off without.

Many social scientists would agree with Kwilecki on this point. For example, let us return to Mary Douglas, who typifies the strong program in Durkheimian sociology. Douglas, unlike Wikstrom, does not present us with a mystery in the form of the individual. True, she would have us see individuals as being nimble, inventive, pragmatic, resourceful, and even a bit canny in the way they create the world in which they live. But her metaphor for the individual is a
miniscule animal on the coral reef, (1978, 6). Every little worm on that reef is simply adding to a process that has been going on for many, many years. On the other hand, were it not for the inventive and laborious work of each individual, social life would be dead of its own weight, inert and maladaptive without the contribution of the individual making choices, playing games, getting by, making do, and making it up as he or she goes along.

According to Douglas, what is missing between the concept of a culture, with its deposit of instructions and memories, and the individual who negotiates more or less freely in terms of that culture, is a social context:

a context conceived in strictly social terms, selected for its permitting and constraining effects upon the individual’s choices. It consists of social action, a deposit from myriads of individual decisions made in the past, creating the cost-structure and distribution of advantages which are the context of present-day decisions. We will pick from the coral-reef accumulation of past decisions only those which landscape the individual’s new choices: the action is this afternoon, the context was made afresh this morning, but some of its effects are long, slow fibres reaching from years back. With such a view of the social environment we can try to make allowance for the individual’s part in transforming it, minute to minute. (1978, 6)

It would seem from this passage that individuals seldom have a reason to take the long view: to look at their work and their choices sub specie aeternitatis. Instead, they are busy making choices, maximizing utility, electing alternatives, exercising options. Indeed, Douglas says that just such a shortened time-perspective describes what she calls “low-grid” societies. These tend to leave a great deal of discretion up to the individual, who is therefore continuously engaged in a process of bargaining and negotiation to control more and more resources, to widen the circle of useful acquaintances, and to keep options open for the future. Each individual thus constructs a social system in which he or she gets by. The formal differences between individuals, for example, in age, gender, status, or religion, matter far less than they do in “high-grid” societies; social life is more open, complex, and uncertain. One must therefore, like a recent U.S. presidential candidate, continue to work the crowd, shake hands, maintain one’s network, and add to one’s store house of opportunities as best one can in order to acquire status and power for
the somewhat longer haul. This intensification of the immediate time horizon, Douglas argues, links industrial societies in the West with preindustrial societies in New Guinea, for instance, or in West Africa. Perhaps it does.

I would argue, however, that the extended present of modern societies, in which the future is a constantly receding horizon and the past has indeterminate boundaries, is quite different from the present of traditional societies in which ritual establishes the boundaries of the present and creates both the past and the future. Time in traditional societies is thus renewed, and the soul is thus granted temporary exemption, pardon, and release from the weight of society. The seasons of the soul, as it were, are determined by the cycle of ritual, whereas in modern societies the burdens of social and emotional debts persist into the indefinite future. The past is never created, and hence old obligations and injustices continue to weigh on the present. Thus without the benefit of rituals which can cancel social and emotional debts, the future does not arrive.

The experience of time, we would suggest, both forms and expresses the innermost life of the individual. Unfortunately, however, Douglas avoids any discussion of the fate of the soul in modern societies. Her metaphors are uniformly spatial, whereas the soul swims, as it were, in the sea of time. Time is a projection of the soul, the medium for its self-realization, and yet also its rival and mortal enemy. It is not sufficient to imagine the self as working in a spatial field composed of drives and relationships, symbols and structures, internal space and external environment, nature and society. Individuals do not merely reproduce and extend the social structure of which they are a part into the indefinite future. The individual does not simply mirror both in body and spirit the network and grid on which personal experience is based. Yet for Douglas one can only see the coral reef of society forming from the small increments of time and energy invested by the little animals that briefly contribute their vital energies to its formation.

The one single cultural value that justifies the movement towards low grid is the unique value of the individual person. Calling on an ethic of individual value, each person can be justified for breaching constraints upon his freedom. This principle is basic to low grid because it extends the individual's scope for negotiating. Each basic principle, the value of the group, the value of the individual, is the point of reference that justifies action of a potentially generative kind. When one winds heav-
ily against the other, the slide starts toward strong group or
toward low grid. When each pulls against the other the ten-
sion is a dialogue within society. (1978, 13)

Note that the opposite of low grid here is not high grid but
strong group: a clear indication that Douglas is working not with
two dimensions (grid and group) but with one. Integration (group)
and regulation (grid) are fundamentally the same processes, as critics
of Durkheimian theory have long alleged. The result is that there is
a polarity at work: at one end of the spectrum the impulses and pre-
rrogatives of individuals prevail over those of social groups, organi-
zations, movements, institutions, and other systems; at the other
end the requirements of those systems for maintenance, continu-
ity, and succession prevail over the claims of the individual. In the
tension between these two poles, Douglas argues, individuals’
choices create a more or less focused, clearly defined, well-articu-
lated and enduring social fabric. What is missing here is any notion
of the self that moves beyond nature and society, beyond sheer
relatedness and vitality, into the metaphoric range of discourse
about the soul.

We spend this much time in discussing Douglas to highlight
the way in which many of the contributors to this volume have
departed from conventional ethnography. Take, for example, Bernice
Martin’s study of her own daughter’s experience of abuse at the hands
of a “common-law” husband. Professor Martin makes it clear that
one pole of her daughter’s existence was in the world of the univer-
sity, where she enjoyed considerable freedom and responsibility, while
at the same time her daughter was also confined by her husband to an
increasingly oppressive world in which not only her movements and
relationships but thoughts and feelings were constantly under surveil-
lance. Bernice Martin could have contented herself with exploring
the fate of individuality in two such different contexts: contexts that
could easily be typified in Douglas’s schema of high and low “grid”
and “group.” Instead, she goes on to discuss her daughter’s as yet
untold suffering. When subject to the social world dominated by her
husband, she was humiliated and beaten for whatever her husband
considered to be an infraction, whereas in the world of the university
she was expected to think for herself, take responsibility for her stud-
ies, and do original work in a collegial and highly professionalized set-
ting. In this process she came dangerously close, we are told, to losing
the integrity of the self which is Professor Martin’s interest in
employing the connotations of the term soul.

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To describe her daughter’s experience of alternating between these two very different social worlds requires a language that goes far beyond Douglas’s notions of the social body, let alone of social worlds that are relatively low or high on their grid and group characteristics. Professor Martin does not hesitate to describe her daughter’s experience as a drama of the soul. Only such a language, it seems to us, can articulate the depths to which social life can impress itself on the innermost recesses of the individual; conversely, discourse about the soul can suggest the resources which an individual must summon to withstand pressures which can literally crush both body and spirit. Many women have indeed died, both physically and spiritually, under the conditions described by Professor Martin. Soul loss, as I will suggest in my essays, is a clear and present danger even in modern societies.

Like Douglas, Bernice Martin knows that ritual encodes what may become the individual’s own moral center, but she goes beyond Douglas in pointing to the moral and spiritual tragedy that can ensue from rituals that work all too well. Professor Martin argues that the domestic rituals of the household, and the responsibility for nurturance and caring which originate there, are so impressed on women in particular that women become defenseless against abuse from men. Not only do these domestic rituals render women defenseless against abuse; they make women prone to feeling responsible and guilty for such abuse. The result is that women tend to sacrifice their integrity in order to respond to appeals for assistance from the very men who are subjecting them to physical and emotional torture. If the demonic is anywhere to be found in modern societies, it is in this corruption of ritual, and not merely in its decadence. Ritual can impress social obligations on the self with sufficient force to crush the soul. Inevitably, then, the most oppressive social systems create a demand for charismatic, that is, magical sources of redemption and release from the weight of duty. It is no wonder, then, that there is such a demand for magical antidotes to the threat of soul-loss: a problem which I take up in my discussion of the seminal work on this subject by Daniel O’Keefe (1983).

The use of moral argument to intimidate, and of physical abuse and social isolation to punish the victim, gain entrance to the soul through the rituals of everyday life. Like Mary Douglas, Bernice Martin also is concerned with social structures and with the way an individual’s life moves in and out of them: with “modes of social control” and with the ways in which individuals actually do organize their lives as they participate in a relatively wide range of more or
less constraining and limiting contexts (Douglas 1978:16). Professor Martin’s story of the social worlds of her daughter would satisfy Mary Douglas’s interest in “the combinations of beliefs in all the possible social contexts in which the individual has to operate” (1978, 15). But whereas Douglas is interested in the mixture of actuality and possibility defined by the social map, Professor Martin raises the question of how individuals may extricate themselves from the labyrinth of social control. Not only does she know a labyrinth when she sees one; she knows that there is a minotaur at the center, and that it is capable of consuming the youth of the city.

In seeking to recover professional discourse on the soul, of course, we are not alone. Others have returned to this concept to express the notion that something essential to the individual is endangered in modern societies. In the hands of certain ethnographers, however, selfhood is still being reduced to the merely social. Take, for example, Michael Fischer (1986), who argues that ethnicity is carried like a mystery within the soul; it is a mystery to be brought to the surface through struggle, through the difficult arts of memory, and through the signal effort of lifting the veil of repression that puts one’s own ethnicity in the impersonal darkness of the unconscious. His criticism of sociology is exceedingly well taken:

*ethnicity is something reinvented and reinterpreted in each generation by each individual and... it is often something quite puzzling to the individual, something over which he or she lacks control...* Insofar as ethnicity is a deeply rooted emotional component of identity, it is often transmitted less through cognitive language and learning (to which sociology has almost entirely restricted itself) than through processes analogous to the dreaming and transference of psychoanalytic encounters. (1986, 195-196; emphasis added)

In reporting on the work of Maxine Hong Kingston, for instance, Fischer (1986, 208ff.) notes that the Chinese have long regarded foreigners as ghosts; in America no less than in the homeland, the world around them was a source of spiritual threat and invasion. In Kingston’s reminiscences of her Chinese-American childhood, however, it is Chinatown itself that seems like a corpse, dying, or haunted: the imagery of death having been internalized and related to one’s community of origin. For the ethnologist, as we have noted, the core of the individual is incurably social, even when the society in question is moribund. From the Rankian viewpoint,
however, Kingston’s sensitivity to the moribund aspects of the Chinese community of her origin is better understood as a projection of her own mortality onto the screen of social life; the Chinese community becomes her double: an ideal, a rival for selfhood, and finally a sign of her own mortality.

There are indeed profound ties between social life and the soul, but they may not be what Fischer has in mind: the residues of communal and ethnic life. On the contrary, Susan Nelson points out that the conviction of an inner shamefulfulness or fault, of sin, is a sign of partial soul-loss. To negate those parts of oneself which seem dangerous or shameful is to collude with one’s victimizers in crushing the soul; psychic splitting is not only a cause but a sign of soul-loss. Nelson urges us, therefore, to rethink the doctrine of sin in such a way as to demand, first of all, the truth about social life, and especially about the abuse of children. It is a truth which can account for psychic death. Without it, the doctrine of a fundamental flaw, of sin itself, can like the theory of drives be used to place responsibility for soul-loss on the victim rather than on the victimizer. There is an indictment of the Christian tradition and of the church in Nelson’s account, and it is not to be missed.

The soul can also be lost not only in abuse but in acts of reverence and worship. Women who were sexually abused as girls by their fathers may have tended to idealize and revere these same fathers, may have sought to become like them, and may have adopted a male alter ego in order to protect themselves from feelings of powerlessness and rage. Those emotions, that would otherwise be directed at their abusers, are turned toward themselves. Thus these victims have learned to hate their own femininity in the same way as any oppressed group learns self-hatred. Their souls are lost, therefore, both because they idealize their victimizers and loathe themselves. To know this much, it seems to us, is essential if we are to get beyond cardboard cutout images of individuals as reflecting social categories. Women may adopt masculine roles, not only because these roles model power and status, but because their own souls have been violated.

In the same vein, Capps argues that the soul is visceral. His essay in this volume also reminds us of the importance of the body as the scene of the soul’s struggle with passion and loss. The battlefield of the soul, metaphorically speaking, is the liver or the spleen: somewhere beyond the reach of symbols and social categories. There the soul struggles for embodiment, long before and after the individual’s spirit has soared in various encounters with people and
places, with society and nature. Not that the soul is immune to the individual’s attempt to acquire a self or to transcend his or her limitations. On the contrary, Capps argues, the soul is often held in abeyance, ignored, defeated, or rejected by the individual who becomes transported in various relationships or lost in grandiose imaginings. It is in the soul, however, that one experiences loss and panic, abandonment and rejection, as well as quietude and the inner certainty of one’s own being.

Capps insists that the soul has a life of its own. The individual’s spirit, so carefully nurtured by Christianity, is therefore for Capps almost a sideshow. While the spirit may be the object of pastoral attention and professional advice, it is the soul that determines the individual’s possible healing. Only the soul can regenerate itself: Capps’s point being that there is more to the individual than priests and pastors, not to mention sociologists and psychologists, ever dreamed of.

This volume, then, parts company with mainstream ethnology at a crucial point. We would agree with an anthropologist like Victor Turner that, deeply rooted in the psyche, there is a “root-paradigm” that governs a person’s sense of the sequence, order, duration, and outcome of one’s life. We would also agree that, when structured by a society, that root-paradigm is acted out in pilgrimage and festival: in dramas of the soul. No doubt we would agree also that, when individuals seem most caught up in sheer temporizing and negotiating, these generic models for human life may assert themselves and may even call for self-sacrifice.

We would not agree, however, that the individual is—at the core—defenseless against the power of these root-paradigms. Turner’s language leaves no room for the autonomy of the soul or for its capacity to fill and move beyond its own inner space:

the main actors are nevertheless guided by subjective paradigms . . . [that] affect the form, timing, and style of those who bear them. (1976, 158)

For Turner, these root paradigms in the self come from beyond the usual social horizon that limits an individual’s sense of what is possible or obligatory, and when they assert themselves it is always the human community that prevails over individuality and the self. Especially in the world of the marketplace, where everything is “up for grabs,” subject to negotiation and dealing, and of only limited and temporary value, the timeless requirements of the human race assert
themselves. Call them "fate" or "destiny," Turner argues, "this implicit paradigmatic control of human affairs in public arenas, where behavior appears to be freely chosen, resolves at length into a total pattern" (1978, 159).

It is as if, for ethnographers like Turner, Fischer, and Douglas, the individual is simply possessed and enthralled by social structures or, worse yet, by root-paradigms that assert themselves when social controls are weak or lacking. Try as they might to redeem themselves, individuals will only exhibit their enslavement to forces that are beyond their ken and control. How is it, then, that individuals do find within themselves the resources to withstand abuse and to overcome their oppression even by individuals to whom they have given themselves?

In answering this question we can turn to a sociologist like David Martin, who documents the liberation of the soul from the powers that plague it. For Martin the soul "is inwardly tuned and it resonates to an harmonic structure intrinsic to the world of being." It is an inner space, although it can be occupied by others who leave the person with no space of his or her own. Indeed, Martin tells the story of Vera, whose inner space was occupied by her own passions, which threatened to consume her; she was also preoccupied in defending her inner space from ministers and psychiatrists, from her family and from believers who tried to define her, to pronounce on her ills, and to limit her prospects. Lacking an inner space of her own, Vera had to go out in the company of others. Conversely, external spaces seemed inhospitable and threatening since she had no inner dwelling place of her own. Psychoanalysts would call such a loss of soul 'displacement.' For Martin, soul-loss

is the dethronement and incarceration of that which should be sovereign, the erasure of essential markings, the averting of the face from the summit of being, the atomization of integrity, the deterioration in the realm of spirit of vital 'presence,' and a repulsive occupation by powers or turbulences making for destruction, darkness, and death.

Others besides David Martin have focused on the soul's struggle for its own sovereignty. Victor Turner, for instance, has studied Thomas a Becket's struggles to possess his own soul in spiritual combat with his sovereign, Henry II. Whereas David Martin, however, would see Becket's struggle as fighting against "the dethronement and incarceration of that which should be sovereign," that is,
his own soul, Turner argues that Becket’s life can only be understood as the slow manifestation of an internalized cultural model, the root-paradigm of martyrdom. Again, whereas Martin finds the soul struggling against “the erasure of essential markings,” Turner locates the struggle as being between a cultural root-paradigm (martyrdom) and Henry II for possession of Becket’s shifting allegiance and self-identity. For Turner there is nothing remaining to be explained in the individual beyond the workings, however subtle and protracted, of long-standing social and cultural forces. For David Martin, however, there is always the possibility that the individual will obey its own sovereignty.

Turner argues that it was the breakdown of normal communication, of smooth and ritualized patterns of action and decision making, that called forth this root-paradigm in Becket’s spirit. At a fateful conference, where “prelates and magnates” lost their usual reserve and became injudicious or even exceedingly dramatic, it was not individuality that emerged in Becket but this root-paradigm of martyrdom that began “to dominate his development from that time forth” (1976, 162). In his contribution to this volume, Martin finds in contemporary Brasil similar cases of spiritual confusion among authoritative voices:

The old monopolies and sacred canopies collapse in pluralistic confusion and people are caught by this and that wind of the spirit, above all by a Pentecostal wind that is adaptable and capable of combination with other elements, like protection against witches in Nigeria, or shamanism in Korea, or ancient cura divina in Brazil.

But Martin ascribes to Vera, one no less beset by spiritual powers than was Becket, a soul of her own. Turner finds only a “myth of martyrdom,” a cultural root-paradigm, slowly asserting its control over Becket, from the time of his installation as Archbishop of Canterbury, through his struggles with Henry II, and the chaotic falling-out of the ecclesiastical authorities with one another over the issue of arch-episcopal authority vis-a-vis the sovereign. David Martin, on the contrary, finds in Brasil no root-paradigms further enhancing their control over the soul of the individual. On the contrary, through the Universal Church, Vera slowly gains the freedom and certainty of an inner space that is not subject to sovereigns either of church or state, of demonic or ecclesiastic origin, but one that is truly her own. As that space becomes more certain, along
with her control of it, so does her ability and willingness to make offerings and even sacrifices, but these, we are reminded, are of her own free will:

People see themselves (or others) as taken over by the potent Enemy and in the ensuing melee they themselves and a supportive human chorus have to call upon the potent Friend to liberate them. The UC is the supportive chorus, shouting out ‘burn, burn, burn’ as the demons are named and come forth, and dancing or singing at the scenes of victory.

Of course, every form of exorcism or initiation contains within itself a principle of violence (hence the Universal Church’s need to fight demonic fires with spiritual fires of their own—‘burn, burn, burn’). What varies from one society to the next, or over time in a single community, is whether the rituals of transformation and initiation can turn the individual from a “prey” into a “hunter,” (Maurice Bloch 1992). For some the process of initiation is aborted midway; a root-paradigm for transferring the victim into the aggressor fails to come to full flower, perhaps because individuals have wills of their own and may refuse to become aggressors on behalf of the community. Vera, as Martin points out, refused to be preyed upon either by the Assemblies of God or by various practitioners of spiritual cure or of psychiatry, she experienced herself as preyed upon by demons and by religious or medical helpers, all the while exercising a will of her own. Turner, too, points out that Becket, however beleaguered by internalized root paradigms or by his sovereign, refused to carry out the will of King Henry II against the clergy and the courts of the Church.

For Turner, instead of an extraordinary act of will on Becket’s part, there was only a man “propelled along this path or passage by certain images and ideas” (1976, 163). For David Martin, Vera is no less beleaguered by “spiritual terrorism,” but she finds her own social space and helps to create it by choosing the remedies of the Universal Church and by following its courses. Thus she acquires additional space for her soul by adding to the physical as well as social space that she can occupy. At last the spirits have room to “come out.” “They leave her head and stomach and come roaring helplessly into the open air.” Nature and society, as it were, are sent packing and leave the soul intact and sovereign in its own sphere.

It would therefore be a mistake to underestimate the power of ritual even in modernizing societies such as Brazil. Indeed, as David
Martin notes, there are strong material forces against which the individual must still seek the sure defense of a spiritual Friend: forces such as the overwhelming power of drugs. What matters is finding an arena for the drama of the loss and recovery of the soul. In that space, the soul finds and creates for itself its own spiritual venue. Martin does not—and need not—evoke the fatal mystery of ethnographers’ root-paradigms to name the demons. Indeed, he credits the believers with the capacity “to assign the correct names to the ‘operative agencies.’” In the end, one has to choose between the ethnographer, who claims to know these agencies and who therefore calls them by the professional names of grid or root-paradigm, and the individual who claims—perhaps with the help of shamans or a chorus—to know how to name the demons themselves.

What are we therefore to make of a society like the United States that lacks strong root-paradigms, where individuals are asked to leave behind the cultural traditions that have given them support and sustenance? How fight for the sovereignty of the soul against sovereigns that are notable by their absence? How to struggle against animal spirits in a society that is highly rationalized? What can one say of the inner struggles of a soul in an environment which does not exercise strong pressures for conformity or have clear and distinct social categories by which to mark and define individuals in their various capacities? To answer such a question would take more than another volume in this series.

Some would agree with Durkheim that anomie is bad for the soul. Americans would therefore lose their souls because their society itself lacks the images, the communities, the relationships, and the self-understanding that foster the development of the soul. Immigrant communities, to be sure, arrive on these shores with strong traditions, a cultural music, so to speak, for the words by which individuals come to terms with others and with themselves. In the end, however, these traditions dissipate themselves into the rather thin air of American society. No longer able to live according to what one knows or to treasure what one loves, the individual learns the dessicated speech of modern corporations and professions: the language of rationality, of goals and objectives, of procedures and processes. The same process of secularization which, as Bettelheim noted, once deprived Freudian psychoanalysis of spiritual substance when it was translated to American shores now has resulted in a disenchanted and anorexic soul.

Add to this insult to the soul the injury sustained by Americans who have been separated from their homes and who must now face
a frontier which itself offers only an empty space in which to expand the self or seek one’s fortune. Never has American society been a comfortable or supportive environment for the soul. In an anomic society Americans continue to be wrenched from familiar surroundings and to be sent into a world which, like the old frontier, is not only promising but unfamiliar and threatening. To survive in such a world takes a soul with substance: not one deprived of the nourishment of religious belief, of folk traditions, and of enduring ties to people and place. Unfortunately, as I have argued, that spiritual substance is no longer administered by rituals and impressed upon the soul.

Are Americans indeed facing a social and cultural vacuum: nothing against which to exercise the sovereignty of their own souls? Or is the United States better conceived as a society which systematically suppresses and eliminates any individual who lacks the capacity to resist from within his or her own depths? In Stolen Lightning, O’Keefe argues that individuals in societies such as the United States are seeking the protection of magic not against an anomic social order but against social pressures that threaten to overwhelm and crush the soul. The prevalence of New Age religiosity and of a myriad popular therapies attests to the demands for such bulwarks against social pressures. Drawing an analogy between voodoo death and the apathy, depression, despair, and suicide that afflict individuals in American society, O’Keefe finds that individuals know when they are not wanted and, unless they find magical support for their individuality, their very existence is threatened. His term for what is ailing Americans makes our argument exactly; it is “soul-loss.”

However, in his discussion of Updike’s character, Rabbit Angstrom, Roger Johnson argues that O’Keefe got it wrong (and by implication, that Durkheim got it right). It is the absence of relationships that anchor and nourish the soul that afflicts Americans like Rabbit: not soul-loss and voodoo-death but death from a worn-out heart. Rabbit is a man who has spent his life ‘scoring’: selling cars, shooting hoops, and sleeping with women. He dies trying to outscore a younger black man with whom he has been playing basketball. That young man, seeing Rabbit nearly exhausted, tries to call the game a tie; he offers mutual recognition, even praise for Rabbit’s shooting, but Rabbit insists on playing out the remaining points and has a heart attack. His heart—like his soul—simply could not get enough nourishment; no wonder that Rabbit had precious little to give to his family and to the women with whom he had slept over a
lifetime of scoring. We should note, moreover, that Rabbit died after being excommunicated from his family: a form of voodoo-death, perhaps, although Johnson does not make the comparison. Had there been either a ritual of transformation or sufficiently charismatic sources of support for the soul, would Rabbit have been able to protect himself against the threat of soul-loss? At the very least, the basketball game is a decadent form of ritual. His is not the first society to witness its rituals secularized into spectacles and games as they lose their power to forge and sustain the soul.

Americans—like Rabbit Angstrom—may well be facing the threat of soul-loss because their society crushes or ignores, extrudes or malnourishes them. Under these conditions, however, the individual may be in a better position to see social structures as counterfeit. Indeed, human relationships are largely a matter of ‘projections’ until and unless there is sufficient mutuality and exchange of feeling that these projections can be replaced by more accurate perceptions of the other and, therefore, of the self. That is precisely McDargh’s point in his essay on “Desire, Domination, and the Life and Death of the Soul.”

For McDargh the soul—the inner and essential self—can best come into play when there is enough leeway for the self to be somewhat playful. That latitude is provided when children find themselves in the company of others who are able to bring their differences into play without either masking them or merely mirroring back the children’s own feelings. The element of difference arouses in children an essential sense of themselves. With that sense they will be able to enter into mutual experiences with others without imagining themselves to be fused in a specious sort of spiritual or emotional communion. In the same way children need to experience the presence of adults as being part of their internal life without having their souls obliterated by too much feeling or sensation. To internalize an adult who is controlling or damaging, invasive or overwhelming is to make friends with the devil, as it were: that is, to open the door to lifelong torment. Neither control or submission but a surrender of the false self and the expression of the true self are necessary for the soul to come alive, according to McDargh. Masochism and sadism, conversely, are the expression of a hunger for knowing and being known that can never be satisfied while one seeks control rather than mutuality, fusion rather than recognition.

What is needed, I would argue, is a morphology of the soul: a map for charting its vicissitudes even in late modern societies. It is crucial that sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists come
to understand the literature on the development of the soul: from the vital energy or protective genius imagined by 'primitive' societies, and from the phantasm or 'free soul' of archaic civilizations, to the 'unitary' soul of classical antiquity. Only such an understanding can ground the range of potential variation of the soul in late modern societies: from individuals who are profoundly open to suggestion and hysteria, on the one hand, to those on the other who experience themselves as possessing a soul in relation to which everything else appears secondary if not actually counterfeit. In the latter category may be those who hold fast to religious or metaphysical convictions, but I would hold open the possibility that a large proportion of modern individuals do not need such reassurances to affirm a soul which emerges from and yet transcends the interaction of nature and society within themselves.