Introduction

After the death of his father in 1896, Sigmund Freud embarked on one of the most fascinating and dramatic journeys of his life. The journey was not to other countries than Austria, nor to other cities than Vienna (though those journeys, later in Freud's life, proved to be very dramatic in themselves)—indeed, Freud's journey took place not in space but in time: after Jacob's death, Sigmund Freud began a strategic and concerted journey "back" through the rich and diverse cultural history Freud had inherited and which he fashioned for himself. This journey manifested itself, interestingly, in Freud's beginning in 1896 to collect an ever-growing accumulation of art objects from around the world, chiefly from Greece, Rome, and China. Each of the pieces Freud bought had a special association for him, telling part of the story of the culture Freud saw as symbolically contained in and articulated by them, and of which he was both a part and a spokesperson.

As the young Freud's collection, most significantly consisting of small statuary but containing many other kinds of art objects as well, grew in size (eventually to over two thousand pieces), it also continued to grow in importance to Freud. In 1938, as he was forced to contemplate leaving Vienna in order to avoid what by that time had become inevitable Nazi persecution, he became increasingly preoccupied with the problematics of keeping his treasured collection around him, and deeply worried as to whether the Nazis would allow its—or, after all, his own—departure from Austria. Freud's concern over the maintaining of his collection superseded many seemingly more pressing and vital ones. For weeks, he anxiously awaited authorization to emigrate with his beloved collec-
tion. Then, on 23 May, 1938, he received word that the objects had been released, and (because they had been intentionally underestimated in value by a sympathetic appraiser) amazingly for only a small fee. Greatly relieved, Freud moved to London, into his new and final home in Maresfield Gardens, and reestablished, for what turned out to be the last year of his life, his accustomed place within the maze of statues and other objects he had so assiduously collected. For that last short period, his life could continue almost as it had been before his forced move, a source of great comfort to Freud, as he repeatedly declared and wrote.

On the death of Freud's daughter Anna in 1982, the residence in Hampstead had been bequeathed to the English Charity for preservation, and had finally become the Freud Museum in 1986. Freud's study in the Hampstead house was then, and is now, just as it was at his death in September 1939, all of the over two thousand pieces he collected over those forty-odd years in the places Freud had designated for them. What had always had something of the air of tomb, with its various reliquaries, had now become a museum instead. In 1987, Lynn Gamwell, Director of the University Art Museum at SUNY-Binghamton, discovered that no significant part of the collection had left Freud's study since its installation there in 1938. Realizing that the collection was a far too well-kept secret, and that it represented a fascinating window on an aspect of Freud not otherwise available, Dr. Gamwell, in conjunction with Richard Wells, Director of the Freud Museum, organized a travelling exhibition of sixty-seven of the collection's antiquities, sponsored by CIBA-GEIGY and the National Endowment for the Arts. In addition, Dr. Gamwell and Mr. Wells produced a remarkable catalogue for the travelling exhibit, combining plates and histories of the chosen pieces with essays about the collection by Freud scholars and art historians and critics.

Dr. Gamwell also arranged or suggested the arrangement, in many of the sites of its display during its American tour, of symposia related to Freud's art objects, to Freud's collecting, or to his work in general. Numerous of these symposia took place, across the country in 1990 and 1991, during the tour. The great majority of them were in the end medical in nature; they addressed issues hav-
ing to do with Freud’s place in the medical or the psychoanalytic community, paying less attention to the objects that had catalyzed the symposia in the first place, and to the urge in Freud that had made collecting (and gathering this collection) so central to his adult life.

When I began to organize the symposium which would accompany and highlight the visit of the travelling exhibition of Freud’s collection to the Art Gallery of the University of California, Irvine campus in November 1990, I knew that I wanted to do several rather different things with it. First, I wanted to gather a small group of diverse academics and scholars to discuss the theoretical and historical dimensions of Freud’s aesthetic itself, as evidenced by the actual objects on display in the Gallery, in an informal but concentrated setting that would offer potential visitors to the exhibition the opportunity to study the pieces on display and to hear commentary about them and their place in Freud’s aesthetic, as well as professional, life. And I wanted to ensure that the symposium presentations would reach a wider audience, since it is my strong view that an understanding of Freud’s collecting, indeed of his larger aesthetic sense, is vitally important to a greater understanding of his work and thought as an innovator and psychoanalyst. SUNY Press and the diligence of Carola Sautter, the acquisitions editor of this volume, have now seen to that objective.

I want to offer special thanks to Peter A. Gelker, M. D., for his assistance in alerting the psychoanalytic community about the symposium.

This volume contains reworked versions of all the presentations at that small symposium. Each of the contributors has a remarkably different tack to take with regard to the importance, impetus, and interpretation of Freud’s aesthetic from all the others; this in itself I look on as a most felicitous part of any meaningful response to the theme of archaeology and the collecting of antiquities as practiced by Freud. The symposium turned out to be provocative and engaging, well worth doing on numerous levels. The findings of the presentations are valid beyond the presence of the antiquities
that inspired them. The figures with which Freud surrounded himself in Vienna and then in London have a great deal to say about his sensibility, his subtlety, his links to the past, and his theoretical models.

On this larger scale the archaeological theme announced in the volume's title and its playful reference to objects of archaeology (both in terms of abstract goals and concrete discoveries) is so pervasive in Freud, and indeed in all scientific thought at least since Aristotle, that its use here is justified chiefly by the metaphor's remarkable aptness to the strategies of psychology and psychoanalysis as developed by Freud. The power of the archaeological metaphor, explored by Donald Kuspit at length in the travelling exhibition's catalogue, has several purposes in Freudian thought. First and foremost is to ground psychology and psychoanalysis in science, and thereby to "ingratiate psychoanalysis with society" (133). This ingratiation consists for Freud of a ratification of the seriousness and solidity of psychoanalysis as a discipline and a purposive engendering of sympathy and support for a nascent discipline of inquiry into self-understanding. For Freud, this self-understanding, on the individual and internal level, is no different from the external and collective activity of the archaeologist. Indeed, Freud thought of psychoanalysis as in no way different from archaeology; they were for him versions of the same thing: both object-related human sciences. Human reality, for Freud—both the mundane, day-to-day reality of lived human experience and the abstracted, metaphorical reality required for any concept of "self," is founded on the past and on the stories and legends by which we individually and collectively come to know ourselves. To investigate the individual reality of the ego (which is itself a story: the story of the "I am") is to attempt to uncover the influences and impetuses of the past, and then to read them into the present and project them into the future. Since fully-lived, adult reality is for Freud a question of maintaining this layered, narrative sense of reality, and fostering the tendentious continuity of past, present, and future, it must be structured in and evaluable by science, that is by a con-
certed and homogeneous methodology. Thus the roots of psychoanalysis and archaeology are identical; Freud’s deep admiration for Schliemann, thediscoverer of Troy, can come as no surprise.2

And yet Freud’s seemingly simplistic view of the relation between psychoanalysis and archaeology is actually much more complex than its surface would suggest. Like the Freudian psyche, the metaphor of archaeology is for Freud infinitely layered, and therefore consists of much more than meets the eye. In fact, one of the most vital aspects of the archaeological metaphor for psychoanalysis, as it is employed by Freud, is its dialectic of concealment and revelation. Freud’s view that objects from the past, like memories, both reveal and conceal that past informs his psychoanalytic inquiry, structuring it around the constant analysis of a yet uncovered and even unremembered past, revealed only indirectly and very partially in its manifestations, be they general and specific behaviors, narratives of dreams, or the collecting of objects of antiquity. Central to Freud’s genius is the realization that to discover, reveal, or create an interpretation or narrative of any part of the remembered past is to metamorphose it; to transpose an object from the past into a narrated present is to bring it into a renewed present, a new reality. In this respect, Freud reveals himself to be every inch the scientist, clearly following a schematic notion of “scientia,” knowledge, back so to speak through the archaeological metaphor to its “original object,” the memory-trace from which it springs but which it may no longer resemble nor contain except as part of a narrative fiction, albeit a narrative with a very powerful present validity.

The carefully-chosen objects with which Freud surrounded himself in his Hampstead study evoked and tantalized, offering a remnant or trace of other times and places while acting as markers for those times and places, as indices of absence but with the reconstitutive power of their centrality to his present narrative of the valid and meaningful past. Indeed, Freud was so greatly drawn to and charmed by the objects he had gathered around him that, sitting at his desk with that array of tiny friends before him, he posited in them the collective psyche of aesthetic culture. This is particularly interesting since the objects’ “value,” aside from their market
value as antiquities, emanated from their suggestion and establishment of meaning, written “through” their objectness to a nearly, and in some cases wholly, forgotten past and time.

And so again, in this respect as in so many others, psychoanalysis and archaeology are indeed identical, and are indeed undone by only one unscientific thing: meaninglessness. Freud himself, of course, made numerous direct references to the similarities between these two sciences, in part to validate psychoanalysis and in part because the metaphor connecting the two—that of excavation of something meaningful which is concealed behind or beneath an obscurant surface—is so apt; what is generally not recognized about Freud’s well-known penchant for the archaeological metaphor is that as a metaphor it indicates precisely the sort of narrative power Freud reserves for it, far beyond the physical objects on which archaeology concentrates. For Freud, the objects archaeology unearths are not central objects, but rather those iconic objects as catalysts for narratives within which they will be framed. The lesson of archaeology and psychoanalysis is that in learning to read, and even more actively to narrate, these markers of the past, we validate (while imagining or inventing) our own past, as a hypothetically logical conduit to the lived present and the projected future, and begin to form a vital relationship between the seemingly glimpsed past and its motivating remnants in (or stories of) present life.

That Freud the metaphorical archaeologist collected aesthetically pleasing objects further compounds their tendentious power. Freud’s view of the psyche contains such a dark side, such a Nietzschean perspective on the forces of which we are constituted, that even for us to view the objects with which he so dramatically surrounded himself is to become aware of a telling omission among the objects Freud actually collected and the objects, as a whole, that might be available to be collected. Only a very limited segment of the Freudian psyche is represented in Freud’s collection, because the very nature of such iconic images, in a cultural context such as the one Freud explores in Civilization and Its Discontents and elsewhere, limits to the “beautiful” the perimeters of what such objects may depict, and what may be remembered (the theme of what is and is not “contained” or “marked” in the objects Freud collected is ad-
dressed in each of the essays in this volume). Thus archaeology, in this case unlike psychoanalysis, shows its limitations as itself a marker of the human psyche, and depicts, rather, the cultural and societal normatives by which that fuller psyche is suppressed.

This volume carries the Freudian notion of metaphorical interpretation and the narrative excavation of history to the critical level. Though they manifest many common themes, the volume’s six essays represent a wide variety of responses to Freud, his collection, and the context in which one might view it and him in terms of both aesthetics and cultural archaeology. A thread of continuity is formed by the fact that, as was the case in the symposium at UC—Irvine in which the papers originated, the central idea in each presentation is that of responding to the aesthetics and the theory of Freud’s collection, as well as to the thematics of collecting itself as an aesthetic and an autoaesthetic activity. As a result of this desire for a close connection with the objects Freud collected, and with the theoretical context in which he concealed the reasons for their assemblage, in all of the following essays reference is made and much specific attention is paid to individual pieces in the collection itself; where appropriate here, illustrations punctuate the narrative to allow greater insight into these specifics. The volume moves generally from considerations of Freud’s biographical context “out” to those of a more theoretical nature, though each of the essays contains elements of both.

In the volume’s first essay, “A Collector Analyzes Collecting: Sigmund Freud on the Passion to Possess,” Lynn Gamwell, the original curator and compiler of the exhibit, introduces the main themes of the volume and sets the stage for further investigation by detailing the collection’s inception and history, and by excavating and examining Freud’s passion for collecting which, as Dr. Gamwell points out, was as powerful in Freud as his much-discussed addiction to smoking. Establishing them as a core of the evidence for Freud’s need to collect, Dr. Gamwell directs our attention to the figures immediately in front of Freud at his writing desk, analyzes their significance, and provides fascinating details of their meaning to Freud and to culture in general. Calling the figures on Freud’s
desk his “audience,” as he himself did, Dr. Gamwell evokes the strong forces Freud drew from these iconic figures as he himself explored unknown, or at least unarticulated, substrata of the psyche. The eerie powers of past and present invoked in the designation of this cluster of small statues as “listeners” to Freud’s discourse with his own internal cultural history, as it is evoked in his written work, are considerable. Dr. Gamwell’s broad familiarity with the collection, piece by piece and as a whole, lends a powerful grounding to the interpretive essays to follow. Dr. Gamwell does considerable interpretation herself, of course, laying out a case for Freud’s passion to “possess” his artifacts and its origins in his personality and desire for recognition and legitimation.

Dr. Peter Loewenberg, a practicing psychoanalyst as well as a professor of history at UCLA, explores in “The Pagan Freud” the “cultural identity” Freud formed—and transformed—out of his Jewish heritage, both in terms of its assimilation (and sublimation) into his life and work, and of his overt rejection of that heritage as a way of life. Investigating what he calls Freud’s “indifference” to any theistic system, as extensively expressed by Freud, Dr. Loewenberg makes a case for Freud’s art collecting as a deeply meaningful and symbolic alternative to religion and spirituality, both because the collected pieces are “cultic and totemic figures” in their own right and because Freud himself infused them with an intense spiritual significance vis-à-vis his own work and thought. In Dr. Loewenberg’s analysis of Freud’s collection and collecting, Freud’s very complicated attitude toward the objects of antiquity, as well as the kind of reality he ascribed to them, informs his inversion of religion and paganism such that the pagan (e.g., pagan Rome) is revered while the Christian (here Christian Rome) is vilified as a sham. Weaving together a series of Freud’s statements on antiquity and paganism, ranging from early in his life to the very threshold of his death, Dr. Loewenberg creates a rich and dense texture of evidence to support his case that Freud was himself a stoic and stubborn pagan to the very end, unwaveringly devoted to principles meaningful to him but without illusions concerning the spirituality, indeed the very reality, of human life. Dr. Loewenberg’s is a portrait of a long-suffering and benevolent Freud for whom aesthetics
and art collecting satisfied a deep need for practical fortitude and creative stimulus.

Juliet Flower MacCannell, in her "Signs of the Fathers: Freud's Collection of Antiquities," excavates a series of symbolic and semiotic themes within Freud's larger collection of figures, and then within the smaller collection chosen for touring, taking as a framework an exploration of various aspects of Freud's passion for collecting itself, within the context established by Neo-Freudian analysis, in particular that of Jacques Lacan and his concept of the object a and the fetish. Dr. MacCannell shows that collecting itself is fetishization and that, indeed, "Neo-Freudianism" as a discipline is itself a function of the archaeological metaphor, since its developments capitalize on the hidden (i.e., semiotic) aspects of Freud's own declared theories and open Freud's work to new angles and angles of critical reaction. Thus, a dialogue between Freud and the Neo-Freudians—chiefly Lacan—might produce in its own right a very provocative (re-)analysis of central Freudian themes. Dr. MacCannell's double interest, in Freud as a collector and Lacan as the theorist of the father-fetish, leads to consideration of the centrality and power of figurality in general and in specific to the nature of the iconic figure, and finally to the place and value of heavily invested figures of antiquity, for Freud.

According to Dr. MacCannell's interpretation, a kind of biological and super-biological evolution can be seen in Freud's figures. Noting the large number of animal figures in Freud's collection, Dr. MacCannell analyzes the developmental stages of Freud's figure collecting, from those of pre-humans (e.g., monkey figures) at one end of the spectrum, to those representing the superhuman (the "narcissistic superego") at the other, showing how animal figures operated for Freud as indices and markers of "the limits on and of the human" in Freudian theory, always in concert with figures linked to the superego, as the opposite limit of the human. As fetish figures defining the human relative to the animal or pre-human, Freud's collection is symbolically important to his theories, in terms of his strategies of hidden and revealed signs, both as totemic figures for the sub-rational forces with which we must deal as animals ourselves, and the cultural or super-individual forces by which
we regulate behavior and establish an ego-sense as rational beings. Dr. MacCannell selects a series of pieces from the travelling collection and analyzes them in order to demonstrate how Freud's figures established for him a set of "ideals" within which ties between individual and community could be forged; then, within the context of this same set of selected pieces, Dr. MacCannell extends her investigation to the broader question inherent in Freud's collection and its significance: the question as to the nature of the very sexual identity men and women experience in this Freudian and Neo-Freudian context. Reminding us that in terms of the concept of sexual identity, that is to say in more strictly evolutionary terms, Freud's "real Father" was a monkey—that [humankind's] divinely ideal genealogy is no more than a "descent from the lower animals"—Freud attempts to correct in us any illusions of a perfected or perfectible human state as attainable or indeed desirable. Given this grounding of the human in the "pre-human," Dr. MacCannell shows how Freud's correction of human aspiration to perfection extends for Freud even to such a powerful model of a perfectible humanity as that conceived in Hegel's idealization of rationality.

Thus art, and the act of collecting art, in the context Dr. MacCannell defines for them, are finally at the same time both great contextualizers and generators of dialectic; art and collecting act as powerful reminders of the perpetual medial position we must always occupy within the spectrum of conceivable human possibilities, caught (to paraphrase Nietzsche) between beast and superego. In this context, art and the activity of its collecting travel well beyond the usual aesthetic sphere; both are indeed useful and telling as semiotic markers, just as both art and collecting are meaningfully evocative as catalysts for deeper and richer self-definition.

Capitalizing on a set of themes introduced in the volume by Dr. MacCannell, Kenneth Reinhard in "The Freudian Things: Construction and the Archaeological Metaphor" focuses on the relationship among Freud, Lacan, the unconscious, and the psychoanalytic object, as extrapolated from the archaeological objects with which Freud surrounded himself. In the Lacanian development and refiguring of Freud, particularly in terms of the unconscious and its relation to the object as such, as Reinhard points out, the archaeo-
logical metaphor so often associated not only with Freud’s art collecting but with his psychoanalytic theory in general undergoes a very significant transformation: no longer is the psychoanalyst’s delving into the unconscious to be seen as the anticipated uncovering of objects by which we as observers, like the patient, can accrue greater and greater personal insight into person and process, but rather as indeed a perpetual loss and re-loss of the unconscious itself, as a “primary rupture.” In the psychoanalytic search itself, Reinhard maintains, are the precise conditions of its displacement. This “Orphic” (or, indeed, Romantic) archaeology, according to Lacan, in which we search and never find, re-defines the “Freudian Thing” in terms of what is lost (and, in our growing understanding of the real conditions of the search, what is therefore found) in Freud’s art collecting and his technique for psychoanalysis. Dr. Reinhard points out the divergences between the (psycho)analytic and the archaeological in light of this altered perspective, and by extension faces the problems associated with the orchestrating of the strategic archaeological metaphor for Freud, suggesting that rather than being merely a metaphor, the archaeological analogy works in Freud’s view more as an allegory for the desired discoveries of the analyst. In the attempt to lift the veils of repression concealing meanings unavailable to conscious process, and to our struggles to find them, the analyst destroys them, leaving only remnants (memorials) to both meanings and repression. Resolution of the dichotomy between psychoanalysis and archaeology can occur, according to Lacan and Reinhard, within the context of the strategy of (re)construction employed, finally, by both. Reinhard cites Freud’s contemporary, Walter Benjamin, on the notion of construction as the creating of a theoretical “constellation” recognizable only in the narration of its totality, and yet which by its very nature is always non-totalized, a matter of perspective. Finally, citing the fact that Freud’s final archaeological marker, his own ashes, reside in one of his own ancient urns, Reinhard draws on Benjamin to show that collecting is a “determination of the collector by the things whose possession itself possesses him.” For Reinhard, as for Lacan and Freud, our struggle for a coherent theoretical comprehension of the “thing” results in our determination by it.
My own essay, like Dr. Reinhard’s, addresses the notion of the constellation relative to Freud’s collection and his worldview, but instead of exploring the theoretical forces contributing to Freud’s zeal for collecting I investigate the cluster of abstracted iconic figures standing, as markers, in hypothetical juxtaposition to the figures on Freud’s desk and around his study. Given Freud’s fascination with the “past in the present,” my hypothesis is that one can perceive, in Freud’s collected figures, a kinship and relation to some absent figures in his own genealogical past whose magnetic pull attests to their power in formulating Freud’s aesthetic. My contention is that Freud’s passion for collecting and the objects manifesting it represent a complex web of self-empowering strategies gathered in totemic fashion around a clearly discernable set of psychological and aesthetic criteria; Freud, I maintain, invents and defines himself through his collecting, establishing a basis for the power of thought and writing in the amassed statuary with which he surrounded himself. My essay’s strategy is to gather together, in a similar sense to that in which Dr. Reinhard uses it, a constellation—a critical mass of ancient narrative power, suspended in those iconic figures before Freud but suggesting and evoking several others not physically represented in the art Freud collected. I identify a “Pentateuch” of such genealogically empowering figures, from whom I contend Freud had to draw power and then distance himself: Freud’s (dead) father Jakob; the Moses of the Philippson Bible, which Freud knew well through biblical text and illustration; the Moses of Michelangelo, about which Freud had so much to say throughout his life; Friedrich Nietzsche, who Freud declares he had to reject in order to have his own thoughts; and the Nietzschean concept of the Übermensch, the ideal, self-sufficient figure of authority, so centrally important to Freud, as a scientist and as a person, as well. Through a suggestive investigation of the theme of autoaesthetics, the essay aims to show that Freud had a powerful strategy, highly aesthetic and multi-layered, behind the form and content of his collection of antiquities, in which he showed himself to be deeply immersed, and which relates closely to his psychoanalytic strategies and values as well. In his need to establish himself as an autonomous figure of authority, Freud privileged other such
figures which, in their own ways, became for him the iconic display of that self-formulative power. In adopting this strategy of sublimation and transference, Freud inadvertently collaborated with that figure from whom he said he had to divorce himself: Nietzsche. In this collaboration, Freud subtly set a tone, along with Nietzsche, for the aesthetization of the twentieth century.

Julia Lupton, in her essay “Sphinx with Bouquet,” is also interested in Freud’s collection from the point of view of what its aesthetics and its selectivity reveals about its collector. She investigates Freud’s notion of science and of the interweaving of the sciences, and Freud’s discriminating taste, chronicling, thematizing, and distinguishing between items chosen and other items not chosen for collection by Freud—and then, at another level, objects chosen and not chosen for inclusion in the very abbreviated travelling version of the collection compiled by Dr. Gamwell and Mr. Wells. Dr. Lupton centers her investigation on Freud’s sphinx figures, including the cover-image for the catalogue accompanying the exhibit, as the enigmatic markers by which to distinguish Freud’s cross-disciplinary and inter-scientific interest. Detailing Freud’s process of selection, Dr. Lupton cites this process as the articulation of an underlying biological sanction for psychoanalysis, a “language of flowers” Freud employs to mark and transcend “a series of linked distinctions” such as botany and aesthetics, narrative and decorative arts, repression and sublimation. Underlying her own investigation is the grounding notion of the “flowering” of Freudian thought, in the formulation of the ideas out of which psychoanalysis grew and blossomed. Inherent in this process, Dr. Lupton claims, is the pivotal Freudian imagery of the symbolism of flowers themselves in the process of development and growth: for Freud, flowers stand for or mean meaning itself.

Dr. Lupton shows that the sphinx and the bouquet typify the two aspects of Freud’s aesthetic theory. The essay makes the case for a telling parallel between the two central sphinxes in Freud’s collection (the “Oedipal” one shown on the cover of the exhibition catalogue and the “à la grecque” sphinx with bouquet left behind in Freud’s study) and the Freudian concepts of repression and sublimation. Calling on the Kantian notion of the flower as emblem of
“free beauty,” Lupton draws a line from Kant through Linneaus’ “sexual system” of flowers to Freud’s distinction between repressed and sublimated sexuality, in dreams and beyond in psychic life. Positing collecting, the “uncanny maternal crossroads” between repression and sublimation, as the focus of Freud’s science, Dr. Lupton shows how “sphinx with bouquet” becomes the sublimated equivalent of “Freud with Kant.” Finally, the essay demonstrates the connection between the sublime sexuality of flower imagery and the sphinx within the Freudian context, on the one hand, and the image of the Medusa as a related condensation of apocryphal “maternal phalli,” on the other, never really “there” but always an emblem for the repressed.

The leitmotif of all the volume’s essays is that while Freud’s collection of antiquities reveals a great deal about him, it conceals even more than it reveals about his psyche, his history and tradition, and the processes of the mind. To give this formulation a Heideggerian turn, the collection reveals what is not concealed within it, even while it defines what is concealed there. In some respect, the art objects with which Freud surrounded himself act as a better—because more elliptical, suggestive, and imagistic—marker for the mechanism of psychoanalysis than any other source; indeed, as good a one as Freud’s writings themselves. Because Freud’s iconic statues are objects, things, Freud’s art engages us at a different level than his erudite (and thus more conscious) work. We can learn a great deal about Freud’s psychic makeup, and by extension our own, by looking closely at Freud’s collection and the strategies that amassed it. This volume offers a first gesture toward such a closer look.