Heidegger’s thinking is distinguished not so much by the concerns he addresses as by the unique emphasis he places on a topic which dramatically changes the order of all the preceding steps leading up to it. A curious pattern works across his entire corpus whereby he shows that, on crucial issues, it is precisely the opposite of the conventional wisdom that is called into question. In Heidegger’s earlier writings, the simultaneous acknowledgment and retraction of an average view of being and of human existence in order to arrive at a more inclusive stance that avoids the initial one-sidedness, becomes the heart of the hermeneutical way of inquiry which he pioneers. Even in his later works (for example, in “The Question Concerning Technology”) Heidegger employs a similar approach in showing the drawbacks of the conventional belief that technology should be construed “instrumentally” as a “means to an end” and as a “human activity.”1 In either case, he displays a concerted effort to shift attention away from what appears most obvious and most easily expressed in theory toward what by contrast retreats before our sight and lingers instead on the threshold beyond all thematic concern.

A century and a half earlier, Kant as well—under the auspices of his Copernican revolution—transferred the focus of philosophical inquiry away from some preset ensemble of concerns—of God, freedom, and immortality—to what otherwise remains concealed on the periphery. He recognized that what previously had been neglected in all metaphysical inquiry as its too obvious antecedent, namely, human finitude, ultimately takes precedence in shaping our approach to those issues believed to be the most important. Precisely
in recognizing the need to transpose abruptly the focus of philosophical inquiry, to catapult us back to the preliminaries that govern any such investigation, Heidegger allies himself with Kant. But what will prove crucial in this study is not only that Heidegger does so, but also when he makes this alliance.

Specifically, Heidegger’s employment of Kantian thought in the 1925–1926 lectures *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, in his 1927 lectures *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, and in his 1927–1928 lectures *Die Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft* suggest an increasingly concentrated effort to wrench from the labyrinth of transcendental philosophy the insight which would enable him to expand the radius of hermeneutics. The expansion of this radius would not only serve to draw forth the theme of inquiry (the meaning of being as temporality), but also would prepare the mode of articulation which is required for the inquiry to proceed. “Being is different than beings, and only this difference in general, this possibility of distinction, insures an understanding-of-being.” As we will see, it is only after having evolved from within language itself the very distinctions that not only pertain to being but facilitate our understanding of it that Heidegger can develop the complementary problem of temporality. In this respect, he forges an allegiance with Kant because, of all thinkers in the tradition, Kant most aptly provides an occasion for considering the understanding of being as such.

In this chapter I will ask how this “occasion” becomes crucial for Heidegger and ultimately leads him to single out Kant as his closest ally. First, several factors prior to 1925 led Heidegger to broach the issues of finitude and temporality before aligning himself explicitly with Kant. Second, in the late 1920s Heidegger found enscrolled in Kant’s description of the intimate relation between metaphysics and human finitude the very outline for the hermeneutical circle. Third, Heidegger’s subsequent encounter with Kant required expanding the radius of hermeneutics, not only by accommodating the more intricate theme of temporality but by incorporating the historical stance or situation of the “interpreter” himself which is implied in appropriating transcendental philosophy.
THE EMERGING PROBLEM OF FACTICITY

As seen from the perspective of Being and Time, Heidegger conceives his task as one of re-asking the question of being. Part of our difficulty in not appreciating the full scope of the question lies in the fact that being itself proves to be so indeterminate insofar as it seemingly applies to anything, making it the vaguest and emptiest of concepts. Anything from plants, animals, humans, or celestial bodies implies something like being. Heidegger’s unique response to this quandary of addressing being entails examining the being who rises into prominence due to its having an understanding of itself (and hence of being as well), namely, Dasein. Dasein is that being who exists and is each case mine, and who thereby marks the site, the “there,” whereby the disclosure of beings-in-totality (in which it itself is included) first occurs. To a large extent this is a formal sketch of Heidegger’s project. This project also entails a hermeneutical side; that is, it involves a unique pattern of interpretation due to the reciprocal implication that the addressing of Dasein’s being has for re-asking the question of being.

Yet, just as we will distinguish between an official and an unofficial story in Heidegger’s estimation of his relation to transcendental philosophy, so the overly formal way of characterizing the development of his project may require modification. Specifically, there has been a recent movement, as led by Kisiel, van Buren, and others, to examine Heidegger’s early lectures between 1919 and 1925 in order to sift through the various factors that influenced his formulation of hermeneutic phenomenology. No doubt much of this movement has been fueled by one of Heidegger’s most famous students, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who pointed to the early lectures of Heidegger (which he attended) as providing a “fusion of horizons” in which all the manifold aspects of Heideggerian thought—the influences of Aristotle and Brentano, the theological tradition, the formal problems of logic in medieval thought—all begin to coalesce into one sweeping ontological investigation into the meaning of being. Gadamer eloquently documents the various historical factors influencing Heidegger’s thinking in a 1964 essay entitled “Martin
Heidegger and Marburg Theology." Foremost in Heidegger's early development was a concern for the particularized dimension of human experience, of concrete factual life, that marks the germ for understanding *Dasein* as "mine" without many of the overt existentialist overtones. Seen from this earlier perspective, Heidegger does not simply re-ask the question of being but he adds the special wrinkle of identifying the intimacy of our concern surrounding it through factual life experience; in this way the later concern for *Dasein* unfolds through what van Buren aptly describes as the "ontoper-sonal animal" that gives a personal face to being, for the most part lacking in the Greeks' preoccupation with *ousia.*

The other crucial issue surrounding Heidegger's thought, which in view of unraveling his dialogue with Kant becomes particularly important for us here, is that of temporality. Most typically, for any issue Heidegger raises there are often lengthy preliminaries before which it seems to bow. The publication of his early lectures dramatizes to what extent this is true, in dictating the lengthy path which must be followed before the question of being can be shown to gravitate around a parallel concern for time. Heidegger does not necessarily view this tendency as a quirk, or even as a sign of how difficult the issue itself is. For example, it is not only the confusion surrounding time that makes it such a troublesome topic to broach. Rather, the inquiry into time requires opening forth a significantly more inclusive path of investigation, in such a way that the very consideration of the topic entails identifying a completely new orientation to philosophy. Heidegger had already gleaned the beginnings of this new orientation as early as 1919, to the extent that his introduction to hermeneutics and his growing interest in temporality sprang out of a common root. These commonalities arise most notably from an initial encounter with the theological tradition, with the writings of Pascal, Luther, and Kierkegaard, and from his sensitivity to an original interpretation of the Christian *eschaton* in light of his lectures on St. Paul (1920–1921). In his 1923 lectures *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, Heidegger marks the beginning of the development of his concept of care (*Sorge*), while pointing to the orientation to "factual-life experience" as the key to developing the project of hermeneutics. He refers specifically to how temporality
reveals itself in the "kairologische moment of Dasein," through a
unique opening forth and concretion of individual existence.9 These
early influences in the development of Heidegger’s task include his
interest in Dilthey’s effort to outline methodologically the para-
ters for the interpretation of culture, while recognizing that such an
interpretive task is intimately interwoven with history.10 The pecu-
liar juxtaposition of the hermeneutical project with time and its his-
tory would provide Heidegger with the configuring pattern for the
development of his phenomenology. As he indicates in a memorable
remark from On the Way to Language:

The term “hermeneutics” was familiar to me from my theo-
logical studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the
question of the relation between the word of Holy Scripture and
theological-speculative thinking. This relation, between language
and being, was the same one, if you will, only it was veiled and
inaccessible to me, so that through many deviations and false
starts I sought in vain for a guiding thread. . . .

Without this theological background I would never have come
upon the path of thinking. But origin always comes to meet us
from the future.11

Ironically, during his brief sojourn as a Jesuit novice (1909),
Heidegger became awakened to the substantive issues of ontology
as developed both by Husserl’s analysis of a categorial intuition in
the sixth of the Logical Investigations and by Franz Brentano’s effort
to uncover the so-called unity in the various senses of being. In re-
gard to this later concern, Heidegger will ultimately point to time as
the gathering “fore-structure” through which the various dimen-
sions of being are simultaneously apprehended. The blossoming
concern for the problem of time as the key inroad into ontology ulti-
mately led him to recast the Husserlian problem of phenomenology
and to rethink the point of departure for interrogating being. In per-
haps the first most noticeable step in this process, a series of lectures
delivered in 1925 and recently translated as the History of the Con-
cept of Time, Heidegger begins to raise the definitive topic suggested
in the title of the work, albeit in a rather cursory fashion at the con-
clusion. Yet, as Kisiel, the translator of this volume has recognized,
in retrospect what might initially appear as a drawback actually can
prove to be a benefit. For we can recall the options in the development of Heidegger’s thought which he entertained, leading ultimately to the selection of a few keys that would chart a radically new direction for phenomenology.¹²

The early development of Heidegger’s thought shows to what extent a debate with his contemporaries, most notably Husserl and Scheler, becomes pivotal, just as later a continuing dialogue with the greatest figures in the Western tradition marks the course of his thinking. Yet, as different as these paths are, they are not necessarily incompatible; indeed, given the original way Heidegger formulates the question of being concurrently with the continual evolution of his hermeneutics, it may very well be the case that these two paths converge with the further exploration of his own historical stance. In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger examines an implicit ontological concern which carves its way across Husserl’s entire treatment of the problem of intentionality. Just as, in his studies on Kant, Heidegger will later downplay the overt emphasis placed on knowledge in favor of an ontological focus, so in addressing Husserl’s account of intentionality he elicits a matrix of issues which can be properly considered only after having returned to a more primordial level suggested by ontology.

Thus, Heidegger examines the “being of the intentional,” which he maintains has been “neglected” along with the more general neglect for the question of being itself.¹³ What proves significant, however, is not that Heidegger transfers a Husserlian problem back to an earlier concern for being, as we have come to expect. Even more important, this move shows that what is “earlier,” even if forgotten, continues to have an impact on what is thought and thereby hints at a prospective reassembling of the “facts” of lived experience which tacitly orient the inquiry.¹⁴ At stake, then, is the strategy for unfolding this orientation, in a way which gradually unearths the problem of facticity as an essential issue for determining the course of ontological inquiry. In posing the concern of facticity, Heidegger does not simply raise one issue to be addressed on a par with all the others. Rather, he calls into question the primordiality of the approach taken by previous thinkers and does this in such a way as to outline the battlefield on which the future development of phenomenology will be decided.
In employing a critique of Husserl to mark the convergence between phenomenology and ontology, Heidegger takes a step which perhaps proves all too familiar to us now. Intentionality is redefined as a comportment toward beings rather than as an isolated act of consciousness generating meaning. As such, all intentional acts only arise with the recognition of Dasein’s belonging to the entirety of beings, to its emergence in the “midst” of them. Dasein’s way of already finding itself situated among beings of course marks its facticity, which in turn is the definitive way in which it first acquires a concern for its existence, as entailing “care.” With these brief steps, Heidegger offers a scenario which will become almost creed in the works after Being and Time. Specifically, intentionality rests upon more basic ontological structures like care; insofar as a comportment toward beings presupposes the inclusive network of relations comprising the world which unfolds through an act of transcendence, Dasein’s transcendence proves to be the soil from which intentionality originates. Most of the basic motifs that will constitute the theme of Heidegger’s magnum opus have begun to emerge. Yet, in a way that Heidegger himself might have acknowledged, it is not so much what these issues are that proves decisive for the questioning undertaken in the History of the Concept of Time; it is how they arise in the course of transforming the phenomenological task as such that is important.

Initially, Heidegger approaches the issue of intentionality not so much as a finished doctrine, but as suggesting a tantalizingly new direction for philosophy, as providing an angle for “questioning back” (rückfrage) to a more essential concern for being. As such, intentionality must be treated less as an isolated problem and more as exemplifying the innovative spirit in all phenomenology to return to the things themselves. In providing a novel avenue to lay bare the phenomena, the analysis of intentional acts consolidates all the previous steps which shift the focus away from a passive observation of experience to the prospect of exploring how whatever is encountered by us achieves the degree of determination and significance it does. By characterizing experience according to its noetic and noematic poles, the act of intending and what is intended, Husserl turns our attention to the actual manifestation of those factors that render our interaction with beings intelligible. In this way, the accen-
tuation of the how ahead of any specific facets of experience serves
to separate out the most rudimentary features that lend determination
to whatever is, (i.e., let it be seen as something), thereby opening
up for investigation a hitherto unfathomable domain of phenomena,
that of categorial structures.\textsuperscript{15}

In one way or another, the tradition has always found in these
structures the beginnings for a study of being, no matter how latent
or obscure: the introduction to ontology. Even Kant, who does not
appear to possess a notion of intentionality and was, on the surface,
reluctant to delve into matters which he considered ontological,
recognized the peculiarity of the copula, is, as denoting a sense that is
not objectively accessible (e.g., in perception) but which nevertheless
is integral to the direct apprehension of anything qua existing.
Not surprisingly, in the later lecture course comprising the Basic
Problems as a preliminary draft of the unpublished second division
of Being and Time, Heidegger marks the convergence between the
elusive character of the is as Kant first recognized it and the way that
enigma will later be reopened through a study of intentionality.
The initial restrictedness in the logical study of being will then be raised
to an entirely new level of understanding through Husserl’s treat-
ment of categorial structures. Due to the complexity of “Kant’s The-
sis about Being” (the title of Heidegger’s last major account of tran-
scendental philosophy) as uncovered in the Dialectic of the first
Critique,\textsuperscript{16} along with its greater import for the retrieval of Kant’s
thought, we must wait until much later to subject it to detailed anal-
ysis. At any rate Heidegger sets a pattern for evoking a concern for
ontology even in the seemingly most rarified reflections on the for-
mal characteristics of thought and language. Despite the initial
stance of neutrality in avoiding “existential claims,” the analysis of
intentionality begets an ontological problematic.\textsuperscript{17}

According to Heidegger, it is not necessarily an explicit allusion
to being, even through categorial structures, which reveals Husserl’s
latent concern for ontology. Rather, it is the tacit recognition that, in
terms of its approach, the analysis of intentionality is indifferent to
anything other than what is most essential. In this regard, a vague
awakening to a preliminary sense of being is already at work, subtly
directing Husserl’s inquiry back to what yields its own possibility. In
acknowledging what grants this possibility, the residual influence of a deeper concern for being, the analysis of intentionality sooner or later gravitates toward ontology.

Heidegger defends this outlook by showing how phenomenology’s preoccupation for what is first in the order of inquiry, the “a priori,” is to be understood as a firstness not only in regard to what is immanent to consciousness or what is necessary beforehand to the experience of an object. Instead, the essential significance of the a priori marks the shift in inquiry back to the level of being, to what is primary in determining the direction of that investigation. The a priori tactfully houses the problem of the existential forestructure of understanding, as will be seen in the next chapter, while providing the occasion to define human comportment as a form of “being-ahead-of.” As we will discover in Chapter 6, the shift becomes important by underscoring the reorientation implicit in Kant’s thinking, in such a way as to make transcendence and the precomprehension of being occurring through it the new point of departure for inquiry. Only in this way can the subsequent retrieval of the Copernican revolution in the Kant-book, as outlined accurately by Sartre, serve as a “microcosm” for the radical realignment of thinking achieved in Heidegger’s phenomenology.

By underscoring the essential character of Husserl’s investigation, Heidegger shows how his mentor has already drawn sustenance from the concerns which issue from being, and has implicitly acknowledged the importance of our introduction to it in the guise of a question. Yet, because Husserl still tends to accept passively the primacy of his own point of departure, he does not approach the different facets of the concern for being from the side of the question itself, does not approach the question by recalling what is most provocative in it. Thus, it is not so much a naiveté about being which colors Husserl’s thought as a neglect for its emergence in the form of a question. In this way, Heidegger identifies the key to his own plan to extract the deeper import of the phenomenological analysis of intentionality. But oddly enough, the significance of this attempt lies in providing an example of how to counteract the neglect for being and thereby to expand the inquiry so as to include within it an angle for addressing the root of that neglect; it marks a tendency inter-
woven into the existence of whoever can engage in an intentional comportment toward beings.

In a very embryonic form, we see Heidegger's attempt to radicalize phenomenology in a way indicative of his later writings. For him, the neglect that is involved, both in regard to the "being of the intentional act" and to "being itself," is not simply to be counteracted and rectified. Insofar as the neglect is much more pervasive and entrenched than that, it itself must be evoked in its own right, or uncovered as a *phenomenon* pertaining to the basic enactment of *Dasein*'s being as care. According to Heidegger, the element of care that includes that neglect, which complements both existence and facticity, proves to be "falling." In this way, he directs phenomenology along a completely new path by showing that what on the surface appears to be only an incidental oversight and negative in character—namely, neglect—must be considered as in some sense contributing to the positive determination of *Dasein*'s being. As Heidegger states:

The two neglects, 1) the neglect of the question of being as such and 2) the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional are not accidental oversights of philosophers. Rather, these omissions serve to manifest the history of our very *Dasein*. . . . That this neglect is possible and reigns in this manner for thousands of years manifests a particular mode of the being of *Dasein*, a specific tendency toward decadence [Verfall]. This means that *Dasein* in this mode of being of *falling* [Verfallen], from which it does not escape, first really comes to its being when it rebels against this tendency.21

Heidegger's phenomenology, then, proves distinct by seeking the very inducement to questioning in what has previously been omitted, allowing the inquiry to draw upon its pregiven affinity to *Dasein* as existing in order to unfold the ensemble of concerns defining its theme. Or more precisely, the theme under scrutiny—being—is to be partially constituted by the inadvertent neglect shown toward it, in a dual sense in which the direction of this disregard doubles back to include the existence of the inquirer. Thus, in order to diffuse the neglect for being, it is equally necessary to follow its corollary development as it concretely arises within *Dasein* itself,
thereby drawing forth the being of the inquirer in its essential reciprocity with being itself. Herein lies the first clue to the distinctive circularity of Heidegger’s project, which admits its own unique classification as “hermeneutical.” For Heidegger, hermeneutics constitutes the definitive strategy for implementing phenomenology. The ability to make this moment of withdrawal the heart of hermeneutic phenomenology, to seek its orientation from a questioning that double backs upon itself, seems to be the important advance which Heidegger makes in both transforming Husserl’s task and in synchronizing the pattern for cultural interpretation (as first identified by Dilthey) with its prior development in the fore-comprehension of care.22 The questioning which is then executed ultimately moves on two fronts, folding back upon itself in such a way as to scrutinize its own path and development, to show the expansion of its arc which constantly reviews the adequacy of its own point of departure.

It is through the double determination of the question or its “duplication” that a rebound from its prior stage of neglect can occur. For the first time, it becomes possible to see how the very formulation of the question of being is determined beforehand by its previous withdrawal and to appreciate to what extent an advance can be made in addressing the hidden dimensions of our (intentional) comportment toward beings. The implementation of hermeneutics does not simply eliminate the initial vagueness in our comprehension of being, but instead recovers its own positive character as orienting the preliminary analysis of being-in-the-world. Thus, Heidegger undertakes his celebrated description of “everydayness” in order to lay bare the comprehensive structure of Dasein’s concern and to determine how the components of its existence engender the aura of familiarity by which each of us interacts with beings (oneself included). The way is thereby cleared for addressing the phenomenon that would serve to enhance Husserl’s analysis of intentionality but which instead hovers elusively beyond its threshold: world as such and the corresponding structures of “being-in,” including Dasein’s capacity for discoveredness (Entdeckheit), or, disclosedness.

In Heidegger’s early formulation of hermeneutics, we find many of the key ingredients which will advance his phenomenology be-
yond that of Husserl's. In view of Heidegger's later exchange with Kant, on the other hand, we discover the definitive insight which opens up this option and allows him to discern the thread that unifies his own project in a way comparable to that of transcendental philosophy, namely, the issue of human finitude. Specifically, the path that Heidegger follows in questioning back to the roots of care is one which is oriented from the point of our abandonment among beings out of which even our own falling begins. This juncture, whose entryway as the "there" of Dasein precedes any comportment toward beings, takes the form of "thrownness." Thrownness is in turn accompanied by a distinctive disposition or mood which awakens Dasein to its own possibilities and draws its attention both to itself and to the surrounding beings, thereby serving as an emissary of discoveredness.

Heidegger's way of extracting the forefront of human concern as it is chiseled out from within beings-as-a-whole provides the key step in recasting the chief components of Kant's view of knowledge in light of the corresponding motifs which comprise our being-in-the-world. Despite Kant's preference for adhering to a notion of the knowing "subject" which is not fully rooted in the world, Heidegger shows that there is nevertheless a latent acknowledgment of that worldly, factual dimension enscrolled in the Kantian account of the capacity yielding the knower's access to an object, namely, affectivity or receptivity (intuition). Seeking a parallel with his own thought, Heidegger suggests that, as a definitive feature of the knower, affectivity marks both our dependence on the manifestness of the object (i.e., our abandonment among beings) and the need to be oriented in some precursory fashion to objects in order that they can become accessible to us as finite. Yet, he does not simply substitute the term receptivity for what in his own inquiry translates as "facticity" or "thrownness." Rather, Heidegger seeks a more radical employment of receptivity in a way that demands recalling its own contribution in defining the being of the subject, its finitude; he thereby subordinates all the empirical features of its sensuous character (i.e., the operation of sense organs) to its deeper ontological determination in eliciting the manifestness of the object. Heidegger summarizes the implications of this move in an important pas-
sage from the first part of the Kant-book: “Human intuition, then, is not ‘sensible’ because its affection takes place through ‘sense organs,’ but rather the reverse. Because our Dasein is finite—existing in the midst of beings that already are, beings to which it has been delivered over—therefore it must take this already-existing in stride, that is to say, it must offer the possibility of announcing itself.”

24

With this remark, Heidegger cites the transposition in the basic Kantian focus that will enable him to formulate the parallels in his own thought on such issues as transcendence and temporality. Within this transposed context, what Kant described as the transcendental power of imagination can arise as the proper corollary to the disclosedness which issues from care. While it is only sometime later that Heidegger begins to develop his allegiance with Kant, his initial way of formulating the hermeneutical problem yields the key ingredients that will enable him to undertake the destructive retrieval witnessed most dramatically in the Kant-book. This way of bringing the Kant-book back within the larger context of Heidegger’s development has special importance: It allows us to see the exact point where his thinking interfaces with Kant’s in a way that preserves the integrity of both and fosters the possibility of a genuine dialogue between them. If there is any limitation to the approach taken by Charles Sherover in his book Heidegger, Kant and Time, we will see that it lies in Sherover’s not having had the opportunity to witness the above development. Accordingly, he tends to work from something like a Kant-Heidegger “infrastructure” that blends the conceptual formulations of the two together without completely recognizing the radical realignment of thinking, the dramatic displacement of metaphysics, which is necessary for such a dialogue to unfold.

The lectures that comprise the History of the Concept of Time, and even those from before 1920, indicate Heidegger’s preoccupation with the issues of facticity and with developing an approach to being that is oriented from a prereflective, pretheoretical level, which remains concealed throughout metaphysics. As Kisiel has suggested, the early period of Heidegger’s thinking is characterized by (1) a concern for a style of questioning, which, due to its pre-
theoretical orientation, refrains from developing philosophy in a scientific form as seen first in the lectures collected in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology; and by (2) the absence of any explicit agenda to undertake a dialogue with Kant, even though much of Heidegger’s early thinking grows out of a critique of neo-Kantianism, with the promise as far back as 1919 to offer a course on transcendental philosophy.\textsuperscript{25}

In the lectures comprising Der Begriff der Zeit (1924), however, we find an initial indication of the path Heidegger will follow in developing his analysis of temporality around Kantian thought.\textsuperscript{26} There he emphasizes two themes which will become integral to his later development of the notion of time: (1) the priority of the future in the determination of time such that “the basic phenomenon of time is the future”\textsuperscript{27}; (2) the implication that history (Geschichte) includes the movement of futurity and possibility (möglichkeit), thereby suggesting the insight that hermeneutics entails a preunderstanding which takes the form of retrieval. As Heidegger states: “This is the first principle of all hermeneutics.”\textsuperscript{28} Accordingly, it is not until Heidegger rediscovers Kant in the period beginning in 1925, and thereafter in Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, that we find the dramatic upheaval in his approach to ontology. At this time we also discover a more explicitly scientific bent which thrusts the issue of temporality into the forefront as the key to the thematic projection of the meaning (worhaufen) of being as witnessed in Being and Time. These lectures constitute Heidegger’s first attempt to import the basic precepts of transcendental philosophy into his own broader inquiry into being. What strikes his interest, however, is not Kant’s emphasis on the issue of time; for as early as 1921, in considering the character of “original Christianity,” Heidegger had already gleaned a basic sense of the ellipitical pattern of temporality that would prove so crucial to him later in his magnum opus.\textsuperscript{29} His familiarity, shown in his early theological writings, both with the Christian idea of the eschaton and with Kierkegaard’s view of “repetition,” along with the lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness he would later edit for his mentor, Husserl, certainly testifies to this.

From Heidegger’s perspective, the appeal to Kant added the
clues to the "groundplan" for integrating the issue of time into the heart of ontology in a way that could pinpoint the relevance of human existence to this inquiry, that is, in regard to its finitude—the relation of the circularity of time to that of the hermeneutical project. Heidegger's early familiarity (1919–1921) with Karl Jaspers's writings seems to have been a factor here, both in regard to his ideas of Existenz and of the limit situation (Grenzsituationen). This early familiarity prefigures Heidegger's later emphasis on the marginal experiences of life which define human finitude—death, guilt, and fate. Heidegger's emphasis on the futural dimension of time as the opening forth of the possibilities of factual life, seen most explicitly in Der Begriff der Zeit, would become pivotal to his subsequent reinterpretation of Kant's view of imagination. In 1925 Heidegger had reached the crucial juncture in his inquiry from which he followed this route, and this becomes evident four years later in his introductory allusions in the Kant-book to "laying the ground for metaphysics" according to the direction given by man's finite nature.

As the earliest attempt to break open the issue of temporality particularly in response to Kant, the Logik, in which Heidegger abruptly turns to an analysis of transcendental philosophy after the Christmas break of 1925/26, proves crucial on two accounts. First, there is a direct recognition of the need to redefine time as an "existential" (Zeit als Existenzial), with an eye to delineating the essential structures of Dasein (as care), which simultaneously replicate and invert the direct analogue in Kantian terms to the "constitutive" character of the categories. Although these lectures follow on the heels of the History of the Concept of Time, they begin to move in a totally new direction, spelling out even more explicitly the factual concretion of human existence through time. For what proves significant in the clues Kant provides is how to shift the emphasis of time away from the measurement of "natural" events to a unique comportment, itself "worldly," that lends itself to the original (in the use of the earlier language, "factual") enactment of temporality. The attention Heidegger pays to examining the transcendental aesthetic, in which Kant transfers the concern for the origin of time away from its objective appearance in physical events to the finite character of
human receptivity, certainly reinforces this emphasis. This move is in keeping with Kant's own insistence that the Copernican revolution necessarily begins with the discovery of space and time as the pure forms of sensory intuition. Thus, in prefiguring the line of inquiry he will later pursue in the first two divisions of Being and Time, Heidegger asks toward the conclusion of these lectures:

In which sense is the being structure of Dasein—care—characterized through time? These structures are not outside that, which they are themselves, neither in time, nor in any specific relation to time, but care is in the way determined by time in such a way that it itself is time, the facticity (Faktizität) of time itself.

Second, and perhaps even more important, these lectures mark the embryonic beginning of Heidegger's attempt to distinguish time as the preformative undergird to meaning. Why should Kant become so central to this decisive development? In simplest terms, by undertaking a deduction of the categories and considering the conditions for their application to objects, Kant shows that predication really rests on a transitive relation (rather than a simple correspondence of meanings). The content of the categories cannot be adduced immediately, but must instead be gathered according to the relation holding between what they would denote in cognition (i.e., the object) and that complementary pole from which their synthetic power emerges (i.e., transcendental apperception). Meaning evolves out of a prior context which orients us toward what is already understood in the guise of an a priori synthesis; it thereby regulates its own scope to include the greatest variations (i.e., of possible signifiers) and finally comprises the referential structure of "world." Put simply, Heidegger saw in Kant the insight that human beings can open upon their experience and find it meaningful in a comprehensive way precisely due to the anticipatory character of their temporal natures.

In recognizing the evolutionary character of meaning, Heidegger comes upon the insight that the process of understanding must be closely wedded to time. He came to see even more fundamentally that the very employment of signifiers must be governed by a preordering pattern, in such a manner that a power not explicitly discursive—time—can fulfill a configuring role in delimiting the
very focus for what can be grasped and articulated. According to the requirements of this strange and innovative logic, obviously inspired by Kant's Copernican revolution, Heidegger places considerable stock in the doctrine of schematism. This doctrine suggests how the configuring power of time can nurture the development of meaning, that is, shape the very preunderstanding that can summon the referential nexus of world and simultaneously mark our own participation in that (disclosive) process. As he will subsequently show in the lectures comprising the Basic Problems a year after, as well as in the Phänomenologische Interpretation and the Kant-book, the unity of this disclosure, in which the precomprehension of being unfolds, takes the form of transcendence. Hence, Heidegger places a strong emphasis on Kant's transcendental philosophy.

By briefly addressing the twofold direction of these 1925–26 lectures, we come to some initial grasp of the place Heidegger's appropriation of transcendental philosophy will play in the overall development of his thought. Ironically, many scholars seemed to have overlooked the importance of Heidegger's prefatory way of juxtaposing the issues of meaning and time, thereby assuming that Kant's doctrine of schematism offers the very clues to their interface. Much more attention has been payed to the obvious outcome of this development, to the unfolding of time as the "transcendental horizon for understanding being," than to the precise configuration of the "upon-which." Yet, even at the conclusion of the Basic Problems, where the concern for the upon-which of a projective understanding gets raised most explicitly, Heidegger formulates the preliminary insight which will make his alliance with Kant ultimately loom so large, namely, that the language belonging to ontology in inherently temporal. As is our vital task here, we must also direct concern at the juncture where Heidegger's analysis of time becomes especially prominent, the more elemental and encompassing appeal to temporality as a phenomenon that goes far beyond the particularized concretion of human existence in Dasein. For only by expanding his project along this broader front, in a manner which returns to acknowledge its Kantian legacy, can Heidegger then extend the radius of the hermeneutical circle in such a way as to couple explicitly the inquiry into the meaning of being with the investigation into human existence.
As is clear from the earliest lectures, Heidegger was aware of how central the issue of time was to the traditional attempt to question the meaning of being. But the precise way temporality can be deployed as a vehicle for countering the tradition’s forgetfulness of that relation, forgetting to make of time an explicit delimiting and organizing backdrop for comprehending being, does not become evident until Heidegger appeals to the temporal configuration of all understanding according to the pattern provided by Kant. As Heidegger tells his students at the beginning of his 1927–1928 lecture course on Kant, which became the *Phänomenologische Interpretation*,

When I began again to study Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* a few years ago and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it was as if the scales fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me the confirmation of the correctness of the way for which I was searching.⁴⁸

Just as the appropriation of Kantian thought constitutes something like a quantum leap in Heidegger’s early thinking, so the complementary question will arise as to whether the Freiberg period of the 1930s, after the publication of *Being and Time*, marks a certain distancing if not a partial retraction of the significance of transcendental philosophy. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this, as already indicated in the introduction, occurs in Heidegger’s “letter” (1962) to Richardson’s *Through Phenomenology to Thought*. There Heidegger remarks that his phenomenological development of the question of being from out of the tradition of German idealism, including Kant as well as Husserl, remains “captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language and was accompanied by inadequate explanations of its own intentions (*Vorhabens*).”⁴⁹ Heidegger suggests that the clarification of this *Vorhabens* alone rests on the further development of his thought in light of the “truth of being.” Accordingly, to the extent that in the intervening period he continues to draw upon Kant’s thinking for guidance there must be a commensurate change in strategy for retrieving transcendental philosophy. This is a concern which will become increasingly compelling as we examine Heidegger’s treatment
of the parallel issues of science and technology, the topics of the con-
cluding chapters of this study.

Yet, at the same time, we must keep a guarded view on the
cogency of any of Heidegger’s retrospective evaluations of his own
thinking in an effort to distinguish an unofficial versus an official
story of the proximity of Kant’s thought to his own. Indeed, even in
the period after 1936, during which Heidegger tends to refer to
transcendental philosophy very infrequently (except in a critical
way), there may be more influence present, if only in an inverse man-
ner, than might otherwise be obvious. As early as *Being and Time*
Heidegger showed a noticeable tendency to pass over some of the
more positive contributions of his predecessors, most tellingly in his
underestimating the *diversity* of topics that link his own project with
Kierkegaard’s. At the very least, these preliminary remarks help to
indicate how complex the topography is which defines Heidegger’s
critical exchange with Kant, insofar as we consider the subtle turns
and twists that characterize all the levels of inquiry comprising the
*Gesamtausgabe*.

Having given new meaning to the Heidegger-Kant dialogue, we
can now consider how that exchange demands a further develop-
ment of hermeneutics. Let us then examine some of the more in-
tegral motifs that define this dialogue insofar as they arise more em-
phatically in the Kant-book. Of seminal importance is the close
relation between Heidegger’s appropriation of transcendental phi-
losophy and his own task of re-asking the question of being.

**THE TRANSPOSITION OF METAPHYSICS**

Beginning from his writings as a student as far back as 1916,
Heidegger displayed a keen interest in neo-Kantianism, particularly
as espoused by his teacher, Rickert. As early as 1912 Heidegger, in
taking his cue from Kant’s first *Critique*, had already emphasized
the importance of the structure of judgment as the key to knowl-
dge, a stance which he would later retract both in his phenomeno-
logical treatment of truth and in his destructive retrieval of transcen-
dental philosophy. Having benefited from Emil Lask’s insights
into the formative, self-indicating roots of experience, Heidegger
would become increasingly critical of this movement while beginning to appropriate Kant’s thought in the period leading up to the publication of Being and Time. Heidegger’s initial flirtation with neo-Kantianism, despite his later abandonment of it, prefigures his more mature position of accenting the broader ontological concerns of Kant’s thinking and recovering them as an integral step in his overall attempt to re-ask the question of being. In this regard, the most encompassing of Heidegger’s earliest published works on transcendental philosophy was aptly titled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929); it continues to be his most important contribution to this development, at least for focusing his sharp divergence from neo-Kantianism. The most pivotal study to date on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, Charles Sherover’s Heidegger, Kant, and Time, confines itself almost exclusively to that work. As exclusive as this focus is, it became an almost self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics was destined to be cited in the annals of Heidegger scholarship as simply the “Kant-book.” Nevertheless, in the remainder of his career, Heidegger published two other works almost completely devoted to Kant, one even with his name in the title, along with works like The Essence of Reasons, the Kantian slant of which can hardly be denied.

The somewhat restricted view of Heidegger’s reading of transcendental philosophy, however, requires radical change with the collection of his previously unpublished lectures in the Gesamtausgabe. To be sure, Heidegger himself would be dismayed by the belief that it is the content of those lectures per se which makes such a dramatic difference since he is always exhorting us to distinguish between an “object of scholarship and a matter of thought.” But what does prove decisive is the interlacing of different texts insofar as they provide a legacy of his encounter with the metaphysical tradition along with his attempt to redirect its beginning toward new frontiers. Both immediately preceding and following the publication of his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927) and the Kant-book, we discover a voluminous number of lectures devoted to the study of transcendental philosophy. These range from the Logik and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1926–1927), delivered