1. Husserl

_The Idea of Phenomenology_ is the title of five lectures delivered by Husserl in Göttingen from April 26 to May 2, 1907, and edited by Walter Biemel in 1950. There is also a subtitle, given in parentheses following the title, which indicates that the title does not mean an *eidos* offered to contemplation, nor a general notion. The wording of the subtitle is deliberately programmatic: *Introduction to the Capital Points of Phenomenology and of the Critique of Reason*.

My objective here is to look to the text of these lectures in order to clarify the stakes of the debate that Heidegger initiated with Husserl, the master with whom he was in “direct contact” and to whom he owed the method later used in his fundamental ontology. And since the notions of immanence, of transcendence, also of Being, play a decisive role in the Husserlian lectures, their elucidation will permit us to clarify the debate.

In addition to the text of the lectures, the work edited by Biemel contains a summary of their progression. This summary was composed by Husserl for his own use. I shall refer to it as well as to the text of the lectures.

According to Husserl’s summary, the train of thought pursued in the lectures proceeds through four stages. The first is a sort of preliminary stage corresponding to the recognition that a critical situation in the epistemological field requires a new form of philosophy. The next three stages correspond to successive stages within phenomenology itself. Husserl men-

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tions either "immanence" or "transcendence" or both in his presentation of each of the four stages. Our task is to elucidate the meaning of these terms in each stage of the development.

1. Let us consider the preliminary stage, i.e., the description of the critical situation that motivated the new form of philosophical investigation called "phenomenology." This preliminary stage is the topic of the first lecture. The text of this lecture makes us realize very quickly that phenomenology has its origin in a perplexity regarding the very possibility of cognition, and that phenomenology was designed by Husserl as a method for overcoming once and for all the discomfort and perplexity that were prevailing at that time in the field of theory of knowledge.

Investigating that perplexity is tantamount (a) to asking what the theories of knowledge are by which it is brought about, and (b) to determining what it is in their methodological principles that inevitably entails perplexity.

Husserl gives only two examples of such theories of knowledge. In both cases the theories of knowledge ground their investigation of cognition on "a science of the natural sort" (13; 17), i.e., a science originating in what Husserl calls the "natural attitude of mind."

Husserl insists that "the natural attitude of mind" per se does not experience any perplexity at all since it is "as yet unconcerned with the critique of cognition. Whether in the act of intuiting or in the act of thinking, in the natural attitude of mind we are turned to the matters (den Sachen) which are given to us each time and as a matter of course, even though they are given in different ways and in different modes of being, according to the source and level of our cognition" (13; 17). Within the natural attitude we have no doubt that our perceptions and judgments relate to the world. To be sure, the natural attitude often faces difficulties. This happens when our cognitions "clash and contradict one another" (14; 17). But this clash does not result in any real perplexity: it merely raises problems which can be solved either by restoring formal consistency if the clash turns out to be of a formal nature, or by refining our observation if it is a conflict between

2. In the case of a dual page number, the first number will always refer to the English edition, in this case The Idea of Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). The second number always will refer to the German original. When only one number is given, this indicates that the English translation of the German text was modified, and the single page number refers to the German pagination. (Trans.)
two empirical evidences. In other words, the natural attitude is basically unshaken.

Such is the case also for the sciences which originate in this attitude and which may therefore be called "sciences of the natural sort" (natürliche Wissenschaften). These sciences include those dealing with real actualities such as the sciences of nature (physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology), the sciences of culture (Geisteswissenschaften), and the sciences dealing with ideal possibilities, such as the mathematical sciences and the sciences which "investigate in their formal generality the a priori connections of meanings and postulated meanings and the a priori principles which belong to objectivity as such" (15; 19), such as pure grammar and pure logic.

All of these sciences progress with assurance. The difficulties which they encounter are always only provisional and are quickly resolved. There is never a doubt that their approaches will eventually reach its object.

What is taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of cognition. Constantly busy producing results, advancing from discovery to discovery in newer and newer branches of science, natural thinking finds no occasion to raise the question of the possibility of cognition as such. (15; 19)

This question is raised not by the natural attitude, but by philosophical thinking and is the subject investigated in the philosophical theory of knowledge. Whereas the natural thinking is sure of its continued power and has no reason to turn the possibility of knowing into a problem, the philosophical theory of knowledge no longer takes for granted that possibility, but reflects upon it. It is "with the awakening of reflection about the relation of cognition to its object," that "abyssal difficulties arise" (14; 18).

As a matter of fact the theories of knowledge entailing these abyssal difficulties are based upon sciences of the natural sort; more precisely upon natural sciences in the usual sense of the word. Husserl's first example is the theory of knowledge that bases its investigation upon psychology. Psychology, in its leading version at the end of the 19th century (we might think of Wundt's work for example), was indeed a science of the natural sort inasmuch as it conceived cognition as a "fact of nature" (15; 19) occurring in a cognizing being, that can be treated as any other natural fact according to empirical procedures of observation, analysis, comparison, induction, hypotheses regarding the influence of other facts, and so on.

According to Husserl, it is by relying upon psychology thus understood that the philosophical theory of knowledge is led into an abyssal perplexity. Every philosophical theory of knowledge addresses the problem of the correspondence between the cognitive act and its object, which amounts to
the problem of truth in the sense of the adequation between the two. But as soon as someone maintains, in agreement with empirical psychology, that knowledge is nothing but a mental occurrence, in the sense of a fact or mental process occurring like any other event in a sector of nature, within the organism with cognition, then the very possibility that “there exist not only my own mental processes . . . but also that which they apprehend” becomes enigmatic. Husserl argues that, logically, whoever maintains that cognition is merely a psychic fact has to become a solipsist: “He never does and never can break out of the circle of his own mental processes” (16; 20). Consequently, the psychological, or psychologicist, theory of knowledge is led to deny the very possibility of science in its double connotation: universality and objectivity.

The implications of a second type of theory are no less “abyssmal.” When a theory of knowledge is based upon biology, it treats knowledge as a biological fact, a characteristic specific to a biological species and determined in the course of a long process of natural selection and adaptation. The consequence is that the manner in which humans know, including the rules and the logical structures that regulate their judgments and their reasonings, is nothing but the outcome of some accidental peculiarities of a certain type of organism. In both cases therefore, it turns out that our cognition, understood as a natural fact, is not fit to gain access to the things as they really are.

The previous theories had been scrutinized thoroughly by Husserl in the Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations. He called the first “psychologism” and the second “biologism.” Together with a third theory called “anthropologism,” they were charged with many faults, including imprecision, inconsistency, self-contradiction, relativism, skepticism, all of which ultimately lead to absurdity.

These accusations are repeated in the five lectures, but the major criticism now levelled at psychologism and biologism concerns the relation between the cognitive act, its meaning, and its object. Introducing his own philosophical theory of knowledge, i.e., phenomenology, as a “critique of theoretical reason” (17; 22) that aims in 1907 at what Kant’s Critique had done in its time, Husserl denounces as a “playground of unclear and inconsistent theories” (17; 21) the “natural” theory of knowledge—and the metaphysics which is “bound up with it, historically and in subject matter.” And Husserl writes that the first task of his new theory is to “stigmatize the absurdities inside which natural reflection almost inevitably falls regarding the relation between knowledge, cognitive meaning and the object of knowledge” (22).

Since the philosophical theories of knowledge leading to those obscu-
rities confine themselves to a reflection of the "natural" sort, the question arises as to what, in the methodological principles of such a reflection, inevitably leads to perplexity. This question is not raised explicitly by Husserl, but he says and repeats that a reflection of the "natural" sort on the possibility for the cognitive act to reach its intended objects ends up with a denial of that very possibility. This is why he insists so much, both at the beginning and at the end of the first lecture, that a sharp distinction must be made between science of the natural sort and philosophical science:

In contradistinction to all natural cognition, philosophy lies . . . within a new dimension; and what corresponds to this new dimension . . . is a new and radically new method which is set over against the "natural" method . . . He who denies this has failed to understand entirely the whole level at which the characteristic problem of the critique of cognition lies, and with this he has failed to understand what philosophy really wants to do or should do, and what gives it its own character and authority vis-à-vis the whole of natural cognition and science of the natural sort. (21; 25–26)

In other words, Husserl’s critique of the theories of knowledge already presupposes another theory of knowledge which no longer, in any way, is of the natural sort, but of a radically new sort, that is, of a truly philosophical one. Hence the preliminary stage presupposes stages that are internally contained in the phenomenological approach itself. To be sure, awareness about the perplexities generated by the natural philosophies of knowledge is what motivates phenomenology, but the very description of those perplexities is carried out in the light of "the new dimension" won by phenomenology. Husserl makes this clear when he states: "Only with epistemological (Erkenntnis theoretische) [i.e., with the phenomenological] reflection do we arrive at the distinction between the sciences of a natural sort and philosophy" (18; 22–23)

But one could perhaps object: Does all this have anything to do with the notions of immanence, of transcendence, and of Being? The answer is yes. And the text goes on to say:

Only does phenomenological reflection bring to light that the sciences of a natural sort are not yet the ultimate sciences of Being. We need a science of Being in the absolute sense. This science, which we call metaphysics, grows out of a "critique" of natural cognition in the individual sciences. It is based on the insight (Einsicht) acquired in the general critique of cognition and what it is to be an object of cognition of one basic type or other, i.e., on an
insight into the meaning (Sinn) of the different fundamental correlations between cognizing and being an object of cognition. (18 modified; 23)

In its Idea³ therefore, phenomenology implies, in a parallel with Kant’s Critique, what Husserl calls a “metaphysical purpose” (Abzweckungen) (23). In its properly critical phase, phenomenology proposes to elucidate the confusions “of the theory of knowledge, into which we are led by natural (pre-phphenomenological) reflection on the possibility of cognition.” Husserl can now propose in a second moment to deflect the metaphysical effects of these flawed reflections: “They involve not just false views about the essence of cognition, but also self-contradictory, and therefore fundamentally misleading interpretations of the being that is cognized in the sciences of the natural sort” (18; 22). But because such a metaphysical purpose is based upon a prior cognitive reflection finally liberated from illusions, only in it will the correct interpretation of Being originate.

The notions of immanence and transcendence come into play when the very conditions of this reflection are established by disengagement from the “natural.” When Husserl depicts the concept of knowledge engendered by “natural” reflections, he writes:

Cognition in all its manifestations is a mental process (psychisches Erlebnis); it is the cognition of a cognizing subject. The objects cognized stand over against the cognition. But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? The unproblematic manner in which the object of cognition is given to natural thought to be cognized now becomes an enigma. In perception the perceived thing is believed to be directly given. Before my perceiving eyes stands the thing. I see it, and I grasp it. Yet the perceiving is simply a mental process and act of mine, of the perceiving subject. (15 modified; 20)

Logically according to Husserl, such a psychological conception of knowledge leads to Hume, who reduced “all transcendent objectivity” to the level of “fictions” that can be explained psychologically, but cannot be given a rational justification. This however does not prevent Hume—at the cost of a contradiction—from “[transcending] the sphere of immanence,” and so, instead of limiting himself to current impressions (the only reality according to him), he treats “concepts such as habit, human nature,

³. The word is capitalized by the author to emphasize its Kantian connotation.
sense organ, vividness, etc. that are transcendent entities (and transcendent by his own admission).” (16 modified; 20)

We are now beginning to get an outline of the answer to the question of what in “natural” reflection leads to an abysmal perplexity. If, in principle, knowledge is nothing but the internal succession of mental events, it follows that knowledge, as a phenomenon of the mind in which it occurs factually, does not know any object. If there were a dividing line and a demarcation between knowledge (immanent by definition) and its objects (transcendent by definition), we would have no hope of ever crossing the line and reaching the objects. Certainly, in spite of his declarations of principle, Hume on many points, “as much as anybody else,” according to Husserl, went beyond the line and acknowledged, in the very concepts with which he operated, that knowledge is much more than a stream of factual occurrences unfolding inside a singular mental agency. Yet it is one thing to acknowledge this state of affairs indirectly and in spite of oneself, and another thing to show how this is the case. This is part of the task of phenomenology. Let us therefore take our first phenomenological step.

2. The import of the preliminary step seems to be this: theories of knowledge of the natural sort are forced to deny the possibility of knowledge because they limit cognition to a succession of occurrences within an immanent sphere from which it is impossible to escape. Consequently, if we want to establish a theory of knowledge free from any form of perplexity, it seems clear that we should not establish it within the sphere of immanence. However the first stage of the phenomenological orientation situates itself explicitly on the ground of immanence.

How should we understand this decision? This is the way Husserl argues: Since the current theories of knowledge lead to unfathomable perplexities inasmuch as they are “natural” and rest on “natural” conceptions, whether these are scientific—e.g. psychological theories of cognition—or pre-scientific, then we must resolutely suspend all knowledge of a “natural” kind. “At the outset of the [phenomenological] critique of cognition the entire world of nature, physical and psychological, as well as one’s own human self together with all the sciences that have to do with these objective matters, are put in question. Their being, their validity, are suspended” (22; 29). Such a universal suspension is the epoche and we should notice that it bears upon Being. That there is a world, a phusis, a psuche, this is what the epoche suspends in this context. “To be” means: to be pregiven (vorgegeben), as standing on its own (an sich), yet known. This suspension is a methodological decision which Husserl expressly compares to Cartesian doubt. In line with Descartes’, Husserl’s epoche aims at the
indubitable: specifically at “making evident something which we have to acknowledge as absolutely given and indubitable.” And, as in Descartes, this indubitable “Being” is the cogito: “While I am judging that everything is doubtful, it is indubitable that I am so judging” (23; 30). Similar remarks could be made concerning any other cogitatio: perception, representation, judgment, reasoning, etc.

The cogitationes that are given as a result of the epoche are nothing pregiven, they are given absolutely and indubitably: they form “a sphere of absolute givenness” (24–25; 32) that constitutes the ground from which the new theory of knowledge must begin.

But what is thus absolutely given in this first knowledge? Is it the fact that any specific cogitatio (perception of this or of that, judgment on this or on that, imagination of this or of that, etc.) is, hic et nunc, effectively experienced by myself? Husserl grants that in the wake of the epoche every cogitatio that is given is a lived experience, or Erlebnis. And in a way, the absolute givenness of the lived experience, or Erlebnis, which each cogitatio is, seems to concern primarily the fact that such cogitatio is being experienced by me, hic et nunc. As it is thus experienced, the cogitatio can, after the epoche, be given to a pure contemplation in which it is an absolute given: “It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted” (24; 31). But when Husserl stresses that “every intellectual Erlebnis and indeed every mental Erlebnis whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure ‘seeing’ and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this ‘seeing’” (24 modified; 31), the point is not at all that I can see that this mental process is actually enacted by me hic et nunc. If the point were the existence of the cogitatio, Husserl would not stress concerning this pure seeing, that it is indifferent whether the cogitatio, which is to be seen, be real or simply imagined.

Whether we reflectively imagine a perception or reflectively consider a perception at the same time as we experience it in actuality, in either case, there is an absolute givenness of the cogitatio which is the perception. “All of these . . . can also be data in imagination; they can ‘as it were’ stand before our eyes and yet not stand before them as actualities” (24; 31). In other words, the absolute givenness of a cogitatio is not its factual occurrence, but the presentation of its essence.

In the entire sphere of cogitationes, what matters to the pure seeing directed at them is not to observe whether they really occur but to “intuitively consider their essence, their constitution, their intrinsic character” (31). Husserl adds: “The task of the critique of cognition is to clarify, to cast light upon, the essence of cognition and the legitimacy of its claims to validity that belongs to its essence; and what else can this mean but to make the essence of cognition directly self-given” (25; 32).
What happens to immanence and transcendence in this context? Precisely when he recapitulates the movement of this first intraphenomenological phase, Husserl writes that the absolute self-givenness of the \textit{cogitatio} is a consequence of its immanence, and that it is “because of this immanence” that the point of departure of phenomenology is “free of the puzzlement which is the source of skeptical embarrassment” (26; 33). “Immanence,” he says finally, “is the generally necessary characteristic of all epistemological cognition” (26; 33).

Now we are the ones who are puzzled. We thought that a bias for immanence was the flaw of the earlier theories of knowledge. Is Husserl contradicting himself? Or is he giving two different meanings to the same word? Indeed, he seems to have been aware of the difficulties caused by his terminology since, in a recapitulation of the first intraphenomenological phase, he devotes a long analysis to the controversial senses of both “immanence” and “transcendence.” Let us follow his analysis.

One thing one can mean by transcendence is that the object of cognition is not actually (\textit{reell}) contained in the cognitive act so that one would be meaning by “being truly given” or “immanently given” that the object of the cognitive act is actually contained in that act. (27 modified; 35)

Then he adds:

But there is still another transcendence whose opposite is an altogether different sort of immanence, namely absolute and clear givenness, which consists of a simply immediate “seeing” and apprehending of the intended object itself as it is. (28 modified; 35)

Let us try to elucidate this distinction. In the first sense, “immanent” means: actually contained in the \textit{cogitatio} as a mental process, and consequently, “transcendent,” as the antonym of immanent, means: not actually contained in the mental process. In the second sense, “immanent” means: given in itself absolutely and clearly to an immediate seeing, and consequently, “transcendent” means: not given in itself with evidence, but rather only meditatively.

To eliminate the apparent contradiction mentioned above amounts to understanding in what sense immanence generates perplexity in the case of the natural theories of knowledge, while immanence frees us from puzzlement and embarrassment in the case of phenomenological theory. Reaching such an understanding presupposes a closer inspection of the way in which natural theories pose the problem of cognition. Their question is that of a relation, of the relation between the cognitive \textit{Erlebnis} and the object.
known. If the very manner in which they pose the problem contains the impossibility of ever solving it, the reason is that at the outset they base their inquiry on

the unspoken supposition that the only actually understandable, unquestionable, absolutely evident givenness is the givenness of the moment actually (really) contained within the cognitive act, and this is why anything in the way of a cognized objectivity that is not actually (really) contained within the act is regarded as a puzzle and as problematic. (28 modified; 35–36)

Such a presupposition, is, according to Husserl, 'a fatal mistake.' Before understanding why, let us note immediately that the two senses of the words 'immanence' and 'transcendence' are implied in the unspoken presupposition of the natural theory of knowledge.

The natural theory of knowledge implicitly states at the outset that what is absolutely evident (second meaning of "immanence") is what is actually contained within the mental process (first meaning of "immanence"). Therefore and inversely, what is not actually contained within the mental process (first meaning of "transcendence") is not absolutely evident (second meaning of "transcendence"). Now it is clear that the object as a physical thing is not contained in the actual mental process. Consequently, the object is problematic.

The fatal mistake consists in believing that the cognitive act is not intrinsically relational and open to the objectivities at which it aims, i.e., that "cognition and its object are actually separate" (30; 37) and that therefore their relation is not given either. Or, if we use the two terms "transcendence" and "immanence," the mistake consists in believing that the cognitive act is an absolute datum or seen entity (second meaning of "immanence") if and only if it is limited to what is actually contained within the mind (first meaning of "immanence"). As a result the cognitive act turns out to be a non-relational process, radically separated from the object, which is neither seen nor integrated as a part of the mental process. As a result, it is impossible to understand how the cognitive act can be related to objects because the objects not only are not a part of the cognitive act, but are not visible within the cognitive act either. In other words, if the relation between cognition and object is not from the outset given to an immediate seeing, then every attempt to understand the possibility of a relation between cognition and object is, as Husserl says, "patent folly" (30; 37).

We are now able to understand in what sense immanence annihilates puzzlement and perplexity in the case of phenomenology, whereas it generates them in the case of the "natural" attitudes of knowledge. What is at
stake in Husserl’s debate with the natural theory of knowledge is a question of “seeing.” The “natural” theory of knowledge says: I only see cognition as an occurrence in the mind, I do not see objects, and therefore neither do I see the relation of cognition to the object. However, the “natural” theory of knowledge goes on to argue that it is still possible to deduce or to infer some explanation of the relation of cognition to the object from what the natural sciences enable us to know, although not immediately, about nature as a whole.

To this, Husserl objects: “Seeing does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction” (31; 38). Concerning what is a matter of seeing, it is absurd to “draw conclusions from existences of which one knows but which one cannot ‘see’” (31; 38). Husserl gives this illustration: “A man born deaf knows that there are sounds, and that sounds produce harmonies... but he cannot intuit such things and in intuiting grasp the ‘how’ of such things” (30 modified; 38). When Husserl maintains that, by limiting itself to immanence and by reducing all transcendence to a nonoperative level, phenomenology liberates the theory of knowledge from its perplexities, he merely states that the theory of knowledge has to be based at the outset on a “seeing” and to remain constantly based on it. The bracketing of transcendence is by no means the exclusion of objects out of the field of the theory of knowledge. It is the exclusion of the unseen, including all the absurd attempts to demonstrate, on the basis of the unseen, something that is, in principle, open to a “seeing” only.

Phenomenological immanence is therefore much broader and of a different sort than the immanence found in the natural theories of knowledge. It is of another sort because, on the one hand, it is “pure” and unmixed with transcendent elements and because, on the other hand, it gives access to essences and not to factual occurrences. It is broader because at the outset it is relational and not closed upon its internal flux.

When the natural theory of knowledge reflects on knowledge, it treats its themes in an impure manner, because in its approach to them it has recourse to procedures, laws, and concepts that are not required by the matters themselves (i.e., that are not seen by the theoretician within the phenomena), but imported or borrowed from pregiven natural sciences. In other words, although the natural theorist of knowledge claims to limit his investigation to whatever is seen within the sphere of immanence, he does not really maintain this principle, but decides beforehand that this sphere is composed only of factual occurrences because the natural sciences assure him that reality is composed of facts explainable by other facts. Therefore his reflection is blind toward what it is supposed to reflect upon and his sphere of immanence is thoroughly intermingled with transcendence. Phenomenological reflection frees its sphere of immanence from this confusion.
Freed from any *metabasis eis allo genos*, the immanence which the phenomenologist considers as the given is not limited to a succession of factual occurrences. What is offered to a phenomenological seeing is not the event of this or that *cogitatio*. Instead it is the essential manner in which *cogitationes* are given as examples of a kind, their essential mode of givenness. If immanence were limited to mental events, phenomenology would be nothing more than psychology. But its goal, Husserl insists, "is not to explain cognition as a psychological fact; it is not to inquire into the natural causes and laws of the development and occurrence of cognitions" (25; 32). Rather, its task is to offer a direct seeing the essence of the *cogitationes* which the mental events exemplify—as in the case of this perception, that imagination, or that judgment.

Thus purified and essentialized, this sphere of immanence is freed from the limits imposed by the natural theory of knowledge. For a relationship immediately reveals itself as belonging to the intuitively given essence of every *cogitatio*. Every *cogitatio* is essentially related according to its specific modality to a *cogitatum* that it claims to intend and attain. This relatedness does not have to be explained mediatey, for it is given immediately to the very *cogitatio* of which it is an essential trait, rather than as a complement or supplement.

Two further stages are thus anticipated in the stage devoted to the *epoche*: the eidetic reduction and the analysis of intentionality.

3. The reduction which is here called "epistemological reduction" is the topic of the third lecture. Husserl begins by recalling the result of the *epoche*.

We have indubitably secured the whole realm of the *cogitationes*. The being of the *cogitatio*, more precisely the phenomenon of cognition itself, is beyond question and it is freed from the riddle of transcendence. These existing things are already presupposed in the statement of the problem of cognition. The question as to how transcendent things come into cognition would lose its sense if cognition itself, as well as the transcendent object, were put in question. It is also clear that the *cogitationes* present a sphere of absolute immanent data; it is in this sense that we understand "immanence." In the "seeing" pure phenomena, the object is not outside cognition or outside "consciousness," it is being given in the sense of the absolute self-givenness of something which is simply "seen." (33 modified; 43)

The "reduction," again referred to as the "epistemological reduction," is designed first of all to defend pure immanence against any contamination
by transcendence. We have already seen that the equation "absolutely
seen = actually contained in the mind as a fact" was the definition of im-
manence in the "natural" nonphenomenological theories of knowledge,
and was the basic reason for the abysmal puzzlement entailed by them. The
reduction aims at overcoming once and for all this deceptive equation. The
reduction is needed precisely "in order to prevent the evidence of the Being
of the cogitatio from being confused with the evidence that my cogitatio is,
with the evidence of the sum cogitans, and the like" (33 modified; 43).
This sentence clearly indicates that in the Husserlian sense, "the Being of
the cogitatio" does not consist in its factual occurrence, in the fact that it is
present. It consists rather in the presentation, the absolute givenness, of its
essence. Existence here means essence. That the cogitatio is factually
present is not of interest to the phenomenologist at all, but only to a natu-
ralist of a certain kind (i.e., the psychologist). More precisely the fact that
my cogitatio exists, that it belongs to me, i.e., its existential "mineness," its
individuation, this fact never turns into a characteristic of the pheno-
menon in the phenomenological sense. Husserl writes:

If I, as a human being employing my natural mode of thought,
look at the perception which I am undergoing at the moment, then
I immediately and almost inevitably apperceive it (that is a fact) in
relation to my ego. It stands there as a mental process of this men-
tally living person, as his state, his act; the sensory content stands
there as what is given or sensed, as that of which I am conscious;
and it integrates itself with the person in objective time. Percep-
tion, and any other cogitatio, so apperceived, is a psychological
fact. Thus it is apperceived as a datum in objective time, belonging
to the mentally living ego, the ego which is in the world and lasts
through its duration (a duration which is measured by means of
empirically calibrated timepieces). This, then, is the phenomenon
which is investigated by the natural science we call "psychology."
(34 modified; 44)

Hence it is not essential to the pure immanent cogitatio that it should
exist, that it should belong to an existing ego and that this ego should be in
the world. In general, individual existence, mineness, Being-in-the-world,
the temporality proper to the one who says "I"—these features are tran-
scendent, they must be excluded from the phenomenon in the phenomeno-
logical, purely immanent, sense of the word. It is for the natural attitude
and its way of thinking that the cogitatio is linked to individual existences
that are in the world and are given within a certain timespan.

Husserl therefore presents us with an alternative: Being in the transcen-
dent and nonabsolute or relative sense and Being in the immanent and ab-
solute sense. In the first case Being means to occur as a fact. In the second
case, it means: to exhibit an essence. We have to choose: Either (a) consciousness is the conscious act of a singular entity which, in fact, is in the world and has certain duration (in which case we remain engulfed in the natural attitude, and this ultimately leads us to psychologism and anthropologism); or (b): being-conscious is the pure givenness of the essence of cogitationes (but these are without intrinsic relation to the facticity of the ego that is in the world and exists for whatever time is granted to it). Between these two meanings of Being, we have to choose.

In addition to striking at the mineness of cogitatio and at the existential facticity to which mineness is linked, the reduction also strikes at the existential facticity of the objects aimed at in the cogitationes. If I consider, for example, this particular cogitatio, let us say this perception as a pure, immanent, and reduced phenomenon, I can indeed attain to the pure contemplation of the phenomenon of perception on the basis (Fundierung) of this or that actual perception that I am having hic et nunc of this tree, this field, this street. But the question is not whether this tree, this field, this street really exist, nor whether the perception of these things is actually taking place within me. What must be offered to contemplation is perception, as such, in its essence.

Thus to each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenalological reduction a pure phenomenon, which exhibits its intrinsic (immanent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute datum. Every postulation of a "non-immanent actuality," of anything which is not contained in the phenomenon, even if intended by the phenomenon, and which is therefore not given in the second sense, is bracketed, i.e., suspended. (35; 45)

This essence, universal by definition, can be contemplated by means of an "eidetic abstraction," i.e., of an ideation that is neither inductive nor deductive, but thoroughly intuitive. It is in relation to this essence and not on the ground of actual events that we must pose the famous problem of the relation of knowledge, particularly of perceptive knowledge, to its objects. Indeed, the intuitive inspection of the essence of each cogitatio reveals in it a specific openness to a specific correlate. Here again the actual existence of a concrete correlate, the existence of a tree over there, is not what we are talking about. Instead what we are dealing with is the essential relation of the perceptive cogitatio to its specific correlate, the perceived-as-such in its essence. Such an essential relation can be intuited within the pure phenomenon, it is an absolute datum. "When at the same time nothing is presupposed regarding the being or non-being of objective actuality," it appears within "those absolute data" exhibited by the "reduced" cogitationes that
"if these data are related to objective actuality via their intentions, this relatedness is an intrinsic character within them" (35 modified; 45).

Even if I raise questions about the existence and reaching the object of this relation to transcendent things, still it has something which can be grasped in the pure phenomenon. The relating-itself-to-transcendent-things, whether it is meant in this way or that way, is still an inner feature of the phenomenon. (36; 46)

Because the pure phenomenon—displayed in the reduced cogitatio—is an essence, pure immanence is an eidetic field. But because a relating.oneself-to-the-transcendent, as well as a claim to posit the transcendent as existing, essentially belong to the cogitatio, pure immanence also forms a transcendental field. In other words, it is a field in which we find conditions for validity. Indeed, what is given to contemplation within the pure phenomenon in which the relatedness to something transcendent inheres, comprises both the sense (Sinn) of the specific intention consisting of this relatedness and the condition of possibility for its validation. Husserl asks:

Since I have to cancel out any previous acceptance of the intended transcendent objects, where else could I investigate both the meaning of this intending-something-beyond, and also, along with this meaning, its possible validity, or the meaning of such validity? Where else but the place at which this meaning is unqualifiedly given and at which in the pure phenomenon of relation, corroboration, justification the meaning of validity, for its part, comes to absolute givenness. (36; 46–47)

In this context, Husserl evokes an objection that manifestly originates in the natural attitude. In that attitude, one might object to the phenomenologist: ‘Your phenomenological approach aims at being scientific, but there is no science that does not lead to the establishing of objects existing in themselves, i.e., to transcendent objects. Now, this very transcendent existence is precisely what you have suspended in your reduction; consequently the judgments you attempt to make after the reduction, have no scientific value. They are purely and simply “subjective” and involve nothing but the reality of the “Heraclitean flux” (37; 47) of your mental processes. In other words, from this position it could be objected that, at most, your propositions are judgments of perception in the Kantian sense, but they are not at all judgments of experience.’ The allusion to Kant is precisely what allows Husserl to deflect the objection. For the natural attitude (in spite of its passing mention of Kant) fails to acknowledge the “indispensable distinction” between the transcendent and the empirical. Such a distinction, even though Kant “did not arrive at the ultimate significance of the distinc-
tion,” is reappropriated by Husserl. Husserl claims that it is precisely not at the level of empirical subjectivity that phenomenology finds its ground, but at the level of “transcendental apperception, consciousness as such” (38; 48). However this apperception has for the phenomenologist “a completely different meaning, one which is not at all mysterious” (38; 48).

Indeed, the synthetic unity that defines transcendental apperception in the Kantian sense is not given to a ‘seeing,’ it cannot be intuited. In Kant, only space and time, the a priori forms of sensibility, are pure intuitions, purely given to an immediate seeing, whereas the a priori concepts or categories together with the a priori principles of the understanding are not intuitively given, are not offered to a seeing, and therefore remain mysterious. By characterizing phenomenological immanence by the notion of transcendental apperception, now freed from the Kantian obscurity, Husserl in a single stroke acknowledges that (a) this immanence is a field of a priori conditions of possibility and of validity and (b) that these conditions can be integrally offered to a seeing which is in no way empirical. In relation to Kant, a metamorphosis of the a priori has occurred. It is not only space and time that have the value of pure a priori intuitions, but also all the cogitations and their cogitatum, the various moments of each, along with the predicative and logical forms in which they are expressed. Thus we have a domain of universal entities (Allgemeinheiten), of “universal objects,” of “universal states of affairs” (41; 51) which can be characterized as a priori inasmuch as they are “essences” absolutely given to a totally pure seeing and in no way presuppose the mediation of any extrinsic support from what is neither contained nor seen in purified immanence. This domain is a priori (a) because it is composed of immediately given essences, also (b) in the transcendental sense of a critique of theoretical reason (it makes visible what allows, within limits which also are made clear, a knowledge of transcendence), and (c) of practical reason (it brings to sight what makes possible any ethical evaluation).

At this juncture we are able to define more precisely the notion of phenomenological immanence. As Husserl indicates in the summary of the movement of the five lectures, the step taken in the second phase “makes clear to us in the first place that actual immanence (reelle Immanenz)—and the same is true of actual transcendence (reelle Transendenz)—is but a special case of the broader concept of immanence as such” (6 modified; 9). In Husserlian terminology, the adjective ‘reell’ means: actual or positive. Actual immanence is the mental flux or the stream of experiences actually felt by a given consciousness. But, after the reduction, we do not accept as obvious that what is absolutely given and what is actually immanent “are one and the same” (6; 9). To be sure, when after the reduction I contemplate—in a pure Schauen—a cogitatio, no longer as a factual occurrence.
but as a general essence, my seeing is still a mental act. It is mine and belongs to the positive flux of my actual conscious experiences. It is then possible to say that this seeing and intuition of a cogitatio, taken in its general essence, or "this act of cognizing the universal," is "something singular," "something which at any given time, is a moment in the stream of consciousness." But precisely "the universal itself, which is given in evidence within the stream of consciousness is nothing singular but just a universal, and in the actual or positive (reell) sense it is transcendent." Yet, this "universal is absolutely given" (i.e., in an immanent manner offered to a seeing), but it is "not actually (reell) immanent" (7; 9). Though transcendent in the reell sense, it is not at all so in the phenomenological sense; it is in no way accepted as existing without being seen. "Consequently, the idea of phenomenological reduction acquires a more immediate and more profound determination and a clearer meaning. It means not the exclusion of the reell transcendent" (7 modified; 9) (because then the exclusion would mean exclusion of the universal, since the universal even when aimed at in a singular act is not actually contained as a part in the stream of consciousness within which the act takes place), but "the exclusion of the transcendent in general as something to be accepted as existent, i.e., everything that is not evident givenness in its true sense, that is not absolutely given to pure 'seeing' " (7; 9).

4. The third phase in phenomenology consists in exploring eidetic and transcendent immanence. As Husserl insists at the beginning of the fourth lecture: "The singular cognitive phenomenon, coming and going in the stream of consciousness, is not the object of phenomenological statements" (44 modified; 55). The subject matter of phenomenological statements is a "generic" cognitive phenomenon. Once reduced, that is, detached from its singular occurrence and considered from what allows it to be "seen," the cogitatio is an absolute "generic" givenness. It is an eidetic datum, an essence. From actual immanence, the reduction allows us to shift to eidetic immanence.

But this purified sphere of immanence is intrinsically intentional:

Cognitive mental experiences (and this belongs to their essence) have an intentio, they refer to something, they are related in this or that way to an object. This activity of relating itself to an object belongs to them even if the object itself does not. And what is objective can have a certain kind of givenness in appearance, even though it is not contained in a reell manner within the cognitive.
phenomenon and moreover does not exist as a cogitatio. To clarify the essence of the cognitive phenomenon and to bring to self-givenness the connections of essence which belong to it, this involves examining both these sides of the matter; it involves investigating this relatedness which belongs to the essence of cognition. (43 modified; 55)

In other words, both the intentio of the cognitive phenomenon and what is intended by it qualify as absolute givenness: both the intentum and the intentio are immanent in the phenomenological sense. But if this intentum is called “objective,” it is not in the usual and “natural” sense of the word, as when I say that my perception presents an object to me now (which means that my perception informs me that there is a tree, a field, a road over there). The object in that sense (the existence of something over there) has been reduced. But the reduction of the existential position of the object is precisely what allows me to contemplate intuitively the generic way in which the object presents itself, in which it appears, its way of being-given. It is this way of appearing (not the fact of being) which is the phenomenological intentum. The intentum is one of the two sides of the intentional relation. The other side (the intentio) and the relation itself are not given as singular, but as universal moments of the intentional relation.

Two questions can be raised. The first is: How are these two sides and the relation that links them given as universalities? They are given on the basis of something singular. The intentio “perception of” is given in its universal properties on the basis of a singular perception of something. We already know that the elevation from the level of the singular to the level of the universal is an “eidetic abstraction.” This abstraction, also called “ideation,” initiates a break from the singular only in order to intuit the universal through the singular. The universal exceeds the singular, it is in a position of surplus with regard to the singular, but only on the basis of the singular can it be phenomenologically seen. The relation between singular and universal, in this case, is called a relation of Fundierung. Thus, on the basis of the particular perception that I now have of this or that thing over there, I can phenomenologically grasp that perception, taken in its intentio, is essentially intuitive and that it belongs to perception essentially, i.e., universally, to be oriented toward the fulfillment of an intentio, that is, to be an intention of fulfillment.

The second question is: What is the extension of the sphere of the absolutely and universally given? The answer is already implicit in what has been said above. The absolutely given includes all the constituents of both sides of the intentional relation. But a precision is required as far as the intentum is concerned. Not only can every kind of intentio be absolutely
‘seen’ in its specific universality, but its specific \textit{intentum} (at which the considered \textit{intentio} aims) can be seen too. Not only all the specific \textit{cogitationes}, but also their \textit{cogitata} can be seen. The examples given by Husserl are sufficient to suggest the breadth of the field of investigation formed by those \textit{cogitata}. First, he mentions the sensible universals, e.g. a specific coloration (for instance ‘redness’) as such can be intuited in its generic character on the basis (\textit{Fundierung}) of some particular red. Then, he mentions sensible relations, e.g. the relation of resemblance, which can be intuited as an ideality on the basis of the consideration of a specific similarity, (for instance the relation that obtains between two samples of the color red). In both cases, a sense (\textit{Sinn}) is given to intuition: the sense ‘red,’ the sense ‘resemblance.’ But Husserl insists that phenomenology is concerned with the entire sphere of cognitive phenomena (their ‘many forms and types’ all considered in their \textit{eidos}, and also in their ‘essential relations’ and their ‘teleological connections’): this entire sphere can be given to a ‘pure seeing and ideation’ (45; 57). These phenomena are offered to seeing along with their specific \textit{cogitata}, so that on both sides, ‘phenomenology proceeds by seeing, by clarifying, and determining meaning (\textit{Sinn}), and by distinguishing meanings’ (46; 58). In this clarification, all the categories and structures which determine the various types of objectivity can be intuited in a pure manner; this includes not only the sensory categories which determine perceptive objectivity (color, extension, form, etc.), but also the categorial forms by which we articulate what we perceive. ‘The categorial forms . . . find expression in words like ‘‘is,’’ ‘‘not,’’ ‘‘same’’ and ‘‘other,’’ ‘‘one’’ and ‘‘many,’’ ‘‘and’’ and ‘‘or,’’ and in the forms of predication and attribution, etc.’’ (56; 71). Included also are ‘‘the basic concepts and propositions (\textit{Grundbegiffe und Grundsätze}) which function as principles governing the possibility of ‘‘objectivizing’’ science’’ (46; 58). The allusion to these principles evokes the Kantian categories and principles of pure understanding, and suggests once again a connection with the transcendental problematic of Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}.

The move that founds phenomenology and gives it its guiding Idea revitalizes Kant’s project with the help of the eidetic method. ‘‘This method,’’ says Husserl, ‘‘belongs essentially to the meaning of the critique of cognition and so generally to every sort of critique of reason (hence also evaluative and practical reason)’’ (46 modified; 58). In Kant, the critique of theoretical reason aims at determining the conditions of possibility for knowledge and its objects. But for Kant, only mathematics and physics deal with objects. Mathematics for Kant is cognitive to the extent that it restricts itself to a construction of concepts within time and space as \textit{a priori} intuitions. And experimental physics is cognitive insofar as it deals with the
empirical content of space and time, as a content which is articulated a priori by the categories and principles of pure understanding. In Husserl, we no longer have this limitation of knowledge to mathematics and physics. The a priori realm, as far as knowledge is concerned, is no longer limited to the a priori conditions of mathematical entities and of physical objects. The phenomenological reduction shows that it makes sense to say that perception, for example, (which was relegated by Kant, except for what concerns the position of existence, to the realm of subjectivity) as well as imagination also have their objects. And because the phenomenological transcendental field is broader than the Kantian transcendental field, it can ground, as sciences, disciplines that were not scientific in Kant’s view, e.g., psychology or history and even the Geisteswissenschaften in general.

In addition to revitalizing and enlarging Kant’s project, phenomenology is also in continuity with Kant as far as metaphysics is concerned. In Kant, the critique of theoretical reason opens the way to a metaphysics of nature. Likewise the critique of practical reason opens the way to a metaphysics of morals. Although now expanded, this metaphysical aim is also reappropriated by Husserl, who writes:

Whatever, in addition to the critique of reason, is called philosophy in the strict sense, is intimately related to this critique: hence metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of spiritual life as a whole (des gesamten Geistesleben), and thus metaphysics in general in the widest sense. (46 modified; 58–59)

Pure immanence, as the transcendental field open to a pure eidetic seeing, is the field of an investigation that is both critical and metaphysical. The phenomenological investigation is critical when it determines, on the basis of an eidetic seeing, the specific validity of each type of cogitatio. It is metaphysical when it determines, on the basis of this critique but also in a pure seeing, the categories and structures that characterize Being as a whole. The Idea of Phenomenology seems to accept as certain, i.e., purely self-given to a pure seeing, that Being as a whole is divided in two ontological realms: nature and Spirit. Hence, “metaphysics . . . in the widest sense” is composed of metaphysics of nature and of metaphysics of spiritual life.

We have thus achieved a full characterization of phenomenological immanence. The eidetic sphere of essences and essential structures determine each type of intentionality on its two sides, the side of the intentio and the side of the intentum. Immanence is also a transcendental sphere in the sense given to the word in Kant’s philosophy because in it categorial and axiomatic conditions for the validity of each type of intentionality are given. Moreover this sphere is transcendental in the metaphysical sense of the