Abbreviations
Preface
Acknowledgments
PART I. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO THE REJECTION OF TRANSCENDENT TRUTH
1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism
2. The Positive Account of Truth
3. Antirealism Revisited
PART II. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO SEMANTIC ANTIREALISM
4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion
5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism
6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett
7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent
PART III. WHY A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH?
8. Criteria and Justification Conditions
9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions
10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible
11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth
12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?
Notes
Bibliography
Index