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Summary
How is language acquisition possible? How is it that humans, within a few years of birth, can speak and understand language, transcending both its limited experience and biological limitations?
In this challenge to the narrow confines of psychology and philosophy, Christina Erneling argues that language acquisition results from the interaction between linguistic creativity inherent in language and a biological and social framework of learning.
Erneling explains and critically analyzes the idea that language acquisition requires a meaningful "language of thought," contrasting this with Wittgenstein's ideas on language and learning. Erneling shows that the assumptions in J. Fodor's development of Chomky's ideas into a theory of "language of thought" have significantly influenced developmental theories, yet fail to resolve the conflict between linguistic creativity and the necessity of a framework for learning. She argues that the later Wittgenstein was more concerned with the conditions of learning than is generally appreciated and shows how his remarks can be developed into an alternative approach to language learning.
Understanding Language Acquisition has profound implications for evaluating hidden metatheoretical assumptions, as well as for empirical research and methods for teaching language and treating language disorders.
"The schism in cognitive science between those who follow the computer model and those who think language is enough in itself is widening. This book is timely and may sway some of the doubters.
"I particularly liked the way that the author focussed on Fodor's exemplary version of the 'language of thought' thesis. Also, it cannot be emphasized enough that Wittgenstein's account of all normative practices requires that there be natural or trained regularities in place before linguistic or other normative practices can be acquired. The consequential step that Wittgenstein makes, of developing a psychology of skills, is well brought out. The book is not only a contribution to the field of developmental psycholinguistics, but to Wittgenstein scholarship." -- Rom Harre, Oxford and Georgetown Universities
Christina Erneling is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1 Learning: Going Beyond Information Given
The Two Problems of Learning: Productivity and the Framework
Historical Attempts to Solve the Problems of Learning
Contemporary Solutions: Skinner, Chomsky, Fodor, and Wittgenstein
The Problem of the Meaningfulness of the Framework: Wittgenstein
Communication
The Domestication Model of Learning and Productivity
Summary of the Book
Chapter 2 Fodor's Theory of Learning
The Problem Situation
The Nature of the Framework: Fodor's Theory of Mind
The Productivity of Mental Processes
The Computational Nature of the Mind
The Language of Thought
The Semantics of the Language of Thought
Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis
Fodor's Theory of Learning
Conclusion: The Myth of Learning
Chapter 3 Problems with Fodor's Account of Learning
Is the Theory Empirical or A Priori?
Fodor Confuses the Description with What It Describes
Learning as Computation
Can the Language of Thought Hypothesis Really Explain Productivity?
Are Fodor's Basic Assumptions Tenable?
Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis
Is the Language of Thought Intrinsically Meaningful?
The Language of Thought and the Following of Rules
Learning as Translation
Is Fodor's Theory the Only "Remotely Plausible Theory"?
Conclusion
Chapter 4 Wittgenstein 1: Background and the Rejection of a Language of Thought
The Problem Situation
Introduction
Two Problems of Learning
Problem 1: The Problem of Productivity
Problem 2: The Problem of the Framework
Does Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Learning at All?
Description, not Explanation
Conclusion: The Connection between Meaning and Learning
Wittgenstein and the Language of Thought
Relationship between Early and Later Philosophy
Tractatus and the Language of Thought
Rejection of the Language of Thought Thesis of Tractatus
Criticism of Image- and Act-Psychology
Chapter 5 Wittgenstein 2: Learning is Not Based on the Language of Thought
Rejection of the "Augustinian-Type Account of Learning"
The Problem of the Framework
Ostensive Definition
Understanding or Grasping
Translation as Reading
The Private Language Argument
Thinking
The Problem of Productivity
Rule Following
Conclusion: A Wittgensteinian Criticism of Fodor
Chapter 6 Wittgenstein 3: Reconstructing a Wittgensteinian Account of Learning
Introduction
The Problem
Learning as Ostensive Teaching
Learning as Apprenticeship
Learning as Operant Conditioning
Was Wittgenstein a Behaviorist?
Learning as Adaptation
Natural Forms of Life: The Starting Point for Learning
Resemblance between Wittgenstein and Piaget
Learning How to Speak
The Necessity of Examples, Imitation, and Playing
Training and Therapy
The Limits of Learning
Conclusion
Fodor's Criticism of Wittgenstein
Problems with Wittgenstein's Account
Chapter 7 The Domestication Model of Language Acquisition
Introduction
The Domestication Model
Is Language Species-Specific?
The Brain
Speech Perception
Speech Production
Anatomy
Voluntary Control and Automatization
Syntactical Skills
Semantical Skills
Imitation
Play
Communicative-Social Skills: The Acquisition of Language Games
Introduction
Symbiosis
Peekaboo
Conclusion
Cross-modal Transfer of Skills
Later Learning
Language and Thought
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Framework and Productivity of Learning
Introduction
Is the Domestication Model an Improvement over Other Theories?
