

Introduction

“But for the grace of God and Jesse Jackson we wouldn’t be here,” exclaims Lloyd Culbertson, a former hostage whose release was negotiated by Reverend Jesse Jackson after the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.¹ Once again, Reverend Jackson returned from a mission abroad in the company of Americans who had been held captive by a foreign government. In this instance, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein released forty-seven Americans and a large group of other foreigners to Jackson on September 2, 1990, one month after the invasion. At the press conference after the return, Jackson expounded on his visit to Iraq and set forth his proposals for averting a war.

Jackson’s five-day mission to the Middle East was inspired not only by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but also by the aggressive acts which followed. One of the most volatile issues was that of foreigners held in Iraq and Kuwait. Iraqi news agencies reported that the thousands of foreign women and children would soon be free to leave the country. However, other reports suggested that the foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait were hostages and could be distributed among potential military strike targets by Hussein as a defensive shield in the event of an attack on Iraq.

In the midst of the crisis, Jesse Jackson obtained a letter of invitation from the Iraqi Embassy to interview President Hussein and some of the foreign hostages for his new syndicated TV talk show. By going as a journalist, Jackson was able to comply with the U.S. advisory against contact with Iraq.² Although State Department officials tried to discourage the mission, key members of the organization held a briefing session with Jackson before his departure.

After Jackson publicly announced his intention to visit Baghdad, several American families who had relatives held in Iraq and Kuwait asked him to assist in gaining their

release. The State Department gave Jackson a list of American citizens held by Hussein to take with him.³

While in Iraq, Jackson held meetings with President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. In those meetings Jackson focused the conversation on issues that could lead to a peaceful solution of the Persian Gulf crisis. He inquired about the issues and complications that prevented the departure of the foreigners and expressed his displeasure with Iraqi disruption of operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.⁴ Jackson further argued that those kinds of hostile acts and holding hostages would not help matters with the United States and, moreover, contributed to the lack of focus on Iraqi's initial grievances with Kuwait and U.S. policy.

With Hussein's permission, Jackson traveled to Kuwait and interviewed American, British, and other foreign hostages. It was after his television interview with Saddam Hussein that Jackson began to press for release of the hostages. He submitted the State Department list of American hostages to Hussein, who eventually agreed to the release if Jackson could obtain landing privileges in the United States for an Iraq airplane. Asserting his respect for Jackson's efforts, while continuing to criticize American policy, Hussein declared, "This is in your honor. I'm doing this for you—not Bush! I have no respect for Bush. But for you!"⁵

The Jackson entourage stopped in London first to drop off the European hostages, then flew to Dulles Airport with the remaining Americans. At a press conference afterwards, several former hostages thanked Jackson for facilitating their release. Jackson used this occasion to publicly encourage President George Bush to negotiate with Hussein in order to avoid further conflict. Explaining President Hussein's concerns, Jackson said, "He feels ignored . . . He feels if we can talk to Gorbachev while they're in Afghanistan with missiles pointed at our country he deserves to be talked with. We need a political solution, not war."⁶ Also at the airport press conference, the Iraqi ambassador to the United States agreed with the call for negotiations and welcomed the hostages back.

However, others were not as pleased with Jackson's success. British and American newspapers scolded Jackson for exploiting the Persian Gulf crisis for his own publicity. They asked by whose authority was Jackson negotiating with heads of states on important international issues. They further declared that Jackson undermined official efforts. Even the State Department hinted that

diplomacy should be left to the professional U.S. diplomats, and not be engaged in by independent private citizens. Other critics argued that Hussein exploited Jackson and used him as a spokesman for his propaganda in the United States.⁷ Despite these longstanding and often repeated criticisms of this kind of international activity, intervening in troubled spots throughout the world is not new for Jesse Jackson, nor for many other American private citizens.

Throughout the years, private citizens in various forms, have endeavored to impact United States foreign policy and international affairs. Using "legitimate" channels, the public influences foreign affairs through conventional exercise of its right to free speech, right to petition and assembly, right to protest, ability to vote, and personally contacting officials. When those avenues fail, many private citizens take on roles previously reserved for United States officials and travel to foreign nations to further understand the problem, focus attention on their areas of concern, and intervene when they believe their actions can make a difference. The subject of this book is the latter avenue chosen by citizens—the choice to engage in citizen diplomacy.

Research Focus

This book assesses the historical and political significance of Jesse Jackson's use of citizen diplomacy during the 1984 presidential election campaign and his 1986 mission to Southern Africa. One central objective is to explain the motivation for Jackson's diplomacy, the strategies employed, and the impact of his initiatives. This analysis also explores how African American politics, political culture, and historical internationalism influenced Jackson's endeavors. This discussion not only is important for historical context, but it also helps dispel the myth that African American international concerns and activities are theoretically insignificant and in practice ineffectual.⁸

Jackson's diplomatic efforts also allow one to ask broader questions about the relationship between private citizens' initiatives in international politics and democratic participation in an elite foreign policy arena. An important question is: To what extent does citizen diplomacy expand the representation of other views and

thus enhance pluralism in foreign policy-making? Other critical issues explored are associated with the structure and processes of citizen diplomacy. Does citizen diplomacy provide an alternate approach for citizen participation in foreign affairs and in the international arena? How does citizen diplomacy fit into the foreign policy-making apparatus and process? Does citizen diplomacy represent a significant challenge to the U.S. foreign policy-making process? What factors contribute to the successes and/or failures of citizen diplomacy? How and when does race become a factor in citizen diplomacy?

Jackson's expeditions to Syria, Central America and Cuba during his 1984 presidential election bid and his 1986 trip to Southern Africa are the examples used in this analysis. The results of the examination suggest that citizen diplomacy provides an additional point of access into the political system and foreign policy process and therefore increases democratic participation in U.S. foreign affairs.

Although Jackson had engaged in citizen diplomacy before, his efforts during the 1984 presidential election campaign were of greater import because he was considered a legitimate contender for the presidency.⁹ In addition, the fact that Jackson succeeded in making apartheid in South Africa one of his most vocal issues during the campaign requires some discussion of his efforts in Southern Africa in 1986. Although other accounts of Jackson's endeavors are discussed in this book, these three cases best illustrate the various approaches to citizen diplomacy. The following issues were considered in the analysis of each case: U.S. official policy; Jackson's foreign policy agenda and platform; divergence in foreign policy objectives between the government and Jackson; motivation for Jackson's diplomacy; Jackson's specific diplomatic goals and objectives; and the results and effectiveness of Jackson's mission.

Jesse Jackson's diplomatic efforts are important to the discourse on citizen diplomacy for several reasons. First, his endeavors are numerous, and therefore an analysis that incorporates many issues and areas of concern is possible. Second, Jackson's efforts broaden the discussion of citizen diplomacy because concrete benefits often resulted, such as the release of hostages. Henceforth, investigating the effectiveness of Jackson's diplomacy requires one to analyze the causes of his successes and failures. This also makes salient the

rationale and motives of foreign governments when they negotiate with and assist U.S. citizen diplomats.

Third, Jackson's efforts help to distinguish citizen diplomacy from ordinary interest group participation in international affairs and provide a line of demarcation between the actions of established interest groups, who utilize formal channels of influence, and private citizens and interest groups who bypass orthodox channels. It must be noted here that sometimes Jackson acted solely as a private citizen and at other times as a representative of the Rainbow Coalition and his foreign affairs constituency. However, the purpose here is not to determine when his constituency's concerns are the basis for his actions, but to focus on the activity itself.

Fourth, investigating Jackson's diplomatic efforts broadens the discussion of where citizen diplomacy is likely to take place. In the past, the majority of citizen diplomacy was directed toward the Soviet Union as a reaction to the cold war, while most other efforts have taken place during times of war. Jackson's energy was directed predominately toward economically depressed and crisis areas in the world, thus examining Jackson's efforts may illuminate when and where citizen diplomacy is likely to take place and who is likely to initiate such efforts. In addition, a more complete picture of the diversity of U.S. foreign policy emerges when examining Jackson's foreign policy agenda and his diplomatic efforts.

Fifth, using Jackson's efforts allows one to discuss how citizen diplomacy can be used in presidential election campaigns. It also expands the discussion of minorities in presidential politics and can contribute to our understanding of the divergence between progressive, liberal, and centrist forces within the Democratic party. And finally, Jackson's foreign policy endeavors raise the question of race and how it affects the efforts of U.S. private citizens who attempt to influence foreign policy.

Because this examination is based on the activity of an individual who represents a particular constituency, one must note that the Rainbow Coalition, which is a broad-based progressive U.S. political coalition founded by Jackson, formed the core of support for his efforts abroad from 1984 through 1986. There were, however, other interest groups who supported or were intricately involved with Jackson's diplomacy such as TransAfrica, the African American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). Other private citizens

not affiliated with the Rainbow Coalition but who actively supported Jackson's approach to a particular international issue are also considered part of Jackson's foreign affairs constituency.

Foreign Policy and U.S. Democracy

In conducting U.S. foreign affairs, there has always been a dilemma between broad democratic participation versus participation by a small elite.¹⁰ This dilemma is shaped by the foreign policy roles prescribed in the U.S. Constitution and the American emphasis on expertise.

The constitution divides the making and implementation of foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches of government.¹¹ The presidency holds the power to command the armed forces, initiate the treaty-making process, appoint and receive ambassadors, and use presidential authority to conduct diplomacy. Congressional powers in foreign affairs are associated with treaty making, war, and control of expenditures. Notwithstanding the passage of the War Powers Act, the congressional role in foreign affairs is largely reactive to presidential lead.¹²

The dilemma of broad democratic participation versus elitism is also shaped by the need for expertise on national security and national interest questions. The emphasis on expertise is based on a longstanding belief that the "high" nature of foreign policy-making requires the talents and skills of America's most qualified individuals. Because of the importance placed on foreign policy issues, expertise is valued over mass participation. In the "national interest" or for the "common good" most Americans support this emphasis and subordinate their specific interests to the interests of the nation. It is for this reason that the formulation and conduct of U.S. affairs are monopolized by the president and his carefully selected advisors.

However, the increasing complexity of the world and a perceived realist bias in foreign policy-making have contributed to the ascension and prominence of nonstate domestic actors. Interest groups, the media, and political parties use a variety of methods, such as lobbying, soliciting public opinion, and directly contacting officials, to gain attention for their international concerns. In *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas*,

Eric Uslander and John Spanier use a set of concentric circles to illustrate the hierarchy of power in foreign policy-making and to show the influence of nonstate actors.¹³ Within the inner circle of the hierarchical model are the president and key advisors; the second circle consists of bureaucrats and advisers; the third circle is Congress; and the fourth circle consists of political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and "personal diplomacy."¹⁴ Based upon this model, the active citizen fits into the fourth circle, which is peripheral and is considered to play only a minor role in crisis situations. Because of this perceived lack of power that the traditional nonstate actors possess, some U.S. private citizens circumvent the fourth circle and engage in citizen diplomacy, which is a less conventional and frequently considered undesirable method of opening up the elite foreign policy process.

Citizen Diplomacy: A Model of Private Citizen Activity in U.S. Foreign Affairs

Citizen diplomacy is defined as the diplomatic efforts of private citizens in the international arena for the purpose of achieving a specific objective or accomplishing constituency goals. One of the most distinctive features of this type of diplomacy is that it operates outside of the existing national foreign policy-making system and may not be supportive of official policy.¹⁵ The principles of citizen diplomacy posited here are drawn from various cases and delineate the motivation for engaging in this type of activity, the frequently pursued modes of operation, and the effectiveness of the activity.¹⁶

Although the diplomatic activities of citizens vary, several themes remain constant. The citizen diplomat is often motivated by a strong desire to make issues of morality salient in world affairs and is usually concerned with peaceful conflict resolution. Citizen diplomats bypass the official foreign policy-making system usually after they have exhausted other measures for influence and when they perceive that policy-makers are insensitive to their concerns. The most frequent concerns relate to issues of peace, war, hostages, business deals, disagreement with government policy, and feelings of nationalism and/or ideological affinity.

The effectiveness of citizen diplomacy is dependent upon various factors, such as the prestige of the citizen diplomat, the

willingness of nations to resolve disputes, the political advantages and/or vulnerability of the disputing parties involved, timeliness, and perhaps most important the difficulty of the goal pursued. The least difficult tasks are fact-finding, while the most difficult is to change the policy orientation of a government.

Determining effectiveness is a difficult task. Concerns relate to the question of how one measures effectiveness, considering that many variables can be attributed to policy outputs, and how one measures influence in a situation where the individual is attempting to influence policy when he or she has no official standing. The foremost question concerns whether influence is only measured by policy change, or whether having input and consideration in the decision-making process satisfies influence? Because effectiveness can have various meanings, there are grounds for arguing that if the goal was ultimately accomplished or the citizen diplomat was able to make a "meaningful" contribution to policy formulation or implementation, then the effort can be considered effective.

The discourse on private citizens' initiatives in international affairs usually excludes the activity of those persons who engage in citizen diplomacy. One result of this exclusion has been a concentration on those acts that are homologous with the pluralist model of democracy, thereby highlighting track two activity (a political-psychological approach that also provides an avenue for private citizen participation in the international arena¹⁷), interest group activity, and people-to-people contact. Consequently, the Dartmouth Conferences (dialogues between U.S. and Soviet citizens of stature) and the work of individuals such as Norman Cousins, who was sent by President Eisenhower to discuss with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev what private citizens could do to help ease the tension between the two superpowers, are well documented.¹⁸ Other popular cases concern those seeking international business deals—such as the late Armand Hammer, industrialist and promoter of Soviet trade for over six decades—and the work of church organizations and religious groups seeking to provide humanitarian relief for suffering people. However, the activities of individuals who pursue their own objectives in the international arena and who employ unconventional means of participation are generally dismissed as out-of-the-mainstream and therefore insignificant.

The dismissal of the significance of citizen diplomacy may have come about for several reasons, particularly a belief among scholars that these types of activities are not influential enough to

warrant detailed scrutiny. However, this discussion contends that often the efforts of private citizens in the international arena have serious implications for U.S. foreign policy and the policy-making process and are therefore worthy of study. The failure to acknowledge the activities of these sometimes very important international actors and their accomplishments results in a deficiency of information in the field of democratic participation in foreign affairs.

As noted previously, the involvement of the private citizen in foreign affairs has evoked a myriad of criticism. Some critics assert that citizen diplomacy interferes with the foreign policy-making process—which has been primarily reserved for elite participation. Others hold the opinion that citizen diplomacy may endanger national security. Regardless of these denunciations, due to the continual advancement in communication technologies and the breakdown of consensus in society on the goals and strategies of U.S. foreign policy, private citizens will remain zealous in their attempts to influence the direction of U.S. foreign affairs.

What Is Already Known about Private Citizens in International Affairs

The literature on the intervention of private citizens in foreign affairs reflects the conceptual confusion that has dogged this area of study and also reveals the lack of consensus on how to approach this phenomenon. Evident at first glance is the problem of nomenclature. Phrases that are in current use to describe private citizen participation in the international arena are private diplomacy, nonofficial diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy, public diplomacy, supplemental diplomacy, informal diplomacy, demi-diplomacy, and track two diplomacy.¹⁹ Moreover, citizen participation in the international arena, whether it is scientific or cultural exchanges, workshops or seminars on questions of peace, or attempts to impact policy can be found under the rubric of any of the aforementioned terms.

Track Two

Up until this time, one framework has generally been accepted to guide the discussion on the diplomatic efforts of private citizens. Track two diplomacy as defined by William Davidson, a psychiatrist,

and Joseph Montville, a foreign service officer, is nongovernmental, informal, and nonofficial diplomacy conducted by private citizens of a nation-state.²⁰ Track two diplomacy, though not a substitute for the official track one diplomacy, supports and often parallels track one goals. The goal of this people-to-people contact is to break down psychological barriers between parties and to create an alternate set of relationships that can prevent an escalation of conflict. Track two should result in an identification of common ground between the parties in dispute. Examples of track two diplomacy are leaders participating in workshops with adversaries and cultural exchanges.

Track two diplomacy, though useful as a starting point for analyzing citizen diplomacy, is problematic for several reasons. First, track two lacks boundaries because it suggests that most forms of citizen-to-citizen contact can somehow nullify psychological barriers, without adequately discussing how. Further this construct does not focus on the types of individuals who are likely to engage in citizen diplomacy, nor the types of issues which may induce their participation. Moreover, track two does not attempt to clarify specific acts that may lead to the effectiveness of the citizen diplomat. More important, track two diplomacy remains an integral part of the U.S. foreign policy-making system. The purpose of track two is merely to support official endeavors. Consequently, those individuals who disagree with official objectives find that it is difficult to develop a parallel track and therefore cannot effectively participate in track two diplomacy. It is at this stage that citizen diplomacy originates.

Track two diplomacy, as does interest group theory, is dictated by and operates within an unquestionable pluralist framework.²¹ However, this does not mean that there are no similarities in the two forms of international activity. Citizen diplomacy does parallel track two in several ways. Both track two and citizen diplomat initiatives are concerned with impacting foreign affairs and relations. Second, both track two and citizen diplomacy usually result from the concerns of a specific group of individuals, and therefore both have constituencies. Finally, both track two and citizen diplomats interact with other groups in society in order to gain support for their efforts.

The primary distinction between the two forms of activity is that advocates of track two emphasize their support of official efforts while citizen diplomats are independent of an ambition to

sustain or bolster official efforts. Hence, those activities that are centered on impacting international politics within the framework of official U.S. policy, or in which the participants operate within the framework of the structures provided for citizen influence are considered separate from citizen diplomacy. In addition, those activities of citizens that seek only to gain an audience with citizens of other nations in order to promote healthier relations between citizens should be considered people-to-people contact, track two diplomacy, or even an aspect of interest group behavior. Viewed in this light, people-to-people contact and other types of international exchanges of information between citizens of different nations should not be analyzed in the same manner as activity that is not officially sanctioned by the U.S. foreign policy establishment, such as high-level negotiations between a citizen and a foreign official. This distinction between track two activity, interest group activity in the international arena, and citizen diplomacy is made in this book. Classifying these activities by their methods and objectives will alleviate the problem of nomenclature and conceptual confusion and help solve the problem of barriers. Accordingly, those contacts between Jesse Jackson and high-level decision-makers from foreign governments that involved discussions adverse to U.S. policy objectives and Jackson's efforts to accomplish specific objectives in the international arena, are the focus of this analysis.

The Logan Act

In addition to track two, any discussion of citizen diplomacy must include the Logan Act. For it is the Logan Act which limits the rights and activities of U.S. citizens in international politics. The Logan Act (1799) prohibits private citizens, without the authority of the U.S. government from "intercourse with any agent of a foreign government with the intent to influence the conduct of that government in relation to any controversies with the U.S., or to defeat any measures of the U.S."²² Since its enactment, several arguments for the repeal of the act have been put forth. For instance, it has been argued that the Logan Act should be invalidated because it violates the First Amendment right to free speech, fails to properly inform citizens of the conduct it proscribes, and allows extensive discretion on the part of the executive in determining when violations have

occurred. Moreover, the federal government's failure to invoke the Logan Act since its enactment would make application of the act at this juncture in history discriminatory.²³ Despite those objections to its existence, the Logan Act remains viable law and, in certain instances, American presidents have threatened to prosecute citizen diplomats under it in order to prohibit their direct international intervention.

Book Outline

The book is organized in the following manner. Chapter two highlights two central approaches to citizen diplomacy frequently utilized by African Americans: nationalism/Pan-Africanism and ideological affinity. In addition, it briefly comments on other approaches to citizen diplomacy, such as hostage release, to provide additional context for Jesse Jackson's efforts. A broad-ranged discussion of the international efforts of African Americans is also provided for historical context. Chapter three examines the international efforts of Jesse Jackson prior to his 1984 presidential election campaign. Also addressed in this chapter is an examination of those key factors that help explain Jackson's international propensities. This includes a brief biographical discussion of Jackson and an examination of African American political culture and behavior. Chapter four presents a discussion of the 1984 Jackson campaign for the presidency and sets forth Jackson's and the Rainbow Coalition's perceptions of U.S. foreign policy and their international agenda. This chapter emphasizes that Jackson's longstanding personal views on international politics were reflected in his presidential campaign's international agenda and platform. Chapters five, six, and seven serve as case studies for Jackson's efforts in Syria, Central America and Cuba, and Southern Africa. A significant amount of attention is given to the motivation for each mission, the mode employed, and outcome. The implications for democratic participation in U.S. foreign policy formulation and processes is also set forth in each case study. Chapter eight provides a summary of the major findings. In the postscript, Jackson's international endeavors since his 1988 presidential election bid are highlighted.