Money and Power in Europe

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Money and Power in Europe
The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation

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Matthias Kaelberer - Author

SUNY series in Global Politics

Price: $95.00
Hardcover - 268 pages

Release Date: June 2001

ISBN10: 0-7914-4995-5
ISBN13: 978-0-7914-4995-0

Price: $32.95
Paperback - 268 pages

Release Date: June 2001

ISBN10: 0-7914-4996-3
ISBN13: 978-0-7914-4996-7

Available as a Google eBook for other eReaders and tablet devices. Click icon below...

Summary

Traces the history of European monetary negotiations from the 1960s to the 1990s.

Tracing the forty-year history of negotiations to construct exchange rate regimes in the European Union, Money and Power in Europe emphasizes the role of a state's bargaining power for the formation of rules. In contrast to the prevailing literature's emphasis on domestic factors like sectoral and partisan interests, policy ideas and domestic institutional structures, Matthias Kaelberer highlights the structural conflict of interest between weak and strong currency countries over the rules of monetary cooperation. Strong currency countries, in particular Germany, because they do not face a reserve constraint, are in a position to shape the rules of monetary regimes decidedly in their favor, including the refusal to compromise on rules of domestic macroeconomic adjustment.

The book traces the bargaining process of five key episodes: the Action Programme of 1962, the Werner Report of 1970–71, the Snake between 1971 and 1979, the European Monetary System between 1979 and 1999, and the attempt to form a monetary union (EMU) associated with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

“An excellent discussion of the origins and evolution of EU monetary cooperation that, at the same time, makes clear that Germany's ability to shape European monetary institutions has been a fundamental factor.” — Thomas H. Oatley, author of Monetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the European Union

“The historical breadth makes this study unique. It is definitely original in the sense that it contradicts much of the conventional wisdom of European monetary integration.” — Karl Kaltenthaler, author of Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money

Matthias Kaelberer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction

2. The Structural Logic of European Exchange Rate Cooperation

3. The Politics of Leadership in Monetary Cooperation

4. The Failure of European Monetary Cooperation during the 1960s: The Case of the Commission's Action Programme

5. European Monetary Cooperation during the 1970s: Werner Report and Snake

6. Asymmetry and Bargaining Exchanges in the European Monetary System

7. The Politics of European Monetary Union: Bargaining over the Maastricht Rules

8. Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

SUNY series in Global Politics

Index

Related Subjects

Economic History
European Politics
International Relations
Political Economy

39349/39348(MR/DG/AV)

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