

Introduction

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In his justly famous account of colonizer and colonized and the fraught process of decolonization, Frantz Fanon claims that Europe is the creation of the Third World. “In concrete terms,” he writes, “Europe has been bloated out of all proportions by the gold and raw materials from such colonial countries as Latin America, China, and Africa. Today Europe’s tower of opulence faces these continents, for centuries the point of departure of their shipments of diamonds, oil, silk, and cotton, timber, and exotic produce to this very same Europe. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.”¹ Fanon proceeds from here to argue that simply granting these former colonies their independence and leaving them to their own devices is not sufficient. Just as the individuals and countries most affected by the crimes perpetrated by Germany’s Nazi regime have had stolen art returned and reparations paid, these newly independent states are due this same consideration. But what of the United States of America? After all, the nation-states that comprise the Americas were also once colonies of Europe. Actually, Fanon addresses this question in his brief conclusion, which takes up the question of the future, and Fanon is adamant that these former colonies not look to Europe as a model. After all, that mistake has already been made by the United States: “Two centuries ago,” says Fanon, “a former European colony took it into its head to catch up with Europe. It has been so successful that the United States of America has become a monster where the flaws, sickness, and inhumanity of Europe have reached frightening proportions.”² Certainly this sickness and inhumanity affects

all aspects of this monstrous nation, including its philosophy. Could the disease also be part of the cure? Might the diseased thought expressed in this monstrous land also be part of the healing process of turning away from Europe toward new traditions of thought, some of which were here all along but neglected by the thinkers who sought to emulate European models of thought?

Ralph Waldo Emerson, in his essay “The American Scholar” also urged American intellectuals not to look to Europe as a model. Indeed, Emerson sought to break free of intellectual vassalage to Europe. Hence, he urged the generation of a new kind of being: the *American* scholar. Emerson, however, was unable to recognize the irony in this call, which includes an act of naming in which a non-European land is named for a European explorer, and then settler colonists are identified with this name. Naming, indeed, as Patrick Wolfe observes, has played a central role in processes of “effacement/replacement” of colonial projects.³ And, as Jodi Byrd notes, naming subsumes indigenous peoples “within the logics and justifications of U.S. imperial mastery that depend upon racial and political hierarchies to maintain and police hegemonic normativity at the site of inclusion.”⁴

What, then, can we say about the naming of “American” philosophy and, by extension, the naming of this volume? We offer the name *Decolonizing American Philosophy* to at once identify and cast into doubt the very idea of American philosophy as a single, unified tradition, as well as to raise the question of whether any such philosophy must be a colonizing force or whether it might also work toward decolonization.

We might ask, What do we talk about when we talk about “American philosophy”? And what systems of domination and histories of oppression are hidden in this question? As has been pointed out repeatedly, the question itself is both a *philosophical* question and also one that is geographically fraught and admits of a number of different answers. What answer one receives seems to depend mainly upon whom is asked. Does American philosophy, if such a thing even exists—no less an eminent American philosopher than Richard Rorty has claimed that it does not—simply mean whatever philosophy is practiced in “America” (typically, if myopically, simply understood as shorthand for “the United States of America”) by, one might suppose, professional philosophers? (Whether practitioners need be professional to count and what it means to be a philosopher is another in a long series of questions elicited by the supposedly simple one raised at the outset.) This is the sort of answer one

might hear from those in the mainstream of what is commonly called “analytic” philosophy that is practiced and taught in most university philosophy departments in the United States. Another answer, an alternative offered by many members of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, goes something like this: American philosophy is the philosophy of America. It is the philosophy that emerged on American soil and is the product of the encounters of Europeans with new challenges on a newly “discovered” continent: this is, of course, a continent that could only be considered “newly discovered” by the Europeans who first sought to enslave the indigenous peoples found there before forcibly removing them from their ancestral lands. Finally, the memory of these peoples was erased as well, though they still resonate hauntingly in the many place names derived from words in various indigenous languages. On this account, American philosophy renders the American settler experience as something heroic.

American philosophy in this second sense includes various philosophical movements that emerged in this context, including Transcendentalism and Personalism but most notably Pragmatism. This conception presupposes the idea that there is something distinctively if not uniquely *American* about American philosophy and, as such, implies any number of further questions such as: What is distinctive about “the American experience” that could give rise to this set of philosophical movements? What could it mean for a philosophy to pertain to a nation or a people? Who is this nation or people? Who counts as American? What do we even mean by America? Do we mean North America, or could we include South and Central America? Does it just mean the United States of America? Even if we were to limit the term in this way, how should we account for the influence and interactions of a great many philosophical traditions in what is, after all, a large, diverse, cosmopolitan society?

One way that people who self-identify as American philosophers speak of the field that they study and to which they contribute is to call it the indigenous philosophy of America or America’s native philosophical tradition. They will hurriedly add that of course when they say this, they don’t mean to identify American philosophy with the philosophy of America’s indigenous peoples (though many will add that they don’t mean to exclude this either). What they mean is the philosophical tradition that came to life out of “the American experience,” whatever that might mean.

In this hurried clarification we begin to see something that might count as a distinctive if not unique feature of the philosophies that emerged

in the Americas: what is called “American philosophy,” both construed narrowly as “classical American philosophy” and broadly as “philosophy of the Americas,” as it emerged from the contexts of colonization and settlement. Like other products of this culture, this philosophy bears the scars of a racialized past and present that are the product of a racialized colonialism. “America” in its various meanings is a settler colonial society that bears the imprint of settler logic. American philosophy is, therefore, a colonized and a colonizing philosophy. But we must not stop there, otherwise we run the risk of denying the agency of the peoples who have emerged from and been transformed by this encounter. In talking about the colonial past of the Americas, one can be tempted to view colonization, disappropriation, and slavery as historical events that occurred in the past and necessarily structure the present and the future. However, as Patrick Wolfe points out, settler colonialism “is a structure rather than an event.”⁵ It will be better to think instead in terms of processes of colonization. Once we have made that move, it is an easy step to notice that processes of decolonization were born with the advent of colonization, and the two have always existed alongside one another. As Gurminder Bhambra notes, “The meaning of modernity does not derive from a foundational event in the past, but from its continual contestation in the present.”⁶ Decolonization is not simply resistance to structures of colonization; it exerts its own creative force as well. Colonization *is* oppression, and decolonial thought and practices have emerged and continue to emerge as resistance to that oppression. But to focus exclusively upon oppression and resistance is to overlook the tremendous creativity and novelty that has been and continues to be unleashed in this encounter. Understanding decolonization as an ongoing process will enable us to better attend to the distribution of creation in the realm of ideas, no longer identified exclusively with Europe or with US settler culture. Decolonization in philosophy has to be partly about uncovering silences. Thus, as Kris Sealy points out in this volume, the question raised by the idea of decolonizing American philosophy is “how American philosophy might engage with questions pertaining to resistive acts of self-determination, political agency, and alternative futures.” Fundamentally, the issue is one of “making newness.”

Even so, one principal idea motivating this volume is that since American philosophy is the product of a racist and colonial culture and, insofar as it contains residua of that culture, American philosophy ought to be both deconstructed and reconstructed to weed out its racist and neocolonial aspects from the parts that can be used to fight racism and

further the process of decolonization. We might, following Anibal Quijano, call this necessary first move “a decolonial analytic,” and it is manifested in various ways in the essays that comprise this volume.⁷ While it is a necessary first step, it is by no means sufficient, and many of the essays in this volume show why this is the case as well. Still, if it is to serve useful, moral purposes in the twenty-first century and beyond, American philosophy will first need to be decolonized. This volume is meant to be a contribution to the forensic task of decolonizing American philosophy and, in so doing, follow in the footsteps of works such as McKenna and Scott’s (2015) *American Philosophy: From Wounded Knee to the Present* and Dussel’s (2013) *Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion*. One thing that the contributors to this volume set out to do is to identify racist and colonial aspects of American philosophy and, having done so, seeing whether anything of value remains.

However, another aim of this volume is to investigate the claim that this process of decolonization is not only something that needs *to be done to* American philosophy but, more significantly, that decolonization is something that American philosophy *does*, or at least, *can do*. American philosophy, *even understood as a settler colonial enterprise*—an understanding that this volume seeks to challenge—has not only been a tool of colonial and racist oppression but has also at times been a resource for resistance to such oppression. One might take as an example the social and political reforms that lie at the heart of the pragmatism of Jane Addams and John Dewey, the trenchant critiques of racism offered by W. E. B. Du Bois, or the strong anti-imperialism of William James’s political philosophy, which Alexander Livingston has recently analyzed in *Damn Great Empires: William James and the Politics of Pragmatism*. Apart from these specific examples, the principal idea here is that because American philosophy, in both the traditional and expanded senses of that term, is and has been a philosophy of reconstruction and transformation, it stands to reason that American philosophy should be able to provide a set of reconstructive and transformative tools that can help advance the cause of decolonization. That is to say, even if one accepts the premise that *the very idea* of “American philosophy” necessarily presupposes colonial hegemony, one might still acknowledge that this tradition could nonetheless offer resources to overcome its own disavowal of thinkers once deemed voiceless and rendered invisible to the tradition. Moreover, as several of the contributors note, once we expand and reconstruct the scope of “American philosophy” in the ways that this volume seeks to do, it begins

to reemerge as a transformative enterprise. This happens not least when philosophical expressions of the colonial encounter and thought that preexisted and persisted in spite of and in resistance to colonization give rise to new ways of thinking that reimagine and reconstruct the alleged “givens” of colonization.

This volume is an exploration of some of the possibilities and difficulties of such a reconstruction. The essays in this volume are examples of the decolonization and decolonizing potential of American philosophy. Decolonization is better thought of not as an event or an outcome, upon the achievement of which we might take what William James called a “moral holiday,” but a process, an ongoing struggle, and a generative force that constantly reimagines present and future.

There are two aspects to this reconstruction. The first entails an acknowledgment of those voices that have been marginalized or silenced by the myopic view of philosophy as the sole domain of white men. Secondly, this reconstruction demands that we let these voices speak, however belatedly, but also demands an engagement with them on their own terms.

Our goal in this volume is to unite a variety of scholars working in American philosophy and the philosophy of the Americas—as well as in the scholarship of decolonization—to ask what it might mean to decolonize American philosophy. Can American philosophy, the product of a colonial enterprise, be decolonized? Does American philosophy offer any tools or resources for decolonial projects? As such, the titular “Decolonizing” functions as both adjectival subject and adjectival object: What might it mean to decolonize American philosophy? And is it possible to consider American philosophy, broadly construed, as a (part of a) decolonizing project?

It is worth noting that as a *philosophical* project, decolonization as an idea not only aims at a transformation but is also a framing of a complex and historically bound set of phenomena as a problem. That is, by setting up decolonization as an objective, the philosophical project can't help but frame the boundaries of the decolonial subject. In other words, decolonial philosophy, in identifying its subject, necessarily says something about who or what it is supposed to be operating on and on whose behalf it operates. But, of course, many decolonial projects are at least partly the products of colonial cultures, and there's a way in which decolonization can be understood as another form of colonization.

The volume is divided into three parts. Part 1, “The Terms of Decolonization,” includes essays that take a critical look at the very idea of the project of decolonizing American philosophy even to the point of

understanding the ways in which, as just noted, decolonization can be understood as another form of colonization. Lee McBride takes up this idea in chapter 1, “Culture, Acquisitiveness, and Colonialism.” McBride observes that there has been a recent surge in decolonial discourse. Decolonial thought is touted in op-ed pieces and blogs and shared via social media. At university, one is prodded to decolonize the curriculum, the canon, and the faculty. In broader contexts, some suggest decolonizing your diet, your sexuality, and your future. Hoping to dispel superficial and enigmatic evocations, McBride articulates what he takes to be the core features of decolonial philosophy. Decolonial philosophy is described as an oppositional reaction to teleological colonial systems of development designed to promulgate European cultural imperialism and amass capital. In closing, McBride briefly highlights three potentially problematic issues worthy of attention: one dealing with the way decolonial populations are conceived, a second regarding the reciprocity of cultural products, and a third reaffirming the need to challenge the acquisitive tendencies and material conditions of capitalist cultures.

Similarly, Kyle Whyte and Shelbi Nahwilet Meissner challenge the meaningfulness of academic uses of “decolonization” absent consideration of material conditions, literally, on the ground. They note that the word “decolonize” can be employed in ways that are unclear when *land* is not at the heart of event planning and philosophizing. They argue, by contrast, that “decolonization,” as we have inherited the concept from Potawatomi, Luiseño/Cupeño, and numerous other indigenous traditions, refers to diverse, land-based political projects and the land-centric philosophies guiding them. Indeed, in these traditions, decolonial practice and philosophizing are already occurring, and land cannot be extricated from these decolonial traditions. In contemporary bodies of work on decolonization, the struggle for collective self-determination and the repatriation of lands is tied to indigenous efforts to protect our futurities. In chapter 2, Meissner and Whyte ask: “What does the connection between land and decolonization mean for philosophy in ‘America’?”

In articulating this question, they first note some ideas about how land is understood by indigenous persons. Next, they offer a brief slice of some of the indigenous traditions that center land in both the critique of colonialism and the pursuit of decolonization and indigenous futurity. Indeed, *decolonization* refers to indigenous resistance practices, and the philosophies guiding them, that date back to the arrival of European colonizers. Next, they emphasize the necessary interrogation of the land-

based practices perpetuated by American philosophy. Finally, they gesture at steps that would be necessary in decolonizing American philosophy. Ultimately, however, Meissner and Whyte conclude that decolonizing American philosophy is impossible.

Closing Part 1, John Drabinski takes up a similar concern when he explores the meaning of “the West” as a racial, colonial project. In reckoning with the African American tradition and its complex relationship to the history and memory of antiblack racial violence, Drabinski argues that the white West is entangled in that violence. In particular, Drabinski argues that embedding the African American tradition in the same violence expands the idea of the West into diverse space, replacing the notion of a single-rooted tradition with a rhizomatic model. Drabinski concludes, in contrast with the previous chapter, that such a model decenters “the West” and, in that very moment, decolonizes the concept, thus indicating a path toward the decolonization of American philosophy.

Having explored the terms of decolonization in Part 1, Part 2 takes up the project of “Decolonizing the American Canon.”⁸ In chapter 4, Eduardo Mendieta observes that the eighteenth century was the age of the scientific voyage as well as the Enlightenment. At this time, he explains, a new conception of nature began to take shape, one that was instigated by the emergence of a new type of literature that was partly inspired by the many popular and widely disseminated travelogues of the so-called age of reason. Along with this new literature, a new type of reader was called for: an enlightened reader. This is a reader that is curious, unprejudiced, scientifically informed, and hermeneutically generous. Chapter 4 takes up Thomas Jefferson and Immanuel Kant as two exemplars of readers that lived up to (or failed to live up to) the Enlightenment’s motto: *Sapere Aude!* Jefferson was a founding father, a two-term president, a polyglot, and undoubtedly the most well-read member of the young republic. Jefferson, Mendieta notes, was also a bibliophile whose goal was to gather any and all literature dealing with the Americas. Kant, on the other hand, while not a bibliophile due to his lack of means, was known to be an avid reader of travelogues and the scientific voyage literature, which was indispensable for his courses on physical geography and anthropology. In a fascinating and very telling coincidence, Jefferson and Kant read, with different lenses and consequences, a text from this emergent literature: Juan and Ulloa’s *Voyage to South America*. Their readings and misreadings of Juan and Ulloa’s travelogue proved decisive for their views on slavery and race, showing how the constitution of intellectual traditions relies

upon a series of readings and misreadings of thinkers and texts that are often forgotten as these intellectual traditions solidify. Mendieta's essay carefully reconstructs one such episode.

Similarly, in chapter 5, Corey McCall compares the experiences of loss and very different responses of two important American philosophers in terms of how they constitute our nation's democratic *ethos*: Ralph Waldo Emerson and W. E. B. Du Bois. In this chapter, McCall argues that Emerson's sense of loss isn't the same as the one shared by Du Bois: it's a white American sense of loss and not an African American one, which means that it is a disavowal of its pain. Although, McCall explains, both Du Bois and Emerson write their experience of loss into their work, Emerson declares that the loss of his son Waldo wasn't nearly as burdensome as he thought it would be, while Du Bois feels sadness mixed with relief at the death of his firstborn child, relief born of the fact that his son won't have to bear the burden of American blackness or of a life lived behind the veil of race. The second section of the essay focuses on these two scenes of terrible loss before turning to the question of the necessary relationship between democracy and loss. McCall interrogates how these authors' respective responses to deeply personal loss animate their writings on topics such as America, empire, self, and world. What happens to our conceptions of philosophy and American philosophy when we read these two thinkers alongside each other on this topic of loss?

Chapter 6, "Latina Feminist Engagements with US Pragmatism," by Andrea J. Pitts analyzes three Latina feminist engagements with Anglo-American pragmatism and neopragmatism: Jacqueline M. Martinez's Peircean-inspired account of semiotic phenomenology; Paula M. L. Moya's conception of postpositivist realism; and Linda Martín Alcoff's critique of Rortyan antirepresentationalism. Each theorist proposes arguments that effectively place an emphasis on the historically contingent and contested nature of social identities while also seeking to impact political forms of stability and the normative significance of identity-based claims. Accordingly, two goals of the chapter are: (1) to examine how Latina feminist interventions within debates regarding the epistemic and political authority of marginalized social identity categories either augment or critique existing US pragmatist and neopragmatist frameworks and (2) how each approach thereby responds to an existing series of questions within Latina feminism through pragmatist and neopragmatist philosophical insights. The chapter concludes by demonstrating how these three theorists can be located within a broader vein of Latina feminist decolonial theory.

Part 2 concludes with chapter 7, “Dewey, Wynter, and Césaire: Race, Colonialism, and ‘the Science of the Word,’” in which Phillip McReynolds seeks to bring into conversation three thinkers who are not often invoked in the same context: John Dewey, Aimé Césaire, and Sylvia Wynter. The reason for bringing these three writers together is to create a space within pragmatism for opening up a genuinely postcolonial approach to race. While there has been some recent work in applying pragmatism in general and Dewey in particular to problems of race, Thomas Fallace’s *Dewey and the Dilemma of Race* (2011) brings to light some problems with this enterprise. Fallace shows that far from being an isolated anomaly within his work, Dewey’s ethnocentrism is a “weight bearing structure” that any pragmatist concerned about race must squarely reckon with. In light of these problematic issues, Dewey’s work is itself in need of reconstruction. Happily, as Westbrook notes, “‘Reconstructing Dewey’ has a decidedly Deweyan ring to it.”⁹

For Césaire and Wynter, as for Dewey, it is the layered, textured, and thoroughly cultural and encultured quality of human experience that necessitates a new science based on what Susanne Langer called “the forms of human feeling.” In noting the layered nature of human experience where archaic structures are never abandoned but built upon and repurposed, Césaire is calling attention to what Dewey called “the principle of continuity.” This is important to us now because, according to Wynter, it is the only way of dealing with “the code of symbolic life inscribed by The Color Line.”¹⁰ It is the only way of proceeding because of the bodily enacted historical rupture of colonialism, both for colonizer and colonized.

McReynolds notes that pragmatists are sometimes accused of not paying sufficient attention to the past, but for both Dewey and Césaire we cannot go back (and would not want to). Yet at the same time, as a Faulkner character observed, the past is still with us. The only promising way of dealing with the reality of racism and the legacy of colonialism is to engage critically with it. Wynter writes, “With the destruction of these barriers (barriers, in Césaire’s terms, between the ‘study of nature’ and the ‘study of words’), the ‘narrative order of culturally constructed worlds, the order of human feelings and belief will become subject to scientific description in a new way.”¹¹ This new science of the human, which is not rooted in the deliberate subjugation and dehumanization of vast swaths of humanity, was what Dewey was calling for in his hopes for a “scientific ethics” and is the reconstruction that is needed in order to put pragmatism to work on race and decolonization.

Part 3 represents this volume's attempt not merely to decolonize the American canon as it has been inherited and interpreted by settler logics but to begin to expand the American canon by allowing traditionally silenced voices to be heard. Part of this expansion involves destabilizing geographical verities, which requires our frameworks to be extended into transnational relationships—thus destabilizing a domestic conception of the American self. In chapter 8, Celia T. Bardwell articulates an ethics of care within transnational boundary conditions so as to address the concerns of the Filipina dependency worker. In effect, this analysis generates a transnational public ethos of care situated within the complexities and contradictions of transnational relationships of dependency that serves as the context many Filipina dependency workers must navigate. Bardwell-Jones's approach is to examine Eva Kittay's argument about dependency and the way it generates a public ethos of care known as a *doulia* principle. On this basis, Bardwell-Jones expands this notion of the *doulia* principle to a transnational context through Jane Addams's conception of care and dependency in her work with immigrant communities. Finally, Bardwell-Jones articulates a transnational *doulia* principle that aims to guide an ethics of care to apply to transnational relationships of dependency, which will help improve the lives of Filipina dependency workers.

Kris Sealey's "Creolization and Playful Sabotage at the Brink of Politics in Earl Lovelace's *The Dragon Can't Dance*," offers the theoretical framework of Creolization as a tool through which American philosophical thought might theorize moments of resistance at the everyday level. Her approach is explicitly transatlantic, insofar as Earl Lovelace's *The Dragon Can't Dance* is her anchoring literary text in this endeavor. Lovelace's literary works (particularly *The Dragon Can't Dance*) are ultimately meditations on meaning making and self-definition for black subjectivity in the Americas, given the legacy of the plantation and the lingering forces of neocolonialism. The goal of this chapter is to name such meaning-making practices "creolizing" practices, which she argues has particular significance for how American philosophy might engage with questions pertaining to resistive acts of self-determination, political agency, and alternative futures. In other words, this chapter offers Creolization—its conceptual grid, its organizing frame—as indispensable for understanding emergent possibilities for freedom and empowerment within this historical violence of the Americas.

Although José Carlos Mariátegui has been considered one of the most original Latin American philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century insofar as he articulated an original emancipatory philosophical

project blending Sorelian Marxism and indigenous nationalism that influenced subsequent decolonial thinkers such as Anibal Quijano, his works often exhibit a paradoxical treatment of race. Such is the claim made by Sergio Armando Gallegos-Ordorica in chapter 10, “Decolonizing Mariátegui as a Prelude to Decolonizing Latin American Philosophy.” Indeed, though Mariátegui argues persuasively in some passages that the notion of race has been used as a tool to divide and oppress populations, in other places he often deploys the notion in ways that bolster racial hierarchies and perpetuate racist stereotypes. Specifically, Gallegos-Ordorica contends that Mariátegui’s thought requires itself to undergo decolonization insofar as Mariátegui subscribes to certain claims that stem from the Eurocentric intellectual framework that he criticizes. To show this, Gallegos-Ordorica offers an analysis of the essay “The Problem of Races in Latin America” and claims that Mariátegui subscribes to same division of human beings into races that he criticizes elsewhere, as well as to the view that certain races are inferior to others by virtue of their passivity. In this chapter, Gallegos-Ordorica argues that if we want to use Mariátegui’s thought to support decolonial endeavors, it is crucial first to decolonize Mariátegui’s thought. Gallegos-Ordorica offers a tentative proposal to carry out this project.

Finally, in chapter 11, “Distal versus Proximal: Howard Thurman’s *Jesus and the Disinherited* as a Proximal Epistemology,” Anthony Sean Neal offers a careful reading of Howard Thurman’s *Jesus and the Disinherited* in order to show how African American philosophy speaks to the particular concerns of African Americans but also is understood as a product of an African American reflective thought. Howard Thurman’s work embodies this dialectical relationship between the particular community and thought born from the experiences that constitute it. Thurman’s work reflects these experiences, and the version of Christianity he develops represents a critical discourse that serves to decolonize inherited religious forms. Thurman successfully makes the shift from Christianity to the religion of Jesus or love, ushering in a new path for an oppressed religious understanding based on his religious humanist concerns. It was his intent to demonstrate the necessity of a religion that claims to be about love to also be against oppression of any kind. In doing so, he closed the gap between the idea of revolutionary love as he understood it in the message of a historical Jesus and “those who stand at a moment in human history with their backs against the wall.”¹²

With the essays that comprise *Decolonizing American Philosophy*, we hope to continue the long-simmering conversations about the various meanings of American philosophy: its scope, its purpose, what it has been, and what it still might become. More importantly, we hope that these essays, taken together, will help us move away from talking about “American philosophy” as a single unified tradition of philosophical thought in the United States to thinking about the many connections between various philosophical traditions of philosophical thought in and of the Americas.

Notes

1. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove, 2004), 58.
2. Fanon, *The Wretched*, 236–237.
3. Patrick Wolfe, “Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409, 388–389.
4. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 171.
5. Wolfe, “Elimination,” 390.
6. Gurinder K. Bhambra, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Reconstructions,” in *Connected Sociologies*, ed. Gurinder K. Bhambra (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 117–140, 123.
7. Anibal Quijano and Michael Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–580.
8. This division into parts that takes up the terms of decolonization and actively seeks to further the project of decolonization should in no way be understood as a reification of the theory/practice distinction, which many of the essays themselves criticize and seek to undermine. Rather, the division is offered as an indication of difference in emphasis and is offered to the reader merely as a navigational aid.
9. Robert Westbrook, introduction to *Dewey and the Dilemma of Race: An Intellectual History, 1895–1922* by Thomas Fallace (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011), viii.
10. Sylvia Wynter, “Genital Mutilation’ or ‘Symbolic Birth?’ Female Circumcision, Lost Origins, and the Aculturalism,” *Case Western Law Review* 47, no. 2 (1997): 128, 501–553.
11. Wynter, “Genital Mutilation,” 179.
12. Howard Thurman, *Jesus and the Disinherited* (Boston: Beacon, 1996), 11.