

Introduction

Theorizing Anticorruption as a Political Project

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Corruption plagues all countries, democratic or authoritarian. Just as endemic are efforts to eradicate and prosecute corruption. The first several months of 2017 alone witnessed the inauguration of a populist president in the United States whose major campaign slogan was to “drain the swamp”; the impeachment of a South Korean president on corruption charges; massive demonstrations in Romania, leading to a plan for an anti-corruption referendum; and the continuation and even intensification of anticorruption politics in all BRICS countries.¹ It seems that anticorruption is now a sort of “cure-all” embraced by regime incumbents, opposition challengers, and the masses alike across a wide range of settings. People of disparate class, ethnic, educational, and even ideological backgrounds agree on the need to stop the “corrupt people in power.” Yet, common outrage and indignation mask profound differences regarding the means by which corruption should be opposed, and the *political* ends that anticorruption efforts should serve. Instead of uniting different political forces under a common goal, anticorruption efforts have time and again proved especially versatile political weapons, useful for advancing divergent personal, partisan, ideological, or programmatic agendas (Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991).² While varieties of corruption and the tools to combat these have long interested political scientists, economists, and policymakers alike (among recent examples, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Rose-Ackerman

and Palifka 2016; You 2016; Rothstein and Varraich 2017), the distinct political logics undergirding anticorruption efforts—when these campaigns develop, who they target, with what framing or justification, and by what impetus or under whose direction—have attracted less systematic study.

While corruption may be defined broadly as the misuse of public authority for private gain,³ the phenomenon—conceptualized most clearly via campaigns against it—spans a wide range. One dimension, often the most visible and punishable aspect, is bribery, graft, and other rent-seeking. Another is privilege: the extent to which the rich or well connected achieve preferential treatment, which various reformist political movements contest in the name of combatting political inequality. In addition, anticorruption efforts sometimes extend to wider issues of bad behavior, such as sexual indiscretions. Such offenses may involve abuse of office, but without the same intrinsic public costs.

Within the political science literature, some have argued that, in the context of modernization, corruption could have beneficial economic effects in developing settings by “substituting” for political institutionalization and potentially facilitating economic development (for example, Nye 1967; Huntington 1968, 59–71; Leff 1964). Nevertheless, it is now commonly recognized that rampant corruption is detrimental to economic development and political governance. Economically, it drains resources, distorts expenditure, and inhibits economic growth (Mauro 1995; Wei 1999). Politically, it weakens regime support by undermining public trust in formal institutions (Seligson 2002) and exacerbating socioeconomic inequality (Uslaner 2008), hence fueling social discontent. If left unchecked, it may lead directly to political instability and, eventually, regime decay.⁴

Notwithstanding the widely recognized harmful effects of corruption, combatting corruption is not necessarily a normal part of routine politics. Whether led from the top or the ground, anticorruption efforts demand significant energy and resources and can carry considerable political risks, with no guarantee of long-term success, especially in contexts where patronage ties feature prominently in politics. Although economically damaging, corruption often serves an important informal political function of generating and maintaining elite support for the regime (Darden 2008). More importantly, by changing and even abolishing the existing informal rules of the game, anticorruption efforts are likely to induce uncertainty among elites, which could potentially lead to elite infighting and weaken elite support for the regime, and hence risk political instability. Meanwhile, efforts from the ground, whether spearheaded by or simply

engaging civil society activists or the masses, may foster disillusionment with, and alienation from, political elites and institutions.⁵ In addition, those targeted by such anticorruption efforts, should they retain authority, might exact retribution later.

Given these inherent difficulties and potential pitfalls, the political will and capability to carry out anticorruption efforts cannot be assumed. Even so, a wide variety of political regimes in differently capacitated states, over polities with divergent historical backgrounds, and at disparate levels of economic development, have attempted such efforts in recent decades, with varying results. What are the political motivations behind anticorruption efforts, across regime types? Whose interests do they advance or threaten? And what ramifications do these efforts have for government legitimacy, standards of accountability, popular engagement or cynicism, the nature of linkages between politicians and citizens, and regime durability? These are the questions this volume sets out to address. They are theoretically and empirically important, not only because combatting corruption presents a nearly universal challenge in both developed and developing settings and across regime types, but also because anticorruption efforts' political, rather than economic and policy, aspects remain understudied and undertheorized.

Why Asia?

This volume focuses on the geographical area of Asia, particularly, Northeast and Southeast Asia. This analytic choice was made for several reasons. First of all, both corruption and anticorruption efforts are pervasive in Northeast and Southeast Asia. To be sure, these phenomena are not unique to the region, but previous scholarship has identified culture as an important contextual factor accounting for corruption (Bardhan 1997). Political culture in the region, although far from uniform, traditionally emphasizes interpersonal relationships, norms of reciprocity, and patronage ties. Many countries in the region share historical and cultural affinities, especially those that are still under the influence of Confucian values,⁶ which provide moral justifications for maintaining political hierarchy and social harmony. Some therefore argue that the collectivist emphasis on group obligation in many Asian cultures creates a breeding ground for corruption (for example, Lipset and Lenz 2000). Indeed, this political-cultural background constitutes a common and maybe even unique

challenge for the region's anticorruption efforts, as corrupt politicians are frequently elected and reelected in Asian democracies (Chang and Chu 2006, 262). Repeated anticorruption efforts, even in stable and developed democracies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have been compromised by their governments' own involvement in corruption, as politicians have continued to adapt to new regulations and find new loopholes, giving rise to new forms of corruption (Chang and Chu 2006, 269–270). What this pattern means, in effect, is that political rather than economic or policy concerns often assume prominent roles in shaping anticorruption efforts in the region.

Second, across Northeast and Southeast Asia, we find a wide array of political regimes that have engaged in large-scale anticorruption efforts. This volume covers several types of regime, including relatively stable democracies, as represented by South Korea and Taiwan; low-quality democracies, as represented by Indonesia and the Philippines; a “hybrid” regime as represented by Thailand, which oscillates between military authoritarianism and democracy; and “closed” authoritarian regimes as represented by China and Vietnam. Moreover, these countries are at different levels of development, following disparate developmental trajectories with diverse historical legacies ranging from colonialism to communism. South Korea and Taiwan are usually considered developed economies. China is now the world's second largest economy after nearly three decades of high-speed growth, though those gains have been distributed over a massive population and growth has slowed down recently. Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are all developing economies with varying rates of growth. It is worth noting that high growth rates in parts of the region have traditionally been associated with high levels of corruption—what Andrew Wedeman (2002) calls the “East Asian paradox.” Despite all this regime heterogeneity, anticorruption efforts have been undertaken, often repeatedly, across these diverse political and economic settings. These efforts in turn have led to varying outcomes. Such empirical variations, not just in the efficacy of anticorruption efforts but, specifically, in their political repercussions offer important analytical leverage when it comes to examining the politics of anticorruption in the region.

Finally, the regional focus of this volume takes into account the possibility of cross-national diffusion⁷ or political-learning effects within a closely knit geographical area. Geographical proximity as well as long-term economic and cultural ties make it possible for countries in the region to borrow from each other's experiences, both positive and negative, or

learn from each other's mistakes, including in the area of anticorruption efforts.⁸ In particular, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the largest regional bloc in Asia. China, South Korea, and Taiwan also have close political or trade ties with ASEAN. In addition, Asia is the only non-Western region where a few governments, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, have been highly successful in curbing, if not eliminating, previously rampant corruption, leading to improved governance. This variation indicates that corruption is not culturally deterministic: it is entirely possible to achieve anticorruption successes in the Asian context.

Therefore, this volume focuses on Asia for its political and economic diversity, its challenging environment for fighting corruption, and the variations it offers in anticorruption outcomes. Our case study approach allows an in-depth and holistic understanding of political dynamics driving anticorruption efforts across a wide range of comparable contexts within a broadly similar time frame of the past several decades. Its sensitivity to spatially and temporally bounded contexts helps reveal the multidimensionality of anticorruption efforts often obscured by large- N quantitative analyses. The regional focus is analytically useful, but it does not mean the theoretical insights generated by this volume are only limited to the region. As the following discussion shows, the theoretical framework this volume presents is potentially generalizable to any developmental setting where regime legitimacy remains contested among the state, political parties, and private interests.

Anticorruption Efforts and Contested Regime Legitimacy

Regime legitimacy refers to the belief of citizens that the nature and functioning of national state institutions conform to their own basic political and moral values (Muller and Jukam 1977, 1566). In other words, a regime is legitimate to the extent that its citizens believe that it provides a satisfactory order and that there is no available alternative that is vastly superior (Fish 2001, 27). Democracy can be an important source of regime legitimacy as it provides procedural justifications for the regime's right to hold power and exercise its authority. But regime legitimacy is conceptually different from democracy. Legitimacy often crucially depends on the substantive values that are realized, including expectations regarding the provision of such valued public goods as social order, economic stability,

and distributive justice (Sil and Chen 2004).⁹ Therefore, beyond electoral competition, these substantive areas also become important arenas of political contestation. Among these issue areas, the need to combat corruption is often the least controversial, as almost all actors, regardless of ideological background, agree that unchecked corruption is detrimental and perhaps even fatal to the society and the economy. This sentiment, coupled with persistent problems of corruption in both developed and developing settings, marks anticorruption as a most prominent and convenient site for contestation over regime legitimacy.

Although few would refute the desirability of curbing corruption, different political actors, motivated by different objectives, disagree over what constitutes corruption, what enables corruption, and how to combat corruption. These disagreements often form the basis for these actors to attack or challenge their opponents, as well as shape the trajectories of anticorruption efforts. The source of these disagreements, we argue, is contention over the basis of regime legitimacy driven by three often-competing yet sometimes overlapping motivations: private interests, party loyalty, and political institutionalization. The heterogeneity of anticorruption efforts stems from a fundamental question: Should regime legitimacy be based on private networks and interests, partisan (including military) allegiance, or formal and impersonal institutions? Any given effort may span these categories to some extent, especially over time or subnational regions. However, we find that the brunt of campaigns in a given regime tends to reflect a prevailing logic from among these types.

ANTICORRUPTION DRIVEN BY PRIVATE INTERESTS

Patronage ties and clientelism, as informal and hierarchical forms of traditional politics, have been prevalent in human societies throughout history.¹⁰ Their existence far predated the emergence of the modern state, which is supposed to be nonpatrimonial, or “impersonal” (Fukuyama 2014, 10). Indeed, it was with the emergence of the modern state that a distinction between private and public interests made identification of “corruption” possible. Nevertheless, across a wide range of settings, including in Asia, forms of “neopatrimonialism” have often repurposed a legacy of patrimonialism beneath the veneer of a modern state, enabling widespread corruption and nepotism (Fukuyama 2014, 26). Pervasive and entrenched patron-client relations undermine the legal-rational approach to political and economic organization, “personalizing” politics (Comp-

ton 2000, 43–45). In this sense, patronage ties and clientelism are often “default” positions for political elites to fall back on when formal and impersonal institutions, across regime types, are unable effectively to check elite behavior. Therefore, it is no surprise that private rather than public interests constitute a highly common motivation driving anticorruption efforts in many countries. This type of anticorruption effort often targets oppositional individuals or patronal networks, but it could also be a defensive reaction to attempts at party or state institutionalization; it may render anticorruption efforts mundane “politics,” in the sense of contests for power and spoils, rather than steps toward a normative conception of “the political.”

Antoinette Raquiza’s chapter, “Anticorruption Campaigns and the Proprietary Polity: The Philippine Case,” for example, offers a vivid analysis of this type of anticorruption effort. Raquiza presents the Philippines as a case in which private interests, especially in the form of political families, have captured formal party and state institutions, including by using anticorruption campaigns as mobilizing vehicles to fight for political offices. In this case, anticorruption campaigns undermine rather than strengthen party and state institutions, as these campaigns are instrumental in reinforcing and perpetuating the clan-based political ecosystem in the Philippines.

Private interests are also often present in, and sometimes even obstruct and hijack, other types of anticorruption efforts. The case of Indonesia, as analyzed by Edward Aspinall in “Fighting Corruption When Corruption Is Pervasive: The Case of Indonesia,” offers such an example, even though its post-Suharto anticorruption efforts were broadly motivated by political institutionalization. Private and patronal interests also played significant roles in largely ineffective anticorruption efforts in Vietnam, as presented in the chapter by Edmund Malesky and Ngoc Phan, “Rust Removal: Why Vietnam’s Historical Anticorruption Efforts Failed to Deliver Results, and What That Implies for the Current Campaign.”

As these case studies show, anticorruption efforts driven by private interests share a number of similarities. First, these efforts tend to target specific individuals and patronal networks rather than focusing on policy changes or institutional reforms that could address long-term structural sources of corruption. The focus is on punishment rather than prevention. As a result, these anticorruption efforts are usually highly inconsistent, as different standards are applied to different networks and individuals. Those calling for anticorruption crackdowns, whether they are incumbents or in opposition, are often corrupt themselves. For example, the sequence of

anticorruption campaigns in the Philippines since the anti-Marcos mobilization of 1986, particularly against Joseph Estrada and his successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, were led by representatives of the oligarchy. Marcos, Estrada, and Macapagal Arroyo were extremely corrupt, but so were many of the elites behind these and other “people power” campaigns, some of whom have used anticorruption efforts to propel their own political careers—though they then face the challenge of demobilization. Anticorruption efforts driven by private interests also tend to be stop-and-go, as their objectives are to take down specific individuals or networks.

Second, and relatedly, this type of anticorruption effort is unlikely to curb corruption effectively. These campaigns could yield short-term results following a few high-profile cases, but they usually do not produce long-term effects on overall levels of corruption, as structural sources of corruption stay in place and are even reinforced by these selective anticorruption efforts. Both the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, continue to be plagued by rampant corruption and rank consistently poorly on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, despite their formal democratic trappings. Over time, the populace tends to develop feelings of cynicism and apathy toward such anticorruption efforts and to perceive most politicians as inherently and hopelessly corrupted.

Finally, repeated corruption/anticorruption cycles involving feuding individuals and patronal networks are usually indicative of the persistence of parallel or “shadow” informal institutions that undermine the party system as well as formal state institutions. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in Indonesia, for instance, continues to be threatened and attacked by forces in the political and law-enforcement establishments. In other words, the issue of regime legitimacy remains unsettled as informal rather than formal institutions still constitute the basis of political authority.

ANTICORRUPTION DRIVEN BY PARTY LOYALTY

Political parties are an intrinsic part of modern politics and an essential institution of modern democracy. It is true that some parties are highly personalistic, lack any coherent platform, and are little more than vehicles of patronal networks. Anticorruption programs initiated by such parties would therefore fall into the previous category. But most political parties do claim to represent certain identities or positions and hence demand a degree of impersonal allegiance from their members, however salient patronal networks also often remain, such as in many Asian countries.

In democratic and semi-democratic settings, political parties regularly engage in electoral politics to compete for political offices. During electoral competitions, they frequently use corruption charges as powerful political weapons against political opponents. From the United States to France to Brazil, corruption allegations dog political parties during every electoral season. But even in many nondemocratic settings, ruling political parties regularly face the challenge of disciplining political elites in order to protect their organizational integrity and cohesion as well as to fend off potential political challengers.

In his chapter, “(Anti-)Corruption and Partisan Bias in Taiwan’s Newspapers,” Christian Goebel analyzes the crucial role of politically aligned newspapers in Taiwan in acting as the two major political parties’ mouthpieces in negatively reporting anticorruption efforts initiated by their political opponents. Such partisan reporting is instrumental in creating and maintaining the public perception of pervasive corruption even though decades of anticorruption efforts have led to long-term institutional changes, moderate setbacks notwithstanding. In other words, the media-manufactured and largely negative public perception ironically obscures a far more complicated reality, in which initially partisan motivations, especially in the case of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), result in far-reaching systematic anticorruption efforts.

On the authoritarian side, the Maoist era in China was marked by anticorruption efforts driven by ideological demands for party loyalty, as Andrew Wedeman describes here in “The Evolution of China’s Anticorruption Strategy.” Beyond an element of private interest in holding on to power, Mao’s anticorruption mass campaigns were very much motivated by ideology and the need to mobilize “revolutionary classes” to find and eliminate “hidden counterrevolutionaries” and “reactionary elements.” And in Thailand, too, as Michael Connors’s chapter, “Anticorruption Politics in Thailand: From Regime Institutionalization to Sovereignty Wars,” details, recurrent stints of military rule, justified largely in terms of getting the country back on track after the foibles of democratically elected but self-serving or insufficiently competent leaders, require that the military (and its ultimate patron, the monarchy) itself sustain “ersatz virtue.” Crafting and sustaining distinctive “ideologies of accountability” not only discredits potential opponents but also justifies authoritarian leadership that meets these (self-promulgated) standards. That said, these efforts in Thailand may be more productively seen as representing efforts by different regime framers—military or party-based—to institutionalize a

particular vision of the regime (as further detailed later). Vietnam offers a similarly ambiguous picture, as Edmund Malesky and Ngoc Phan describe. Here, we see efforts styled as highly normative but, at best, really more about bolstering the legitimacy and position of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Intermittent high-profile anticorruption efforts largely sidestep serious systemic reform, targeting instead specific government and business leaders, and largely lacking thus far in long-term efficacy or wide impact.

Anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty also share similarities across regime types. First of all, such efforts tend to pay much more attention to corruption outside the party than within the party. This is not to say within-party corruption is necessarily overlooked or condoned, but anticorruption campaigners usually put much greater emphasis on cracking down on corruption committed by perceived political opponents, such as opposing political parties or Mao's "Rightists" and "counterrevolutionaries"; if the emphasis is intraparty corruption, the intent is more likely a purge, still for the purpose of advancing the party as a corporate body under particular leadership, than to uphold a "neutral" normative standard. The partisan media in Taiwan, for example, tend to extensively and sensationally expose the opposing party's corruption scandals while staying relatively mute about those committed by their "own" politicians. In China, too, Mao went so far as to link corruption inherently with political and ideological opposition, and actually used anticorruption mass campaigns to identify and crush critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A prominent example was Mao's Anti-Rightist Campaign following the Hundred Flowers Movement of 1956, which ironically was supposed to help the CCP rid itself of corruption. Anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty are thus characterized by an "us versus them" mentality rather than seeking to eradicate corruption *per se*.

Second, anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty may or may not lead to long-term institutional changes; either way, they tend to generate negative public perceptions due to the unequal treatment of corruption cases within and outside of the party. In the long run, the public rightly comes to perceive anticorruption efforts as instruments of power struggle or repression by political parties. As the case of Taiwan demonstrates, even real progress made may hence be obscured by the excessive focus on political competition. In Vietnam, meanwhile, citizens' experience of corruption has not measurably changed, despite dramatic campaigns; not surprisingly, positive impacts on perceptions of corruption and regime

legitimacy have proved ephemeral. And in Thailand, too, such efforts have contributed to a prevalent “antipolitics” sentiment within society, which a self-proclaimed “honest” military has, in turn, mobilized against elected governments.

Finally, anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty tend to lose steam once electoral victory is secured or campaigners perceive political “enemies” as vanquished. But compared to anticorruption efforts driven by private interests, there is more chance for anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty to lead to long-term institutional changes, especially under democratic settings. This difference is because under democracy, parties, once in power, are less likely to be able to change anticorruption policies arbitrarily, even if those policies were enacted to target these parties in the first place. This pattern is illustrated by the case of Taiwan, where anticorruption efforts enacted alternately by the Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP governments, but especially the latter, have led to cumulative positive long-term changes. The DPP, for example, did not single out the KMT specifically in its anticorruption programs. In order to remain credible, it had to turn also against its own people. In other words, anticorruption policies and institutions could create their own momentum and take on lives of their own, despite their origins in electoral competition.

ANTICORRUPTION DRIVEN BY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Other than serving private or partisan interests, anticorruption efforts can also be for the purpose of political institutionalization—the creation and maintenance of a set of formal institutions that effectively guide and regulate elite behavior across party lines. As Samuel Huntington once argued, “a society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires,” and the “capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests” (Huntington 1968, 24). In this sense, rampant corruption itself could be seen as one key indication of the combination of “weak political institutions” and “strong social forces” found in many developing societies, including in Asia (Huntington 1968, 11). Regardless of regime type, political institutionalization plays a crucial role in contributing to regime stability and durability.

It is important to note that pursuing a core objective of political institutionalization does not necessarily exclude an element of private or partisan interests in anticorruption efforts. But the essential difference is that, unlike the two other aforementioned types, this type of anticorruption

effort aims at long-term, enduring institutional reforms that transcend short-term power struggles. These campaigns' intent is an enduring, politically neutral norm; these are more programmatic than targeted reforms. Such efforts may be the result of public demands from below, pushing for political and legal equality, but they may also be initiated from the top in order to shore up regime popularity and legitimacy as well as to improve economy and governance. The case of Thailand, as presented by Michael Connors in his chapter, best demonstrates this fungibility: military and civilian party leaders alike have sought to promulgate moral messages, centered on anticorruption claims and priorities, to their own advantage. Clearly, there is an element of party/military-based legitimation here. Yet both camps' objectives run deeper and longer-term: to institutionalize a new regime, premised on a particular set of norms. Connors thus suggests that while the conventional view of oscillations in Thailand's anticorruption politics is that all are for partisan advantage, we should instead understand these as being "about higher order questions of sovereignty, state form, and hegemony." In addition, as the case of Vietnam shows, international factors could well play a role, as institutional reforms for the purpose of curbing corruption, attached as "conditions" to foreign investment and aid, create external, politically disinterested arbiters and lasting effects (Jensen and Malesky 2018). Their usually sustained and systematic trajectory does not mean that anticorruption efforts driven by political institutionalization will always succeed, but these efforts are usually designed in a way that focuses on preventing corruption over time rather than simply punishing corrupted individuals and groups.

In his chapter on Indonesia, Edward Aspinall argues that, even though the official post-Suharto anticorruption agenda has been embodied in formal institutions, such as the establishment of the powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) and a specialist anticorruption court, these efforts have often been obstructed and even penetrated by private and patronal interests seeking personal gains. Despite the establishment of a new enforcement regime, corruption remains nevertheless central to Indonesia's political economy. On the one hand, these formal institutions enable nongovernmental organizations and other social groups to campaign against corrupt political leaders. On the other hand, at the local level, political actors often form temporary alliances with social groups to bring down political enemies in the name of battling still-endemic corruption. The result is a sort of stalemate: despite

some victories by the institution-builders, corruption remains persistent and pervasive, with few signs of decisive improvement.

Nevertheless, anticorruption efforts motivated by political institutionalization have achieved sustainable results in some cases. In his chapter, “Korea’s Anticorruption Struggles: Fighting against Networks,” Ray Dongryul Kim demonstrates the difficulty of achieving success. Kim traces South Korea’s long-term efforts to combat corruption, which evolved from actor-based individual corruption to more bureaucratic, network-based collective corruption following the country’s neoliberal reforms. Sweeping new efforts shifted the focus from punishing corrupt individuals to institutional reforms intended to break down entrenched, corruption-enabling bureaucratic networks. This chapter shows that even serious anticorruption efforts that attempt to address structural sources of corruption are usually protracted struggles, as new forms of corruption emerge and adapt.

Meanwhile, Andrew Wedeman presents a much more mixed picture of post-Mao anticorruption efforts in China, which moved away from Mao’s “politics in command” approach and relied on party and state institutions rather than the “mass line” to combat corruption crimes. Intermittent efforts in anticorruption institutionalization have still been periodically punctuated by politically motivated, high-profile crackdowns, such as the sensational Bo Xilai case, indicating an element of power struggle. But in general, the overall trend seems to be shifting from a combination of routine policing and short-term bursts of hyper-enforcement to systematic and sustained enhanced enforcement, especially under the current president, Xi Jinping, who has primarily focused on expanding institutional capacity for enduring corruption prevention and punishment in addition to tightening his political grip.

Clearly, and as the cases of Thailand, South Korea, and China illustrate to dramatic effect, anticorruption efforts driven by political institutionalization not only can be observed across regime types but may also coexist with other types of anticorruption efforts. Compared to anticorruption efforts driven by private interests or party loyalty, anticorruption efforts driven by political institutionalization are usually more consistent and last longer. This approach does not mean individuals or groups will not be specifically targeted or that there will not be any selective enforcement or treatment, but these anticorruption efforts tend to stay in place even after their original “targets” are gone. In the case of China, for example,

Xi's anticorruption campaign has continued unabated at all levels of the government and has led to the routinization of many anticorruption measures, beyond the point at which he firmly consolidated his political power. In South Korea, a groundbreaking new anticorruption law, the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act, took effect in 2016 with the goal of eradicating bureaucratic corruption in the long run by dissolving the institutional roots of corruption. In Thailand, each new regime establishes itself with a new constitution, often entailing substantial institutional changes, to formalize a new order.

Moreover, anticorruption efforts driven by political institutionalization are characterized by attempts to change the "rules of the game" instead of simply meting out punishment to individuals and groups. In both contemporary South Korea and China, these efforts center on breaking up the informal patronal or bureaucratic networks that gave rise to rampant corruption in the first place. The underlying message is that formal institutions and rules, rather than informal networks and norms, should form the basis of regime legitimacy and hence the ultimate guideline for elite behavior.

Finally, compared to the previous two types, anticorruption efforts driven by political institutionalization are more likely to generate positive public responses over time once they are perceived as "serious." In other words, anticorruption efforts are only likely to provide a long-term boost to regime legitimacy when people perceive such efforts as persistently and consistently applied and see that no group is exempt from such efforts. The recent corruption scandal surrounding South Korea's ex-president Park Geun-hye led to massive political turmoil, but Park's orderly impeachment and subsequent prosecution also indicate the country's determination to combat corruption systematically by following institutional due process. Of course, not all such efforts result in sustained success, as "backsliding" can take place whenever anticorruption policies are reversed or undermined by new forms of corruption. But at least these campaigns are less likely to be viewed with the kind of cynicism that the other two types of anticorruption efforts tend to induce.

Rudra Sil's concluding chapter, "The Comparative Study of Anti-corruption: Where Do We Go from Here?," reviews the distinctive logics and pathways of anticorruption efforts as laid out in the three parts of the volume. It considers what might happen if the cases that come closest to blurring the boundaries among the three motivations were employed to explore a more eclectic perspective on the emergence and execution

of anticorruption efforts. The chapter suggests a more nuanced approach to assessing just how close each of the cases examined in this volume gets to an ideal-typical scheme for using anticorruption efforts to bolster the official capacity and autonomy of the state, with those efforts that are most dominated by conflicts over private interests doing the least in this regard.

In sum, this volume proposes a framework for understanding the diversity of anticorruption efforts, arguing that these variations be taken seriously: they reflect different political dynamics in different institutional settings, and carry distinct implications. Rather than focus on policy-making and policy-implementation, then, we shed light on the diverging political logics behind, and political ramifications of, anticorruption efforts. The cases on which the chapters here elaborate suggest that anticorruption efforts serve a wide range of political purposes, characterized most importantly by whether they are driven by private interests, party loyalty, or a goal of political institutionalization. Significantly, this three-ideal-type analytic lens should not be understood as implying a kind of hierarchy, in which any one type is inherently more beneficial or more enduring. Not only may strategies be mercurial or opportunistic, as the chapters here demonstrate well, but also further political institutionalization of authoritarianism (as in the cases of China or Vietnam) or military dictatorship (as in the case of Thailand) would hardly be desirable, even if the level of corruption decreases over time. At the same time, having democratic institutions alone does not entail political will on the part of elites or incentives on the part of citizens to make corruption an issue. Likewise, lack of democracy in and of itself does not necessarily preclude serious and systematic attempts to deal with corruption. Instead, this volume reveals that to fully understand the political dynamics underlying anticorruption efforts, we need to go beyond a simple democracy-versus-authoritarianism dichotomy, and that anticorruption strategy may be associated more closely with shifting bases of regime legitimacy than with regime type itself. What is more, anticorruption strategies can and do evolve within regimes. In cases such as South Korea and China, anticorruption strategy has gone through significant changes over time, after repeated failures, even as the regime type *per se* has remained relatively constant.

This is not to say, however, that regime types do not matter, especially the distinction between democracies and nondemocracies, when it comes to facilitating positive anticorruption outcomes. Although democracy alone, as demonstrated in cases such as the Philippines and Indonesia,

does not guarantee any particular anticorruption strategy or outcome, it may be conducive to anticorruption efforts motivated either by party loyalty as a sign of healthy competition embedded in a wider system of checks and balances or goals of political institutionalization. As the cases of South Korea and Taiwan show, too, democratic settings could help in institutionalizing anticorruption efforts that originate in party competition, leading to long-term positive effects.

As anticorruption demands sweep the globe today, it is all the more important for us to heed the diverging logics of and motivations behind anticorruption efforts. The challenges might appear common; the responses vary greatly. Ultimately, as this volume shows, anticorruption efforts tend to create unintended momentum or externalities, making it all the more critical that we understand what their intent and expected scope actually was. These campaigns may strengthen regime legitimacy or boost parties' or leaders' popularity, but they may also undermine a regime or specific leaders in the long run, including opening the door to legal reforms and democratization. At a time when calls to combat corruption have become almost reflexive, we cannot afford to ignore the potential of anticorruption efforts to be double-edged swords.

Organization of the Volume

This volume comprises three parts, reflecting our tripartite framework for conceptualizing anticorruption efforts: whether the basis of regime legitimacy at issue is personal, partisan, or institutional. It should be emphasized that these three ideal-typical categories are not separated by clear-cut boundaries. As multiple cases demonstrate, one type of anti-corruption effort over time could intentionally or unintentionally evolve into another, and differing, even countervailing, strategies may coexist, sometimes prominently, or succeed one another within a regime. For example, anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty may lead to institutionalized anticorruption mechanisms as illustrated by the Taiwanese case. Thus anticorruption efforts driven by party loyalty could be a sign of systemic health or decline, depending on the context. We classify cases per the *dominant* or most defining type of anticorruption effort we see there, albeit acknowledging the diversity of campaigns we may find even within a given case, particularly over time.

The first part contains those cases reflecting primarily private networks and interests, including the Philippines and Indonesia. In both these states, weakly institutionalized parties and engrained clientelist, including clan-based, networks shape the use of anticorruption efforts and undermine even promising efforts at more systematic reform—although Indonesia has made significant progress in shifting toward institutionalization of its anticorruption efforts. The second part focuses on those cases reflecting largely a partisan basis for allegiance: Taiwan and Vietnam. In Taiwan, institutionalization has taken place over time, despite the strong public perception of the partisan nature of anticorruption efforts, but such public perception remains highlighted and even exaggerated by partisan-leaning media. In Vietnam, although a recent anticorruption campaign seemed more far-reaching, the VCP's largely politically driven anticorruption efforts have been instrumental and inconsistent. The third part examines those cases in which anticorruption efforts have strived significantly to propound political legitimacy based on formal and impersonal institutions, including Thailand, South Korea, and China. In all these cases, we may find earlier or overlapping anticorruption efforts reflecting private or partisan interests, but the drive for institutionalization more substantially characterizes present-day efforts. Finally, we tie these cases together, considering, too, the awkwardness of some cases' fit within their "dominant" category—foreshadowed already in this introduction—in the conclusion.

Notes

1. This volume discusses the case of China in detail. In Brazil, corruption charges had brought down Dilma Rousseff, and ex-president Lula was soon to be convicted for corruption. In Russia, both the Putin regime and the opposition led by Alexei Navalny then claimed to pursue anticorruption agendas. In India, nonelite individuals such as Arvind Kejriwal and Anna Hazare were able to capture media attention and mobilize grassroots pressure on elites to expand anticorruption activities, including the withdrawal of large-denomination rupee notes often used for black market transactions. In South Africa, Zuma was embroiled in corruption charges and would eventually be removed as head of the African National Congress.

2. While Gillespie and Okruhlik focus on conceptual development and a typology mostly based on authoritarian examples from the Middle East and North Africa, however, we highlight political motivations cutting across regime types.

3. Scholars have offered a wide range of definitions of corruption. For some prominent examples, see Nye (1967), Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Manion (2004).

4. It is important to point out that high corruption does not necessarily lead to state breakdown. Keith Darden (2008), for example, finds many illiberal states in which high “informally institutionalized” corruption actually contributes to elite compliance and therefore high state capacity.

5. It has been argued that heightened publicity of official corruption could lead to social unrest. See, for example, Lorentzen (2014).

6. These countries include China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

7. Koesel and Bunce (2013, 753) define cross-national diffusion as “the transfer among countries of an innovative idea, product, policy, institution, or repertoire of behavior.”

8. For example, ASEAN held an anticorruption workshop in Jakarta in 2016. Later in the year, China hosted a China–ASEAN anticorruption workshop, and it has sought help from ASEAN to set up a regional mechanism to help it hunt down fugitives from its anticorruption campaigns.

9. Bo Rothstein (2011) uses a similar concept of “quality of government.”

10. The very words “patron” and “client” trace their origins back to ancient Rome. James Scott (1972, 92) defines the patron-client relationship as “a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.”

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