ONE

INTRODUCTION

An Individual Level Explanation of Foreign Policy Change

Why do some hawkish leaders become dovish, thereby pursuing dramatic change in their states' foreign policies, while other hawks remain committed to the status quo? Recent history provides us with important examples of prominent foreign policy "hawks" who underwent dovish transformations. These leaders' shifts led, in turn, to major changes in their states' foreign policies. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's peace overtures to Jerusalem, just four years after launching a surprise attack on Israel, led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela's repudiation of violence in his 1989 letter to President P. W. Botha set the stage for the country's transition from apartheid to democracy. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev moved his country from a policy of containment to détente between 1985 and 1991.

Yet major foreign policy transformations have occurred not only in authoritarian regimes, where change, some would argue, may more likely occur as a result of the whims of an authoritarian leader, but also in democratic societies.[1] For example, Charles de Gaulle, the French military leader who became president of the Fifth Republic, reversed the longstanding French policy vis-à-vis the Algerians by granting them independence. The United States also has undergone a number of major foreign policy reversals. President Richard Nixon's famous 1972 visit to China marked a significant turnaround of American-Chinese relations. President Ronald Reagan began seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union even before

Gorbachev came to power and, in so doing, effectively reversed his hardline stance toward the country to which he had formerly referred as "the evil empire" (Farnham 2001; Fischer 1997).

Foreign policy transformations can also take place in the opposite direction; that is, dovish policies can be replaced with hawkish ones, as was the case in the Carter administration. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter revised his relatively dovish beliefs and attitude toward the Kremlin. Whereas he entered office with high hopes of improving U.S. relations with the Soviet leadership, he ended up pursuing hawkish policies, such as withdrawal from the SALT II treaty, recalling the American ambassador from Moscow, and boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow (Aronoff 2006; Glad 1980, 1989; Lebow and Stein 1993; McClellan 1985).

Since the 1990s, Israel has had a comparatively large number of hawkish leaders who have reversed their previously hardline positions toward the Palestinians. Every premier since Ehud Barak, who governed the country from 1999 to 2001, has publicly endorsed a future Palestinian state despite many years of championing alternative solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most dramatic foreign policy change in Israel in the last two decades, however, was the historic decision in 1993 to negotiate the Oslo accords with Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—a reversal of longstanding Israeli policy of not negotiating with what had long been regarded as a terrorist organization. Had it not been for Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's and then-foreign minister Shimon Peres's change of heart—and the latter's determination—the Oslo agreements would not have come about. What led these two veteran leaders, both of whom had long opposed a peace deal involving the PLO, to pursue this sea change in Israeli foreign policy? Focusing primarily on the case of Peres, without whom such a change would not have occurred, the objective of this book is to explain why some hawkish leaders are more inclined to adopt more dovish foreign policy positions than others. Such an explanation should, more broadly, enhance our understanding of foreign policy change.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDYING A LEADER'S HAWK-TO-DOVE SHIFT

The phenomenon of hawkish leaders who pursue dovish policies has occurred in many parts of the world, and in many cases these shifts have led to major foreign policy changes by states. The extant political science literature, however, has not provided an adequate explanation for why some leaders change their core political beliefs, thereby altering their states' foreign policy, while

others, witness to the same situational factors, remain firmly committed to their original beliefs.

Why do some hawks remain hawks, for example, while others become more dovish in their foreign policy orientation? To what extent do situational factors determine the likelihood of a leader's propensity to opt for more accommodative strategies vis-à-vis an adversary? Are certain personality characteristics critical to our understanding of this occurrence? None of these questions is adequately answered in mainstream explanations of foreign policy change, yet each has significant theoretical and policy value. With respect to theoretical debates, explaining foreign policy change remains an unsettled topic in the international relations literature. With regard to policy debates, if there are certain common factors underlying a leader's shift from a hawkish foreign policy orientation to a more dovish one, then identifying such factors could, among potential benefits, help policymakers shape the circumstances that might sway other leaders to opt for peace diplomacy.

How significant are the leaders themselves in affecting major foreign policy change? Few would question that events, such as the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the disappearance of Apartheid, and the end of the Cold War are of historic significance. But would they have taken place had other political actors prevailed? This is an important counterfactual question. Writes Fred Greenstein, a political scientist who has written prolifically on leadership:

> Most historians would agree . . . that if the assassin's bullet aimed at President-Elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in February 1933 had found its mark, there would have been no New Deal, or if the Politburo had chosen another Leonid Brezhnev, Konstantin Chernenko, or Yuri Andropov rather than Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the epochal changes of the late 1980s would not have occurred, at least not at the same time and in the same way. (1992, 105)

Yet the discipline of political science has long neglected the role of leaders. As Greenstein observed nearly a half-century ago, the study of personality and politics has more critics than practitioners (Greenstein 1967, 630). In the field of international relations, scholars generally minimize the importance of leaders and their personalities, attributing political outcomes to structures and situational factors. In recent years, however, a number of scholars have called on political scientists to "bring the statesman back in" because many political outcomes cannot be adequately explained without factoring in the role of leaders and their personalities (Byman and Pollack

2001; see also Aronoff 2001; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Hudson 2005, 2007; Sasley 2006; Ziv 2010, 2011).

This book addresses this lacuna by studying the hawk-to-dove phenomenon and its impact on a state's foreign policy change. It makes four contributions to the literature. First, it explains why certain leaders are more likely to revise their foreign policy beliefs than are others. Second, it incorporates the individual level of analysis into international relations theory so as to provide an improved understanding of the role of leaders in foreign policy change. Third, it contributes to the learning literature by providing an additional mechanism by which to assess whether a leader has truly learned something new—genuinely adopting a new belief—as opposed to espousing a different position for tactical reasons. Fourth, it makes an important empirical contribution by shedding new light on the personal characteristics of key Israeli decision makers. Their personality attributes, in turn, are shown to have impacted their beliefs on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the wake of international, regional, and domestic changes.

Rethinking Explanations of Foreign Policy Change

International relations scholars tend to downplay the role of individuals in state (and nonstate) behavior. Yet a leader's personality can play a central role in foreign policy decision making. Theories that emphasize systemic-structural factors or domestic-level variables, while ignoring the signal role of decision makers, can offer, therefore, only partial explanations of foreign policy change.

The mainstream international relations scholarship currently lacks a robust theory of foreign policy change. Insight from the literature on cognitive psychology into leaders' personalities may be critical in explaining foreign policy change—for example, a decision maker's dovish turn. Cognitive psychologists, pointing to such factors as an individual's cognitive openness and cognitive complexity, are able to show why some decision makers are more prone to alter their beliefs than others. This study suggests that rationalist approaches must be supplemented with cognitive psychological explanations for an improved theory of foreign policy change.

The Inadequacy of Systemic-Level and Domestic-Level Approaches

The systematic study of foreign policy change is a relatively recent development in international relations scholarship. It had been largely ignored prior to the early 1980s, which were witness to a number of attempts by several prominent authors in the field to address this gap (Boyd and Hopple 1987; Gilpin 1981; Goldmann 1982, 1988; K. J. Holsti 1982; and Rosenau 1978,

1981).[2] The failure to deal with foreign policy change in a systematic manner led James N. Rosenau to point out that "in our search for recurring patterns—for constancies in the external behavior of nations—we tend to treat breaks in patterns as exceptions, as nuisances which complicate our tasks" (1978, 371). It was the epochal events that took place between 1989 and 1991 that highlighted the importance of foreign policy change to the field of international relations, which had failed in predicting the extraordinary changes that accompanied the end of the Cold War.

Since the early 1990s, a general trend in the literature has been to question the utility of systemic-structural approaches, such as neorealism, in explaining states' foreign policy behavior in general and foreign policy change in particular.[3] To be sure, Kenneth Waltz makes clear in his *Theory of International Politics* that his structural theory does *not* determine which specific foreign policy actions states will take or when they will take them. He wisely observes that his theory must not be confused with a theory of foreign policy (Waltz 1979, 121–23). Yet, structural realists tend to account for foreign policy change by pointing out that states adjust their behavior in response to perceived changes in the characteristics of the international system. For some of these theorists, system-level variables, such as the distribution of power, explain the variation in foreign policy (Mearsheimer 2001).

Of neorealism, Robert Keohane writes: "The link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the incentives and constraints imposed by their environments" (1986, 167). Thus, neorealists would explain foreign policy change by pointing out that states adjust their behavior in response to perceived changes in characteristics of the international system. Yet, as Voss and Dorsey (1992) point out, "one of the most central criticisms of the realist and structuralist interpretations of systems theory has been their inability to cope with change in a state's policies, whether those changes occur in terms of domestic or foreign policies." They further argue that "to confront the significant implications of these changes, a singularly causal explanation that sees change as deterministically and environmentally derived would not appear to be adequate" (Voss and Dorsey 1992, 24).

Indeed, recent research on foreign policy change finds that systemic-structural explanations are underdetermined; at best, they are partial explanations. Such criticism has come from scholars employing a similar rationalist framework—for example, those analysts emphasizing domestic-level variables (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994)—as well as from those favoring nonrationalist approaches, such as cognitive and/or motivational psychology (Farnham 2003; Lebow and Stein 1993; Levy 1994, 2003) and prospect theory (Welch 2005).[4]

Domestic-level theorists argue that internal factors, such as bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and political parties are what underlie foreign policy change (Goldmann 1988; Hermann 1990; Risse-Kappen 1991; Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994). What both systemic-structural and domestic political explanations share, however, is a tendency to downplay the role of decision makers themselves in shaping a state's foreign policy behavior.

In contrast to rationalist assumptions, cognitive psychologists reject the notion that people readily revise their beliefs in light of new information, regardless of whether it emanates from the international environment or from domestic political circumstances (Conover and Feldman 1984; George 1969; Jervis 1976; Lau and Sears 1986; Little and Smith 1988; Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Tetlock 1985; Vertzberger 1990). Cognitive consistency theorists posit that people are "cognitive misers" who tend to accept information that is consistent with their prior beliefs, rather than information that challenges those beliefs. People rely on their belief systems to help cope with potentially overwhelming environmental uncertainty and are highly unlikely to change their beliefs in light of discrepant information. Leaders can be expected to discount systematically new information or use those elements that correspond with their preexisting beliefs, thereby resisting change in their fundamental beliefs (Jervis 1976; Little and Smith 1988; Stein 2002, 293). Leaders, in particular, may be disinclined to change their beliefs given that it is difficult to explain such a change to the public, which is rarely fully aware of the informational basis of the currently held beliefs; nor is the public necessarily aware of new information the leader may have come across. Thus, to protect their credibility with the public, leaders may choose to avoid information that challenges their beliefs (Vertzberger 1990, 122, 137–38).

Like theories of cognitive consistency, attribution theories emphasize that people's schemata—cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept, person, role, group, or event—are generally resistant to change once they are formed (Stein 1994, 163; see also Vertzberger 1990). And, like cognitive consistency theorists, attribution theorists argue that people tend to discount information that is discrepant with existing schemata, a factor that also helps to explain cognitive stability (Stein 1994, 163; Stein 2002, 293).

Yet images people hold sometimes *do* change. People do not *always* hold on to their beliefs; their schema *can* change. In recent years, a number of studies in cognitive psychology have challenged some of the assumptions of the cognitive consistency and attribution theories. Scholars employing the *operational code* framework have found significant changes in the fundamental beliefs, for example, of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush (Renshon 2008)

and Jimmy Carter (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) and Israeli premiers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres (Crichlow 1998).[5] And, in contrast to Jervis's claim that once change comes, "it will come in large batches" and that "several elements will change almost simultaneously," recent studies show that changes in core beliefs do not necessarily cause all of one's beliefs to change (Jervis 1976, 170; Renshon 2008, 830–31, 840).

Other researchers have looked into certain personality types that appear to be more predisposed to changing their own views and their states' foreign policies than are others. Cognitive psychologists note that individuals who are *cognitively open*—that is, receptive to new information that challenges their core beliefs—are more likely to change their beliefs than are those who are *cognitively closed*; those in the latter group are more likely to reject information that challenges their beliefs (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen 1967; Goldmann 1988; M. Hermann 1984; Rokeach 1960; Stoessinger 1979). Similarly, cognitive psychologists distinguish between *cognitively complex* individuals—those who recognize multiple dimensions in people, objects, and situations—and *cognitively simple* individuals, who tend to view the world in black and white terms (Hermann 1980; Shapiro and Bonham 1973; Tetlock 1984, 1985; Vertzberger 1990; Wallace and Suedfeld 1995). Political scientists employing this framework—and the one used in the present study—have argued, accordingly, that cognitively open and complex leaders are more likely to change their beliefs, and will therefore be more inclined to alter their states' foreign policies, than their cognitively closed and simple counterparts (Aronoff 2001, 2006; Farnham 2001; Stein 1994; Ziv 2011). Discourse analysis of these decision makers' own words in memoirs, press conferences, speeches, and published interviews, as well as testimony from associates of these leaders, elaborate upon the extent to which the decision maker is receptive to new information he or she comes across (cognitive openness) and also the number and combination of dimensions the decision maker applies to people and situations (cognitive complexity). These studies find that the more a decision maker is open and complex, the higher the likelihood that he or she will revise his or her beliefs when confronted with new information. Thus, cognitively open and complex decision makers are more likely to learn than those who are cognitively closed and simple.

Learning and Foreign Policy

How can we determine whether a decision maker who espouses a new position on a given issue has actually changed his or her beliefs as a result of "learning" as opposed to having adopted a new position out of mere expedi-

ency? In other words, how do we know if genuine learning has taken place? This is an important question because the answer will likely be indicative of a decision maker's level of commitment to a newly announced policy.

Jack Levy defines "learning" as "a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience" (1994, 283).[6] In other words, learning is a change of beliefs at the cognitive level. Unlike schema theory, it is an active process (Levy 1994, 283; Stein 1994, 170). Learning is an analytic construction, whereby people interpret historical experience through their own "frames," which they apply to that experience. This helps to explain why different leaders draw different conclusions from similar experiences.

Nye's (1987) distinction between "simple learning" and "complex learning" offers a useful framework in helping the researcher ascertain whether the decision maker has actually learned. Simple learning refers to new information the actor uses to alter means, but not ends. Similarly, Haas (1991) distinguishes simple learning, which he calls "adaptation," from genuine learning. Complex learning, by contrast (the only real learning, for Haas), involves the alteration of one's causal beliefs that lead, in turn, to the adoption of new goals.

The literature on learning suggests that most learning takes place at the tactical level (Tetlock 1991, 28).[7] A major challenge for the scholar, therefore, is to determine the extent to which a decision maker has surpassed the tactical level. The conventional wisdom is that complex learning is brought about by dramatic occurrences—wars, crises, catastrophic events, etc.—which may trigger a change in a decision maker's belief system (Bennett 1999, 84–85; Nye 1987, 398). Recent studies have explored, for example, the impact of the Korean War on Mao Zedong's more hostile and confrontational worldview (Feng 2005) and that of 9/11 on George W. Bush's more negative and bellicose worldview (Renshon 2008).

Complex learning can also occur incrementally, however (Ziv 2013). A decision maker may change his or her beliefs over an extended period of time as a result of a trickling of information that challenges the logic of a prior belief. Such incremental change may herald a change in ends given the amount of time that has elapsed, enabling the decision maker to reassess his or her beliefs. It is this incremental process that characterizes Shimon Peres's evolution from a hard-nosed hawk to a dove.

A Theoretical Framework

This book argues that it is the leader's cognitive structure—his or her levels of cognitive openness and complexity—that is the critical causal variable in

determining his or her propensity to revise core positions in light of new information. A cognitively open and complex leader will be more sensitive to structural changes internationally and to changes in the domestic political environment. Such a leader is more amenable to change his or her beliefs and reorient the country's foreign policy than a leader who is cognitively closed and simple. Systemic-structural and domestic political factors are necessary but insufficient determinants of such a change; they are permissive conditions, not causal factors.

DEFINING "HAWKS" AND "DOVES"

The term *hawk* is used to denote a leader who has an uncompromising attitude in the realm of foreign policy, whereas the term *dove* denotes a leader who prefers strategies of accommodation with the adversary. These terms are context-specific, however, since a dovish policy in one situation might mean something quite different than a dovish policy in other circumstances. For example, the hawk-dove divide in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations was based on one's positions on issues such as arms reduction, whereas the hawk-dove divide in the context of French policy toward Algeria from 1954–1962 was based on one's position regarding granting Algeria independence.

Since this book focuses on the hawk-to-dove transformation of long-time Israeli leader Shimon Peres, it is necessary to lay out specific criteria that define the "hawk" and "dove" labels in the Israeli context. For the period in question (1967–2014), I examine Peres's positions on the following issues to distinguish hawks from doves: (1) territorial compromise; (2) Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza; (3) negotiations with the PLO; and (4) Palestinian statehood.

Since 1967, the year in which Israel became an occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a consequence of the 1967 War, it is what one observer calls "the territorial divide" that has essentially differentiated hawks from doves.[8] Doves have supported territorial compromise; that is, returning parts or all of the occupied territories. Hawks have generally opposed territorial concessions, preferring to either provide the Palestinian residents of these territories with some sort of autonomy or having these territories formally annexed by Israel. The establishment of Jewish settlements in these territories has been an important strategy in retaining them; thus hawks have supported their expansion, while doves want to see them curtailed—even dismantled. Until the Islamist movement Hamas won a large majority in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006, the PLO was widely considered by the international community and by the Palestinians themselves as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Whereas Israeli doves have long supported negotiations with the

PLO, hawks have opposed it on the grounds that one must not negotiate with a terrorist organization. Finally, doves have supported the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while hawks have opposed it.[9]

Doves and hawks are ideal types; in reality, however, people fall along a continuum, with those at one end being strongly hawkish and those at the other end being strongly dovish. Thus, for example, a leader who opposes the expansion of settlements, favors territorial compromise and supports PLO talks that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state is considered more dovish than one who favors territorial compromise in theory but opposes dealing with the PLO (or Hamas) and rejects Palestinian statehood. The latter, however, is more dovish than one who rejects not only negotiations with the PLO and a Palestinian state, but also the very notion of territorial compromise.

This study considers all three levels of analysis in explaining the momentous decision to negotiate with the PLO: (1) the cognitive structure at the individual level; (2) the balance of power at the systemic level; and (3) coalition politics, party politics, and public opinion at the domestic level.

Each leader's cognitive structure—specifically, his levels of cognitive openness and complexity—is evaluated through a comparative analysis of character assessments provided by interviewees as well as discourse analysis of statements made by Shamir, Begin, Rabin, and Peres on issues other than the Palestinian question. The leader's level of cognitive openness is assessed by comparing the analytical results as they pertain to three questions: (1) Is the leader receptive to the views of other leaders or is he dismissive of opinions that differ from his own beliefs? (2) Does the leader surround himself with advisers who are free to challenge his views or does his staff consist largely of yes-men? (3) Does the leader respond to new information that challenges his beliefs by rejecting that information or by updating his beliefs in response to these inputs?

The leader's level of cognitive complexity is assessed by determining his ability to identify nuances in given situations and use them to his advantage. The analytical results of three key questions are employed in this regard: (1) Does the leader tend to view the world in black and white terms, or does he view shades of gray in people and events? (2) Is the leader able to identify situational ambiguity and use it to his operational benefit? (3) Does the leader tend to view conflict situations in zero-sum terms or positive-sum terms?

The balance of power is evaluated in terms of the distribution of military and political capabilities of actors in the Middle East. The impact of these systemic-structural conditions on Israeli security interests is then

assessed, specifically the extent to which shifts in the international and regional balance of power have impacted Israel's geopolitical position.

Coalition politics, party politics, and public opinion are evaluated by examining press reports, polling information, party platforms, intraparty debates, parliamentary debates, and responses from interviewees. These factors are examined within the context of Israeli foreign policy decision making as it pertains to the Palestinian issue in order to determine whether and to what extent they have impacted Israeli foreign policy.

WHY SHIMON PERES?

This study demonstrates the inadequacy of standard rationalist explanations of foreign policy change that are based on systemic and/or domestic political variables. These factors are found to be insufficient in explaining why Shimon Peres became a dove prior to his erstwhile Labor Party rival Yitzhak Rabin, who was witness to the same international and domestic events. Moreover, other hawks who were privy to these events, such as Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, never became doves. Begin and Shamir are cases of the "dogs that did not bark."

Shimon Peres is the primary case study in this book for three reasons. First, Peres is an exemplary case of a hawk-turned-dove. His formative political years were spent running the ministry of defense, where he oversaw furtive arms deals with the French as well as the initiation and development of Israel's nuclear weapons program. His views on foreign policy were distinctly hardline, as was manifested by his belligerent rhetoric toward Israel's Arab adversaries, his fervent support for counterterror operations, and his push for Israel's involvement in the 1956 Sinai War. Following the 1967 War, Peres stood to the right of the Labor Party, his political home, by opposing territorial concessions and promoting the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. It was only in the late 1970s that he changed his mind about territorial compromise and settlement expansion, becoming a supporter of the former and an opponent of the latter. By the late 1980s, Peres identified with the party doves, who were advocating negotiations with the PLO, a position he vigorously pushed following Yitzhak Rabin's victory in the 1992 national elections. By 1997, Peres publicly endorsed the notion of an independent Palestinian state—a view he has retained to this very day. The one-time hawk had become a devoted dove.

Second, the data availability on Peres makes him a particularly appealing leader to study. Peres's six-decade political career is unique not only in terms of its broad time span but also in terms of the extent to which he has been a key player in Israeli foreign policy decision making. As the

empirical chapters make clear, Peres has had a hand in major foreign policy decisions since the mid-1950s. Many archival documents dating to the earlier part of Peres's career have been declassified and are now available to the public. Because Peres is a prolific writer and speaker, his transformation from hawk to dove also can be traced through his own words. Furthermore, expert testimony is readily available given the numerous family members, friends, acquaintances, former colleagues and aides—supporters and detractors alike—who are still alive.[10] These witnesses are important for corroborating Peres's words as well as providing the interviewer with insight into Peres's personality. Furthermore, Peres himself is alive and generally grants interviews. In two lengthy interviews with the Israeli president that were conducted in November 2006 and April 2012, this author probed Peres's evolving beliefs and major decisions during his political career.

Third, Peres has had a significant impact on Israeli foreign policy; he is not just an ordinary policymaker whose views have shifted. Peres matters because he has had a central role in shaping the course of events in Israel, in contrast to other hawkish Israeli officials who became doves but whose impact on Israeli foreign policy has been far more limited. Former president Ezer Weizman, a high-ranking official in Likud, became increasingly dovish in the late 1970s. In 1980, Weizman left Begin's government and formed his own political faction before ending up in the dovish wing of the Labor Party. Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of military intelligence, similarly shifted in a dovish direction, advocating in 1977 talks with the PLO that would lead to a Palestinian state, many years before Israel's mainstream political establishment was prepared to do so. Weizman and Harkabi are but two examples of Israeli hawks who became doves. However, these figures had relatively minor roles in influencing the direction of Israeli foreign policy and are thus less appealing cases for exhaustive research.[11]

To be sure, there are other examples of hawks who adopted dovish policies *and* who played a major role in Israeli foreign policy. As made clear in chapter 5, however, the extent of Yitzhak Rabin's transformation appears to have been more limited than Peres's shift. The concluding chapter addresses the more recent Israeli case of Ariel Sharon's dovish turn, as well as the enigmatic case of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose beliefs do not appear to have shifted in a significant manner.

This study independently confirms other works that have found both Peres and Rabin to be pragmatic leaders who display a high level of sensitivity to their environment. In a quantitative analysis of each leader's "operational code," Crichlow (1998) shows that Peres in particular displayed pragmatic behavior, shifting his strategy over time in response to situational

changes. Aronoff's (2001) qualitative study examines the cognitive structure of Israeli prime ministers. She finds Rabin and Peres, in particular, to have high levels of cognitive complexity, which helps to explain their ability to change their image of the PLO. In contrast, Shamir's cognitive simplicity prevented him from revising his image of the PLO. Yet Aronoff focuses also on two other factors: the decision makers' ideology and their "time horizon"—that is, the percentage of time that each leader devotes to thinking of the past, the present, and the future. These additional factors are superfluous, however, for explaining the decision makers' foreign policy beliefs; her model is thus overdetermined. Moreover, her framework does not account for the systemic-structural and domestic political variables that are ultimately necessary in explaining *why* a decision maker might revise his or her beliefs. Thus, the explanation offered here is more parsimonious with respect to the psychological factors by focusing solely on cognitive openness and complexity as determinants of a leader's propensity to change foreign policy directions. At the same time, it does not neglect the important situational variables that would prompt him or her to do so.

METHODS OF INQUIRY

Interviews, archival documents, and a slew of primary and secondary source material were utilized for this project. Autobiographical works and biographies of the decision makers were consulted, as were their op-eds, public speeches and published interviews. The decision makers' written and spoken statements were juxtaposed with expert testimony from veteran journalists, former political aides, members of Knesset (the Israeli parliament), retired diplomats, ex-generals, and close friends and family members (in the case of Peres). Two personal interviews with Peres are included in this list. The rest of the interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C., where retired diplomats and ex-government officials gave their accounts of the personalities of these leaders and their take on what factors led Peres and Rabin—as opposed to Begin and Shamir—to change their positions on the Palestinian problem.

Complementing the interviews are relevant papers of record and periodicals covering political affairs in Israel from 1953 to the present, as well as archival research that took place in three locations in Israel: the Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives (IDFA) in Tel Hashomer, the Israel State Archives (ISA) in Jerusalem, and the Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archive in Beit Berl. The IDFA has yielded a plethora of newly available material—specifically, minutes from meetings, briefings, and closed-door speeches from Peres's early years as director-general

of the ministry of defense. The ISA has supplied transcripts of Knesset deliberations and speeches, which provide a glimpse of the various leaders' attitudes at different points in time and highlight the differing approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict amongst the various Knesset factions. The Labor Party Archive, a repository for all archival materials pertaining to the party, is a particularly valuable resource for helping to assess the differences between Rabin and Peres within the context of the general attitudes prevailing in the party at any given time.

Two commonly accepted methodological approaches have been used to analyze the data: process tracing and discourse analysis. Useful for both theory testing and theory development, process tracing is used to trace the link between possible causes and observed outcomes. Bennett and George define "process induction" as a type of process tracing that involves "the inductive observation of apparent causal mechanisms and heuristic rendering of these mechanisms as potential hypotheses for future testing" (1997, 5). Indeed, the plentiful research data has helped to identify the causal path depicting Peres's and Rabin's dovish turns.

Discourse analysis has assisted in the process of determining each leader's personality characteristics—in particular, his levels of cognitive openness and complexity. A leader at the lower end of the complexity continuum tends to describe situations in black and white terms, using absolutist language to convey a thought—words such as *always, never,* or *without a doubt.* Little or no ambiguity can be discerned from his statements. By contrast, a cognitively complex leader tends to avoid absolutist language, crafting thoughts in a more subtle or ambiguous manner, thereby leaving some wiggle room for an altered position in the future. The cognitively complex thinker, when discussing a controversial issue, will generally convey the impression that the issue under discussion is not cut-and-dry but rather involves multiple dimensions. Such thoughts are often conveyed by employing conditional language (e.g., *if, as long as,* etc.), a certain level of ambiguity, or by explicitly acknowledging (though not necessarily endorsing) alternative points of view. The latter is indicative not only of cognitive complexity—the recognition of different dimensions to an issue—but also of the extent of an individual's cognitive openness. Of the four leaders examined in this study, Shamir most closely typifies the cognitively closed and simple leader. He rejects out of hand the validity of other viewpoints and indicates absolute certainty in the rightness of his way. At times, he even perceives those who challenge his views as traitorous. Peres, by contrast, exemplifies the cognitively open and complex leader. He often acknowledges various ways of looking at a problem, and his statements are often ambiguously worded so as to leave the door open for a future change in policy.

Limitations of the Study

This in-depth exploration of Peres's dovish shift enables us to gain a rich understanding of the circumstances that led to his shift and why his political rivals were either slow or failed to revise their foreign policy beliefs. One should not attempt to overgeneralize from this study, however, since it examines a small number of cases. The conclusions derived herein are contingent generalizations, and it is left to future researchers to apply the theoretical framework presented here to other cases.

Some would consider the loss of parsimony in an explanation that encompasses various sets of factors at different levels of analysis to be an additional limitation. Explanations that use fewer variables to explain outcomes are often preferred to those that employ more variables because they explain a lot with a little and so maximize analytical leverage. Yet, as this book attempts to demonstrate, more parsimonious approaches provide inadequate explanations of changes in leaders' foreign policy views and of changes in their states' foreign policy behavior. A more accurate account of this phenomenon, therefore, requires scholars to sacrifice some analytical parsimony.

BOOK STRUCTURE

In the following pages, Shimon Peres's significant reversal on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is explored. In describing his dovish transformation, Peres's decision-making approach and attitudes are compared with those of his contemporaries. An explanation, rooted in cognitive psychology, is offered for why Peres and, to a lesser extent, Rabin, became dovish, while Begin and Shamir maintained their hardline positions all along.

Chapter 2 compares the cognitive structure of four Israeli prime ministers—Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres. To avoid a tautology, the analysis is done on each leader's statements and actions on issues *other than* the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than on the basis of this book's dependent variable. Shamir is shown to be the least cognitively open and complex of these leaders and therefore the least amenable to altering his views. Begin is also found to be relatively cognitively closed and simple. Peres is shown to be the most cognitively open and complex, and therefore the most likely leader to alter his views. Rabin is also a relatively cognitively open and moderately complex leader but less so than Peres.

Chapter 3 explores Peres's hawkish years (1953–1977). This chapter demonstrates that Peres, in the earlier part of his career, was an uncompromising

hawk and that he had a major impact on Israeli foreign policy even though he was a secondary political actor during these years. Archival documents, interviews, and Peres's public statements reveal his deep lack of faith in Arab intentions toward Israel, resistance to domestic and international calls for restraint in the wake of Israeli counterterror operations, and vociferous opposition to territorial compromise, negotiations with the PLO, and Palestinian statehood during the decade following the 1967 War. As minister of defense in the mid-1970s, Peres emerged as a stalwart ally of settlers, lending his support to some of the first Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Chapter 4 focuses on the first phase of Peres's dovish transformation (1977–1987). The Socialist International and his own political aides, coupled with domestic and international events, are shown to have influenced his acceptance of territorial compromise, opposition to settlement expansion, and, more generally, a change in rhetoric toward the Palestinians and the elevation of the peace process to the top of his agenda. During Peres's years as leader of the opposition, he consulted regularly with numerous officials both at home and abroad. He often sought out the opinions of his young, highly educated and ambitious aides, who were encouraged to challenge Peres when they disagreed with their boss. His willingness to entertain ideas other than his own contributed significantly to his reevaluation of his long-held views on the Palestinian issue.

Chapter 5 covers the second phase of Peres's dovish transformation (1987–1997). The London Agreement that Peres reached with King Hussein in 1987, followed by the collapse of the "Jordanian option" the following year, led Peres to the conclusion that Israel needed to directly engage the PLO—a move he had resisted for decades. Peres had an important role in bringing about this sea change in Israeli foreign policy following the election of Rabin in 1992. As foreign minister, he applied no small amount of pressure on Rabin to formally authorize the secret negotiations taking place in Oslo. By the mid-1990s, Peres's dovish transformation was complete: he staunchly advocated territorial compromise and negotiations with the PLO, while opposing continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and he also became a strong proponent of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The final chapter (chapter 6) summarizes the central conclusions drawn from the empirical research and demonstrates how this model might be applied to explaining other cases in Israel and elsewhere. Regarding the former, vignettes are provided of former prime minister Ariel Sharon and current prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Like Netanyahu today, Sharon was a chairman of the right-wing Likud party. However, as prime minister, Sharon came to support the idea he had long fought against: Palestinian statehood. Parting ways with Netanyahu, he eventually bolted his political

home and formed Kadima, a new party whose central aim was to promote a two-state solution—a policy the Likud continues to reject. Sharon appears to be more cognitively open than Netanyahu, a factor that probably played an important role in his decision to leave Likud and promote a different policy. Similarly, this chapter includes vignettes of three leaders outside of Israel—U.S. president Ronald Reagan, Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and U.S. president Jimmy Carter. It is their relative cognitive openness and complexity that may help to explain why Reagan and Gorbachev became more dovish toward the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, while Carter became more hawkish toward the Soviets. The chapter concludes by arguing that the cognitive structural analysis approach can have useful implications for policymaking, including on such fundamental questions as war and peace.