

Introduction

Islamic Philosophy and the Crisis of Modern Rationalism

This volume examines the modern reception of Islamic philosophy and its importance (and implications) for a critique of modern Western philosophy. In an essay titled “Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy,” an eminent scholar of Islamic political philosophy, Muhsin Mahdi, extends the crisis identified and labeled by Edward Said as “Orientalism” to the academic approach to Islamic philosophy. Mahdi accepts Said’s diagnosis that the problematic sense of “Orientalism” arises from “a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shared by the three great empires—British, French, and American—in whose intellectual territory the writing was produced.”¹ This so-called dynamic exchange is, according to Said, “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it.”² In other words, Orientalist discourse is the systematic academic discipline of dominating, controlling, and managing the so-called Orient for the sake of the Western imperial political agenda. The Orient, in this account, is not the Far East, but rather primarily refers to what we call the Middle East, and for Said principally the *Islamic* Orient. His conclusion is that, as a result of the Orientalist discourse, Islam “has been fundamentally misrepresented in the West.”³

In Chapter 1, I identify the Orientalist moves of some of the prominent modern scholars of Islamic philosophy and trace them to what Mahdi astutely identifies as the underlying philosophical predicament of Orientalist discourse (i.e., the discourse that succumbs to Imperialist pressure). Mahdi admits that the recent literature critical of Orientalism has shown that “Oriental studies of Islam and Islamic civilization have been founded on a mixed bag of religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic (in some cases even racist), and scientific

prejudgments and practical political interests."⁴ In other words, "these studies are guided by irrational motives and political interests."⁵ Mahdi asserts that there is no escape from this predicament and that there is an underlying crisis of rationalism tainting modern scholarship wherein the so-called modern rationalism is "in many ways . . . dogmatic and irrational."⁶ Said also acknowledges the philosophical root of the Orientalist quandary: "The real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything." Said denies that such a representation is possible; therefore, "we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation *eo ipso* is implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the 'truth,' which is itself a representation."⁷

Rejecting the possibility of true representations jeopardizes Said's attempts to diagnose "Orientalist" symptoms of Oriental studies, as it would be impossible to accuse such studies of falling short of "truth." Said is aware of this problem and circumvents it by arguing that we should aim for methodological self-consciousness.⁸ In other words, we should acknowledge the complexity of "irrational" factors that constitute a representation and refuse to camouflage our representations as "truths." I agree with Mahdi that Said's "methodological self-consciousness" is only a beginning and "must lead to a search for a genuine form of rationalism."⁹ Mahdi writes: "Understanding the reasons for the limited scope and humanly unsatisfying character of modern rationalism, and the search for a more wholesome unity that satisfies both the rational and imaginative or poetic aspects of man's life, are tasks that are still before us."¹⁰ These are tasks that Mahdi himself does not carry out. However, he does provide a clue as to how to proceed in performing them; he maintains that the study of premodern rationalism, including Islamic philosophy, can "be of some use" in dealing with the development of a full and complete account of rationalism.¹¹ In this text, I draw on the work of principal Islamic Peripatetic philosophers (*mashshā'īyūn*)¹² in order to elucidate and challenge the boundaries of modern reason. As a result, I believe some of the false dualisms afflicting mainstream modern philosophy (e.g., reason vs. nature, reason vs. spirituality, and reason vs. imagination) will weaken their grip on us.

By "the principal Islamic Peripatetic philosophers," I mean Abū Naṣr Muḥammad Fārābī (Alfarabi) [d. 950] and Abū 'Alī Ḥussain ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) [d. 1037] upon whose work the core edifice of Islamic philosophy is constructed. Following Michael Marmura, I maintain that Alfarabi was, properly speaking, the architect of this edifice.¹³ But I also agree with Roger Arnaldez when he calls the early period

of Islamic philosophy “Avicennan,” presumably due to the realization and completion of this edifice in the work of Avicenna.¹⁴ I also consider the debate initiated by the influential theologian, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ghazzālī (Ghazali) [d. 1111], in critiquing Alfarabi and Avicenna, and the rebuttal of Ghazali offered by the twelfth-century Muslim Peripatetic Abū al-Walīd ibn Rushd (Averroes) [d. 1198]. These exchanges contribute to the clarification of the Peripatetic intellectualism. This is not to deny the importance of their predecessors—for example, Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (al-Kindi) [d. 873] and his school as well as the early Ismaili thinkers, such as Abū ‘Abdullah Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī (d. 942) and Abū Ya‘qūb al-Sijistānī (d. circa 974)—who sought, in various ways, to reconcile Islam and Greek philosophy. This work, however, is not an examination of the history of the rise of Islamic philosophy. Rather, what I am seeking to accomplish is the recognition of the importance of Islamic Peripateticism in the formulation of an antidote to the dualisms troubling mainstream modern philosophy.

In the first chapter, I ground my search for the role of intellect in Islamic Peripatetic philosophy by questioning the received account of philosophical activity as the production of abstract rational discourse. For this, I draw from Pierre Hadot’s insightful readings of Greek philosophy wherein Hadot advances the view that, for the Greeks, philosophy was primarily the practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom.¹⁵ I accept this account, which flies in the face of the dominant yet sterile understanding of philosophy as rational discourse, and propose that Hadot’s thesis (about the nature of philosophical inquiry among the Greeks) provides a novel way of interpreting Islamic philosophy as an inheritor of the Greek philosophical tradition.

In Chapter 2, I develop the corollary to the above account of Greco-Islamic philosophy as an overcoming of the modernist’s divide between reason and world through an account of moral knowledge as involving a cultivated sensitivity to relevant features of the world.¹⁶ In this account, claims to knowledge, as active exercises of our acquired concepts, are answerable to a world that is experienced by means of an involuntary actualization of those same concepts. This account of knowledge can be generalized and contains important consequences for the crisis-ridden modern foundationalism (and its opponents who deny the rational bearing of the world on the mind).¹⁷ In this regard, I contend that Heidegger’s phenomenology anticipates and embraces a version of this overcoming of the divide between mind and world.¹⁸ More pointedly, it was this aspect of Heidegger’s view that led his

disciple, Henry Corbin, to Islamic philosophy. I draw on the relevant writings of Corbin and Heidegger to illuminate just how this phenomenological insight is anticipated by the Islamic Peripatetic tradition. In the third chapter, I expand on the ways in which the phenomenological debunking of the mind–world dualism is available in the texts of the Islamic Peripatetics. For the latter, the world is always already intellectually shaped (through the emanations of the Active Intellect). The philosopher is tasked with overcoming the inertia that prevents us from getting things right. In their concern with philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises aiming at the things themselves, Islamic Peripatetics and their modern European counterparts are in alliance with the Greeks in their focus on the emulation and realization of a human exemplar as the standard of wisdom.¹⁹ This relationship to an exemplar is not a mere moral discipleship; rather it is constitutive of the philosophical activity as such—the transformation of the self for the sake of knowledge. However, the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers differ in the significance they assign to the power of prophecy in their accounts of philosophical exemplars and their disciples. This unique Muslim Peripatetic account of the philosophical exemplars follows from the Islamic tradition’s explanations of the revelations of Prophet Muhammad. The Islamic Peripatetic account of prophecy is, in turn, responsible for what Mahdi identified as the harmony of the rational and the imaginative aspects of human life that, in this context, has legal, ethical, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I explore the Islamic theory of imagination and its place in the prophethood distinctive of Islamic philosophy. In developing the details of the cultivation of the imagination advanced by the Islamic philosophers, I delineate the poetic appropriation of the art of spiritual hermeneutics (*ta’wīl*) to account for the cultivation of the theoretical dimension of the intellect. Beginning with Avicenna, a significant moment in the Islamic cultivation of the soul involves the interpretation of imaginative symbolism. This hermeneutics aims to free the interpreter from the grip of the mundane and culminates in an experience of the divine. I relate this aspect of Islamic philosophy to a strand in modern European philosophical exploration of the faculty of the imagination and the analytic of the concept of the sublime. For this comparison, I consider the seminal aesthetic writings of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger as well as the work of some of their prominent readers and commentators.²⁰

The modern accounts of the sublime explicate that of which this term is predicated either as located beyond the reach of imagination (Kant and his followers) or as a relic of an era that failed to

recognize the full capacity of human imagination (and therefore the Hegelian sublation of the sublime in the beautiful). I maintain that Islamic Peripatetics, following Avicenna, develop an engagement of the sublime that bypasses the Kantian paradox (imagining the unimaginable) without succumbing to the historicizing of the sublime (*pace* Hegel). Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī, a prominent expositor of this alternative, which is a subject matter of my conclusion, advances the Avicennan account of the poetic imagination by assigning to the perfected imagination the role of a cognitive faculty that brings into view the objects of an imaginal realm (*‘ālam al-mithāl*), between the spiritual and the physical.

In Chapter 6, before turning to the later tradition of Islamic philosophy, I offer a critique of Heidegger’s phenomenology from the perspective of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy. I show that Islamic Peripatetics extend the domain of the practice of spiritual exercises beyond Heideggerian “authenticity”; as a result, they unfold new vistas of theoretical experience and endow the philosopher with exceptional dignity and freedom.

In the conclusion, I show that the later Islamic philosophers continue the projects of the Peripatetics and make original contributions to the philosophical enterprise advanced by their predecessors. To illustrate this point, in addition to Suhrawardī’s writings, I discuss the salient work of the greatest of the later Islamic philosophers, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī (Mulla Sadra), and the schools and the traditions that trained him and those that were subsequently influenced by his contribution.