

Introduction

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Americans living in the Middle Colonies—Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York—were demonstrably loyal to Great Britain throughout the French and Indian War (1756–1763). Praised by the government for their contribution to the war effort, their patriotism soared following the spectacular victory over France. Only when the British government attempted to balance its budget, pay off its war debts, and increase its grip over its North American colonies by taxing them and by rigorously enforcing and tightening its trade laws did urban residents in the Middle Colonies begin to question whether the government’s policies were threatening their liberty and economic well-being. A postwar depression, which many colonists blamed on the government’s stern policies, only worsened tempers and the economic climate.

Most Americans nonetheless initially refused to see villainy in Britain’s behavior. For British Americans, it was the mother country. For other European Americans, including the Dutch in New York and the Germans in Pennsylvania, it was the country that allowed them great religious and political freedom. Surely when the government understood how its policies were hurting Americans, it would change course. Moreover, Middle Colony residents, who lived in rural areas and who were consequently not immediately affected by the government’s new economic policies, did not earnestly participate in the protest movement until 1774.¹

Government policies were only one source of tension that Americans in the Middle Colonies experienced in the postwar period; local issues also divided them. Anglicans and Presbyterians clashed repeatedly for religious and political advantage.² The Dutch Reformed were bitterly split over how their church should be organized and over what language should be used in religious services.³ New Englanders and New Yorkers clashed over land titles in what would eventually become the state of Vermont.⁴ Landlords

and tenants came to blows over land tenure in the Hudson Valley, where Loyalism and neutrality would become major forces during the Revolution.⁵ Pennsylvanians and alleged intruders from Connecticut fought over possession of the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania.⁶ Scots-Irish Presbyterians on the Pennsylvania frontier and Benjamin Franklin's Quaker Party fought over Indian policy and whether the province should become a royal colony.⁷ The East Jersey proprietors and the settlers of Newark and Elizabethtown, Essex County, New Jersey, clashed, sometimes violently, over landownership.⁸ In short, in the 1760s and 1770s, the Middle Colonies were a cauldron of religious, ethnic, economic, and social tensions. As British-American relations turned violent, these internal strains helped determine the side individuals and groups supported in the imperial conflict.

Despite the considerable efforts historians have made to uncover and examine these tensions, their understanding of the American Revolution in the Middle Colonies is uneven and incomplete. Scholars know much about the victors but much less about the Loyalists; those Royalists, with whom they are familiar, were usually from the elite rather than from the common sort.⁹ Books have been written about Loyalism as it existed in each of the Middle Colonies.¹⁰ Others have delved into Loyalist intellectuals, who ideologically justified their cause, or into prominent Royalist leaders, such as Joseph Galloway.¹¹ However, no study has focused on the Loyalists of the lower and middle sort who constituted the muscle and sinew of their cause.

The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle States, 1763–1787 seeks to remedy this situation. It aims to uncover how these long-ignored, ordinary people of the Middle Colonies chose the side they did; to illustrate the ways in which they participated in and endured the Revolution; and to determine what happened to them because of their defeat. It offers a collection of chapters written by scholars of the Middle States who have focused their research on the experiences of the American Loyalists. In addition, a chapter on the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) explores why most of these Indians eventually sided with Britain and remained loyal to their long-standing treaty obligations with the Crown.

The "other Loyalists" were a complicated medley of individuals escaping attention primarily because of the paucity of evidence. Most remained faithful to the Crown throughout the conflict because of their political beliefs, religious convictions, or self-interest. Some had started as Patriots but later converted to Loyalism. For example, Ross Curry of Philadelphia abandoned the Patriot cause to become a lieutenant in a unit of Pennsylvania Loyalists. He was attainted for treason, had his property confiscated, and became an exile in Parrtown (St. John), New Brunswick, Canada.¹² Gilbert Giberson, a Monmouth County, New Jersey, farmer, resigned his captaincy in a Patriot militia unit when the Declaration of Independence was promulgated.¹³ Ellis

Barron of Woodbridge, New Jersey, served on the Patriot Committee of Observation for Middlesex County in 1775 but joined the Loyalists when British troops entered New Jersey in 1776.¹⁴

Others returned to Loyalism for reasons that had little to do with political independence. Nicholas Housecker, who was allegedly a mercenary, fought first as a major under Whig General Anthony Wayne but then switched over to the other side.¹⁵ Some individuals found themselves labeled and mistreated as Tories, even though they did not consider themselves Loyalists. The predominately neutral Quakers, for example, had initially tried to remain aloof from the contest because of their religious commitment to pacifism. However, their refusal to aid the American Patriots, who needed all the help they could get, led to Friends being labeled Tories. New Jersey Whigs seized the property of Joseph Peddle, a Quaker farmer residing in Burlington County, who had refused to bear arms for either side because of his religious beliefs. Delaware Patriots denounced Quaker John Cowgill of Duck Creek Hundred as an enemy of his country and carted him through the streets for declining for religious reasons to use Continental money.¹⁶

Once the military conflict commenced, many Loyalists signed pro-British loyalty oaths, supplied provisions, and worked as civilian auxiliaries in support of the Crown. They performed militia service in places that the British controlled. For example, James Burwell of Morris County, New Jersey, enlisted in the British military in 1776 and fought at Yorktown in 1781.¹⁷ Loyalists also joined the irregular forces that harassed the American forces in areas that were in dispute.¹⁸ Evan Thomas became a commander in the Bucks County Volunteers, engaged in predatory warfare against the Whigs around Philadelphia, and finally settled in New Brunswick, Canada. Lewis Fenton and Jake Fagan, both of Monmouth County, raided out of the New Jersey pine barrens.¹⁹ Some adherents of the Crown suffered imprisonment or gave their lives for the cause. Elizabeth Vandyne was jailed in New Jersey in 1776 for counterfeiting Continental currency. Fagan was killed in 1778, and Fenton the next year. Lawrence Marr of New Jersey was captured attempting to carry off the books and papers of the Continental Congress. The state of Pennsylvania tried him as a spy and executed him in Philadelphia in 1781. John Connel and David Dawson of Chester County, Pennsylvania, joined the British army during its stay in Philadelphia (1777–1778) and removed with the troops to New York. Connel eventually served on a British privateer, was captured in 1779, and was subsequently imprisoned. Dawson was caught passing counterfeit Continental money, for which he was put to death. Abraham Carlisle, a Philadelphia Quaker, also aided the British, when they occupied that city. After they withdrew, Pennsylvania prosecuted him in 1778 for assisting the enemy. He was consequently put to death, and his property was confiscated.²⁰

Ultimately, many of the active Loyalists, who had virulently opposed the Revolution, fled from the new nation to settle elsewhere in the empire. They became the founders of Upper Canada (Ontario), the solidifiers of British control of Arcadia (Nova Scotia), and the creators of New Brunswick as the Loyalist province.²¹ Isaac Allen, a Trenton, New Jersey, attorney and a lieutenant colonel in the New Jersey (Loyalist) Volunteers, suffered a disability while fighting in the South and went to New Brunswick, where he eventually became a Supreme Court justice. Thomas Francis, an African American slave, fled New Jersey for New York in 1782 and subsequently went to Canada.²² Other Crown adherents went to Great Britain, Bermuda, or the British West Indies. However, many Loyalists, especially those who had refrained from displays of demonstrative support for the Crown or who had not alienated their American neighbors, remained in the new nation after the war and sought to reintegrate themselves into their communities.²³ William Debnam, an English shoemaker, became a Loyalist but remained in Burlington County, New Jersey.²⁴

The imperial policies that Britain pursued following the French and Indian War eventually persuaded many Middle Colony residents that George III was engaging in a conspiracy against liberty and that American independence was the only option. It is consequently advisable to outline the key British actions that led to civil war and revolution in the thirteen North American mainland colonies that became the United States.²⁵ To start, the king issued the Proclamation of 1763 in October of that year. It forbade colonists from settling west of the Appalachian Mountains. At first, westward-looking colonials believed that this prohibition injured their economic prospects by restricting their ability to acquire land, but over time loopholes enabled investors and settlers to ignore the line and to move beyond the mountains. However, the proclamation included another important provision. Land that the Crown controlled, and for which no land grants had been made, was to be allotted to veterans of the war. This provision led to the establishment in New York of large pockets of veterans on the northern frontier, near Canada. These settlements placed experienced soldiers, who had fought for the empire, in a strategic location in case of a future war that involved the former French colony. Many former soldiers here and elsewhere in the Middle Colonies were either indifferent to the Revolutionary cause or eventually became Loyalists, for they would not accept the destruction of the empire for which they had fought.²⁶

Richard Robert Crow, who served with the British army at Quebec, Louisburg, Martinique, and Havana, was granted land in New York but settled in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. At the time of the Revolution he turned down an offer to serve as a high-ranking officer in the American army and

fled to Nova Scotia at war's end.²⁷ Philip Skene, who had been wounded at the Battle of Ticonderoga (1758), received a land patent in 1765, in what became the township of Skenesborough (presently Whitehall, New York). He served with the British army until he was captured at the Battle of Saratoga (1777). In 1779, the state of New York confiscated his property because of his Loyalism. William Gilliland, a British veteran, received a grant of land north of Crown Point on the west side of Lake Champlain. Whigs arrested him early in the war for his pro-British activities. His finances consequently suffered, and he was imprisoned for debt from 1786 until 1791. In 1771, another British veteran, Adolphus Benzell, received a land grant for over 1,000 acres at Crown Point, New York. Although he died in 1775, he had favored the British before the war, and most members of his family were Royalists in the Revolution.²⁸ A few veterans did transfer allegiance to the revolutionaries, however. Richard Montgomery, for example, served as a general in the Continental Army and in 1775 gave his life for the cause.²⁹

The Revenue (or Sugar) Act of April 1764 was designed to help pay for the British troops stationed in America, in part to keep the colonists in check. The act cut in half the duty on foreign molasses in the belief that the lower rate would inhibit smuggling; banned the importation of foreign rum into the colonies; doubled the duties on foreign products shipped from England to the colonies; and extended the list of enumerated goods, which colonists could transport only within the empire. The act also authorized creation of a new vice admiralty court in Halifax, Nova Scotia. At a prosecutor's discretion, any colonial maritime or civil case falling within the jurisdiction of a vice admiralty court could now be filed at the new site. The cabinet hoped this step would improve the chance of conviction, enhance compliance with the act, and increase revenues. Because rural people were little affected by this act, they remained quiet. However, aggrieved urban colonials, especially those such as Isaac Sears, a future Whig, who favored free trade, did protest.³⁰ Over time, as Parliament enacted other measures to regulate and tax trade, urban merchants in the Middle Colonies would be forced to calculate whether or not the advantages they reaped from the Acts of Trade and Navigation outweighed the cost of the legislation enacted after 1763. The conclusions that individuals reached about this matter in turn often influenced how they sided during the Revolution.³¹

The Quartering Act of March 1765 required colonial governments to supply and house British troops sent into their provinces. These troops were supposed to protect the empire from attacks by a revived French military or by aggrieved Native Americans. Protesting colonists argued that the measure was really taxation without representation, for Parliament was attempting to compel provincial assemblies to allocate money for specific purposes. Urban Americans claimed too that these troops were being kept in or near the

major cities along the Atlantic coast to enforce Britain's postwar policies and to intimidate residents. The presence of these troops on American soil inescapably became a sore point. In 1770, the "Battle of Golden Hill" pitted British regulars against New York City's Sons of Liberty and neighborhood civilians.³² However, De Lancey party leaders, many of whom eventually became Loyalists, saw the army as a counterweight to the Liberty Boys and were pleased that local militants had gotten a drubbing in the fracas.³³

Heedless of the negative (although predictable) consequences of its actions, Parliament also passed the Stamp Act (March 1765), the first direct tax Britain ever levied on its North American colonies. The measure taxed most printed material, including newspapers, broadsides, and many commercial and legal documents. The tax was to be used to support the army stationed in America. Infractions of the law could be tried, at the prosecutor's discretion, in either the juryless vice admiralty courts or the local common law courts. The tax antagonized many economic constituencies in the Middle Colonies. Merchants were incensed because the need for stamps on commercial documents would increase costs and complicate business transactions. The requirement that the tax be paid in specie threatened (following the Currency Act) to kill the very commerce upon which the measure aimed to raise revenue. Land speculators were vexed by the taxes that were now to be levied on their deals. Lawyers were upset, for stamps would have to be affixed to court documents. Printers were appalled, because the statute inflated the cost of what they printed, threatened to undermine freedom of the press, and could wreck their business. Clergymen feared that baptisms, marriages, and funeral services would not be performed, for the certifying documents would be taxed.

The Stamp Act consequently managed to offend all of the key interest groups in the Middle Colonies. Thomas Jones, a staunch Loyalist who would finish his life as an exile in England, believed that "all parties, all denominations, and all ranks of people appeared unanimous in opposing its [the Stamp Act's] execution." Joseph Galloway, a future Pennsylvania Loyalist, argued that "one Half of the Americans will die rather than submit to it. The Fermentation is almost general to the Eastward, and does not seem much less to the Westward."³⁴ Not all colonists, of course, opposed this legislation. James McEvers, a New York City Anglican merchant and future Loyalist, accepted appointment as a stamp officer only to resign when he was threatened with violence against his person and possessions.³⁵ William Coxe, a Philadelphia merchant who had been appointed New Jersey's stamp distributor, had initially expected provincial residents to comply with the act and had even executed the 3,000-pound sterling bond required by the Stamp Commission. However, after the *New York Gazette; or the Weekly Post-Boy* reported on August 22 that someone had refused to rent him a home

“unless he would insure the House from being pulled down, or Damaged,” Coxe resigned and pledged to a large crowd that he would not implement the measure.³⁶ John Hughes, Pennsylvania’s stamp distributor, was not so easily intimidated. He recommended to the Stamp Commissioners that his son Hugh be appointed Coxe’s replacement. In mid-September, with the help of about 800 “White Oaks,” Hughes even withstood a mob that wanted to demolish his house because he would not resign his commission. However, it was all to no avail. In early October he pledged before a crowd that he would not execute the Stamp Act. What is unknown is what this stubborn man thought, in the midst of his tribulations, about the fact that his brother Hugh was a prominent New York City Liberty Boy. An embittered man, John Hughes died in 1772 in Charleston, South Carolina, where he had been serving since July 1771 as Collector of the Customs.³⁷

More than self-interest was involved in the opposition to the Stamp Act. As early as the 1752, William Livingston, a future Whig and the first governor of the state of New Jersey, had argued: “It is a standing Maxim of *English Liberty*, ‘that no Man shall be taxed, but with his own Consent.’”³⁸ This argument was repeated in rebuttal to the postwar British imperial policies. One writer neatly summarized the American constitutional position: “Since we are agreed in the *Right of the Colonies, to be taxed only by their own Consent given by their Representatives*; It follows, that if they are not so represented in Parliament, [then] they have not given, nor can they possibly give their Consent to be there taxed, consequently . . . such a Tax must be arbitrary illegal and oppressive.” “Freeman” avowed that it was “not the Tax itself” but “the unconstitutional Manner of imposing it, that is the great Subject of Uneasiness to the Colonies. Whatever Justice there may be in their bearing a proportional Charge of the War, they apprehend, that Manner of levying the Money upon them, *without their own Consent*, by which they are deprived of one of the most valuable Rights of British Subjects, *never can be right*.” A third writer, “A. B. C.,” insisted that Americans could be “taxed only by our Legal constitutional Representatives.”³⁹ However, future Loyalist Joseph Galloway took a different approach: “If then it be reasonable that America should be taxed towards her own safety, and her safety depends on her enabling the Crown to secure it; if without this she may be lost to the mother country, and deprived of her civil as well as religious rights, if she has been thus negligent of her duty, and perversely obstinate,” is it not undeniable that it “becomes the indispensable duty of a British parliament to interfere and compel he to do what is reasonable and necessary” and tax the colonies.⁴⁰

Although the protest movement against the mother country led by 1765 to a significant amount of violence, most colonial farmers were largely unaffected by the laws passed between 1762 and 1765 and did not perceive

the ruckus against the new British policies to be important in their lives. They continued to support the government, if for no other reason than that they rarely trusted urban merchants and their machinations. Although there were exceptions, most assemblymen and government officials from the rural areas of the Middle Colonies never became leaders of the protest movement in the 1760s. In Dutchess County, New York, many tenant farmers of Patriot landowners turned Loyalist, not because they favored Britain but because they resented their landlords. On the other hand, many Loyalist landlords, such as the Johnson family, which held vast acreage in the Mohawk Valley and which had retained the fidelity of its tenants, often took them into the pro-British camp.⁴¹

Although the ministry had backed down in the face of urban riots and repealed the Stamp Act in March 1766, the government's general policy remained the same. Immediately after the repeal, Parliament passed the Declaratory Act, which proclaimed its supremacy over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever."⁴² The continued need for revenue led George Townshend, chancellor of the Exchequer, to persuade Parliament in 1767 to pass the Townshend Act, which levied duties on glass, lead, paint, paper, and tea imported into the colonies. The proceeds were to be spent for colonial defense and for defraying the cost of government. A companion measure created an American Board of Customs at Boston that had power over all colonial customs officials. Urban colonists responded with a boycott of British goods, and in 1770 Parliament again backed down, this time by repealing all of the Townshend duties except the one on tea, which was to remain a symbol of parliamentary sovereignty. The De Lancey party, which favored close economic ties with the empire, consequently persuaded New York City residents to lift their boycott against all items except tea, and the other Middle Colonies reluctantly followed suit. Relations with the mother country improved.⁴³

In 1773, Parliament enacted the Tea Act, mainly because the East India Company faced bankruptcy and needed to sell the vast amounts of tea overflowing its warehouses. The Tea Act remitted all British duties on tea exported to the colonies and allowed the company to sell directly to consignees there instead of at public auction in Britain. Company tea would thus be cheaper than the tea British Americans smuggled into the colonies to avoid paying the Townshend duty. The ministry failed to consider how colonists would react to a law that overturned established patterns of trade, that ruined a few influential businesses by granting the East India Company a monopoly in America, and that would set a precedent for Parliament's creating similar monopolies over other commodities on the American market. It also reopened the question of whether Parliament could tax the colonies.⁴⁴ Many Americans considered the Boston Tea Party (December 1773) and

the corresponding events that prevented the marketing of tea in other cities, including Philadelphia and New York, virtuous resistance to a program that would ultimately harm all Americans. The resulting tea parties split colonial public opinion between those who supported the protests against this monopoly and those who may have lamented the act but who detested even more the mass public actions that violated the laws.⁴⁵

Parliament responded to the Boston Tea Party with the Coercive (or Intolerable) Acts, which aimed to punish Massachusetts for its insubordination and to intimidate colonists elsewhere from following that province's lead. But the altering of the Massachusetts charter, the tampering with the administration of justice in the province, and closing the port of Boston only awakened colonists throughout America, in both urban and rural areas, to the imperial dangers that menaced them. If Parliament could unilaterally change the Massachusetts charter and mistreat that colony, then it could do the same to them.⁴⁶

Both rural and urban communities in the Middle Colonies sent food and money to support Boston in its crisis. This was the first time many agrarian areas became active in the protest movement.⁴⁷ The fear of violence was so great that the pro-government response to the crisis was muted. For example, in November, "Cassius" informed New York City that William Kelly, a retired merchant who was living in London, had told officials of the East India Company that "there was no danger from the Resentment of the People of New York" over the Tea Act, for New York's "Governor [William] Tryon, (a Military Man) who . . . would cram the Tea down their Throats." Kelly's effigy was consequently carted around town and burned at the Coffee House before thousands of spectators.⁴⁸

In the wake of the Coercive Acts, most of the colonies agreed to send representatives to Philadelphia in September 1774 for what became the First Continental Congress. In October, that body adopted the Continental Association, which called for the cessation of all British imports beginning on December 1, 1774, and for an embargo on all exports to Britain, Ireland, and the British West Indies starting on September 1, 1775. Most important, Congress called for the creation of committees in every town, city, and county to enforce the association and to punish violators. In time, these extralegal bodies became the de facto governing bodies in each colony.⁴⁹ They enforced boycotts and made sure that local residents supported the protest movement. To do this each committee circulated the Continental Association and demanded that everyone living in the community sign it. Even more pressure was now put on those who remained loyal to the Crown. If they did not sign, they might be ostracized, tarred and feathered, or run out of town on a rail.⁵⁰ Many people signed under protest to save their lives, health, and property.⁵¹ After the Cumberland

County, New Jersey, committee forced Silas Newcomb to confess that his family had consumed tea, he was compelled to sign a recantation rather than be denied all contact with his neighbors.⁵² In effect, the associations became law enforcement agencies, maintaining obedience to congressional and state committees' policies.

When the North Ministry and General Thomas Gage responded with military force against the protesters in Massachusetts and shed American blood at Lexington and Concord (April 1775), many Americans rose to meet the challenge.⁵³ It was now almost inevitable that only a clash of arms could settle the conflict.

As American Patriots in the Middle Colonies moved from protest to rebellion, other Americans, who opposed independence, joined the Royalist camp. John Alsop, who was representing New York in the Continental Congress, resigned his position over independence and consequently was labeled a Tory.⁵⁴ Some of these Loyalists, such as Governor William Franklin of New Jersey and Thomas Jones, a justice of the New York Supreme Court, had objected to at least a few of the new imperial policies that followed the French and Indian War, but they now stopped short and refused to make a complete break with the mother country.⁵⁵ Others were involved in groups of people that were much more Loyalist in sentiment than they themselves were, but because of friendship these lukewarm persons were cemented to Loyalism. What follows in these pages are the stories of ordinary people who for various reasons withstood the hostility of their neighbors to remain faithful to the Crown.

Middle Colony Loyalists, for the most part, were disorganized, because they relied heavily on government officials to enforce colonial ordinances. This dependence was their great weakness. As the associations in the local communities and the committees that they spawned grew in strength and became de facto governments, the official royal colonial governments, on which the Loyalists depended for their safety and security, were rapidly wasting away, for British power in America had really rested on the consent of the governed. Hence, in many communities, officials such as sheriffs, who were responsible for enforcing laws, either shirked their duty or were not obeyed. The associations were becoming the new political powers, and the Loyalists were forced to obey, suffer punishment, or leave.⁵⁶

The reasons individuals chose to support the Crown are varied and complicated. As the following chapters will demonstrate, many colonials did so for reasons that were personal or local rather than imperial in nature. The causes for allegiance to the Crown often involved religion, ethnicity, relations with neighbors, crime, and revenge for perceived wrongs. The horse thief, William Clarke of New Jersey, for example, had self-interest rather than principle in mind when he stole and then sold more than 100

horses to the British for profit before he was killed in 1782.⁵⁷ Some Royalists resented the newly emerging Whig leaders, especially those who did not come from an elite background. Still other Loyalists were clearly motivated by the imperial crisis. Throughout this period of imperial reorganization, many Loyalists had agreed with the protesters that the acts passed by Parliament were undesirable, did not meet the needs of the empire, and were destructive of patriotism. However, these critics differed from the Patriots in that they did not perceive these acts as a suitable justification for either violence or independence. Some Crown supporters were pacifists who opposed violence and war. Other Loyalists blamed the adoption of Britain's policies on evil ministers and misguided parliamentarians. They anticipated that when "good" King George saw through the plans of these ministers, he would correct the problem. The Crown was sovereign and would right all evils. This misunderstanding was their undoing. They did not realize that the king and Parliament were allied in pursuing this policy. Loyalists maintained their belief that the Patriots were misguided, ill informed, and more destructive of liberties and freedoms than was the British Crown.

Notes

1. For the situation in the rural areas, see John B. Frantz and William Pencak, eds., *Beyond Philadelphia: The American Revolution in the Pennsylvania Hinterland* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), and Joseph S. Tiedemann and Eugene R. Fingerhut, eds., *The Other New York: The American Revolution beyond New York City, 1763–1787* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

2. See Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Presbyterianism and the American Revolution in the Middle Colonies," *Church History* 74 (2005): 306–44.

3. Arthur J. Wall, "The Controversy in the Dutch Church in New York concerning Preaching in English, 1754–1768," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly* 12 (1928): 39–58; John W. Beardslee, "The Dutch Reformed Church and the American Revolution," *Journal of Presbyterian History* 54 (1976): 165–81; Randall Balmer, *A Perfect Babel of Confusion: Dutch Religion and English Culture in the Middle Colonies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), viii–ix, 38–39, 106–108, 141–56.

4. Michael A. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1993); Paul R. Huey, "Charlotte County," in *The Other New York*, ed. Joseph Tiedemann and Eugene Fingerhut, 199–222.

5. Sung Bok Kim, *Landlord and Tenant in Colonial New York: Manorial Society, 1664–1775* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), chs. 7, 8.

6. William Smith, *An Examination of the Connecticut Claim to Lands in Pennsylvania. With an Appendix, Containing Extracts and Copies Taken from Original Papers* (Philadelphia, PA: Joseph Crukshank, 1774), in *Early American Imprints*,

1639–1800, ed. American Antiquarian Society (New York: American Antiquarian Society, 1981–1982), no. 13629 (hereafter cited as *Early American Imprints*); Lorette Treese, *The Storm Gathering: The Penn Family and the American Revolution* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), ch. 9.

7. William S. Hanna, *Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); James H. Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746–1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972).

8. John E. Pomfret, *Colonial New Jersey: A History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 158–59; 161–63; Nicholas Murray, *Notes Historical and Biographical concerning Elizabeth-town, Its Eminent Men, Churches, and Ministers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 1–12; Brendan McConville, *These Daring Disturbers of the Public Peace: The Struggle for Property and Power in Early New Jersey* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

9. The terms *Loyalist* and *Royalist* are used interchangeably in the text for stylistic reasons. Whigs often used the pejorative term *Tory* to refer to a Loyalist, for in Britain a Tory was a person who had supported James II during the Exclusion Crisis (1678–1681) and the Glorious Revolution (1688) or who in the eighteenth century championed the Church of England and upheld the prerogatives of the Crown over the rights of Parliament; see “Whig and Tory,” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, retrieved September 12, 2007, from *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, <http://0-www.search.eb.com.linus.lmu.edu:80/eb/article-9076766>.

10. Alexander C. Flick, *Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution* (New York: Arms Press, 1901); Philip Ranlet, *The New York Loyalists* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1986); Anne M. Ousterhout, *A State Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the American Revolution* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Harold Bell Hancock, *The Loyalists of Revolutionary Delaware* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1977); E. Alfred Jones, *The Loyalists of New Jersey: Their Memorials, Petitions, Claims, Etc., from English Records* (Newark, NJ: New Jersey Historical Society, 1927; reprint, New York: Gregg, 1972).

11. Janice Potter, *The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York and Massachusetts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); John E. Furling, *The Loyalist Mind: Joseph Gasloway and the American Revolution* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977); Eugene R. Fingerhut, *Survivor: Cadwallader Colden II in Revolutionary America* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983).

12. Lorenzo Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution with an Historical Essay*, 2 vols. (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1966), 1: 353. Wilbur Henry Siebert, *The Loyalists of Pennsylvania* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1864; reprint; Boston: Gregg, 1972), 105.

13. Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 81–82.

14. *Ibid.*, 21.

15. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 1: 545.

16. Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 170; Hancock, *The Loyalists of Revolutionary Delaware*, 23, 74.

17. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 1: 277; Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 264.

18. The literature on the American Loyalists is extensive. For a start, see William H. Nelson, *The American Tory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); Wallace Brown, *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (New York: Morrow, 1969); Robert M. Calhoun, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760–1781* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973). For an estimate of the number of Loyalists in the colonies, see Paul H. Smith, “The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 25 (1968): 259–77.

19. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 2: 353; 1: 420, 408; Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 275.

20. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 2: 451, 48; 1: 331, 361, 296; Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 275, 293; Siebert, *Loyalists of Pennsylvania*, 69, 77.

21. For Canada see A. G. Bradley, *The United Empire Loyalists: Founders of British Canada* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1932); Robert M. Calhoun, Timothy M. Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk, eds., *Loyalists and Community in North America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), Part 3.

22. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 1: 159, 435; Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, 9–10.

23. Mary Beth Norton, *The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774–1789* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Wilbur Henry Siebert, *The Legacy of the American Revolution to the British West Indies and the Bahamas: A Chapter Out of the History of the American Loyalists* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1913).

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51. For one example of individuals who signed the Continental Association under pressure, see Letter to Mr. Rivington from the precinct of Newburgh in Ulster County, July 14, 1775, *Rivington's New-York Gazetteer*, July 21, 1775.

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