

ONE

Solidarity and the Categories

The fundamental thesis of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism is that the final actualities of the universe cannot be abstracted from one another because each actuality, though individual and discrete, is internally related to all other actualities. This mutual involvement of discrete actualities is what Whitehead meant by the *solidarity* or *connectedness* of the universe.¹ Whitehead's thesis appears to be logically inconsistent, for it posits final actualities that are at once mutually transcendent, as entailed by their discreteness and individuality, and mutually immanent, as required by their reciprocal internal relations. Most interpreters of Whitehead have avoided this problem by conveniently interpreting the solidarity of actualities to mean simply that earlier actualities are immanent in later ones. Any other sense of immanence—such as that of later actualities in earlier ones, or of contemporaries in each other—they tend either to ignore altogether, or to explain away by the claim that Whitehead was being careless whenever he spoke of the mutual, or reciprocal, immanence of the universe's final actualities.²

This last claim, I hold, is entirely without justification. I am quick to admit, even insist, that Whitehead was a far from careful writer. But we are not talking here of an occasional phrase or passing remark. Rather, numerous explicit references to the mutual immanence of the universe's final actualities are to be found in each of Whitehead's metaphysical works. One book, *Adventures of Ideas*, even devotes almost an entire chapter (Ch. XII) to discussing the immanence of later actualities in earlier ones and of contemporaries in each other. Thus, to ignore or to explain away Whitehead's pronouncements on the mutual immanence of discrete actualities is a tacit admission that no one has yet made complete sense of

the fundamental metaphysical vision animating the philosophy of organism. For that vision, I shall argue, is that *any* two actualities, regardless of their temporal relationship, are internally related to each other by reason of their immanence in one another. Accordingly, one major goal of this essay is to elucidate Whitehead's thesis of universal solidarity, while recognizing its paradoxical nature but also trying to exonerate it from charges of logical inconsistency.

1. *Solidarity and the organic categoreal scheme*

Let me begin by emphasizing the central role that the doctrine of solidarity plays in the organic philosophy. This can be done by inspecting a few passages taken from Whitehead's writings and from his lectures at Harvard. To understand the full import of these passages, however, two things must be borne in mind. First, for Whitehead the final actualities of the world—what he terms *actual entities*, *actual occasions*, or *events*—are, one and all, happenings or events having all the necessary or metaphysical characters of occasions of experience (AI 284, 303). Second, to say that actual entities, or occasions of experience, are the final actualities is to say that whatever exists in the universe *by way of actuality* is an actual entity, a constituent aspect of an actual entity, or an interrelated group—technically termed a *nexus* or *society*—of actual entities (PR 27–30).

With those two observations in mind, let us first examine Victor Lowe's account of what Whitehead took to be the six basic principles of his metaphysics. Since these principles jointly provide a bird's-eye view of Whitehead's philosophy, I quote in its entirety the account Lowe gives of them:

I can also report what Whitehead gave out in his regular Harvard lectures of 1926–27 as “the six main principles of my metaphysics”. These were the principles of Solidarity (every actual entity requires all other entities in order to exist), Creative Individuality (every actual entity is a process and its issue comes from its own limitations), Efficient Causation, the Ontological Principle (the character of Creativity is derived from its own creatures, and expressed by its own creatures), Aesthetic Individuality (every actual entity is an end in itself and for itself, involving its own measure of individual self-satisfaction), and Ideal Comparison (every creature involves in its constitution an ideal reference to ideal creatures in ideal relationships to each other, and in comparison with its own satisfaction). Whitehead added that these principles apply to all actualities, including God.³

When Whitehead says that every actuality requires all other entities for its existence, we must understand him to mean that all other entities are constituents of that actuality. This follows necessarily from the hypothesis that the final actualities have the metaphysical properties of occasions of experience; for, as construed by Whitehead, “experience is not a relation of an experient to something external to it, but is itself the ‘inclusive whole’ which is the required connectedness of ‘many in one’” (AI 299). Accordingly, for Whitehead, “every item of the universe, including all the other actual entities, are constituents in the constitution of any one actual entity” (PR 224).

The problem posed by the thesis of solidarity now becomes obvious: How can the universe, or world, be composed of actual entities and yet be itself contained in each of its component actualities? Whitehead, however, is fully aware of the problem; indeed, he makes it explicit in more than a few passages of his works, referring to it sometimes simply as ‘the problem of solidarity’ and at other times as ‘the paradox of the connectedness of things’ (PR 88; AI 293). To cite but one example, in *Modes of Thought* we find Whitehead saying that

there is a dual aspect to the relationship of an occasion of experience as one relatum and the experienced world as another relatum. The world is included within the occasion in one sense, and the occasion is included in the world in another sense. (MT 224)

This bond between world and occasion, Whitehead immediately admits, is a “baffling antithetical relation” (MT 224); but, for him, when we examine our everyday experience of the world, or when we inquire into the presuppositions of common practice, into the presuppositions of the natural sciences, or into the presuppositions of basic epistemic claims, we run again and again into this paradoxical relation of mutual immanence (MT 218–27):

For example, consider the enduring self-identity of the soul. The soul is nothing else than the succession of my occasions of experience, extending from birth to the present moment. Now, at this instant, I am the complete person embodying all these occasions. They are mine. On the other hand it is equally true that my immediate occasion of experience, at the present moment, is only one among the stream of occasions which constitutes my soul. Again, the world for me is nothing else than how the functionings of my body present it for my experience. The world is thus wholly to be discerned within those functionings. Knowledge of the world is nothing else than an analysis of the functionings. And yet, on the other hand, the body is merely

one society of functionings within the universal society of the world. We have to construe the world in terms of the bodily society, and the bodily society in terms of the general functionings of the world. (MT 224–25)

This compelling character of human experience—that it is a constituent of the universe and that the universe is a constituent of it—suggests to Whitehead that the togetherness of all final actualities somehow involves their mutual immanence: “In some sense or other, this community of the actualities of the world means that each happening is a factor in the nature of every other happening” (MT 225). By thus generalizing what is manifest in our experience of the world into a necessary feature of every final actuality, Whitehead arrives at what I have termed the thesis of solidarity (MT 227). The thesis maintains that “any set of actual occasions are united by the mutual immanence of occasions, each in the other” (AI 254). It asserts, in effect, that any two actual entities, regardless of their temporal relationship (AI 254), are at once mutually transcendent and mutually immanent. The problem is to find a sense of ‘mutual immanence’ wholly consistent with the discrete individuality of actual entities.

It is precisely in respect to this problem that the importance of the solidarity thesis—its pivotal role in Whitehead’s philosophy—can be made fully evident; for it is no exaggeration to say that the organic philosophy is devoted to the elucidation of the mutual immanence of discrete actualities. That this is so becomes evident when we examine the following three passages taken from *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas*:

The [categorical] scheme should [develop] all those generic notions adequate for the expression of any possible interconnection of things. (PR vii)

The coherence which the system seeks to preserve, is the discovery that the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entity involves the other actual entities among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation. (PR 10)

The world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion. The categories have to elucidate this paradox of the connectedness of things:—the many things, the one world without and within. (AI 293)

Clearly, the solidarity, or connectedness, of the world is the thesis whose truth the organic categorical scheme is designed to convey and demonstrate.

The importance of connectedness is also made evident by Whitehead's assertion that it was with a view toward its elucidation that he chose the working hypothesis of his philosophy—namely, that the final actualities of the world have the necessary features of acts or occasions of experience (AI 284; PR 65, 217). It is instructive, in this regard, to first consider the manner in which, in the following passage, Whitehead takes Cartesian philosophy to task:

[If] we hold the Cartesian doctrine of substantial souls with many adventures of experience, and of substantial material bodies, then on that hypothesis the relations between two occasions of experience qualifying one soul are no evidence as to the connectedness of two such occasions respectively qualifying two different souls, and are no evidence as [to] the connectedness of a soul and a material body, and are no evidence as to the connectedness of two occasions of agitation of one material body, or of two such occasions respectively belonging to different material bodies. (AI 283–84)

Surely, the gist of Whitehead's criticism is that the central hypothesis of Cartesian philosophy precludes outright any possibility of doing justice to the connectedness of nature. In marked contrast, the advantage of the organic working hypothesis, that which makes it attractive to Whitehead, is precisely its capacity to suggest categories applicable to the connectedness of things. Thus, immediately after the passage just quoted, Whitehead writes:

But if we hold, as for example in *Process and Reality*, that all final individual actualities have the metaphysical character of occasions of experience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's immediately present occasion of experience with one's immediately past occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature. (AI 284)

Thus the organic philosophy's basic working hypothesis, as well as its categorial scheme, is intended to help illuminate the paradoxical connectedness of occasions.

What needs to be illuminated, it must be added, is "the solidarity of individuals with each other" (PR 532). For, in the organic philosophy, actual entities are not only the final constituents, but also the final *individuals*, of the universe. In this regard, it is important to notice that Whitehead borrowed the term 'solidarity' from H. Wildon Carr's Presidential Address ("The Interaction of Body and Mind") to the Aristotelian So-

ciety, Session 1917–18 (PR 65, fn. 3), and that, for Carr, the term solidarity meant “that diverse, even divergent, activities together bring to pass a single common result to which all the activities contribute without sacrificing their individual integrity.”⁴ It follows that the problem posed by the *solidarity* of actual entities is not to be solved at the expense of the *individuality* of actual entities (PR 22; AI 54; IS 200–01; MT 98).

The preceding considerations establish beyond any reasonable doubt the fundamental role that the thesis of solidarity is intended to play in the organic philosophy; they also strongly suggest that any attempt to solve the problem posed by that thesis should do so through an examination of the organic categories that were meant to shed light on it. This is the approach taken in this essay. Accordingly, my first task is to attempt to isolate, so far as this is possible, those organic categories that have an immediate bearing on the connectedness of occasions. To achieve this end, I will shortly analyze an instance of mnemonic experience in order to take advantage of Whitehead's suggestion that the analysis of the obvious connection between one's own successive occasions of experience yields categories applicable to the connectedness of all occasions. When this presystematic analysis of an act of remembering is completed, I will then seek those organic doctrines or categories that closely correspond to, or are presupposed by, the factors and processes yielded by that analysis.

The need to isolate as soon as possible those categories which are relevant to the explanation of the world's solidarity is dictated by the complexity and opacity of the organic categorial scheme. As formulated in PR, the scheme consists of one Category of the Ultimate, eight Categories of Existence, twenty-seven Categories of Explanation and nine Categorial Obligations. And this scheme, Whitehead himself tells us, “is practically unintelligible” when taken by itself (PR v). Its categories become meaningful only through their use in the elaboration and discussion of the organic cosmology, that is, by their “confrontation with the various topics of experience” (PR vii). To avoid having to consider the entire organic cosmology, therefore, it is imperative that I differentiate the categories more immediately pertinent to the task at hand from the less relevant ones.

In one sense, however, all the organic categories are relevant to the elucidation of the connexity of occasions. At least this is what one should expect, given the criteria that according to Whitehead any scheme of metaphysical categories should meet. We must remember in this regard that, for Whitehead, metaphysics or speculative philosophy “is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms

of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (PR 4). Now, in respect to this definition, 'coherence'

means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions. It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. (PR 5)

To the extent that this ideal is fulfilled by the organic philosophy, this essay's final elucidation of the thesis of solidarity will be deficient precisely in those respects having to do with those notions, or categories, that will have been considered either perfunctorily or not at all. These shortcomings, however, should be outweighed by the depth of interpretive analysis obtained in other more basic respects. This essay, then, should be judged by how well it enables us to understand what Whitehead meant by the solidarity of occasions, not by how much of the organic categorical scheme it brings to that task.⁵

2. *Concerns, limitations, and plan of this essay*

The elucidation of the solidarity thesis is this essay's pivotal concern, but it is not its only concern. It cannot be its only concern because the mutual relevance of the solidarity thesis and the categorical scheme necessitates that the elucidation of the thesis go hand in hand with the interpretation and development of the scheme. After all, the very fact that the organic scheme of metaphysical principles is intended to illuminate the solidarity of actual entities implies that no major organic principle can be deemed to be adequately understood unless its relevance to the solidarity of actual entities has been duly demonstrated.

It is precisely in this last regard, I maintain, that the major received interpretations of Whitehead's metaphysics are flawed. They have failed to capture the full sweep of Whitehead's profound metaphysical vision because they have either ignored or underestimated the importance of achieving an adequate understanding of the solidarity or connectedness of actual entities. Moreover, because they have overlooked the mutual relevance of the solidarity thesis and the scheme of categorical principles, the received interpretations have often misrepresented—sometimes grossly

so—many of the most fundamental organic principles, including, for example, the Category of the Ultimate and the principles of relativity, process and ontology (*i.e.*, the fourth, ninth, and eighteenth Categories of Explanation). Accordingly, our concern with interpreting and developing the organic principles most relevant to the elucidation of solidarity is necessitated also by the fact that we cannot rely on the received interpretations of those principles.

So far as they miss the full import of the metaphysical principles most relevant to the solidarity of the universe, the major received interpretations endanger significant areas of the *applicability* of Whitehead's organic metaphysics.⁶ At risk, to mention a few, are, first, the theories of perception and cognition; second, the reconciliation of deterministic efficient causation with autonomous final causation; third, the relevance of God to the concrete course of universal history; and fourth, the development of a metaphysically grounded existentialist anthropology. An additional concern of this essay is to suggest the increased range and depth of applicability gained by the organic metaphysical scheme when its most basic principles are interpreted in accord with the demands of the solidarity thesis.

In this regard, no more than a suggestive treatment of the relevant metaphysical doctrines is possible because the central task of elucidating the fundamental organic thesis is too complex and time-consuming to allow extended explorations of the specialized applications of the organic conceptuality. Moreover, the sustained employment of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme in any special field of interest requires, to my mind, more critical evaluation and improvement of that scheme than is compatible with the immediate purpose of this essay. For the same reason, the essay can only suggest that when the thesis of solidarity has been properly understood the affinities between Whitehead's speculative thought and that of philosophically-minded contemporary scientists, such as David Bohm, Karl Pribram, Ilya Prigogine and Henry Pierce Stapp, will be seen as greater than is usually acknowledged.⁷

All this is by way of stating the concerns and the limitations of this essay. It does not attempt to explain the whole of Whitehead's metaphysical theory, to critically evaluate it, or to explore the empirical applications of its principles. For all those tasks presuppose an adequate understanding of the basic organic thesis, and achieving that understanding is itself a task of no small proportions. Accordingly, the elucidation of the thesis of solidarity is the sole immediate aim and the unifying concern of this essay. I do confess an underlying aim to place the interpretation, criticism,

development, and application of Whitehead's philosophy of organism on a radically new foundation, one that takes seriously the vision of universal solidarity animating all of Whitehead's speculative thought.

For the moment, the task at hand is the interpretation and development of the solidarity thesis. To that end, the remainder of this chapter seeks to identify, and to begin the discussion of, the organic categories and doctrines that are most immediately relevant to the elucidation of solidarity. Indeed, the chapter seeks to present in microcosm the ideas, principles, and doctrines which the rest of the essay presents in macrocosm. For the sake of readers less than familiar with Whitehead's philosophy, the chapter gradually introduces the basic organic ideas and technical terms used in the subsequent discussion. Thus, the initial presentation of the relevant terms, principles, and doctrines will enable us, in Section 12, to further explain the problem posed by the solidarity thesis, as well as to anticipate the crucial elucidatory role played in that respect by the metaphysical theory of extensive continuity that is implicit, I will argue, in Whitehead's speculative writings. A brief preview of the remaining chapters concludes the present one.

3. *Memory: a key to the relevant categories*

My immediate task is to locate and examine the organic categories in terms of which the connectedness of nature is to be elucidated. A key to these categories is to be found in a presystematic analysis of the connection between one's own successive occasions of experience. For, as we saw earlier, Whitehead maintains that such an analysis can be validly used to suggest categories applicable to the connectedness of all occasions—provided, of course, that we assume the truth of his working hypothesis. Therefore, it is to be assumed, as over against the traditional doctrine of substantial souls, that a man's soul is nothing else than the coordinated stream of his experiences, and that the stream is ultimately composed of discrete but interconnected occasions of experience, no two of which originate in unison.

According to Whitehead, whenever we remember a definite moment of our antecedent experiences, the act of remembering and its relation to the remembered experience are such that they cannot be intelligibly analyzed without the introduction of four interrelated notions, which he terms respectively 'repetition', 'immediacy', 'becoming', and 'being' (PR 205–08). In order to see how these four notions function in presystematic or pre-

categorical analyses of instances of remembering, let us consider one such instance. Let the experience to be remembered be something as relatively simple as a quick glance at an issue of *The New Yorker* lying on the floor, a foot or so to the right of the desk where I am presently writing. Let me glance at the magazine only long enough to notice that its cover depicts a harbor scene. Now let me return to my original position at the desk, and let me immediately try to remember what I have just done and seen. What salient features of this act of remembering may be considered, according to Whitehead, as essential to all such acts?

One such feature, Whitehead would hold, is the indubitable feeling that some contents of my present experience are somehow effecting a *repetition* of my earlier experience. I find myself experiencing once more the kinesthetic sensations of turning my head to one side and downward; I feel again the previous orientation of my body, particularly of my head, in respect to the magazine on the floor; finally, I have once again before me the magazine's cover painting, and I even grasp, albeit dimly, some of its details—a solitary sailboat in the harbor, the cluster of houses in the foreground, and the sun half-hidden behind a group of clouds. Now these are all contents of my present experience, yet one and all have stamped on their foreheads, as it were, this character—that they are repeating in and for my present experience the contents of my earlier experience.

Another prominent feature of my act of remembering, Whitehead would maintain, is its *immediacy*. I am remembering my earlier experience, but I am remembering it *now*. The earlier experience, as repeated in, and for, my present experience, has a second-hand character about it. However, my present experience has an essential over-all character of first-handedness. This first-handedness involves my feeling or entertainment of those contents of my present experience that are repeating contents of my earlier experience. These repetitive contents constitute *what* I am feeling or entertaining, but other present contents express *how* I am feeling them. Thus, even as I am remembering the painting on the magazine's cover, I begin to wonder who painted it and whether it represents an actual harbor. Curiosity, then, is an additional factor of my experience, expressing the manner in which I entertain or feel the repetitive contents. My curiosity is ultimately about the painting itself; nevertheless, as it arises in my present experience, it is concerned directly only with the memory-image. It arises with the act of remembering and not with the original perception. In any case, the total configuration of curiosity spurred by, and directly referring to, a memory-image constitutes the first-handedness or immediacy of my present experience.

Actually, the total configuration of my present experience is more complex than that. The manner in which I entertain my memory-image of the painting on the magazine's cover is only one concrete component of my present experience, albeit the focal one. In the periphery of my experience, so to speak, there is a slight pain in my neck, which I associate with the memory of having turned my head too quickly a brief moment ago; these additional contents I entertain respectively with annoyance and regret. Also lurking in my experiential background are auditory, visual, tactile, and kinesthetic sensations expressing, no matter how vaguely, the fact that I am sitting at my desk, in this room, this particular afternoon. Each of these contents I feel in some manner or other, and the manners in which I feel them ultimately coalesce into a unified feeling of myself-in-the-world-at-this-moment. This unified feeling is, properly speaking, the total configuration of my present experience—abstracting, of course, from the ongoingness of the self-emergence of that experience. The unified feeling and the process of its emergence constitute the immediacy of my present experience. Thus, as Whitehead puts it,

'immediacy', or 'first-handedness', is another element in experience. Feeling overwhelms repetition; and there remains the immediate, first-handed fact, which is the actual world in an immediate complex unity of feeling. (PR 206)

A third essential trait of my present experience, Whitehead would say, is precisely the ongoingness of its emergence. It is something that *becomes*, and, presently at least, it is just its own *becoming*. In this respect, it should be obvious that the notions of 'repetition' and 'immediacy' involve the notion of 'becoming'. My act of remembering first repeats, though not necessarily in all its details, my earlier experience; then it overwhelms that repetition through feeling, and is on the whole a novel, fresh, immediate fact of experience. Clearly, this is evidence for the ongoingness of my experience—its repetitive contents becoming first, and the feelings whereby these contents are overwhelmed becoming afterwards. Two phases of becoming are thus distinguished; but they are phases of my one present moment of experience, inasmuch as the later phase presupposes, refers to, and includes within itself, the earlier phase. In other words, the creative operations of the second phase take into account the product of the creative operations of the first phase.

A fourth essential feature of my present experience, according to Whitehead, is its ultimate reference to the *being* of my earlier experience.

Thus, in the background of my experience there is the vague but insistent feeling that my earlier experience endures in a fashion of its own. If this be doubted, consider the notion that some contents of my present experience effect a repetition of my earlier experience. This notion presupposes the continued endurance, or being, of my earlier experience, not merely as repeated in my present experience, but, as I intend to show, in itself. For just as it would make no sense to speak of an artist painting a replica of a masterpiece, unless that masterpiece were there to serve as a model, so, for the same reason, it would make no sense to speak of my present experience repeating my earlier one, unless the earlier one were in some sense also there, serving as a model.

But in what sense can the earlier experience be there? In what sense can it endure or be? Surely, it cannot endure as its own process of becoming; that is, it cannot endure as something which is happening. For the direct deliverance of my present experience is that I am remembering something which was happening a brief moment ago, but which is definitely not happening now. Therefore, if what endures cannot be my earlier experience considered as the process of its becoming, then the only alternative is to posit that what endures is the experience considered as the product or outcome of that process.

This may be put in another way. My earlier experience is no longer happening; yet it is not on that account mere nothingness. Nor is it something merely because I remember it. Its being something in its own right is a presupposition of my remembering it, and not the other way around. What then is it? Since it cannot be a process, I am led to the idea, by no means far-fetched, that its process terminated in an enduring product, and that it is this product which serves as the datum from which derive, and to which refer, certain contents of my present experience. I am also led to the idea of the enduring product somehow giving witness to the process whereby it came to be. Otherwise, the product would not provide a basis for the reconstruction of its becoming effected by and within my present experience.

The upshot of this line of thought is that the intelligible analysis of my act of remembering, considered as a *becoming* or experience-process, requires the endurance of the remembered experience, considered as a *being* or experience-product. It may be objected that this is not so. Thus, one may try to argue that the relation between my present and earlier experiences can be adequately explained in terms of the neurophysiological functionings with which they are associated. On this approach, some such present functioning is held to be identical with, or similar to, some earlier functioning. The functionings in question are assumed to give rise to

identical or similar contents in the experiences with which they are respectively associated. But it is only to the extent that the present functioning is identical with, or similar to, the earlier one, that I experience a feeling of familiarity with some contents of my present experience. Roughly speaking this is all that is needed, it could be argued, to account for the nature of my present act of remembering, at least insofar as it has the character of repeating contents of my earlier experience.⁸

But surely this explanation of memory is circular. For how would I know that some of my present neurophysiological functionings are identical or similar to some of my earlier ones? Do I remember the earlier functionings? Are they somehow still available, so that I can compare them with my present neurophysiological functionings? Clearly, either this explanation is circular or it is forced to posit some manner of endurance for the earlier functionings. This is not to deny, however, that these functionings play an important role in our acts of remembering. What one is questioning is whether such functionings can account for the ultimate character of our mnemonic experiences—that they are presently repeating something which occurred earlier.

In any case, we are not presently interested in the problem of memory *per se*. We are merely using a Whiteheadian (presystematic) analysis of my act of remembering to familiarize ourselves with certain features of that act which Whitehead takes to be essential to all such acts and which suggest to him categories applicable to the connectedness of nature. That my earlier experience endures and that my present experience is a novel becoming have emerged as two such features. For Whitehead, this means that we

have certainly to make room in our philosophy for the two contrasted notions, one that every actual entity endures, and the other that every morning is a new fact with its measure of change. (PR 207)

Another pertinent observation, in this regard, is that the analysis of my act of remembering also presupposes the endurance of that act *qua* experience-product. For in fact the analysis of that act was carried out in, and by, experiences subsequent to it. Hence, it was analyzed only to the extent that it was remembered or reconstructed in and by those subsequent experiences. For this reason, my mnemonic act itself must be construed as an ephemeral becoming, involving repetition and immediacy and terminating in an enduring being that somehow gives witness to the process which was its becoming.

In addition to the notions already considered, a Whiteheadian, pre-

categorical analysis of mnemonic experience involves two other notions that are worth mentioning at this point, for they will be incorporated in organic doctrines directly relevant to the connectedness or solidarity of the universe. I will term these notions 'anticipation' and 'succession'. Both of them functioned implicitly in the foregoing analysis of an act of remembering.

The first notion has to do with the fact that my remembered experience, as well as my experience of remembering, involved an element of anticipation. Thus, my reason for glancing at the magazine on the floor was so that, in a subsequent experience, I could remember taking that glance. Also, my reason for remembering the experience of glancing at the magazine was so that, in subsequent experiences, I could analyze my experience of remembering and thus provide an example of a Whiteheadian, pre-categorical analysis of mnemonic experience. In both cases, I anticipated that my then present moment of experience would terminate and thus give way to a new experience; also in both cases I anticipated that my then present experience would somehow be an object for my subsequent experiences. It seems, therefore, that each experience involves the anticipation of the fact that what it is as a process will terminate with the achievement of what it is to be as a product, and involves also the anticipation that this product can be taken into account by subsequent experiences. It should be noted, in passing, that each experience takes into account the general potentiality for subsequent experiences.

The second notion has to do with the fact that the remembering occasion succeeded the remembered occasion, and it was in turn succeeded by the occasions which effected its analysis. Also, in the becoming of the remembering occasion there was a succession of phases—the first phase involved repetition; the second, immediacy. Thus succession is intrinsic to the occasion, as well as extrinsic. But in this context 'succession' is misleading, for what we are alluding to is not *mere* succession. The act of remembering succeeds the remembered act and takes it into account. Also, the act of remembering is succeeded and taken into account by the acts which effect its analysis. Finally, the phase of immediacy succeeds and takes into account the phase of repetition. Thus the *relata* of 'succession' are also the *relata* of 'taking into account'. We shall see that this twofold notion of succession, intrinsic and extrinsic, gives rise to one of the truly important categories of Whitehead's organic philosophy.

Our presystematic analysis of memory has involved six basic notions: *becoming*, *being*, *repetition*, *immediacy*, *succession*, and *anticipation*. The first four of these are explicitly generalized by Whitehead into essential fea-

tures of all occasions of experience. This move permits Whitehead to summarize these four notions

in the statement that *experience* involves a *becoming*, that *becoming* means that *something becomes* [i.e., that an experience-product comes to be ⁹], and that *what becomes* involves *repetition* transformed into *novel immediacy*. (PR 207)

It is implicit in this passage that *succession* is also essential to an occasion of experience. This is obvious, for, as we have seen, what is repeated, albeit under an abstraction, is the occasion or occasions that the experience in question is succeeding. Moreover, it is evident that the passage from the phase of mere repetition to the phase of novel immediacy involves the succession of the one by the other, even though the former, or rather its product, may remain as a component of the latter. Finally, though the notion of *anticipation* is not implicit in the passage just quoted, Whitehead does say elsewhere that the experience-process of an actual occasion is in essence a passage from repetition, or *re-enaction*, to *anticipation* (AI 248; IS 243). In short, all six notions considered in the analysis of mnemonic experience denote essential features of every actual occasion.

Accordingly, my next task is to provide a first look at the organic categories or doctrines suggested by, or giving expression to, these six presystematic notions. For those doctrines or categories should prove to be the organic principles most useful for, and most pertinent to, the elucidation of the connectedness of all occasions—the elucidation, that is, of the thesis of solidarity. To the extent that this is true, their claim on our attention is fully warranted.

4. *Becoming and being: the actual entity as subject-superject*

Whitehead incorporates the distinction between 'becoming' and 'being' in the doctrine that every actual entity is to be construed as a 'subject-superject', where in each case 'subject' refers to the actual entity considered as a becoming, and 'superject' to the actual entity considered as a being (PR 57). For any given actual entity, therefore, the subject is that entity considered in respect to its existence while in the process of becoming, and the superject is that same entity considered in respect to its existence as the product or outcome of that becoming (PR 71, 369, 390). The *subject* is the 'actuality in attainment', whereas the *superject* is the 'attained actuality' (PR 326–27).

The relation of subject to superject, therefore, is that of creative process to created product. It must be emphasized, however, that we do not have two different entities, the one creating the other. On the contrary, we have but one entity, first existing as in the process of realizing itself, and then existing as the static outcome of that process of self-realization. The one entity is both the process of self-realization and the self-realized product. "An actual entity is at once the subject of self-realization, and the superject which is self-realized" (PR 340). An actual entity, however, is not literally at once both subject and superject, both creative process and created product. The product is the final outcome of the creative process; hence, the existence of the product marks the end of, and is subsequent to, the existence of the process. In other words, an actual entity first exists as subject, and then as superject. Both modes of existence cannot belong to it at once.

Nevertheless, *in regard to its complete history*, an actual entity is both process *and* product, both becoming *and* being, both subject *and* superject. This is one reason why an actual entity is not to be construed merely as subject or merely as superject but is to be construed always as subject-superject. "An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of" (PR 43). Achieving a complete description of an actual occasion is not a matter of juxtaposing two otherwise independent descriptions: the one of the occasion's subjective existence, the other of its superjective existence. On the contrary, the two partial descriptions are not independent of one another, since they convey the analyses of two modes of existence that presuppose each other for their ultimate intelligibility.

Thus, on the one hand, the analysis of what an occasion is *qua* subject requires a reference to what that same occasion will be *qua* superject; for the subject is not an aimless creative process but is guided by its ideal of what the superject or outcome of that process is to be (PR 130). "The enjoyment of this ideal," writes Whitehead, "is the subjective aim, by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process" (PR 130). The subjective aim, then, is the final cause of the occasion entertaining it. But what the occasion *qua* subject is aiming at is the realization of itself *qua* superject. The ideal superject is the final determinateness at which the subject aims. Accordingly, what happens during the occasion's process of becoming is, in part at least, "merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is integrally to be, in its own character of

the superject of its own process" (PR 369). In this respect, therefore, the superject is already present (ideally or conceptually) as a condition determining how the process conducts itself (PR 341). For this reason, any explanation of the character of the subjective process involves a reference to the character of the superjective product either as aimed at in, or as achieved by, that process.

On the other hand, any explanation of the character of the superjective product requires a reference to the character of the subjective process; for the superject is what it is partly by reason of the genetic process that produced it. Indeed, to understand the structure of the superject, it is necessary to reconstruct the process of which it is the outcome. How this is done need not concern us at this time. What should be emphasized now is that, for Whitehead, the analysis of the superject can be deemed successful only if it allows for the reconstruction of the genetic process. If the reconstruction is not possible, then the analysis of the superject has been faulty (PR 359–60).

An occasion's existence as subject and its existence as superject, we must conclude, cannot be intelligibly divorced from one another; but this is not to say that an occasion exists simultaneously as subject and superject. The attainment of the subjective aim halts the creative process; but since the process *is* the subject, the subject has ceased to exist; what remains is the completed occasion—the superject. The actuality in attainment has given way to the attained actuality.

The superject is the actual entity as fully made and is, for that reason, also termed the *satisfaction*, in the root sense of that word (PR 71, 129–30). The satisfaction "is the actual entity as a definite, determinate, settled fact, stubborn and with unavoidable consequences" (PR 336). The superjective satisfaction can have consequences because once it exists it never ceases to exist (PR 44). Moreover, it has consequences in virtue of being repeated, or reproduced, in every actuality whose becoming finds that satisfaction already in existence. In the organic philosophy, we shall argue throughout this essay, attained actuality is construed as being both cumulative and reproducible (PR 365). Moreover, what is already accumulated must be reproduced in and for each new actuality in attainment. Thus the becoming of each actual entity constitutes an expansion of what the universe is by way of actuality (PR 438). Thus, too, the creative advance of actuality is irreversible (PR 363). Metaphysically, there is no undoing what has been done, and every deed impresses its identity on all deeds beyond itself.

5. *Repetition and immediacy: objectification and subjective form*

The notion of repetition gives rise to, and is incorporated in, Whitehead's theory of (causal) *objectification*. This theory generalizes the repetition of the past that is evident in conscious mnemonic occasions of human experience into a feature of all actual occasions, human and non-human. Thus, the "doctrine of objectification is an endeavor to express how what is settled in actuality is repeated under limitations, so as to be 'given' for immediacy" (PR 208). The objectification of a completed occasion abstracts from its qualitative essence, or *definiteness*, but it does not abstract from that occasion's relational essence, or *position*. Since, as we shall argue later, the particular identity of an occasion is primarily a function of its position, this means that a completed occasion and any one of its objectifications in later occasions are *two and the same particular*. That a completed actual occasion can be repeated without losing its self-identical particularity is so paradoxical and revolutionary a doctrine that Whitehead's interpreters heretofore have been unable to accept it literally.¹⁰ But accept it literally we must if we are to do justice to the thesis of solidarity. It follows that a substantial portion of our essay will be devoted to the elucidation of the interrelated notions of objectification, position, and self-identity.

The notion of novel immediacy gives rise to, and is incorporated in, Whitehead's theory of *subjective form* (AI 227; PR 354). This theory generalizes what is novel in an act of remembering—the 'manner' of entertaining, or of responding to, the past as given for it—into a feature of all actualities. According to it, every nascent occasion responds to each past occasion objectified in it by generating some novel quality or other to define its own manner of taking that objectified occasion into account, and thereby to partly define itself (PR 354–56). In this way, the occasion contributes to its own determination as it responds to every past occasion given, or objectified, for it (PR 234). Each resulting instance of self-definition is termed a *subjective form* because the occasion as self-determining—or, equivalently, as self-functioning—is the occasion as *subject* (PR 38). Thus the subject is the occasion as in its own immediacy of self-realization (PR 38). "But the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it is how *that* subject is feeling that objective datum" (PR 354).

The theories of (causal) objectification and of subjective form combine to form the broader theory of *physical prehensions* or, equivalently, of *physical feelings*. Physical prehensions contrast with *conceptual* ones, which we shall discuss shortly. For the moment, let us notice that the *physical*

prehension “of one actual entity by another actual entity is the complete transaction, analysable into the objectification of the former entity as one of the data for the latter, and into the fully clothed feeling whereby the datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction—‘clothed’ with the various elements of its ‘subjective form’” (PR 82). This formulation of the nature of a physical prehension begins to make evident, the majority of Whitehead’s interpreters notwithstanding, that the subjective activity of an actual occasion is subsequent to the activity whereby the past actualities are objectified, or repeated, in the novel occasion and are in that fashion data for the novel occasion’s subjective activity. The objectifications, in other words, are data derived, by means of a reproductive activity, from the novel occasion’s correlative universe of completed, or settled, actualities. But the subjective activity of the novel occasion is in no way involved in the derivation or production of the objectifications. The subject does not create the objectifications; it merely reacts to them. This is one reason why the completed actualities are always said by Whitehead to be objectified *for*, rather than *by*, the novel subject.

The activity of objectification, I am contending, *precedes* the activity of self-determining immediacy, even though the products of the former activity are absorbed into, or subordinated to, the products of the latter. We have to distinguish, in other words, between the becoming of the datum *for* subjective immediacy and the becoming which *is* the subjective immediacy (PR 228). True, the two becomings are only successive stages in the becoming of one and the same actual occasion; nonetheless, to lose sight of this distinction is to eradicate the organic philosophy’s distinction between efficient causation and final causation or, equivalently, between the process of transition and the process of concrescence.

6. *Objectification, immanence, and the extensive continuum*

Before examining how the presystematic contrast between repetition and immediacy is incorporated into the systematic contrast between transition and concrescence, we need to take a closer look at the organic doctrine of objectification. For that doctrine plays a truly crucial role in the elucidation of the solidarity thesis. Notice, in this regard, that, *as objectified*, the universe is *included* in each of its constituent occasions; whereas, *in itself*, the universe is also *outside* each occasion (PR 347–48). The universe, then, is both inside and outside every occasion. In this manner, the notion of repetition, as incorporated in the doctrine of objectification, begins to

throw some light on the "paradox of the connectedness of things:—the many things, the one world without and within" (AI 293). The world without and the world within, it now begins to appear, are numerically different; yet they are the same world, in a sense of 'same' to be gradually explained.

It must be emphasized at this time that the notion of objectification is broader than the notion of repetition. If it were not, the doctrine of mutually immanent occasions would have to be abandoned for two reasons. First, according to Whitehead the notion of repetition is tied up with the notion of *efficient causation*—that is, if one occasion is repeated within another, then the former is a cause of the latter; therefore, since for him mutually contemporary occasions are causally independent of one another, it follows that they cannot directly repeat one another; nevertheless, in the organic philosophy, contemporary occasions do objectify one another, and the one sense in which these objectifications are direct implies the mutual immanence, in some sense or other, of the occasions involved. Second, for Whitehead, anticipation implies the objectification of the future; but such an objectification cannot involve the repetition of occasions (though it may involve the anticipation of repetition) because there are no actual occasions in the future, and thus there is nothing to be repeated. Repetition, then, must be construed as an aspect of the peculiar mode of objectification—the *causal mode*—by which an occasion becomes immanent in occasions later than itself. But there are two other modes of objectification—having to do, respectively, with contemporary occasions and with the potentiality for future occasions—which do not involve repetition.

The existence of these two other modes of objectification forces me to look beyond the notion of repetition in my attempt to explain the thesis of solidarity. The repetition, or *causal objectification*, of an earlier occasion in a later one may account for the immanence of the past in the future, but it cannot account for the immanence of the future in the past nor for the mutual immanence of occasions contemporary with one another. To account for these other modes of immanence, indeed to fully account for the causal mode also, we must turn to the organic doctrine of the *extensive continuum*. In that doctrine, as we shall see, lies the solution to the paradox of solidarity.

These last remarks are not intended to serve as an explanation of the doctrines of objectification and mutual immanence; they only intimate such an explanation. They are intended, however, to forestall objections of the sort raised by Hartshorne to an earlier version of this essay.¹¹ As