

Introduction

I

THIS collection of essays is offered to the reader with the special aim of stimulating further interest in the exploration of the major achievements of Greek philosophy through a collection of important studies by contemporary specialists in the field. The volume is not designed to serve as a substitute for well-known historical surveys of philosophical ideas or systematic treatments of the major periods of classical Greek thought. Although the essays have been grouped in rough chronological sequence from the period of the Pre-Socratics to post-Aristotelian developments in certain important philosophical topics, the arrangement is primarily a matter of convenience.

At the heart of the present endeavor is a concern for introducing the reader to the work of scholars addressing themselves to basic topics and problems in Greek philosophy. The essays bear witness to the sobriety and carefulness with which evidence and differences of opinion have been weighed. Soundness of scholarship is combined with generous open-mindedness, we believe, in all cases—virtues which appear especially in judicious phrasing of conclusions. The reader will not fail to see that the scholars represented here are far more modest in claiming finality for their exegesis than some of the luminaries of previous generations. In these essays new evidence has often been applied profitably to correct errors of fact or emphasis made by leading scholars of the past, notwithstanding their lasting contributions and original work. It is very much to the credit of contemporary research that progress has been made toward a more reliable interpretation of Zeno's thought, for example, as compared to what Zeller wrote on the subject in 1881. The findings of Gregory Vlastos (and of Fränkel to whose work, published in 1942 and 1955, Vlastos refers), G. E. L. Owen's article in 1957-58 and D. J. Furley in 1967, provide good examples of gains in understanding the quality and scope of Greek thought.¹ Again, we refer the reader to Guido Calogero's essay in which he ably points out how a fresh exploration of the connection between logical issues and ethics can reveal why Socrates must be regarded closer to Gorgias than to Prodicus, as

claimed by Wecker in the nineteenth century.² David Norman Levin's essay is another example of what recent scholarship can offer not only by way of settling old disputes on issues surrounding the authenticity and date of composition of a Platonic dialogue—the *Lysis* is his case in point—but also how to give more satisfactory answers to substantive questions of content and doctrine. He introduces interpretive procedures that go beyond grappling with “what Plato said,” a technique widely used a generation or two ago. Michael J. O'Brien shows with cautious confidence how “their apparent inconclusiveness” need not hamper, as has often happened, the interpretation of Plato's early dialogues. Reluctant to accept the thesis and its implication, held by men of the stature of Burnet, Taylor, and Wilamowitz, that the early dialogues may correctly be read only as literary biography rather than as dialogues with developed positions in philosophy issues, O'Brien is able to give the reader a fresh and worthwhile reading of the *Laches* dispelling that indictment, at least in this case.³ David J. Furley, working on the extant texts of Epicurus, takes a new look at the well-known paradox of ancient atomism and finds ample ground for disagreement with older authorities such as C. Bailey. Many such examples of critical discussion confirm the contributions of modern scholarship in extending and refining the attainments of the past.

The broader consideration, however, is to underline why it is that essays of the sort that make up the contents of the present volume assist the reader in understanding in certain special ways not only the general character of Greek thought that sets it apart from other periods in the philosophy and science of Western man, but also how the treatment of selected topics, when done in depth and detail, can generate on its own power appreciable comprehension of larger issues. Much clarification can be attained in the conceptual delineation of genuine problems in ancient Greek thought along with a probing into the tenability of various solutions. But the gains go even further. The reader has the comfort of perusing studies on manageable topics that can be treated without the taxing of one's attention that full-length monographs often require. But even if this be regarded only a minor advantage, there is still much merit in the opportunity here afforded for informing the reader on current conceptions of scholarship and how its findings fare in the history of the subject. This is not to say that such advantages cannot be had through acquaintance via the steady flow of pertinent literature in the printed pages of our learned journals. The special feature which these essays display in this respect is one that results from the association of the

scholars involved and from the exchange of views that was made available through a public hearing from which their authors benefited.

With the introduction of new techniques for textual analysis, sharper tools for the detection and removal of errors in interpretation, and the liberal utilization of the latest findings and techniques in related fields such as the history of science and anthropology, scholars have been able to give us deeper insights into and more reliable accounts of the ideas of classical Greek thought and its development. We know more about the Pre-Socratics than was known during the nineteenth century, and the recent approaches to Platonism and Neoplatonism exhibit an impressive absence of intellectual prejudice. We do not mean to imply that contemporary scholarship is in some miraculous way immune to error or that it is thoroughly capable of exercising self-criticism without external assistance; however, the current work of philosophical scholars shows a deeper awareness of hidden interpretive assumptions that have so often colored the contributions of previous generations. One may cite the case of the influential waves of Hegelianism whether of the left or right wing variety, that underlay so many treatments, say of Plato or Aristotle and, in similarly obvious ways, dominated the understanding of the entire development of Greek thought in its diverse phases.

It is a distinctive merit of contemporary philosophy to have assisted in freeing our understanding of the past from misconceptions rooted in cultural or historical prejudice. The advances in logical theory and analytical thinking have contributed much to the elucidation of many issues and have helped bring about an appreciation of philosophical concepts previously neglected. It is to Alexander P. D. Mourelatos's credit, for instance, that he found it possible to bring together in his essay on Parmenides pertinent, fertile ideas from the writings of the Logical Positivists, and Bertrand Russell in particular, and to build an instructive parallel between contemporary conceptions of stages of thought and what he detected to be the case in Parmenides. This type of fruitful exploration of modern intellectual trends for their relevance in interpreting ancient thought has brought in many instances remarkable results; witness, for example, the new paths that Benson Mates opened towards a reconsideration of the foundation and originality of Stoic logic.⁴ Although Mates's work was not done in response to the circumstance that elicited the writing of the essays printed in this volume, it nevertheless illustrates the basic point we have in mind. Of comparable orientation but with a different emphasis are the closely reasoned account of the meaning of the "Gold-Example" in Plato which Edward N.

Lee gives in his paper, and the sustained analysis which Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, Leonardo Tarán, and Kurt von Fritz undertake in their respective studies.

Much has been done in recent years to focus more carefully on the subtle connections between religious and philosophical thought in classical Greece. The topic has received so much attention that mastery of the extant literature alone requires the skills and devotion of a specialist. It is gratifying to find in some of the essays printed here investigations that contribute to recasting the issue in new molds. The traditional way of looking at the relationship of religion to philosophy had resulted in a stereotype which conceived of a one-way process from the one to the other, accompanied by the ebb and flow of tension and conflict. Charles H. Kahn directs his efforts to an examination of the extant fragments of Empedocles to show how it makes good sense to view the physical poem as being in a serious way a religious work as well. His argument helps to show that it is no longer unacceptable to approach Greek thought from the perspective of organic cultural models. Part of Kahn's essay considers how non-Greek conceptions of the soul and the immortal element in man prevent us from seeing what he regards as the correct relationship between Empedocles' two poems. The governing assumption in Kahn's essay is that of consistency in the thought and religion of Empedocles, and deserves further reflection. The issue is intimately related to the pervasiveness of rational standards in the early Greeks, and, as he aptly remarks, "the fifth century B.C. had only one standard of truth, and hence no notion of irrational faith" (p. 4).

Interpreting the place of religious elements in the cosmologies of the early Greek thinkers has been a standing concern of philosophers and theologians since antiquity. The perspective from which it was done has shifted with the winds of doctrine prevailing in each period and school. That this topic can still engage the attention of contemporary scholars comes as no surprise to the reader. What is of primary interest, however, is the special mode of analyzing the surviving fragments of the early philosophers and the different questions now being raised. In this connection, H. A. T. Reiche's paper has a double function, to exhibit in detail the complex relationship of empirical evidence to the theology of Xenophanes and, while carrying out this task, to criticize "purist" approaches, like Reinhardt's, that have relied heavily on aprioristic notions for interpreting Parmenides as well as Xenophanes. Reiche's target is the dependence of approaches appealing to aprioristic notions on Kantian principles that compartmentalize the logic of the necessary and the contingent:

Thus in Jaeger's work appreciation of the visual roots of *prepein* is found side by side with, yet wholly unconnected to, his . . . attempt to deduce the perfection of Xenophanes' highest god from *prepon* conceived as aprioristic criterion, operative in aesthetics, ethics, and politics. A dichotomy informs Jaeger's handling of Xenophanes. The theology remains unconnected to the cosmology, and the normative criterion operative in the first is for all practical purposes stripped of its visual root-meaning and reduced to a mere postulate. . . . Proximately, at least some of this insistence that Xenophanes' deduction of the divine attributes is purely rationalistic seems to reflect the profound impact of Reinhardt's revolutionary *Parmenides* book, which coupled the attempted reversal of the accepted sequence, Xenophanes-Parmenides, with the logico-verbal view of Parmenides' *eon*. [p. 93].

These samples of criticism of underlying interpretive assumptions illustrate what may be regarded one of the central features of this collection of essays. With one or two exceptions, their authors have sought to combine analysis of concepts and close reading of textual sources with responsible assessment of related interpretations and their attendant methodological problems. Such critical evaluation of past and present contributions to the topics discussed in this volume has paid handsome dividends, and if one were to enumerate the special procedures applied, it would be proper to mention the following four: (a) In a variety of cases, scholars find it necessary to take issue with ancient authors, whether philosophers in their own right or commentators and doxographers, in order to verify through proposed tests the reliability of what is being reported on the ancient thinker under consideration. In this connection, it should hardly surprise if the accuracy of reports coming from Neoplatonic sources or the correctness of viewpoints as stated by Plato or the more literal-minded Aristotle, is often brought to question. Ancient authorities receive in these essays a fresh and reassuring scrutiny. (b) Much of the reexamination is directed against the difficulties generated in the past by scholars who confounded detached analysis of testimonies and speculative theories of intellectual history. Thus, the heritage of the nineteenth century has proved to be a mixed blessing since both its faults and original insights have sometimes been adopted without the necessary sifting required to separate the useful from the superfluous. (c) Critical discussion has been extended to include the contemporary literature relevant to each particular theme treated here. Because our authors do not accept without independent assessment the results of other authorities, it is gratifying to see how much lively debate has been carried on in the pages of this volume and how fresh insights

emerge from exegetical discussions and exchange of findings. (d) Finally, these essays reveal a significant degree of disagreement even among themselves. To see how these differences can work to advance argument one step further as they use one another's analysis and point of view is one of the most constructive lessons a student can learn from exposure to the processes of creative scholarship.

II

The essays on the Pre-Socratic thinkers will disappoint the reader who is looking for facile surveys and sweeping accounts of the highlights of early Greek cosmology and the nature of reality. What these essays basically offer is an analysis in depth of fundamental problems. The exposition is done through close argument, careful delineation of topic and meticulous inspection of testimonies and evidence. The fact that the philosophies of Anaximander, Xenophanes, Parmenides and his followers, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras receive special attention must not be turned into a basis for judgment against the significance of other early philosophers of Greece. Perusal will show that these analyses and discussions encompass far more than the individual titles seem to indicate. The subthemes that come up for examination comprise a wide spectrum of philosophical problems with far-reaching implications for the entire period of Pre-Socratic thought and what follows after that.

Charles H. Kahn takes a fresh look at the alleged "two strains" of Empedocles, his mystery religion and his natural philosophy. He asks the question: "If the contradiction between his philosophic and religious views is as flagrant as most modern authors supposed, is it conceivable that Empedocles himself was unaware of that fact?" (p. 4). He takes a close look at the "contradiction" and examines the arguments offered by two types of theories that have attempted to explain it: (a) theories that talk of a "mere juxtaposition of irreconcilable elements" (Zeller, Jaeger, and Vlastos), and (b) theories that propound the hypothesis of Empedocles' spiritual development, the *Purifications* being regarded of a later date and thus reflecting a genuine change. Kahn accepts the second type of theory with modifications but rejects the insistence on the radical difference between the two poems and proceeds to show why he believes the physical poem must also be regarded a religious work.

In *On Nature*, Empedocles, the cosmologist, understands all natural processes as the combination and separation of the four elements under the influence of the contending forces of Love and Strife. Since

thought and physical body seem to be identified, thought or mind is dissolved at the same time as the physical combination of the body. In the *Purifications*, Empedocles, the self-proclaimed god and seer, teaches the transmigration of the soul. This disparity cannot be explained by resorting to a theory of radical changes in Empedocles' views. Kahn argues that an interpretation can be given to show the two to be consistent. He points out that the physical poem presents a theory of the conservation of matter. The elements are not destroyed but separated. Furthermore, in Greek thought the soul which is a totality of an individual personality must be distinguished from the soul representing the God-like and immortal element in man. With these two reminders, Kahn then suggests that any one of the elements could play the role of the transmigrating daimon or the immortal soul of the religious poem. The corporeal elements are eliminated by contextual evidence in the *Purifications*, and Strife is discounted since it is depicted as the enemy of the daimon. This leaves Love as the element which corresponds to the daimon. Thus, by reconstructing Empedocles' conception of the soul, Kahn is able to reconcile the two poems.

Edward L. Minar's essay advances a reinterpretation of the characteristics of the cosmic phase in the philosophy of Empedocles. According to the conventional view, at the apogee of Love's influence the cosmos consists of a spherical, homogeneous mass which is usually characterized as static, solitary, and happy in its solitude. After a reexamination of the texts, Minar concludes: "Perhaps the question is best left undecided whether the whole was spherical either all the time or at the two extreme states. The main point to be made here is the likelihood that there was anything unique about the sphericity of Love's world, and the inappropriateness of the supposition that 'the Sphere' was a contribution to theology" (p. 46). The unity which Love brings about is not a homogeneous and static cosmos, but rather "a unity in which diverse elements cooperate to form a 'cosmos'." He sees this interpretation as having the advantage of agreement with Empedocles' eschatological notions and Empedocles' analysis of organic evolution. The reverse order of the stages of organic evolution then provides the complementary phase and characteristics for the gradual triumph of Strife. In developing his thesis, Minar argues against Vlastos, who emphasized the equality in prerogatives of the two cosmic periods (equalitarian justice). Minar insists that "any interpretation of Empedocles' cosmic periods must take account, it would seem, of the fact that for Empedocles the effects of Love are desirable, those of Strife noxious" (p. 46). It is noteworthy that in scrutinizing

the relevant testimonies for the reconstruction of Empedocles' thought, Professor Minar shows how the Neoplatonists Philoponus and Simplicius have been influential in advancing ways of understanding Empedocles' theory of what the world is like at the triumph of Love: they tend to think of it as a thoroughly uniform mixture spherical in shape.

Alexander P. D. Mourelatos agrees that Parmenides B. 8. 34-41 contains a conception of the relation of mind to reality which is philosophically and historically important. The what-is is not only thinkable; it is also the end of all thinking. Mind stands committed to reality. This relation is normative, an ideal for thought. Mind tries to reach the real. Ordinary discourse or thought conceals and yet vaguely adumbrates reality. It is the goal of philosophy to "translate" ordinary thought to the primary level where what was vaguely shadowed becomes precise, clear and definite. Hence, Parmenides, like Plato, Bertrand Russell, and the early Wittgenstein, has a conception of the nature of thought as analytical and regressive. In his concluding paragraph, Mourelatos states what he finds to be Parmenides' main philosophic message: "The absurdity of mortal thinking is that it misdescribes totally what it *was intended* to describe. It is not that human names are meaningless; they are, rather, widely off the mark—their mark. Mortals could not have found themselves farther from the goal—their goal. . . . Parmenides reminds us of the relation of *pistis* between mind and reality. With the list of mortal judgments he documents the failure of the human mind to live up to this commitment" (p. 74).

Margaret E. Reesor's essay discusses what she believes to be the problem confronting Anaxagoras and how he tried to solve it. Her thesis is that he was concerned with the question "Could objects of sense perception be equated with being?" To answer this, Anaxagoras had to solve two problems: first, how could he accomplish his aim and still observe Parmenides' criterion for being, that is, that being was not divisible but continuous and all the same? Second, he had to answer Protagoras and explain to what extent sense perception is unreliable without saying that sensibles were relative to the percipient hence not existent. He met Parmenides' criterion of being with the principle that there is no smallest and used this in turn to base his theory of the continuum of the objects of sense perception. From this it followed that each entity was composed of all other entities and qualities, including all the opposites. In answer to Protagoras, who believed that the opposites and the qualities were relations, Anaxagoras asserted they were

existents. He also used his theory of opposites to argue for the validity of sense perception, again *contra* Protagoras who regarded entities and qualities relative to the percipient.

A careful look at the empirical evidence related to Xenophanes' theology together with the debate about it during the last fifty years, has led H. A. T. Reiche to decide that the best way to approach the problem is through an exploration of Xenophanes' distinction of human from divine knowledge. He takes DK 21 B34; 35; 18² to imply: (a) unmediated *autopsy* is the surest form of human knowledge; (b) yet *autopsy* must be regarded relative to the spatio-temporally and biologically conditioned perspective of the viewer; (c) even the self-critical *sophos* can at best attain not absolute truth but only greater or lesser probability; (d) the only method by which man can improve his knowledge of the unknown so that it be more inclusive and precise is by what Alcmaeon called *tekmairesthai kai ta hexēs*, i.e., by collecting and collating empirical *tekmēria*. Reiche proceeds to show how these statements can be consistently extended to Xenophanes' theology, and by denying that this philosopher is a dualist he also denies that Xenophanes espoused "the mutual exclusiveness of the highest god and the other *theoi* and the *panta*," or that he ever taught that god-knowledge, or any knowledge for that matter, is wholly distinct from ordinary sense perception. The conclusions he reaches, namely, that it was temporal rather than spatial symmetries that furnished Xenocrates with the empirical referents of his theological thesis, that his empirical approach to available data was cultivated with full awareness of its superiority over the anthropomorphizing autopsy, and finally that the equivalence of *dokos*, *dedoxasthō* . . . *eoikota tois etymoisi* and *prepei* are equivalent expressions signifying empirical insights of maximal probability and least of minimal necessity, taken together permit an empirical account of the properties of the *megistos theos*.

The belief in the earth's immobility as a special problem, examined in passing by some of our authors, receives close consideration in John Robinson's essay. He shows that Aristotle's way of attributing immobility of earth to Anaximander is derivative, going back in fact to what Aristotle mistakenly thought Plato said in the *Phaedo* and the *Timaeus*. Robinson argues that Aristotle erroneously attributed to Anaximander the view that the earth's immobility is due to the earth's "indifference," stationed as it was at the center and equidistant from all things. He gives textual evidence to indicate that Anaximander remained within the tradition of the earliest thinkers who believed the earth to have absolute

weight. In this way Anaximander brought to the foreground of scientific reflection issues such as why the earth does not fall down. The problem is solved by imagining the earth to be flat or disc shaped and supported underneath by either water (Thales) or, in most views, air. Robinson maintains that Aristotle failed to see that for Anaximander and the earliest thinkers there were two problems: (a) why the earth does not *fall down*, and (b) why it remains fixed *laterally*. The latter problem accounts for the kind of view attributed to Anaximander in the *De Caelo*, but it does not pertain to the former problem created by the earth's absolute weight.

Gregory Vlastos gives an exposition and criticism of one of Zeno's dialectical arguments against plurality. Zeno argues that if there are many existents, then the size of any one is null and is infinite. Vlastos maintains that the deduction of nullity of size is inferred from the conclusion of a previous argument. Vlastos proceeds to point out that in deducing the infinity of size the clever Zeno involves himself in a fallacy by intercalating the false premise that "the sum of every infinite set whose every member has finite size must be infinitely large" (p. 130). This fallacy Vlastos finds to be Zeno's own, since there is no trace of a similar error in any of his predecessors. Vlastos is inclined to accept the possibility that Zeno's arguments exercised a certain influence on his contemporary, Leucippus. He also observes that we have sufficient evidence to say that Zeno's other contemporary, Anaxagoras, was acquainted with Zeno's argument but must have certainly rejected the fallacious inference from it (p. 133). Nevertheless, Vlastos finds Zeno to be a skillful dialectician, considerably more advanced than Parmenides in logical technique. He defends Zeno against charges of sophistry and concludes instead that he is a showman with a penchant for melodramatic finales. Zeno had already presented an adequate argument against plurality: if the many exist, then they cannot have size and they must have size. But, determined to get the more dramatic conclusion "so small as to have no size and so large as to be infinite," Zeno involves himself in an error he could have avoided, given the mathematical sophistication of his day. Nevertheless, Vlastos concludes, Zeno is significant in the history of Western thought for far more than his dialectical skill. In assessing Zeno's substantive contribution, he states in his conclusion: "But Zeno reveals more than technical talent in this argument. In its opening part he throws out an idea new to Western philosophy: the incorporeality of Being. It is easy to miss its significance, since he exploits it only for dialectical purposes. How great is its value

will be apparent if one notes that in this area the vision of the great Parmenides remained blurred and indistinct; and that without this needed clarification the whole of that great metaphysical construction hovers uncertainly on the edge of confusion" (p. 136).

Leonard Woodbury's essay, to which Mourelatos refers as important and deserving a more careful reading (p. 70), offers an interpretation of Parmenides B8, 34-41 to the effect that Parmenides believed the real world to be "expressed" both in a certain thought and name. Basic to Woodbury's argument is the observation that the antithesis of *onoma* and *ousia* can be found in later literature but is on the whole absent from the vocabulary of philosophers prior to the sophistic age. On a more technical level, Woodbury proposes *onomastai* in B 8, line 38, a reading that has drawn considerable attention in recent scholarship and is also referred to by Mourelatos, who supports the proposal but is reluctant to accept the accompanying interpretation. If the real world is "in" that-which-is, then the real world is also expressed in the form of thought "it-is" (rather than "it-is-not") and in the name "being." This is the name that does not founder on contradictions as do the names instituted by mortal men. It is the name by which the real world is truly known, in which its reality is truly expressed. Knowledge then is found in the use of a name, and Parmenides' philosophy of names leads to his ontology.

III

The works of Plato have been a wellspring of influential ideas as well as a source of philosophical problems to the inquiring mind. In the present collection the dialogues come up once again for a fresh look and a careful study and reexamination of their composition, background, thematic richness, and principles of interpretation. The relation of the Sophistic movement to Plato's thought is investigated on several occasions with the intent to fix with more precision the boundaries of certain doctrinal affinities. The titles of the essays are indicative of the range of interest and direction Platonic studies have taken in recent years. Individual works such as the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and the *Seventh Letter* receive close attention as do such basic themes as the relation of Forms to particulars, problems of method and structure of arguments, issues in language, logic, the philosophy of mind and theory of knowledge, ethical and political concerns, love, friendship, the place of reason in society, the concern for immortality and the persistent quest for reality.

R. E. Allen examines the relation of Forms to particulars, especially in the *Republic* and the middle dialogues. Plato faced a Parmenidean problem. Given Parmenides' criteria of reality, to wit, to be real is to be intelligible, not qualified by opposites, self-identical, and unchanging, the question arises what can be said of the sensible world which fails to satisfy these criteria? Plato rejected the alternative of maintaining the complete unreality of the sensible world and adopted the theory of degrees of being instead: sensibles were held to be intermediate between full reality and unreality (p. 165). To support this thesis Plato "proved" the existence of Forms by the argument from opposites (*Rep.* 479 A-C). The argument, however, does not establish that things qualified by opposites are less real than Forms. Plato explains the relation of Forms to particulars in terms of originals and copies. The original can exist apart from the copy, but not vice versa. The copy depends on the original for its existence. Allen argues that when the copy-theory of participation is properly understood, then one cannot accuse Plato of the difficulties engendered by the self-predication of the Forms. The relation of Forms to particulars is not that of predicates to instances of predicates but of originals to shadows or reflections. Thus, when "beautiful" is predicated of Forms and copies it is not used univocally but is systematically equivocal.

Guido Calogero's richly documented discussion supports the thesis that among the sophists Gorgias was probably more influential on Socrates than Prodicus. Welcker, the nineteenth-century German scholar, tried to show that Socrates adopted and modified the philosophical methodology of Prodicus. Calogero finds that in the *Helena* and *Palamedes* of Gorgias the Socratic ethical principle, *nemo sua sponte peccat (oudeis hekōn examartanei)*, is clearly presupposed. Calogero's detailed analysis of the *Palamedes* reveals remarkable similarities to Plato's *Apology*. Textual comparisons indicate quite strongly that Socrates modeled his defense after the defense of Gorgias's *Palamedes* rather than the reverse. The philosophical point this article makes goes beyond the quest for antecedents of the formulation of an ethical dictum. As Calogero states, "Gorgias, envisaging the *nemo sua sponte peccat* in its most elementary form, might fall into a sort of moral indifference" (p. 183). The principle had to be grounded on firm philosophical foundations, which is precisely what Plato did.

David Gallop reviews Plato's conception of dreams, the contrast he sees between waking and dreaming, and the analogies drawn from this distinction. He finds that the results help to clarify Plato's theory of

knowledge, particularly in explicating the famous Divided Line of the *Republic*. Particularly interesting is Gallop's conclusion that the dreaming-waking contrast is relevant in ascertaining the status of the *Republic* itself. The connection between dreaming-waking and image-original is taken to be of crucial significance in understanding certain aspects of Plato's thought (p. 192). It can be maintained that the *Republic* has the status of a dream and if seen as a verbal image of the Forms, is analogous to the triangles that the mathematician draws to aid him. In both cases the philosopher resorts to images to *achieve* clarity. Thus, the *Republic* is a *prophetic* dream, offering insight into the Intelligible World. But the *Republic* has dream status also because it envisages an ideal city unrealized in fact, and so may be regarded as Plato's dream of wish-fulfillment of that which he despairs of building in waking life (p. 198).

The traditional view holds that the morality developed in the *Republic* with emphasis on the Good as the end of man, on the tendance of the soul, and the moral responsibility of the individual is foreshadowed in the *Gorgias*. Robert W. Hall argues, however, that the *Gorgias* displays a view of morality more akin to the *technē-phronēsis* ethic of the early dialogues. He stresses what he finds to be a rarely recognized moral paradox of *Gorgias*, that moral individuals are self-determined and yet they are "created" by the art of politics just as any object is created by its appropriate *technē*. In the *Gorgias*, statesmanship is not yet distinguished from ordinary *technē* as it is in the *Republic*. Given this peculiarity, the *Gorgias* would seem to lead to a disagreeable state of affairs: "There are no evil citizens, only incompetent 'statesmen'." Nevertheless, Hall does see in the *Gorgias* other elements which signify a transition to the view of morality in the *Republic*. The *Gorgias* suggests a concept of inherent value apart from utilitarian ethics by introducing a cosmic ordering principle which is the source and sustaining cause of value in all things, an obvious adumbration of the Form of the Good. Furthermore, Socrates is made in this dialogue to espouse a philosophical way of life apart from politics. In the *Republic* this culminates in the idea of the philosopher-ruler.

The subject of Edward N. Lee's article is the enigmatic gold-example in Plato's *Timaeus*. A person is making all kinds of figures in a lump of gold, continually transmuting one shape into another. Somebody points to one of them even as he is reshaping it into another form and asks, What is it? Plato then discusses three possible replies. Lee's principle of interpretation adopted with reservations from Cherniss, is

the specific dialectical situation of question-and-answer in which the answerer formulates his answer keeping in mind the capabilities and character of the questioner. Lee argues that of the various answers that can be given to the particular question before us, only one is strictly correct; but if the questioner is of a certain sort, willing to accept another kind of answer, then the question should be replied to on his level. Lee then defends this scheme of dialectical encounter, which involves accommodation to the capabilities and character of the participants in the encounter, as genuine Platonic doctrine.

Donald Norman Levin's essay concentrates on the *Lysis*. He proposes a new method for identifying the main scheme of the dialogue: "By placing the last first and the first later and by ranging freely through the whole I hope not only to shed more light on the conduct of the argument of the *Lysis*, but also to demonstrate that the structure is closely interwoven and that the cleavage . . . between a protreptic introduction and a philosophical main body . . . is much less pronounced than would appear at first glance" (pp. 237-38). To identify the basic theme he asks whether this is a dialogue of the formula "What is *X*?" (viz. *Laches*, "What is courage?" or *Charmides*, "What is temperance?"). There is also another formula, found in other dialogues: "Is *X/Y*?" (e.g. *Meno* and *Protogoras*, "Is virtue teachable?") Neither of these formulae, however, will do in the case of the *Lysis*, especially if we take the *X* to be "friendship." Levin claims the *X* which awaits definition is not "friendship" (*philia*) but "friend" (*philos*). In the course of his discussion, he analyzes *eros* and *philia*, their relationship and place in the various dialogues and the ways in which the study of these terms throw light on the progression of meaning from a less inclusive to a broader usage. The conclusion drawn is that the *Lysis* is significant in the development of Plato's theory of *kala*, from lesser to more lofty, and finally to *auto to kalon*. The dialogue suggests that Plato had by this time conjured up the world of eternal immutable Forms.

Ronald B. Levinson's comprehensive article contributes to the debate on Plato's logical competence by a systematic survey of Plato's scattered judgments upon language. He concludes that during his long career Plato consistently held the view that, on the one hand, language or words are not to be confused with the idea or reality under investigation, and on the other, that words have great worth as instruments for instruction and discrimination. Levinson observes that Plato rejected using etymology for the inquiry into reality, but maintained the superiority of the spoken over the written word. On the positive side,

Plato implicitly formulated the law of contradiction, and characteristically guarded against the ambiguous use of words. He also regarded words as agents of human thought rather than as autonomous bearers of meaning, and in this respect Levinson attributes to him the use of stipulative definition. This point is brought out in a consideration of the *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, first by noting the obvious Platonic habit of defining words or rather inquiring into the things which they denote. Definition of the definiendum, indicating the discriminatory and diacritical use of words, falls into two parts: (a) marking the definiendum off from other confusable entities, a task involving analysis and classification, and (b) assigning to the entity defined its proper place in the moral life and in the whole complex of being, a task which reveals the contextual aspect of the Platonic definition. Levinson agrees that the *Phaedrus* does not mark a radical change in Platonic philosophy, i.e. a turning away from the theory of Forms, but indeed adds no more than a formal elaboration of the method employed in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. Also among Plato's achievements are the advances made in the *Sophist* in the analysis of the structure and components of a sentence, the recognition that a sentence must be either true or false (Plato had established earlier, against Antisthenes, that there can be negative statements and false sentences), and the discrimination between assertion and denial.

Although Levinson is aware of "the importance of the ideal name as the model for the law-maker in the *Cratylus*" and he is prepared to agree that the Forms must be sought and somehow found, Rosamond Kent Sprague notes that Levinson is mostly concerned with other themes and "has, perhaps necessarily, underplayed the relationship of linguistic problems to the problems of metaphysics" (p. 368). Sprague's position is that Plato, in writing the *Cratylus*, tries to show how his concern for a theory of language is actually subordinate to the theory of Forms and that by means of the rejection of current linguistic theories one can "demonstrate the necessity for the theory of Forms" (p. 367).

J. M. E. Moravcsik studies in detail the celebrated passage 209E-212A in the *Symposium*, where Plato describes the steps on the ladder of love leading to the apprehension of the Form of Beauty. Proper understanding of this passage requires taking into consideration not only Plato's dramatization of the relationship between reason and eros but also how this interplay was carried out with the aid of a compressed outline of a theory of mind and certain basic ontological theses. Moravcsik's analysis shows that the passage involves a complex scheme of three

kinds of steps: of reason, of emotion, and of creation. Their arrangement, in turn, discloses a number of significant connections between reason and eros, once their nature is fully seen, connections that shed further light on how best to approach the problem of the one and the many as it pertains to creation and the final vision of the Form of Beauty. Moravcsik's cogent argument makes clear why Beauty, as Plato conceives it in the *Symposium*, is both a common denominator and a distinct entity, and also why there is no real conflict between the two once the relation between Form and its subordinate species is cast in the right light. A substantial part of the essay is given to a discussion of the kinds of properties ascribed to Beauty. Thus, Moravcsik elucidates how the context of the passage requires certain basic distinctions on three vital issues: (a) the property of being everlasting and not subject to perishing must be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a Form; (b) to meet the criterion of sufficient condition in this case, one would have to show that the Form of Beauty is the only entity which is unqualifiedly beautiful; (c) the problems attending the issue of individuating properties can be met with the aid of the theory of definite descriptions. The distinction between Form-making and Form-individuating properties obtains in the case at hand even if Plato did not conceive the problem and its solution the way techniques of modern analysis have made possible.

The structure of the *Laches*, Michael J. O'Brien observes, is no doubt based on the opposition of *logos* and *ergon*. He argues that the dialogue rather than being inconclusive, can be seen as containing an implicit resolution in the realm of *ergon* or of personalities. The dialogue is an interaction between thought, characters, and their actions. The characters illuminate thought, and thought in turn judges the characters. Laches, the robust soldier of action, offers as a definition of courage "steadfastness of soul." Socrates' criticisms induce him to qualify the definition by including intelligence, but even this proves unsatisfactory. Nicias, the theoretical strategist, suggests that courage is "knowledge of the fearful and the safe." At the end of Socrates' criticisms of the definitions of courage propounded by Laches and Nicias, we are still left with proposals that are too general. O'Brien points out that the fault in each of these definitions corresponds to the merit in the other. Laches, who had said that courage was steadfastness, retreats quickly in the unfamiliar field of philosophical discussion. Nicias, who dwells on the theoretical aspect, falls short of his own definition in the actual battle of Syracuse in which he revealed his ignorance of what was to be feared

most. Socrates alone represents the agreement of *logos* and *ergon*. At the time of his death he is both steadfast and knowledgeable of what is most to be feared: injustice rather than death. The unity of the *Laches* consists, then, not only in the harmony between the incomplete definitions of Laches and Nicias but equally in the juncture of these theoretical strands to form a practical solution in the person of Socrates himself. In the *Laches* "the purposes of the dramatist and the philosopher are in perfect agreement" (p. 132).

Martin Ostwald advances the thesis that there are two states in the *Republic*, that of the Guardians and that of the Philosophers, whereas the usual interpretation is that the Philosophers of Books V–VII are, though refined, the Guardians of Books II–IV. Ostwald undertakes to challenge the compression of the two by arguing that the state of the Guardians is a paradigmatic model developed in order to discover the principles of justice and injustice. If this is what Plato meant to propose as the ideal state, then it must not be taken as intending to serve a practical political aim. This fact, Ostwald argues, ought to be apparent from the many practical questions Socrates ignores when discussing how such a state is to function. Once the question of an actual state attaining this ideal is brought to the foreground, Socrates advocates looking for practical ways of approximating the state of the Guardians that will require the least change in actual states. What comes to prevail in the *Republic* is the view that the state of the Guardians can be approximated but not realized. This is as it should be since we must not blur the distinction between the ideal state and this world in which we are still subject to the conditions of change and decay. The point is addressed to those who are philosophers become kings or those who are now kings aspiring to become true philosophers. These philosopher-kings can bring about the required changes in three ways: by willingness to serve as guardians of the laws; by not failing to effect a model in their soul, "the constitution within" (which indeed is the ideal state of the Guardians, on which they will model the actual state); and by performing acts which will reflect both their experience and their knowledge. Plato has become convinced that the Philosopher is the only hope through which the state of the Guardians can be realized. Once again, the relationship of *logos* and *ergon* proves to be of the essence in the effort to determine the limits of the art of the possible and the contours of the vision of the ideal.

Since Beauty, Friendship, and Eros are closely related Platonic themes, it would be advantageous to read the essays by Levin and Moravcsik in conjunction with George Kimball Plochmann's discussion

of the supporting themes in the *Symposium*. Plochmann is fully aware of Moravcsik's interpretation of the "ascent" passage and like both Levin and Moravcsik proposes to treat his particular subject by paying special tribute to the underlying unity of dramatic and philosophical elements that gives this and other dialogues their unique quality of style and thematic richness. Plochmann observes that in most dialogues the dialectic is controlled by the critical checking of words and definitions by a central figure, whereas in the *Symposium* the dialectic is disclosed by the sequence of characters, patterns of applause, and other incidents. Each speaker in the dialogue supports the themes of the central figure's consummate *logos*, Socrates' encomium on love. Plochmann also identifies a principle of selection which establishes the dialectical order within the speeches. To grasp the usefulness of this principle for purposes of interpretation and appreciation, one must first realize how it is that the *Symposium* must not be read simply as a statement of philosophy with a delightful background or as an instance of philosophical literature exhibiting a drama of persons, but rather as a new genre that integrates both. As Plochmann understands it, "For Plato real philosophy . . . and real poetry . . . are precisely the same" (p. 132). To argue in favor of the logical character of the subsidiary components and supporting themes, from Alcibiades' antics and Aristophanes' hiccups to the placing of the guests and their order of speaking, in this novel form of expression, is Plochmann's special task.

Thomas M. Robinson finds the passage 245C-246A in the *Phaedrus* genuinely challenging in that it contains one of the most condensed and difficult arguments, as he calls it, for the immortality of the soul. A correct analysis of this argument can hardly be given unless one is prepared to embark on a search for the logical and metaphysical issues to which it is related. (Professor Leonardo Tarán, who refers to Robinson's essay, offers a number of illuminating comments on the relevance of this passage in relation to his own efforts to decide the issue of character of the *Timaeus* and whether it makes more sense to read this latter dialogue literally or metaphorically (see Tarán's essay, pp. 394-95, note 33). Robinson defends the original reading that the soul is *aeikinētos* against Robin's *autokinētos*. As Robinson states the case for Plato, *aeikinētos* is *auto kinoun* and is the source of motion; hence it is immortal and indestructible. *Archē* and *auto kinoun* are one and the same so that there may be no cessation from being and no coming into being. These conclusions Robinson applies to the notion of soul itself. Robinson compares the *Phaedrus* passage to the final argument for immortality in the *Phaedo*,

with which it has much in common. There the soul is likened to the static Ideas and yet is also said to be the principle of Life, two notions which are incompatible. Robinson suggests that the more empirical cast of the discussion in the *Phaedrus* "has its roots in the pre-Socratic tradition" (p. 347). The essay ends with a critical note on the relationship of the soul regarded as reverse of motion to the motion of the pre-cosmic chaos in the *Timaeus* 49A ff. The question is there raised whether motion in the Receptacle indicates the presence of soul. Robinson perceives that Plato is dealing with two entirely different kinds of motion; hence there seems no reason to reproach him with a lack of logic, as some of his critics have done.

Thomas G. Rosenmeyer argues contrary to most recent scholarship, especially the thesis in Richard Robinson's *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, that for Plato hypothetical reasoning does not take an upward path and that the more general hypothesis is not, structurally, the higher. He suggests that it is misleading to think that Aristotle's logical terminology, which is ontologically conditioned, is either derived from Plato's logic or can be legitimately used as a guide to understand Plato's model of hypothetical reasoning. As a structural concept, "hypothesis" more often carries the sense of foundation, that from which to build up a superstructure. As a directional concept for logical progression, it indicates the beginning of a discussion or argument which proceeds horizontally from start to finish as a sentence progresses across the page. Drawing his evidence from the later as well as the middle and some earlier dialogues, Rosenmeyer is able to substantiate the thesis that the movement in Plato's conception of hypothetical reasoning is not a downward one but one from general assumption to specific conclusion. The significance of this interpretation is that Plato, unlike his student, Aristotle, and Plato's interpreters, *does* separate his metaphysical topography from his logic.

Leonardo Tarán's essay is a detailed consideration of the question whether the creation myth in Plato's *Timaeus* should or can be taken literally. The reader may well be aware how the literature on this controversy has affected interpretations of the Platonic corpus as a whole. Tarán's main target is Vlastos, who has given the most recent and most complete statement in defense of the thesis that Plato meant the creation of the world literally. One of the fundamental points Tarán makes is that the correct interpretation of the creation myth is tied to the problem of the origin of evil. The context of the myth shows that its purpose is "to give an account of the nature of man and of the universe to serve as the background for another mythical account, the purpose of which will be

to show that the ideal state is superior and ultimately more powerful than an adversary which has greater material resources and skill but is morally inferior" (p. 373). Tarán observes that the features of the creation myth place it in a different category and ultimately concludes "that Plato purposely chose the form of a creation myth to give a systematic account of the nature of man and of the universe" (*ibid.*). Tarán bases his argument on the contradictions which he maintains Plato deliberately introduces in order to guide the reader to a systematic and metaphorical reading—contradictions that conspicuously follow once the chronological order in the account of the creation of the body and soul of the universe is given primacy.

Plato's *Seventh Letter* confronts the student with a set of problems of the highest order. Kurt von Fritz's objective is to scrutinize the meaning of the philosophic passage which boldly asserts the inherent weakness of every written statement of things that require understanding, a thesis intimately connected to what some of its interpreters have suspected to be the problem of Plato's esoteric teachings. Kurt von Fritz remarks that although most authorities in the field have decided in favor of the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter*, a new controversy has arisen which has prompted renewed attacks on the authenticity of the letter, this time from another direction. It has been proposed that the philosophic passage in the letter, assuming that the letter is authentic, can be regarded as testimony for the existence of an "esoteric" doctrine. This issue has created a serious problem of interpretation because the doctrine associated with it is not to be found anywhere in the dialogues but is claimed to have been communicated orally to a select few. Assuming the veracity of the claim, the supporters of this view have considered it a task of the first order to try to reconstruct this "esoteric" doctrine from available and presumably acceptable testimonies. In this essay von Fritz bypasses the larger issue of the authenticity of the letter to concentrate on the problems that arise in connection with the philosophic passage. He considers his primary task here "to come to the help of the *logos* of the *Seventh Letter*" and remove the misunderstandings associated with it.

IV

One of the more fascinating developments in recent approaches to ancient Greek philosophy is the steady deemphasis of the differences between Plato and Aristotle, and in turn, between Aristotle and later philosophers, in order to identify in more judicious ways their similarities