CHAPTER ONE

Climate Policy and the Domestic Salience of International Norms

Climate change emerged as a major political issue in the late 1980s. As a recently identified environmental threat, the science was not well understood, and the economic consequences were uncertain. Scientists, political leaders, business executives, and the general public had to examine the threat, evaluate its potential economic and ecological implications, and develop strategies to respond both domestically and in cooperation with other states. The international and domestic responses to climate change present an important opportunity to analyze the process of problem definition and policy response in both a comparative and longitudinal context. By the late 1980s, even though every developed country acknowledged that climate change, at a minimum, required additional study and potentially demanded coordinated international action to address the threat, there was still significant variation in the domestic political responses and foreign policy positions adopted by the developed states. What explains this variation?

The conventional answer to this question is that differences in national cost-benefit calculations of the domestic effects of climate change and the policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions explain the variation. The potential economic effects of climate change, as well as the redistributive consequences of policies to address it, have heavily influenced both the international negotiations and the domestic policy debates. However, the rationalist material explanation does not appear to provide a sufficient explanation for the variation. Several states accepted emission reduction commitments that would be extremely difficult to achieve, and other states rejected commitments that would appear to be easy to meet. The larger normative context of the climate negotiations appears to have influenced the positions adopted by many states. The domestic and international deliberations produced contentious normative debates related to how political leaders should respond to the problem. The international and related domestic responses to climate change provide an important opportunity to explore the interrelated processes of international norm emergence and domestic political

responses to a new problem. To what extent did the debates over norms influence state interests and behavior, and conversely to what extent did domestic politics affect the emergence of international norms?

Norms are defined as collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given actor.[1] Most international relations scholars accept that norms exist, but there has been a growing debate surrounding the questions of when and how international norms affect state behavior. Materialist approaches to international relations theory have tended to treat norms as merely reflecting the interests and power positions of the dominant states. From this perspective, powerful states promote norms to justify and legitimate their preferred policies. It is the underlying pursuit of material interests that explains the process of norm selection and affirmation. The most powerful states create incentive structures that provide benefits for the affirmation of preferred norms and costs for norm violation. Thus, norms have no independent effect on national interests or behavior; they are tools utilized by the dominant states to pursue their interests. However, constructivist and liberal scholars have challenged the exclusive focus on material interests. They argue that actors do not define their interests exclusively in material terms, but rather they pursue a complex mix of interests that reflects normative as well as material foundations. Ideas matter. The social construction of the problem and the process of determining appropriate responses profoundly affect the formation, evolution, and pursuit of national preferences.

The constructivist literature on international norms has tended to emphasize the role of persuasion and social learning among political leaders in the process of international norm emergence. However, recently several scholars have begun to focus on the relationship between domestic politics and international norms.[2] Particularly in international environmental affairs, it is typically not sufficient for political leaders to be persuaded of the appropriateness of a norm for it to alter state behavior. Rather, the norm must become embedded in domestic political discourse and eventually be incorporated into the foreign and domestic policies of the state. National leaders play a vital role in this process, but in most cases the norm must be accepted by domestic political actors for it to significantly alter national behavior. This suggests that domestic institutional structures, political culture, and historically contingent choices will be critical intervening variables in the translation of international norms into domestic policy.

International norm emergence is by definition a process of social interaction. National leaders as well as private norm entrepreneurs compete to shape norms. International norms develop concurrently with domestic and foreign policy formulation. The processes are intimately connected. States seek to establish international norms that are consistent with domestic norms and interests in order to minimize adjustment costs. Norm entrepreneurs

seek to alter international norms as a means to influence domestic policy. It is thus important to view the contested process of norm emergence as a two-level game involving both domestic and international actors. The theoretical focus of this book is not primarily on the process of international norm emergence but rather on the relationship between international norms and domestic policy. Which norms will be translated into domestic policy and why? When is a norm likely to influence the formulation of domestic and foreign policy responses to climate change? These questions point to the problem of determining domestic norm salience.[3] Norm salience refers to the norm's level of domestic political influence.[4] To what extent does an international norm constrain national behavior or create obligations for action? To what extent do political actors appeal to the norm to justify domestic policies or to block policy changes? In other words, how influential is the norm in shaping national political dialogue and behavior?

The starting point for studying norm salience is to analyze domestic political rhetoric. Rhetorical norm affirmation provides early evidence of the promotion of a preferred norm or the acknowledgement of an emergent international norm, which may later be more fully transcribed into domestic institutional structures and policies. However, it may also represent the cynical use of norm affirmation to deflect political pressure and avoid concrete action. It is thus necessary to evaluate behavior as well as rhetoric to gauge the domestic salience of the emergent norm. Analyzing the connections among international and domestic forces in the development of climate policies touches upon a number of important domestic policy areas, including energy, transportation, commerce, taxation, and foreign policy. Analytically linking the large number of actors, policy areas, and multiple levels of analysis is a daunting task. However, in order to gauge domestic norm salience, it is essential to evaluate the incorporation of international norms into the domestic and foreign policy responses to climate change across the full range of these policy areas, and it is the ability to evaluate these complex relationships that provides the foundation for evaluating the forces affecting domestic norm salience.

Both foreign and domestic strategies are essential to effectively address the threat of climate change. International agreements create pressure on countries to fulfill their international commitments and provide a mechanism for coordinating domestic efforts. However, meaningful international agreements to reduce GHG emissions require effective domestic measures. The close connection between international commitments and domestic policy provides an opportunity to analyze the relationships among national rhetoric, international negotiating stances, and domestic policy. The focus of this study is on the climate policies pursued by the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1985 and 2005. The four political entities and twenty year history of climate policy provide both

comparative and longitudinal studies to evaluate variation in the domestic salience of international norms.

The foreign policy element of this study analyzes the development of international climate policy from its rise to the forefront of the international environmental agenda in the mid-1980s, through the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the completion of the Kyoto implementation agreement at Marrakech, Morocco in November 2001, and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005. The domestic policy analysis focuses on the national framing of the threat posed by climate change and the politics of reducing CO_2 emissions. Other GHGs will be discussed where they are relevant. To the extent that there is an identifiable domestic climate policy, governments pursue it through changes in related policy areas. Reducing CO_2 emissions requires adjustments in some combination of transportation, energy production, energy use, and taxation policies. The politics of these policy areas can be highly contentious and are intimately linked to issues of economic competitiveness, economic growth, and domestic standards of living. The contentious nature of the links highlights the forces shaping climate policy and offers insight into the domestic effects of international norms.

The analysis focuses on a series of climate policy "decision points." A "decision point" is the juncture at which a government must make a policy decision relevant to a particular issue. A decision point may not require a change in policy. The continuation of an existing policy reflects a decision. In fact, it is the most common type of decision, because altering the status quo typically requires the expenditure of more resources than the continuation of the existing policy. No change is thus the default outcome. Either domestic or international factors can produce a decision point. Each of the chapters explains the generation and outcome of decision points related to climate change and analyzes the role of international norms in the policy debates. For example, the United States and Germany both undertook reviews of their national energy strategies in 1990 and 1991. The trigger for these reviews was not climate change, but rather the Gulf War and concern for the security of oil supplies from the Middle East. The reviews created an opportunity to address the relationship between energy and climate change. Each government had to decide whether CO_2 emission reductions would be included as a primary goal of energy policy. The Kohl government addressed the issue, and the Bush administration made only passing reference to it. The energy policy reviews created a brief window of opportunity to link climate policy with energy policy. Why did Germany debate the relationship between climate change and energy while the United States did not? By 1991 an international norm requiring all developed states to accept a CO_2 emission reduction commitment and establish a domestic strategy to reduce national emissions was achieving prominence. This norm appeared

to significantly affect the German debate, but not the American debate. What explains the variation in norm salience? This is the type of question that is of paramount interest to this study.

Domestic and international forces exert pressure for changes in national policies, but typically these forces are insufficient to trigger a decision point without a precipitating event. Domestically, national elections or legislative initiatives on issues related to climate policy may act as precipitating events. National elections force candidates to articulate positions on climate change, which may initiate a review of existing policies. Legislation on related issues also creates decision points. In the United Kingdom, the privatization of the electricity industry resulted in substantial reductions in CO_2 emissions and eventually stimulated a debate on the relationship between power generation and climate change. The German energy policy review forced a debate on the relationship between Germany's heavy reliance on coal and its commitment to reducing CO_2 emissions. Attempts to increase government revenue initiated discussions of the relationship between energy taxation and CO_2 emissions in the European Union, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The appearance of a crisis event can also produce decision points. The exceptionally hot summers of the late 1980s created a public perception of a crisis, which pushed climate change onto the domestic policy agenda in the United States.[5]

External forces also precipitate decision points. Pressure from other states forced all three countries to articulate policy positions or to reexamine existing ones. International organizations created decision points by forcing states to articulate policy positions in international forums. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC), and the European Union (EU) all forced states to articulate policy responses to initiatives put forward by these organizations. The long line of climate conferences and negotiating sessions forced states to continuously articulate and justify their positions in the face of critiques from international organizations, NGOs, and other states. As each decision point emerged, international norms were a part of the decision making environment that had the potential to influence the outcome of the policy debate. These decision points thus provide opportunities to gauge international norm salience in domestic political dialogue, policy choice, and implementation.

MEASURING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SALIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS

Constructivist and liberal international relations scholars have led the research into international norms; however, they have emphasized different

types of norms.[6] Liberals have emphasized "regulative norms," and constructivists have tended to stress "constitutive norms." Regulative norms constrain national behavior and alter the incentive structures facing states. Constitutive norms are fundamental to the identities and interests of actors.[7] Constructivists argue that norms primarily affect behavior by becoming integrated into the actor's identity and altering the perception of the appropriate response to a given set of circumstances. The actor's identity and interests are reconstituted by acceptance of the norm. Liberals argue that prominent norms influence behavior by altering the actor's incentive structure, which affects the cost-benefit calculation of alternative strategic options. The norm constrains or regulates behavior.

Norms can have both effects. Whether a norm has a constraining or constituting effect on a particular actor depends in part on the process of norm affirmation and acceptance. An actor may be persuaded of the appropriateness of the norm and its behavioral imperatives, in which case the norm will likely be incorporated into the identity of the actor and structure the actor's behavior. Alternatively, an actor may affirm an emerging norm as a result of coercion. In this case the norm constrains the options available to the actor and may alter the actor's behavior, but it is not accepted as part of the actor's identity. The distinction between coercion and persuasion in the process of norm emergence has important consequences for the translation of the norm into the domestic political system.

The central mechanism in most constructivist accounts of norm emergence is social diffusion.[8] Constructivists emphasize the role of persuasive communication in altering the intersubjective understanding of the proper response to a given set of circumstances. In the process of norm building, actors attempt to "frame" normative ideas in a way that resonates with existing norms and with the interests of the target audience. Frames are "specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action."[9] Frames are tools used to define a problem and mobilize support for a particular response. Actors utilize frames to persuade a target audience of the appropriateness of a proposed normative response. However, the emphasis on persuasion obscures the important role played by material factors.[10] Actors strategically use norms to pursue both ideational and material interests. Actors may apply material incentives and disincentives to influence norm acceptance and compliance without necessarily redefining the target's preferences. Thus, norms may emerge that do not reflect the beliefs and preferences of most actors but rather reveal calculated norm compliance to achieve benefits and avoid costs.

Coercion plays a prominent role in norm affirmation. This suggests that rhetoric and even behavior may not reflect true motivations. Rather,

actors are responding to shifts in incentive structures caused by the emerging norm and supporters of the norm. This is an important distinction because if behavior is dictated by coercion a state will be more likely to alter its behavior when the consequences of compliance or noncompliance change. On the other hand, if norm acceptance is based primarily on persuasion that a norm is appropriate, then it is more likely to be transcribed into the domestic political dialogue, and compliance is probable regardless of changes in incentive structures. This issue is particularly important during the early phases of norm emergence. Once a norm becomes institutionalized domestically—even if it is the result of coercion—it is likely to continue to influence national behavior regardless of shifts in the underlying incentive structure.[11]

The focus on the effect of international norms on state behavior raises a larger question related to the target actors that must be persuaded or coerced to accept a norm. The constructivist literature has emphasized the role of national decision makers. The empirical literature on norms appears to highlight two primary forces shaping elite support for an emerging international norm.[12] First, norm entrepreneurs may mobilize international and domestic support for the norm in an attempt to coerce political leaders to affirm the norm either by threatening political consequences or by "shaming" through concerted efforts to condemn national leaders for their failure to accept the norm. Success does not necessarily reflect authentic persuasion; rather, the leader may affirm the norm in response to coercion. A second mechanism involves a process of learning on the part of national leaders, who internalize the norm and create an intersubjective understanding of the appropriateness of the behavioral imperatives contained in the norm. In this case, the norm is likely to have maximum effect on the definition of interests and their strategic pursuit. It is possible that both mechanisms can be at work. Some leaders may be persuaded of the correctness of the norm, and others may respond to coercion. It is also likely that a different combination of persuasion and coercion will be at work in different countries. Domestic institutions may also affect the ability of norm entrepreneurs to influence national leaders.[13]

Elite acceptance of an international norm is necessary but not sufficient for the norm to alter state behavior. Elite acceptance is particularly important in issue areas where decision makers have significant independence. For example, national leaders are fairly insulated in the process of choosing targets to bomb during a military operation. There are many norms that constrain targeting decisions, but the choice is ultimately up to the civilian and military leadership. It typically does not require the prior consent of other domestic actors. In this case, it is critical that national leaders either be persuaded of the appropriateness of relevant norms or perceive a sufficient incentive structure to enforce compliance for the norm to have an effect on

behavior. However, many issue areas involve multiple linked issues and much larger groups of participants. The domestic implementation of a norm may require the support of national leaders and at least the passive support or ambivalence of a large number of other actors. Climate change is a good example of this type of situation. The executive has significant leeway to negotiate on behalf of the country; however, climate policy will require domestic policy changes that demand broad political support to enact them. For example, the norm requiring developed states to adopt a GHG emission reduction commitment will require changes in energy, industrial, taxation, and/or commercial policies. Numerous domestic actors will be involved in these policy debates. Persuasion of norm appropriateness or coerced acceptance of the norm among the political elite will be insufficient to achieve domestic compliance. The implementation of the behavioral imperatives contained in an emergent norm may require the persuasion or coercion of a broad set of domestic interests for the state to effectively implement the norm. This points to the problem of determining the domestic salience of international norms.

The domestic salience of an international norm is critical to evaluating the likelihood of a norm altering national behavior. How do you measure the domestic salience of international norms? Certainly, rhetoric is an important indicator of political salience. Rhetoric may indicate support for—or at least acknowledgement of—an emerging norm, but it does not necessarily provide evidence of persuasion of the appropriateness of the norm or evidence that national behavior will inevitably change. Rhetoric can be cynically manipulated to bolster a state's image or to postpone costly policy changes. The combination of national rhetoric and behavior provides stronger evidence of norm salience. Has the government justified national policy changes with reference to international norms? Are other policy initiatives consistent with the norm? Domestic norm salience can be arrayed along a continuum from domestic irrelevance to a "taken for granted" status where the norm is embedded in domestic institutions and policies.

To measure domestic norm salience, it is typically necessary to focus on several domestic actors. For an international norm to affect national behavior, it is critical that national leaders affirm the norm and commit to act on it. As discussed above, leaders may either be persuaded of the appropriateness of the norm or coerced to affirm it. Persuasion is likely to produce a greater commitment on the part of national leaders to fulfill the behavioral requirements of the norm. If leaders are not persuaded of the appropriateness of the norm, then coercion may become important, and the mobilization of domestic interest groups is critical to creating pressure on national leaders to affirm the norm. International norms may circumvent the national leadership and directly enter the domestic political debate. Domestic actors

may become convinced of the appropriateness of the emergent international norm or calculate that it serves their interests. These domestic interest groups, combined with international supporters, may be able to coerce the political leadership to affirm the norm and perhaps act on it. However, persuasion or coercion of the political leadership may not be sufficient to achieve compliance with the behavioral requirements of the norm. If domestic policy changes are necessary or if domestic actors must alter their behavior, then the affected interest groups must be either persuaded to act or coerced. The eight-point scale included below provides a potential measure of domestic norm salience. The scale expands upon Andrew Cortell and James Davis' (2000) three-level scale of salience. Cortell and Davis focus on the domestic salience across "domestic actors."[14] The scale below attempts to differentiate between the salience of the norm for the domestic political leadership and broader public discourse. Norms may achieve salience through the promotion of the norm by public leaders, who seek to alter domestic political discourse and policy. However, it is also possible that an international norm may be rejected by the political leadership, but the norm may become embedded in domestic political discourse by resonating with important domestic actors, which may force the leadership to acknowledge the norm and act on it. It is thus necessary to differentiate among the political leadership and the broader political discourse as well as between norm affirmation as the result of persuasion of the appropriateness of the norm and norm affirmation resulting from coercion. The scale below attempts to capture the effects of these variables on norm affirmation.

1. *Irrelevance.* National leaders do not acknowledge the emergent international norm in any way, and it is not a part of the foreign or domestic policy dialogue. National leaders do not even feel compelled to justify actions that contravene the proposed norm.

2. *Rejection.* National leaders acknowledge a proposed norm but reject it. The state will likely support an alternative norm and engage in debate with supporters of the less desirable alternative. The dialogue is conducted primarily on the international stage, and the normative debate has not entered mainstream domestic political dialogue.

3. *Domestic Relevance.* National leaders continue to reject the proposed international norm, but it has entered the domestic political dialogue. At this point the government faces pressure from both international and domestic actors to affirm the emergent norm.

4. *Rhetorical Affirmation.* National leaders affirm the norm as a result of political pressure from within and/or internationally. The norm is now

a part of the domestic and foreign policy dialogue, but it has not been translated into foreign or domestic policy changes.

5. *Foreign Policy Impact.* National leaders adjust the state's foreign policy to affirm the norm and may support its inclusion in international agreements. The change in position may be the result of persuasion of the appropriateness of the emergent norm or through domestic and/or international coercion. However, national leaders continue to reject changes in domestic policy to implement the norm's behavioral imperatives, or domestic actors continue to reject the norm and block domestic changes required by the norm.

6. *Domestic Policy Impact.* National leaders and other actors begin to justify changes in domestic policy on the basis of the international norm. At this point, the policy changes typically serve other purposes as well, but the norm provides additional justification for the changes. The norm is fully embedded in the domestic political dialogue, but the onus is still on the supporters of the norm to justify policy changes that may adversely affect domestic interest groups.

7. *Norm Prominence.* Domestic interest groups that wish to continue policies or pursue new initiatives that contradict the norm must now justify the violation of the norm. The burden of proof has shifted and the norm is becoming embedded in the domestic institutional structures and policies of the state.

8. *Taken for Granted.* The norm has become embedded in the domestic institutional structure of the state, and compliance with the norm is nearly automatic.

Measuring norm salience raises a number of important questions. Was persuasion or coercion the primary mechanism shaping norm salience? How did international forces alter the domestic debate? Which domestic actors were central to determining the level of salience? To what extent did material considerations affect norm salience? Did differences in domestic institutions or political culture matter? The literature on international norms has articulated a series of hypotheses related to the variables that should influence the level of domestic political salience. The hypotheses are presented below and then evaluated in the substantive chapters.

HYPOTHESES: VARIABLES INFLUENCING THE DOMESTIC SALIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS

Hypothesis 1. The greater the congruence between an international norm and domestic political norms, the greater the potential for the norm to be inte-

grated into domestic political dialogue and achieve a high degree of political salience.[15] When domestic actors perceive the norm to be an extension of preexisting domestic political norms, it is likely to face only limited opposition, and domestic actors are predisposed to acknowledge the norm and act on it. Conversely, when the international norm is perceived as alien or contradicting preexisting domestic political norms, it will face substantial opposition.[16] Such norms will likely require a reexamination of domestic political norms before the international norm can achieve substantial domestic salience.[17]

Hypothesis 2. The greater the congruence between the domestic policy implications of the international norm and the material interests of influential actors, the more likely that the norm will achieve political salience.[18] The debates over international norms should not be seen as distinct from the pursuit of material interests. States will seek to promote norms that minimize adjustment costs. International norms that do not entail substantial domestic redistributive consequences should face significantly less opposition than norms that will adversely affect the material interests of influential domestic actors. Actors facing adverse material consequences will attempt to block the domestic incorporation of international norms that will harm their interests. However, in cases in which the international norms are consistent with domestic norms, such actors will likely face substantial opposition to their efforts unless they can justify their opposition on the basis of something other than the effects on their material interests.

Hypothesis 3. The stronger the perception that a norm serves the "general interests" of humanity and environmental protection, the more likely that it will be perceived as legitimate by a broad coalition of interested actors. Important normative debates typically occur within the public sphere, which will include political leaders as well as domestic interest groups, NGOs, and the broader public. This larger audience will look suspiciously upon a state or other actor that they perceive to be promoting a norm that merely serves narrow self-interests. The influence of NGOs is closely linked with the public perception that they are concerned with a broader general interest.[19] As Thomas Risse notes, "actors who can legitimately claim authoritative knowledge or moral authority (or both) should be more able to convince a skeptical audience than actors who are suspected of promoting 'private' interests."[20] However, states whose interests happen to be consistent with an emergent norm may also utilize the norm to provide "cheap legitimacy" to their preferred policies.[21] Frank Schimmelfennig has called this strategic use of norm-based arguments "rhetorical action"—"rhetorical action changes the structure of bargaining power in favor of those actors that possess and pursue preferences in line with, though not necessarily inspired by, the

standard of legitimacy."[22] The broader perception of the legitimacy of a norm in providing for the "public good" will be a critical force shaping the salience of the nascent norm.

Hypothesis 4. Normative debates that are more public in nature and require domestic policy changes expand the number of relevant actors and create greater potential for private actors to create an incentive structure to force political actors to accept the norm regardless of their conviction related to the appropriateness of the norm. The extent to which normative debates are conducted in the public sphere will affect the influence of private actors on public officials. Normative debates that are primarily held among official actors without significant public input limit the range of actors that must be convinced of the appropriateness of the nascent norm. It is sufficient for political actors to be persuaded of the appropriateness of the norm for it to achieve salience. This situation also limits the potential for coercion by other interested actors to force political leaders to affirm the norm.

The greater the access and influence of norm entrepreneurs in the political process, the more likely that their norm will achieve significant salience. The domestic political structures of the states, the representative mechanisms for interest groups, and the number and significance of political access points will influence the domestic salience of international norms.[23] The extent to which norm entrepreneurs have opportunities to engage political leaders and persuade them of the appropriateness of their preferred norm or shame them into affirmation of the norm will significantly influence the potential for the norm to achieve domestic political salience.

Based on these hypotheses, it is possible to identify the conditions, which should provide the strongest foundation for a nascent international norm to achieve domestic political salience as well as those conditions that will reduce the level of salience. International norms that resonate with existing domestic political norms and which are also consistent with the material interests of significant domestic actors should rapidly achieve domestic norm salience. Obviously, cases in which the international norm does not resonate with existing domestic political norms and which would adversely affect significant domestic economic actors will be least likely to achieve domestic norm salience. The potential domestic salience of international norms in cases in which either the norm resonates with existing domestic norms but negatively affects domestic economic actors or in which the norm does not resonate with existing domestic norms but positively affects the material interests of domestic economic actors is much more difficult to predict. The level of salience should be significantly affected by the domestic political structure and the relative influence of important domestic actors in such cases. The broader perception of the legitimacy of

the norm will also be critical in determining whether it will achieve domestic salience. These hypotheses will be evaluated in the case studies of climate policy.

WHY STUDY BRITISH, GERMAN, AND AMERICAN CLIMATE POLICY?

Greenhouse gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane, and nitrous oxide make up less than 1 percent of the Earth's atmosphere, but they are responsible for maintaining the Earth's temperature at levels capable of supporting life. Without the greenhouse effect, the Earth's average temperature would be –18 C (–.5 F). With the greenhouse effect, the surface temperature averages +15 C (59 F). The concentrations of all GHGs, with the possible exception of water vapor, are increasing in the atmosphere as a result of human activity. Scientists have concluded that the Earth's average temperature has increased by approximately one degree over the past one hundred years, and at present trends the average temperature will increase between 2.5 and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit (1.4 and 5.8 degrees centigrade) between 1990 and 2100.[24]

The warming of the atmosphere poses a number of potential problems. It will cause thermal expansion of the oceans and a net loss of ice at the poles and contained in glaciers, leading to an increase in the average sea level of between 3.5 and 34.6 inches (.09 and .88 meters) by 2100.[25] Such increases could engulf small island states and submerge large tracts of low-lying coastal areas in countries around the world. Scientists predict that the higher ocean temperatures will produce more frequent and more powerful storms leading to higher costs from storm damage. Regional weather patterns are also likely to change. Some regions may benefit from greater amounts of rainfall while others will suffer from drought. Changing weather patterns could have significant effects on agriculture, urban water supplies, as well as forcing changes in ecosystems. The higher temperatures could also affect human health through the northern migration of tropical disease and the adverse effects of prolonged heat waves. The impact and costs of these changes are highly uncertain. Much of the effect will depend on the speed and regional variation of the predicted effects. The slower the warming, the easier it is to adapt. Depending on the specific local effects, it is possible that some countries could be net beneficiaries from longer growing seasons, increased water supplies, and reduced energy use for heating. Some scientists have suggested that dramatic climate changes are also possible due to shifts in ocean currents that could have catastrophic effects on weather patterns. The potential costs of climate change remain highly speculative.

Carbon dioxide is responsible for roughly 60 percent of the "enhanced greenhouse effect," or the additional warming above preindustrial levels.

The burning of fossil fuels is the primary source of carbon dioxide emissions. Methane is responsible for approximately 15 to 20 percent of the enhanced greenhouse effect. The major sources of methane emissions include rice paddies, cattle, waste dumps, leaks from coal mines, and natural gas production. Nitrogen oxides, CFCs, and ozone contribute most of the remaining portion of the enhanced greenhouse effect. It does not matter where the GHGs originate. They have the same effect on the atmosphere. Any solution to the problem of climate change necessarily requires multilateral action, and, if it is to be meaningful, a solution entails changes in domestic policies.

Domestic climate policies must inevitably address carbon dioxide emissions and/or removal from the atmosphere, because CO_2 is the most important of the GHGs. To reduce CO_2 emissions, states must decrease the burning of fossil fuels, but these fuels lie at the heart of every state's economy. Managing CO_2 emissions presents risks to a state's competitive position by increasing costs of production, and it threatens to alter domestic lifestyles and standards of living. In addition to reducing emissions of CO_2, it is also possible to remove CO_2 from the atmosphere. Plant life acts as a "sink" for CO_2 by removing vast quantities of the gas through photosynthesis. It is thus possible to partially offset emissions of CO_2 with better land management and the expansion of forested areas. There are also a number of other technologies that could potentially remove CO_2 from the atmosphere and sequester it in the deep ocean, below the surface of the Earth, or chemically convert it into a solid form. At this point, these options remain impractical, and the reduction of CO_2 emissions and the use of sinks to remove CO_2 dominate the climate policy debate. While political debates and international negotiations over the reduction of all GHGs will be addressed in this book, the primary focus will be on attempts to regulate CO_2 emissions as the most important GHG and the most politically charged gas to regulate.

The United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom offer several advantages for analyzing the role of international norms in the evolution of climate policy. They have been critical actors in the climate negotiations. They interacted within the same international institutions (with the important exception of German and British membership in the European Union) and had significant influence within those structures. They also share a number of common traits which hold important domestic variables constant. They are democratic states with close economic and political ties. They have been active in pursuing international environmental interests and have played major roles in environmental negotiations. Conservative governments led each country during the formative years of climate policy, and liberal governments eventually assumed power in all three countries after the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Additionally,

they are all advanced industrial states with similar patterns of CO_2 emissions, though the overall scale of emissions from the United States dwarfs those of Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1990, over 60 percent of CO_2 emissions in all three countries emanated from the energy transformation industry and mobile sources (i.e., cars, trucks, and trains). The bulk of the remaining emissions were from industry. Thus, each government would have to address the same sectors to reduce CO_2 emissions.[26]

While these similarities hold many variables constant, differences in domestic institutional structures have the potential to affect whether and how international norms are translated into domestic policy. For example, Germany's hybrid single member district and proportional representation electoral system for the Bundestag has created an opening for the Green Party to have a much larger effect on German policy than such parties could achieve in the British and American political systems. The dominant position of the prime minister in British politics permits the government to act more expeditiously to change domestic policies than either the German or American governments. The German chancellor can typically push policy changes through the lower house, but he must contend with an influential upper house of parliament (the Bundesrat) that is often controlled by the opposition. The American president faces a much more independent House of Representatives and Senate even if the bodies are controlled by the president's party. The adversarial legalism of American regulatory politics also creates obstacles to policy implementation. The domestic institutional structure of each state affects the strength and influence of domestic actors in the policy process, shapes actor strategies, and affects the ability of the executive branch to formulate and successfully pursue domestic and foreign environmental policies. These variables have their greatest effect upon domestic environmental policy, but they also impinge on the foreign policy process. A full discussion of the effects of institutional variation on climate policy is beyond the scope of this study. However, these may be important intervening variables affecting the domestic salience of international norms; therefore, they will be discussed when relevant to the incorporation of the norms into the domestic policy process.

Each state also possesses a unique approach to state-sponsored environmental action that influences the national response to new environmental problems. This approach is a product of the state's institutional framework, domestic environmental policy norms, cultural differences, and historically contingent choices made in both the domestic and international policy processes.[27] The state's approach to environmental action is not static. It will change incrementally over time, and in times of crisis it may change very rapidly.[28] As a new environmental problem emerges, the domestic approach to environmental policy structures the national response. Environmental policy

norms dictate the types of evidence required to induce action. They influence the institutional path through which the issue will be addressed as well as which actors will shape the national response. Proposals to change national policies to address the problem must also be consistent with existing environmental policy norms.

The national response to the new environmental problem will thus emerge from a contested process of political interaction structured by the national approach to environmental policy. Altering policies to address the problem will require domestic actors to overcome the status quo bias in environmental policy. Domestic actors who would be adversely affected by the proposed policy changes will attempt to obstruct the changes. However, they cannot openly and vigorously attack the state's environmental philosophy without facing public pressure to submit to national environmental norms. There will also be individuals and groups with more extreme environmental positions. The influence of these groups is also constrained by the national approach to environmental policy, which reflects a generally accepted balancing of societal interests. Once regulations are enacted, the various domestic actors respond to the incentives and strategic opportunities created by those regulations. Any proposal that threatens the domestic status quo must overcome the inertia of established policies. The effect is that previous policy decisions constrain the range of acceptable international policy initiatives as well as the ability to alter domestic policy. Therefore, two states with similar economies and even geographic circumstances may produce divergent responses to a new environmental challenge.

Several scholars have explored the variations in national approaches to state-sponsored environmental action.[29] Two major differences in the norms governing environmental policy in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany have arguably had important effects on the emergence of international climate norms and the translation of those norms into domestic policy: the application of the "precautionary principle" and the perception of the role of the market in environmental protection. One of the core principles of German environmental policy is the precautionary principle.[30] The precautionary principle requires the government to address potential environmental threats even before scientific evidence provides substantial confirmation of the hazard. The application of the precautionary principle predisposed the German political system to address climate change even before there was conclusive scientific evidence linking GHG emissions to climate change. The British and American political systems, on the other hand, have tended to require significant scientific evidence before taking regulatory action to address a potential problem. In the American case, the frequent need for regulators to defend their actions before the judiciary has reinforced the requirement to justify regulations on the basis of concrete

scientific evidence. The result has been a politicization of environmental science. Advocates of various policy responses seek to support their positions with scientific evidence and challenge the research of political opponents, which has undermined the formation of a national consensus that a policy response to climate change is necessary.

The role of market mechanisms in environmental protection was also an important element in the response to climate change. The success of the American sulfur emission market colored the American debate surrounding the principles that should guide the policy response to climate change. The antiregulatory legacy of the Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush administrations was also important. Both administrations emphasized the need for cost-benefit analyses to justify regulatory action. The uncertainties surrounding both the science and economics of climate change made meaningful cost-benefit analysis nearly impossible, which complicated the American debate. Both Germany and the United Kingdom were experimenting with economic incentives to address environmental problems, but neither had gone as far as the United States in requiring cost-benefit analyses to justify regulatory action.

Differences in domestic institutional structures and environmental policy norms should affect the domestic salience of international norms. Each of the chapters seeks to trace the concurrent evolution of German, British, American, and EU (the inclusion of the EU is necessary to understand German and British policies) policy responses to climate change and the emergence of related international norms. The objective is to measure the salience of the international norms and evaluate the forces influencing the level of domestic political salience.

This book focuses primarily on two normative debates that were critical to the development of international and domestic climate policy. First, who should bear primary responsibility for reducing global GHG emissions? Should developed states be forced to act first because they are historically responsible for the vast majority of GHG emissions, or should all states bear a common responsibility to reduce emissions? This debate involved issues of justice and fairness as well as economic costs and efficiency. If developing and developed states faced similar obligations then this would limit the competitive effects of emission reduction policies as well as reducing the costs of emission reductions globally since there were more cost effective emission reductions available in developing countries. The second primary normative debate focused on the principles that would guide global emission reductions. Should individual states be held to a principle of national accountability, which would require every state to reduce its domestic GHG emissions, or should the principle of economic efficiency guide global emission reductions? Most environmental NGOs, developing countries, as well

as most European states argued for a norm requiring national responsibility. The United States, Japan, and Australia (among others) argued that the important point was to reduce global emissions, and that these emission reductions should be achieved wherever they were most cost effective. The resolution of these normative debates and the degree to which their related norms achieved domestic political salience would significantly shape the development of both international and domestic climate policies.

The chapters are organized chronologically. Chapter 2 focuses on the early identification and framing of climate change in the mid-1980s through the establishment of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC) at the end of 1990. This was a period when climate change was primarily a foreign policy issue and not a significant domestic political issue. Chapter 3 analyzes the Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations (1991–1992) and the early domestic political debates in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The early protocol negotiations after the completion of the FCCC through the Berlin Mandate agreement (1992–1995) are discussed in chapter 4. The focus shifted in this period from international negotiations to domestic policy debates. Chapter 5 focuses on the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (1995–1997), and finally chapter 6 analyzes the failure of the Hague negotiations to complete the Kyoto Protocol, the subsequent decisions by the United States to pull out of the Kyoto Protocol and the German, British, and EU decisions to ratify the Kyoto Protocol without the United States (1997–2001), and the Protocol's entry into force in February 2005.

Each chapter traces the evolution of the domestic and foreign policy responses to climate change adopted by the three states within the context of the larger normative debates surrounding climate policy. To what extent were international norms incorporated into the domestic political dialogue? Were domestic and foreign policies consistent with the national rhetorical positions and with the emerging international norms? If there were discrepancies, what explains the inconsistency? An evaluation of these questions provides the foundation for making judgments about the salience of international norms to the domestic political process as well as evaluating the hypotheses related to the forces affecting norm salience.