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Polling and the Dilemmas of Democracy

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On 21 January 1998, news media across the country became captivated by yet another alleged Clinton scandal, one that seemed more sensationalized and damaging than those of the past. Rumors quickly spread about a possible sexual relationship between Clinton and a young White House intern. Stories of Clinton's womanizing were not new, but because this was the first time Clinton had been accused of having an affair *as president*, this story had a greater impact. Clinton was accused of telling the intern, Monica Lewinsky, to lie under oath about the relationship. The allegations, if true, were quite serious. Even longtime Clinton advisor George Stephanopoulos, one of his most ardent supporters, said on ABC News that if the allegations were true, they could lead to impeachment proceedings.¹

Clinton received advice from many people regarding how to handle the allegations. Some of Clinton's top advisors, including former chief of staff Leon Panetta and the chief of staff at the time, Erskine Bowles, told Clinton to come clean and take responsibility if the allegations were true.² Clinton did not listen to the advice of Panetta and Bowles. Instead, he relied on a longtime confidant, campaign strategist, and pollster, the controversial political consultant Dick Morris. Morris told the president to authorize a poll to gauge the reaction of the American public to the allegations; Clinton agreed. The poll indicated that the public was less concerned about the affair, but quite worried about the obstruction of justice charges.³ As Stephanopoulos put it, "The poll said lie" if the charges were true.⁴ Five days later, in the Roosevelt

Room of the White House, Bill Clinton, with a fixed glare, stared into a television camera, wagged his index finger, and emphatically insisted “I want you to listen to me . . . I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie. Not a single time. Never.”⁵

As he did quite often with policy issues, Bill Clinton relied on a poll to help formulate his “position” on the Lewinsky scandal. According to presidential scholar George Edwards, “The Clinton administration is the ultimate example of the public presidency, one based on a perpetual campaign and fed by public opinion polls, focus groups, and public relations memos.”⁶ Clinton was notorious for taking into account public opinion on everything from health care to where he should spend his summer vacation. Critics claimed that Clinton relied too heavily on polls to formulate his policy views. According to Morris, the president was better at reading polls than any pollster Morris knew.⁷

With Clinton in his hottest water yet, the Republican-led Congress pursued impeachment. While Clinton looked to public opinion polls to formulate his message, Congress virtually ignored the public’s attitudes on the scandal. Public opinion polls overwhelmingly indicated that, though the public did not condone the president’s actions, they did not believe he should be impeached. Instead, nearly every poll showed that the public favored censure.⁸ And yet, on 19 December 1998, William Jefferson Clinton became the second president in United States history to be impeached.

The two cases above show the importance—or perhaps lack of importance—of polls in American politics. The issue this book sets out to address is: what is the role of polls in a representative democracy? On the one hand, polls seem essential to the functioning of a robust democratic government. Some argue that polls are quintessential in a democracy because they send a symbolic message that the people matter. Proponents of polls suggest that, in a democracy, publicly elected officials should not only respond to the “will” of the people, but are obligated to follow the lead of the people and “give them what they want.” Polls are one way to find out what the people want. Not only do polls provide politicians with the “will” of the people, but, as Asher notes, polls provide “the opportunity for citizens to learn about their compatriots and to dispel myths and stereotypes that might otherwise mislead public discourse.”⁹

On the other hand, some people believe that politicians rely too heavily on polls—especially polls that may provide misleading or inaccurate information. Critics of polls assert that politicians often blindly follow polls when creating policy and fail to exert creative

leadership. Others claim that pollsters have the potential to manipulate public opinion and the political agenda. Additionally, some have argued that polls have lessened voter turnout and created a more cynical public. Do polls make our government stronger by giving the citizenry a voice in the political process and providing important information about policies, campaign strategy, and the horse race? Or do they hinder and undermine democracy by forcing politicians to become slaves to the opinions of a generally uneducated public, allow for the manipulation of public opinion, and provide false information that has the ability to influence policy and electoral outcomes?

Whatever the answers to the above questions, Americans cannot escape polls; they are part of our everyday lives. We take polls on everything, from the presidential vote choice, to positions on abortion, to what movie should win the Oscar. During the 1996 presidential election alone, more than three hundred national and four hundred state polls asked voters for their presidential vote choice; this in an election that was not even close.¹⁰ According to Traugott, eighteen different organizations produced a final estimate of the outcome in the 2000 presidential election and pollsters conducted more polls than ever before.¹¹ Since we cannot escape polls, we must understand their impact on our society.

Polling in a Democratic Society

This book sets out to analyze two different questions regarding polling and its place in a democratic society. First, how are polls used—or how should they be used—by policymakers, in this case, the president? Second, is polling dangerous to democratic governments or is it an essential aspect of democracies?

Politicians' Use of Polls

In a republic such as the United States, citizens elect representatives to go to Washington, state capitals, or city halls to make policy. Some believe that the role of an elected official is to act as a “delegate,” to follow the will of the people when creating that policy. In a delegate version of democracy, if the people want tax cuts, the politicians should give them tax cuts. If not, come the next election the incumbents should be looking for new jobs. If one supports the delegate model of representation, then it is important for politicians to be able to read public opinion on a variety of issues. Polls can provide politicians with

an estimation of popular will and sentiment. As Archibald Crossley wrote nearly seventy years ago, polls are “the long-sought key to ‘Government by the people.’”¹² Beyond giving elected officials a sense of public opinion, polls send a symbolic message that the voice of the people matters.¹³

Politicians often decry the use of public opinion polls, arguing that they provide inaccurate information. Many elected officials claim they can read the political pulse of the people through meetings with constituents and phone calls and letters to their offices. However, the problem with relying entirely on these kinds of contacts is that politicians are unlikely to get an accurate picture of public opinion. The types of people who attend political rallies or write their congressperson look quite different than the public at large. It is the public at large that elects the politicians. Therefore, according to a delegate theory of representation, like it or not, politicians need public opinion polls.

Certainly not everyone believes in the delegate model of representation. Instead, many people take a Burkean view of representation. Under this model, politicians are not expected to follow public sentiment, but to act as “trustees” instead. Proponents of trustee representation believe that politicians should not vote with public opinion, but with their personal convictions about what they feel is best for their constituents or the country. We elect representatives not to use our judgment, but to use theirs; we elect them to apply their wisdom to the issues at hand. In other words, if the public wants tax cuts, but the politician knows that tax cuts will threaten Social Security, then the politician should vote against tax cuts. As “experts” on policy, politicians are believed to have a clearer idea of the impact of policy; therefore we entrust them to make the right decision. Several studies have indicated that politicians view themselves more as trustees than as delegates, although most prefer to act as “politicos,” a mixture of the two models.¹⁴ Interestingly, the public does not necessarily agree with the elites. A recent poll found that 63% of the public wanted Congress to “stick closely to American public opinion . . . including results of polls” when making legislative decisions. Only 34% wanted representatives to “do what they think is best.”¹⁵

Nevertheless, many argue that politicians should pay little attention to polls, because they believe that polls do not provide any meaningful information about preferences. Scholars have long criticized the American voter for their lack of knowledge about politics and their inability to hold stable opinions.¹⁶ In fact, Converse argued that the majority of Americans were incapable of thinking ideologically or holding consistent opinions on issues; instead, they held “non-atti-

tudes.”¹⁷ A non-attitude is when people have no genuine opinion on an issue, yet respond to a survey question as if they do, so as not to look uneducated. The problem of non-attitudes can be immense because, if the public or even a portion of the public does indeed hold non-attitudes yet responds to a survey, we are not measuring opinions at all. In reality, all public opinion polls would indicate then would be a bunch of noise. In chapter 8, James Fishkin tackles the problem of non-attitudes head-on by arguing that deliberative polling is important for a healthy democracy.

While the delegate vs. trustee debate normally refers to legislators, perhaps no elected official faces more headaches regarding the role of public opinion than the President of the United States. As Michael Genovese discusses in chapter 2, the president is put in a precarious situation; we expect the president to lead, but at the same time we expect him to follow. We expect the president to do what we want, but we criticize the president, as we did Clinton, when he puts too much emphasis on public opinion polls. Because of this predicament, presidents spend a great deal of time trying to manipulate public opinion and have increasingly relied on polls.¹⁸ In chapter 3, Larry Jacobs and Melinda Jackson provide an in-depth examination of Richard Nixon’s use of polling, specifically his efforts to change the public’s perception of his image and rally support for his administration. Diane Heith continues the discussion of presidents and polls in chapter 4 by examining presidents’ use of polling from Nixon through George W. Bush. Heith argues that the president’s use of polls to “permanently campaign” rather than to govern weakens the policy-making process.

The Dangers of Polling in a Democracy

Politicians certainly rely on polls for a variety of reasons—whether it is to help formulate strategy, decide where to stand on issues, or manipulate public opinion—but not everyone is enamored with the use of polls. In fact, many worry that polls actually undermine democracy.

While some question whether we want politicians following public opinion polls (because of the public’s lack of knowledge regarding many issues and the possible presence of non-attitudes), perhaps the most common argument against the use of polls is that the “polls are wrong”; they lack external validity. The belief is that poll results are not generalizable. After all, as critics of polls argue, how can the opinions of fifteen hundred people tell us anything? Or, how accurate can polls be if I have never participated in one? The response to these questions

is that statistical theory allows us to get a clear picture of what public opinion is without having to interview everyone. As Asher correctly notes, just as a chef does not have to eat the entire stew to determine if it is finished, pollsters do not have to interview the entire population to get an accurate reading of public opinion.¹⁹

Still, many people remain skeptical. Polls certainly are not always correct; even those that are perfectly implemented may have some problems (e.g., a bad sample). Others worry about the ability of polling results to be easily manipulated through question wording or the order the questions are asked. For instance, public opinion is drastically different when people are asked if they support *welfare* or *assistance to the poor*. Both questions get at the same topic—the government’s role in helping the poor—but people are much more likely to favor “assistance to the poor” than they are “welfare.”²⁰

One area where polls receive great criticism is their ability to correctly predict the winner of an election. In reality, since the 1950s trial heat polls have been quite accurate in predicting the winner of presidential elections. Polls become even more precise the closer they are conducted to Election Day.²¹ Since 1952, the average error in the final Gallup Poll has been less than 2%.²² Occasionally, the polls have not correctly predicted the winner (e.g., many of the final polls in 2000 forecasted that Bush would win the popular vote) or they have overestimated the margin of victory (e.g., Clinton in 1992), but these examples are not common.

Exit polls—where voters are asked whom they voted for as they leave the voting booth—in particular are the subject of skepticism by the public, especially given the controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election. In chapter 7, Jerry Wright argues that the public’s concerns over the accuracy of exit polls, while perhaps understandable in light of recent events, are not valid. In fact, Wright claims that exit polls are beneficial in a democracy because they allow researchers to understand certain phenomena, such as why people voted the way that they did.

Polls also provide candidates with important information. They allow candidates to see their standing in the horse race, learn where they are strong and where they are weak, and help them create campaign messages and develop strategy. Imagine being a student where you received no feedback on your performance until the last day of class. You would not know if you should keep doing what you have been doing or needed to take a different approach. Feedback on exams provides you with that information. Polls are the “midterms” for candidates.

While the polls may be accurate, the public still could be receiving inaccurate information. Many question the media’s ability to interpret

polls. Michael Traugott argues in chapter 5 that journalists play a crucial role in acting as intermediaries between the polling organizations and the people, but they are not always trained in interpreting polls.²³ As Traugott shows, the results of the same poll are often read differently by various media sources. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the public often blindly follows what the media are reporting as truth. This faith often occurs because the public, like the media, is not educated on distinguishing between a good poll and a bad one, nor is it trained in interpreting poll results.

As Traugott notes, the media's discussion of polls could also have an effect on political behavior. Studies of media coverage during elections have found that it is often the horse race that gets the most attention.²⁴ On the one hand, the media's constant discussion of the polls could be positive. While Americans are not necessarily active consumers of politics, they seem to enjoy the competitive aspect of politics; therefore, polls could spark political interest and participation. According to Lavrakas and Traugott, polls can engage citizens in the political process and raise their interest in elections.²⁵ Americans love competition; they want to know who is winning and who is losing. Polls provide this information. In turn, they may allow citizens to become more educated on certain elections and the issues involved. Lavrakas and Traugott are quick to point out, however, that the use of polls has a downside if the discussion is simply the horse race.

Not everyone buys the claim that polls spark interest and turnout. In fact, some believe just the opposite. In 1996, Roper Center director Everett Carll Ladd was quite critical of polls overstating Bill Clinton's margin of victory over Bob Dole.²⁶ He argued that the fact that the polls predicted an easy Clinton victory dampened interest in the election, causing lower voter turnout (turnout in the 1996 election was the lowest since 1924). Traugott briefly addresses this question in chapter 5.

Similar criticism has been directed toward exit polls. Some scholars claim there is an East Coast bias to exit polls that lessens turnout on the West Coast,²⁷ although not everyone agrees.²⁸ For instance, in 1980 early exit poll results from states in the eastern time zone clearly indicated a Reagan landslide. As a result of the exit poll returns, Jimmy Carter had already conceded the election at 9:30 P.M. eastern standard time, while polls in some western states were still open for another hour and a half. Though the early calls did not influence the outcome of the presidential election, they may have affected local races by keeping voters on the West Coast away from the polls. Reagan certainly still would have won, but his margin of victory might have

been smaller, and Democrats might have fared better in state and local elections.

The controversy surrounding exit polls in the 2000 presidential election brought a different charge regarding voter turnout. There was controversy because the networks had called Florida for Al Gore before all of the precincts in the state had finished voting. Because the Florida panhandle is in the central time zone, precincts were still open in the largely Republican part of the state when the networks had already declared Gore the winner. Republican leaders claimed that this action by the media had an influence on the outcome in Florida because it discouraged Republicans in the panhandle from voting. "Every single state that was called for Gore was called sooner, much sooner, than the states that were called for Bush," complained Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA).²⁹

Not only can polls potentially influence *whether* someone votes, people argue they also influence *how* someone votes. There are two hypothesized effects that occur because of the information citizens receive from trial heat polls: the bandwagon effect and the underdog effect. Forget polls for a minute and think about the NCAA basketball tournament. Many people who have little interest in who wins the tournament before it begins suddenly find themselves rooting for a team. They may support a team that is expected to do well—jump on the bandwagon—because that is the popular choice. Or, they might find themselves rooting hard for "the little guy." We often love an upset; we want to see the underdog do well. Some scholars argue that the same phenomenon occurs in elections, or at least there is some evidence that it is likely to be present.³⁰ People may see that a candidate has a comfortable lead and identify with the winner, or they might pull for the underdog. Either way, the voting behavior of citizens could be influenced by the polls. Not everyone believes that bandwagon and underdog effects are as prominent as some scholars suggest. Asher claims that there is a lack of evidence supporting either of these views. "Bandwagon and underdog effects can and do occur," writes Asher, "but their magnitude is small and probably inconsequential."³¹ However, Sabato and Simpson argue that whether there is actually a bandwagon effect is of little importance. "There may actually be little or no real 'bandwagon effect,'" write the authors, "but politicians and consultants *believe* there is such a thing and strive to create it by looking like a winner."³² In other words, candidates may try to manipulate trial heat polls.

Manipulation of trial heat polls is not the only concern regarding polling. People also worry about the manipulation of public opinion in general. We noted earlier Jacobs and Jackson's study of Nixon in

chapter 3. However, the problem of manipulation could be much more deceitful than the tactics employed by Nixon. In chapter 6, Matt Streb and Susan Pinkus discuss various types of unscientific or unethical polls and the problems these polls can potentially create. Streb and Pinkus focus primarily on one particular kind of devious polling: push polls. These “polls” are not really polls at all. Instead, respondents are presented with hypothetical, often blatantly false information under the guise of legitimate survey research. As Streb and Pinkus argue, these polls lead people to question legitimate survey research, they manipulate public policies, and they have the potential to make people cynical about politics. It is not that Streb and Pinkus are arguing that polling is bad—in fact, like Traugott, they believe that when conducted properly polls can be extremely useful and important in a democracy—but that we must be concerned that polls are implemented and interpreted properly.

While most of the scholars in this book argue that, even with the potential problems of polls, they are an integral part of any robust democracy, the public may not agree. Traugott found that the public believes that polls are accurate estimates of the outcome, but that they did not like the “intrusiveness of the continual presentation of the ‘trial heat’ results.”³³ This finding reminds one of us of our grandmother who would refuse to participate in trial heat polls. When asked whom she would be voting for, her reply was always, “I thought the ballot was supposed to be secret.” The public seems to hold opinions similar to grandma’s. According to one poll, 66% of respondents felt that the media spent too much time discussing pre-election polling stories in the 1988 presidential election.³⁴

Because of the controversy surrounding exit polls, the public’s disdain for them is even more intense. According to Traugott, a majority (51%) believe that the “government should not allow early election projections.”³⁵ Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller came to similar conclusions.³⁶ In chapter 7, Jerry Wright goes into greater detail regarding this subject, arguing that, even though the people do not like them, exit polls have an important place in a democratic society.

The History of Polling in America

Concerns regarding polling are not new; people have criticized polls since they were first conducted. In fact, polling has been around for quite some time. It is generally agreed that 1824 was the first presidential election in which polls were used. In that election, the

Harrisburg Pennsylvanian conducted a “straw poll” (a poll that does not use probability sampling) that showed Andrew Jackson leading John Quincy Adams 335 votes to 169.³⁷ Other newspapers and some magazines, such as the *Farm Journal*, began producing straw polls during the nineteenth century. However, it was not until 1916 that presidential trial-heat polls received extensive coverage. That year, the *Literary Digest* conducted the first of several polls trying to predict the winner of the presidential election. The *Digest* correctly forecasted the winner of the 1916, 1920, 1924, 1928, and 1932 elections, although the predictive power of the poll was somewhat limited outside of forecasting the winner.³⁸ In 1936, the magazine predicted that Kansas Governor Alfred Landon would beat incumbent President Franklin Roosevelt in a landslide. In reality, Landon won only two states and a total of eight electoral votes. What went wrong? The *Literary Digest*’s sample was biased toward the Republican Landon. The people included in the sample were chosen from telephone directories and automobile registrations. With the country still in the midst of its greatest depression ever, the people on these lists were overwhelmingly wealthy Republicans. A class bias skewed the results.

The unscientific nature of the *Literary Digest* poll brought about more scientific ways to predict presidential elections by polling luminaries such as George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley. The new wave of pollsters were embarrassed in 1948 when they predicted that New York Governor Thomas Dewey would defeat incumbent President Harry S Truman. The blunder led to one of the most recognizable pictures for students of American politics: Truman holding up a copy of the *Chicago Tribune* that had the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman.” While pollsters had made great strides in the twelve years since the *Literary Digest*’s error, they still had to develop better polling techniques. Pollsters had difficulty predicting who would actually vote in the election. Their sampling methods remained inadequate, and they did not conduct polls until Election Day. Because the Dewey-Truman race was believed to be a blowout, some polling organizations stopped conducting polls as early as September! The failure to poll closer to Election Day kept pollsters from capturing voters who made up or changed their minds in the last several weeks of the campaign. As noted earlier, since the Dewey-Truman race, pollsters have been much more accurate in their predictions. With the greater predictive power of trial heat polls today, pollsters and news organizations are conducting more polls than ever before.

While polling to predict election winners has been around for quite some time, politicians’ use of polls to measure public opinion is rela-

tively new. Certainly, as Genovese argues in chapter 2, presidents have always tried to measure the pulse of public opinion, but presidents were forced to rely on unscientific methods such as afternoon “open houses” where citizens were encouraged to visit the White House to discuss their concerns with the president. It was not until John Kennedy that presidents regularly polled public opinion in scientific ways, although FDR did encourage the development of government polling.³⁹ Kennedy’s internal polls were kept quite secret, however, to keep people from thinking that he was creating policy based on public opinion polls.⁴⁰ As Jacobs and Jackson note in chapter 3, Nixon was really the first president to continuously commission public opinion polls. Heith discusses in chapter 4 how presidents’ reliance on polls has not changed with Bill Clinton or George W. Bush.

Polling has come a long way, then. Whether polling to predict elections or polling to govern, the quality of polling has improved and the importance of polling has grown immensely. As a result, the number of polls conducted has exploded. Like it or not, polling has become a part of the everyday lives of Americans, and it is not going to go away anytime soon. Since we cannot escape polling, we might as well learn to understand it. Accordingly, this book sets out to analyze what the place of polling is and should be in a robust democracy.

The Format of the Book

This book addresses whether polls make democracies stronger or whether they undermine democracy. The following chapters focus on the two main questions posed above: How do policymakers use polls? And what are the dangers of polling in a democracy? Chapters 2–4 examine the importance of polling and public opinion as they relate to political actors—in this case, the president of the United States. In chapter 2, Michael Genovese notes the problems presidents have when trying to govern. On the one hand, presidents are expected to lead. We want persuasive presidents who feel strongly about a platform and are able to rally the public around their cause. We do not want presidents who continually succumb slavishly to the will of the people. At the same time, presidents are expected to follow “our lead.” We become leery of presidents who try to manipulate public opinion, and we negatively rate presidents when they take unpopular positions. In chapter 3, Larry Jacobs and Melinda Jackson examine Richard Nixon’s use of polling to attempt to manipulate perceptions of the president. In chapter 4, Diane Heith concludes the discussion of polling

and the president by analyzing polling in the Nixon through Bush II administrations. Heith argues that recent presidents have continually used polls to “permanently campaign.”

In chapter 5, the discussion moves away from the president and instead focuses on the public. Mike Traugott asks the question: “Do Polls Give the People a Voice in a Democracy?” Traugott asserts that people know little about accepted polling methods and that this lack of knowledge limits the public’s ability to analyze poll results. He also takes the media to task (specifically journalists) for its poor understanding of poll results and argues that this can distort the public’s perceptions of what public opinion really is on various subjects.

In chapter 6, Matt Streb and Susan Pinkus examine nonscientific and unacceptable forms of polls, including push polls. Streb and Pinkus maintain that these types of unscientific polls are dangerous in a democracy because they distort true public opinion and have the potential to make people cynical about polling and politics. Unfortunately, these polls have become more prominent in the last several years and show little sign of dissipating.

In chapter 7, Jerry Wright makes a strong argument favoring the use of exit polls. Wright claims that the public misunderstands exit polls. Instead of exit polls being a negative in a democratic government by possibly influencing the outcomes of elections, Wright asserts that they are imperative because they provide valuable information to the public, the media, and researchers.

In chapter 8, Jim Fishkin discusses his attempts to diminish the problems of “non-attitudes” through the use of deliberative polling. Fishkin argues that most polls provide inaccurate information because people do not have true opinions about the issues that they are asked. Deliberative polling improves democracy, Fishkin claims, by showing what “true” public opinion would be on issues if the public were informed. He believes that deliberative polling, in turn, will educate the public allowing them to make better decisions when voting.

Finally, in chapter 9, we close by arguing that polls, when conducted and interpreted correctly, do not undermine democracy. Instead, they are an essential part of any functioning representative government.

Notes

1. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, p. 434.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 436.

3. Heith, "Polling for a Defense."
4. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, p. 436.
5. Brice, "Not a Single Time, Never," p. A1.
6. Edwards, "Frustration and Folly," p. 234.
7. Morris, *Behind the Oval Office*, p. 143.
8. Jacobs and Shapiro, *Politicians Don't Pander*.
9. Asher, *Polling and the Public*, 4th ed, p. 21.
10. Bogart, "Politics, Polls, and Poltergeists."
11. Traugott, "Assessing Poll Performance."
12. Crossley, "Straw Polls in 1936," p. 35.
13. Lavrakas and Traugott, *Election Polls, the News Media, and Democracy*.
14. Kuklinski and McCrone, "Electoral Accountability"; Friesma and Hedlund, "The Reality of Representational Roles."
15. Morin, "Unconventional Wisdom."
16. Campbell et al., *The American Voter*; Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems."
17. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-attitudes."
18. Jacobs and Shapiro, *Politicians Don't Pander*.
19. Asher, *Polling and the Public*, 4th ed.
20. Rasinski, "The Effect of Question Wording."
21. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House?*; Erikson and Wlezien, "The Timeline of Political Campaigns."
22. Wayne, *The Road to the White House 2000*.
23. One of the contributors to this book experienced the lack of the media's knowledge regarding polls at first hand. During a "prep" meeting with broadcasters to discuss the results of a local mayoral election, the contributor was asked if the exit poll results were raw numbers or percentages.
24. Lichter and Noyes, "There They Go Again"; Streb, *The New Electoral Politics of Race*.
25. Lavrakas and Traugott, *Election Polls, The News Media, and Democracy*.
26. Ladd, "The Election Polls."

27. Jackson, "Election Night Reporting."
28. Epstein and Strom, "Survey Research and Election Night Projections."
29. Walker, "Truth or Consequences," p. P1.
30. Goidel and Shields, "The Vanishing Marginals"; Ceci and Kain, "Jumping on the Bandwagon"; Navazio, "An Experimental Approach to Bandwagon Research"; Fleitas, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects"; Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller, "Public Reactions to Polling."
31. Asher, *Polling and the Public*, 4th ed., p. 139.
32. Sabato and Simpson, *Dirty Little Secrets*, p. 247.
33. Traugott, "Public Attitudes about News Organizations," p. 143; see also Roper, "Evaluating Polls with Poll Data."
34. Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller, "Public Reactions to Polling."
35. Traugott, "Public Attitudes about News Organizations."
36. Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller, "Public Reactions to Polling."
37. Moon, *Opinion Polls*.
38. Crossley, "Straw Polls in 1936."
39. Jacobs, "The Recoil Effect."
40. Kennedy was so concerned about his use of polls that they were kept in a safe in the attorney general's office.