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## EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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The English-speaking world has long had anthologies of Heidegger's later essays after *Being and Time*. *Supplements* adds for the first time in any language a comprehensive anthology of the most important of his recently discovered essays before *Being and Time*, offering selections drawn from the long series of Heidegger's experimental, constantly supplemental attempts at rethinking philosophy that stretch from the earliest essays in the teens to those in the early twenties preceding *Being and Time* and pointing beyond to the later writings, when Heidegger's famous "turn" took in part the form of a "return" to his earliest writings. It presents them under a title taken from the first 1974 publisher's prospectus for Heidegger's *Collected Edition* (GA), which announced that certain texts from the Early Freiburg Period, though not included in the edition's original plan due to their anomalous character, might nonetheless later be "published as a supplement [*Supplement*]." The nine milestone selections—five of which were generally not even known of in Heidegger scholarship until the mid-1990s (chapters 2, 6, 8, 9, 10)—are representative of the Student Period (WS1909–10 to SS1915), the Early Freiburg Period (WS1915–16 to SS1923), and the first years of the Marburg Period from WS1923–24 to 1926, when *Being and Time* was composed.

As explained in detail below, this new primary source will serve scholars, teachers, and students well when used as a supplemental companion volume to early lecture courses such as the editor's translation of *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (OHF), *Being and Time* (available from State University of New York Press in a new translation by Joan Stambaugh), and even later works such as *Contributions to Philosophy*. References to these writings have accordingly been provided. Finally, because Heidegger's early experimental essays often make for difficult reading and can at times seem quite inscrutable, this collection also has been designed so that readers can, if they wish, use it in conjunction with the editor's secondary works on the early Heidegger (YH, RHFS, and OHF). References

to these and other secondary works listed in the secondary bibliography at the end of the volume also have been provided.

Four of the selections were composed or published by Heidegger as free-standing journal articles. The remaining six were composed in different genres: a book notice, a supplemental conclusion to a dissertation, an introduction to a planned book, transcripts of two talks, and a letter. However, except for the letter, these too are presented in the genre of “essays,” able to stand on their own with the proper editorial introduction and in the literal sense of “essays” as “attempts” or “experiments” (*essais*) in thinking.

Previously unpublished chapters, which make up almost two-thirds of the body of the volume, include chapter 1 (the editor’s “Chronological Overview”), the translation in the first section of chapter 5 (“Author’s Book Notice”), and the translations in chapters 6 (“Letter to Father Engelbert Krebs”), 8 (the talk “The Problem of Sin in Luther”), 9 (the book introduction “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle”), and 10 (the talk “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview”). While chapters 3 and 4 (the journal articles, “The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy” and “The Concept of Time in the Science of History”), as well as the second section of chapter 5 (the supplemental book conclusion, “The Problem of Categories”) appeared in journals twenty to thirty years ago, they have been thoroughly revised and reedited in collaboration with the original translators. Even chapters 2 (the journal article “*Per mortem ad vitam*”) and 7 (the journal article “Comments on Karl Jaspers’ *Psychology of Worldviews*”), which originally were published in English in the nineties, have been revised to bring them up-to-date with current research and to standardize translations of key terms and stylistic conventions in this collection.

In all cases, the attempt was made to provide a translation as interpretively faithful as possible to the original German text, while respecting equally the conventions of the English language. Translations are always interpretations “in a nutshell,” Heidegger wrote in 1922 in one of his very first forays into the philosophy of translation occasioned by the challenge of writing a planned book on the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (see chapter 9 of this book, p. 127).<sup>2</sup>

## NARRATIVE OF CHAPTERS

### CHAPTER I: CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

The opening chapter provides a detailed chronology of Heidegger’s education, professional appointments, teaching, research, and publications and is divided into four sections: Student Period: Education; Student Period: Research and Publication; Early Freiburg Period; and Marburg Period. Referring back to this chronology, which also functions as a primary bibliography, subsequent chapters offer representative selections of “essays” from these three periods. The selections

are flagged by daggers in the left margin of the chronology, so that when moving to subsequent chapters the reader can conveniently return to the chronology for philological and bibliographic information on the selection in question. The narrative of chapters presented below, to which the reader can return, also provides references to relevant secondary background material in the editor's previous publications (YH, RHFS, and OHF) and in other works listed in the secondary bibliography at the end of this book.

The selections are presented not only as a set of "supplements" to Heidegger's other early writings, but also as a series of "supplements" in the spirit of his own lifelong theme that his texts constituted a "path" of thinking about the relation of being, time, and human existence which was ever incomplete and undergoing supplementation with new attempts.<sup>3</sup> Already in 1916 he wrote that "as temporally conditioned cultural facts, the particular concrete sciences are never complete but rather always on the way in their discovery of truth" and again in 1920 that "the path leading to the 'things themselves' treated in philosophy is a long one" (see this volume, pp. 50, 74). Later in the first 1972 edition of *Early Writings*, he suggested that this predicament was pronounced in the series of "my early attempts" (*Versuche*) from the Student Period to *Being and Time*: "Stirring at that time in but a dark and uncertain and helpless manner, the question of what unifies the manifold meanings of being *remained*—throughout the many overturnings, labyrinths, and perplexities—the unceasing impetus for the treatise *Being and Time* which appeared two decades later."<sup>4</sup> Specifically regarding his "attempts" after 1919, we read elsewhere: ". . . the path of questioning became longer than I suspected. It demanded many stops, circuitous experiments, and wayward excursions."<sup>5</sup> What we find in the opening chapter's long chronology of Heidegger's research and publication and more specifically in the "essays" selected from it for this volume, such as the conclusion "written as a supplement" (GA1 191) for the publication of Heidegger's postdoctoral dissertation (chapter 5), is precisely a path or series of supplemental "attempts" or "essays" from the early teens to 1925, one that also "stops" for a time with *Being and Time* in the late twenties and then, occasioned by the failed experiment of this never finished work, pushes forward into the later texts with their new supplemental attempts to rework his early thought.

#### CHAPTERS 2–5: STUDENT PERIOD

Chapters 2–5 present essays from Heidegger's Student Period at the University of Freiburg.<sup>6</sup> Chapter 2, the book review article "*Per mortem ad vitam* (Thoughts on Johannes Jørgensen's *Lies of Life and Truth of Life*)" (1910), is drawn from the first anti-modernist theological phase of Heidegger's student years when, as the chronological overview in the previous chapter outlines, he was studying for the priesthood in the Department of Theology between WS1909–10 and SS1911 and produced a series of book reviews, poems, and other texts that

exhibit predominantly theological, moral, aesthetic, and cultural interests. Representing the intellectual starting point of Heidegger's development, these texts basically put forth an anti-modernist Aristotelian–Scholastic position in which, following the official stand of the Catholic Church at the time, Heidegger condemns what he perceives to be the subjectivist, historicist orientation of modern philosophy and liberal culture as exemplified in figures such as Nietzsche, calling for a historical return to the realism of medieval Aristotelian–Scholastic philosophy with its commitment to an objective, timeless order of being based on God.

Using chapter 2 as a foil, chapters 3–5 offer essays from the second neo-Scholastic philosophical phase of the student years from WS1911–12 to SS1915 which is sketched out in the chronological overview. During this second phase, Heidegger, making an anxiety-ridden “turn” in his intellectual outlook and career plans from the priesthood to the academic profession, first transfers to the Department of Natural Sciences and Mathematics (WS1911–12 to WS1912–13) as he considers a career as a high school teacher in mathematics and then to the Department of Philosophy (SS1913 to SS1915) for a university teaching career, generating a series of journal articles, book reviews, and dissertations that crystallizes at the end of the Student Period in the project of an innovative neo-Kantian, phenomenological neo-Scholasticism attempting to supplement and critically renew medieval Scholasticism in the modern world by synthesizing its logic of the categories of being with the systematic concerns of contemporary neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, the philosophy of history, philosophy of life, and German Idealism.

In chapter 3, “The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy” (1912), Heidegger's first publication in a properly academic journal, the critical realism of the contemporary thinker Oswald Külpe, as well as Husserl's phenomenology, is used by Heidegger to explore the aggravated modern problem of the intentional relation of consciousness to being. The article criticizes the “identification of being and being-perceived” in the traditional English empiricism of Berkeley and Hume and in contemporary epistemology, arguing both historically for the enduring validity of “Aristotelian–Scholastic philosophy, which has always thought in a realist manner,” and systematically for the need to synthesize this philosophical tradition with the “new epistemological movement” represented by Külpe and Husserl. “Positive, progressive work must be its main concern,” Heidegger writes of Aristotelian Scholasticism (pp. 40, 48). Speaking like a Thomist, an English empiricist, and a German phenomenologist all at once, Heidegger maintains that the structure of the intentional “relation” (*Bezug*) of consciousness to its “content” (*Inhalt, Gehalt*), i.e., being, lies in the fact that after objects have stimulated the sense organs and nervous system, creating “sense impressions,” consciousness is able to abstract from the subjective factors of these impressions and to “posit” and “define” the “real being” of the “external world” by means of the “ideal being” of concepts or categories: “. . . a being that is thought is in no way identical with being in thought. What is in

being here (in the phenomenal sense) is a concept whose content is intentionally referred to transcendent being. . . . Real being is thought by means of a concept, but this in no way means that such being is taken inside the subject and transformed into psychical being" (p. 43).

Chapter 4, "The Concept of Time in the Science of History," which the chronological overview shows Heidegger delivering to the Department of Philosophy in SS1915 as a trial lecture required for the postdoctoral degree (*Habilitation*) and license to teach in German universities (*venia legendi*) as a lecturer (*Privatdozent*) and publishing it the following year as a journal article, now adds an exploration of the very modern theme of the historical "actualizing" (*Vollzug*) of the mind's intentional "relation" to being and value, and it is Heidegger's very first publication to do so, such that he cited it later in *Being and Time*.<sup>7</sup> It also is his first work to pursue this theme through an in-depth contrast between the qualitative, "significance"-charged, and "difference"-laden concept of time in the historical sciences and the quantitative, neutral, and homogeneous concept of time in the modern mathematical natural sciences (for this contrast, see also chapter 10, pp. 170ff. and §§80–81 of *Being and Time*). In this regard, and as can be seen in the chronological overview, Heidegger draws on his intensive studies in the Department of Natural Sciences and Mathematics from WS1911–12 to WS1912–13, his studies in the Department of Philosophy from SS1912 to SS1915 with the philosopher of history Heinrich Finke and with the distinguished neo-Kantian philosopher Henrich Rickert on the transcendental logic of the natural sciences and the historical human sciences, his continued studies after SS1911 with the speculative theologian Carl Braig who introduced him to Hegel's historically oriented Idealism, and his independent studies of Dilthey's and Nietzsche's philosophies of life and history from 1910 onward.<sup>8</sup>

Chapter 5, "The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus," comprises two texts also relating to Heidegger's postdoctoral degree awarded in SS1915. The first section, "Author's Book Notice," presents a notice on the 1916 publication of the postdoctoral dissertation "The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus," which he had submitted to the Department of Philosophy the year before. It conveniently summarizes the dissertation, showing that the expanding series of historical influences and systematic interests documented in the chronological overview from Heidegger's first anti-modernist theological phase to his second neo-Scholastic philosophical phase now momentarily crystallized in the sweeping synthetic historical-systematic experiment of, first, a regressive treatment of "the history of problems" focusing on Duns Scotus' metaphysical theory of the "categories of being" in relation to his grammatical-logical theory of meaning and, second, a critical systematic reconstruction of this historical position within the conceptuality and concerns of contemporary phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. As Heidegger stated much later, the result of this neo-Kantian, phenomenological neo-Scholasticism was a metaphysical "onto-logic" (GA1 55) of categories of being that approached these categories as

a conceptual nexus of timeless ideal being by means of which intentional “judgments” gain access to real being and which is itself grounded in the absolute being of God.

The second section of Chapter 5, “Conclusion: The Problem of Categories,” presents the forward-looking conclusion “written as a supplement” (GA1 191) to the dissertation for its publication. This supplemental conclusion now adds an admission of deep “intellectual *unrest*” in the face of “the impression of a certain deathly emptiness” given by the treatment of categories in the dissertation (p. 62). While restating the dissertation’s ontological separation of the realms of “time and eternity, change and [the] absolute validity [of the categories of being], world and God,” Heidegger poses the perplexing problem of understanding how the realm of the truth of ideal being and that of historical actuality work together within an intimate living unity, arguing that this unity, as glimpsed by medieval mysticism, constitutes the “authentic depth dimension” of philosophy, and that future philosophy must aim at a “*breakthrough* to [its] true actuality and actual truth” (pp. 66, 68). Drawing on his research into contemporary philosophy of value, life, and history, as well as into Hegel’s Idealism and medieval mysticism, he poses the problem more specifically in terms of three “requirements” that a theory of the categories of being must fulfill if it is to avoid the impression of abstract emptiness: (1) demarcating the irreducible categorial regions of being in their relation to the actuality of different kinds of experienceable objects; (2) seeing the categories of being in their inseparable intentional “relation” to “the subject” and not merely the “logical judging subject,” “the epistemological subject” with its “theoretical attitude” focused on in his 1912 journal article on epistemology (chapter 3), but more deeply in line with his 1915 talk on historical time (chapter 4), the subject as “living spirit,” which is “*historical spirit in the widest sense of the word*” (p. 66); and accordingly (3) “history,” as the process of the “actualizing” of the subject’s intentional relation to the content of the categories, “*must become a determining element for the meaning of the problem of categories*” (p. 67). Here, as well as in the application at the time for a research grant documented in the chronological overview, the young self-professed phenomenological neo-Scholastic announces that he will be dedicating his life’s work to these problems, suggesting that the answers are to be found in a neo-Hegelian approach that sees the historical “actualizing” of spirit’s “relation” to categorial meaning to be grounded in the “teleological” unfolding of “the absolute spirit of God” and of the soul’s “transcendent relation” to God (pp. 66–67).

#### CHAPTERS 6–10: EARLY FREIBURG AND MARBURG PERIODS

The remaining five chapters, which comprise subsequent “essays” from the Early Freiburg Period (WS1915–16 to SS1923) and the first years of the Marburg Period (WS1923–24 to WS1925–26),<sup>9</sup> tell the story that as the student-turned-

lecturer now attempted to fulfill the above three “requirements,” he eventually, around 1919, abandoned his unstable neo-Scholastic onto-logic of timeless being for a new fundamentally historical phenomenological ontology, left the Catholic Church for free Protestantism, and now launched into a series of bold new experiments investigating: (1) how the demarcation of the different categorial regions of being, which make up the intentional “sense of the content” (*Gehaltssinn*) of experience, hinges upon seeing these regions to be based on the “significance” of the immediately experienced, practical world; (2) how the “subject” constituting the deepest “sense of the relation” (*Bezugssinn*) to the categories of being has the form of “factual life” in its practical situatedness and with its own categorial structures; and (3) how historical time is the deepest “sense of the actualizing” (*Vollzugssinn*) or “temporalizing” (*Zeitigungssinn*)<sup>10</sup> of the intentional relation to the categorial content of the world and is the condition of the possibility of this relation. The texts between 1919 and 1925 experimented with often poetic descriptions of the dynamism of historical time as a “properizing event” (*Ereignis*), “there is/it gives” (*es gibt*), “it worlds” (*es weltet*) (GA56/57 63–76); as a non-objectifiable “be-ing” or “existing” (chapter 7 of this volume); as an open-ended “kinesis” or “motion” (chapter 9 of this volume); as a “whiling” (*Verweilen*) or “sojourning” (*Aufhalten*) in the “awhileness of temporal particularity” (*Jeweiligkeit*) (OHF 7ff./5ff.); and as a “happening” (*Geschehen*) (chapter 10 of this volume). This series of self-supplementing experiments would lead to the most ambitious “essay” of Heidegger’s early thought, namely, the composition in 1926 of the book *Being and Time*, which exhibited a recent marked turn to the paradigm of Kant’s transcendental philosophy<sup>11</sup> and now transformed this still little-known figure into a leading European philosopher and the more familiar Heidegger we know today.

In this second but more dramatic confessional and philosophical “turn” in his early development, which Hans-Georg Gadamer has called “the turn before the turn,”<sup>12</sup> Heidegger on January 9, 1919 wrote to his friend from the early teens, Father Engelbert Krebs of the Department of Theology, that “epistemological insights extending to a theory of historical knowledge have made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me, but not Christianity and metaphysics—these, though, in a new sense” (p. 69). Then in February he opened his lecture course in the special post-war semester with a revolutionary call for “a completely new concept of philosophy” that would entail “the catastrophe of all (previous) philosophy,” echoing this call in WS1921–22 with talk of “the end of philosophy” and “the genuine new beginning.”<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, the remaining chapters of this volume show that Heidegger now pursued (1) a regressive “destruction” or “dismantling”<sup>14</sup> of the history of Western ontology back to the foundational dimensions of the practically significant world, factual life, and historical time; (2) a reconstructive “appropriation” or “repeating” of this history in a new beginning; and for the sake of this “systematic” reconstruction (3) a series of critical appropriations of the ontologically rich traditions of primal

Christianity (Augustine, medieval mysticism, Luther, Kierkegaard), Aristotle's physics and practical philosophy, and Dilthey's philosophy of life and history.

Chapter 6, the 1919 "Letter to Father Engelbert Krebs,"<sup>15</sup> in which he announces his profound confessional and philosophical turn, and chapter 7, the 1920 book review essay "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*,"<sup>16</sup> belong to the first phase of Heidegger's Early Freiburg Period, when he was a lecturer at the University of Freiburg between WS1915–16 and SS1923, also serving as Husserl's assistant from 1919 onward. These texts are drawn from the body of articles, lecture courses, and correspondence in the chronological overview from 1916–1921 in which Heidegger, drawing on his Christian heritage in a new way, was especially interested in developing a "phenomenology of religion"<sup>17</sup> and using it to exploit the significance of the primal Christianity of figures such as Luther and Kierkegaard for rethinking ontology historically along the lines of the three requirements voiced in the 1916 supplemental conclusion to his postdoctoral dissertation. Employing the technical terms "sense of relation," "content," and "actualizing" to explore factual life's intentional relation to being, Heidegger's article deals with Jaspers' Kierkegaardian philosophy of existence, its relation to Husserl's phenomenology<sup>18</sup> and contemporary philosophy of life,<sup>19</sup> the nature of concepts as formal indications,<sup>20</sup> and the current fundamental tasks of philosophy.

Chapter 8, the WS1923–24 talk "The Problem of Sin in Luther,"<sup>21</sup> dates from the very start of Heidegger's Marburg Period, when he taught at the University of Marburg as an associate professor between WS1923–24 and SS1927 and then as professor from WS1927–28 to SS1928. Insofar as this two-part talk given in Rudolf Bultmann's seminar on St. Paul's ethics explored Luther's biblically based understanding of the dynamic being of man's relation to God, it derives from the first phase of the Early Freiburg Period mentioned above and should be read with Heidegger's 1919–20 article on Jaspers.

Chapter 9, the 1922 book introduction "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,"<sup>22</sup> is drawn from the body of texts in the chronological overview from 1921 to 1924 in which Heidegger now takes a marked turn to a direct engagement with the source of Western ontology in Aristotle, combining this with his explorations of primal Christianity. The text is a draft overview introduction to a large, projected but never published book on Aristotle (planned to be published in Husserl's phenomenological journal), which was to have systematically worked out Heidegger's new historically oriented hermeneutical-phenomenological ontology by means of a critical, historical appropriation of Aristotle especially<sup>23</sup> but also of primal Christianity, medieval Scholasticism, and Husserl's phenomenology.

Chapter 10, the 1925 ten-part talk "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview," is drawn from a group of texts in the chronological overview from 1924 to 1925 and immediately before the 1926



composition of *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger turns to a systematic engagement with Dilthey's philosophy and Dilthey's recently published correspondence with his friend Count Yorck. A premonition of Dilthey's and Yorck's presence in *Being and Time*, though without the heavily Kantian transcendental framework that appears in *Being and Time*, this series of lectures investigates the significance of Dilthey's philosophy of history and its relation to Husserl's phenomenology for rethinking the question of being.

### USING SUPPLEMENTS

#### SUPPLEMENTING *BEING AND TIME*

In addition to reading this new source of Heidegger's early thought on its own as a presentation of his very first self-supplementing attempts to reformulate the traditional question of being on the basis of time, scholars, teachers, and students can use it, along with early lecture courses before *Being and Time* such as the SS1923 *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (OHF),<sup>24</sup> as a companion volume to supplement *Being and Time*. Since its initial appearance in English translation in the early sixties, it was very difficult to study *Being and Time* in connection with its rich history in the preceding decade and a half, simply because few texts from this period were available either in German or English. The series of "essays" in this book from the Early Freiburg and Marburg Periods provides important first drafts, as it were, of *Being and Time* (see especially chapters 7, 9, and 10), and the book as a whole is an overview of the longer history of its making from the early years of the Student Period onward. These first drafts add to *Being and Time* the following supplemental material lacking in it: (1) first versions of the historical destruction of Western ontology that was to have constituted the unpublished part 2 of *Being and Time* (see §8); (2) details of the critical appropriations of primal Christianity (New Testament, Augustine, medieval mysticism, Luther, Kierkegaard), Husserl, Aristotle, and Dilthey, which are mentioned but not fully explained in notes, the exception being Dilthey, who is treated in §77, though in nothing like the detail of the 1925 talk on Dilthey in chapter 10 of this volume; and (3) the first and in many respects different versions of the systematic reconstruction of ontology presented in Divisions I and II of part 1 and to be presented in the unpublished Division III of part 1, first versions that are referred to in notes in §§15 and 54 but not summarized. "The author may remark," the text reads, "that this analysis of the environing world and in general the 'hermeneutics of the facticity of Dasein' have been presented repeatedly in his lecture courses ever since the winter semester of 1919–20."<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, specific themes and historical references in *Being and Time* can be supplemented and followed up with the texts in this volume. For example, §1 on the theory of categories of being in the history of Western philosophy can be supplemented especially with the texts from 1916 and 1922 on the same topic in

chapters 5 and 9 of this volume; the references to Jaspers' discussions in his *Psychology of Worldviews* of a philosophical anthropology of human Dasein,<sup>26</sup> the "limit-situation" of death,<sup>27</sup> and Kierkegaard's concepts of "existence," "temporality," and the "moment"<sup>28</sup> supplemented with the long 1920 article on Jaspers' book in chapter 7; §43(a) on the problem of the external world with the 1912 article on the same topic in chapter 3 and the discussion of Dilthey's approach to this problem in chapter 10; the references to Luther's critique of the concepts of man and God in medieval Scholasticism (§3), to his powerful analysis of the anxiety-ridden human condition after the Fall in his *Commentary on Genesis*,<sup>29</sup> and to other Christian influences on Heidegger's notions of "care,"<sup>30</sup> "mood,"<sup>31</sup> "anxiety,"<sup>32</sup> "death,"<sup>33</sup> and "conscience"<sup>34</sup> exerted by the theological anthropology of St. Paul, Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard's "edifying writings" supplemented with the 1924 exposition of Luther's theological anthropology in chapter 8 and with the first part of the 1922 text on the history of Christian and Aristotelian anthropology in chapter 9; the truncated references to "Aristotle's ontology"<sup>35</sup> in his metaphysical, psychological, logical, and practical writings and more specifically to his understanding of the "ontic priority" of human Dasein (§4), "desire" or "care,"<sup>36</sup> "mood" (§§29–30), "discourse" (§§7[a]–[b], 33–34), the environing world of ready-to-hand equipment for practical dealings (§15), and "truth" as the "unconcealment" brought about by intellectual virtues such as "practical wisdom" and "science" (§§44, 7[a]–[b]) supplemented with the long text on Aristotle in chapter 9; §§76–77 on the science of history and the concept of historical time in Dilthey and Yorck supplemented with the 1925 series of lectures on Dilthey and Yorck in chapter 10, as well as with the 1916 article on the science of history in chapter 4 that *Being and Time* cites in connection with the problem of "time-reckoning";<sup>37</sup> and the references to Husserl's phenomenology<sup>38</sup> and the briefly stated claim that phenomenology must become a historical, "destructive" hermeneutical phenomenology of being (§7[c]) supplemented with the fuller discussions of these topics in chapters 7, 9, and 10.

#### SUPPLEMENTING HEIDEGGER'S LATER WRITINGS

This book also can be used, along with the earliest lecture courses, as a companion volume to supplement Heidegger's later writings after *Being and Time*, in which he made his famous "turn" from *Being and Time*'s Kantian-transcendental emphasis on human being to being itself and from its equally Kantian-transcendental conception of being as constituted by static historical structures to a more dynamic, differentiated conception of being as a difference-generating historical "event" (*Ereignis*). Ever since Heidegger's well-known letter of 1962 to William Richardson brought attention to the turn from the "Heidegger I" of *Being and Time* to the "Heidegger II" of the later writings,<sup>39</sup> the lack of relevant texts again made it difficult to study the historical genesis of this turn and to make sense of Heidegger's elliptical suggestions that "Heidegger II" was not only a turn to new

topics and sources but also in part a critical “re-turn” to his earliest attempts before the “Heidegger I” of the Kantian-transcendental experiment of *Being and Time*, as he now attempted to supplement and rewrite this unfinished, failed experiment in later “essays” such as the 1936–38 *Contributions to Philosophy—On Event* (cf. G65 §42 “From *Being and Time* to ‘Event’”).<sup>40</sup> As we now know from the recent publication in the *Collected Edition* of the full range of Heidegger’s early texts before *Being and Time* and texts after *Being and Time* in the late twenties and early thirties providing the details of the turn from “Heidegger I” to “Heidegger II,” the later experimental texts critically reappropriated the nonanthropocentric, speculative, and mystical lines of thought in his 1915 postdoctoral dissertation, which had focused on the relation of language (grammar) and the categories of being and ultimately on an “inner Dasein . . . anchored in a primordial, transcendent relation of the soul to God” (p. 67). These later attempts also experimented anew with the highly innovative texts after the Student Period on the historical dynamism of factual life’s relation to being, returning for fresh takes on early terms and themes such as “properizing event” (*Ereignis*); “it worlds”; “there is/it gives”; the predominantly verbal sense of “be-ing”; “whiling” and “sojourning”; historical “happening”; “mystery”; the terminological triad of “content,” “relation,” and “actualization”; the nature of philosophical terms as “formal indications”; the “end of philosophy” and a “new beginning”; philosophy as a perpetual “turning,” “beginning,” or “path”; technology; and university reform.<sup>41</sup> Though Heidegger certainly also criticized the very philosophy of life (Dilthey) and philosophy of existence (Kierkegaard, Jaspers) in which his thought of the late teens and early twenties was framed,<sup>42</sup> we nonetheless find him as early as his SS1928 lecture course reintroducing the term “to world” from KNS1919 and experimenting with it anew in relation to the pre-Socratics, telling his students that it was used “already in my early Freiburg lecture courses.”<sup>43</sup>

Thus, along with early lectures courses such as the SS1923 *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (OHF), *Supplements* adds to the later experimental texts after “the turn” certain background material lacking in them: important early themes and terminology to which these texts returned and thereby a filling out of Heidegger’s claim that they constituted in part a return to his “essays” before *Being and Time*. Translated later texts which, in making this claim, most clearly present themselves as a return to the Heidegger before “Heidegger I” and can thus especially be supplemented with the present volume include *On the Way to Language*,<sup>44</sup> which returns to the theme of the relation of language and being in the 1915 postdoctoral dissertation (chapter 5 of this volume) and that of hermeneutics in the early twenties (see chapters 4, 7, 9, and 10 of this volume, as well as OHF, “Translator’s Epilogue”<sup>45</sup>), and *On Time and Being*, which also returns to the reading of Aristotle’s notion of truth in the early twenties (see chapter 9 of this volume).<sup>46</sup> Another candidate connecting later texts to those before *Being and Time* is the anthology *Pathmarks*<sup>47</sup> which, though primarily intended to present later texts, opens with the 1920 article on Jaspers’ Kierkegaardian philosophy of existence

included in chapter 7 of this volume. The supplements (*Nachträge*) in this volume also can be used with later texts such as *Contributions* [Beiträge] to *Philosophy—On Event* which, though not explicitly relating themselves to the earliest texts, nonetheless involve critical reappropriations of earlier themes and terminology, including Heidegger's early theological interests in his phenomenology of religion (cf. GA65 405ff.). For example, *Contributions* returns to the technical term *Ereignis* ("properizing event") first introduced in KNS1919 (GA56/57) for characterizing the happening of factual life's intentional relation to being; "indication" (*Anzeige*) first introduced around 1920 (see chapters 7 and 9 in this volume); and the triad of terms "relation" (*Bezug*), "content" (*Gehalt*), and "actualization" (*Vollzug*), which first became technical terms also around 1920 (see chapters 7ff.).<sup>48</sup> Similarly, essays in the English-language anthology *The Question Concerning Technology*<sup>49</sup> picked up much earlier discussions of technology in the late teens and early twenties (see YH 320–22, 370), and those in *Poetry Language Thought*<sup>50</sup> returned to poetic terms such as "it worlds" and "it events" from KNS1919 and "whiling" from SS1923 (OHF), as well as to the general theme of the relation between philosophy and art that had concerned Heidegger since his student years.

Very little has been written about Heidegger's early interest in art, but he pursued in high school and during his university studies an avid interest in the literature of Stifter, Hölderlin, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Dostoevsky, Rilke, Trakl, and Greek tragedy.<sup>51</sup> In fact, the report of Heidegger's religion teacher on his senior high school years complained that "at times he pursued German literature—in which he is very well read—a bit too much, to the detriment of other disciplines."<sup>52</sup> During his student years he also took at least two university courses in art history and published reviews of literary works and his own poems.<sup>53</sup> His interest in the relation of philosophy and art stretches from his first essay published in *The Academician* in 1910 (chapter 2 of this volume) to his 1915 post-doctoral dissertation, whose introduction underscored the importance of relating the theory of the categories of being in medieval Scholastic philosophy to the "total culture" of the Middle Ages and so promised a future "phenomenological investigation of mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic literature in medieval Scholasticism" (GA1 205). Accordingly, the supplementary "Conclusion" to the dissertation for its book publication opened with a quote from the mystical German poet Novalis and again touched upon medieval mystical literature (chapter 5 in this volume, pp. 62, 64 n. 4), just as the publication of the trial lecture on the category of time Heidegger presented along with his dissertation opened with a motto from the medieval mystic Eckhart (chapter 4, p. 49).

This interest extended into the Early Freiburg Period and then, after being eclipsed in the Marburg Period culminating in *Being and Time*, beyond into the later writings on the philosophy of art. At times taking up the neo-Kantian doctrine of the different spheres of categorial value, including aesthetic value, which Heidegger explores at one point with the "poetic" neologism "'it values' for me" (*es wertet für mich*), the lecture courses of KNS1919, SS1919 (GA56/57), and

WS1919–20 (GA58) and the notes for the lecture course on “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism,” originally planned for WS1919–20 but undelivered (GA60), continue in the same vein as the postdoctoral dissertation, approaching the “life-worlds” in “art history” (e.g., Hölderlin’s translation of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, the German Romantic poets, Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Stefan George, Rembrandt, Bach, and mystical literature) as primordial expressions of the manner in which categorial sense manifests itself pretheoretically as an “it worlds for me” and an “it events.”<sup>54</sup> The 1920 essay on Karl Jaspers focuses on Jaspers’ inappropriate “aesthetic attitude” (chapter 7 of this volume, pp. 88ff.). The SS1921–22 lecture course discusses “the relationship between philosophy and art” in terms of an “anology” between the primordial active sense of “philosophy” as “philosophizing” and that of music as “making music” (*musizieren*) (GA61 46–50). The 1922 essay on the effective history of Aristotle in Western philosophy again takes up from the postdoctoral dissertation the question of the relationship between “the hymnology and music of the Middle Ages, as well as its architecture and plastic arts,” and “the philosophical and theological anthropology of this era” (see chapter 9 of this volume, p. 125, n. 11). The SS1923 lecture course again discusses the relation between “art history” and philosophy (GA63 36–57/OHF 29–45). When Heidegger comes to work up his lecture course manuscripts into the book *Being and Time* in 1926, the earlier discussions of art are collapsed into a few elliptical comments on how art and especially poetry have to be understood in terms of the basic existential structures of human existence studied in ontology.<sup>55</sup> But the earlier discussions were subsequently renewed in Heidegger’s later philosophy of art, so that the famous “turn” in his thought after *Being and Time* is for this reason not just a novelty but also in part a “return.”

Note too that in fashioning in 1919 neologisms such as “it values,” “it worlds,” and “it events,” which are takeoffs from a double reading of *es gibt* as both “there is” and more literally “it gives” (GA56/57 65–68), the young Heidegger also was putting to work in philosophy his abilities as a published poet since 1910. This literary crafting of new terminology for philosophy continues through the early 1920s with neologisms such as his often enigmatic translations of Aristotle’s key terms in 1921–22 (chapter 9 of this volume) and the highly poetic term *Jeweiligkeit* (“the temporal particularity of awhileness”) in 1923–24 (GA63/OHF) to the recycling of earlier neologisms such as *das Man* (the “they” or “everyone”) in *Being and Time*. This “poetic thinking” manifests itself again in an emphatic style in the later writings, such as the *Beiträge zur Philosophie, Vorträge und Aufsätze*, and *Zur Sache des Denkens*, and so here too, then, Heidegger’s “turn” after *Being and Time*, with its use of poetic vocabulary such as *Ereignis* (“event,” “enownment”), *Es gibt* (“there is/it gives”), *Welten* (“worlding”), *Dingen* (thinging), and *Weilen* (“whiling”), shows itself to be in part a “return” to and radicalization of an earlier style of poetic thinking.<sup>56</sup> Heidegger may have been saying as much in a 1957 curriculum vitae that later served as the introduction to the reprinting of his student writings in a single volume. Referring to

the courses he took from his teachers in theology and art history, he stated that “the decisive and therefore ineffable influence on my own later academic career came from two men . . . the one was Carl Braig, professor of systematic theology. . . . The other one was the art historian Wilhelm Vöge.”<sup>57</sup>

#### SUPPLEMENTING THE REDISCOVERY OF HEIDEGGER’S EARLIEST THOUGHT

This book carries forward into the English-speaking world the work of supplementing the originally incomplete plan of Heidegger’s *Collected Edition*, which was announced in the first publisher’s prospectus in the fall of 1974 but did not include many of the early texts before *Being and Time*, including those presented in chapters 2, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of this volume. The prospectus, issued on the occasion of Heidegger’s eighty-fifth birthday, stated that the edition was intended “to allow the path of the question of being to be seen in the sequence of its steps more penetratingly than before. . . . Because the *Collected Edition* is meant to show the movement of Heidegger’s path of thinking, the chronological principle of the genesis of the texts forms the basis of each division.” Nonetheless, the admission was made that “it remains postponed for a later decision whether the lecture courses from the early Freiburg period (1916–1923) will also be published as a supplement [*Supplement*] to the second division” containing the lecture courses from the Marburg and Later Freiburg Periods. Moreover, the prospectus’ plan for “Division III: Unpublished Essays” made no mention of unpublished essays preceding the Marburg Period. Eventually, the fifth prospectus of April 1984 announced that the literary executor, Dr. Hermann Heidegger, had made the decision to include the lecture courses from the Early Freiburg Period as a “supplement.” To date, ten of these courses have appeared in German and one in English translation (OHF), with a number of others currently being prepared for publication in English.<sup>58</sup> Prospectuses also have announced plans to supplement the *Collected Edition* with previously unpublished shorter texts preceding the Marburg Period, as well as with a fuller selection of those from the Marburg Period itself, and a good number of these shorter texts, as well as early correspondence, have been published either in the *Collected Edition* or outside of it.<sup>59</sup> With more than half of it consisting of selections from these shorter texts added to the originally incomplete plan of the *Collected Edition*, this book is, along with translations of early lecture courses, an important counterpart in the English-speaking world to the ongoing work in the German language of supplementing the *Collected Edition* and thereby allowing the constantly supplemental “sequence” of Heidegger’s texts “to be seen . . . more penetratingly than before.”

For this reason, as well as because Heidegger’s texts before *Being and Time* are generally still little known in the English-speaking world, this book makes an important contribution to the recent discovery of Heidegger’s earliest thought and the ongoing labor of supplementing our still incomplete historical picture and critical evaluation of it. After the publication of *Being and Time*, the large

corpus of earlier published and unpublished texts comprising course manuscripts, articles, talks, books, book reviews, poems, and correspondence soon fell into oblivion, with the exception of Heidegger's cursory, sometimes historically inaccurate discussions of them in later autobiographical comments, anecdotal accounts by his students such as Oskar Becker, Karl Löwith, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt who privately circulated them and held them in very high esteem, and eventually Otto Pöggeler's ground-breaking work *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* in the early sixties which, by using Heidegger's unpublished manuscripts, for the first time systematically linked *Being and Time* and later writings to Heidegger's earliest thought (Pöggeler 1987).<sup>60</sup> Then, with the publication of the *Collected Edition* from the late seventies onward, the rediscovery of these lost texts gained momentum in the nineties with a series of books presenting historical studies, philosophical evaluations, and independent experimental uses of Heidegger's early thought that were for the first time based on the whole of his early corpus and not just *Being and Time*.<sup>61</sup> Five of the nine early Heidegger texts in this volume (chapters 2, 6, 8, 9, and 10) were first discovered in the eighties and then became known to Heidegger scholarship in the English-speaking world only in the mid-nineties. Though it may itself need to be supplemented when additional, important shorter texts planned for publication in the *Collected Edition* appear in the future, as may be suggested by the chronology of the large body of Heidegger's early research and publications in chapter 1 of this volume, *Supplements* nonetheless has, along with translated early lecture courses, at the very least established a reliable textual basis in the English language for scholars, teachers, and students to continue studying, evaluating, and experimenting with Heidegger's earliest "essays" before *Being and Time*. These "dangerous supplements"<sup>62</sup> promise not only to add to our previous understanding of the development and significance of Heidegger's thought but also to correct and supplant it in important ways.