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Introduction¹

Donald Quataert

For more than a decade, scholars in European, North American, and East Asian history have been pursuing consumption studies as an important new key to unlocking the past. Materialists to the core, they argue that the consumption of goods, not their production, drives history. The comestibles, clothes, furniture, and household goods that nourish and adorn our bodies and homes, they say, define our social identities and ranks. Some, especially those in United States and European studies, go further and argue that modernity itself occurs at the moment when consumption becomes a widely dispersed, socially-accepted, and morally-proper form of economic behavior and characteristic of social differentiation. Modernity is also marked by the rise of mass consumerism, and by its ascendancy of the consumer over the producer. In sum, in their view, we are not what we make but what we eat, wear, and use.

Convinced of the centrality of consumption to the making of the modern world and of its essentiality to modern identity, consumptionists have expended enormous energies uncovering patterns of consumption in the past. For example, they have combed probate inventories, holding that the nature and the quantity of the goods possessed capture the structure, hierarchy, and mobility of a society. Hence, in one study, a scholar examined three thousand probate inventories in England, 1660–1760, to determine the kinds of goods being purchased and the changing pattern of their usage over time. At this early date, she concluded, people possessed ever-greater quantities and varieties of goods, in order to mark themselves apart—that is, for purposes of social differentiation. Thus, a consumer revolution and the modern era already had begun by ca. 1700.²

Some consumption studies seek to prop up the notion of United States "exceptionalism"—the American historical experience seen as fully idiosyncratic—by linking shifting consumption patterns in colonial America to subsequent democratic political developments. As the proliferation of material goods jeopardized their ability to differentiate through lavish display, American colonial elites instead began to employ refinement of taste as a social maker. That is, early eighteenth-century elites shifted over to strategies of discretion and understatement, seeking to undo middle-class efforts to rise socially via the accumulation of goods. They changed the playing field of social status and sought to replace mere wealth with refinement of taste as the hallmark of one's place in society. In the process, some historians argue, this "refinement of America" created the blurred and fluid social boundaries that thereafter have distinguished American society and political culture.³

Also, many histories of consumption have concluded that the emerging importance of consumer goods occurred independently of wealth. The mounting emphasis on the acquisition of goods became "oddly disconnected"⁴ from economic well-being and sometimes occurred in times of general depression and decline or failing family fortunes. Thus, there are two distinctly different pictures of the seventeenth-eighteenth century past. The production image is one of real wage decline while consumption historians see a rising abundance of consumer goods. In an influential set of articles, the historian Jan deVries posited that shifts in consumption, in fashion, prompted a profound alteration in production. DeVries argued that already in the early seventeenth century there were "reallocations of the productive resources of households."⁵ Experiencing a greater desire to consume, households began working harder in order to commercially produce more wares so that they could afford to buy additional consumer goods. This "industrious revolution" caused households to devote more time to producing goods for sale and in fact triggered the "Industrial Revolution."⁶ Thus, DeVries believes, demand changes precede and cause production shifts in the world of consumption.⁷ Hence, a society experiencing rising consumption might well be undergoing a fundamental shift in its attitude toward time, work, and money.

Embedded in these studies is the effort to explore the complex meanings that owners attached to their goods. Possession of a certain textile could mean middle-class status in one home, while in another time and place ownership of handmade "oriental rugs" provided escape from the tedium of a mechanizing, standardizing world. Our grandmothers proudly displayed rotund "happy buddhas" in their

parlors surely not to denote their sinicization but for other reasons, such as to display their new prosperity.

At least one consumptionist, however, believes that material goods define values only in the West. Only there, Chandra Mukerji argues, are material interests not made subject to other social goals.⁸ In my view, however, holding to such beliefs resembles the earlier, now-abandoned, insistence among modernizationists that economies must pass through particular stages of growth before they achieve economic maturity, inevitably understood as a big-factory economy with an industrial proletariat. In any event, studies of southeast Asia during the period 1450–1680 seem to contradict Mukerji's assertions about the uniquely-Western nature of the values placed on material goods.⁹

This Southeast Asian research reveals fashion cycles and consumption patterns suggestive of those in Europe and America indicating the possibility of a worldwide pattern of increasing consumption during the seventeenth century. These findings fit well into the growing consensus that capitalism was not a uniquely European phenomenon, and thus cannot be used to explain Western domination of the modern period. If the consumer revolution (and capitalism) and thus modernity were evolving autonomously in several areas of the early modern world, then subsequent European ascendancy must be reinvestigated and explained in terms other than Western particularism. Thus, Ottomanists and other Middle East specialists have much to consider when approaching consumptionist studies.

The present volume is an initial Ottomanist foray into this world of consumption. Most of the contributions herein discuss the Ottoman capital city of Istanbul and stress the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While it can be argued that Istanbul was the consumer leader for most of the Ottoman era, this assumption needs to be tested by additional empirical studies that focus on other regions. The emergence of port cities such as Salonica, Izmir, and Beirut offered alternative consumption models, the significance of which needs to be determined. This volume intends to provoke further studies into Ottoman consumption history and the present editor is well aware of the many questions and regions that remain unexplored.

Several of the contributions below are methodological in scope. In her wide-ranging essay, Faroqhi, for example, provides a general historiographical context and insights into the utility of a consumptionist approach for Ottomanists. She raises important issues such as that of leisure and the apparent paradox between falling incomes and rising consumption, as well as the central problem of the morality of con-

sumption. This morality issue is, I believe, an effective prism through which much of Ottoman history can be reunderstood. Matthews, as I indicate below, enters the world of the court judge (*kadı*) in an effort to understand the utility of probate inventories for consumption history. Salzmänn, in her contribution, concretely demonstrates that consumption studies can offer new interpretations of a well-known event, in this case a 1730 revolution, the so-called Patrona Halil revolt. Furthermore, she comparatively analyzes the tulip in its Asian, Ottoman, and West European settings as a means of examining the issue of changing cultural meaning on a global scale. Some of the contributors focus on the consumption of other goods—Zilfi, for her part, discusses both slaves and clothing in the context of eighteenth-century Istanbul. Jirousek, in a provocative piece, traces the changing patterns of fashion in the direction of “mass fashion dress,” that, she says, is emblematic of modernity. Frierson essays the world of nineteenth-century newspaper advertising in an effort to find the modern and non-Western aspects of late-Ottoman consumer markets. In an encyclopedic manner, Artan explores the use of food. Micklewright introduces us to photography and photographs as items of consumption and insists that we treat these as texts worthy of careful analysis.

The notion of a consumer revolution clearly holds promise for its different perspectives and provocative approaches. There certainly was a sea change in Ottoman consumption habits taking place in the seventeenth century, as the spread of coffee and tobacco makes abundantly clear. Further, the widespread adoption of tobacco and coffee was occurring simultaneously across vast regions of the globe. If Ottoman, west European, southeast and east Asian consumers were behaving in a similar manner, then a shared consumer revolution was taking place. In Europe, the desire for consumer goods (according to some consumptionists), triggered technological change. In the Ottoman world, the proliferating consumption of coffee and tobacco might well explain the splendors of the Ottomans’ Tulip Period (1718–1730) and its booming consumerism, discussed in Salzmänn’s contribution. The Ottoman industrial upswing that we now know occurred in the 1700–1760 era may have been born in the emergence of tobacco and coffee as mass consumption items.

The meanings that the various cultures attributed to these new drugs requires comparison, a simultaneity of new use that compels reconsideration of capitalism as a particularly European invention. On the Ottoman scene, historians long have noted the wrath of Sultan Murad IV and the more tempered responses of his successors to these innovations, but have remained largely uninterested in the economic,

social, and cultural meanings of the new goods. Sociable activities such as drinking coffee and smoking tobacco generated an identifiable material culture that needs to be explored, as do the new public spaces of the coffeehouse. More generally, the task remains to understand and then link this transformation to other changes in Ottoman society and its polity during the seventeenth century.

We need to consider the manner in which consumption maintained or altered social boundaries. For example, as the Artan article demonstrates, the sultans distributed food to certain households physically outside the palace and thus demarcated them as belonging to Ottoman elite circles. Similarly, as Zilfi demonstrates, they distributed robes as badges of honor and esteem, elevating the recipients to a special place in the Ottoman social hierarchy. Tobacco and coffee, for their part, may well have served as instruments in the creation of a common Ottoman cultural system, as well as markers of social differentiation, as various social groups purchased different grades of the drugs.

The basic suppositions of most consumptionists regarding the significance that persons attached to material goods, as well as Mukerji's interpretation, can offer helpful guidance to Middle East historians seeking to understand the spread of consumer goods and the larger question of modernization. Middle East specialists in the past had assumed that the adoption of Western forms (of government, education, the military) indicated the westernization of the borrowers. And yet, consumption studies make clear that the ownership of Western goods—whether guns or clocks or cloth—does not mean the westernization of their users. The significance that Ottomans attached to their possession does not flow inherently from the nature of the good or its place of origin. For example, the Ottomans' acceptance of clocks does not necessarily imply their greater interest in concepts of time, although it might. Nor, more generally, does the appearance of European goods imply the increased Western-ness of their owners, although it can. After all, no one posits that, when Ottoman peasants vastly increased their consumption of India-made goods during the eighteenth century, they were being Indianized! So too, nineteenth-century Ottoman peasants did not buy cheap English cloth because they wanted to be English. Nor, when Jirousek and Zilfi suggest that Europeans were borrowing from Ottoman fashions, are they implying their Ottomanization. Similarly, Artan holds for internal, domestic explanations for changing consumption patterns, in this case, in food. We learn from our Europeanist/Asianist/Americanist predecessors in the history of consumption that the meanings of such goods must be explored, for example, through the use of literary sources.

The increased use of calicoes and Manchester cloths among peasants in part surely derives from their low cost and perhaps also from a sense of escape from the usual. Among upper levels of the social hierarchy, however, totally different meanings may have prevailed. Indian or English textiles initially may have imparted great social prestige and differentiation, at least in the early phases of their importation. During the nineteenth century, each social class smoked a particular kind of tobacco, marking their respective social boundaries. Western clocks, mirrors, weapons, and other luxury items similarly distinguished their owners from socially superior or inferior competitors. Ottoman customers obtained [foreign] goods not always for economist reasons—because they worked better or were cheaper—but sometimes for their social value. Here then are factors based on domestic Ottoman dynamics and not only externalist ones stressing imitation of foreigners as the explanation for Ottoman historical evolution.

The clothing laws promulgated by the Ottoman state offer another proof that consumption issues often are not about consumption at all.¹⁰ These laws avowedly sought to curb excessive or extravagant consumption or mark Muslim superiority. It is true that (1) wasteful expenditures were siphoning monies out of the empire; and, (2) some non-Muslims were infringing on Muslim privileges. But these laws are important for additional reasons. *First* of all, in promulgating laws, the state was asserting its authority, reiterating its self-proclaimed monopoly on the use of force, and demonstrating a willingness to maintain control, social order, and discipline. The state also used laws to build alliances with various constituencies from whom it was seeking support. Hence, on various occasions, it took the side of those advocating probity and modesty, Muslim superiority or its opposite, the equality of non-Muslims and Muslims.

The enactment or reiteration of laws did not always reflect actual violations or changing fashions but the demands of some subjects that the state take a position on such matters. Threatened by events including foreign wars and economic precariousness, they demanded stability via reiteration of their social place, as defined by apparel. Therefore, consumptionists show us, clothing laws are about state formation as well as intrasocietal dynamics.

Second, the laws also reflect on issues relating to social differentiation. Consumption habits did not merely concern the treasury or Muslim privilege. They also distinguished among lower, middle, and upper ranks and changes in fashion imperiled those distinctions.¹¹ Thus, clothing laws can be about individuals and groups of one rank seeking to alter their social status by adopting the clothing or headgear of others. And, sometimes, the state permitted social blurring; for ex-

ample, in one region of the empire, Tokat in northern Anatolia, it released non-Muslims who performed valuable services from the clothing restrictions particular to their group.¹²

Consumptionists once argued exclusively in favor of emulation, the percolation of tastes and fashions from the top layers of society downward as the lower elements imitated the consumption patterns of their social betters. Indeed, there are many examples of emulation both in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Josiah Wedgwood made his pottery fortune by spectacularly manipulating emulative impulses among all classes of English buyers. In addition, Wedgwood sent goods to English ambassadors who presented them to the Ottoman court as a means of promoting sales among broader segments of the nonroyal elite Ottomans.¹³ But another study shows that taste changes could travel up the social ladder: in late seventeenth-century England, socially subordinate merchants were atop the consumption hierarchy, ahead of the gentry, followed by artisans, yeomen, and then husbandmen.¹⁴ This example suggests that emulation—from the top down—should not be assumed. Rather, we need to hold for the possibility that subordinate groups sometimes could be fashion leaders. And, if the English example has any utility, trend-setting in the fashion world by the lower ranks anticipated their move into elite political and economic status. Hence, tracing the adoption of goods outside the military-administrative (*askeri*) class will shed light on the transformation of the Ottoman polity. And, as a somewhat later corollary, the fashion leadership of Ottoman non-Muslims in the nineteenth century reflected their changing place in the political hierarchy as well.

Important vehicles for consumption research are the probate inventories (*tereke defterleri*), for some, an “archival abyss,”¹⁵ the use of which is hotly debated. In her contribution, Faroqhi is optimistic and offers sound advice on their use. Probate inventories may be an important key to unlocking the Ottoman consumptionist past, for they record at least some of the material possessions of recently deceased Ottomans. In an ideal world, reliably and consistently listed goods that are representative of other goods or of people’s domestic behavior should reveal what other records cannot.¹⁶ They can demonstrate which goods have become normal in everyday life—for example, establishing the consumption of coffee or tobacco through the presence of coffee cups and pipes in the inventories. Before probate inventories are used more extensively, however, Ottomanists need to better understand their nature and shortcomings.¹⁷

Matthews’ article is a strong cautionary statement about the deeply problematic nature of these inventories and their possible misuse. She

sees the probate inventories in part as a social construction, not merely a listing of goods. Hers is marvelous dissection of the probate inventory, taking it apart piece by piece in order to understand its structure and therefore its uses and shortcomings. She also offers an exceptional analysis of the Islamic courts that administered the inventories and their place in the local society. Her work is an indispensable tool for understanding how the courts really worked. Her comments suggest that the inventories must be used in a highly self-aware fashion if they are to have any utility at all.

Consumption history can further illuminate the course that Ottoman manufacturing followed during the era of European industrial hegemony. While supplyside factors affecting the trajectory of indigenous manufacturing have been presented by Ottomanists,¹⁸ the demand side of the equation remains unclear. Local consumers' taste preferences played a crucial role in maintaining or undermining local producers. In France, for example, the bourgeoisie favored styles that emphasized comfort and careful craftsmanship rather than ostentatious display. They thus created and maintained a market for goods that were not mass produced and could only be made laboriously, in small workshops. In this manner, they dictated the overall shape of French industry as a handicraft sector that evolved quite differently from the large factory, machine, mass-produced character of English manufacturing.¹⁹ The tastes of Ottoman consumers, I insist, shaped local manufacturing in a manner analogous to that of French industry. Their preferences for locally made goods in some cases were consciously political choices, made in the knowledge that to purchase foreign manufactures would doom Ottoman producers and thus eat away at the very fabric of Ottoman social and political life.

While the early twentieth-century boycotts against Austro-Hungarian and Greek goods are famed, such concerns are manifest in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well, as Jirousek's article demonstrates. On other occasions, consumers' selections were connected to their desire for attributes such as softness or color, qualities that mass manufactured goods lacked. When, on the other hand, they did purchase foreign-made goods, they helped to ruin indigenous manufacturers. Altogether, a consumption perspective makes it apparent that the profile of Ottoman manufacturing derives from Ottoman internal dynamics and not only foreign influences. The consumption model, in sum, enhances the sense of Middle Eastern agency.

Frierson's article demonstrates the crucial role of advertising. Advertising embraces not only sellers' presentations of goods in the

newspapers and shop windows of later nineteenth-century Ottoman life. It also includes the ambassadors' presentation of Wedgewood products at the imperial court. Similarly, the promotional activities of itinerant pedlars and merchants at periodic markets and fairs were important, but remain difficult to detect. Newspapers and show-window displays reveal how the *sellers*, at least, wished their goods to be apprehended. We cannot be certain that buyers attached the same meanings to their newly acquired goods.²⁰ At first glance, most of the newspaper advertisements noted in Frierson appear to have publicized European made goods, hardly surprising given the venue in which they appeared. Since the purchase of foreign goods in some sense was an action against the whole Ottoman economic structure, their promotion and purchase clearly need to be better understood. This topic richly deserves further analysis.

The Ottoman world, both the state and its subjects, always consumed a mixture of foreign and domestically made goods. Whether or not there always was a distinction made between "foreign-made" or "Ottoman-made," however, is not certain. Nor is the meaning of such terms and changes in the significance attached to "foreign" and "Ottoman" as designators. Such a task seems essential to an understanding of Ottoman self-definition, not to mention cultural values, social change, and state economic policies.

Fashions and changing consumption patterns need to be related or, in the words used a few pages earlier, "oddly disconnected," from production patterns of decline or growth both at the imperial and the regional level. Similarly, comparisons of consumption patterns in the capital city of Istanbul with other administrative centers such as Belgrade or Sofia, or with centers of domestic or international trade (Izmir, Beirut), of manufacturing (Buldan, Salonica), or of mining (Zonguldak/Ereğli) will reveal much about the relationships between production and consumption, wealth and poverty. In this volume, there is a powerful emphasis, likely too much, on the imperial capital. Nonetheless, this is not entirely unwarranted. Holding three percent of the entire population of the empire, Istanbul for a long time was its major consumption center and, quite probably set consumption trends during most of Ottoman history. On the other hand, the role of the city's non-Muslims as fashion trend-setters in the nineteenth century should encourage studies comparing the consumption patterns of Istanbul with Beirut, Alexandria, and Izmir, which housed important concentrations of Ottoman non-Muslims. These port cities surely contested the capital's primacy in the consumption of goods, with implications that warrant further attention. And finally, regional variations

in consumption can say a great deal about the variety or homogeneity of Ottoman culture as well as its diffusion.²¹

A focus on consumption also challenges assumptions that the state was the primary agent for change in the Ottoman world. For example, in economic history, most historians explain Ottoman agricultural commercialization as a function of state actions, governmental decisions that imposed taxes in cash and forced subjects to become involved in market economies. In this view, governmental policies—cash taxes—are seen as the crucial determinant in the shift of Ottoman producers to a market economy. A focus on consumption choices and household allocation of resources helps to redirect emphasis away from such state idolatry and back to Ottoman society as the agent of change. That is, families' own growing desire for goods explains their increasing commitment to market production. Also consider, similarly, that the Ottoman state objected strenuously to coffee as well as tobacco consumption and yet both were adopted widely. We need to reinterpret these state prohibitions in a less literal way as we already have done for the clothing laws, as negotiations and not mere prohibitions. In this case, the coffee and tobacco laws represented negotiations among the state, elements of the *ulema* opposed to the innovations and others who favored the new drugs (merchants and consumers). These debates, as both Jirousek and Faroqhi indicate, were concerned with the morality of consumption and were won by the advocates of consumption.²² What does this tell us about state-subject relations and the control that the Ottoman state (incorrectly) is said to have maintained over society?

While there can be little doubt about Ottoman households' shift in favor of greater consumption, considerable uncertainty about the timing remains. The articles by Zilfi, Jirousek, and Frierson, for example, respectively argue for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as turning points. The Tulip Period (1718–1730) reveals an important increase and change in Ottoman consumption patterns, at least among certain Istanbul groups and some provincial elites. Some of the evidence presented by Salzman argues for an earlier shift, back in the seventeenth century, at least for Istanbul, while Jirousek and Frierson both stress the later nineteenth century as the crucial turning point.

It might be useful to view the overall pattern of Ottoman consumption as one that: (1) began building in the seventeenth century with mounting coffee and tobacco consumption; (2) continued to broaden and deepen in the eighteenth century, as seen in the vast increases in the import of Indian textiles and the increasingly vital Ottoman manufacturing activities; and (3) developed still further in

the nineteenth century, with the explosive rise in European imports and the continuation of local industrial production.

An "industrious revolution"²³ in my own view already was well underway in the Ottoman nineteenth century, marked by a vast increase in the number of women employed in manufacturing. Consumption historians see such a trend as part of a set of decisions within the household designed to increase its flow of money, facilitating greater demand for goods both Ottoman and domestic. We need to determine if the shift to increased use of waged female labor in fact had occurred earlier and if the Ottoman "industrious revolution" had other distinctive features.

A decrease in the number of festivals (regionally or at the imperial level) would indicate a growing emphasis on longer and harder work at the expense of leisure time as a means of obtaining the desired goods. After all, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the vast increase in the number of goods—tulips at the elite level, and of coffee and tobacco among broader elements of the populace—required cash. The elites might have gouged the taxpayers to pay for the tulips but the monies for much of the coffee, tobacco, and Indian cloth must have come from increased amounts of waged labor or commercial agriculture or savings. All this speaks to a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century propensity toward consumption and emphasis upon the production of goods rather than leisure.²⁴ Jirousek nonetheless argues against this chronology, maintaining that the evolution of mass fashion dress marks the later nineteenth century as radically different from preceding eras.

To sum up: consumption studies can help to disentangle modernization from Westernization, and place the internal dynamics of Middle East society closer to the center of attention. Of equal significance, a consumption focus deemphasizes the Ottoman state, which for too long has dominated our study of Ottoman history. Quite by contrast, consumption history focuses on the countless individual decisions concerning the amount of time to spend in leisure and in production. It thus places agency in the hands of households and their members.

And yet, while consumption has much to offer Ottoman and Middle Eastern studies, it is not an unproblematic concept and indeed can be a perilous business. After all, this approach removes the emphasis from work or politics and gives primacy to cultural issues over political ideology. Situating the culture of consumption as the central concern negates or might detract from efforts to build alternatives to capitalism.

Further, care must be taken to not overstate the consumption case. Societies have constructed social values around goods for centuries

and not only in Europe. Also, we must not merely substitute one totem of modernity—the appearance of the industrial revolution—with that of another—the consumer revolution. Nor was there a necessary link between the two: a consumer revolution need not be a precondition for mechanical industrialization although this was the course followed in some west European countries. In the Ottoman Empire and perhaps elsewhere, consumerism's main impact on the productive sphere may have been the increased use of female labor rather than mechanization. Comparative studies is a vitally important tool and yet we cannot always be looking for replications of patterns found by the careful research of vast numbers of European and American historians.

In the end, consumption studies may be most important for the fundamental question that it poses about the role of goods in shaping and reflecting political, economic, social, and cultural behavior.

Notes

1. The present volume emerges from the Seventh Biennial Conference on the Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, held at Binghamton University, October 11–12, 1996. All of the present contributors, except Matthews and Zilfi, offered earlier versions of their papers to this conference, "Consumption in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1923." Beshara Doumani and Sherry Vatter also contributed valuable papers; for several reasons, they are not included here.

2. Weatherill (1988); Neil McKendrick, "Commercialization and the Economy," in McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb (1982) 9–194.

3. Compare Karin Calvert, "The Future of Fashion in Eighteenth Century America," in Carson, Hoffman, and Albert, eds. (1994), 252–83, and Bushman (1992).

4. deVries in Brewer, and Porter, eds. (1993), 101.

5. *Ibid.*, 107.

6. de Vries, (1994), 249–70.

7. Take the example of England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In England, consumer tastes had preferred the silks and satins of France; in 1678, they were cut off by English restrictive tariff policies. Consumer demand for such unobtainable goods led to the rise of the consumption of calicoes from India. Calico appealed to the middle classes because of its silklike quality and because it was easy to clean. But laws then barred the imports of calicoes. To meet this frustrated demand for the Indian textiles, English industrialists began tinkering with machinery to make them—techno-

logical changes that led to the Industrial Revolution. Thus, the invention of capital goods proceeds from desires for material goods, an exclusive feature of Western culture. See Mukerji, (1983), esp. 186ff.

8. Mukerji (1983).

9. Reid (1988).

10. See Quataert (1997), 403–25.

11. Weatherill (1988).

12. See Tokat Şeriye Sicilleri, 1224AH, cited in Duman (1998).

13. McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb (1982), 101–40.

14. Weatherill (1988), 195–96.

15. deVries (1993), 98–106.

16. Weatherill (1988) is an excellent model for the exhaustive and sensitive use of these inventories.

17. Also, in his remarks to the 1996 conference, Beshara Doumani strongly warned about the pitfalls of the probate inventories and was not at all encouraging about their utility.

18. See, for example, Quataert (1993), and the sources therein.

19. Walton (1992).

20. Here, I think, consumption studies can be useful, for they urge us to be careful about assuming the meaning of goods. Take, for example, Heath Lowry's personal communication about the provincial land surveys, *tahrir defterleri*, those meticulous enumerations of property and land use. In none of these surveys, he says, are we to find maps. Consumption studies here are helpful for they urge us not to deplore this absence of a good commonly found in the West (maps), as some Ottoman shortcoming or failure, but rather to try to understand its significance. For example, might the absence of maps indicate the state's effort to hoard information?

21. See Weatherill (1988) for intercity comparisons in England.

22. For models, see McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb (1982) as well as Brewer and Porter, eds. (1993).

23. deVries (1994).

24. Cross (1993).