

CHAPTER ONE

METHOD AND LIBERTY

In *Oppression and Liberty*¹ Simone Weil says that to be deprived of liberty robs life of its value (see p. 85). Here “liberty” does not mean “being able to do whatever you wish.” “True liberty is not defined by a relationship between a desire and its satisfaction, but by a relationship between thought and action” (p. 85). Such a relation is found in certain forms of *manual labour*—for example that of skilled craftsmen. So she will argue (see p. 104) that the freest society would be one in which manual labour was most highly esteemed, and “Man would then have his fate constantly in his own hands” (p. 87). In the same way she describes slavery as a condition in which a man does *not* have his life in his own hands.

If we say this is possible, we should still recognize that what I do, the life I lead, is limited by the special time and place in which I live, by the hardships and misfortunes I meet, by the death of friends and those on whom I depend, by obstacles I could never have foreseen, etc., etc. But the way I try to meet these difficulties, the possibilities I recognize and the decisions I make, the methods I try and (often) the methods I *refuse* to try—or also my capitulation when I give up—these are “my own doing.”

Simone Weil’s *method* in this section follows in some respects the use of geometry in physics; also the use of theoretical *models* in physics; the notion of ‘ideal cases’. She may have been influenced by Descartes’s method of analysis into “simple elements.” She starts with an “abstract model” of “completely free activity”—the activity of thought in solving a problem in arithmetic. She then considers the limitations and modifications which

must be made when we pass from this to solving problems in physics, in engineering; and finally to the activities in which people are engaged with others in a society.

This helps her to bring out some things. Consider, for instance, her picture of a free community, her "purely theoretical" sketch of the conditions that would make the "material life" (i.e., the productive, economic life) of a community free from social oppression.

Thus, if we wish to form, in a purely theoretical way, the conception of a society in which collective life would be subject to men as individuals instead of subjecting them to itself, we must visualize a form of material existence wherein only efforts exclusively directed by a clear intelligence would take place, which would imply that each worker himself had to control, without referring to any external rule, not only the adaptation of his efforts to the piece of work to be produced, but also their co-ordination with the efforts of all the other members of the collectivity. The technique would have to be such as to make continual use of methodical thought; the analogy between the techniques employed in the various tasks would have to be sufficiently close, and technical education sufficiently widespread, to enable each worker to form a clear idea of all the specialized procedures; co-ordination would have to be arranged in sufficiently simple a manner to enable one continually to have a precise knowledge of it, as concerns both co-operation between workers and exchange of products; collectivities would never be sufficiently vast to pass outside the range of a human mind; community of interests would be sufficiently patent to abolish competitive attitudes; and as each individual would be in a position to exercise control over the collective life as a whole, the latter would always be in accordance with the general will. Privileges founded upon the exchange of products, secrets of production or the co-ordination of labour would automatically be done away with. The function of co-ordinating would no longer imply power, since a continual check exercised by each individual would render any arbitrary decision impossible. Generally speaking, men's dependence with regard to one another would no longer imply that their fate rested in the hands of arbitrary factors, and would cease to introduce into human life any mysterious element whatever, since each would be in a position to verify all the activities of all the rest by using his own reason. There is but one single and identical reason for all men; they only become estranged from and impenetrable to each other when they depart from it; thus

a society in which the whole of material existence had as its necessary and sufficient condition that each individual should exercise his reason could be absolutely clearly understood by each individual mind. As for the stimulus necessary to overcome fatigue, sufferings, and dangers, each would find it in the desire to win the esteem of his fellows, but even more so in himself; in the case of creative work by the mind, outward constraint, having become useless and harmful, is replaced by a sort of inward constraint; the sight of the unfinished task attracts the free man as powerfully as the overseer's whip stimulates the slave. Such a society alone would be a society of men free, equal and brothers. Men would, it is true, be bound by collective ties, but exclusively in their capacity as men; they would never be treated by each other as things. Each would see in every work-fellow another self occupying another past, and would love him in the way that the Gospel maxim enjoins. Thus we should possess, over and above liberty, a still more precious good; for if nothing is more odious than the humiliation and degradation of man by man, nothing is so beautiful or so sweet as friendship.² (pp. 98–100)

She does not suggest that what she sketches could ever exist. The sketch is to give a standard by which to measure the liberality or oppressiveness of communities that do exist or may exist.

“The above picture considered by itself, is, if possible, still farther removed from the actual conditions of human existence than is the fiction of a Golden Age. But, unlike that fiction, it is able to serve, by way of an ideal, as a standard for the analysis and evaluations of actual social patterns” (p. 100).³

But is it satisfactory as a standard? We are deprived of liberty and we know only that this robs life of its value (see p. 85). We want to make our aspirations clearer—to become clear about the liberty we want. Does Simone Weil's sketch in this place look like an answer?

It would seem as though Simone Weil had been blinded by the abstract model which she thought she must construct if she was to follow precise methods at all. And something of the same applies to her conception of ‘thinking’ and her use of this to distinguish free activities from servile ones. She writes as though we could speak of “social organization” apart from the histories and other features of societies. And similarly, she writes as though “thinking” were one activity or process—perhaps comparable to “respiration”—which we could recognize anywhere, and which would be the same process wherever it might be.

But it would be confusing and mistaken, I think, to suggest that we always mean the same—in the sense of “the same activity”—whenever we speak of thinking. Was there no thinking before there was method (i.e., what *we* should recognize as method)? This may show the value of Marx’s pronouncement that “social existence determines consciousness,” although he made confused use of this.

One reason for taking *thinking* as a paradigm of free activity is that thinking cannot be brought about by force—a man cannot be forced to think. Although in a sense he can. And “forced to think” is a common expression. But she means “not by commands, threats and penalties.” She distinguishes here between *thinking* in the sense of calculating, investigating, testing, criticizing,—and *imagination* which may go with terror or unfulfilled desire. It might have made her essay clearer if she had been more explicit and more detailed on this.

But this does not show much about the control of action by thought. It almost looks as though she was suggesting that *method* enables me to control my life just as it enables me or men to control natural forces perhaps when I build a dam or a bridge. “Thinking is making plans.” Does a man who *plans* his actions, his life, *control* the course of his life to a greater extent than the man who does not plan? For example, a methodical businessman more than an artist? An artist who, perhaps, brings little method to the conduct of his life, although he may keep to certain standards—rejecting what would be a betrayal of his art (but without making plans).

Do I by making plans control the course of my life, whether my plans do generally fail or generally succeed? “When your plans have failed you can *learn* from this: you can investigate to find out where your mistake was. If you made no plans, you cannot learn—or not in this way.” But learning where my mistake was does not always enable me to “correct it” in the sense of avoiding that sort of pitfall in the future. “I make up these sex rules for myself, and then. . . .” Here the analogy with solving mathematical or theoretical problems does not serve.

The danger that someone devoted to ‘method’ will be inflexible and have very restricted vision. Simone Weil speaks later in the essay of a servility to computers and generally to instruments. May there not be a comparable servility to “methodical procedures” and especially to analogies with problems in mathematics and in technology? Obviously there are certain activities in which planning is important (or indispensable) as it is not in others. A mariner must plot his course, check his position, distance travelled, and so on.

The reason why she concentrates on ‘thinking’ in her special sense—with the paradigm in doing mathematics—seems to be this: she is thinking of mathematical or logical rules, rules of thinking, as contrasted with natural laws. “Events in nature do not proceed from the clearer and the simpler to the more complex and difficult.” *Internal* relations in logic, as contrasted with *external* relations which are discovered by experiment. It is as though she were unable to give an account of the distinction between thinking—“what is *peculiar* or *proper* to thinking”—and material events in any other way. “In thinking the sequence is guided by intelligence, in material processes it is not.”

Even with certain occupations—a navigator for instance—where planning is particularly necessary, it does not follow that a navigator is more in control of the course of his life than is an artist who lives without making plans, or than a mendicant pilgrim is. “But surely the mendicant pilgrim is dependent constantly on the wills—the charity—of others?” “To the extent to which a man’s fate is dependent on other men, his own life escapes not only out of his hands, but also out of the control of his intelligence; judgement and resolution no longer have anything to which to apply themselves; instead of contriving and acting, one has to stoop to pleading or threatening; and the soul is plunged into bottomless abysses of desire and fear, for there are no bounds to the satisfactions and sufferings that a man can receive at the hands of other men” (p. 96).⁴ Yes. But this raises the question of what “controlling *the course* of his life” is. For suppose it was by his own decision (his own will) that he came to lead this sort of mendicant life.

The notion of ‘self-discipline’—does this come in here? “Character is self-discipline.” The difference between self-discipline and military discipline. Granting that self-discipline is needed in a soldier, this is something different.

Simone Weil’s comparison with working on a poem or painting. Notice that this comparison leads away from distinctions of means and ends in connexion with the life one is trying to lead. We might say that self-discipline *is* controlling one’s life.

His own action: what comes from *him*. We may speak of ‘originality’ in this sense: without meaning that he is “doing something new.” (I’ll show my originality by having my own arithmetic; first in the field; the man who discovered, gave his name to . . .)

“Mut ist immer originell.” (Courage is always original.)

Simone Weil writes: "A clear view of what is possible and what impossible, what is easy and what difficult, of the labours that separate the project from its accomplishment—this alone does away with insatiable desires and vain fears; from this and not from anything else proceed moderation and courage, virtues without which life is nothing but a disgraceful frenzy."⁵

It is interesting and important that she does bring these in here: that she thinks courage (and purity) are somehow fundamental to liberty—no less so, I imagine, than are the features of solving arithmetical problems which she has mentioned.

She claims that these virtues grow *only* from "a clear view of what is possible and impossible." In what sense? Often courage is demanded and shown where the man does *not* have a clear view of what is possible and impossible—in regard to external circumstances and also in regard to what he can expect of himself. If "impossible" means *unthinkable*—as we might say, *morally* unthinkable: "What are you asking me to do? Are you *crazy*?"—this is different. But in that passage she is not speaking of this.

Simone Weil may be exploring a comparison between "the values of science" and "the values of art." The notion of 'the pursuit of truth for its own sake' was a protest against certain forms of instrumentalism and pragmatism which were themselves a revolt against it. See Marxist views of science, benevolence, raising the lot of man, the domination of science by engineering, the treatment of mathematics as a game, an obsession with problems because they are puzzling, the satisfaction of reaching a solution, "an achievement," fields in which one may gain prestige.

Contrast with this "Helping men to understand their relation to the world," "removal of superstition," explanation of what had seemed inexplicable, enlightenment versus obscurantism, knowing what you are faced with—not a slave to your own fears and imagination.

There is also something important—or may be—in the notion of 'being scientific,' for example, *toward* some problems and difficulties. It becomes stupid when the difficulty is one to which this "investigation to discover what the facts are, measurement, etc." is not applicable. Even 'being methodical' may, in certain problems—for certain decisions—be stupid, may be a form of evasion.

Simone Weil emphasizes the connexion of science (which she seems sometimes to regard as what is meant by *pensée*) with application, in order to make clear the notion of living a life of freedom, as opposed to

slavery. Responsibility: deciding what course to take in view of one's own understanding of the situation in which one is placed.

There is still room for considerable ambiguity here. Perhaps especially in the analogy between scientific or engineering problems and the problem of what is the best course to take. "The scientific answer."

In *Oppression and Liberty* Weil is trying to explain the hold which a way of thinking had on Marx and his followers; and the way in which it prevented them from criticism or examination of their conception of 'revolution'. What she brings out is the trust which Marx had in science, and the idea that the growth of science (which he often read as the growth of technology) would *liberate* man (whatever that may have meant). So that men could lead their *own* lives rather than submit to a form of life that was imposed on them.

She says: "All religions make men into a mere instrument of Providence, and socialism, too" (p. 45).⁶ This leaves out the contrast she would have drawn later between *necessity* and *grace*. She would have said (in most respects, apparently) "l'homme est un simple instrument de la nécessité—ou de la *force*," as the warriors of the *Iliad* were "instruments" of the war in which they were engaged. She says that "we find in Marx a different conception . . . namely, a materialism which no longer has anything religious about it and forms not a doctrine but a method of understanding and of action" (p. 45).⁷

It seems to me a deep misunderstanding to speak of any sort of scientific method for removing injustice (especially if this means "injustice in general"—not this specific injustice which is being committed now). It suggests that we might identify justice—or perhaps liberty—by the way in which it was brought about. It seems to emphasize an analogy with health or disease.

One way in which this is misleading is in her close association of *oppression* with *force*, which she wants to take in the sense of 'force' in physics. This is partly because she wants to emphasize the way in which men are caught up in developments, such as war, for instance, or the struggle for political power in which they seem to be *driven* and more often than not victims. Cf. Lenin's "vehicles of social forces."

The difficulty is that she speaks as though it should be possible to *formulate laws* and *assign causes*, although she does not really suggest any.

When she spoke later of "a science of the supernatural" (or "a science of supernatural intervention") which should be no less rigorous and precise than physics, this was probably in the wish to find a method

of distinguishing *idolatry*, or a test of idolatry. Feeling rightly that confusions in one's thinking on these matters are, if anything, more objectionable than confusions in accounts of natural happenings.

But granting the need for clarity and criticism here, one first matter should be to see the difference between the clarity sought here and the clarity sought in physics. A *theory* of the supernatural, in the sense of a scientific theory which may be tested by experiment, cannot be what she wanted.

A method for producing a society (or for changing a given society into one) in which individual men will act with justice towards one another—or act with compassion or charity towards one another—seems as confused an idea as a method for producing a society of high culture (for example in arts and sciences).

One can say “the popular view of tuberculosis is wrong, for tuberculosis has such and such features”; or “the popular view of ‘hereditary disease’ is wrong or mistaken, for a disease is hereditary. . . .” But not in this way: “the popular view of liberty or of injustice is wrong,” as though here also the ‘view’ were a view, or theory, regarding what happens.

Marx could say that commonly accepted views on the nature of capitalist profits were wrong (for example, regarding “what they come from”)—in a sense analogous to that in which we speak of hereditary disease. It is true that some attempts to remedy injustice may be more stupid and others less so. But this is not comparable, for example, to more stupid and less stupid treatment of a disease: for being the less stupid course is that which (inter alia) knows something about the infection, say, and especially knows something of previous experiences and experiments of others in connexion with it. “The previous experience and treatment of injustice” seems irrelevant and meaningless. You cannot legislate for the removal of injustice, still less so for the promotion of justice. You cannot legislate for liberty. “It must come from *him*.” It cannot be a subject of *planning*.

“The subjective factor.” The need to take account of spontaneous independent activities in any political society, of initiatives which do not come from the government. Legalistic treatments (such as the contract theorists) hardly provide this.

This is connected with Simone Weil's taking solving a mathematical problem as the paradigm of free—not servile—activity. “Because here you are not simply carrying out instructions: you have a reason for each move you make, that is, you know why it must be done and that it is not

simply that so and so has ordered it. You make your own decisions and carry them out." The idea of "acting intelligently," or being guided by your understanding in what you do. "So that what I do depends on me (I am responsible)."

But this could be said of art as well as of mathematics. Weil would have agreed, at least in her later work. And this could be said of friendship and generosity. If you cannot force anyone to think, you cannot force him to be generous either. Nor to give artistic criticism.

If someone solves a mathematical problem, he is using expressions he has learned and he is employing methods he has learned. Further: there would not be what we call 'mathematics' nor 'mathematical problems' unless there were a difference between 'correct' and 'incorrect', unless there were an established practice of mathematics. I may find the solution on my own, but I do not invent mathematics on my own—that means nothing.

There are different cases of following a rule. "Following a rule I can understand," "Now I see how it goes," "now I can go on," "now I can find the solution myself." What is the difference when I am "following a rule—command, order—which I do not understand"—or blindly carrying out instructions? Do I understand the rules printed on the box of the game I buy in Woolworth's? We should hardly call this "blind obedience," "blindly carrying out instructions," nor say that it is sensible of me to follow them. Partly because of this notion of "understanding the game," knowing how to play according to the rules, and, in this sense, understanding them, I know "what to do" in such and such a situation in the game.

A bank clerk may unlock the door of the bank when a man holds a gun to his head and tells him to unlock it. (Or because of blackmail, etc.) This is something he would not do were it not for the threat. (But could I say that what he does "depends on *him*"?)

"Receiving the order," "being told the rule" (of mathematics or a game). "Do you understand what he is telling you to do?" "Do you understand the rule?" The sign, expression, or assurance that I do understand the rule is: "Now I can go on by myself." There is nothing of this sort when I understand what the man with the gun is telling me to do.

Simone Weil seems to suggest that it is similar when a factory worker is told the moves to make in operating a machine. (Or is this *not* what she means?) Cf. "A man would be completely a slave if all his movements proceeded from a source other than his mind, namely, either the irrational

reactions of the body, or else the mind of other people; primitive man, ravenous, his every bound provoked by the spasms tearing at his belly, the Roman slave perpetually keyed up to execute the orders of an overseer with a whip, the manual worker of our own day engaged in a production line, all these approach the wretched condition" (p. 86).⁸

She speaks of complete liberty (*la liberté complète*) (p. 86). I do not think this means anything except when it is *contrasted* with some form of oppression or some form of servitude. And I do not know what the servitude would be which is contrasted with solving the problem in arithmetic. Is *this* "which takes away the value from life" (p. 85)?⁹ This has something to do with her method of investigation, her use of an abstract model here. (Why am I not "complètement libre" when I am playing table tennis?)

She writes: "a completely free life would be one wherein all real difficulties presented themselves as kinds of problems, wherein all successes were as solutions carried into action" (p. 86).¹⁰ I wonder how she would work this out; how she would illustrate "presented themselves as."

Again: "Man would then have his fate constantly in his own hands; at each moment he would forge the conditions of his own existence by an act of mind."¹¹ This is important: in the same way she describes slavery as the condition in which a man does *not* have "son propre sort—on sa propre vie—en mains." But the model is still very abstract, as appears when you try to imagine an actual case.

Is Simone Weil's method—starting with an "ideal" or "perfect" case, examining the deviations in actual practice, asking what causes these, and so on—is this an appropriate method for analysis of 'liberty' or 'oppression'? Trying to give an account of the relation of thought and action, and in this sense of having one's life in one's own hands, not being the plaything of blind forces, and such.

I do not think she does follow this method in *The Need for Roots* (*L'Enracinement*). And this is connected with the importance she attaches there to *collectivité* and *le passée*. The "needs of the soul" go far beyond "the fate which is in his own hands" (son propre sort en mains). And her different attitude towards "legitimate government" goes with this.

The intolerable character who calculates the possible chances before any and every action. (Insurance to cover risks. A *commercial* view.) "It is worth doing whether it seems foolhardy or not." If we were always engaged in engineering, the case would be different.

“Trying to decide what to do—trying to decide how to live.” In the second on “une société libre” she is asking how far or in what way free action or a free life is conceivable—in any society. There is point in starting as she does with the action or life of an *individual*, but this need not have led to the degree of abstraction she keeps. This, as we shall see, is reflected in the way in which she speaks of “*the* organization of society.”

NOTES

From Notes dated 26.2.68; 28.2.68; 11.3.68; 12.3.68.

1. *Oppression and Liberty*, trans. Arthur Wills and John Petrie, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973. All quotations from this edition. French edition: *Oppression et Liberté*, Paris: Gallimard, 1955.

2. “Ainsi, si l’on veut former, d’une manière purement théorique, la conception d’une société où la vie collective serait soumise aux hommes considérés en tant qu’individus au lieu de se les soumettre, il faut se représenter une forme de vie matérielle dans laquelle n’interviendraient que des efforts exclusivement dirigés par la pensée claire, ce qui impliquerait que chaque travailleur ait lui-même à contrôler, sans se référer à aucune règle extérieure, non seulement l’adaptation de ses efforts avec l’ouvrage à produire, mais encore leur coordination avec les efforts de tous les autres membres de la collectivité. La technique devrait être de nature à mettre perpétuellement à l’oeuvre la réflexion méthodique; l’analogie entre les techniques des différents travaux devrait être assez étroite et la culture technique assez étendue pour que chaque travailleur se fasse une idée nette de toutes les spécialités; la coordination devrait s’établir d’une manière assez simple pour que chacun en ait perpétuellement une connaissance précise, en ce qui concerne la coopération des travailleurs aussi bien que les échanges des produits; les collectivités ne seraient jamais assez étendues pour dépasser la portée d’un esprit humain; la communauté des intérêts serait assez évidente pour effacer les rivalités; et comme chaque individu serait en état de contrôler l’ensemble de la vie collective, celle-ci serait toujours conforme à la volonté générale. Les privilèges fondés sur l’échange des produits, les secrets de la production ou la coordination des travaux se trouveraient automatiquement abolis. La fonction de coordonner n’impliquerait plus aucune puissance, puisqu’un contrôle continu exercé par chacun rendrait toute décision arbitraire impossible. D’une manière générale la dépendance des hommes les uns vis-à-vis des autres n’impliquerait plus que leur sort se trouve livré à l’arbitraire, et elle cesserait d’introduire dans la vie humaine quoi que ce soit de mystérieux, puisque chacun serait en état de contrôler l’activité de tous les autres en faisant appel à sa seule raison. Il n’y a qu’une seule et même raison pour tous les

hommes; ils ne deviennent étrangers et impénétrables les uns aux autres que lorsqu'ils s'en écartent; ainsi une société où toute la vie matérielle aurait pur condition nécessaire et suffisante que chacun exerce sa raison pourrait être tout à fait transparente pour chaque esprit. Quant au stimulant nécessaire pour surmonter les fatigues, les douleurs et les dangers, chacun le trouverait dans le désir d'obtenir l'estime de ses compagnons, mais plus encore en lui-même; pour les travaux qui sont des créations de l'esprit, la contrainte extérieure, devenue inutile et nuisible, est remplacée par une sorte de contrainte intérieure; le spectacle de l'ouvrage inachevé attire l'homme libre aussi puissamment que le fouet pousse l'esclave. Une telle société serait seule une société d'hommes libres, égaux et frères. Les hommes seraient à vrai dire pris dans des liens collectifs, mais exclusivement en leur qualité d'hommes; ils ne seraient jamais traités les uns par les autres comme des choses. Chacun verrait en chaque compagnon de travail un autre soi-même placé à un autre poste, et l'aimerait comme le veut la maxime évangélique. Ainsi l'on posséderait en plus de la liberté un bien plus précieux encore; car si rien n'est plus odieux que l'humiliation et l'avilissement de l'homme par l'homme, rien n'est si beau ni si doux que l'amitié." Simone Weil, *Oppression et Liberté*, Paris: Gallimard, 1955, pp. 130–32.

3. "Ce tableau, considéré en lui-même, est si possible plus éloigné encore des conditions réelles de la vie humaine que la fiction de l'âge d'or. Mais à la différence de cette fiction il peut servir, en tant qu'idéal, de point de repère pur l'analyse et l'appréciation des formes sociales réelles." *Oppression et Liberté*, p. 132.

4. "Dans la mesure où le sort d'un homme dépend d'autres hommes, sa propre vie échappe non seulement à ses mains, mais aussi à son intelligence; le jugement et la résolution n'ont plus rien à quoi s'appliquer; au lieu de combiner et d'agir, il faut s'abaisser à supplier ou à menacer; et l'âme tombe dans des gouffres sans fond de désir et de crainte, car il n'y a pas de limites aux satisfactions et aux souffrances qu'un homme peut recevoir des autres hommes." *Oppression et Liberté*, pp. 127–28.

5. "Une vue claire du possible et de l'impossible, du facile et du difficile, des pains qui séparent le projet de l'accomplissements efface seule les désirs insatiables et les craintes vaines; de là et non d'ailleurs procèdent la tempérance et le courage, vertus sans lesquelles la vie n'est qu'un honteux délire." Simone Weil, *Oppression et Liberté*, Paris: Gallimard, 1955, p. 117.

6. "Toutes les religions font de l'homme un simple instrument de la Providence, et le socialisme lui aussi." *Oppression et Liberté*, p. 66.

7. "On trouve chez Marx une autre conception . . . à savoir un matérialisme qui n'a plus rien de religieux et constitue non pas une doctrine, mais une méthode de connaissance et d'action." *Ibid.*, p. 67.

8. "Un homme serait complètement esclave si tous ces gestes procédaient d'une autre source que sa pensée, à savoir ou bien les réactions irraisonnées du

corps, ou bien la pensée d'autrui; l'homme primitif affamé dans tous les bonds sont provoqués par les spasmes qui tordent ses entrailles, l'esclave romain perpétuellement tendu vers les ordres d'un surveillant armé d'un fouet, l'ouvrier moderne qui travaille à la chaîne, approchent de cette condition misérable." *Oppression et Liberté*, p. 116.

9. "ce dont la privation ôte à la vie sa valeur." *Oppression et Liberté*, p. 115.

10. "Une vie entièrement libre serait celle où toutes les difficultés réelles se présenteraient comme des sortes de problèmes, où toutes les victoires seraient comme des solutions mises en action." *Ibid.*, p. 116.

11. "L'homme aurait alors constamment son propre sort en mains; il forgerait à chaque moment les conditions de sa propre existence par un acte de la pensée." *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.