

## CHAPTER I

# Receiving the Tradition

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In what follows I propose to analyze a single moment of donation and reception in the tradition of Western philosophy. I will analyze a single scene from Plato's *Phaedrus*, a scene that becomes for Derrida in "Plato's Pharmacy" a sort of cameo or postcard around which to frame a series of questions concerning the relationship in Plato between speech and writing, life and death, master and disciple, and so forth, a scene that has become for me a sort of still life or snapshot around which to frame a series of similar questions concerning the opportunities and dangers of passing on or receiving the tradition. My hope here is that while trying to say something about receiving the tradition, about the structures of reading and reception, legacy and inheritance, by analyzing the myth told by Socrates on a warm summer day to Phaedrus as they recline on the banks of the Ilissus to discuss the nature of the beautiful, others familiar with similar landscapes such as those of Umbria might also hear, even if just for a moment, the chorus of cicadas that so often accompanies conversations there—for as Socrates tells us in another myth in the same dialogue, it is they who "make report [to Calliope and to Urania] of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest" (259d).<sup>1</sup>

My thesis here is rather straightforward: while "Plato's Pharmacy" would appear to be a reinterpretation of Plato based on a close reading of the *Phaedrus*, it is concerned more essentially with the reception of Plato in the tradition, with the way in which the Platonic corpus programs, in some sense, its own reception. Rather than being simply another interpretation or reading of Plato, then, it is a reading of how we read in the tradition, an interpretation of how we interpret, an analysis not only of what Plato has given us but of how what he has given us has transformed our reception of him.

After a short, two-page preface that appears dissociated from the rest of the essay since it speaks not so much of Plato but more generally of the nature

of writing and the text, Derrida begins the first section of "Plato's Pharmacy" (PP) with the injunction: "Let us begin again."<sup>2</sup> Having just spoken of the decision involved in every reading, Derrida begins by marking his own incision into the textual web. Rather than cutting into Plato's corpus at the place in the *Statesman*, for example, where the paradigm of statesmanship is weaving together various dispositions in the city and where the paradigm of this paradigm is learning letters, Derrida begins with the *Phaedrus*. Rather than beginning with a Platonic dialogue that itself speaks of composition and weaving, therefore, Derrida begins with a dialogue whose very composition has been at issue for some time—particularly the relationship between the various parts of the dialogue and the whole, Plato's capacity or incapacity to, we might say, weave together the various parts into a coherent or organic whole being constantly put into question.

And so it is with the question of composition or organization that Derrida begins. Thus while Diogenes Laertes and Schleiermacher some seventeen centuries later both thought the *Phaedrus* to be the work of a young Plato, the reverse was argued in the beginning of this century, when it was claimed that the *Phaedrus* is an inorganic and poorly composed dialogue because Plato, while knowing what should have been done to make it into an organic whole, was too old and senile to accomplish his intentions. To counter both of these claims and the assumptions upon which they rest, Derrida will try to follow what he calls a "more secret organization of themes" (PP 67)—one that would be neither properly organic nor inorganic, an organization that would in fact first orient and organize the whole notion of organization as a relationship between present parts, that is, a notion of organization that would judge a dialogue good inasmuch as it is a well proportioned body where all the parts, though essentially inessential, would fit together according to some present order or plan—even if concealed or hidden. Derrida is looking for an organization that would explain the necessity for what has seemed for some two millennia to be an unbalanced dialogue—unbalanced, most particularly, because of the myth of writing added on inelegantly or inorganically at the end. Notice, then, the place Derrida has chosen to mark the supplemental nature of writing: a dialogue that has always been understood as doing the very thing for which Socrates, the master, would condemn writing in the *Phaedrus*—that is, not respecting the organic order of things but simply putting them together randomly—and then, within this dialogue, a myth about writing that has always been taken to be a supplement, a mere appendix to the body of the dialogue itself, a myth wherein writing is itself condemned for being supplemental to speech, a mere bodily appendix to the living word. Finally, Derrida begins not simply with this supplemental myth in a somewhat supplement dialogue about the supplement of writing, he begins not with the dialogue *itself*, but with the dialogue's reception in the tradition. This is

Derrida's supplementary thread. While beginning with these so-called "secondary sources" on Plato might appear to be a typically scholastic gesture, Derrida will ultimately interrupt this gesture by demonstrating how such secondary sources have already been programmed to a large extent by the primary text, that is, by Plato. Derrida's gesture thus turns out to be a fitting one, for it fits commentary or interpretation to a text that has produced a certain tradition of commentary or interpretation. Such a gesture on Derrida's part is, thus, "rigorously called for from one end of the *Phaedrus* to the other" (PP 67).<sup>3</sup>

In other words, Derrida is interested not so much in the theory of writing presented in the *Phaedrus* as in the way in which that theory has been assumed in the criticisms of the *Phaedrus*. He begins not merely with a *description* of the supplemental nature of myth and writing but with the *way* in which the *Phaedrus* has itself been thought by the tradition to be a supplementary text in the Platonic corpus, written when Plato was either young and ambitious or old and senile. The suggestion is that the general theory of writing proposed in the *Phaedrus* in some way programs its reception in the tradition.

An important question implicit in all of this, then, is the legacy of writing, the inheritance of a certain tradition and thus our relationship to that tradition. If we, as readers, are indeed the heirs of a tradition of Western philosophy, how should we respond to what our forefathers have given us—and how should we respond to or read Plato, arguably the forefather of all forefathers, the one for whom the rest of Western philosophy would be but a footnote?<sup>4</sup> This question gives us, I think, yet one more reason why Derrida begins with secondary texts on the *Phaedrus*. For this secondary literature on Plato, which Derrida locates within a certain hermeneutic tradition of interpretation, is emblematic of what Derrida finds already programmed in the *Phaedrus*, since what is at issue there is precisely the relationship between reader and writer, or listener and speaker, the one who produces or who is a father of a certain speech or text and the one who receives or inherits it. What is at issue is the relationship between *primary* and *secondary* texts, the bequeathing of a tradition and its reception. But what is this bequeathing and this reception, what is inheritance or legacy, indeed, what is this filiation? What is the filiation between speaker and listener, writer and reader, writer and text, giver and receiver? What secret thread—not to be confused with some hidden or secret law—is between them?

In the section "The Father of Logos," Derrida analyzes the moment of the donation of writing.<sup>5</sup> He begins this section with a citation from the *Phaedrus*, with the moment when Theuth presents the *pharmakon* of writing to the king Thamus—the moment when the servant gives to the master a gift that, it seems, will receive its valuation from the king—the moment, we could say, when the disciple, the inventor of *écriture*, presents his new invention to the

master. The servant gives to the king a gift that will then be valued by the king, by the giver of all value, almost as if this gift had no value as a gift until it was received by the king, as if everything logically began with the king, with the sun, under his light, almost as if, finally, the relationship or filiation between servant and king, speaker and hearer, writer and reader, were determined only after the reception of a neutral gift—a gift that would be more like a placebo than a *pharmakon*.

But how are we to read this scene of the *Phaedrus*? If we rush ahead to the king's response and valuation, Derrida seems to suggest, we will have missed this moment of presentation of the *pharmakon* before it has been received and given value. Hence there would seem to be something extremely radical, politically charged, perhaps even revolutionary, in Derrida's phrase "Let us cut the king off here" (PP 75). By cutting the king off at the pass, at the moment he is to pass judgment, by making an incision into the textual web at the very moment that the text is about to become an organized book, written from the very beginning from the point of view of the king, Derrida is trying to isolate not simply the oppositional structure of the text but that which orients it and makes it hierarchical. Derrida's strategy is to suspend the action at the moment of this decision, at this moment just before valuation—a moment whose status is difficult to determine since it is the king who, as we will see, by valuing, gives tradition, legacy, inheritance, even time itself. Thamus is the king of kings, the god of gods, *basileus*, says Derrida, being "the other name for the origin of value" (PP 76). And so Derrida cuts the king off at the moment when he will have to decide, to cut, to be incisive, at the moment when it is a question of the value of writing and the writing of value, an exemplary intervention in the text at the very moment when intervention is at issue.

In suspending the moment of reception, Derrida is suspending not simply one particular valuation within the purview of the king but the very structures of valuation upon which the power of the king rests. For it is the *reception* of the king's authority, it seems, that not only confirms but actually *gives* him his authority; by suspending this reception, we catch a glimpse of what might be called the king's "mystical authority." As Derrida writes in "Force of Law":

These moments, supposing we can isolate them, are terrifying moments. . . . This moment of suspense, this *epoche*, this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law. But it is also the whole history of law. *This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence.* It is the moment in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone.<sup>6</sup>

Even though the king does not himself write, it is he who will pass judgment on writing, on the *next generation* of inventions. I emphasize “generation” here because Thamus is, as Derrida remarks, not only a king but a father, and the *pharmakon* is presented to him not only by a servant but by a son. While Theuth, the servant or son, writes, Thamus, the father or king, speaks—and in speaking determines the relationship and relative valuation of speaking and writing, kingship and servitude, judgment and obedience, the father and the son, and so on. This association of the origin and power of writing, of logos, with the paternal position is an indispensable part—as Derrida says in one of those large claims that itself cannot be neatly separated from the tradition—of “‘Platonism,’ which sets up the whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality” (PP 76). This association is not, as we will see, something that can be simply ignored or rejected, for it is, as Derrida quite clearly realizes, a “structural constraint” (PP 76).

Thus just at the moment when the king is about to decide upon the value of writing, Derrida cuts him off, freezes the action right at the moment of decision and value. For what is at stake is not a particular decision or judgment but the very structure of decision and judgment, not a particular value but the institution of value as such in the name of the king. By cutting the king off in this way, Derrida draws attention not simply to a certain philosophical legacy but to the very legacy of this legacy, to the handing down of a certain way of handing down, of orienting a whole matrix of oppositions: good son/bastard son; speech/writing; master/servant, and so on. By immobilizing the moment of this passing down, Derrida is asking not only about the legacy of the king but about the legacy of Plato’s text, a legacy of philosophy that we might all too easily accept—that is, that we might receive while remaining blind to the structures of our own reception.

Now, all these questions of reception and filiation are repeated in the translation of Plato’s text. As many have noted before Derrida, *pharmakon* can mean both remedy and poison, both that which heals and that which kills or destroys. The question posed throughout “Plato’s Pharmacy” is thus whether the *pharmakon* means remedy in one place and poison in another, depending on the circumstances, on the context, or whether *pharmakon*—as that which would precede the relation between the essential and the circumstantial—can never in fact be mastered in this way, reduced to an either/or. The question will be whether *pharmakon* can be mastered by a notion of context where what is important is the meaning and not the process of writing or speaking, or whether *pharmakon* is the name of a fundamental ambivalence, being both remedy and poison at once, an antisubstance that would precede the separation of thought and expression, speech and writing. To say straightaway that the meaning of *pharmakon* depends on its syntactical relation in the dialogue would already be, as Derrida shows, to accept the opposition between meaning and expression, signifieds and signifiers, where what is

important would be what is meant and not what is said, what is thought and not what is expressed. Derrida will thus try to reintroduce the ambivalence of the *pharmakon* back into the body of the dialogue, or rather, he will try to release or reactivate it from within, so that it might be shown to organize the dialogue from beginning to end without ever being present as such.<sup>7</sup>

In speaking of the various translations of the word *pharmakon* into English and French, Derrida does not claim that drug, remedy, philter, poison, and so on are incorrect or illegitimate translations of this word—assuming that it is, in fact, a word. There is perhaps always, as we like to say, something lost in the translation, but when it comes to a word like *pharmakon*, the loss is essential and inevitable. For if we simply go ahead and translate this word by making reference to the context in which it is used, we may be reducing to mere polysemy, to a regulated polysemy, something that is fundamentally ambivalent—an antisubstance that cannot be reduced to one meaning or another. And so the problem is not translating *pharmakon* as poison when what is meant in a particular instance is remedy; the problem is translating or receiving it at all. While the word drug or philter might be better at preserving the ambivalence of *pharmakon* than remedy or poison, these latter are not simply mistakes in translation—indeed they are in certain sense correct—but paradigmatic instances of a certain naiveté concerning what translation is, paradigmatic moments in a Platonic tradition of translation. Again, the *Phaedrus* programs its own translation; it programs its own reception, its own essential dispersion into other languages, into English, French, and, first of all, into Greek. Indeed we see at the end of the dialogue that what might be understood as glossing, that is, explaining what is said in a text, is itself a sort of translation from Greek to Greek; and, in the *Phaedrus*, we see that this is always done in the name of interior speech or thought, in other words, in the name of the king. In Thamus's speech at the end of the *Phaedrus*, *pharmakon* is glossed, translated, in effect, from Greek to Greek as "remedy," as that which remedies not memory but only recollection, such that through this glossing the ambivalence is reduced to polysemy—not by the particular translation but by the very fact that it was translated or glossed at all in one way rather than another. By receiving the word *pharmakon* as a word that is polysemic—that is, as having different meanings determined by the context or by the intention of the one who uttered it—we, as readers or interpreters, end up repeating the decision of the king, the decision that *will have*, in fact, framed the dialogue from the very beginning.

For the *pharmakon* is, in truth, presented and judged *even before* it is presented and judged; it has already been received in the understanding and translation of Theuth's own speech. It is not strictly necessary, therefore, to unfreeze this freeze frame, to restart the film, if you will, in order to watch Thamus receive and then give value to the gift of Theuth. For Theuth *had already* presented the *pharmakon* as something that it is not; that is, he had

misrepresented not only its status—claiming it to help memory when it would in fact harm it—but its power, presenting it as something non-ambivalent, as something that *can be presented*. Theuth had thus already presented the *pharmakon* from the point of view of the sun—that is, from the point of view of all value, the king-father-good who determines the relative values of speech and writing, origin and reception, and so forth, and who, in deciding, frames the entire dialogue from the very beginning (PP 111). This is where the topology begins to be disturbed and the immobilization disrupted—the place where we see that the scene never really could have been immobilized, that its immobilization was only simulated.

And yet because the word *pharmakon* is presented, because it makes an appearance, it is given a chance, the chance to be put into play with all the other uses of the word *pharmakon* in the Platonic corpus and beyond. The *pharmakon* is neutralized as soon as it is put into play, but it is still given the chance each time it is neutralized to be received—to be received as such, as the place or medium of transfer, transition, translation, and the like. Though the sign *pharmakon* marks an ambivalence within the Platonic corpus that is neutralized each time by the decision of a reading or a translation, this neutralization cannot *occur* without this decision, reading, or translation, that is, without our reception.

Derrida thus begins each of the early sections of “Plato’s Pharmacy” not simply with a question concerning a certain reading of the text but with a question about reading in general, about how to read or receive the tradition. Because the *Phaedrus* gives us, presents to us, a general theory of writing, it is an exemplary place to ask about the relationship between theory and practice, the general and the example. Once again, the status of the example, of the paradigm and the particular—all those things that are at the heart of metaphysics—turns out to be at issue in “Plato’s Pharmacy.”

By cutting the king off and immobilizing the scene at that moment of decision, Derrida is able to focus attention not only upon the moment of a particular legacy or handing down but upon the moment when legacy and filiation are themselves handed down. In so doing, he is able to locate or immobilize the unlocatable and unimmobilizable filiation of this legacy, its twisted topology.<sup>8</sup> This is what legitimates and necessitates the move from the legacy in the dialogue to the legacy of the dialogue. By immobilizing the scene just before the moment of decision, just before writing has been put down, before speech has been privileged over writing because it is closer to the breath, to life, to the truth of intention, our own decision about how to read or interpret is also momentarily interrupted.

Hence we are justified, I think, to imagine Derrida himself, and eventually *ourselves*, as the inheritors of a tradition in the role of Theuth the servant, waiting for the moment when the tradition would tell us about the value of our writing and reading and, most importantly, about the value of our legacy. The

tradition thus plays the role here of the king, the tradition, or, as if there is any difference, the Platonic text, which gives itself to us and, in giving itself, determines how we are to value and receive it.

And yet, as I have tried to show, we are, as the disciple Theuth, already the master Thamus, for in waiting for the decision of the king, in accepting to receive it, we have in effect already received it, already given or passed it down to ourselves; we are both the tradition's disciple and—unbeknownst to ourselves and even when we think ourselves most radical—its master. By suspending this moment of donation, of what we now see to be a self-donation or self-bequeathing, Derrida suspends the moment when we will have to decide how to read, how to read ourselves, when we will have to decide what reading and writing—what we—are. We thus catch a glimpse of the twisted topology suggested here: we are in essence reading a text about reading and writing wherein there is a scene depicting and doubling our own reading of writing. We are reading a text that has been handed down to us in which there is a scene that depicts and doubles the handing down of this text and thus our reading of it. The *Phaedrus* can thus be read either as one very small though important and influential moment in the history of Western philosophy or as the self-representation and programming of this entire history. As readers, we may read the scene between Theuth and Thamus as a small part of Western philosophy that may teach us something about reading or writing, or we may read it as the representation of our own reception of this tradition.

For the sake of making a claim—and thus of being pedagogical—I would say that this second understanding must be part of any deconstructive reading, for it is the moment when one's reading of a text becomes implicated in what is being read, when one's status as disciple becomes implicated in the structure of the master text, when the homage one is paying—to a text, to a teacher, or to a tradition—becomes implicated in the structures established by that text, teacher, or tradition. And it is also that moment, supposing, as Derrida says, that it is a moment and that it can be located, that the master's authority is not simply interrupted or immobilized but is shown to be self-justifying, which is to say, ultimately unjustified, the result of a "mystical authority" wherein the master—like real life—is perhaps always absent.

All this raises, of course, the huge and no doubt impossible question of the relationship between Plato and Platonism, or between the tradition and us, the immense question of how to receive the tradition. As I have tried to demonstrate, the point can never be simply to try to argue Plato's case for him by saying that he has been misinterpreted, that he has been treated unjustly by the tradition. Plato's text will have been Platonic because it will have programmed its own reception; and yet, because each reception offers the chance for the groundlessness of the corpus to be reinscribed, Platonism always repeats a gesture of Plato's that is already beyond Platonism.



We begin to read where we are, which is always, it seems to me, “within” Platonism—but this does not mean that we must receive Plato’s text unequivocally. Derrida writes in *Positions*: “When I try to decipher a text I do not constantly ask myself if I will finish by answering *yes* or *no*” (52). Derrida does not ask whether he will, in the end, say yes or no to Plato, yes or no to Platonism. Indeed, one cannot just say no to Platonism, for saying no simply recapitulates and reaffirms it. In other words, we cannot simply refrain from receiving. This is why, as I have tried to show, Derrida makes so much in “Plato’s Pharmacy” about the heritage and transmission of the *Phaedrus*, about the legacy of the text—of this text of legacy—and about our reception of that text. While the king says yes to speech and no to writing, yes to life and no to death, *our* reception threatens to repeat these choices by saying yes to the thought or intention of the text and no to ambivalence, yes to the living author now gone and no to the text, yes to speech and no to writing. By interrupting this testamentary scene, by intervening in it, Derrida lets us see both the structure of this scene and the ambivalence that this structure had to suppress: the ambivalence in the reception of both Thamus and Theuth and in the *pharmakon* “itself.”

In the critical reception of “Plato’s Pharmacy,” it has been the ambivalence of the middle term, of the *pharmakon*, that has most often been emphasized—and yet, curiously, overlooked. For in the formula “Thamus receives the *pharmakon* from Theuth,” it is easy to assume that the *pharmakon* simply comes *between* Thamus and Theuth, between the king and his servant. The *pharmakon* would simply be there, waiting to be given by the servant or valued by the king, even if the servant presents it already from the position of the king. And yet, where would this ordering—be it temporal or logical—come from? Might it not be the case that in order for Thamus and Theuth to become differentiated and hierarchized in the first place (the king over the servant, the father over the son) the threat of the *pharmakon* had *already* to be overcome? Indeed, it would seem that the threat that Theuth poses to Thamus, the threat of a servant to his king, of a son to his father, can take place only as the simulacrum of the *capital threat* found in the *pharmakon*. In other words, Theuth’s parricidal threat can take place only because it follows upon, and is the simulacrum of, an even more radical “parricide” that threatens the very difference and order of master and slave, father and son. The *pharmakon* is the place of this other parricide, this capital threat—a threat not simply to some term within the tradition (some king or father) but to the tradition itself and to all the hierarchies it establishes.

By interrupting the family scene between the father and the son, Derrida shows that the scene was itself constituted by an even more originary act of violence. The *pharmakon* of writing is not a mere supplement to an already constituted scene, an external threat to an already established order, but that which threatens from within the very value system of the father-king-son. And

so I would like to conclude by asking what it would mean to receive this scene of legacy as such, that is, not as it presents itself, but as the parricidal scene? What would it mean to receive not this scene of reception where one says yes or no to the *pharmakon* or yes or no to Platonism, but this scene of ambivalence? How would one prepare oneself for this reception—for receiving that which interrupts all reception? How would one receive a “pure performative act”? Finally, if Platonism, along with anti-Platonism, is the necessity of saying yes or no, of deciding, if it is a place of hierarchical oppositions, how might one understand the relationship between the Platonic scene of legacy and the legacy of the *pharmakon*, between the Platonic house and the pharmacy?

Derrida's analysis of the *Phaedrus* demonstrates why and how the tradition exercises such power over us. It does so not simply because it furnishes us with our themes and concepts—with history, origin, and power, with everything under the sun—but because it gives us the means and resources for our receiving all these themes and concepts, for our turning toward the sun. As in the scene of the *Phaedrus*, we are determined as inheritors—as disciples—of a tradition not simply because of the immense power of the past but because of the structures of inheritance and reception that constitute and sustain this power.

And yet, as we have seen, the tradition is not simply an immense program that unfolds and inscribes us from the beginning in some sort of eternal present; every time the tradition is handed down, the decision to receive the tradition is at once revealed and concealed. It is concealed insofar as the structures of reception are received without question, in a reception that then reconstitutes the tradition as it will have been, as we will then assume it *always already was*. But this decision to receive the tradition will be revealed insofar as the tradition is shown to be dependent upon its reception—upon the structures of reception. The decision is revealed insofar as it allows us to catch a glimpse of another history, not another history of what has been received but another history of reception. Such a history would provide not only new analyses and new themes, but new places for thinking, for thinking reception and for thinking as reception. One might imagine the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Perugia as one such place, a place not only with its own tradition, with a tradition of thoughtful and provocative encounters with figures within the philosophical tradition, but, more importantly, a place where the tradition might be received and questioned, received as a tradition of questioning and yet questioned in this very reception.

## NOTES

1. *Phaedrus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, 1983.

2. Jacques Derrida, “Plato's Pharmacy,” in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 65. Hereafter cited as PP.

3. Notice, then, that Derrida says that the supplement must be rigorously "prescribed"—that is, written and not spoken in advance—by the necessity of a game. Hence what we assume to be the Platonic position, represented by Socrates' position in the *Phaedrus*, seems to be inverted. Socrates will say that writing is a game that no one who is serious will undertake, and he would seem to be saying that speech is to be privileged over writing and thus it and not writing would "prescribe" what is to be said. To this Platonic speech and seriousness Derrida opposes writing and play—though he adds both rigor and necessity to these, precisely those things that the Platonic doctrine would claim they lack. Writing would, according to Socrates, have no necessity and no rigor; everything would be said in speech, in what one meant to say, that is, in intention.

4. I use *forefathers* advisedly here in order to echo Plato's use of patriarchal terms throughout the *Phaedrus*. I also speak throughout in terms of *a* tradition or *the* tradition, even though it is precisely the singularity, homogeneity, and exemplarity of this tradition that I am trying to question.

5. The following analysis might be read as a correlate of what Derrida does in *Given Time*. While he speaks there of donation as the moment when A gives B to C, I will be considering reception as the moment when A receives B from C, when Thamus receives the *pharmakon* of writing from Theuth, when we receive the tradition from Plato.

6. "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority," trans. Mary Quaintance, *Cardozo Law Review* 11.5–6 (1990): 990–93. I will try in what follows to demonstrate the impossibility of receiving such a pure performative act—even though such an act will have always already "taken place."

7. In the reception of "Plato's Pharmacy" it has been the question and ambivalence of the *pharmakon* that has been most often taken up, leaving the question of the *mise-en-scène* of this reception relatively neglected. Does this concentration on the *pharmakon* in Plato's text and the relative neglect of the reception of his text in Derrida suggest a certain "Platonic" repetition of the structures of reception in the reception of "Plato's Pharmacy"?

8. In *Spurs* Derrida makes a similar move, immobilizing the scene once again at the moment of donation: "I immobilize for the moment the play on 'to give' and 'to give oneself' and 'to give oneself for.'" *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 70.