

## *Introducing Kantian Social Theory*

Although there are certainly many philosophers working on contemporary issues from what may be construed broadly as a Kantian perspective, it is less certain that one may refer to the work of these philosophers under the rubric of “social philosophy.” Indeed, it is not altogether clear to many philosophers just what the term designates nowadays, let alone what it might mean to say that Kant had a social philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Kant maintained definite views on the nature of the state and its origin and functions so that it is unproblematic to attribute to him a political philosophy.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, his views on “society” as such are not so easily isolated. Here I will argue that although Kant’s theory of the state provides a focal point and is of central importance for his broader account of society, his contractarian theory of the state is itself only part of a larger story. For Kant, the establishment of the state is a stage in his account of the social progress of humanity, that is, of the morally perfected society as the final destination of humanity. In the final analysis, Kant’s notion of the state must be understood as that of an enabling institution—one that makes possible the prospect of a human community that is not captured in the notion of social contract. His social philosophy, I will argue, encompasses but also extends far beyond his political philosophy.

## SOCIAL VERSUS POLITICAL THEORY

What does it mean to say that Kant, or anyone for that matter, has a social philosophy? The term is an indefinite one among philosophers today. Contemporary introductory texts in philosophy run the gamut from comfortable conflation of social with political philosophy to conscious separation of them with complete and independent chapters devoted to each. Perhaps most common is the tendency to treat social philosophy under the heading of political philosophy, with a nod in the direction of the distinction: the two areas may be viewed as a matter of focus, with political philosophy highlighting the state and its justification, including questions of its organization, scope, and functions. Social philosophy looks at more intimate spheres of personal interaction and social relationships, and questions of what constitutes the good society.<sup>3</sup>

In collecting these essays, the editors have construed "social philosophy" very broadly, much the way Anthony Giddens defines social theory:

It is a body of theory shared in common by all the disciplines concerned with the behaviour of human beings. It concerns not only sociology, therefore, but anthropology, economics, politics, human geography, psychology—the whole range of the social sciences.<sup>4</sup>

The reason for adopting this rather sweeping view of social philosophy is not expedience, but has to do with Kant's own approach to the subject. The three basic questions that, according to Kant, drive rational inquiry (What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?)<sup>5</sup> provided the subject matter of Kant's three Critiques. But throughout his entire career, Kant was deeply concerned with a further problem: "What is man (*der Mensch*)?"<sup>6</sup> Although Kant does not answer this question explicitly, observations about the nature of humanity and its ends are to be found interwoven in the fabric of his three Critiques, as well as in his treatises and lectures on a great range of subjects, including anthropology, politics, history, religion, and education.

For Kant "*der Mensch*" is, by nature, many things: rational and free on the one hand, but also natural—a "being of needs"—on the other; a creator, finite but of infinite value, and a subject, ultimately, unknowable "in-itself." In addition, and arguably basic to all of these, is our social nature. For Kant, human beings are not isolated individual atoms of consciousness (even if, for the purposes of analysis, he studies

them as if they were). What might be called Kant's "conditional" rationalism guides his account of humanity: *If* we are to make sense of ourselves and our place in the universe, we must assume the "fundamental principle" of the teleological organization of nature, namely, that no organ is without a use, nor is any organization without a purpose.<sup>8</sup> In the "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" he claims that "All of a creature's natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their end." Insofar as human beings are characteristically rational beings, the complete development of their nature must occur "only in the species, not in the individual." Answers to existential questions about an individual human being's final purpose, if any are to be found at all, must be sought in his or her social nature. For Kant, even what might appear the most solitary of human accomplishments, learning to "think for oneself," requires that social conditions exist in which such autonomy first becomes possible:

For any *single* individual to work himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult. He has come to be fond of this state, and he is for the present *really incapable* of making use of his reason, for no one has ever let him try it out. . . . Therefore, there are few who have succeeded by their own exercise of mind in freeing themselves from immaturity (*Unmündigkeit*) and at the same time in achieving a sure and steady pace. . . . But that the public should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed, if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow. (Emphasis added)<sup>9</sup>

A "freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point" is a condition of enlightenment, and one that only the social order can fulfill.

In his essay for this volume, Robert Paul Wolff argues that Kant wanted to base the categorical demands of morality itself on the necessity of the social contract. Thus the study of social conditions, for Kant, is also the study of the conditions of Enlightenment, and if Wolff is right, of morality.<sup>10</sup> It would be truly surprising if a philosopher so profoundly concerned with human morality and Enlightenment autonomy had no theory of the social conditions of these! Still, the suggestion that Kant had a social theory not identical to his political theory is complicated by the fact that, as a proponent of social contract theory, Kant upheld the view that *genuine* society and culture, as opposed to disorganized or merely provisional groupings of individuals, depends for its very constitution upon a particular form of political organization. Like other classical social contract theorists, Kant

held that individuals first become genuinely social creatures, dependent for their very being upon harmonious, or at least non-destructive interaction with others, only on the condition of the institution of a social contract. So for instance, Rousseau says that

Before examining that act whereby a people chooses a king, it would be well to examine the act whereby people become a people. For since this act [of "public deliberation"] is necessarily prior to the other, it is the true foundation of society.<sup>11</sup>

There are, of course, important differences among different contract theorists, but most contract theorists, including Kant, share some version of the position that genuine sociability and culture is possible only on the condition of the creation of a civil state.<sup>12</sup> For Kant,

The highest purpose of Nature, which is the development of all the capacities which can be achieved by mankind, is attainable only in society, and more specifically in the society with the greatest freedom. Such a society is one in which there is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent with the freedom of others. Nature demands that humankind should itself achieve this goal like all its other destined goals.<sup>13</sup>

This aspect of Kant's contractarian account may be elucidated by contrast with conservative, organic theories of the state in which previously existing social conditions—traditions and traditional authority—are viewed as the legitimate conditions of the existence of the state. Thus Burke wrote in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* that "Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society."<sup>14</sup> For liberal contractarianism, on the other hand, social relationships are likely to be viewed as relationships among individuals who are citizens of a state. Liberal social philosophy then focuses attention on an account of citizens' rights vis-à-vis each other, or of the ranking of their various individual preferences with respect to those of other citizens. The bedrock of social relations is taken to be the political, that is, contractual, context in which individuals have, if only tacitly, placed themselves. If the political context constitutes the social in this way, then a philosophy of social relations, including an account of the social nature of human beings, will always lead back to and ultimately rest upon political conditions and principles. The social, on the traditional liberal contractarian account, must, in this important respect, be subsumed under the political.<sup>15</sup>

The point of the polity is to guarantee the rights of each individual to all freedoms that do not interfere with the freedoms of others. The society that results is a "free society"—one defined in terms of the liberty-protecting function of the state. But as Stanley Benn has pointed out, defining society in terms of the liberal state gives rise to a tension within liberal political theory.<sup>16</sup> Because liberalism is committed to maximizing the individual freedom and pluralism that the social contract is designed to protect, there is a strong (libertarian) tendency in liberalism to severely restrict the state's proper functions, and to give as much latitude as possible to all sorts of "special interests." Given this tendency, the liberal society that is brought into existence by social contract may well be extremely diverse, not to say amorphous. As a result "the society" is exceedingly difficult to identify and to define, containing, as Kant put it "a thoroughgoing antagonism among its members." This raises the question, In what sense do these mutually antagonistic citizens all belong to the same "society"? It is certainly extremely misleading to say that they form a single "community." In a recent essay on Kant's practical philosophy, William Galston finds the same problem already in Kant's political philosophy: "There is, in short, a tension, prefigured in Kant's political thought, between the moral underpinnings of liberalism and the tolerance of diversity that stands at the core of liberal society."<sup>17</sup> The liberal state just by virtue of its protective nature breeds pluralism of social visions among its citizens. Beyond the somewhat vacuous claim that they are all "citizens" subject to the rights, protections, and laws of the state, liberal contract theory as it is traditionally construed does not seem to be able, by itself, to say anything of theoretical substance about the nature and value of the diverse communities and cultures that exist under its protection.

While liberal political philosophy has continued to define society in terms of political freedom, the last half of this century has seen a growing sympathy among liberal theorists toward the view that "the social" may involve other fundamental values that deserve more profound theoretical discussion. Especially in areas of race, ethnicity, and gender, many liberals have argued for the recognition and valuing of cultural and other social differences and even, on occasion, have argued for special protection for various social groups from dominant cultural forces.<sup>18</sup> However, this special valuing could not occur on the theory that "our" society is no more than the system of citizens under the liberal contract. After all, under that system everyone is essentially the same. So in trying to theorize the social, contemporary liberal theorists have obviously gone beyond traditional contract theories in their own approaches. Is there precedent for this in Kant?

Put in Kant's language, the problem is that the contractarian account of society permits no substantive vision of the final purpose of society. In itself this may be a virtue, since it gives the appearance at least of leaving each individual member free to choose his or her own social vision so long as that does not entail actions that hinder the same freedom in others. Kant himself subscribed to some such minimalist account of the state in several places.<sup>19</sup> However, it is also clear that he saw the need for an account of society that went beyond the contractual association in order adequately to theorize the myriad social relationships and characteristic social needs of its individual citizens. Thus there is good reason for contemporary liberals to return to Kant's social theory in their attempts to address the need for a positive liberal vision of society.

The essays that follow in this collection are the attempts of several contemporary philosophers to address social problems from a perspective that draws on Kantian theory. Taken as a whole they present a strong argument for the claim that Kant had a social vision that encompassed and went beyond his contractarian theory. In the remainder of this introductory essay I want to begin the task of fleshing out Kant's social vision. The essays that follow by Allen W. Wood and Robert Paul Wolff also suggest ways of refocusing our Kantian lenses in order to bring into view the picture of human social nature and the social good contained in Kant's philosophy.

## KANT'S SOCIAL THEORY

Of course, in addition to his political theory, Kant had a theory of personal morality—an ethics that was intended to answer questions of right in the private social arena, an area left more or less untouched by contractarian politics. Moreover, scholars have been arguing for some time now that Kant did not rest content with the allegedly individualistic, formalist ethics of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the second Critique.<sup>20</sup> Others have supplemented this approach by arguing that Kant attempted in the third Critique to enrich his account of moral experience with an account of the importance of aesthetic experience in the development of moral feeling and autonomy.<sup>21</sup> Yirmiahu Yovel and Harry van der Linden have both given accounts of Kantian ethics that argue for its essentially social nature, emphasizing Kant's claim that individuals have a duty to promote the highest good and arguing that such a duty, for Kant, is social.<sup>22</sup>

These and other works in recent Kant scholarship make it increasingly more credible to read "through" Kant's ethical theory to a

larger vision encompassing history, society, and the emotional life. Insofar as Kant's ethical theory is independent of his contractarianism, such enriched accounts point out a path for elucidating a systematic and substantive account of what constitutes the good society in Kant's work.

But in spite of recent attempts to read the social into Kantian ethics, it might still seem objectionable to some to argue that this constitutes a social theory. That is, it might still be objected that for the liberal political theorist, theoretical accounts of society must be tied to political theory and to the social contract. And Kant's political philosophy is undeniably liberal. He clearly believes that genuine society is possible only under the "civilized" conditions created by the social contract and the institution of civil society. In the "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" he argues that the development of all natural human capacities can be fulfilled only in civil society, where a maximum degree of freedom for every individual is guaranteed by "the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others."<sup>23</sup> Under the social contract, human antisocial tendencies are not immediately transformed into harmonious social ones, but, at least, Kant says, when "enclosed within a precinct like that of civil union," antisocial tendencies are forced to express themselves in a way that gradually cultivates social morality.

Be it ever so slow, however, this process does occur, or at least, the philosopher must assume that it does. Just as, if we are to theorize about nature at all, we must assume a principle of purposiveness as a regulative guide to its system, so if we are to write our own history we must assume there exists a natural purposiveness in human efforts, even if human beings are not from the start guided by the thought of this purpose.<sup>24</sup> In fact, it is only long after human beings enter into a civil state that they even begin to be guided by the thought of themselves as purposive as a species.

This gradual awakening of an integrated sense of the social is what constitutes the progress of human history, for Kant, so that the moral cultivation of individuals in civil society becomes an important theme for him. Kant describes the beginning of this process in the "Idea for a Universal History" with the following interesting metaphor:

In the same way, trees in the forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and straight—whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from others grow stunted, bent and twisted. (46, KGS 8:22)

This metaphor is worth considering in detail. First, it is noteworthy because it represents a kind of compromise between the contractual model of the state, in which metaphors of artifice set the tone (the state is "constructed," "built," "erected" upon the foundation of the contract), and the organic models preferred by conservatives like Burke, for whom the state should naturally "grow" out of an already well-ordered (God-given) social hierarchy. For Kant, human society is natural, like a forest, but composed of individuals who are forced by competition and crowding to train themselves in a direction that, left on their own, they would not take. There is a certain artifice that is forced upon human beings by nature because they are at once social and antisocial creatures.

Thus the metaphor of a natural grouping perfected by the growth forced upon it by its very situation in a group suits Kant's view of civil society very well. But this is only the beginning of an ongoing process. It is true that for Kant the materials of human society are the products of nature—but these materials are, as he puts it in a famous passage, a very "crooked wood"—they must be continually cultivated, pruned and clipped if they are to achieve perfection.<sup>25</sup> The unsociable sociability that forces human beings together and then forces them to stay together under the social contract continues to cultivate and refine them in the civil state. The civic uprightness forced on individuals by the state leads to further civilization. The forest ceases to be simply a result of nature as it becomes more and more cultivated. As it progresses, the human forest becomes more and more like a carefully tended arboretum or garden.

The latter metaphor is apt: Precisely what constituted the well-kept garden was a matter of considerable debate in eighteenth-century aesthetics, and the garden is one of Kant's paradigm cases in illustrating taste in the fine arts. "Landscape gardening," Kant tells us, "arranges nature's products beautifully" (i.e., tastefully). And in a footnote he describes it in the following way:

Landscape gardening . . . actually take[s] its forms from nature (at least at the very outset: the trees, shrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field), and to this extent it is not art . . . and the arrangement it makes has as its condition no concept of the object and its purpose. (KGS 5:323)

One should not try to press the analogy too far, perhaps, but it is worth comparing his account of landscape gardening to the process of human cultivation in the civil state: The "unsocial sociability" that forces human beings together partially against their nature finally produces



the civil state, bringing human beings from the wild, so to speak, into the garden. But they do not change their wild ways immediately in this context, anymore than do transplanted shrubs and flowers. Human beings continue to be unsociable, but under the constraints of civil society this aspect of their nature is forced to flower:

All the culture and art which adorn mankind and the finest social order man creates are fruits of his unsociability. (KGS 8:22)

Unsociable sociability is the unconscious path that humans are forced to follow out of the state of nature and into the civil state. Crucial to this process is the development of taste, which Kant defines as “the power of judgment” that

consists in disciplining (or training) genius. It severely clips its wings, and makes it civilized, or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance as to how far and over what it may spread while still remaining purposive. It introduces clarity and order into a wealth of thought, and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for approval that is both lasting and universal and hence fit to being followed by others and *fit for an ever advancing culture*. (KGS 5:320, emphasis added)

As this disciplinarian account of taste suggests, Kant does not paint an entirely rosy picture of the development of culture and the process of civilization. The force of legal discipline in civil society “straightens out” the bent wood of its citizens, only to produce more subtle kinks that in themselves Kant does not find particularly admirable. Civil society can lead eventually to a further phase in the development of human nature that Kant calls “the hardest of evils under the guise of outward prosperity”:

To a high degree we are, through art and science, *cultured*. We are *civilized*—perhaps too much for our own good—in all sorts of social grace and decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached *morality*—for that, much is lacking. The ideal of morality belongs to culture; its use for some simulacrum of morality in the love of honor and outward decorum constitutes mere civilization [*Civilisirung*]. So long as states waste their forces in vain and violent self-expansion, and thereby constantly thwart the slow efforts to improve the minds of their citizens by even withdrawing all support from them, nothing in the way of a moral order is to be expected. For such an end, a long internal working of each political body toward the education of its citizens is required. Everything good that is not based on a morally

good disposition is nothing but pretense and glittering misery. (KGS 8:26)

Although Kant here agrees with Rousseau that civil society ("*Civilisirung*") is, morally speaking, in itself hardly preferable to no society at all, he argues that it is to be valued more highly because it is (or can be) a crucial step toward moral development, which he equates here with culture ("*Cultur*"). Later, in the *Critique of Judgment*, he admits that refined taste indisputably leads to a great deal of evil by producing in us many "insatiable inclinations." Nevertheless, he continues, the fine arts and the sciences

involve a universally communicable pleasure as well as elegance and refinement, and through these they make man, not indeed morally better for [life in] society, but still civilized for it: they make great headway against the tyranny of man's propensity to the senses, and so prepare him for a sovereignty in which reason alone is to dominate. (KGS 5:433)

Thus it is fair to say that for Kant, the state first makes possible the conditions under which taste, the fine arts, and "high" culture in general can develop. These lead eventually to genuine, moral sociability, which in turn makes us fit to become truly rational, moral beings suited for a more perfect society. But it is also important to bear in mind that for Kant the mere existence of the individual political state is not enough to guarantee the emergence of culture, since hostilities and preparation for war with other states may very well keep individual states in a condition of a state of nature ("*barbarische Freiheit*") with respect to each other (IUH 49, KGS 8:25–26). Thus civil states are forced towards cosmopolitanism, a federation of states that is a precondition for genuine social progress and a "matrix within which all original capacities of the human race may develop." (IUH 51, KGS 8:28).

At this point Kant's account of the development of the good society begins to separate theoretically from civil politics and to go beyond it. But even cosmopolitanism cannot in itself be said to *constitute* the good society. Such a society—the "highest good" (= *Endzweck*) of which humanity is capable and toward which it must be viewed as striving as a species, is a society that is not constituted as an amalgam of various different special interest groups under the umbrella of the social contract. It is not a well-kept garden, or set of such gardens. The pruning and disciplining of humanity's social nature is itself only a step toward the development of a society that approximates a unified "common being" (*ein gemeines Wesen*)—a "commonwealth" whose

members are determined as rational beings to try to bring about the highest moral good on earth. This duty, as Kant insists that it is, is not a duty to better oneself morally, because mere individual moral self-improvement will not bring about the highest moral good on earth. Rather it is a "determination" or "vocation" of all human beings as members of a rational species. This vocation calls on individual persons to unite with others as members of a "system of *wohlgesinnter* (well-disposed) *Menschen*" to form a community whose purpose is to attempt to bring about the highest good (KGS 6:97–98). That is, it is the vocation or purpose of all human beings as social beings to try to bring about a world in which virtue is systematically combined with happiness, and in which each individual respects and is respected by every other individual. Kant's original metaphor might be pressed home in contemporary terminology as follows: the highest form of society is like a freely formed, interdependent ecosystem in which the flourishing of the whole depends upon the flourishing of each of its members.

Allen Wood has recently argued for a similar point, I believe, when he argues that Kant's ethics is at bottom a communitarian, not an individualistic ethic. "Kant's ethical theory," he says, "is an attempt to articulate the common rational plan through which humanity will find rational concord. Its final aim is a human society free from antagonism, where every rational being is treated as an end and (in the words of a later document with similar aims) the free development of each has become the condition for the free development of all."<sup>26</sup> For Kant, Wood argues, the final purpose of humanity is determined not by a political goal, but by a social morality. For Kant morality itself requires that human beings seek to bring about the highest good possible on earth,<sup>27</sup> and this Kant tells us in the *Religion*, is necessarily a social task. As such it presupposes the civil state, and Kant insists, going well beyond his contractarian precursors, it presupposes a "system held together by cosmopolitan bonds" (KGS 7:333). But as we saw, even a cosmopolitan system is properly speaking only the outer framework for "a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and towards the species" (KGS 7:333).

Thus, Kant's account of society goes far beyond an account of relations between citizens of a state while at the same time maintaining the historical necessity of the state. Although his account of society's progress *begins* with the social contract, it goes on to encompass a developmental history of society that ultimately detaches from the political to become a theory of social ethics. In the final analysis, genuine human society is characterized as a community of individuals united for the purposes of constituting a moral commonwealth.

On this account any doubts about whether Kant does indeed have a social theory that is distinguishable from his political philosophy may be put to rest. Moreover, precisely because his social theory is not identical to his politics, it is possible to see how Kantian social theory is sufficiently independent of Kantian politics to be an instrument for criticizing various questionable political positions that Kant himself held. Indeed, as some of the following essays suggest, taking Kant's social philosophy seriously may *force* certain questions about the validity of some of these views.

## NOTES

All references to Kant's works in this essay are to the Akademieausgabe (Prussian Academy Edition) of Kant's collected works (*Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, hereafter KGS), except the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where references are to the A/B editions of that work. Translations of the works cited usually indicate Academy pagination in the margins.

1. Onora O'Neill and Christine Korsgaard both raised these questions in conversation, and I am grateful to them for pressing these issues.

2. Key texts for Kant's political philosophy are easy to find, and they include: "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" (1784); "On the Proverb: That May Be True in Theory but Is of No Practical Use" (1795); "Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795); *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Part II: "The Doctrine of Right" and Introduction to the Doctrine of Right); with the exception of the latter, Hans Reiss has collected these and others in his (second) edition, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant scholars have also studied other texts as implicit sources of Kant's political theory. One fine example is Hannah Arendt's reading of Kant's third Critique, focusing on certain passages from the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*: cf. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

3. The texts I selected as fairly representative of current accepted views include: *Philosophy: The Basic Issues*, ed. Klemke et al. (New York, St Martin's Press, 1990), R. P. Wolff, *About Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989), B. N. Moore and K. Bruder, *Philosophy: The Power of Ideas*, (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield, 1993). In a recent text, William McBride addresses the issue directly: "[to separate social and political philosophy] seems unnecessarily artificial. This is because of the actual interconnection of the two domains at the deep level with which philosophy is concerned and because most of the best-known philosophers in the Western tradition . . . have in fact written about broader social issues as well as political institutions." *Social and Political Philosophy* (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 2.

4. Anthony Giddens, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 5.

5. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 804–5/B 833.

6. Kant posed the fourth question in his lectures on logic, claiming there that the first three questions all relate to the last, so that in a sense all philosophy is ultimately “anthropology.” Here, if the student lecture notes may be trusted, Kant’s use of “anthropology” is more or less the same as our use of “social theory” in this text. It is “cosmopolitan” or “worldly” philosophy, “the science of the relations of all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason.” KGS Vol. IX, 25, trans. M. Young in *Lectures on Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 538.

7. Lewis White Beck lists these in his introduction to his edition of *Kant: Selections* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 20–23. Curiously, he does not mention the social nature of human beings that Kant insists upon, although it may be implied by the “creator” item, since for Kant, no culture is possible without sociability. I believe this omission is typical of a long-standing view of Kant’s work on questions of “the social” as not, in Beck’s words, “programmatically.” The work represented in this anthology undermines this interpretation.

8. “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” KGS 8:13–31. For treatment of the teleological aspect of Kant’s theory as essentially practical, cf. Richard Velkley’s *Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

9. “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” KGS 8:36.

10. In his famous essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Kant identifies Enlightenment with thinking for oneself, and outlines some of the social conditions that help and hinder the development of the autonomy of reason.

11. *The Social Contract*, ed. Donald Cress, (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1988), Book I, Ch. V, p. 23.

12. Locke’s view is problematic, however, since it maintains the preexistence to the social contract of natural rights to property and punishment. Contemporary contractarianism, as exemplified best by Rawls, has become hard to pin down on this issue. Rawls has recently argued that his version of the contract does not make assumptions about the “metaphysical” nature of persons.

13. “Idea for a Universal History” in *Kant on History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1985), KGS 8:22.

14. *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (*The Works of Edmund Burke* [Boston, 1884], 3:359). Contemporary echoes of this general critique may be heard in communitarian attacks on Rawls’s version of Kantian politics. Cf. Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

15. This, of course, does not mean that the liberal can have no social theory. A contractarian can very well give an account of society within the polis, and of how the liberal society ought to conduct itself. Cf. William Galston in “What Is Living and What Is Dead in Kant’s Practical Philosophy”

for a discussion of what he calls the "substantive" justification of the liberal state, which amounts to a social ideal (in *Kant and Political Philosophy*, ed. R. Beiner and H. W. Booth [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993]).

16. Stanley Benn, "Society" in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 7:473.

17. "What Is Living and What Is Dead," 222. Galston believes that this tension is inevitable and also to a large extent capable of resolution through liberal education. Very much in line with the argument of this and other essays in the present volume, he claims that "Kant's teleological doctrine of human perfection thus exerts an irresistible pressure on the limits of the neutral state" (220).

18. Susan Moller Okin is a good example of a liberal theorist who has argued the need to recognize difference. Cf. *Justice, Gender and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

19. Cf., e.g., "Doctrine of Right" KGS 6:312ff., and "On the Proverb: That May Be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use," KGS 8:289–90ff.

20. Cf., e.g., Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Onora O'Neill, *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

21. Cf., e.g., Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. chap. 1: "Feeling and Freedom: Kant on Aesthetics and Morality." Also Jane Kneller, "The Aesthetic Dimension of Autonomy," in Robin Schott, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Kant* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

22. Yirmiahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), and Harry van der Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1988).

23. Quotations from "Idea for a Universal History" (IUH) hereafter are taken from Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*.

24. IUH, pp. 41–42 (KGS 8:17–18) .

25. IUH, p. 46 (KGS 8:23).

26. Allen Wood, "Unsocial Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics," *Philosophical Topics* 19.1 (1991).

27. *Critique of Practical Reason*, KGS 5:113–14. I have argued this point in "Imagination and Aesthetic Freedom in the German Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51.2 (1990).