

VERITAS SEDITIOSA

Yes—a separation had to occur, one not sought after and hence avoiding the clamor of rebellion Erasmus had heard in Luther’s *veritas seditiosa*. In total stillness with respect to Heidegger’s accomplishment, the *sed* of a departure arose, one effected as a *seditio*—remote from the critical affectation predominant today, remote from its strained efforts at self-assertion. But our *seditio* is not merely not an overcoming of metaphysics, it is not even a recuperation from it; for another metaphysics has become apparent to us and incited the present demand for distinction, another metaphysics because an *ἀλήθεια* other than that of Heidegger’s experience of withdrawal has been attended to.

A *sed* urges us to give it voice, effected as a *seditio*, awakened by that to which Heidegger always only alluded as “the most ancient of the ancient” (*das Älteste des Alten*). This most ancient no longer permits the expectation of an “other beginning”; rather, it awakens that which has long since been begun as σοφία, as it is ever more ancient than φιλοσοφία—in each epoch, it awakens the latter. Here “the most ancient of the ancient” comes to speech, this side of the history of philosophy, this side of the world of modernity as well: only now. In this present, however, realized only in a *seditio* by what has been thought in the former configurations of wisdom, realized in their deliverance from the violence of sub- and postmodern thought. How can this occurrence be understood?

In the midst of this world Husserl gave the appearance of having and being able to renew the *ordo philosophandi* in accordance with the Cartesian and Kantian models—grounded in the methodical stance generated by the “radical” ἐποχή. Its radicality dissolves into an illusion not only in Husserl’s recollection of Descartes, an illusion whose truth is to be encountered in Heidegger’s experience of withdrawal. It is only with the “expropriation” thought by the latter that the radical ἐποχή truly came into the world—on this side of all autocracy of an “attitude.”

That experience, however, had to make a turn on this side of modernity—towards a radicalized “poverty” of thinking. This turn was no longer to be

“experienced” with Heidegger but rather to be unfolded out of an expunction of all determinacy—precisely on account of this, solely *ordine* and yet not “speculatively.” But then how? We answer—neglecting Plato and Heidegger’s aversion—by way of a “story”: Beckett’s title can serve us here as a guiding word: “*Sans*.” “Without.” From the experience of our present it became a catchword for him. It is a word of endurance. How is that? We first ask: without what or whom? We answer: without either, and elaborate: to stand in the present of contemporary thought without joining in the debate, that is to say, with those who in this today, in its everyday, do the talking for philosophy. Thus ‘without joining in the debate’ means first of all: without allowing oneself to be dictated the themes of their discourse, without making a contribution to them.

One might think: what absurd obstinacy! Moreover: what vanity! Such character traits may have their causes but no reason (*Grund*). By contrast, the said ‘without’ most certainly has a reason, that is, the modest intention first of all to learn and only to learn, namely, to learn thinking from what has been thought in philosophy, more precisely, this and only this: to attend to the destiny of the topic of thinking (*die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens*)—to that which gives what is to be thought. Whoever is “expert” in these matters will easily note here: already this intention has been learned and in fact from that thinker who expressly raised the question ‘What is called thinking?’ This from the experience: “What is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking age is that we do not yet think” (*WD*, 3/5 f.). A word from Heidegger—my teacher.

In all the talk while learning, there was no participation in his topic and thus none in the fulfillment of his task. Who would have participated, for instance, in the unfolding of Hegel’s system? Perhaps after the manner of a “scientific community,” where participation in research is indeed taken for granted? This is certainly how one learns “to do science,” but is thinking also to be learned in this way—precisely that thinking which Heidegger asserted is still lacking?

In the philosophy business the prevailing opinion is that in learning, all that matters is engaging in critique. But this is only the flip side of a learning that misunderstands itself as repetition. Such alternatives suppress what is aimed at in learning to think from what has already been thought: to exercise reticence with respect to those thoughts which, in the sense-explication of our world and in the philosophy of its history, have made all the difference—with respect to the thoughts that have, judged in light of the history of science, broken free of the matrices of “ordinary science,” that were able and had to assert a new paradigm. The applicability of this model to philosophy lives, however, on the fiction that there too a kind of “ordinary science” persists in the continuum of technical progress.

This fiction is not without cause. It lies in an age-old habit, namely, in that of drawing the philosophical distinction between what appears and its Nature (φύσις). Although the ground of such distinction has disappeared along with the philosophy of our history, the conviction still prevails that one need only attend to what appears, to “phenomena,” as is done in the so-called positive sciences, in order then to inquire—somehow “philosophically”—into its “Nature.” The illusion of such philosophical inquiry manifests itself, however, in the violence of what appears in asserting its “regional” character—while its “specific” character has long since disappeared. Though the philosophy business makes a virtue out of the calamity of reason’s no longer having a subject appropriate to it—for such would have to be a totality. This is manifest in the assurance that the thinking proper to the science of pure reason, or so-called metaphysics, was totalitarian.

Phenomena and their description are to guarantee first of all the immediate comprehensibility and thus accessibility of philosophy. This illusion—and it became an illusion as soon as the relation between the phenomenon and its Nature became groundless in modernity (the progression of modern art is already instructive in this regard)—this illusion was, of course, also promoted by Heidegger insofar as he offered time and again a phenomenal introduction to his thought, which then seems even less comprehensible. On the other hand, it was precisely he who gave a decisive turn to the traditional relation between what appears and φύσις insofar as he understood the latter as a truth to which it is essential that it conceal itself. Precisely this is a turn, however, away from the Nature which was regarded as the essence of what appears to the Nature which, as self-concealing, determined the history of occidental thought. Once again: not the Nature of this or that, nor even the Nature of the All or what is first with respect to everything, but rather φύσις as it is the event of a concealment and in fact one that has come to be historical in occidental thought.

An earth-shattering occurrence already becomes apparent here: that which all philosophical science of this history sustained was the difference and thus the relation between Nature, or essence, and what appears. At the limit of modernity Heidegger slips completely free of this relation while remaining caught up in its first side, namely, φύσις as the event of concealment in truth as it is understood by the Greeks, namely, in unconcealment. It is precisely on account of this that his relation to philosophy as phenomenology literally remains shady. In the end Heidegger’s thought no longer deals with phenomena but rather with an event of concealment that destines thinking to forget its proper topic—spoken in Heidegger’s darkness: thinking turns to what appears, to what is present, to what is, even to the Being of beings—both with refer-

ence to its universality and also to its divinity—but by way of this turn forgets precisely Being itself.

No light penetrates the darkness of Heidegger's thought so long as reference continues to be made to the double-pivoting of a φύσις that is simultaneously an emergence into appearance and a self-concealment. This reference fades insofar as thinking finds its way out of Nature not only as it is the Nature of what appears but, what is more, out of Nature as the history of self-concealing and thereby severs the history of occidental thought from just this Nature. This was our point of departure from Heideggerian thought.

In order to clarify just what occurred with our turn, it is now necessary to elucidate how it came about.

Heidegger already taught the attention not to phenomena so much as to what has been thought—this being for the entire philosophy business, and especially for its contemporary manifestation, an abomination of, shall we say, inbreeding. But how did Heidegger attend to what has been thought? With the decisive qualification that it belongs to a history of oblivion and even to what remains unthought—precisely in this respect, one unbridgeably severed from the likewise historical, since it is missive, commemoration. If he sought out what has been thought in its strength and abstained from all manner of critical belittlement, then by no means only so as to take advantage of some opportunity to place himself on its ground; for his place remained the turning (*Kehre*) of the said oblivion into the noticing of just that oblivion and the history of concealment. This could only mean: to tarry in the presence of the mission of this history as it was present for him in the concealment proper to the “truth” or neg-ligence characteristic of technical thinking. It is precisely on account of this truth that what is said in the name ἀλήθεια, in truth as unconcealedness, for him becomes the legacy of his thought. As indicated above, it was only in taking our point of departure from this legacy that our turn could begin. But that means at the same time: in view of the usual notion which Heidegger read, as it were, as a bastion of forgetful thinking—namely, the locus of truth is judgment. The scrutiny of this notion, however, was ultimately referred by Heidegger's rejection of it no longer merely to the beginning of Greek thinking but rather—due to the oblivion of the hint in the name ἀλήθεια, or unconcealedness, an oblivion which started already in that beginning—to what has been spoken pre-incipiently and thus to the pre-philosophical ἔπος of the Greeks. It was precisely here that it became necessary to hear from what has been spoken, what has been said concerning λόγος and ἀλήθεια (cf. my “The Early Greek Usage of the Words *Logos* and *Aletheia*”). What was to be heard there—once again, beyond the ἀλήθεια which for Heidegger remained bound up with φύσις?

Ἀλήθεια has its place in the relations dominant in letting someone know something—where one is dependent upon the knowledge of another and at the same time is faced with the possibility that he who was questioned will prevent a participation in knowledge. Here knowledge is based on testimony, on an attention to (*Anwesenheit bei*) something. Contrary to Heidegger's habit of representing being-present (*Anwesen*) with reference to appearing and this in turn with reference to an emerging to which a self-concealing is simultaneously essential, Homer has it be understood: the key to the sense of being-present lies not in being-present as it is held to be a modification of appearing but rather in one's attention to (*Anwesen bei*) something, in one's regard of (*Achten auf*) something or someone.

The denial of participation in knowledge by means of an immediate deception or by eloquently pulling the wool over someone's eyes is met by a discernment on the part of reason as the sole superior adversary. It is not as if it could replace the testimony of eye and ear. Rather, its discernment is related only to the said denial, to the attempt to deceive. As for what presence is as an activity of reason, such is understood precisely with respect to this limit, to an incipient negativity. This state of affairs is of elementary significance for the comprehension of philosophy as the science of reason. It stands or falls with the said limit, whose actuality continues to be the distinction between "how it is" and "how it is not"—thus the delimitation of "being." Just this is attested insofar as ἀλήθεια, or what is called 'truth', has its element in the λόγος, in its critical nature. It is only via this λόγος that a truth can be safeguarded against deception. The pre-philosophical understanding of ἀλήθεια proves to be a bequest for its status in early Greek philosophy.

Just how fundamental the privative character of ἀλήθεια is to such letting-know is manifest in the earliest philosophy, namely, in pre-Parmenidean physiology and cosmology—astonishingly enough, precisely in the fact that there is no talk of it whatsoever. For letting-know has no significance for their respective constitutions since their knowledge radically severs itself from all hearsay, instead being grounded, on the one hand, on one's own presence with what appears and, on the other hand, on the presence of the latter as the κόσμος of everything. This is in turn present with him who understands the λόγος of the ἁρμονίη of this κόσμος because he has attained reason from the latter and by no means from a plurality of appearances.

Only with Parmenides' dismissal of both forms of presence does ἀλήθεια turn up in philosophy. How so? In fact, renewed as the topic which a goddess lets one know, but with the decisive difference that what is given to be known does not depend on the attention of a "Muse," that is, an attention to everything; rather, such shows the ground of its truth within itself. To take on the

corresponding reason in pure reflection—precisely this task faces the listener in this case and thus he has to produce the knowledge in question as his own.

Why recall all of this? Because it is just in this regard that our departure from Heidegger's view of what he called 'the first beginning of thinking' occurred. Yet this separation was by no means carried out by thinking Heidegger's thought "further," but rather by subjecting it to an ἐποχή, by stepping out of the field of resistance which he himself generated to the investigation just recalled and in fact in his reliance on the self-concealing inherent in the nature of truth, a nature that was held to have been constitutive of the history of occidental thought. It was only this detachment from this last point of bondage to the φύσις which conceals itself in what appears that opened up our view to the history of philosophy in light of the rational works constitutive of it and no longer to the "theory of the Being of beings" attributed to it.

Precisely this view asserted of occidental thought that it privileged thinking over Being as it is that of beings. It took up the demand to think "Being itself" as the destiny which has priority over thinking. It seemed to have remained what had everywhere gone unthought in that history. In our transformed stance towards that history, however, Parmenides already revealed: thinking is in fact to be urged to bring its topic, namely, "how it is," to the determinacy of "being"; this, however, in keeping with the prior standard of the difference between "how it is to be" and "how it is not to be," namely, according to the standard set by Θέμις and Δίκη, or the directive provided by what has always already been established. It is precisely on account of this that the thinking which is freed of all observation of appearances takes on the fundamental trait of acknowledging "principles" (cf. my *Ground and Present as the Aim of Early Greek Philosophical Inquiry*). The determination of thinking is perfectly perspicuous here and lacks any of the obscurity characteristic of the "mission" of history as it is thought by Heidegger.

The complete traversal of the history of metaphysics (cf. my *Topology of Metaphysics*) revealed: it possesses a historicity which is grounded in the acknowledgment of principles; for these are epochally distinguished and thus the corresponding acknowledgment is as well. What calls forth the said differences? It is just this question that resulted in our complete departure from Heidegger's "history of Being." Its originary "there is—Being" (*es gibt—Sein*) was transformed into an incipient "it gives," a gift that is given as knowledge and in fact as an epochally distinguished bequest of σοφία to φιλο-σοφία. The latter is always offered a knowledge concerning man's destiny to distinguish himself not only from other animals but, prior to that, from himself. Yet that which—unlike, for instance, in the teachings of Buddha—in our tradition, and only in it, called forth a philosophical reason is precisely that state of affairs

already touched on in the aforementioned elucidation of ἀλήθεια: it has its abode in λόγος and thus in the latter's πειθώ, or persuasiveness—opposed to the possibility of deception.

Each epoch of philosophy begins with a negative stance of thinking towards the respective wisdom as a type of knowledge for which just this wisdom cannot offer any guarantee. Only the self-assertion of reason contrary to the wisdom which it itself does not furnish makes possible reason's distinction from itself, its purification into perfect self-activity in a positive relation to the knowledge that has been given and thus in the conception of its truth within the bounds of a logic that it itself furnishes.

It already follows from this shifting stance: there has never been a one-tracked history of philosophy but always a history distinguished within itself—said in view of Heidegger: never the one “epoch” of metaphysics, that is to say: the keeping-to-itself of Being itself in a growing oblivion of that which properly gives what is to be thought. This, as it were, “physical” view of the history of thought had to be abandoned, though we held fast to what Heidegger saw as the task of thinking in a transformed sense. Yet in each epoch of philosophical thinking, the task proved to be: to conceive the truth of a configuration of wisdom—namely, the knowledge of the Muses, of the Christian doctrine, and finally of the civil consciousness. It then became clear precisely in view of this: an epoch of the said history is concluded wherever precisely this task is accomplished as a common endeavor. This history of philosophy is neither completed insofar as philosophy becomes equal to its concept nor does it fall into ruins insofar as metaphysical thinking abandons itself to technical thinking. It is concluded as a tripartite architectonic of that which is epochally accomplished. It is just this then that grants the departedness of architectonic reason, which according to its epochal principles is constructive reason, its sense, namely, that of an accomplished task.

The topic of thinking is at present no longer what Hegel called ‘physical and spiritual Nature’, no longer those totalities of pure reason which Kant had represented in the dialectic of pure reason, but rather a history, a world, and a speech which are separated from all “Nature.” This insight initiated the sense-explication of modernity—to be sure, one inconceivable to modernity itself (cf. my *The Rational Architectonic of Modernity*). Only the notion of a closed history freed our view for the other notion of an equally closed world of the sense-explication, which explicates itself as that of modernity in singular significance and in fact with the pervasive severance of our world from its history. The clarification of the characteristic architectonic of this sense-explication was the second stretch of the course of our undertaking. What did it contribute to the clarification of our task?

As the explicated world, ours was initially distinguished into three dimensions, for the sense-explication proper to it is first directed to the sciences, which are no longer grounded philosophically—to their speech (Frege), world (Schlick), and history (Kuhn)—then to the sense-construct of the life lived through (*erlebt*)—in its history (Dilthey), world (Husserl), and speech (Wittgenstein)—finally, to the other future over against our world as it is first historically determined (Marx), then mundanely (Nietzsche), finally linguistically (Heidegger).

In this final dimension the sense-explication has the peculiarity of severing itself expressly from philosophy and in fact in favor of the thought of man's distinction from himself. Thus, each time a trail is left here by what the configurations of wisdom once brought into view. Such a view of the distinguished man, however, is failing for the core sense-explication of modernity. It remains referred to a future before which it pauses. Unlike the muddle-headed advocates of utopias.

The distinction of the said sense-explicative dimensions of our world reflected on its history and brought the following to light: the reason that in each instance takes a negative stance towards a configuration of wisdom, towards its givenness, is distinguished within itself. Taking its point of departure from the determinacy of thinking—in the case of the first epoch, as observation (*ἰστορίη*) in accordance with the difference between what appears and its “Natures”—it is “natural” reason; taking its point of departure from the determinacy of the topic—again in the case of early Greek philosophy: as the *κόσμος* of the totality of what appears—it is “mundane” reason. Distinguished from both of these incipient types of reason, purified of both into the conception of the truth of a type of wisdom, it is “conceptual” reason.

The sense-explication of modernity translates “natural” into “technical” reason (Frege, Schlick, Kuhn), “mundane” into “apocalyptic” reason (Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger), but “conceptual” into “hermeneutic” reason (Dilthey, Husserl, Wittgenstein). Here it should be noted: the selection of authors is guided entirely by the difference that their respective thoughts make within the framework of intellectual tasks. This selection completely disregards an estimation in view of their effect on the public.

Yet can there still be any talk of types of reason within the sphere of modernity? Does this talk not relapse into the assumption of a faculty of human reason? The introduction of a reason proper to philosophy and its history has freed itself from this assumption, a reason introduced with its early Greek beginning in the negative stance of thought towards the knowledge of the Muses as something given. The common ground relating the latter and philosophical

knowledge lay, however, in the presence claimed by both sides. Yet Heidegger contested the “privilege of presence” in the thinking of our tradition—no least due to the priority he had to give the future; and it is on account of this that he in turn had to radically temporalize the sense of “Being.”

It might now seem—and this semblance has also become operative in present thought—that Heidegger asserts a priority of absence (*Abwesen*) over presence (*Anwesen*). Yet this is an oblique view, namely, one still attached to the so-called “question of Being.” This question had its sense only on the basis of the question concerning the nature of truth. It hit upon the precedence, due to its originariness, of concealedness over unconcealedness. It is not presence and absence that make all the difference there, thus also not “Being,” but rather the disclosure of a remoteness to the things of the future world and the growing propinquity to them—to let them become of concern instead of being present. In a concern that takes on the significance of the future. If, in the epochs of its conception, reason has been the “faculty of principles” (Kant), there can no longer be any talk of it with regard to the sense-explications of modernity, for it is by no means present in the latter as that philosophical reason which is called forth by a configuration of wisdom—neither in negative nor in positive significance. Modernity requires and frees us to translate what has been regarded philosophically as “reason” into a *ratio terminorum*. Into which? Precisely into that ratio which Heidegger was able to understand only in the unity of the phrase ‘the destiny of the topic of thinking’ since it is involved in the “event of the appropriation” of Being (itself) and thinking. With its dissolution into its three terms, this phrase allowed for a “building,” for that “tectonic” thinking which discloses the sphere of history as well as that of the world in their architectonics.

But even if the latter is, if not a closed, then at least a complete construct, the ἐποχή inherited from modernity, and thus the reticence with respect to what has already been thought, is to be intensified. The ἐποχή thereby enables us to become aware of our own place: the sphere of speech—as it is to be appreciated neither intrahistorically nor intramundanely. Here history and world are only seemingly reduced to moments of speech, for it is not the totality of what the “concept” has been. The sphere of the actuality of speech cannot be exhibited as a closed construct. It is precisely here that the antipathy of the sub-moderns to thinking in terms of totalities has its roots.

But how can this sphere be at all determined as such? Indeed, no longer as such but rather by way of its distinction as an open sphere. In what way?

We recall: prior to all wisdom, man distinguished the genus ‘living being’ within itself, namely, into man and the other animals. Only the configurations

of wisdom show how man is capable of distinguishing himself from himself, namely, as hero, as saint, as citizen. In the history of philosophy, however, it is reason which distinguishes itself both within—into natural and mundane reason—and from itself, and in fact as conceptual reason. That which was correspondingly distinguished in the world of modernity was the sense proper to each sense-explication. And thus we talk only loosely of technical and apocalyptic and furthermore of hermeneutic reason. These stand only seemingly for a distinction of reason from itself. An observation of some consequence. To what extent?

What becomes of this bequest of distinctions within the sphere of speech as it harbors the tasks of present thought? To begin with, its first horizon drew our attention to the fact that the rational architectonic of modernity as just sketched was not properly structured inasmuch as its periphery had been misinterpreted. Namely, we have come to see that the periphery is occupied not by technical but rather by hermeneutic reason. Why? The periphery is the place of the encounter of what in the sphere of history has been the innermost type of reason—namely, the said conception—since it distinguished a given epoch. Hermeneutic reason can only simulate—to be sure, not: imitate—this reason. What is given to hermeneutic conception is no longer the truth of a given wisdom but rather the truth of a Being which is lived through, which is dispersed immediately into a multiplicity of phenomena. We recall here only Husserl's "principle of all principles": whereas, e.g., the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction let reason stay with itself, with the state of affairs as a rational one; in the Husserlian principle, in question is something that primarily has to be given in a perception and thus is extrinsic to thinking, to reflection. Every phenomenon "of an originally giving intuition" stands for this principle, which, unlike the Aristotelian principle, hasn't the character of an axiom, hasn't the character of a truth to be acknowledged in the actuality of reason, more precisely: of the λόγος. The Husserlian principle is an assertion that has its truth in the will and in fact in the will to truth, to phenomenological science. Wittgenstein pushes this mentality to its extreme, a mentality which says: description, not explanation, is the task, and it explicitly excludes the concept as such.

To understand a bequest which is originally, since it is in itself, nothing thought: here it becomes apparent in what way this hermeneutic intention is different from a conception of a bequest, which is precisely the eminent sense of something thought, something known, since it is not just known how it is but, prior to that, how it is to be and how is not to be—thus it knows the difference the "law" makes.

The first sense-explicative dimension of modernity is, as was said above, a simulation of conceptual reason, for there is no wisdom in this world that

would allow of conception. The dimension of technical reason, however, moves from its previous peripheral into the intermediate position of the sense-explicative architectonic of modernity and thus—and this is important—into the immediate neighborhood with, as well as opposition to, apocalyptic reason. Each rejects the other—especially regarding the future and thus the present of man within the sphere of modernity.

The occasion for this revision of the sense-explicative architectonic of modernity arose from our observation that in contemporary thought the core sense-explication of modernity is simulated—Marx by Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche by Foucault, Heidegger by Derrida. What occurs there? Whereas the former in each case left the trail of the said σοφία with its demand for man's distinction from himself and, precisely on account of this, abandoned philosophy, the simulative way of thinking proper to submodernity turns against this demand for an other future of man and therefore is able to slip into the guise of philosophy—into the externality of a guise since the attempt is made to abandon philosophy philosophically. Precisely because this attempt depends on the core sense-explication of modernity and simultaneously sinks below its level of being the trace of wisdom, we speak in this regard of the formation of the dimension of “submodernity.”

What characterizes its way of thinking? It is an-archic, and this not only in the modern sense of the rejection of all principles of conceptual reason but, what is more, of their modern translation into something that asserts “dominance,” that is held to assert the unity of a world. Here ‘anarchy’ does not mean that this thinking relinquishes all regulation, that it abandons itself to arbitrariness. No, it is—as they say these days—externally regulated and in fact by that “outside” constituted by the so-called others. It is precisely on account of this that Derrida speaks of a “responsible anarchy.” Here thinking knows itself to be bound to answer to the others, to their alterity and ultimately to the alterity of the “Wholly Other.” They are others, however, no longer in the sense of an ego as a *res cogitans*, no longer even of an ego that enters into intersubjectivity, but rather of an ego of intercorporeality—as Merleau-Ponty terms it. Thus the responsibility in question here is that for the other as he is encountered *in corpore*. This will have to be further developed on the appropriate occasion (see, for now, “The Dimension of Submodernity,” pp. 227-239 below).

Here we can direct only an orienting glance at the totality of the sphere of speech—a totality not closed but rather one distinguishing the horizons of thinking.

We recall briefly: in the history of philosophy, reason distinguished itself within itself—as natural and mundane reason—and then from itself as conceptual reason. In the world of the sense-explication, sense distinguished itself

within itself, and in fact according to its hermeneutic and technical understanding, and then from both according to its apocalyptic understanding. Now as far as speech—let us say: responding—is concerned, it distinguishes itself within itself insofar as it forms on the one hand the said anarchic horizon of thinking, but on the other that of linguistic operations. In the latter, the hermeneutic sense-explication's contribution to the articulation of the world is abolished and transferred to the sciences, which are no longer even the simulation of philosophy, sciences which we characterize as structuralist: first, pure linguistics (Jakobson); second, semiology (Barthes); third, the theory of subhistoric and submundane linguistic structures, namely, structural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss) and psychoanalysis (Lacan). If 'subhistoric' is said here instead of the usual 'prehistoric', then because the structures disclosed there remain present no less than do the submundane structures of the "unconscious."

The distinction of thinking from itself within the history of philosophy was borne by conceptual reason; within the world of the sense-explication, by its apocalyptic type. How are matters now with this distinction within the sphere of speech proper to present thought? In view of modernity, only one sense-explication remains to be transformed and in fact that of technical reason. But how on earth could a descendent of just this type of reason take upon itself the task of distinguishing reason from itself? In which determinacy does it even come into view here? In precisely the one that accepted thinking in the transformation of Heidegger's legacy, namely, his understanding of *ἀλήθεια*. In its formation of history and world into closed constructs, it already proved to be—spoken with Heidegger—a building thinking, though as "logotectonic" it dismisses his thinking. Specifically in the translation of what for him remained "poetizing." It is exactly this logotectonic thinking just invoked that is in the process of arranging precisely that horizon of speech which requires a distinction of thinking from itself. Only as such does it serve the aim of all wisdom. That is, dwelling and its *ἦθος*. The contemporary establishment of an ethics-market and the most diverse supplying of it has noticed this somehow, but disguises what is characteristic of dwelling by projecting a continuum extending from conventional moral philosophy to a theory of action. Here, at the great expense of acumen, trivialities are offered which are readily accessible to common sense.

What dwelling is, how action is subordinate to it, have been brought into view by the configurations of wisdom of our tradition, and precisely this was appreciated in a certain way in their conceptions—we recall here only the inaugural manifestations of conceptual reason in each epoch: neither Parmenides nor Plotinus nor Kant takes his point of departure from action, that is, from

giving preference; each stresses the precedence of something that is not at one's disposal. The modern attempts that took shape in the projections of an other dwelling of man are no less instructive, despite their having foundered. Such foundering points most insistently to what the philosophy of conceptual reason has known: the truth of a wisdom, namely, of the knowledge of dwelling prior to all habits, has to be one already given. It cannot be fabricated or established by a consensus of a majority of provisional opinions. For, strangely enough, dwelling is—unlike the patterns of human behavior—highly uncommon since, for it, man's distinction from himself is imperative. It is precisely on account of this that the speech of the type of knowledge in question is in fact in an eminent sense an inhabited (*gewohnt*), but not a common (*gewöhnlich*), speech. It cannot be appreciated as what is spoken but only as what has been said, and this in the exceptional sense that the listener abides by what is said to him. Therefore, in his case the aforementioned distinction begins with one of listening itself. The New Testament says it well: whoever has ears with which to listen—that is to say: for whom listening is not an immediate but rather a mediated, namely, an expressly given and thus distinguished, listening.

Logotectonic thinking is focused on this distinction. Learning this distinction is the first task of reason where its history, namely, that of philosophy, has been dismissed not only with the articulation of our world but also where the limit of this modernity has been transgressed into the horizons of thinking constituting the sphere of speech. Its first horizon elicits the simulation of the core sense-explication of modernity and lets thinking loose into the said anarchy. The other horizon is that of the linguistic reason just sketched. Both horizons melt into the sole place that present thought demands: *hic Rhodus, hic saltus*. Which leap is called for? Once again: to man's distinction from himself and in fact with reticence regarding the configurations of wisdom which no longer presently address anyone as they did in their respective epochs; no longer, as in modernity, as projections of an other future of the other man; but rather as those that have been. Here the positions of thought regarding a knowledge of the destiny of man which thinking itself does not furnish is completed in the sense of that completeness of that knowledge which was proper to the Muses, to the Homeric seer who knows, namely, how it actually is, how it will be, how it is before.

For us such knowledge of a concluding whole cannot be that of philosophy as it has been First Science. After its passing and the fading of its modern adversary, all that remains of that knowledge is the accomplished vision of man's distinction from himself, as it was brought into view in the configurations of wisdom of our tradition.

“Without”—we began with this contemporary code word. The familiarity of what it addresses, however, does not yet offer the distinct knowledge of our present. For such, a distinction even in the experience of this “without,” of the *sed* of the aforementioned *seditio*, is required. A distinction that is itself to be further distinguished: that of speech both within and from itself.