CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Over the past forty-five years, the State of Israel has undergone a striking shift. After embracing the premise that its Arab neighbors could only grasp the language of violent force, it moved toward policies that gradually de-escalated the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, Israel became one of the most inegalitarian societies in the Western world. Is the occurrence of these two processes coincidental, or are they related? To what extent has the conflict played a role in molding the social structure? And has that structure had any impact on foreign-military policies regarding peace and war? This book tackles this neglected linkage.

The linkage between social structure and foreign policy in Israel reflects the broad theoretical project that explores the conditions under which a state selects its preferred mode of action in the external arena. Considering the trends toward demilitarization and de-escalation of violent interstate conflicts that seem to have prevailed during the past decade, understanding this linkage becomes more important than ever. Echoing some of the current criticism of the most prominent international relations (IR) theory, neorealism, this book emphasizes the role of internal forces in shaping external policy choices.

The next section discusses the analytical gaps in IR and statist theories. It is followed by two sections outlining the theoretical framework in which I ground the empirical analysis. The final section presents the implications of the lacunas in the above general theories for the case of Israel and sketches my general argument.

THE ANALYTICAL GAP

The manner in which state security interests are defined and the way such interests are executed have inspired broad writing. This writing has been

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largely embraced in IR studies and, to some extent, in statist theories. Interestingly, the point of departure for strands of thought in both fields is the fact that international politics is deeply anarchic.

Explicitly, the central claims in the neorealist paradigm (the dominant one among international relations) is that the international system is anarchic in the absence of a central authority above the individual states that comprise the international system. Anarchy is the ordering principle of international politics, a principle from which the notion of self-help results, the belief that "force is the ultimate arbiter of disputes" (Levy, 1989, 224). This means that since anarchy leads to uncertainty among states regarding each other's intentions, the hierarchy of a state's interests is dominated by ensuring survival, by its security interests. Security interests motivate every single state to maximize its power position over other states (to achieve relative gains/relative power), which predisposes each state to competition in zero-sum international politics. Naturally, an arms race or even a slide toward war might be one of the outcomes of this structure, patterned by the logic of security dilemmas[1]; international institutions cannot prevent war by changing states' innate patterns of behavior.

In a self-help environment, the distribution of material capabilities in the international system is the focal factor determining the behavior of individual states. Distribution of power imposes constraints on and, hence, changes the operations of states according to their relative power. State policies are rationally assessed by decision-makers informed by material and nonmaterial capabilities and future expectations (see Gilpin, 1984; Keohane, 1986; Levy, 1989, 224–228; Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Waltz, 1979; Wohlforth, 1994/95, 96–98). As we will see below, constructivists also share some of these assumptions.

Implicitly, theories of state formation have attributed the power of the modern state to the state's position in the anarchic global system; its monopoly on the use of the societal resources of violence is the ordering principle of the state's internal control (Weber, 1972, 78). Monopoly control over violence is also the basis of a state's sovereignty relative to other members of the international system. Sovereignty, in turn, gives the state powers of coercion over internal activities (see Mann, 1984, 1988; Rosenberg, 1990; Schmitt, 1976; Shaw, 1984; Thomson, 1990, 1994; Tilly, 1985a). In practice, states exploited the state of anarchy that unintentionally resulted in the creation of bureaucratic coping mechanisms (Tilly, 1985b; see also Lake, 1992).

Historically, needs originating externally and state rulers' manipulation of domestic power centers worked together to centralize the modern state. The introduction of massive artillery and gunpowder in warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries propelled state agencies to extract resources for military buildup whenever (competition-oriented) geopolitical conditions necessitated or permitted it (Tilly, 1985a, 1992). Conscription was imposed on the

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domestic population when growing needs for disciplined manpower could no longer be met by mercenaries (Thomson, 1994). The state then became the exclusive entity able to underwrite and maintain a military (Andreski, 1971, 98–99; Finer, 1975; Tilly, 1985b; Weber, 1972, 221–223). At the same time, state activities aimed at preparing for and legitimizing war also became a lever for internal state expansion. Civilian bureaucracies dealing with mass conscription, tax collection, military production, and territorial centralization were products of this process (Barnett, 1992; Giddens, 1985; Hooks, 1990; Porter, 1994; Tilly, 1992).[2]

Overall, for neorealists, global anarchy determines the state's relations with other states in the international arena, while for statist theorists, global anarchy determines the state's relations with internal forces. Nevertheless, in each school, one arena is seen as a major causal factor while the other one remains a "black box."

For neorealists, the black box is the state's internal features facilitating and shaping external moves. That goes beyond the level at which state capacities cumulatively change the distribution of power in the international system, which in turn determines the state's relative power. As it has become more and more established among IR scholars and acknowledged by most neorealists, neorealism is a theory that pertains to the "properties" of the international system rather than individual states (Schweller, 1993, 75). Since global anarchy permits the state to opt for more than one mode of action within a self-help system (Waltz, 1988), anarchy as such is not a structural cause (Wendt, 1995, 77–78). Theorizing about individual state priorities thus requires an attempt to identify mediating mechanisms between global systems and state behavior in situations where global constraints by themselves do not force a specific mode of state action.

In an attempt to build such a bridge between structural variables and a theory of foreign policy, neorealists have largely focused on states' rational mechanisms of decision-making. Assuming that states possess internal autonomy to administer foreign policy (see mainly Krasner, 1978), neorealists imply that strategists exclusively conduct their countries' politics. Strategists consider the concentration of power in the international system, other states' intentions, and their own state power. They then calculate several alternative policies in terms of the costs/risks and benefits relative to previously defined security interests.

Nonetheless, distinctions between objective facts and the way agents reach an understanding of them are absent in the neorealist analysis, which confines itself to presumably objective realities alone. Expressing qualitative judgments rather than quantitative measurements, terms like "risks" and "gains" acquire meaning only through the dynamic political interaction between the state and domestic groups that goes beyond the narrow circle of decision-mak-

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ers. Risks, costs, and gains differentially impact on, and, hence, are appreciated by, different domestic groups on which the implementation of state policies is grounded. Those groups' members function as soldiers, taxpayers, or at least voters. That is exactly the analytical gap between global structures and the manner in which they determine an individual state's activity (see Gaddis, 1992/93, 34; Wendt, 1987). No wonder that some neorealists admit that under countervailing external pressures, that is, when the international system permits more than one option, "other levels of analysis will necessarily play a more important role in explaining state behavior," such as the effects of external policies on domestic politics (Glaser, 1994/95, 86; see also Mearsheimer, 1990, 25, on the role of nationalism). In short, neorealists imperfectly lay out the causal chain linking the features of the international system to a state's assessment of that system.

How a state assesses the reality of the international system has been partly illuminated by the neoliberal and constructivist wing of IR studies. Rejecting the neorealist perspective that privileges exogenous structure (anarchy) over processes, constructivism in particular—as a self-perceived critical theory—broaches an alternative way of thinking. For constructivists, "world politics is 'socially constructed' which involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material . . . and that these structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just behavior" (Wendt, 1995, 72–73). While for neorealists self-help causally follows from anarchy as the very nature of the international system, for constructivists, self-help is one possible institution created by what "states make of anarchy." Socialization mediates the international system to influence the action of individual states. States respond to the actions of other states and "learn" the international system. Through this form of international socialization, intersubjective concepts (like sovereignty), identities, interests, and expectations are created through which states distinguish between "friend" and "foe." Reciprocal effects of states' behavior on each other thus affect the social structure within which individual states are embedded. In turn, this structure socializes individual states (see mainly Wendt, 1992, 403–410). The distribution of material capabilities matters but it acquires meaning through the structure of interstate shared knowledge (according to which states interpret their counterparts' intentions) rather than exogenously dictating state behavior. War, then, is a possible, not a probable, outcome (Wendt, 1992, 1995).

Drawing on the reorientation of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev, constructivists highlight the key role played by the flow of values and ideas in reshaping national interests and inducing leaders to autonomously reassess the nature of the international system beyond the predicament of built-in anarchy. After all, Gorbachev could have embarked on the opposite road and become more aggressive in the face of the Soviet Union's decline.

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Accordingly, neoliberal and constructivist scholars have partially addressed the domestic debates, informed by external events, among Soviet decision-makers that shaped political reality (see, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991; Lebow, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1994).[3]

Though I accept the constructivist stand that international socialization plays a key role in shaping states' behavior, the analytical trajectory along which constructivism marshals a state's selection of its priorities is credible only in part. For example, the domestic structural change that brought the USSR to a crossroads where reassessment became critical, is overlooked. So are the conditions under which the Gorbachev faction successfully mobilized domestic support beyond the decision-making circle in order to prevail over other groups. This is the very process through which a certain set of ideas wins out over other alternatives.

Similar to neorealists, constructivists implicitly perceive the state as a unitary, internally autonomous actor while its domestic dimension plays a secondary role in shaping behavior relative to the international system (as reflected in Wendt, 1994, 385–387). The role of domestic groups, whether autonomous relative to the state or not, in filtering external information through the lenses of their social interests, identities, expectations, and concepts, and converting it into action has not been theorized in either school—even though this information contributes to the construction of shared knowledge about threats and risks.

Significant in particular is that constructivists overlook the relations among social forces, forms of state, and the world order whereby hegemonic social forces champion their worldviews through global institutions and thus create intersubjective meanings of world order (such as protectionism, free trade, sovereignty, etc.; see Cox, 1981, 135–141; Mann, 1993, 35–42; and also the classical analysis by Polanyi, 1944). Such processes, moreover, cumulatively change the features of the international system, particularly the distribution of power (Gaddis, 1992/93, 34). At this stage, moreover, neorealism adduces a problem-solving perspective based on a previously created global structure (Cox, 1981, 128–129).

Also, both wings of IR studies have given little attention to the historical processes that originally led to interstate competition (see Levy, 1989, 227, on realism). After all, real assets are generally at stake, not just images of systems, values, and ideas. Moreover, in addition to state agencies, other internal actors evaluate those assets and correspondingly inform state institutions of them. Nonetheless, having tended to reduce particularist interests to state interests, IR statist theories are inclined to overlook the role of particularist interests in inducing state action (see the critique by Ashley, 1984, 239–240).[4] So, in the absence of a full conceptualization of the relative weight of internal versus external factors—with their impacts on decision-making (in neorealist terms) or

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on state identity (in constructivist terms)—during moments in which two or more strategic (not only situational) options for external action exist, we are left in the dark regarding the conditions under which states cling to competition or cooperation, or how a competition-driven state elevates war. State mechanisms of assessment should be further theorized.[5]

This brings us to military capabilities. Although they play a pivotal role in shaping and executing state security interests—they are the crucial pillar in a state's assessment of its relative power—scholars from both IR wings have not addressed the internal features that determine the military capabilities of a state. Although domestic resources account for a state's capacity to act externally (see Organski and Kugler, 1980), their explicit conceptualization is missing (see mainly the critique by Barnett, 1990, 529–535). IR scholars have a lot to say about how states mold and change the international system but less about the internal structure that facilitates a state's action within that system.

Statist theorists have partially filled the gap left by IR scholars by focusing on state features. Scholars illuminate how states extract domestic resources through their position vis-à-vis the organization of major social classes (see mainly Tilly, 1992) and the strategies employed to convert those resources into military power. These are strategies of war preparation, which include taxation, production, and conscription (Barnett, 1992). Employment of these strategies impacts on the internal status of the state relative to societal and political forces, which, in turn, further affects state features.

While a state's strategies of war preparation matter, more significant is the legitimation that allows these processes to take place and permits the use of—or threat to use—violent force (see Mann, 1993, 258–261).[6] The satisfaction of domestic groups with the effects of war and war preparation on society plays a key role in this regard. Wars not only make states (to use Tilly's dictum); they also make societies by reshaping social groups' interests and identities and, hence, social relations of power. By addressing these issues, we may move further than statist theoreticians (such as Giddens, 1985; Tilly, 1992) toward linking the consequences of war, both actual and potential, to the causes of war, the black box of statist theories. Who gains from certain outcomes of war and thus might be motivated to sustain them? Facilitating or impeding war preparation, group interests are also a component of state features.

Consequently, although the anarchic nature of the international system leads to internal state expansion mediated by previously created state capacities, statist scholarship as such has not explained *how* states fuel wars. Noting that the international system allows states considerable freedom to administer foreign-military policies, the creation of a militarized state and its propensities toward resource extension do not necessarily dictate a selection of certain policies.

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To sum up, the "black boxes" of one school serve, at least partially, as the causal factors in the other school and vice versa, as figure 1.1 shows. We may infer from the figure that the transition from a state's internal features to its actual performance (conduct of policies) in the external arena, via the selection of foreign-military policies is inadequately linked in the causal chain—that is, as long as IR theories do not delve beyond the level of the state as a unitary actor. As for proponents of the statist theories, they directly pass from either the material features (theories of state formation) or legitimation (militarism) to actual performance (war preparation), skipping over processes of selection of policies. Both schools, however, address how actual performance affects the state's status internally and externally, and its impact on the properties of the international system (IR) and the features of a single state (statist studies). To tie the loop, it is necessary to blend both schools and move further in examining the manner in which domestic variables decrease the scope of freedom states enjoy in the international system, with implications for decision-making systems. Evaluating external assets, filtering external information, enabling extraction of domestic resources to facilitate external activities, legitimizing the use of violent force, and the like are among the roles domestic agents play. By doing so, they drive, facilitate, harden, and impede state policies. Socially constructed interests engineer agents' actions, as I now show.

INTERESTS

This and the following section introduce the basic theoretical concepts that guide the empirical analysis informed by five schools—neorealism, constructivism, state formation, neo-Marxist statist approaches, and scientific realism. Additional concepts will be suggested later along with problems springing from empirical observation.

Scientific realists have generally established the idea that agency and structure are mutually constitutive elements. The constitution of agents and structure represents a duality in which social structures are both the medium and the outcome of human action. Structures do not exist apart from the practices they recursively organize or the social agents' conceptions of these practices (which also include a discursive dimension). It is the agents' recognition of certain rules that enables structures to exist. But structures also condition social activity by socializing agents, creating preconditions for their behavior, setting restrictions on their activities, and giving meaning to their participation (for instance, as family/community members, citizens, individual states composing the international system, etc.) (for scientific realism see Isaac, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c; Outhwaite, 1987; Shapiro and Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1987, mostly following the concept of "structuration" in Giddens, 1984). Though social structures depend on the self-understanding of the agents involved, they are not "reducible to what agents think they are doing, since agents may not understand

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

Figure 1.1
The Causal Chain of State External Action

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the structural antecedents or implications of their actions" (Wendt, 1987, 359). Structures are therefore real, not empirical.

Scientific realism suggests four implications for the understanding of agentic interests.[7] First, assuming that agents are motivated by their interests, agents produce/reproduce/transform structures through their very interest-driven, partly purposive behavior. In turn, agents' interests are constituted through the agents' participation in the production/reproduction of social structures. Interests are a product of social experience through which an individual learns to internalize interests as though they were his or her own, even if doing so is unconscious. Interests emanate from norms, values, and logic subsumed in social practices and bound up with social roles and identities (Isaac, 1987a, 97–99; see also Connolly, 1993, 45–74; Wendt, 1992, 396–399). Interests, then, are "those purposes implied in the performance of social practices and therefore implicitly and practically held by participants in these practices" (Isaac, 1987a, 99, defining "real interest"). It is this form of interest that sustains social relations (see ibid., 97–100).

Second, and interrelatedly, assuming that agents are simultaneously involved in different structural relations, agents construct different sets of interests with possibilities for noncohesiveness, even contradictions, between them. Tension between consciously defined, short-term interests and undefined long-term interests is a typical symptom. An agent's involvement in the production/reproduction/transformation of structures might thus entail prioritizing certain sets of structural relations relative to others. No wonder that "many groups appear to be unaware of their own real interests . . . or articulate them falsely . . . [or] say conflicting things" (Tilly, 1978, 61).

Third, the very dialectical nature of structural relations also means that reproduction of structures unavoidably embraces *relations of exchange* between agents in which agents implicitly exchange readiness to harmonize their personal/group interests to structural orders in return for structure-produced gains. Subjectively perceived, unbalanced exchange might thus generate agents' exit from structural relations, particularly in a situation in which agents are motivated by conflicting interests. As much as interests refer to a structurally embedded orientation, relations of exchange embody a structural pattern; groups do not necessarily bargain over the terms of exchange (see more below).

As for the fourth and concluding implication, if socially constructed and unconsciously held conflicting interests govern agentic action, a space is then opened not only for the *construction* but also for the *reconstruction* of agents' interests. A perceived unbalanced relation of exchange might shift agents' behavior, particularly through interaction with other agents, creating new commitments, identities, possibilities of, or expectations for action owing to the creation of newly available resources or the drying up of old ones, and so on.

It is the strategic effect of other agents' moves that fuels the agents' satisfaction with the newly created reality relative to the previous one, a sat-

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isfaction that does not necessarily entail explicit reformulation of interests. Enduring satisfaction generates the reconstruction of interests, while agents neglect their former interests and structural affiliations. A transformation of structures might be the result. Alternatively, reconstruction of interests might encourage agents to neglect their intention to exit, a reconfirmation of relations of exchange.

So, the more interests were harmonized, the less likely that agents would have been motivated to replace old structural relations with new ones, that is, to mitigate innate tensions between interests; hence, the less likely that reconstruction would have taken place. A similar result would have occurred had agents been aware, from the outset, of the structural relations within which they were embedded. In such cases, structures would have become visible and thus solidly tied. This will have the implications of making agents' interests more self-conscious. Agents then might have been more aware of the cost of the exit option created by the pressures and incentives of their counterparts. Likewise, agents would have been less subject to the manipulation by others through which they indirectly transferred their loyalties from one set of commitments to others.

Finally, had structures and interests been visible, agents would not have made errors in their relations with others. Errors relate to: (1) a failure to calculate invisible structural limitations imposed on other agents, limitations such as commitments, expectations, loyalties, identities, and so on; agents' moves then might provoke others' antagonism; and (2) a failure to calculate other agents' capacities to accumulate power owing to the pattern of exchange, which might generate a realignment of power relations.[8] Reconstruction thus is also an error-correction mechanism, that is, agents' reaction to situations in which their actions overtly produce unanticipated consequences. Reconstruction of interests, I contend, is what a state unintentionally does in its pursuit of mitigation of intergroup conflicts and creation/aversion of structural exits with it.

Methodologically, defining and identifying interests is always a problem because interests are observable only in part, that is, at the level where agents express conscious, rational preferences and intentions. Identification of agents' interests might be drawn from a general analysis of the connection between interests and social position. Further, focus on mechanisms of error correction helps identify structural constraints on agentic action, hence, interests as well (see Tilly, 1978, 60; 1995a). By doing so, we can avoid a self-confirming explanation—interests are what agents do. But the ultimate analytical test is *interpretive* rather then *empirical*, done by measuring certain explanations against alternative theories that have been ruled out. If war preparation is a process of structural production then, arguably, factoring in of agentic interests matters.

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THE THREE DOMAINS OF STATE ACTION

The role social agents play in shaping the state's foreign-military policies is relevant to the three domains of state action, as figure 1.2 proposes. The first domain exhibits the IR elements in the underlying causal chain (see figure 1.1): the state's actual, externally oriented performance, directly and intentionally motivated by the rational calculation of self-help-guided security interests and by previously understood threats and previously created material power. In short, this approach focuses on the problem-solving perspective of statecraft (see Cox's critique of neorealism, 1981, 128–129). State policies produce war or peace, which result in victories, defeats, casualties, loss of resources, and so on. IR scholars, notably neorealists, credibly address activity in this domain.

Domains II and III embrace state features. In the second domain, the actual outcomes of external activities or the expectations of such outcomes affect domestic agents, be they social groups, political parties, particular state agencies, business organizations, and the like. Those agents reconcile their interests, consciously or unconsciously, to those outcomes. Hence, their attitudes toward issues of peace and war, competition and cooperation, are shaped by and determine—via their willingness to legitimize and be mobilized for carrying out state policies—state strategies of war preparation.

This process starts with the evaluation of external assets domestic agents expect to gain regardless of who initiates state action: state agencies or domestic agents themselves. Assets might be raw material resources (Krasner, 1978), markets, religious sites, territories (Kocs, 1995), and so on. They might be new holdings to be possessed by the state or existing holdings that are imperiled by other states. When pushing the state to compete with other states to attain those assets (if a fine tuning of existing policies is inadequate), agents are inclined to present their particularistic interests as universalistic, national security interests serving a vast social group. The level of universalization determines the level of legitimization domestic forces confer on state actions, especially costly ones.

Collective action, lobbying, manipulation, provocation, and the like are all means through which groups attempt to universalize security interests in their concurrent effort to gain the support of state agencies; as does the state when working to mobilize agents (the movement from evaluation to universalization and mobilization in figure 1.2). Universalization of military establishments' activities by means of tight political supervision dovetails with this process if the military takes part in marking external targets as interests. With the support of state agencies, universalization is more workable, as is the capacity to mobilize the society to support, and in many times even to carry out, the burden state policies prescribe (a two-way movement from universalization

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

Figure 1.2
The Three-Domain State Action

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to mobilization).[9] Though the extent of interstate competition might go beyond the agents' initial intentions, real interests, not anarchy as such, spark interstate competition from the outset.[10]

Nevertheless, universalization of particularistic interests is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for enduring costly competition. It is particularly so if competition elevates war without a tangible, immediate, existential danger. And as long as modern warfare relies on the mass mobilization of citizens functioning as soldiers, taxpayers, or at least voters, and the extraction of huge domestic resources, the groups involved in the initial phase (i.e., evaluation), and those who are expected to carry out the burden that results from this phase, do not necessarily overlap. On the other hand, intimidation by means of threat is also an insufficient instrument for mobilizing long-term support unless it involves a state's pledge to protect values, rights, identities, and interests against an external threat (Lake, 1992), all required to shape popular consent (Tilly, 1995b, 167). So, a state's capacity to act externally is determined by its capacity to improve the well-being of the mobilized groups. Improvement means realization of both the existing domestic interests and the construction of new interests. The latter are adapted to the newly expected/created situation shaped by external action. Bettering groups' well-being is, in many cases, an *unintended consequence* of external, intended action.

To provide benefits to groups, the state may utilize three sources (a two-way movement from mobilization to realization/construction): (1) direct production of new material resources by means of external extraction (for example, by seizing new raw material resources or by being given foreign aid; it is a movement from external action to mobilization); (2) indirect production through the process of state extraction for war preparation, enabling the state to reallocate resources, for instance, by creating new jobs or increasing budgets (see Mastanduno et al., 1989; Starr, 1994); (3) production of symbolic resources from wars/interstate competition. Allocation of citizenship, access to political power via the expansion of political participation, social prestige, construction of identities, militarism (including access to arms), and national pride are among the resources states allocate to social groups as a result of the latter's military participation (i.e., participation in war and war preparation). Since these three sources are dynamically created or expanded through military participation, agents create resources for themselves when mobilized by the state. Realization and construction of interests are endogenous, not exogenous, to mobilization.

Concurrently, as the above state theorists have established, the resulting status of war/war preparation affects the third domain: empowerment or disempowerment of the state via expansion or diminishment, respectively, of its domain. Both effects go beyond the direct functional needs of conducting foreign-military policies.

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But the movement from realization/construction to state empowerment goes in the opposite direction as well, inasmuch as state expansion affects social relations by benefiting social agents differentially. In many instances, this process oversteps the context of mobilization for war. Two issues are relevant: (1) as I have suggested above, the enhancement of the state's internal extraction to maintain the war effort results in the reshuffling of domestic resources, from which there are new gainers and losers; and (2) the state's preoccupation with collective existence works to cement its image as an essentially rational and universalistic entity. A universalistic military, with professional rather than affiliational recruitment, is instrumental in bolstering this image. Also instrumental is the augmentation of state's relative autonomy over internal agents through the possession of resources aimed at war preparation. This makes the state (as long as it retains a high degree of cohesiveness) less constrained by those agents' preferences, as state-centered theories have established (see, for example, Ellis, 1992; Krasner, 1978, 10; Nordlinger, 1981; Poggi, 1978; Skocpol, 1985; Trimberger, 1977).

As neo-Marxist scholars argue (albeit without dealing directly with the military domain of the state), the state's construction of social inequality (within previously established relations of social power between the state and dominant groups) becomes more legitimate when based on that universalization and rationalization. State universalism blurs the exploitation of peripheral groups by installing the interests of dominant groups as incarnations of the general interests of the seemingly unified political community (see, for example, Althusser, 1976; Ditomaso, 1978; Domhoff, 1986; Gold et al., 1975; Habermas, 1971, 81–122; Poulantzas, 1978; Therborn, 1976; Zeitlin, 1980, 22–28).[11] Hence, the existence of cultural-ideological barriers to political action demanding all-encompassing reallocation of the societal resources. Reproduction of inequalities is the result.

War preparation, it follows, creates social structures rather than being just an administrative process. Discourse, by which agents, in a mutual manner, passively acquire meaning from, and actively bring and constitute meaning to their action and modes of allocation and extraction of resources, are among the structures created by a state of war that affect social relations of power. Agents' collective identities, concepts, and interests are constructed or solidified at this stage.

Within this structure, state action constructs particularistic interests when agents consider *exchanging* their support for the state's bellicose policies, with the internal burden and the state's internal expansion that it entails, in return for a share in the possible profits of this process and the supply of protection. Groups and the state bureaucracy do not necessarily bargain over the terms of exchange. Overtly, albeit subtly, groups take advantage of their elevated role owing to war/war preparation while state agencies have less leverage to halt

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group demands. After all, "the voice of the people is heard loudest when governments require either their gold or their bodies in defense of the state" (Porter, 1994, 10).[12] Indirectly, however, agents' well-being is altered for better or for worse owing to state-designed structures. Internalizing those changes, agents adjust their interests accordingly, as we have already noted.

Moving one step further, to the extent that agents (including the military establishment and its constitutive social groups) acquire benefits, they gradually shift from being merely mobilized for shouldering state policies to possessing interests in retaining, even furthering, those policy outcomes. A reversal of policy in the external arena that is not backed by internal change or compelled by external change is then hardly able to be implemented. Those reversals actually entail structural change, rather than just a change at the level of strategic doctrine. The reversal comes to be at odds with the parties' mutual commitments.[13] That is the meaning of interests as durably hardening state action, reducing the scope of possibilities the international system permits, beyond just energizing episodic, short-term action. All in all, the main movement—a two-way one from external action to realization of interests via mobilization with implications for state's internal expansion—is set in motion.

But agents have an "exit" option, too. Notwithstanding the expected gains from external moves, agents, driven by short-term calculations, might hinder the state's attempts to mobilize their support or resources for such moves, especially costly bellicose moves. Short-term sacrifice is not necessarily mitigated by long-term considerations—hence, the creation of unbalanced exchange. Unsatisfied agents would then be more prone to recalculate gains and risks of alternative routes of external action, deem their previous commitments as an error, and reconstruct their interests accordingly. Drawing from Hirschman (1970, 106–119), the absolute "exit" option might be emigration. Still, by legally voicing their dissatisfaction with the gains from war, agents might cause, even without resorting to forms of massive disobedience, the breakdown of structures maintaining the state of war, that is, delegitimization of war preparation. This is a moderate version of exit by means of breaking the "rules of the game."

Subordination of short-term interests to long-term goals is precisely what social institutions, first and foremost the state, customarily do. In line with our general understanding of interests, we maintain that the state, through its dynamic, long-term accumulation of resources, not only realizes or constructs group interests, but also *reconstructs* interests. States do this by creating alternative sources of satisfaction for agents when the original ones dry up, thus inducing agents to change their exit-prone conduct for another set of interests. If the state ultimately fails, an agent's exit from the state-constructed structural relations of exchange is set in motion, bringing about a reverse course in the external arena. By making war preparation less legitimate, the decline of relative power in IR terms is the

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likely result. This is a *negative* movement in figure 1.2, from the failure to realize interests to the state's diminishment in its external domain, via the failure of mobilization, with implications for internal state power. Unavoidably, this process entails the deuniversalization of previously deemed national interests or the devaluation of assets for which the state competes.[14]

We see that agents may read and interpret external events differently based on their position relative to the expected outcomes of those events. Domestic interests actually filter information from the international system into societies. Information ranges from assets appearing as external, actual gains to losses inflicted on the society by another state, whether by warfare or economic means. Converting information to political action, domestic agents transmit, indirectly in general, the extent of their willingness to carry out foreign-military policies. Traditional distinctions between hawks and doves, expansionists and nonexpansionists, or isolationists and internationalists should be seen within this context; they are socially constructed.[15]

Clearly put, the external arena matters only by virtue of the manner in which internal agents filter this arena's "objective impacts" via their interests and take advantage of the setting (material or discursive) that it creates. It is the state that selects between conflicting signals, functioning as a mediator between global trends externally and social group preferences internally.[16] Seeing interests as both engines and filters, through which domestic forces drive, energize, or harden foreign-military policies or reverse them by impeding their implementation, partly fills gaps created by IR students.

In turn, internal agents reciprocally affect the realities of the international system via the state. In this regard, constructivists give a plausible explanation of the nature of the dynamic construction of global structures. They claim that states are socialized through interstate interactions by responding to the actions of other states (see Wendt, 1992, 1994). And cumulatively, as other scholars maintain, internal changes within individual states impact on the distribution of power in the international system, even changing the structure of power (Cox, 1981; Gaddis, 1992/93, 34). So, states possess the capacity to utilize external action to reconstruct interests internally as much as states take part in molding their surrounding international structure by utilizing their domestically accumulated material power.

In sum, processes taking place in Domains II and III cyclically affect Domain I. Given the preexisting limits set by the international system, a competition-oriented posture becomes a possible, even preferred mode of action to the extent that groups gain from this type of state action. At the minimum, groups that benefitted from the outcomes of bellicosity accept moves initiated by competition-geared, hawkish state agencies; at a higher rate of involvement they directly drive/impede moves or passively/actively hinder reversal and thus harden polices. Escalation and a slide toward war become potential out-

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comes within the pattern of security dilemmas. Domain I embraces the direct causal force behind foreign-military polices; Domains II and III make those policies possible and indirectly fuel them. Domestic interests in conjunction with international constraints generate the contingencies of particular outcomes; they are determinants but not deterministic (see Isaac, 1987a, 49–50, on causal mechanisms).[17] The two main motions in figure 1.2, the positive and negative, are at the heart of this book.

It is with this conceptualization as the foundation that I use the term "state." Although it refers to the state's institutional system (including the military)—acting both internally and externally—it does so in linkage with the structural arrangements that are affected by and affect the direction of its activity. I address a problematic arising from this conceptualization pertinent to the borders between the state and other agencies in chapter 2.

Overall, dialogue between the different schools, mediated by the concept of interests, may convert black boxes into factors. So, the present study proposes to draw on several schools of thought, particularly those embraced by IR and critical statist theories, rather than positing a distinct alternative. By integrating several schools of thought, I hope to gain in scope more than I might lose in accuracy.

A focus on Israel's conduct in the conflict with bordering Arab countries presents a typical case in which the regional and international arenas have permitted a state to select from among several alternatives. Domestic considerations played their part in inducing the state to act within the boundaries of the external arena. We now proceed with analytical gaps in the study of the case of Israel.

THE EXOGENOUS CONFLICT

At first glance, Israel is a classic case of a state guided by principles of self-help. A prolonged Jewish-Palestinian intercommunal conflict in Palestine under the British Mandate and the 1948 War against the neighboring Arab countries subsequent to the state's formal establishment set the direction: Israel's interest was defined in military terms. It was geared toward expanding security margins beyond ensuring the sheer survival of the state against the perceived existential threat posed by fundamentally hostile and unreliable Arab countries. With this vision of threat, self-help left no space for flexibility toward bordering states. Retaining military superiority over the Arab states, sustaining high capabilities for deterrence, and conducting retaliatory behavior underlay Israel's doctrine. This was the Israeli version of "relative power" within the evolving security competition.

From these principles, Israel derived its strategies. A defensive posture prevailed during the state's first years, guided by Israel's lack of resources in the

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face of similarly deficient Arab armies. Israel insisted on basing its security on territorial holdings, especially those acquired during the 1948 War, rather than making concessions for attaining peace with the Arab states. An aggravated threat, compounded by the emergence of militant regimes in some Arab states, led Israel to a massive military buildup conducted under French auspices, including the acquisition of nuclear armaments to establish opaque deterrence. In doing so, Israel extended the security margins through an offensive doctrine. Israel initiated the Suez War (1956) and the Six-Day War (1967), signaling the crescendo of its offensive policies. After 1967, with control over huge conquered territories and a regional monopoly on nuclear capabilities, Israel could retake a defensive posture. Ensuring "defensible borders" was entwined with Israel's insistence that any future peace agreement include Israeli control over part of the territory conquered during the Six-Day War.

Nevertheless, a number of events induced a reorientation of Israel's strategic doctrine, central to which was a change in the distribution of material capabilities at the regional level. Diminishment of the threat posed to Israel by the bordering Arab states, which ensued after the fall of the Soviet Union (the Arabs' chief ally) and Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991, signified an opportunity to settle conflicts from an advantageous position. At the same time, new limitations were imposed on Israel's capacity to exploit its military capabilities. Among these limitations were the proliferation of nuclear weapons among radical states in the region; the costs and losses that Israel absorbed due to wars, beginning with the October War (1973); and the switch in the posture of the United States—on which the Israeli military depended—from permitting Israel's bellicosity to checking Israel's activities as a means of terminating regional conflicts. This mélange of opportunities and limitations prompted Israel to gradually prioritize strategies of de-escalation of the conflict with the relatively moderate bordering countries as a means of reducing the conflict's costs and containing both the radical Islamic movement and the spread of nuclear weapons in the region (see Inbar and Sandler, 1995; see also Peres, 1993, 1–32). The first signs of the overall change accounted for Israel's concessions producing the Israel–Egypt peace accord (1979). Later, a more intensive appearance of the phenomena accounted for the Israel–PLO interim agreements (1993–95) and (at the time of writing) a tacit approval to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria (on Israel's doctrine from the IR perspective see Aronson, 1992; Evron, 1987; Handel, 1973, 1994; Horowitz, 1985, 1987; Levite, 1988; Safran, 1978; Shimshoni, 1988; Yaniv, 1994).

Elegant arguments of this kind are hardly disputable. Nevertheless, one could argue that Israeli IR scholars reflect the neorealist strand of thinking and replicate some of the same flaws—thinking that regional anarchy causally generates an objectively defined security interest constituted on self-help principles on which Israel's military doctrine was built. The external system does not

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appear to the state as anything more than "conditions of possibility for state action" (Wendt, 1987, 342); Israel, IR scholars stipulate, reacts to an external reality that constrains its behavior. Thus, the very sources of security competition and Israel's part in crafting it remain unexamined.

Most conspicuous is how scholars have overlooked the crossroads at which Arab leaders displayed pragmatism, when they did not force the reality of conflict on Israel, opening, even if only a little, the vista of alternative paths. In the early 1950s, Israel did not want to grant territorial and demographic concessions in return for peace before Arab hostility hardened (see Morris, 1993; Pappe, 1992; Rabinovich, 1991).[18] In the post-1967 period, Israel again impeded the possibility for withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in the Six-Day War in return for peace treaties, or for interim agreements, at least with Egypt, that might had been attainable and could have prevented the October War (see, Gazit, 1984; Rabin, 1979, 338–360; Shlaim, 1994, 41–47; Touval, 1980, 71–77; Yaacobi, 1989). The situation was aggravated by the Israel-initiated Lebanon War in 1982 against both the PLO and Syria, perceived as an unnecessary "war by choice" by the Israeli Center-Left (see Horowitz, 1983; Yariv, 1985). Likewise, massive colonization of the occupied territories and the use of an "iron fist" against local Palestinians were instrumental in keeping the conflict alive up to the time of the Intifada—the Palestinians' violent resistance against Israel's rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1987–93).

Alternatively, drawing from *contingent realism*—a version of neorealism more optimistic about the likelihood of establishing interstate cooperation (Glaser, 1994/95)—Israel could employ either strategies of de-escalation/cooperation or escalation/competition.[19] Moderate strategies could have tested the Arabs' willingness for peace, communicating nonoffensive signals as a means of lessening the other side's fears, and establishing cooperative institutions to reduce the uncertainty innate in regional politics. The adoption of moderate strategies might have helped Israel accommodate its security interest by political means and avoid enduring losses, an economic burden, and a risky arms race.

Nevertheless, scholars have not weighed the costs and risks of an arms race relative to those entailed in de-escalation against the fact that Israel actually failed in coping with the security dilemma by aggravating the threat to its security. This failure went from a conventional, regional threat in the early 1950s to a global, conventional threat and a restricted nuclear one from the mid-1950s with the incorporation of the Israeli-Arab conflict into the Cold War. The latter grew into a regional, poorly restricted proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East that became apparent subsequent to the Gulf War. Risks of competition rather than only risks of cooperation might have concerned Israel. Its "selection of concerns" merits an explanation. Still, all of this is not to historically judge whether Israel really could have advanced the

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peace process in these periods—we cannot evaluate the Arab side's possible reaction; it is only to address Israel's failure to fully exhaust the potential for furthering the process. Hereinafter, setting Israel's rigidity against Arab pragmatism serves this line of analysis rather than implying historical judgment.

This being the case, we are left in the dark regarding the main question: why did Israel strategically prioritize force-oriented policy over more pacifist strategies, not only how did Israel manage its everyday policies in the face of external threats (on which IR accounts are considerably plausible)?

Adhering to the IR analytical avenue, Israel's shift toward peace is not fully understandable, either. At last, presented with opportunities for peace and the limitations and threats of the status quo, Israel again faced a crossroads from the late 1970s on. Opportunities for peace, however, could also have been read as opportunities to maintain the status quo. As a security-seeking state, Israel could have remained jealous of its militarily defined security interest when the regional system seemed to have changed significantly and then could have displayed a tough position toward the Arabs insofar as they were viewed as accepting Israel's unquestionable military superiority. This particularly holds true when taken against Israelis' increasing awareness of the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The United States, after competition with the Soviet Union ended, imposed pressures to halt offensive moves. But Israel's recognition of the PLO (1993) and the apparent Israeli endorsement of a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights went beyond America's direct pressures. In short, the international system did not compel Israel to change its policies. Indeed, the force-oriented logic was proposed by the Israeli right wing (see Netanyahu, 1995) but was practically rejected by Israel's government.

To sum up, both strategies at each historical milestone—cooperation-prone in the 1950s–80s and competition-prone in the 1980s–90s—were equally rational. The regional arena offered an array of options, each of which had costs and benefits. So, the regional system does not provide a sole determinant for Israel's choice other than by addressing the alternative calculations and the values on which each possible route was grounded. In this regard, neorealism in general and neorealist explanations for Israel's shift in particular do not furnish us with plausible explanations. (I will introduce more IR explanations along with the empirical discussion. My purpose here is just to whet the reader's appetite for further examination.)

Not only have IR scholars neglected the question of "why," but also the intersecting question of "how." This refers to the state's *execution* of its defined security interests, the manner in which the state mobilizes the internal legitimacy and resources on which its military power is built. In this process are grounded Israel's assessment and reassessment of its own relative power, which might have inclined it to overlook past options for de-escalation and reverse its

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