

CHAPTER 1

TRANSLATION AS SOCIAL ACTION: THE EARLY AMERICAN SIMMEL TRANSLATIONS

The history of sociology is in need of a new historical narrative, a story that reflects and reinforces the contemporary transition in sociological thought from a celebration of scientific autonomy to a demonstration of social relevance. Whether they are accomplished through critical analysis of sociological discourse (Stehr 1986), historical analysis of sociology's changing publics (Buxton and Turner 1992), or pragmatic proposals for change (Seidman 1992), sociology's aspirations to professional and intellectual self-sufficiency have been pronounced a failure. Not only has the discipline failed to achieve scientific status, it has, with few exceptions, alienated itself from key audiences by withdrawing from participation in civic discourse. The new narrative that I envision responds to recent calls to renew the social contract of sociology with its broader publics (Halliday and Janowitz 1992). It will take the form of studies which feature the historical and contemporary contributions of sociology to moral-political issues. These studies will tell a story not of the advance of sociology but of the struggle to define America.

This chapter reexamines the American Simmel reception in light of the conception of sociology as a conversation on America rather than a conversation sociologists have with themselves.¹ It views sociologists as creative figures, like poets and novelists, who help to shape America's future by molding how we think about it. While sociologists typically exercise little formal power in society, they can wield considerable influence informally through their writings as well as through their classroom lectures, curriculum decisions, and organizational activities. Through their roles as scholars and citizens, sociologists participate in defining the direction of

this country to successive generations of Americans.

Mannheim (1982) drew attention to this "supra-theoretical capacity" of thought to both apprehend and transform social reality when he argued that "all sociological thought is originally embedded in a drive for change" (Mannheim 1982: 199). What Marx in the *Theses on Feuerbach* considered a political desideratum, Mannheim conceived as a premise of sociological analysis. Research that is guided by this assumption, Mannheim proposed, must examine both the contextual background and transformative purposes of social thought. This approach directs analysis away from the systematics of thought, focusing on thinkers' conceptual contributions to cumulative theory, and toward the history of theory-in-use, analyzing the role of ideas in local experiential contexts (cf. Merton 1967).

When examined in this light, the American Simmel reception gains a new significance. Not only a contribution to the history of sociology, the American Simmel reception can be read for its connections to the history of America. More specifically, that reception embodies efforts to transform American society, to shape its future, to influence the American prospect. It is these efforts, and the role of Simmel's thought in them, that constitute the central subject matter of my study. The writings and translations of Simmel by Albion W. Small, Robert E. Park, and Everett C. Hughes provide an instructive example of what is at stake in such an analysis. While an understanding of Simmel's reception by these three Chicago sociologists cannot be reduced to an analysis of their practical interests and strategic aims, such an analysis adds a new dimension to the story of Simmel in America.

THE RIOT OF IMAGINATION AND THE ORDER OF INVESTIGATION

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of great intellectual insecurity. As urbanization, industrialization, and immigration changed the pace and shape of American life, disparate voices of contending classes struggled for public attention and political influence. Friends of Humanity and Friends of Capital offered differing views on the central issues of the day: the former demanding change, the latter wanting society left alone. If both sought to influence public sympathies and sensibilities, neither attained unrivaled legitimacy.

This ideological confusion, coupled with an inchoate and anachronistic system of graduate education in the United States

(Storr 1953), led unprecedented numbers of young intellectuals to travel abroad in order to attain some mental and moral purchase on problems at home. They traveled mostly to Germany, and in the 1870s–1880s to the universities of Berlin and Leipzig, the two centers of German scholarship at the time (Herbst 1965: 16–18). Leipzig, the home of Wundt's famed psychology laboratory, had long been a popular destination of Americans studying abroad. And Berlin, the capital of the new German Empire, was home base for a galaxy of leading German academics, including Gierke, Ranke, Mommsen, Dilthey, Helmholtz, Schmoller, and Paulsen. Albion Woodbury Small was a member of the generation of American intellectuals who came to Germany in the 1870s and 1880s. He studied at Berlin in 1879–1880 and at Leipzig and the British Museum a year later. While Small was at Berlin studying with Gustav Schmoller (Herbst 1965), the German political economist, Georg Simmel was there studying philosophy. Dr. Small and Dr. Simmel would later meet, perhaps through Schmoller, a mutual friend. Their intellectual relationship contributes a central chapter to the American Simmel reception.

Small returned to America with both an admiration for German *Wissenschaft*, the scholarly study of specialized subjects, and an esteem for German scholars as framers of social policy. German scholars were organized and active in formulating national policy. Small was especially impressed with the scholars associated with the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*—who included his professor Gustav Schmoller—men who battled advocates of laissez-faire and socialism alike (Bernert 1982). In contrast, Small's America was morally and politically rent and lacked a group with cultural authority capable of mending the social fabric. Following the German model, Small sought to carve out a region of cultural authority and consensus within the chaotic world of urban America. His vision was expressed in the conclusion to the volume on *General Sociology*: if society is to be properly guided, "there must be credible sociologists in order that there may be farseeing economists and statesmen and moralists" (Small 1905a: 729).

Small made modest attempts to institutionalize his vision, first as professor (1881–1889), then as President (1889–1892) of Colby College in his home state of Maine. When in 1892 he was called by William Rainey Harper to head the first Department of Sociology, however, his vision was given a vital foundation. The place would be the University of Chicago; the discipline would be sociology; the means would be the graduate program, the scientific journal, and the professional society.

In these efforts, Small was certainly guided by his religious roots in the social gospel (Greek 1992; Ahlstrom 1975: 264–65). Small's Baptist education and faith, as Dibble (1975: 147) has shown, are closely interwoven with his politics and sociology. His belief in the brotherhood of man and the benefits of a Christian cooperative commonwealth formed the basis of his relentless opposition to the pervasive dogma of *laissez-faire*. And a commitment to religious gradualism may have been behind his opposition to the many late nineteenth-century socialist programs, with their apocalyptic and millennialist tone. But Small was guided as well by what Hollinger (1991) has called the "intellectual gospel." With this term Hollinger refers to the convictions, practices, and discourse of those intellectuals of the late nineteenth century who, while remaining committed to Christianity, felt enthusiasm for the ethic of science. The intellectual gospel is "the belief that conduct in accord with the ethic of science could be religiously fulfilling, a form of 'justification'" (Hollinger 1991: 123). While the social gospel motivated social reform, sanctifying work in settlement houses or the Progressive political movement, the intellectual gospel stimulated the academic reform that resulted in the rise of the large research university, sanctifying work in the lab or archive (Hollinger 1991: 134). Supplementing and in some cases replacing prayer with knowledge and worship with research, these intellectuals, Louis Agassiz, T. H. Huxley, and Woodrow Wilson among them, chose science as a religious calling.

Hollinger (1991: 126) characterizes Johns Hopkins University, the model for American research universities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the institution where in 1889 Small took his Ph.D., as "the most ideologically intense bastion of the intellectual gospel in the United States." Daniel Coit Gilman, president of Johns Hopkins, was an admirer of the German system of education in general, and of the University of Berlin in particular, and incorporated into his innovative educational reforms a number of German practices and ideals: the Ph.D. degree, the seminar, the principles of *lehrfreiheit* and *lernfreiheit*, and the scientific journal (Hawkins 1960: 16; Franklin 1910: 227–28). Small took these elements of the "religion of research" (Herbst 1965, p. 31) with him and proselytized for the secularized faith as chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. There he formulated the first commandment of graduate schools in the religious idiom: "Remember the research ideal, to keep it holy" (Small, 1905b: 87).

The social gospel and the intellectual gospel together guided Small's interest in and reception of the works of Georg Simmel. If the social gospel defined Small's ends, the creation of a Christian

cooperative commonwealth, it also defined his adversaries, proponents of the anti-Christian laissez-faire doctrine. The intellectual gospel provided the means for achieving those ends, professional training in social research.

These considerations add a new dimension to our understanding of the intellectual kinship between Small and Simmel. As others have shown (Levine, Carter, and Gorman 1976: 815–17), both men were attempting to define sociology as an independent discipline. But if for Simmel the “problem of sociology” was primarily a theoretical and philosophical question, for Small it was also a question of profound practical significance. It would grant to sociologists alone the cultural authority then distributed among the many contenders for social influence. Pastors, politicians, and the public would then be obliged to turn to sociology for answers to contemporary problems. By the turn of the century, Small was convinced that sociology had approached such a level of indispensability, calling “unpardonable” the efforts of “any man to offer himself as guide in our maze of human difficulty, unless he has got such help from available sociology that he can bring to bear upon the problems he confronts” (Small 1899: 391).

Small’s efforts to transform sociology into a cognitively privileged discourse were institutionalized in the *American Journal of Sociology* (*AJS*), edited by Small from its inception in 1895 to his death in 1926. The first issue of the journal grandly announced that the “era of sociology” had begun (Small 1895a). Sociology was portrayed as a response to the times: to the extensive economic interdependence, the acute bewilderment with one’s fellow citizens, and the plethora of programs for social change. The new discipline was needed to counteract attempts of the educated and uneducated alike to turn their “meager knowledge into social doctrine and policy” (p. 3). In place of these popular philosophies produced by “the riot of imagination,” professional sociologists would substitute “the order of investigation” (p. 7). *AJS* would provide a voice for academic sociological doctrines: professional yet accessible, practical yet visionary. It would provide “a factor of restraint upon premature sociological opinion, a means of promoting the development of a just and adequate social philosophy, and an element of strength and support in every wise endeavor to insure the good of men” (p. 15).

SIMMEL BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM

The *AJS* was not the first American scholarly journal to introduce Simmel to an American audience. In fact, it was a relative late-

comer to this task. The Cornell University philosophy journal, *The Philosophical Review*, published extensive and favorable reviews of Simmel's books beginning with its first volume in 1892. In addition, the *International Journal of Ethics* in 1893, and *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* in 1895, both published translations of Simmel's works prior to the first *AJS* translation in 1896. As Frisby (1992: 156) notes, "This reception was due not merely to individual initiatives but also to the wave of American students studying in German universities." The reviews in *The Philosophical Review*, for example, were written by American philosophers who had studied at Berlin: Frank Thilly—whose Berlin associates included Edward Alsworth Ross (Ross, 1936: 37)—and Walter G. Everett and Charles M. Bakewell, both of whom most likely had heard Simmel's lectures. Simmel's involvement with the *Annals* was also furthered by an American abroad, Samuel McCune Lindsay, who included Berlin in his grand tour of European universities in 1891–1894. Lindsay edited the "Sociological Notes" of the early issues of the *Annals*, with the cooperation of Simmel (see *Annals*, Vol. 6: xi, 562), among others, and in 1900–1902 was president of the Academy.²

The early numbers of the *American Journal of Sociology* regularly cited the American and European publications of Simmel's works before they were translated in the *Journal* (e.g., Small 1895b; Vincent 1896; Tufts 1896). And the *International Monthly*, later renamed the *International Quarterly*, a New York journal with Simmel and Giddings of Columbia University on the advisory board, published two translations of Simmel's works: "Tendencies in German Life and Thought Since 1870" (1902) and "Fashion" (1904). The *AJS* was, however, the first American professional journal to systematically translate the German sociologist's works, publishing nine papers by Simmel under Small's editorship³ (see Table 1).

These translations were the result of a deliberate plan on the part of Small and his colleagues to promote Simmel's work and the intellectual issues he pursued. As Small (1925: 84) commented retrospectively: "We fondly hoped that not only sociologists but social scientists in general in all English-speaking countries would respond [to the translations], if not to the extent of adopting Simmel's theories, at least to the extent of general admission that science without a recognized methodology is unthinkable." Focusing on Simmel and on the "fundamental problems of methodology"—that is, the philosophical and conceptual foundations of sociology—provided for more than just the advance of theoretical issues in sociology. It supported Small's efforts to advance the American prospect by combating Her-

TABLE 1 Simmel in the *AJS*: The First 15 Years

<i>Volume and Year</i>	<i>Title</i>
Vol. 2 1896-1897	"Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology"
Vol. 3-4 1897-1898	"The Persistence of Social Groups"
Vol. 5 1898-1899	"A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value"
Vol. 8 1902-1903	"The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group"
Vol. 9 1903-1904	"The Sociology of Conflict"
Vol. 11 1905	"A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion"
Vol. 11 1906	"The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies"
Vol. 15 1909	"The Problem of Sociology"
Vol. 16 1910	"How Is Society Possible?"

bert Spencer, the arch-intellectual champion of *laissez faire*.

As Hofstadter (1955) has shown, the "vogue of Spencer" was protracted, extensive, and insidious. Spencer's extension of Darwin's understanding of natural selection to the social order supported political ultraconservatism, ethical fatalism, and practical do-nothingism. It also provided the Friends of Capital with scientific justification for their campaign of ruthless acquisition and social indifference. By portraying the "survival of the fittest" as a natural law, Spencerian doctrine supported the repudiation all state involvement in the social order, including the rejection of humane efforts to attenuate the ravages of industrial growth. The politics of indifference continued unabated, if not unchallenged, through the 1890s. All of this was anathema for Small, who viewed "'natural selection' . . . today [as] a problem not a solution" (Small 1896a: 310). Small rejected the views of those he called "dogmatists of societal fatalism" (Small 1916: 199), those who argued that "whatever is in society is right, or if not right at least unavoidable" (Small 1896c: 581). The early issues of the *AJS* set out to discredit this Spencerian view, and Simmel's assistance was enlisted in this effort.

According to a leading philosophy of science of the late nineteenth century (Mill 1872), science proceeded by induction, the generalization from meticulously gathered evidence, rather than through deduction, the logical reasoning from first principles. This privileging of induction over deduction accompanied a repudiation of metaphysics, dogma, *obiter dicta*—all associated with the discredited theology of the past. It also legitimated two forms of critique: charges of

provincialism and prematurity. Charges of provincialism were leveled against writers who generalize from a narrow base of knowledge to all of society. Such authors, specialists in biology or economics, for example, fashion grand and universal claims from restricted evidence. Provincialism of this sort flourished in England following the publication of Darwin's *Origins*, as Henry Adams noted in his *Education* (Adams 1961 [1918]: 224). The related charge of prematurity applied to those who lack the scientific humility to admit, with Small (1898: 393), "that we have as yet relatively little sociological knowledge which deserves to be dignified as 'science.'" According to Small, proper science must reject the hasty quest for final results and accept "the importance of correct beginnings" (Small 1896b: 315):

Every person with an *a priori* theory or programme about society; every person who wants to divide up the facts of human experience into convenient little blocks of toy knowledge with which he may play science; every person who wants to pretend that he understands the laws of influence in society, resents the connotations of our method. It means that we know comparatively little about society yet, and that it will take a long, hard, combined labor, by many searchers and organizers working within sight of each other, to get the social facts into such shape that they will tell us much general truth. (Small 1898: 393)

In "The Methodology of the Social Problem," Small (1898) aimed both barrels at Spencer's sociology: it was both premature and partial. Spencer purported to discover social laws before all the facts were in, and before they were organized and properly interpreted. Consider, for example, Spencer's attempt to work out a general understanding of the general forms of relationships between persons. Small (1898: 390) considered this enterprise one of the strongest features of Spencer's sociology, but it was undertaken without benefit of Simmel's related and pathbreaking efforts to identify and analyze the most important 'social forms,' efforts which were first being published in Small's *Journal*. Any generalizations based on Spencer's incomplete data were, therefore, hasty and inadequate. While Small does not say this, such inadequate generalizations include those which supported *laissez-faire*.⁴

There are, of course, many motives for Small's championing of Simmel's works, including altruistic service to the intellectual community. But it seems to me that one important element in Sim-

mel's appeal was his strategic usefulness to Small's campaign against Spencer. It should be noted that Small did not translate or promote Simmel's early sociological writings, such as *On Social Differentiation* (1890), which take up Spencerian perspectives on evolutionism and the principle of differentiation. Indeed, Simmel himself turned away from his Spencerian heritage in his later writings. Rather, Small's translations were mostly of Simmel's exercises in formal sociology, and it was these essays that would be adapted by Small for polemical purposes. These writings not only provided a reminder of what must still be accomplished in the field of sociology—the production of “an adequate schedule of the ‘forms’ of social life” (Small 1898, p. 391); they also provided ammunition for a critique of those efforts, like Spencer's, to propose laws based on meager foundations. According to Small, premature generalizations and provincial inductions, such as Spencer's, may attain greater value only when viewed in light of Simmel's pioneering work in formal sociology. To quote Small (1898: 391): Simmel's studies on social forms “may give value to Spencer's material . . . which it does not at present possess.”

If Simmel's writings served as ammunition for the *Journal's* criticism of conservatism, they also aided its criticism of radicalism. This side of the Simmel reception can be found in Simmel's formal introduction to the *Journal's* readers in Volume 2: a translation of “Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology” and an extensive and favorable treatment of his ideas in “The Present Status of Sociology in Germany,” an essay by one of Simmel's students, Osias Thon (1897) of Berlin. The latter essay discusses the works of Simmel, Toennies, Marx, Stammler, Schmoller, and Schaeffle, among others; but Simmel is very much the hero of the piece and Marx very much the villain.

Thon introduces the problem of the scientific legitimacy of sociology, and credits Simmel with defining sociology as an independent science, thereby removing it from confusion with social philosophy, as in Toennies, or with metaphysics, as in Comte and Spencer. At the same time, Thon, like Small (1909), takes issue with Simmel for limiting the domain of sociology to the study of the forms of association alone, as opposed to their motivational contents. In Thon's view, it is neither desirable nor feasible to “treat forms of association in complete abstraction from their content” (Thon 1897: 571). “As a matter of fact,” he continues, “Simmel himself, in his own sociological investigations, by no means conceives the problem in a purely formal way. On the contrary his strength is in profound and acute psychological interpretations” (Thon 1897: 571). This characterization of Simmel as social psychologist of social

life is repeated later: "Simmel's method of sociological analysis is distinguished by profound psychological analysis and by historical illumination of problems, though relatively less by the latter than by the former" (Thon 1897: 736). Sociology is properly defined, then, as "the science of the forms and the psychical motivation of human association" (Thon 1897: 570).

In addition to giving sociology its *raison d'être*, Simmel is credited with providing powerful ammunition against Marx and historical materialism. This ammunition comes, first, from Simmel's investigations into the philosophy of history. Following Kant's analysis of the natural sciences, Simmel analyzed the intellectual presuppositions of the historical sciences. How is historical understanding possible? How is it possible to mediate the temporal distance between past and present? In answering these questions, Thon charges, "historical materialism is of no assistance," because the materialist conception of consciousness is "soulless" (Thon 1897: 579), that is, it portrays consciousness as a historical and existential variable rather than a constant, and therefore provides no basis for comprehending mentalities of the past. "So long as the search is for an explanation of historical occurrences," Thon maintained, "it will be essential for the historian to transport himself, so to speak, into the psychical conditions of the persons or groups whom he depicts. We may add that historical materialism not only does not remove this difficulty in cognitive theory, but rather increases and complicates it." In contrast, Simmel's analysis of the psychological preconditions of historical understanding solves the problem. For, according to Thon, his analysis presumes a unity of consciousness between historians and their subjects, thereby permitting "the reproduction in the mind of the investigator of the psychical conditions fundamental to the historical occurrences" (Thon 1897: 579).

In addition to contributing a more satisfactory philosophy of historical understanding than is offered by historical materialism, Simmel provided a critique of the ethical superiority of socialism. The argument for the ethical superiority of socialism derives, in part, from its purported universality: its claim to advance the interests of humanity, as opposed to the interests of one class alone. But Simmel directly contests this claim. Thon points out that Simmel, in his *Soziologie*, declared "in opposition to all previous explanations, that the psychological ground of all struggles for equality, *the socialistic* included, is endeavor after higher status, not for actual equality" (Thon 1897: 735; emphasis added). Thus Simmel demonstrated, with his "profound psychological analysis," that the motives

for movements of equality "contain a vigorous individualizing element" (Thon 1897: 735, 736).

This argument is repeated and extended in Small's translation of Simmel's "Superiority and Subordination" (Simmel 1896), an essay that substitutes for the Marxian interest in domination the Simmelian principle of reciprocity. In this essay, Simmel directly contests the views of socialism and anarchism, both of which emphasize the possibility and desirability of virtually complete equality. Simmel's review of the historical record reveals case after case of movements aiming for equality resulting instead in new arrangements of superiority and subordination. In addition, Simmel takes a visionary stance: "For as long in the future as prevision can reach," he declared, "we may contest the possibility of a social constitution without superiority and inferiority" (Simmel 1896: 400). While Simmel believed that natural human differences would continue to "press for expression in external graduations of rank," he did foresee promising cultural tendencies. Stated in the form of a proposition: sorrow, humiliation, and oppression, feelings which follow from subordination to others, are reduced in direct proportion to the advance of two conditions: first, the reduction in investments of personality in work, and, second, the increase of opportunities for shared leadership (Simmel 1896: 400-3).⁵ Not revolution, then, but evolution, the slow working out of progressive cultural tendencies, would bring about the changes desired by the radicals. Thus did Simmel's first appearance in the *AJS* help to further the *Journal's* stated mission, namely, "to work against the growing popular impression that short cuts may be found to universal prosperity, and to discountenance utopian social programmes."⁶

SIMMELIAN INTERACTIONISM CONTRA BIOLOGICAL RACISM

Near the end of his life, Small expressed disappointment with the results of his efforts to promote Simmel's writings and the issues they raised. Writing in the context of a review of Nicholas Spykman's (1966 [1925]) independent efforts to provide a hearing for Simmel's works, Small declared defeat. In contrast to his high aspirations for a wide acquaintance with Simmel's writings, Small estimated that "the Americans who have given indubitable evidence of having considered Simmel thoroughly might be counted on the fingers of one hand" (Small 1966 [1925]: 84). The situation was worse in England, specifically at the London School of Economics (LSE), he believed; there he found the pages of his *Journal*, including those containing his transla-

tions of Simmel's writings, unread and even uncut.

While Simmel's writings found a wide readership on the continent—especially in Germany, of course, but also in France, Italy, and Russia (Gassen 1959: 357-75)—Small's disillusionment was well founded. American and British interest in Simmel's writings during the early decades of this century was limited, going well beyond skimpy journal citations or uncut pages at LSE.⁷ British scholars, especially, displayed little interest in Simmel. This disinterest was due in part to cultural snobbery, in part to Anglo-American distaste for abstract reasoning, and in part to growing anti-German sentiment before and after World War I (Kennedy 1980).⁸ Instructive in this regard is the British publication of an abridged translation of "Sociology and the Social Sciences," an essay by Emile Durkheim and Paul Fauconnet (1904). It actually omits that section of the original essay containing a discussion of Simmel's works. But if many British and American scholars were chauvinistic in their attitude toward Simmel, he too displayed his European chauvinism toward them. This point is evidenced by Simmel's refusal to attend the 1904 St. Louis Exposition. Small was a vice president, with Harvard's Hugo Münsterberg, of the Exposition's Congress of Arts and Sciences. Despite Small's efforts to secure Simmel's attendance, including a visit to Germany in the summer of 1903 (Small 1925: 87), he did not attend. Rather, Simmel derided the Exposition, calling it a "circus of celebrities" and said he would have nothing to gain from attending the conference, since he could always meet in Berlin with his noted colleagues and contemporaries.⁹

Despite these discouraging signs, Small maintained his faith in the message of Simmelian sociology and professed his hope that the Spykman book would do "for Simmel and for social science what [the *A/S*] was unable to do thirty years ago" (Small 1925: 84). But Small's hopes for a sustaining Simmelian tradition were placed on the wrong source. While translations are necessary to the process of passing on European sociological traditions, they are not sufficient. Unless intellectual leaders make the translations come alive by drawing attention to their relevance to contemporary problems, those books and articles will likely lie fallow. For this reason, the American Simmelian tradition was not greatly advanced by Spykman's book, as Small had expected, but by members of his own department: by Robert E. Park in the years immediately following Small's leadership of the department, and by Everett C. Hughes later.¹⁰

Small played no minor role in this transition. It was Small, not W. I. Thomas, who first invited Park to Chicago, after they met one

summer and spoke about Park's interests and German education. Small sensed a greater kinship with Park than Park did with Small, and the original offer was not accepted (Park n.d.: 2-3). But W. I. Thomas's subsequent and successful offer to Park after their meeting in 1912 surely required Small's sanction, as Hughes (1964: 18) would later intimate. After Park joined the faculty in 1914, he gathered about him most of the graduate students in the department with, again according to Hughes, "a strong supporting hand from Small" (Hughes 1953: 2). In addition, in one of his graduate seminars, Small translated with his students Park's Heidelberg doctoral thesis, "*Masse und Publicum*" (Hayner n.d.), and he had a hand in shaping the selections in Park and Burgess's text-reader, *Introduction to the Science of Society*. In particular, the curious absence of selections by Freud in the 1921 text, Raushenbush (1969: 2) reveals, was a result of Small's intervention. Small was in control, then, even as he transferred intellectual leadership of the department over to Park.

There was much in Park that Small would find congenial: his German Ph.D., his appreciation for German philosophy, his concern for society. But Park's acquaintance with Simmel and his knowledge of Simmel's writings must have been significant. Unlike Small, Park had studied with Simmel, his only formal instruction in sociology. In the winter semester of 1899-1900, in addition to courses with Paulsen and Frey, Park took Simmel's courses in ethics, sociology, and nineteenth-century philosophy. But this list of courses barely indicates the nature of what Hughes (1954b) called Park's "great indebtedness to Simmel." Others have begun to chart the extent of this debt. In addition to examining the Simmelian bearings of Park's dissertation (Levine 1972), researchers have examined Park's extension of Simmel's concepts, such as "social distance"; his appreciation of Simmel's essays, such as "The Stranger" (Levine 1985: 73-88); and the logical connections between Parkian and Simmelian social theory (Paharik 1983). But while these efforts examine theory in the service of sociology, they neglect to explore the role of theory in the service of society.

Consider the concept of interaction, a key term in Park's system and a nice rendering into English of Simmel's term "*Wechselwirkung*." Levine (1971: lii-liv) has done a service in identifying the theoretical and methodological implications of Park's extension of Simmel's term. But what were its social implications? What practical interest, what "drive for change," does the concept of interaction represent? A complete answer to this question would require a full-length study of Park's writings, beginning with the reformist impulses revealed in *Masse und Publicum* and ending with Park's

final courses at Fisk University (Raushenbush 1979). Such a study, which will not be attempted here, would necessarily stress the role of "interaction" in Park's intellectual response to the turn-of-the-century problem of race adjustment or assimilation—the "Negro Problem."

From his earliest days as a newspaper reporter, including his muckraking journalism on King Leopold's Congo atrocities (Lyman 1992), to his work with Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, Park endeavored to improve the situation of people of color. His efforts embraced Washington's gradualist accommodationism, if not his boundless optimism, and rejected the fatalistic racialism of the times. These components of Park's practical agenda shaped his politics, his publications and his courses, including his first course at Chicago on "The Negro in America." As Park's lecture notes on "Interaction" show, the Simmelian term had a special part to play in this agenda.

Park's notes tell a story that turns on the device of contrasting old and new. In the past, Park reveals, scholars used to believe that the differences between people were "due to inherited differences; they were *racial* . . . [which] is to say they were fixed and immutable." But, he continued, these scholars' beliefs were shattered when they found that when people were "introduced into new environments" they behaved differently. In contrast to this earlier view, Park contends, "now we say 1) that different people develop the same institutions under similar circumstances; 2) that racial differences are not as great or as important as we suppose; and 3) that similar institutions and similar personality traits develop under similar conditions." Granting that certain temperamental differences exist between individuals and races, Park concluded, "After that we shall explain everything as the effect of interaction." Among the most decisive structural conditions shaping interaction, Park notes, is the size of the group. Here he links Simmel's essay on the influence of numbers to his own essay on "The City" (Park 1915), an essay which explores the consequences of urban life for social interaction."

These notes add a new dimension to understanding the place of interaction in Park's system and his "great indebtedness" to Simmel. Like Small, who drew on Simmel to combat the outmoded and socially regressive doctrine of *laissez faire*, Park made Simmel central to his own practical interests and reform efforts. In a discussion of these efforts, Janowitz (1965: 733) noted: "Park, following on W. I. Thomas, was destroying biological racism and was searching for a new vocabulary of intergroup relations." Simmel's "interaction"

was a part of this new vocabulary, providing Park with a "counter-concept" (Mannheim 1936: 272) to the outmoded racialist doctrines of the past. By focusing on interaction, Park shifted social analysis from an emphasis on inherent and immutable individual characteristics to social conditions and mutable personalities. The conceptual turn was radical and nearly comprehensive. As Park noted, with few exceptions, such as the controversial notion of racial temperament, "everything" can be explained by interaction. Rejecting the fatalism of racialist doctrine, this framework held open the promise that, through interaction and communication between peoples, racial accord could be reached. Along with the selections in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, it also provided a scientific rationale for the accommodationist approach to blacks in the Progressive era.

Park and Burgess's *Introduction* (1st ed., 1921) was written in the aftermath of the 1919 summer race riots: in Washington, D.C., New York, Omaha, and Chicago, as well as throughout the South. In July of that year, a black swimmer crossed an invisible color line on one of Chicago's public beaches. He was killed by angry white men, and the subsequent three days of rioting left thirty-four dead, hundreds wounded, and several houses burned (Sandburg 1969 [1919]). Park (1923: 194) called the riot a "catastrophe" and "a sort of moral earthquake." If, according to one analyst, the riot expressed "a series of assaults upon the accommodative pattern by Negroes, indeed, a challenge to the very existence of that pattern" (Grimshaw 1959: 68), the *Introduction* provided a scientific defense of racial accommodation and an expression of hope in racial assimilation and accord. Extending Simmel's notion of interaction into "four great types"—competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation—Park and Burgess turned the manifestations of urban discord into natural processes, as natural as the animal and plant life with which they were compared, with an evolutionary and progressive trend. The "final perfect product" (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 736) of these four processes was assimilation, through which the bonds of a common cultural life would unite American citizens.

While Park held out the promise of assimilation for all, he was ambivalent about its prospects for blacks. As Lyman (1972) has shown, Park identified a number of troublesome obstacles—skin color, racial temperament, race prejudice, the absence of interracial intimacy—which, he believed, impeded the attainment of racial accord. Wherever he looked in contemporary America—in the North and the South, in urban and suburban regions—Park saw racial conflict and accommodation, not assimilation. Curiously, it was in the

past, during slavery, that Park found black and white unity: "By a curious paradox, slavery, and particularly household slavery, has probably been, aside from intermarriage, the most efficient device for promoting assimilation" (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 739). The intimacy of contact between slaveholder and slave, he believed, reduced racial prejudice and fostered racial accommodation, a way of life shattered by emancipation and the ensuing racial strife.

In his romanticized view of slavery, in his views on racial temperament, which he never abandoned (see the discussion in Lyman 1992: 106–12; 119–20), and in his positive attitude toward racial accommodation, Park shared much with the Southern exponents of "racial accommodationism," Edgar Gardner Murphy and Benjamin F. Riley (Fredrickson 1971). Murphy, an Episcopal minister turned social reformer, was a close associate and supporter of Booker T. Washington. And Riley, a Baptist minister and author of *The White Man's Burden*, wrote an early and sympathetic biography of the black leader. Park was surely familiar with the writings of these men, who were so close to the Tuskegee leader that they have been called "white Washingtonians" (Fredrickson 1971: 293). Along with Nathan S. Shaler, a Northern popularizer of racial accommodationism and contributor to Park and Burgess's *Introduction*, these men battled the ascendant Negrophobia of the Jim Crow South with positive views of black character and support for racial cooperation. By portraying a rosy picture of slavery and promising racial unity through black accommodation to white society, their works found a receptive audience among Northern Progressives. While most of their ideas are outmoded and inaccurate, they were "enlightened" views for the time: optimistic and soothing to the white liberal conscience.

What Park added to this strain of Progressive thought was scientific legitimacy. He borrowed the term "accommodation" from James Mark Baldwin, the psychologist and moral philosopher, whose work, like his own, expressed a strong reaction against biological theories of society (Sewny 1967). Accommodation, a concept that was also an emergent value, assisted Baldwin in his own break with biological discourse. In his *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1901–5), Baldwin distinguished between adaptation, a biological process of adjustment to the natural environment, and accommodation, a social and psychological process of adjustment to the social environment. On the basis of this distinction, Baldwin (1902) conceived a theory of individual development and social evolution which eschewed the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. In place of this faulty principle, he proposed

intelligent accommodative adjustments to the environment as a mechanism of advance, a view which had much in common with that of Lester F. Ward. Park found Baldwin's antibiological focus and his evolutionary progressivism compatible with his own beliefs. In the *Introduction*, he emphasized Baldwin's point that accommodations are socially and not biologically—that is, racially—transmitted: Social accommodations “are not a part of the racial inheritance of the individual, but are acquired by the person in social experience” (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 664). And, like Baldwin, he regarded accommodation as a positive factor in social evolution, as it provided for a degree of relative equilibrium, a temporary stay of ‘the war of all against all,’ and a necessary phase before the peace and unity of assimilation.

Park also added a progressive component to racial accommodationism: Simmel's emphasis on reciprocity.¹² While Simmel's doctrine of reciprocity carries epistemological and ontological implications (e.g., Levine 1971), it also conveys ethical connotations. These implications vary depending on the context and subject under discussion. But one message that can be discerned may be described as a secularized manifestation of Christian reciprocal effect, such as is found in the Golden Rule: “Do as you would be done by.” This ethical subtext underlies the *Introduction's* Simmel selections, especially in those readings included under the category of “Accommodation,” more than any other section¹³ (see Table 2). Consider, for example, the important selection titled, “The Reciprocal Character of Subordination and Superordination,” an excerpt from Small's translation of Simmel's essay “Superiority and Subordination.”¹⁴ When read along with the two essays that precede it—Münsterberg on “The Psychology of Subordination and Superordination,” and “Memories of an Old Servant,”—the ethical import of Simmel's ideas become manifest.

“Society needs the leader as well as the followers,” Münsterberg asserts, a sentiment shared by the three authors here under consideration (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 690). But they also hold that leader and led have a reciprocal effect on each other. Münsterberg shows that just as the strong submit to the weak—through pity and the nobler altruistic sentiments, for example—so the weak lean on the strong. Everywhere, he argues, the weak “choose their actions under the influence of those in whom they have confidence.” (p. 690) When, on the one hand, leaders inspire confidence, the led show feelings of modesty, admiration, gratitude, and hopefulness. When, on the other hand, leaders force submission, the led react with demonstrations of self-assertion: rejection, self-expression, and boast-

TABLE 2 Selected Chapters from *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* and Corresponding Simmel Selections

<u>Social</u> <u>Contacts</u>	<u>Social</u> <u>Interaction</u>	<u>Competition</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Accommodation</u>
The Sociological Significance of the "Stranger"*	"Social Interaction as the Definition of the Group in Time and Space" "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction"*	"Money and Freedom"*	"Conflict as a Type of Social Interaction" "Types of Conflict Situations"	"The Reciprocal Character of Subordination and Superordination" "Three Types of Subordination and Superordination" "War and Peace as Types of Conflict and Accommodation" "Compromise and Accommodation"

Note: Selections marked with an asterisk were newly translated for the text-reader, while those with no asterisk were excerpted from Simmel's essays published in the *AJS* and translated by Albion Small. See Wolff (1950: lix) for more precise information on the source of these readings.

ful or pugnacious acts of self-display. The recollections of the anonymous "Old Servant" serve to exemplify Münsterberg's positive scenario. "Servants need a good example from their superiors," writes the author, "and when they hear the world speak well of them they do look for the good ways in the home life" (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 693). The excerpt continues with a romanticized portrait of domestic service and a catalog of virtues allegedly following from close master-servant relationships: industry, deference, loyalty, honesty, earnestness, mutual respect.

Finally, the Simmel selection completes the moral lesson. While relationships between leaders and followers appears to be one-sided, with the one absolutely influencing and the other absolutely being influenced, in fact, Simmel argues, this is not the case. Behind the appearances there is a hidden and highly complex "reciprocal action of inferior upon superior" (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 695). Indeed, relationships can be characterized by the degree of relative freedom and reciprocal action of the subordinate. Even under despo-

tism, Simmel argues, subordinates have the right to press claims for reward or protection from the lawgiver. And "the monarch himself will be bound by the regulation which he has ordained" (p. 696). Such reciprocity between ruler and ruled was represented in Roman law, where "*lex*" implied both a ruler's promulgation of a decree and a subject's acceptance or rejection of it. Reciprocity between leader and led applies in modern societies, as well. Orator, teacher, journalist, politician—all seem to involve one-sided leadership. But the orator's assembly, the teacher's students, the journalist's audience, and the politician's public all limit and control the action of the leader. In summation, Simmel writes: "All leaders are also led, as in countless cases the master is the slave of his slaves" (p. 697).

In this selection, Simmel sets forth a position on inequality whose ethical implications go beyond Münsterberg's and the old servant's implied support for racial paternalism. On the one hand, he concurs with them in the view that in relations with subordinates, leaders reap what they sow: "The decisive character of the relation [between superordinate and subordinate] . . . is this, that the effect which the inferior actually exerts upon the superior is determined by the latter" (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]: 695). On the other hand, he goes beyond them in his arguments that the appearance of absolute control is deceptive, that the freedom of subordinates is a sociological given, that no human society or social group escapes reciprocal influence by subordinates, and that the rule of law provides rights as well as obligations. Taken together, these points support the position that dominance is always a two-way street, a negotiation between leader and led. Also, when read in light of the racial conflicts of the Progressive era, they support an ethics of mutual dependence and accommodation between the races, of blacks and whites working together to live peacefully side by side.

SIMMEL AS INTELLECTUAL ROLE MODEL

In comparison to the many translations of Simmel's works by Small and Park, Everett C. Hughes's single published translation, "The Sociology of Sociability" (Simmel 1949), seems meager indeed. But it would be wrong to evaluate Hughes's impact on Simmel's American reception on the basis of this translation alone. After the death of his two teachers, and of Louis Wirth in 1952, Hughes was the hub around which much Simmel scholarship turned. Among the Simmel scholars of the period following World War II—Salomon at the New School, Merton at Columbia, for example—Hughes was *primus inter pares*.

His position as senior American Simmel scholar was part historical accident and part design. As a student in the mid-1920s of Small and Park, both of whom knew Simmel personally, Hughes later became the living link to the past. Certainly Merton could not claim such an aura; and Salomon's Heidelberg Ph.D. and writings on Weber resulted in his early identification as a representative of Weberian sociological thought (Johnson 1952: 343; Kalberg 1993).

But a more important reason for Hughes's significance is that he defined himself as a "Simmel man" (Hughes 1954a) and cultivated the study of Simmel at Chicago. Hughes's translation of the essay on "sociability," for example, was used in his classes to illustrate Simmel's understanding of the difference between "form" and "content" long before it was published in the *AJS* (Hughes 1971). And other untranslated sections of Simmel's *Soziologie* were regularly included in his lectures. Hughes's lectures and seminars on Simmel continued the Chicago Simmel tradition and inspired the next generation, including Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Erving Goffman, and Donald N. Levine. In contrast, there was no Simmel tradition at Columbia before Merton,¹⁵ whose involvement with Simmel was fertile but unsustainable (Jaworski 1990); and Salomon turned his attention and sympathies to French social thought after the war (Salomon 1955).

Consequently, as senior American Simmel scholar, Hughes's opinion about matters Simmelian was regularly sought and his influence was widespread. This is shown especially in his behind-the-scenes role in the postwar Simmel translations. When in 1947 Hughes was approached by Jeremiah Kaplan, the twenty-year-old cofounder of The Free Press, about translating Simmel, he recommended Kurt H. Wolff, whom he had met several years earlier during Wolff's postdoctoral study at Chicago.¹⁶ Wolff included an acknowledgment to Hughes in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (1950), his translation of parts of Simmel's *Soziologie* and a few other pieces. Later, when Kaplan wanted additional translations, Hughes read and made suggestions for improving the text of *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, translated by Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, and he wrote a foreword to the volume (Hughes 1955). During President Johnson's "War on Poverty," when a translation of Simmel's essay "The Poor" was being published, Hughes reviewed the manuscript and wrote a prefatory note to the translation, "A Note on Georg Simmel" (Hughes 1965).

The "Note" is characteristic of Hughes's writings on Simmel, brief and filled with tantalizing hints about his interest in the German sociologist. One such clue is his characterization of Simmel as "a

man both extraordinarily humane and extraordinarily detached, a complete liberal intellectual" (Hughes 1965: 117). One senses that in Simmel Hughes found an intellectual role model: not as a theorist to slavishly follow—for Hughes read Simmel not for knowledge but for inspiration—but as a man whose intellectual style he found appealing.¹⁷ Urbane and erudite, Simmel could analyze profound matters while writing on apparently frivolous topics. Hughes contrasts the sober scholarship of Weber to the playful style of Simmel in a manner that reflects, perhaps, more personal differences between himself and his two real-life role models: his father, the Methodist minister, and his mentor Robert Park, the newspaperman-turned-sociologist.

At the first meeting of the German Sociological Society in 1910, Max Weber proposed a program of study of two current phenomena—voluntary associations and the newspaper. Simmel gave a gala opening address on the apparently frivolous topic of the "Sociology of Sociability," taking as one of his illustrations *décolleté* dress which has the double function of exciting men to playful mood while keeping them at a distance. Weber was speaking as secretary at a business session; Simmel was introducing sociology to the *élite* of intellectual Frankfurt. Each was perfectly cast. (Hughes 1965: 117)

Hughes once wrote that in matters of personal and intellectual style, he was "more of a Simmel than a Weber man" (Hughes 1954a). While Hughes was interested in much of what Simmel wrote, I believe that "The Sociology of Sociability," his only published Simmel translation, is emblematic of what he found most compelling in Simmel. An analysis of some of the arguments in Simmel's essay helps to elucidate not only Hughes's affinities to Simmel, but also what may have been the strategic aims of publishing his translation when he did. Published in 1949, the bicentennial year of Goethe's birth, the essay manifests Hughes's belief in the enduring significance of Western spiritual values. Used regularly in his classes throughout the forties—during the Nazi imperilment of democracy and the domestic pressures of wartime—Simmel's essay offered wise counsel during dark times.

WORLD CRISIS AND THE REDEMPITIVE VALUE OF SOCIABILITY

Simmel's essay on sociability characteristically analyzes the larger social significance of an interactional form. Here he discusses

sociable conversations—in courtly society and in the salons of his acquaintance—and finds in them a microcosm of contemporary social ideals. The rules of sociability exclude personal and substantive concerns from the conversational game; or, at least, if one discusses such matters they are treated lightly, playfully, and artfully. When such everyday concerns as gaining and losing advantage are excluded from sociable conversation, the single goal of mutual joy could be realized. To quote Simmel (1949: 257):

Sociability creates, if one will, an ideal sociological world, for in it—so say the enunciated principles—the pleasure of the individual is always contingent upon the joy of others; here by definition, no one can have his satisfaction at the cost of contrary experiences on the part of others.

This temporary equality of sociability thus symbolically manifests the possibility and promise of democracy:

This world of sociability, the only one in which a democracy of equals is possible without friction, is an *artificial* world, made up of beings who have renounced both the objective and the purely personal features of the intensity and extensiveness of life in order to bring about among themselves a pure interaction, free of any disturbing material accent. (Simmel 1949: 257)

But sociable conversation does more than symbolically fulfill democracy's promise. Like nature and art, it serves a redemptive function, what Simmel called "a saving grace and blessing effect" (Simmel 1949: 261). Because sociability frees us, if momentarily, from our cares and provides a "saving exhilaration" in talk, modern men and women are able to bear the weight of life's burdens and agitations. "The whole weight of life," Simmel's essay concludes, "is [in sociability] consumed in an artistic play, in that simultaneous sublimation and dilution, in which the heavily freighted forces of reality are felt only as from a distance, their weight fleeting in a charm" (Simmel 1949: 261).

This view of the redeeming possibilities of conversation provided a fitting vision not only for Simmel's salon society, but also for the American academy during rising fears of communist menace in American educational institutions.¹⁸ The image of conversation as democratic and redemptive offered a liberal counterimage to paranoid suspicions of subversive conversation on academic campuses. It was a timely message, sent during the year in which an anticom-

munist witch hunt at Chicago was resoundingly defeated. From 1947 to 1949 the Broyles Commission, an Illinois State anti-Communist crusade, "focussed on education, and on the University of Chicago in particular" (Schrecker 1986: 113). In a series of public hearings in the spring of 1949, faculty and administrators were confronted with supposedly incriminating evidence against them. Among those questioned was Ernest W. Burgess, the Sociology Department Chairman, who defended himself against allegations that he was affiliated with a communist 'front' organization (Harsha 1952 [1949]: 118 ff). The Broyles Commission was unsuccessful, finding no Communists on the faculty—a result due in no small measure to the defiant attitude toward the Commission's activities on the part of University Chancellor Robert Hutchins and many university professors. Hughes's translation played no known instrumental role in this action; but it can be read today as symbolic of the resistance.

But the optimism manifest in Simmel's vision of the redemptive possibilities of sociability was tempered by a darker message expressed in his essay, the recognition of the inherent fragility of "pure" forms. This point is expressed in the translation when Simmel acknowledges that sociability "may easily get entangled with real life" (Simmel 1949: 258). It is to this message that Hughes would turn later in life when he had occasion to reflect on Simmel's sociology:

The idea in [Simmel's] paper on sociability is an interesting one. The notion that there can be a social interaction completely as a play form without any ulterior goal. He makes indeed by implication the point that it is very hard to keep it unsullied. I think it is hard to keep any kind of interaction unsullied by other forms or ulterior goals. (Hughes 1970: 3)

Hughes expresses here a view of a corrupted or failed humanity, a view expressed in his wartime writings on the failed realization of Western ideals. Instead of justice he witnessed vilification; instead of equality he saw exclusion; and instead of truth he found compromise and rationalization (e.g., Hughes 1945; 1952 [1947]; 1963 [1943]). But, if Simmel's essay gave support to Hughes's sense of a corrupted humanity, it also showed how scholarship might proceed under such conditions: with good humor rather than heavy seriousness; with an attention to large processes in small phenomena. Hughes and Simmel were both humanists trying to craft an improbable science during treacherous times. Simmel's essay on sociability showed how this can be done. He discovered democracy in a teacup, redemption from life's distress over lunch, and truth in a low-cut dress.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

I set out to reveal the ways in which Simmel's reception by three Chicago sociologists contributed to contemporary discourse on moral and political issues. This goal was formed in response to recent concerns that sociology has failed to make significant contributions to civic discourse. By documenting the moral and political orientations of key figures in sociology, I have attempted not only to uncover the past, but to provide models for the future.

To recognize this feature of the American reception of Simmel's work is not to deny that there were good intellectual reasons for an interest in Simmel. One can and must examine the historical and contemporary interest in Simmel from both points of view. Indeed, it is probably an error to consider theoretical reason and practical life as polar terms. A pragmatic and phenomenologically informed study of social theory, its production and reception, would explore the links between life world and social thought. But the main justification for this one-sided portrait of the early American Simmel translations is that it provides a needed balance to past studies, which neglect to study translators' practical interests and moral concerns.

Typically, discussions of translations in sociology take one of two strategies. They may, first, feature the technical aspects of translation, for example, by discussing word choice and special translation difficulties (e.g., Gerth and Mills 1958 [1946]; Wolff 1950); or, they may, second, study the "Americanization" of an author's writings, studying the shifts in meaning that result from transmission into an American context of works written, say, in a German context (e.g., Hinkle 1986; Roth 1992). In contrast to these approaches, I have studied translations as strategic resources in contests over moral or political issues. The selection of texts, the timing of publication, the translation of words and ideas, the interpretation of meaning—all may be considered as possible elements in sociologists' engagement with social issues, as forms of social action. If translations serve intellectual needs, I have suggested, they may also serve moral and political purposes. Future research along these lines might profit by pursuing a synthesis of this distinctive approach with the more conventional ways of studying translations. A complete examination of efforts to translate Simmel into the American idiom would require such an analysis of the technical, cultural, and practical aspects of the transmission.

My main contribution, however, has been to tell the story of the American Simmel reception, or at least one significant part of it,

as a chapter in the continuing struggle to define America. Read in this way, the translations and discussions of Simmel's writings tell a story of scholar-citizens struggling to shape the prevailing definitions of human behavior and society: of Small battling the inhumanity of laissez faire capitalism; of Park creating a new language to replace the dangerous ranting of biological racism; of Hughes offering a commentary on American society troubled by domestic and world crisis. If these efforts fail to meet strictly scientific standards, they may be read with different standards in mind. There is much in them to be admired. They demonstrate courage in the face of adversity, passion in the pursuit of truth, and vigor in the effort to guide America through stormy times.