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Refusal as a Moral Position *From Separation to Connection*

In the name of science, developmental and moral psychologists traditionally detach themselves from two types of involvement. On the personal level, they most often refrain from taking a position as moral critics of real-life events. On the professional level, they refrain from studying moral critics in two ancient and very familiar social institutions: family and war. This is despite the fact that the family is considered the first school of moral development, and that war is an extreme yet frequent social phenomenon that can nevertheless reveal the noble as well as the most base examples of human behavior.

This personal (and eventually professional) detachment seems to derive from the assumption that science and social criticism will not survive without isolation. As noted by Walzer (1988), researchers may think that “political leaders must be realistic and sober, while social critics must be idealists, fierce but distant, out of touch with the complexities of real life. . . . But these stereotypes are almost certainly wrong” (p. 75).

No professional group can accept blame for the exigencies of history (May 1987). Yet, moral and developmental psychologists may serve as good examples for position taking in the face of injustice. What position, for example, did the renown Swiss child psychologist Jean Piaget assume in the face of the systematic and orderly gassing of 1.5 million children in his neighboring countries during World War II?

The actual voicing of one’s own moral criticism (so it can be heard) illustrates (what I mean by) taking a position as a moral

critic. Obviously, prior to this brave move, one must be capable of seeing the nature of the king's new clothes. This observation depends in turn on the position chosen. As has been observed by Burke (1965) "A way of standing is also a way of seeing or not seeing" (p. 13).

Lawrence Kohlberg, who built on Piaget's (1932/1965) pioneering work on moral development of children, embarked on his career after taking a position as a moral critic by smuggling Holocaust Jewish refugees out of Europe to Palestine. His work on moral development (Kohlberg 1984) has been one of the most significant contributions to the study of moral and political psychology. Yet his theorizing on a "just community" is freed from position taking (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989). Morality has been conceptualized as developing among peers only. Though he developed his career during the Vietnam war, Kohlberg examined the level of moral competence of only two soldiers: Eichmann's post hoc reasoning, at his Jerusalem trial for his compliance with his superiors, and Michael Bernhardt for not shooting in the My Lai massacre (see chapter 3). Not a single study has focused on the moral dilemmas, thinking, or actions of American combatants who objected that war.

These examples of detachment of cognitive moral psychologists from real-life dilemmas of war are linked by a common view of the moral self as existing and developing in no man's land. As noted by Broughton (1987):

The heart of genetic structuralism, unfortunately, is the negation of memory. Development conceived as progressive formalization is incompatible with the maintenance of biographical integrity. Piaget's (individual) subjects have no biography; they are not only genderless and generationless but also lacking personhood. His theory no more allows for life history than it does for history. (pp. 289–290)

Assuming that the everyday world is a moral world, criticism is an inherent part of it, even if this path is chosen by few. What are the positions awaiting moral critics in general and refusing combatants in particular in times of war? What makes them choose these positions? How do they place themselves in these positions? To whom and under what premises do they proclaim and rehearse their critical arguments?

These questions will be discussed in different forms throughout the book. This chapter starts the discussion with a focus on two

philosophical views of selective refusal as a position of criticism: the “separate” position (Rawls 1971) and the “connected” position (Walzer 1988). This is followed by two psychological models that portray selective refusal as reflecting universalistic morality and a separate perspective (Kohlberg 1984) or a particularistic morality and a connected perspective (Gilligan 1982). Finally, separate and connected methodologies are presented. The philosophical, psychological, and methodological views that are presented in this chapter are incorporated in the study of Israeli soldiers as moral critics.

The “Separate” Moral Position

The separate position is a hypothetical one and describes how some individuals take a stand in moral argument. It is central to John Rawls’ (1971) conception of moral criticism. The separate moral critic has the privilege of taking “a point of view distanced from the controversy” (Habermas 1990, p. 162). This distance is possible if the moral concerns are voiced from the “original position” and out of the “veil of ignorance”—that is, if no one is to be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural contingencies or social change in the adoption of justice principles (Rawls 1971). The “original position” refers to a stance such that the parties who deliberate the position are rational and mutually disinterested, and there are no limits on the general information that is available to them. “Veil of ignorance” refers to making decisions without knowing one’s own place in society, one’s class position or social status, or one’s fortune in the distribution of natural talents and abilities. Rawls believes that people seek to enhance their positions, seek activities that allow for meaningful cognitive elaboration, rather than merely hold to them.

Where would the separate critic place himself in times of war? Rawls considers war as a fertile ground for moral criticism. Theoretically, according to Rawls (1971), “the aims of a well-ordered society, or one in a state of near justice, are to preserve and strengthen the institutions of justice” (p. 131) and to achieve a just peace. If war objectives or conduct do not follow moral constraints, the individual may feel the need to give “voice to conscientious and deeply held convictions” (Rawls 1971, p. 128). He/she may take a position of civil disobedience or of a conscientious objector, both of which apparently entail some form of law break-

ing. Civil disobedience is defined by Rawls as a “Public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law, usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (p. 126). It is primarily based on the conflict of duties as the question is “at what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by legislative majority . . . cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice” (p. 126). Civil disobedience is political because the position is guided by political principles (the principles of justice that constitute a social institution). The civil disobedient does not appeal to the principles of personal morality, though it may coincide with and support his/her claims.

Metaphorically, this form of resistance is regarded by Rawls (1971) as a rational form of public speech (p. 127), a channel of communication that emphasizes its nonviolent nature. It is public not only because it is being addressed to the public but because it is not covert or secretive. This mode of criticism does not negate the fidelity of the critic as he is willing to accept the consequences of his actions. The person who takes this position does not deliberately seek out occasions for disobedience in order to state his case. For Rawls, conscientious objection is a position similar to that of civil disobedience but is narrower in scope, such that the critic does not comply with the law or administrative order for reasons of conscience. Rawls concedes that when it comes to actual situations, there is no significant difference between the positions presented above, and the same position may entail both dynamics. Rawls’ moral critic has the right to take a stand even if injustice has not yet occurred:

A citizen may maintain that once it is clear that the moral law of war is being regularly violated, he has a right to decline military service on the ground that he is entitled to insure that he honors his natural duty. Once he is in the armed forces, and in a situation where he finds himself ordered to do acts contrary to the moral law of war, he may not be able to resist the demand to obey. Actually, if the aims of the conflict are sufficiently dubious and the likelihood of receiving flagrantly unjust commands sufficiently great, one may have a duty and not only a right to refuse. (Rawls 1971, p. 140)

Can criticism be seen as having been constructed from a position that is not endowed with the privilege of separateness?

The “Connected” Moral Position

The connected position is central to Walzer’s (1988) view of moral criticism. The connected moral critic is viewed as a person who has ties to a particular culture. His/her sense of justice emerges from shared understandings or agreements with other individuals who are aware of their historical moral selves and who form part of that society (Walzer 1988). The special role of the critic is not only to describe what is wrong in ways that suggest a remedy but also to take a stance. Otherwise the criticism has no moral value. Walzer (1988) explains:

Critics position themselves differently in relation to their audience, adopt different linguistic strategies, make different claims to authority. They take a stand—That is what criticism requires. (p. 12)

Unlike Rawls’ focus on moral reasoning and justification, Walzer views the realm of action as central to the connected position. He explains:

Men are bound by their significant actions, not by their feelings or thoughts; action is the crucial language of moral commitment. Socrates was bound because he chose to act like a citizen in a world where citizenship was morally significant. (Walzer 1970, p. 98)

From the connected position, the only way to understand commitment to principles is to view them as commitment to other men “from whom or with whom the principles have been learned and by whom they are enforced” (Walzer 1970, p. 5). Thus, the connected moral critic would not be able to implement the ideas of a “veil of ignorance” as a guideline for his or her judgment:

Faced with a choice between saving my own child or someone else’s child from an imminent and terrible danger, I would adopt a random decision procedure. It would be much easier, obviously, if I were not able to recognize my own children or if I had no children of my own. But this highest form of ethical life is available only to a few strong-minded philosophers or to monks, hermits, and platonic guardians. The rest of us must settle for something less, which we are likely to think of as something better: we draw the best line that we can between family and community and live with the unequal intensities of love. (Walzer 1983, p. 231)

Thus, from the connected position, the moral critic is tied to the rest of the world not only by principles but also moral language,

moral action, and moral commitment. The moral critic is a person who takes a position in relation to other positions. This position is fortified by moving back and forth between concrete and abstract moral thinking, “from merging the abstract and the concrete, from experiencing the abstract concretely or experiencing the concrete abstractly” (Cochran 1985, p. 4). The connected position taken by the moral critic is oriented toward moral issues to which he is bound—in the words of Cochran (1985), “To be oriented, we do not just make distinctions arbitrarily, but rather make distinctions that matter” (p. 6).

In the moral sphere, things that matter have to do with our conscience, which represents “an inner alternative to the ego, a motive beyond self-interest” (Walzer 1970, p. 132). Even though the conscientious action might be performed in individual terms, the concept of conscience is not an individualistic one; although the moral decision may be constructed in a lonely manner, “the code we almost certainly share” (Walzer 1970 pp. 130–131).

Where would the connected critic place himself in times of war? War is a fertile ground for any inquiry on connected positions: “A man has enormous debts to his native land and to his polity. He receives from them both not merely physical security but moral identity” (Walzer 1970, p. 112). To fight for one’s own state is therefore one of the most serious obligations that “citizenship is usually said to entail” (Walzer 1970, p. 120), though “the (occasional) need to kill is surely the most awful of the burdens” (Walzer 1970, p. 121). Yet, it is easier to do so when the citizen is sent to fight a just war: to protect fundamental values such as national independence, communal freedom, and the lives of people, when all other means of protecting them are exhausted (Walzer 1977).

Walzer (1970) acknowledges the possibility that when a democratic country decides to go to war there will be cases of conscientious refusal by two groups of individuals:

Those who have taken no part in the decision to go to war, and those who oppose that decision (or who oppose the conscription law that follows it), because they believe war itself or this particular war to be immoral. (p. 120)

Like Rawls, Walzer (1988) believes that soldiers are obligated to criticize potentially unjust events. This criticism, however, emerges from a connected position:

[When] injustice is done in my name, or it is done to my people, I must speak out against it. Now criticism follows from connection. (p. 23)

Unlike Rawls' focus on justice reasoning in the dilemma of the separate critic, the dilemma of the connected critic primarily reflects a conflict of loyalties. The citizen is "obligated to obey because of his membership in a larger society, obligated to disobey (sometimes) because of his/her membership in a smaller one—(this situation) is for all its tensions, very common in history" (Walzer 1970, p. 14).

Walzer (1977) believes that civil protest and disobedience usually arise out of a community of values. But the army is an organization, not a community, and the community of ordinary soldiers is shaped by the character and purposes of the organization, not by their private commitments:

There is a rough solidarity of men who face a common enemy and endure a common discipline . . . to disobey is to breach that elemental accord, to claim a moral separateness (or moral superiority) to challenge one's fellows, perhaps even to intensify the dangers they face. (pp. 315–316)

Within this framework, selective refusal might also be seen as a form of "moral selfishness," though sometimes it should be seen as "the only resort of the principled but lonely man" (Walzer 1968, p. 14).

For the outside observer, the selective refuser might be seen as acting from a separate position. At some point the resister will be forced to face the public and explain his claim for moral superiority, consistency and integrity (see chapter 2). However, this apparent separation is but an attempt to circumscribe the "critical distance" needed for his position—a close place to stand so his voice will be heard, but not too close, in order not to be engulfed by the audience (Walzer 1988). What is the psychological meaning of the separate and the connected positions? How can they be studied?

The Psychological Making of "Separate" and "Connected" Moral Positions

Psychological representations of Rawls' concept of the separate position are central to Kohlberg's most influential theory of the

development of morality within individuals (Kohlberg 1984) and society (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989). Drawing heavily on the work of Kant and Rawls, Kohlberg's model portrays the moral critic as capable of undergoing a qualitative change in his moral potential to the point where he or she is freed from personal and societal constraints, independent of culture, and holding the capacity to examine conflicting claims of rights in a rational, objective, and detached way of thinking. This mode of thinking embodies the premise that when there is a conflict between the legal and moral domains, the moral should almost always take precedence because it represents the more objective and impartial solution within and across societies. Kohlberg's decision maker is an individual who is an implicit moral philosopher. He interprets information in terms of the cognitive structures or general organizing principles of thought that define his current stage of moral development. As the individual develops, higher stages displace the structures found at lower stages.

Kohlberg extended Piaget's two-stage model of moral development (from a primitive mode of heteronomous morality, of obedience to authority and fear from punishment, to an autonomous mode, where judgment includes the point of view of the other), to a model with six stages that develop over time and experience. The stages represent three possible approaches to any moral dilemma with respect to society's moral norms: preconventional (stages 1–2), conventional (stages 3–4) and postconventional (principled) perspectives (stages 5–6). At stage 1, the preconventional individual judges action by the likelihood of concrete punishments or rewards, while at stage 2, the individual seeks to gain tangible concrete rewards for correct behavior. In stage 3, the individual sees social approval of specific group members as more important than concrete rewards, whereas, at stage 4, the decision maker is capable of seeing the entire social system and of maintaining his conscience. Loyalty to family, group, or nation is seen as valuable in its own right, regardless of consequences. The transition from conventional to postconventional moral judgment requires introspection and moral theorizing. Individuals experience dissonance and confusion in assessing moral questions, and question social rules that were formerly taken for granted. For a stage 5 person, right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group. Stage 6 marks "the final and complete triumph of reason over moral uncertainty"

(Emler 1983, p. 53). Right is defined according to principles based on respect for other people as ends rather than as means. The existence of stage 6 has never been validated empirically and thus does not appear in Kohlberg's revised Manual (Colby and Kohlberg 1987).

One way of understanding the three levels in Kohlberg's model is to think of them as three different types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations. From this point of view, a person at the preconventional level is one for whom rules and social expectations are something external to the self. A conventional person has achieved a socially normative appreciation for the rules and expectations of others, especially authorities, and identifies him/herself with the occupants of social or societal role relationships. The postconventional (principled) person has differentiated him/herself from normative roles, and defined values in terms of self-constructed reflected principles.

According to Kohlberg, the content of the dilemma situation or preferences may vary from issue to issue or from person to person. Yet, the structural feature of the moral thinking remains constant and defines a stage of development, a way or form of reasoning. Each individual is believed to progress through formally identifiable stages that are an invariant sequence of hierarchical, irreversible forms of moral reasoning. In the course of moral development, reasoning about fairness, justice, rights, duties, and obligations increases in conceptual sophistication, integration, and comprehensiveness and becomes more inclusive. Once the individual's stage is determined, it is possible to assess how that individual would interpret moral issues other than those on Kohlberg's test. The stages are not intended to define how one acts, but rather to outline the decision maker's structural components of moral cognitions. Yet, they may serve as good predictors of the maturity of moral action in a real-life setting (Kohlberg 1984).

The stages are identified by a standard moral interview format, structural interviewing techniques (appendix), and a standard form scoring manual (Colby and Kohlberg 1987). Kohlberg's scoring procedure involves the assignment of stage score for each match between a manual criterion judgment and a moral judgment in the interview. The scores are given in a form of moral maturity scores as well as global scores. The moral maturity scores represent a weighted average of to-issue scores and range from 100 (pure stage 1) to 500 (pure stage 5). Stage 6 does not appear in the revised scor-

ing manual because in practice there is no difference between stages 5 and 6 (Gibbs et al. 1982). The global score consists of a pure stage (the subject's modal level) or a transitional score (e.g., 3/4) when two stages are assigned an equal number of points.

Thus, according to Kohlberg, the ideal moral critic is the one who is capable of holding a separate and objective view on the dilemma situation, if he has reached a stage of "gradual purification of the justice concept [binding duties and obligations] through its segregation from 'nonmoral' considerations" (Emler 1983, p. 59). This mature, principled moral thinker is capable of voicing his/her concerns from a pure, disconnected position across contexts because he holds a "decentered understanding of the world in which he lives" (Habermas 1990, p. 138). If Kohlberg's separate critic decided to challenge societal dictates and obligation to participate in a given war, he should be able to provide rational extralegal reasoning for his position of refusal and be able to explain the extralegal considerations that override his obligation to obey. This reasoning needs to be assessed using a scoring manual devised for real-life dilemmas of disobedience (Linn 1989a, 1989b).

Psychological representation of Walzer's (1988) conception of the connected position might be found in the work of Gilligan (1982). Gilligan conceptualized the moral critic as holding a connected and interactional self, and as searching for a unique way to conceive oneself in relation to others. Whereas the separate critic would be willing to place him/herself in a timeless and ahistorical distance from his/her audience, the connected critic would look for a place among particular individuals living in concrete historical settings. Criticism might be seen as having its source in personal feelings of connection. Even justice can be viewed as "first of all a natural sentiment, an inborn sense of our connectedness with others and our shared interests and concerns" (Solomon 1990, p. 153).

Gilligan argues that the moral critic may conceptualize and understand relationships as connected or separate. The connected or separate perspectives result in the construction of two moral orientations. These orientations are two possible ways of conceptualizing moral criticism and actions, of assessing the most important feature in the situation, or what actions are worthy of praise or blame, as well as the basis for making a moral decision (Gilligan and Wiggins 1987; Brown and Gilligan 1993). Gilligan argues that she has observed close ties between self-description and moral orientations: that different images of the self give rise to different

visions of moral agency, which in turn are reflected in different ways of defining responsibility” (p. 241). When the individual sees himself as connected to or in relation to others, it will lead to decisions based primarily on the voice of care, with the focus on issues of attachment abandonment, responsibility, and relationships. When the individual sees himself/herself as a separate, independent being, his/her decision will spring primarily from the voice of justice with the focus on issues of equality, oppression, reciprocity, and impartiality in the resolution of moral conflicts (Gilligan et al. 1990; Brown and Gilligan 1993). Like Kohlberg, Gilligan was inspired by Piaget’s work but directed her studies on morality in line with his focus on real-life decision (in children’s play) and the conception of morality as bound to human relationships: “apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity” (Piaget 1932/1965, p. 196). Whereas Kohlberg (1984) sees the self as being in relation to the wider society and social institution, it is considerably less interactive than the one portrayed by Gilligan.

Gilligan’s conception of moral criticism reflects two lines of psychological experience to which all human beings are vulnerable: oppression and abandonment. The vulnerability to oppression may give rise to justice concerns, to the ideas of fairness, independence, rights, equality, and reciprocity. The vulnerability to abandonment may give rise to care concerns, to the ideas of loyalty, love, and relationships. Whereas Kohlberg views moral conflicts as linear, entailing a single and just moral solution (Kohlberg and Candee 1984), Gilligan views moral conflicts as negotiable, entailing the burden of consequences, and very often they are unresolved. The critic is viewed as living in a constantly changing social world. His/her audience might be real or imaginary. His thinking might be influenced by personal and or collective ties. When criticism is tied to meaningful people and not to abstract principles only, a moral decision cannot be regarded as a “discrete moment of rational ‘choosing’” but rather as a “type of consciousness,” that although rooted in time, is not bound by a single moment” (Lyons 1988).

Whereas Kohlberg would study the critic by using a set of hypothetical justice-focused dilemmas, by abstracting cognition from both emotion and action, Gilligan would ask the critic to talk about her/his real-life experiences of moral conflict and choice, and then would go and interpret such narratives, looking in particular for evidence of two moral voices or orientations (justice and care). This

would follow an interpretive methodology based on sequences of readings with the focus on self, context, the individual's conception of morality, and moral language. Gilligan suggests a qualitative assessment of the critic's moral voice "because it is embodied, connects rather than separates psyche and body; because voice is in language, it also joins psyches and culture. Voice is inherently relational . . ." (Brown and Gilligan 1993, pp. 14–15).

Since voice should be examined in relational terms, there is no expectation to examine the highest form of moral potential but rather how one's own voice is heard by the critic him/herself as well as his/her audience. An examination in relational terms also implies the attention to the content of one's voice, not only its form. It also requires attention to the critic's use of symbols, metaphor, and moral language and what words are better heard than others.

In her voice-sensitive method, Gilligan would listen to the story the person tells: "the geography of his psychological landscape . . . to listen to the drama, the . . . who, what, when, where, and why of the narrative . . . to images, central metaphors, emotional resonances, contradictions or inconsistencies in style, revisions and absence in the story as well as shifts in the sound of the voice and in narrative position . . . [and] locate the speaker in the narrative [he or] she tells. In addition, the listening requires what we reflect on ourselves as people in the privileged position of interpreting the life events of another and to consider the implications of this act" (Brown and Gilligan 1993, p. 16).

Another focus in the assessment process is directed toward the "self": the way one defines oneself in the situation intellectually and emotionally, which parts one would want or choose to disclose about the self, as well as the role of the self in the dilemma situation of the story. Assuming that criticism is not voiced in a context-free scenario, attention is given to the why and how a given voice (justice or care) is raised, which voice is being suppressed or silenced and by whom, who is the significant audience for these moral concerns, when and how one should dare doing it, and what are the consequences of assuming such a position.

Because Gilligan's approach is constrained by a set of a priori definitions of justice and care, in this work we draw also on Tappan's (1990) methodology, which shares Gilligan's key methodological features but adopts an open-ended conception of the cognition, emotion, and action of lived moral experiences as they are repre-

sented in an interview text. In Tappan's hermeneutic approach to interpreting narrative representations of lived moral experience in interview texts, the individuals' account of their lived experience is understood in its own right; even if it may not be a direct expression and representation of what really happened, it nevertheless has a psychological reality that deserves our interpretation.

In the following study on Israeli soldiers as moral critics, the tension between the two philosophical and psychological views on, and the tension of, the separate and connected positions is discussed throughout the book. Perspectives, psychological theories, and related methodologies are utilized in different phases of the inquiry.

Operatively, four groups of moral critics are examined. The first group consists of thirty-six selective conscientious objectors from the war in Lebanon (Linn 1989a, 1989b). The experience of this group is presented as a background source for understanding the phenomenon of refusal during the Intifada. The second group is the most important one and consists of forty-eight Intifada refusers. To the best of the author's knowledge, no single psychological study has been conducted on these two groups of refusers during war time.

The third group of moral critics consists of twenty-four reservists from the war in Lebanon and thirty-two reservists from the Intifada who, even though they were against these morally controversial military conflicts, nevertheless decided to serve in one or both conflicts. Though an equally important group of moral critics, they are utilized in this research as a control group, and their experience is presented as the background of the Lebanon and the Intifada refusers. The fourth group is a heterogeneous group of soldiers and exsoldiers who voiced their moral criticism in numerous channels (media, letters, books, protests, etc.) and also serve as the background of the refusers' experience. Throughout the study I also followed Ryff's (1984) suggestion that the researcher and the subjects could in collaboration differentiate what is unique from that which is shared in the meaning of the experience.

Individuals in the first three groups underwent the same procedure of individual interviewing and testing in their homes. One part of the interview consisted of Kohlberg's test of moral development (Form B, see appendix). The second part consisted of a test of concrete moral justification for one's own action of objection. The third part was dedicated to the subject's narrative regarding his cho-

sen position of criticism: his civilian and military experience, his conception of self, morality and moral feelings before and after his decision. Attention was given to the critic's subjective perception of his position, moral orientation, moral language and content, cultural metaphors and symbols, and his significant audience. Finally, a comprehensive demographic and attitudinal questionnaire was administered (soldiers' attitude toward the Holocaust, their reflections about the war in Lebanon, and the Intifada, their action, their punishment, and their planned future in the Israeli society, etc.).

The order of the first three parts of the interview were randomized among subjects. Each interview lasted 1.5–3 hours and was recorded with permission and later transcribed. All tests were scored blindly by the same qualified rater, who had not done the initial interviewing and was not aware of the subjects' identity. The scoring procedure of the hypothetical moral competence of the subjects followed Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) revised manual of the Moral Judgment Interview (herewith MJI). The Actual Moral Reasonings (herewith AMR) was scored blindly with regard to MJI scores by the same scorer, and were computed in line with the real-life dilemma manual as presented in Linn 1989a, b. The analysis of the indepth interviews drew on Gilligan's and Tappan's narrative analysis.

Since refusers were not part of my close circle of friends, it was easy for me to approach them from a separate position. Their decision to refuse intertwined with my academic interest in the relationships between moral judgment and action.

Having raised this topic for a legitimate academic inquiry, I had to go through a long period of suspicion as to my loyalty to the state of Israel. Social researchers seem to have been influenced by the hostile atmosphere revolving around the refusers. There is no surprise that no single psychological study has been conducted on the Lebanon and the Intifada refusers *during* these two morally controversial conflicts.

One way to find the subjects was to approach the Israel Defense Forces. Yet, in order to free myself from any constraints and maintain an ideal separate position, I tried to locate these people by myself. During the war in Lebanon, the uniform response to inquiries regarding their identity was "I have no friends like that." It took eight months of searching before I came across a member of Yesh Gvul (the refusers' protest movement; see chapter 6) who held not only the entire list of refusers but was also willing to give it to me.

The first sample of thirty-six Lebanon refusers was drawn from this list of eighty-six refusers who were imprisoned during the first year of the war (1982–1983). I found this independent way of contact most helpful throughout the interview process. Many wanted me to assure them that I was not connected to the military institutions before they were willing to participate. The study group of forty-eight Intifada refusers was recruited in the same way: they were randomly sampled from a list of 165 reservists who were imprisoned during the first four years in the same way.

Whether refusal is the right moral response and resolution to the dilemmas faced by the Israeli reserve soldiers is certainly a serious question that deserves attention. However, as suggested by Hare (1981) “people can disagree about the just solution” (p. 158). The real concerns, he argues, are the knowledge of the guiding principles of those who attempt to solve the moral dilemma they face. This line of inquiry is particularly attractive when applied to anyone who may claim moral maturity, consistency, and integrity, as in the case of selective conscientious objectors. These claims are examined in the following chapter.