

Introduction

Why Citizenship Constitutes a Theoretical Problem in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century

Rousseau, writing books addressed mainly to a reading public in France, as well as a larger European audience, took care that the title pages drew attention to his identity as a "*citoyen de Genève*." Following this illustrious precedent, I shall, in this introduction, allow myself the presumption of writing as a Canadian, since it seems to me that Canadians have especially good reasons to be anxious about whether modern citizenship is in a sound condition.¹

The topic of citizenship is of course a large one, and it seems to grow larger day by day, as more and more theorists are drawn to reflect on the many-layered crises that are rendering citizenship ever more problematical. In a brief introduction, it is necessary that I limit myself to highlighting only a few aspects of the problem that seem to me salient, especially in the light of contemporary concerns as well as the events that have provoked them. Nationalism, ethnic strife, the fragmentation of previously united multinational political communities such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even my own political community place the problem of citizenship—of what draws a body of citizens together into a coherent and stably organized political community, and keeps that allegiance durable—at the center of theoretical concerns. But once we put it on the agenda, and begin to examine the problem with some attention, we soon see that manifold difficulties start to unfold. As far as North American society is concerned, we are committed socially and economically to capitalism, whether in a milder or harsher version, and we are committed intellectually to some variety of liberalism. But capitalism is certainly no respecter of civic boundaries; on the contrary, to the extent that our lives today are shaped by the modern corporation, we are driven to attend to market imperatives that transgress and subvert civic boundaries.²

(This is so pervasive that in Canada a new fringe party like the "National Party" needs to arise in order to protest against this.) As for liberalism, it is a philosophy concerned with upholding the dignity and inherent rights of individuals, understood as instantiations of a *universal* humanity, and so it is unclear why this philosophy would accord any special moral status to the claims of citizenship. Why concern ourselves with the quality of civic life within *our own* national boundaries rather than with, say, human rights violations within some society halfway around the globe?³ So we see that the two defining commitments of our modern, more or less capitalist, liberal society tend to render the meaning of citizenship deeply problematical, rather than help to dispel what puzzles us here.

In the first part of this introduction, I want to draw attention to a few of the salient challenges to the idea of citizenship in the modern world, and then subsequently come back again to the question of a principled theoretical response (or perhaps the lack thereof).

I.

Let me begin with Jürgen Habermas's very helpful summary of three contemporary developments that have rendered deeply problematical the relation between national identity and citizenship:

First, the issue of the future of the nation state has unexpectedly become topical in the wake of German unification, the liberation of the East Central European states and the nationality conflicts that are breaking out throughout Eastern Europe. Second, the fact that the states of the European Community are gradually growing together, especially with the impending *caesura* which will be created by the introduction of a common market in 1993, sheds some light on the relation between nation state and democracy, for the democratic processes that have gone hand in hand with the nation state lag hopelessly behind the supranational form taken by economic integration. Third, the tremendous influx of immigration from the poor regions of the East and South with which Europe will be increasingly confronted in the coming years

lend the problem of asylum seekers a new significance and urgency. This process exacerbates the conflict between the universalistic principles of constitutional democracies on the one hand and the particularistic claims of communities to preserve the integrity of their *habitual* ways of life on the other.⁴

These political crises identified by Habermas are indeed central to an understanding of why the problem of citizenship is especially salient in our day. Ethnic and sectarian conflict in northeastern and southeastern Europe; a redefining of national states at the heart of Europe, in a post-Cold War epoch that might have been expected to diminish political turbulence but seems instead to have generated *more* of it; dislocating shifts of identity provoked by mass migration and economic integration, accompanied by defensive reactions to bolster these jeopardized identities: all these political dilemmas have raised anew deep questions about what binds citizens together into a shared political community. To these formidable challenges may be added what is probably the greatest challenge of all to contemporary citizenship, namely, persistent mass unemployment, which offers the surest prospect of excluding tens of millions of people even within the richest nations on earth from a sense of full membership in civic community.⁵

As regards the issue of national identity, the basic problem as I see it is that national citizenship is being simultaneously undermined by not only globalizing pressures but also localizing pressures. But these two opposing challenges are by no means unrelated. In fact, particularistic identities assert themselves most forcefully just when globalist tendencies present real threats to such identities. It is no accident, for instance, that nationalism rises up again in Europe simultaneously with a movement towards European integration.⁶ Nationalism is typically a reaction to feelings of threatened identity, and nothing is more threatening in this respect than global integration. So the two go together, and although they push in opposite directions, *both* undercut the integrity of the state, and the civic relationship it defines. This is what I elsewhere refer to as the dialectic of globalism and localism.⁷ By calling this a "dialectical" relationship, what I mean is that the two are inseparable tendencies; they are opposites that nonetheless mirror each other, two sides of the same coin.⁸ Hence there is an unsuspected

correlation between liberalism and nationalism. This thesis, I believe, admits of a more generalized formulation, namely, that the attraction of ideologies generally is a function of deracination; as deracination spreads in modern societies, individuals are increasingly exposed to the grip of ideologies of all kinds (whether universalistic or antiuniversalistic).⁹

I want to return later to this question of "nation" in the civic sense, as opposed to "nation" in the ethnic sense, and of how the latter subverts the former. So let me turn now to some other issues that pose contemporary challenges to the idea of citizenship. Since my space is limited, let me concentrate on three (related) challenges to the idea of citizenship:

1. what Michael Walzer has called "the civil society argument";
2. what I call "groupism," or "groupist" ideologies, but which might also be called "radical pluralism" (not the old liberal pluralism, but a new, trendy left wing pluralism);
3. as a generalization of 1. and 2. above: the post-modernist challenge.

1. *Civil Society.*

In the 1970s and 1980s, "civil society" was raised as one of the most prominent banners in the struggle against the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe. The basic idea here was that active involvement in an autonomous civil society composed of a multitude of voluntary associations separate from (or opposed to) the sphere of the state, represents a superior form of citizenship as compared with the decayed citizenship of subservience to an all-pervasive paternalistic state. More recently, this slogan of East European intellectuals has been picked up and embraced by theorists in the West.¹⁰ These theorists argue that given the character of the modern state, with its anonymity, its bureaucratic remoteness, its imperviousness to democratic agency, the modern state is, not the vehicle of citizenship, but a bar to genuinely democratic citizenship. Citizenship, then, must be *localized*. This is of course a new formulation of an old argument, for all forms of liberalism invoke some version of the civil society argument.

This kind of argument certainly has a lot of force to it. Michael Walzer, in his contribution to this volume, explains the force of this idea, but also traces its limits. As Walzer rightly argues:

Here is the paradox of the civil society argument. Citizenship is one of many roles that members play, but the state itself is unlike all the other associations. It both frames civil society and occupies space within it. It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all associational activity (including political activity). It compels association members to think about a common good, beyond their own conceptions of the good life. Even the failed totalitarianism of, say, the Polish communist state had this much impact upon the Solidarity union: it determined that Solidarity was a Polish union, focused on economic arrangements and labor policy within the borders of Poland.¹¹

Although Walzer is plainly sympathetic to the civil society vision, he understands that, as he puts it, "citizenship [i.e., political, state-centered citizenship] has a certain practical preeminence among all our actual and possible memberships."¹² It is surely highly significant in this connection (as is noted by Walzer as well) that the Solidarity movement in Poland, the most sensational model of the civil society vision, and the one that helped most to inspire this line of theorizing, did *not* confine itself to civil society once the totalitarian state had collapsed, but went on to turn itself into a political party, quickly assuming the reins of government, and the leader of the original Solidarity movement is of course today the president of Poland. This was not a sellout by Solidarity, but a natural response to the "built-in" insufficiency of the kind of "localized" citizenship made available to us at the civil society level alone.¹³

2. *Pluralism.*

A more radical version of the same argument is made by theorists like Iris Marion Young in the name of group identity, invoking popular slogans like "the politics of difference."¹⁴ Here the cultural fragmentation of citizenship is seen not as a danger, but as a positive advantage. Debates about multiculturalism in Canada and the United States obviously draw upon this sort of

radical pluralist argument. Will Kymlicka has pointed out the central perplexity to which we are led when we follow through this way of thinking to its ultimate limit:

On the one hand, many of these groups are insisting that society officially affirm their difference, and provide various kinds of institutional support and recognition for their difference, e.g., public funding for group-based organizations. . . On the other hand, if society accepts and encourages more and more diversity, in order to promote cultural inclusion, it seems that citizens will have less and less in common. If affirming difference is required to integrate marginalized groups into the common culture, there may cease to be a common culture.¹⁵

The pluralist vision poses a threat to the idea of citizenship because groupism taken to its logical conclusion amounts to a kind of ghettoization; that is to say, a tendency on the part of each group in the society to withdraw behind the boundaries of its own group, its own groupist identity, with no need to acknowledge a larger common culture. Citizenship would then be reduced to an aggregate of subnational ghettos.¹⁶

In order to clarify the range of theoretical options, I want to distinguish three basic possibilities:

- (1) The first of these options I will call "nationalism." In a provocative essay entitled "In Defense of the Nation," Roger Scruton defines national identity in terms of ethnic-cultural identity.¹⁷ According to Scruton's argument, groups must assimilate to the "national idea," or if they cannot, ought not to belong to the political community but instead should belong to one that offers them a sense of home and rootedness. The thrust of Scruton's argument is that what ultimately sustains the liberal state is not a sense of *political* membership in the state but the *social* loyalties and allegiances that define nationhood, and therefore that citizenship as a political concept is ultimately parasitic upon nationhood as a social concept. In other words, a relation to the nation as a prepolitical community is more basic than any relation to the state precisely because the former is

situated on the social side of the social/political dichotomy. For instance, Scruton's argument is that America "works" as a liberal state, not on account of a sense of shared political commitment to the Constitution, but rather, because it has successfully instilled the sense of itself as a genuine "nation," albeit one defined nonethnically.¹⁸ It is at the social level, the level at which national identification reposes, that one secures the sense of prepolitical community without which the liberal state, no less than any other kind of state, dissolves. While Scruton defends the liberal state, he attacks liberals because liberalism, as he conceives it, is defined by blindness to or willful ignorance of this essential truth.¹⁹

Scruton repudiates any association between nation and race. Rather, "nation," as he defines it, refers to the development of a people's destiny, preferably within definite territorial boundaries, embracing shared language, shared associations, shared history, and a common culture (including, often but not always, the culture of a shared religion). The idea of a multinational state, on this conception, is inherently unsustainable, for such states either move in the direction of forging a unitary sense of nationhood, or cease to exist. Admittedly, the sustainability of multinational states appears at present to warrant a great deal of pessimism. (Scruton refers to Lebanon, Cyprus, and India, but he seems to have been premature in his judgment that Czechoslovakia had solved its problem of common nationhood).²⁰

- (2) In various writings, Bhikhu Parekh offers a strong defense of multiculturalism.²¹ According to his argument in its most robust version, the state is obliged to serve the pluralistic identities of subgroups, not vice versa. In one passage, he goes so far as to argue that immigrant communities in Britain are bound by no obligation to conform to a larger host culture, on the grounds that British society not only admitted but positively recruited them to help rebuild its postwar economy, "in full knowledge of who they were and what they stood for."²² How far is a society really obliged to go in order to accommodate minority cultures? Is a liberal

society required to condone the wearing of veils by Islamic schoolgirls forced by their families to do so? Should France exempt North Africans from French military service and allow them to substitute service for countries that in given circumstances may be militarily opposed to France? Should Rastafarians in Britain be exempt from marijuana laws that apply to the rest of the population? Should the Hispanic population in the U.S. not be required to adapt to English as the primary language of daily life? If there is no limit whatever to cultural pluralism, then clearly we approach the point where the very notion of common citizenship as an existential reality dissolves into nothingness.²³

- (3) Having summarized Scruton's nationalist option and Parekh's multicultural option, I want to propose a third possibility, which I would develop under the heading of citizenship. According to this third conception, there is a requirement that all citizens conform to a larger culture, but this culture is national-civic, not national-ethnic.²⁴ It refers to political, not social, allegiance, or, to employ the classical liberal dichotomy, it identifies membership in the state, not membership in civil society. I think this conception is captured very well in Jürgen Habermas's notion of "constitutional patriotism."²⁵ Admittedly, it can be quite tricky to separate out these two senses of nationhood, for the social and the political, culture and state, unavoidably overlap in all kinds of ways. Still, I think this approach offers a helpful way of mediating the debate between nationalists like Scruton and multiculturalists like Parekh. As I try to spell out at further length below, what I'm searching for under the title of citizenship is an elusive middle term between opposing alternatives that I find unacceptable.²⁶

3. *Post-modernism.*

In recent years, certain French intellectual fashions have caught on in North America, and the most familiar umbrella term for these new theoretical tendencies is "post-modernism."²⁷ The basic theoretical challenge here is that the philosophical universalisms

that we know from the canonical tradition of the West all involve what we might call a "hegemonic function," which is to suppress various particularistic identities. Appeals to universal reason typically serve to silence, stigmatize and marginalize groups and identities that lie beyond the boundaries of a white, male, Eurocentric hegemon. Universalism is merely the cover for an imperialistic particularism. If all of this is correct, then the debunking of Western rationalism, and the universalism it presupposes, serves to liberate oppressed groups who are then free to express and articulate their authentic, but suppressed, identities. Post-modernism, thus defined, is actually an encompassing theoretical statement of the claims of localism and pluralism reviewed above. But if we were right to criticize the idea of a localizing and pluralizing citizenship, then we ought to be disturbed by the claim by post-modern social theory that *all* social reality is untranscendably local, plural, fragmentary, episodic, and infinitely rearrangeable.

Post-modern philosophy has sought to do for social theory what the post-modern movement has done in art and architecture: to turn pastiche into a distinctive style; to splice and tape cultural identities so that any comforting sense of fixity or essence is subverted—perhaps to turn the necessities of our modern condition into virtues.²⁸ In Salman Rushdie's phrase, this involves seeing cultural "mongrelization" as a positive and enriching thing.²⁹ I certainly agree that there is something attractive and refreshing about this notion that we are all hybrids. Still, there is something worrying here as concerns the possibility of sustaining a coherent idea of citizenship. This worry is captured very well in the following response by John Pocock:

A community or a sovereign that demands the whole of one's allegiance may be foreclosing one's freedom of choice to be this or that kind of person; that was the early modern and modern danger. A plurality of communities or sovereignties that take turns in demanding one's allegiance, while conceding that each and every allocation of allegiance is partial, contingent, and provisional, is denying one the freedom to make a final commitment which determines one's identity, and that is plainly the post-modern danger. . . . It is one thing to decide that being a Canadian—or, like me, a New Zealander—offers one an open

range of identities, and that freedom consists in retaining one's mobility in choosing between them. It is quite another when the sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers of this world get together to inform one that there is no choice of an identity, no commitment of an allegiance, no determination of one's citizenship or personality that they regard as other than provisional (or may not require one at any moment to unmake). Under post-modern conditions we do confront these alliances of unmakers, deconstructors, and decenterers, and our citizenship may have to be our means of telling them where they get off.³⁰

So one might hope; but more and more we find today that it is the deconstructors who tend to be successful in telling citizenship where *it* gets off.

It is doubtless true that the primary motivation behind the politics of difference is to secure inclusion for traditionally excluded groups and marginalized voices. But does it make sense to speak of inclusion if all is particularity, and there is no possibility of rising above the contest of rival particularisms? Inclusion in what? If citizenship doesn't involve a kind of universality, how can there be a community of citizens to which the hitherto excluded and marginalized gain entry? Here, post-modernism leaves us at a loss, and to recover a coherent idea of citizenship we must go back to older categories of political thought (available from Aristotle, Rousseau, or Hegel, for instance, rather than from Nietzsche or Foucault).³¹

One hopes that pillars of the republican tradition such as Aristotle and Rousseau were mistaken in thinking that ethnic and cultural homogeneity is a necessary condition of civic identity. On the other hand, it should be clear that the more that citizens become fixated on cultural differences within the political community, the more difficult it becomes to sustain an experience of common citizenship. In other words, what is shared as citizens must have a power to shape identity that at some point overrides, or is more salient than, our local identities. Consider as an example the recent controversy concerning gays in the U.S. military. The argument here, surely, (*viz.*, the Clinton argument) is that the willingness and capacity of gay soldiers to contribute to the defense of the American nation pertains to a shared civic identity that is larger, is more

comprehensive, and possesses a more egalitarian foundation than the more local allegiances of homosexual identity or heterosexual identity. From this point of view gay activists or gay theorists who want to lay such emphasis on their partial identity as gays that it excludes the possibility of a more general ("sex-blind") citizenship cannot help but undermine the egalitarian argument that Clinton is trying to make on their behalf. Shared citizenship entails egalitarianism, and this egalitarianism is undercut by too much emphasis upon particularistic identity insofar as the egalitarian conception presupposes an appeal to what is shared across divergent cultural or ethnic groups. An obvious parallel is the nonconscription of Arab Israelis into the Israeli army. I think that there is a compelling egalitarian argument for the full participation of Arab-Israeli citizens in the I.D.F. But such an argument presupposes that what Jews and Arabs share as citizens transcends their ethnic identity. One would not be at all surprised if many or most Arabs were unwilling to embrace this egalitarian argument, precisely for the sake of giving priority to their Arab identity (which mirrors perfectly the Jewish motivation that denies them equal citizenship in the first place). This would simply be another way of saying that for them Israeli citizenship is impossible. Yet one would like to think that a citizenship that transcends ethnicity *is* a possibility.³²

The affirmation of particularity is by no means limited to the sphere of ethnic conflicts and national identity. Certain brands of feminism present the appearance of a kind of "gender nationalism"; that is, they seem to suggest the same kinds of narrow particularism that one encounters in the realm of ethnic divisions. Another example would be identification with one's own social class, to the exclusion of other classes within society.³³ Yet I think the events of our day entitle us to give special attention to national particularism. After all, no feminists so far as I know are proposing a gender equivalent of ethnic cleansing, and even in the days when class warfare was being waged on behalf of class-based ideologies in Russia and China, this was done in the name of a higher universalism that was supposed to be the ultimate outcome of the struggle of one class against another. But today nationalists are indeed killing one another, and doing so without any appeal to a higher trans-

national universalism; on the contrary, they do so in brutal rejection of any kind of universalism. Let us, then, probe further the relation between citizenship and nationalism.

II.

Our problem today is that we seem to be locked into a choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives, neither of which strike me as satisfactory. On the one hand, there are the various kinds of universalism that exalt the inviolable moral worth of individuals, seen as human beings *as such*, above and beyond any collective or civic identity that would "particularize" human beings, so to speak. This universalistic vision, as we discussed early on in this essay, tends to render morally dubious any privileging of citizenship, which implies, after all, an exclusive and particularistic identity. On the other hand, we have the forces of exclusivity and particularism that celebrate and affirm just those forms of group identity that distinguish sets of individuals from one another, and which tend, again as we referred to at the outset, to generate the kind of ethnic and nationalistic outbursts whose outcome, as we have seen more and more in the last few years, is the self-dissolution of citizenship. So we are left with two competing visions—liberal universalism and antiliberal particularism—*both* of which tend to subvert, from opposing directions, the idea of a civic community. Mutually exclusive, but not—one hopes—exhaustive. However, in order to show that these alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities, one would have to make available a full-fledged theory of citizenship. And here, I'm sorry to confess, I simply don't have in my possession such a theory of citizenship. (I wish I did.)

Lying at the heart of this dilemma is what I would call the "universalism/particularism conundrum." To opt wholeheartedly for universalism implies deracination—rootlessness. To opt wholeheartedly for particularism implies parochialism, exclusivity, and narrow-minded closure of horizons. Yet it is by no means clear that a viable synthesis of particularistic rootedness and universalistic openness is philosophically or practically available. In practice, and perhaps even in theory, we always seem to get drawn to one

unsatisfactory extreme or the other. This elusive synthesis of liberal cosmopolitanism and illiberal particularism, to the extent that it is attainable, is what I want to call "citizenship."

The conundrum sketched here is the same conundrum that we find Rousseau struggling with at the end of the *Social Contract*, where we are left with two unhappy alternatives: political particularism, which is false and inhuman, and moral universalism, which is morally and religiously true but is politically useless and ultimately uncivic.³⁴ Rousseau criticizes that phony cosmopolitanism that allows individuals to "boast of loving everyone in order to have the right to love no one."³⁵ Yet by the same token, Rousseau is as critical as any universalist liberal of the spirit of national exclusivity and parochialism. In the *Second Discourse*, the very thinkers who are, in the *Geneva Manuscript*, condemned for their cosmopolitanism, are praised as "great cosmopolitan souls, who surmount the imaginary barriers that separate peoples!"³⁶ Rousseau is anti-cosmopolitan and anti-particularist.³⁷ The *via media* between universalism and particularism remains inaccessible. The key here, of course, is to distinguish genuine cosmopolitanism from phony cosmopolitanism (or: to distinguish "the liberal spirit," in the sense of openness to the real diversity of social experience, from "liberal tolerance" in the sense of a shallow acceptance of whatever the existing social order happens to have cast up), but to draw these distinctions is by no means easy, at least theoretically.

In order to help clarify the alternatives here, I want to distinguish three theoretical perspectives:

1. liberal: emphasizing the individual, and the individual's capacity to transcend group or collective identity, to break the shackles of fixed identity (social station, hierarchy, traditional roles, etc.), to define and redefine one's own purposes, and so on.
2. communitarian: emphasizing the cultural or ethnic group, solidarity among those sharing a history or tradition, the capacity of the group to confer identity upon those otherwise left "atomized" by the deracinating tendencies of a liberal society.

3. "republican": emphasizing "civic" bonds. From my point of view, *both* of the above two competing perspectives (No. 1 and No. 2) jeopardize the idea of a political community that is reducible neither to an aggregation of individuals nor to a conjunction of identity-constituting groups. That is, both liberal and communitarian theories pose threats to the idea of citizenship as I understand it. The decisive question, of course, is whether there really exists some third possibility that is theoretically coherent and practically viable. I think that Jürgen Habermas is groping in the direction of such a theoretical perspective with his idea of "constitutional patriotism," an idea of citizenship that is intended to be neither individualist nor communitarian, neither liberal nor anti-liberal. But it remains highly uncertain whether one can give sense to such an idea relative to the realities of life at the end of the twentieth century (or indeed whether such an idea of citizenship has *ever* made sense).

My threefold schema yields two instrumental approaches to citizenship, and one non-instrumental approach to citizenship: According to perspective No. 1, political community is instrumental to the strivings of individuals to give to their lives an authentic meaning or sense that they are happy with as individuals. For example, the idea here would be that membership in "Canada" is justified by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. According to perspective No. 2, political community is instrumental to the strivings of communities to elaborate a collective identity that can be constitutive of the selfhood of its members (to use Sandel's terms). Here, the idea would be, for example, that membership in "Quebec" as a quasi-state would be justified by the state's promotion of the collective identity of Québécois (understood as a linguistic-ethnic category rather than as a category of citizenship equally applicable to anglophone or allophone citizens of Quebec).

According to perspective No. 3, political community is a good in itself: political traditions constitute living totalities that are not reducible to the purposes of individuals or the goals of subcommunities, and our humanity would be diminished if our lives lacked a focus for this civic dimension of existence, even if it were somehow possible to satisfy all of our individual and group purposes without participation in a larger political community. This ambitious claim is a modern (and no doubt watered down and liberalized) version of Aristotle's ancient claim that human beings are by nature political animals, that without full membership in some kind of polis, we live a life that is less than fully human.³⁸

Allowing myself now to speak freely in my Canadian voice, I will call perspective No. 1 the "Pierre Trudeau" vision of citizenship (with its uncompromising appeal to individual rights), and we can call perspective No. 2 the "Jacques Parizeau" vision of citizenship (with its invocation of "old stock" Québécois).³⁹ I find both of these two accounts of citizenship radically deficient, but I lack any confidence that I can come up with a third account that will satisfy readers or satisfy myself, a third perspective that supplies the deficiencies of No. 1 and No. 2, and retains (in a higher synthesis) the strengths of each (relative to the other). The convincing "NO" that issued forth from the citizens of my political community in the 1992 referendum, some of whom voted no for "Pierre Trudeau" reasons and some of whom voted no for "Jacques Parizeau" reasons, brings home to us in a very concrete political fashion the difficulty of conceptualizing the experience of citizenship in a way that doesn't get drawn into the unhappy either/or enforced by the polarizing alternatives of perspectives Nos. 1 and 2.

Let us summarize our analysis by specifying three models of political community:

1. Political community in the service of individual identity (liberalism)
2. Political community in the service of communalist identity (nationalism)
3. Political community as an expression of "civic" identity (?)

The closest I can come to filling in this question mark is Václav Havel's appeal to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as a civic union. But of course, as we all know, both the political movement that Havel founded and the idea of Czechoslovakia to which he appealed have recently succumbed to liberalism in Bohemia and nationalism in Slovakia. The now departed Czechoslovak federation provides one example, and my own polity provides another, of a more general syndrome whereby citizenship gets squeezed out between the opposing imperatives of liberalism and nationalism: Just as Czecho-Slovak citizenship gets squeezed out between Czech liberalism and Slovak nationalism, so Canadian (Anglo-Gallic) citizenship gets squeezed out between Anglo liberalism and Gallic nationalism.⁴⁰ Needless to say, these formulas represent a gross simplification of complex societies.⁴¹ But theory typically involves radical simplification, in the interests of sharpening our sense of fundamental alternatives in the midst of complexity.

My basic thesis is that liberalism is correct in its diagnosis of what's wrong with nationalism, and nationalism is correct in its diagnosis of what's wrong with liberalism. Therefore we are left deprived of a suitable vision of political community unless we can come up with a third possibility that is neither liberal nor nationalist, and that somehow escapes the liberal's arguments against nationalism and the nationalist's arguments against liberalism.⁴² The problem, as my examples are intended to convey, is that this other possibility tends to get squeezed out between universalizing and particularizing antipodes. In his essay "Nationality," Lord Acton wrote: "The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test . . . of its freedom."⁴³ The fate of what was until not long ago the state of Czechoslovakia proves how difficult it is for contemporary states to pass this test—notwithstanding the huge advances of liberal democracy that we have witnessed since 1989. Indeed, paradoxically, these advances of liberal democracy appear to have made it *more* difficult for contemporary states to pass this test! What I've been trying to suggest here is that the fate of a country like Czechoslovakia (alas, no longer a country!)—or for that matter the fate of a country like my own—constitutes a philosophical problem.

III.

Reflection on citizenship is occasioned by certain commonplace experiences; in my case, reflection on the experience of being a "rootless cosmopolitan." Being a Jewish intellectual in an economically advanced, socially liberal, culturally diverse, and politically very marginalized society, it was virtually unavoidable that I would turn out to be a rootless cosmopolitan. The pressures towards rootless cosmopolitanism are so strong that an intellectual (a cosmopolitan intellectual!) like Michael Walzer has to devote the full force of his energies as a theorist to showing that the moral and intellectual claims of rootless cosmopolitanism are illegitimate.⁴⁴ When Kant set out his ideal of the "world citizen," considering politics in the light of a "*weltbürgerliche Absicht*," he articulated something genuinely attractive, but I suspect that even Kant himself realized that there is at the same time something not entirely attractive in this point of view. (Consider, for instance, what Kant says concerning the sublimity of war in the *Critique of Judgment*.) So, cosmopolitanism is morally and intellectually deficient. But what are the alternatives? Are we to resist rootless cosmopolitanism through the vehicle of something like Canadian nationalism, with all the ludicrous parochialism that this entails? Or do we opt for, say, Québécois nationalism, which is no less ludicrously parochial? All nationalisms are driven by the urge to resist rootless cosmopolitanism, but they do so at the price of embracing various stifling parochialisms in relation to what one might call the "ideal of an open humanity." So, cosmopolitanism is unsatisfactory, and anti-cosmopolitanism is unsatisfactory. This inevitably forces upon us the question: Can there be an ideal of citizenship that is neither deracinating nor parochializing, or is such an ideal nothing but a chimera?

Let us illustrate what we have in mind in referring to the pettiness of nationalism. Consider the following exchange during a conversation between Salman Rushdie and Edward Said:

SAID: . . . A close friend of mine once came to my house and stayed overnight. In the morning we had breakfast, which included yogurt cheese with a special herb, *za'atar*. This com-

bination probably exists all over the Arab world, and certainly in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. But my friend said: "There, you see. It's a sign of a Palestinian home that it has *za'atar* in it." Being a poet, he then expatiated at great and tedious length on Palestinian cuisine, which is generally very much like Lebanese and Syrian cuisine, and by the end of the morning we were both convinced that we had a totally distinct national cuisine.

RUSHDIE: So, because a Palestinian chooses to do something it becomes the Palestinian thing to do?

SAID: That's absolutely right.⁴⁵

These discussions of the real or imagined uniqueness of national cuisine may seem innocent enough, but in the fevered world in which we live, there is no telling when such benign reflections may turn ugly. In a documentary film by Michael Ignatieff entitled *The Road to Nowhere*, depicting the shambles that the former Yugoslavia has become, Ignatieff suggests gently to his interlocutors, members of a Serbian paramilitary unit in a village outside Vukovar, that the wine they are drinking is Croatian wine. This draws the vehement retort, "*Serbian wine!*"

This kind of thing is inherent in all nationalisms.⁴⁶ On the other side, I agree with Joseph Carens's argument in chapter 8 of this volume that there is something in the very logic of liberalism that carries one towards cosmopolitanism. If one follows this through all the way, one eventually arrives at a point where all national (civic) boundaries become meaningless; that is, where citizenship itself becomes meaningless. These strike me as not very satisfactory alternatives. Thus, my concern with citizenship is centrally motivated by the feeling that there must be a third alternative beyond liberalism and nationalism, which represent two opposing extremes in the relationship between the individual and group identity. Liberalism seeks to give the individual primacy over the group, even (if necessary) at the price of an alienation from any and every group identity. Nationalism seeks to give the group primacy over the individual, which—as we see with more and more stark evidence today—contains the seeds of real human evils. As one of the neo-fascist thugs in the film *My Beautiful Launderette* says, "You have to belong to something." Extrapolating from the film, this statement

about the need for belonging can be interpreted in two possible ways: Either fascism is a uniquely evil expression of an otherwise benign human need for belonging; or there is a kind of latent fascism implicit in any impulse towards group belonging. I find myself unable to dismiss the element of truth expressed in the second interpretation. Again, given this choice between alienating liberalism and the latent evil in any fully consistent nationalism, my response is that there has to be another alternative.

In the preceding section, I proposed a name for this desired alternative, and it takes no more than the display of this banner ("republicanism") to be plunged into the swirling controversies that animate contemporary citizenship theory (as the exemplary essays in this collection so well illustrate).⁴⁷ Of course, the term "republican citizenship," conjuring up images of robust civic involvement and citizenly commitment, necessarily implies a rebuke to liberalism, with its minimalist conception of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship (preferring to define citizenship in terms of rights and entitlements).⁴⁸ These two opposing visions of what citizenship requires are nicely encapsulated in Richard Flathman's contrast between "high citizenship" and "low citizenship," and the contention between them remains one of the central debates carried on by theorists of citizenship. The republican vision is associated with the enthusiasms of theorists like Hannah Arendt, Benjamin Barber, Skinner and Pocock, Charles Taylor, and myself, and these enthusiasms get a sceptical reception from Flathman, Michael Ignatieff, Kymlicka and Norman, and George Kelly, among the contributors to this volume.⁴⁹ But as Kelly rightly emphasizes, we are not in a position to determine what intensity of human energies to invest in the activities of citizenship until we have established the character of the civic relationship, and the nature of the political community whose legal and ethical bonds define the idea of citizenship. Theorizing citizenship requires that one take up questions having to do with membership, national identity, civic allegiance, and all the commonalities of sentiment and obligation that prompt one to feel that one belongs to *this* political community rather than *that* political community; and as this introduction has sought to sketch, precisely these questions remain as puzzling as ever, perhaps considerably more so in an age when the planetary

scope of politics makes the national state appear more like a municipal arena. In this sense, the choice between "high citizenship" and "low citizenship" waits upon a better understanding of the civic community that presumes to make claims upon us as citizens.

Notes

1. Cf. J. G. A. Pocock: "I recall reading, a couple of months ago, an article in the *Economist* forecasting that Canada might become the first post-modern democracy, and wondering whether this was an encouraging prospect." This volume, p. 47.

2. Of course, this aspect of the contemporary world economy is a direct entailment of liberalism as applied to the realm of economics. For a good recent statement of the connection between political liberalism and economic liberalism, see James Fallows, "What Is an Economy For?," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 1994, pp. 76-92. As Fallows makes clear, the Western liberal commitment to the primacy of universal markets over national borders necessarily undermines the claims of citizenship in the formation of economic policy. (Thus, Western nations typically treat their citizens as consumers first and foremost, whereas Asian societies like Japan typically require that the welfare of consumers be subordinated to their interests as members of a distinct political community.)

3. For an account of the globalizing, and therefore implicitly anticivic, thrust of the liberal tradition, see Joseph H. Carens's contribution to this volume (chapter 8).

4. This volume, pp. 255-256. The crisis of immigration and the crisis concerning European integration are clearly connected. The nature of this connection is nicely summarized by Jean-Marie Colombani, editor of *Le Monde*: "Just when we need a sense of strong nationhood to help integrate and absorb a new generation of immigrants, with different races and religions, the French are asked to transfer their allegiance to some vague European idea. This contradiction is feeding an identity crisis and undermining trust in our political leadership." Cited in *The Washington Post*, Sunday, 21 Mar. 1993, p. A32.

5. As Michael Ignatieff lays out with great lucidity in chapter 2, the modern welfare state was intended to embody a definite *civic* ideal, in the sense that it grew out of the conviction that the state would have to guarantee a modicum of material security in an insecure world if it were

serious about giving a content to citizenship that a relentlessly market-based society would otherwise betray without limit. In this respect, the willingness of contemporary Western democracies to tolerate a much greater flux in the structures of economic life, entailing a greatly reduced security of employment, cannot help but be symptomatic of a profound crisis in the idea of citizenship. (This volume, p. 69; George Kelly's critique of what he labels "Civil II," in chapter 3, strikes me as failing to appreciate sufficiently this civic aspiration at the root of the expansion of the welfare state.)

6. For an elaboration of this phenomenon with respect to the European Community (viz., European federalism as a source, paradoxically, of Le Penism), see Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Pursuing a Chimera: Nationalism at Odds With the Idea of a Federal Europe," *Times Literary Supplement*, 13 Mar. 1992, pp. 3-4.

7. Ronald Beiner, *What's the Matter With Liberalism?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p.109.

8. Cf. Ernest Gellner, "From the Ruins of the Great Contest," *Times Literary Supplement*, 13 Mar. 1992, p. 10: "A modern society is a mass, anonymous one in which work is semantic not physical, and in which men can only claim effective economic and political citizenship if they can operate the language and culture of the bureaucracies which surround them. The socio-economic processes which helped establish a liberal and consumerist society in the West also engendered nationalism, for men can only live comfortably in political units dedicated to the maintenance of the same culture as their own. So in the West, the emergence of modernity was accompanied by the emergence of nationalism."

9. On nationalism as a reaction against deracination, cf. Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," in *Against the Current*, ed. Henry Hardy (London: Hogarth Press, 1979), pp. 349, 351-352.

10. See, for instance, John Keane, "The Limits of State Action," in Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 1-30. While Keane is certainly a proponent of the "civil society argument," he fully appreciates why traditional leftists are uneasy about promoting the autonomy of civil society at the expense of the state.

11. This volume, p. 169.

12. This volume, p. 170.

13. See G. M. Tamás, "The Legacy of Dissent," *Times Literary Supplement*, 14 May 1993, pp. 14-19, for a good account of the reasons for

the appeal of the antipolitical slogan, "civil society," and of its sorry consequences in post-Communist Eastern Europe. For another useful critique of the civil society argument, see Elizabeth Kiss, "Democracy Without Parties?," in *Dissent* (Spring 1992), pp. 226-231.

14. See chapter 6 in this volume, as well as Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also chapter 10 in this volume, pp. 301-309.

15. Will Kymlicka, *Recent Work in Citizenship Theory*, A report prepared for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, September 1992, p.24. (This is a fuller version of chapter 10 in this volume.)

16. A good analysis, in the Canadian context, of what the "politics of difference" does to citizenship, and of how civic solidarity becomes hopelessly fragmented when each interest group puts in its own distinct claim for recognition, is offered in an unpublished paper by Reg Whitaker entitled "What is the Problem With Democracy?". At its worst, the politics of difference is really just a new, trendier version of the old liberal interest group politics, not less cynical for all the leftist patina that accompanies it. For a fuller analysis of the Canadian situation with respect to citizenship, see Alan C. Cairns, "The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship," in *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, ed. William Kaplan (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 181-220.

17. Roger Scruton, "In Defense of the Nation," in Scruton, *The Philosopher on Dover Beach* (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), pp. 299-337.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

19. Scruton insists that the communitarian ideal of thinkers like Walzer, Sandel, and Taylor offers no remedy to the emptiness of liberalism because these theorists fail to recognize that real community entails an affirmation of "sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life's meaning depends upon obedience, and also on vigilance against the enemy" (*ibid.*, p. 310). Relative to this exacting standard, Scruton would surely say that my efforts to map out an alternative to the liberal idea of political membership really amount to just another version of liberalism.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 318.

21. Parekh is the prime target in the Scruton essay cited in the preceding notes.

22. Bhikhu Parekh, "The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy," *Political Studies* Vol. 38, 1990, p. 701. For a more balanced view of the reciprocal obligations of majority and minority cultures, see Parekh, "British Citizenship and Cultural Difference," in *Citizenship*, ed. Geoff Andrews (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), pp. 183–204.

23. As is alluded to in my examples, this argument is coming to a boil in France in the political debates concerning assimilation of the Muslim North African population concentrated in the absolutely wretched suburbs circling most of the major cities, especially in the South. The F. N., like Scruton, argues that this is not a matter of racism, but of "national identity." The Socialist government, with Kofi Yamgnane as Secretary of State for Integration, attempted, I believe, to move towards something like what Habermas means by "constitutional patriotism." That is, one cannot be a proper French citizen without being able to accept, for instance, the equality of women, or without being able to serve in the French army in a war against Iraq, and so forth. For a good summary of these dilemmas, see *L'Express*, 31 Oct. 1991, pp. 74–88.

24. Does it make sense to apply the term "nationalism" to historical phenomena such as the process of Italian unification during the *Risorgimento* and the founding of Czechoslovakia under Masaryk? This would seem confusing insofar as we tend to think of nationalism today as a separatist force seeking to subdivide existing states according to national-ethnic criteria, whereas Italy under the leadership of Mazzini and Garibaldi and Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Masaryk built up political communities that joined together national subcommunities (Czechs and Slovaks in the case of Czechoslovakia; regional subgroups in the case of Italy). For the same reason, I would hesitate to speak of chauvinistic attitudes in America as "American nationalism," whereas the militancy of, for instance, Black Muslim groups in America would easily qualify as nationalistic. Perhaps what we require here is a distinction, corresponding to my national-civic/national-ethnic distinction, that distinguishes movements of national self-determination that gather together different groups in a more encompassing political entity and those that split up larger political entities along ethnic or religious lines. This would allow us to distinguish, for instance, the "synthesizing nationalism" of Czechoslovakia in 1918 from the divisive Czech and Slovak nationalisms we are witnessing today (and a similar process of deunification is afoot in contemporary Italy). Thus, one might opt for labels such as: a building-up or integrating nationalism vs. a demolishing or tearing-asunder nationalism; however, as a point of terminology, I would prefer to reserve the term nationalism strictly for the latter. I am grateful to Clifford Orwin for pressing me to clarify this point.

25. See Jürgen Habermas, "Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity," in Habermas, *The New Conservatism*, ed. Shierry Weber Nicholzen (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 249–267.

26. For a somewhat similar laying-out of alternatives, see William Rogers Brubaker, "Introduction," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. Brubaker (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 3–6. In saying that I find the multiculturalist alternative unsatisfactory, I don't mean to suggest that claims by cultural minorities for special treatment are always destructive of citizenship, or that they should never be accommodated. On the contrary, I am in full agreement with Kymlicka and Norman's conclusion (p. 309 below) that, given the great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations in multination states, it would not be realistic to expect any generalized answer to the question of how to reconcile common citizenship identity with more particularistic group identities. One must go from case to case and from country to country, and see what actually works in different situations. Federalism is obviously a major device for trying to accommodate cultural differences while preserving common citizenship.

27. These views are typically derived from what Charles Taylor rightly calls half-baked neo-Nietzschean subjectivism. *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 70.

28. It is more than a little ironic that Nietzsche is generally cited as the patron saint of the post-modern movement, for Nietzsche anticipated by a hundred years this aspect of post-modernism—namely its "deconstruction" of a unitary culture—and bitterly criticized what he foresaw: see his discussion of the "style of decadence" in *The Case of Wagner*, section 7.

29. Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands* (London: Granta Books, 1991), p. 394: "*The Satanic Verses* celebrates hybridity. impurity, intermingling. . . . It rejoices in mongrelization. . . . *Mélange*, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that. . . . is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to embrace it. *The Satanic Verses* is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining. It is a love-song to our mongrel selves." Cf. Edward Said (*ibid.*, p. 182): "The whole notion of crossing over, of moving from one identity to another, is extremely important to me, being as I am—as we all are—a sort of hybrid."

30. This volume, pp. 47–48.

31. For a classic statement of this older vision of citizenship, see Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960),

pp. 9–11. In line with Wolin's delineation of the term "political," a society deserves to be thought of as a "polis" to the extent that it transcends groupism.

32. It is of decisive importance in this connection that one distinguish between countries like Israel and (contemporary) Germany, where citizenship laws are based on ethnic criteria, and countries like Canada and France, where citizenship laws avoid ethnic criteria. As is pointed out in a perceptive Toronto *Globe and Mail* editorial ("Behind Europe's fear of the foreigner," 21 June 1993, p. A10), there is a disturbing tendency, in France for example, in the direction of ethnically defined citizenship. For further discussion of this contrast between the French "state-centered" conception and the German "Volk-centered" conception, see Brubaker, "Introduction," pp. 7–9; and William Rogers Brubaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis," *International Sociology* Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 379–407. See also Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging* (Toronto: Viking, 1993), pp. 3–10. I am much indebted to Nissim Rejwan for giving me a sharper angle on these questions, particularly on the issue of how nationalism contradicts the universalistic implications of the idea of citizenship.

33. Among the forms of social cleavage that may or may not coincide with national-ethnic cleavages, religion, of course, looms extremely large. One thinks, for instance, of recent efforts by Hindu extremists to subvert the tradition of secularism in post-colonial India. See Amartya Sen, "The Threats to Secular India," *The New York Review of Books*, 8 Apr. 1993, pp. 26–32.

34. I have tried to develop this reading of Rousseau in an essay entitled "Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil Religion," *The Review of Politics* Vol. 55, No. 4 (Fall, 1993), pp. 617–638. What I draw from Book 4, chapter 8 of Rousseau's *Social Contract* is the following schema:

liberalism = Christianity = anti-civic
 nationalism = the "national religions" = parochial, inhuman
 citizenship = the non-existent civil religion that would combine,
 impossibly, the universalism of Christianity and
 the civic character of the national religions.

35. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 162.

36. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 160.

37. It strikes me that the message of *The Satanic Verses* is in this respect exactly the same as the *Social Contract* (both books, on my reading, are committed to the dual teaching of the soullessness of cosmopolitanism and the inhumanity of tribalism), and it is interesting that in the twentieth-century case no differently than in the eighteenth-century case, the inner ambivalence of the author in relation to the contest between tribalism and cosmopolitanism does not spare his book the fate of being burned by members of his own tribe.

38. The same applies to Hegel's idea of citizenship as combining in a higher synthesis the substantiality of preliberal political community with liberalism's respect for universal humanity. Hegel, however, entertained the extravagant assumption that the historical evolution of the modern state somehow guaranteed the emergence of this synthesis. I fully share Hegel's aspiration for something more robust than liberal citizenship that does not involve relinquishing liberal principles, but I see nothing in the cultural and political experience of the last two centuries that warrants Hegel's confidence that the conditions for the realization of his civic ideal are already inscribed in the historical reality of the modern state.

39. I owe non-Canadians some words of explanation. Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada between 1968 and 1984, left as his main legacy for the country a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that brought about a major shift away from Canada's tradition of parliamentary supremacy in the direction of a more American tradition of individual rights upheld by a Supreme Court. Trudeau and his followers fought strenuously, and so far successfully, against two major constitutional initiatives by the Mulroney government (the first, defeated in 1990; the second, defeated in 1992) that would have strengthened the prerogatives of collectivities. The argument of Trudeau and the Trudeauites is that these initiatives are a betrayal of the Charter's vision of the equal citizenship of rights-bearing individuals throughout the polity. Jacques Parizeau, current leader of the Parti Québécois, the nationalist-separatist party in Quebec, was equally opposed to the Mulroney constitutional initiatives. In his case, however, the grounds of opposition were not that too much was being conceded to the claims of collectivities, but rather that not enough (at least as concerns Quebec) was being conceded to collective aspirations.

40. It is a nice illustration of the ironies of Canadian citizenship that the leading spokesperson of "Anglo" liberalism in Canada is a French-Canadian!

41. In particular, my formula makes it seem as if nationalism were absent on the Czech side of the new border. As a corrective, it is worth noting that the new citizenship law adopted in the Czech Republic reposes on an ethnic classification that has the consequence that many Gypsies who had been citizens of Czechoslovakia find themselves stripped of Czech citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that they had been born on Czech soil; in this respect, the new law appears to follow the exclusivist German model rather than the inclusivist French model (see note 32 above).

42. I allude to this problem of why liberalism and nationalism offer unsatisfactory alternatives to each other in *What's the Matter With Liberalism?*, p. 123 and p. 110, note 33.

43. Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 160.

44. See Edward Said's defense of Palestinian nationalism in Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands*, p. 183: one cherishes national particularity because "twentieth-century mass society has destroyed identity in so powerful a way." Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 388: "rootless cosmopolitanism... is the fate toward which modernity moves."

45. Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands*, p. 175. It is striking that Said and Rushdie are so keen to unearth a distinctive Palestinian national identity, notwithstanding their remarks in celebration of hybridity and mongrelization cited elsewhere in this essay. They seem to allow themselves a little bit of irony here, but not so much irony as to upset their political purpose.

46. The seamy side of nationalism will be conceded by any nationalist who stops to reflect on *another* people's nationalism, rather than that of one's own people. By the same token, nationalists are more likely to acknowledge the extent to which the division of the human race into nations is governed by the contingent, the arbitrary, the accidental, when they consider their enemies. Note, for instance, how the moral arbitrariness of nations gets recognized in the opposing ideologies of two arch-nationalists: the pan-Arabism of Saddam Hussein, according to which the distinction between the Iraqi and the Kuwaiti nation is artificial; and the pan-Arabism of Ariel Sharon, according to which the distinction between the Jordanian and the Palestinian nation is artificial. If even diehard nationalists like these are able to realize, however perversely, the dependence upon paltry accidents of history of the boundaries between seemingly established nations, then perhaps there is some ground for hope that more moderate

nationalists will come to entertain similar insights into the contingency and evident arbitrariness of national differences.

47. For an excellent panorama of the various current debates, as well as a very helpful bibliography, see chapter 10 in this volume.

48. See, for example, Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Democracy and the Citizen: Community, Dignity, and the Crisis of Contemporary Politics in America," in *How Democratic Is The Constitution?*, ed. Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 79–101; and Sheldon Wolin, "What Revolutionary Action Means Today," in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London & New York: Verso, 1992), pp. 240–253. For a good elaboration of a paradigmatically liberal idea of citizenship, see Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

49. For some contemporary samples of the "high citizenship" view, see Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1965); Quentin Skinner, "On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty," in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, ed. Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1992), pp. 211–224; Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures," in Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes*, ed. Guy Laforest (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 59–119. For critical responses to the republican tradition, see chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 in this volume.