# 1

# Doublings

One cannot (therefore) have begun.

For one will always only have begun again, redoubling what will always already have commenced.

*Redoubling*—the word is itself double, saying again in its prefix the repetition, reproduction, that is said in *doubling*. Its sense too is double: it means both to double and to double again—hence, a doubling itself subject to doubling, reiterable without a controlling limit, doublings. As in the exhortation that Shakespeare has Gaunt deliver to Bolingbroke:

And let thy blows doubly redoubled
Fall like amazing thunder. . . .[1]

*Doubly redoubled*: the phrase itself doubles what *redoubled* alone (in its double sense) already says, thus both saying and enacting doublings.

To begin will always be (or prove to have been) redoubling—which is to say no beginning at all.

Even for Socrates, paradigmatic figure of the beginning of philosophy. He (too) must redouble his effort and can begin only by beginning again, by setting out on a δεύτερος πλοῦς. His final discourse, spoken in the face of death, recounts his redoubling turn to discourse, his re-

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1. Shakespeare, *Richard II*, act 1, sc. 3, lines 80–81.

course to λόγοι. The turn traces out the scene on which the history of metaphysics will be played out. For it is a turn away from the blinding vision of origin: Socrates will "be careful not to suffer the misfortune that befalls people who look at and study the sun during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyesight unless they look at its image [εἰκών] in water or something of the sort." A turn, then, to images. And yet, also a turn to λόγοι: "I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things [τὰ πράγματα] with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to λόγοι and examine in them the truth of beings [τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν]."[2] Both the discourse that follows in the *Phaedo* (which interprets the recourse as issuing in ὑπόθεσις) as well as those around the center of the *Republic* that are linked most closely with the pivotal discourse of the *Phaedo* serve to demonstrate that the recourse to λόγοι is nothing but a way of redoubling the drive to origin, of posing in every instance the thing itself (τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό)[3] as εἶδος and thus (re)launching the advance toward the originals. It is thus anything but simply a recourse to images, and one soon realizes that a redoubling haunts that very turn with which philosophy would begin. The turn is, at the same time—in Greek one would say, more appropriately, ἅμα— both originary, releasing an advance toward the origin, *and* regressive, directing one back to the images through which, if not among which, one would advance only by a kind of double vision. Thus, the double turn both directs one toward the origin and opens the space of the difference between the εἴδη and the things of sense. In turn, the εἴδη will only double in a sense, in sense itself, in sense as such, the things of sense, doubling thus the very sense of sense, establishing the limits that delimit (almost) the most gigantic of spaces, the scene of every γιγαν-τομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας.

After Nietzsche—if not already in the Platonic inscription of the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (which fathers images—doubles—of itself), to say nothing of the χώρα (the mother of images, the virtually unspeakable condition of doublings)—one can no longer—that is, it turns out that one never could—be assured of controlling this doubling, of limiting it by referral to the delimiting origin. For when the true world finally becomes a fable, it is not only the (no longer) true origin that is set adrift but also the very doubling of sense. Now writing, whose very sense is in

2. Plato, *Phaedo*, 99d–e.
3. Plato, *Epistle* VII, 341c.

a sense to double sense, cannot but drift as on the open sea, on beyond "the land of truth," on beyond that "island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits," out upon "the wide and stormy ocean."[4]

As if, again, on a δεύτερος πλοῦς. But now still more openly exposed to doublings. A writing amidst doublings.

Which is to say (also) a writing of—in the double sense of the genitive—a certain release of mimesis, a writing that would exceed the interpretation of mimesis that, inscribed in the Platonic texts, has governed, among other things, the history of the relationship between philosophy and literature. Even in the Platonic interpretation, mimetic doubling involves a mechanism that foils any effort at a controlling inscription, except perhaps one that would itself double textually (as in certain dialogues) the very logic that the mechanism releases. In its very simplest schema this "sort of logical machine"—as Derrida calls it in "The Double Session"—consists in the following: mimesis both furthers and hinders the disclosure of the thing itself, disclosing the thing by resembling it but obscuring it by substituting a double in place of it.[5]

Another, related mechanism is outlined in one of Derrida's discussions of Saussure in *Of Grammatology*.[6] The discussion belongs to that moment of double reading in which one undertakes to expose a certain doubling interior to the text itself, a doubling by which the metaphysical solidarities that are marked undergo a certain destabilization. The solidarity in question is phonocentrism, the subordination of writing to speech. For Saussure this subordination is secured within the order of mimesis as representation: "Language [*Langage*] and writing are two distinct systems of signs: the second *exists for the sole purpose* of representing [*représenter*] the first" (*G* 46; *C* 45—Derrida's emphasis). Writing would thus be related to human speech in the global sense (*langage*)

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4. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in vol. 3 of *Werke: Akademie Textausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), A 235/B 294–95.

5. Derrida writes that "the whole history of the interpretation of the literary arts has moved and been transformed within the diverse logical possibilities opened by the concept of *mimesis*. These are numerous, paradoxical, and disconcerting enough to have released a very rich combinatorial system." Derrida adds a note outlining this logic in two propositions and six possible consequences and concluding: "this schema . . . forms a sort of logical machine; it programs the prototypes of all the propositions inscribed in Plato's discourse as well as in that of the tradition" (*La Dissémination* [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972], 213). The simple schema that I suggest here is discussed in *Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), chap. l.

6. *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967)—references indicated in text by *G*. Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (Paris: Payot, 1980)—references indicated in text by *C*.

as outside to inside. Since writing is "foreign to the internal system" (*G* 50; *C* 44), it is to be excluded from the field of linguistics, spoken language alone constituting the object of that science. Thus would linguistics be rigorously delimited: "External/internal, image/reality, representation/presence, such is the old grid to which is given the task of outlining the field of a science" (*G* 50). Thus, in turn, is marked the solidarity of Saussurian linguistics with one of the oldest chains of metaphysical concepts. What produces a certain doubling back over this mark is Saussure's inability simply to disregard writing: "Thus, although writing is foreign to the internal system, it is impossible to disregard a process by which language is continually represented [*figurée*]" (*C* 44). Writing cannot be disregarded because, even if properly outside, it is not in fact simply outside but has always already contaminated spoken language, invading the interior and usurping the role that belongs properly to spoken language. Saussure cannot but denounce this inversion of the natural relationship and propose to protect speech from the violent intrusion of writing, to restore thus the natural relationship. What is especially to be denounced is the usurpation: writing (a mere representation, an image, of speech) becomes so intertwined with speech (the presence, the reality, the original) that there is an inversion, a perversion, in which it comes to seem that speech is an image of writing. In place of the rigorous distinction between the original reality and the representational image, there is a mingling of image with original, a confusion that Saussure can only denounce as a dangerous promiscuity—dangerous because it obscures the origin, dividing it from itself. Hence the mechanism:

> There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split *in itself* [*se dédouble en soi-même*] and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles [*Le reflet, l'image, le double dédouble ce qu'il redouble*]. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three. The historical usurpation and theoretical bizarreness that install the image within the rights of reality are determined as the *forgetting* of a simple origin. (*G* 55)

Determined as (merely) a forgetting of a simple origin, this mechanism by which the double splits, and thus redoubles, that of which it is

the double—this doubling operation is also determined by Saussure as catastrophe or monstrosity. Derrida cites from the *Course in General Linguistics*: "Language [*La langue*] is independent of writing" (*C* 45); and then, assuming (one of) the voice(s) of Saussure, he continues: "such is the truth of nature. And yet nature is affected—from without— by an overturning that modifies it in its interior, denatures it, and obliges it to deviate from itself. Nature denaturing itself, deviating *from itself*, naturally gathering its outside into its inside, is *catastrophe*, a natural event that overturns nature, or *monstrosity*, a natural deviation within nature" (*G* 61).[7] Thus catastrophe, monstrosity, within the very order of mimesis, released by the very logic of such doubling. Or rather, what— within a certain interpretation of mimesis, within *the* interpretation of mimesis that both governs and is governed by metaphysics and its his- tory—can only appear as catastrophic, as monstrous.

Writing as catastrophic doubling. Writing of monstrous doubling— again in the double sense of the genitive.

How, then, is a δεύτερος πλοῦς to be undertaken again? How is the turn that is inscribed in the Platonic texts (most succinctly in the pivotal discourse of the *Phaedo*) to be reinscribed in a writing of monstrous doubling? No doubt, by remarking the metaphysical inscriptions, sub- mitting those texts to a double mark, a double reading and writing.[8]

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7. Saussure offers several examples of such inversion, such monstrosity: "But the tyranny of the letter goes even further. By imposing itself upon the masses, it influences and modifies language. This happens only in very literary languages where written texts play an important role. Then vi- sual images lead to wrong pronunciations; such mistakes are really [ *proprement*] pathological. This happens often in French. Thus for the surname *Lefèvre* (from Latin *faber*) there were two spellings, one popular and simple, *Lefèvre*, the other learned and etymological, *Lefèbvre*. Because *v* and *u* were not distinct in the old system of writing, *Lefèbvre* was read as *Lefèbure*, with a *b* that had never really existed in the word and a *u* that was the result of ambiguity. Now the latter form is actually pronounced" (*C* 53–54). Citing this passage, Derrida asks: "Where is the evil? . . . And what has been invested in the 'living word' that makes such 'aggressions' of writing intolerable? What investment begins by determining the constant action of writing as a deformation and an ag- gression? What prohibition has thus been transgressed? Where is the sacrilege? Why should the mother tongue be protected from the operation of writing?" (*G* 61). Saussure predicts that such vi- olence exercised by writing upon speech will only increase in the future: "It is probable that these deformations will become ever more frequent and that the silent letters [*les lettres inutiles*] will come more and more to be pronounced. In Paris one already pronounces the *t* in *sept femmes*; Darmesteter foresees the day when one will pronounce even the last two letters of *vingt*—truly an orthographic monstrosity" (*C* 54).

8. "This structure of the *double mark* . . . works the entire field within which these texts move. This structure itself is worked in turn: the rule according to which every concept necessarily receives two similar marks—repetition without identity—one mark inside and the other outside the decon- structed system, should give rise to a double reading and a double writing" (*La Dissémination*, 10).

Among those inscriptions there is one that enjoys a certain privilege: a privilege, to be sure, with respect to Derrida's own itinerary, but also a certain limited privilege in principle. For in his readings of the Husserlian texts[9] what Derrida undertakes to demonstrate—or at least to begin to confirm—is "that the recourse to phenomenological critique is the metaphysical project itself, in its historical achievement and in the purity, yet now restored [*seulement restaurée*], of its origin" (*V* 3). What Derrida submits to double reading in *Voice and Phenomenon* is a decisive reinscription of the beginning of metaphysics, a redoubling that would restore the original precisely in the double. Thus it is that, while proposing to relate his texts by way of a strange geometry that would allow them to be, for instance, stapled in the middle of each other, he grants nonetheless that "in a classical philosophical architecture *Voice* [*and Phenomenon*] would come first [*en premier lieu*]."[10]

The voice is the pivot on which Derrida's text turns. It is what would empower speech, what would grant to expression the capacity to become transparent, self-effacing, in such a way as to allow the expressed meaning to present itself in its pure ideality. Thus would expression be differentiated from mere indication, which would always remain outside this sphere of pure diaphaneity. Thus would Husserl, within the limits of the affinity of this differentiation to the Aristotelian differentiation between speech and writing, also authorize the classical concept of writing as the visible-spatial doubling of speech—even if less dogmatically than Saussure, even if also finally, in "The Origin of Geometry," uncovering a decisive (and disruptive) connection between writing and ideality.[11] On the other side, Husserl would protect the ideality of meaning from all empirical contamination, rigorously differentiating expression from sense experience, marking them as distinct strata and precisely thereby undertaking to control the doubling that now comes to double the Platonic turn.

Everything depends, then, on the reduction that Husserl attempts to carry out in the first chapter of the First Logical Investigation. Here it is a matter of the reduction of indication: beginning—though in a sense also

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9. Primarily *La Voix et le phénomène: Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967)—references indicated in text by *V*. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968)—references indicated in text by *LU*.

10. *Positions* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 13.

11. See Introduction to Husserl's *L'Origin de la géométrie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 83ff.

not beginning, in more than one sense—with the general concept of sign, Husserl's analysis generates a series of "essential distinctions" by which what is nonessential, merely indicative, is separated off from the concept of meaningful sign, from expression, which through the reduction thus comes to be circumscribed in its essence. The reduction is in effect—or rather, in its intended effect—an eidetic reduction of language.

And yet, Husserl evades the beginning; he begins, not at the beginning, but only at a point where a doubling has already come into play and produced a differentiation. Derrida notes that Husserl forgoes taking up the question of the sign *in general*, that he limits himself to the observation that every sign is a sign for something, without inquiring about what it means to be a sign for something. Instead of beginning at the beginning by asking "What is a sign in general?" Husserl proceeds almost immediately to the radical dissociation between two kinds of signs, to the heterogeneity between expression and indication (*Ausdruck, Anzeige*). Derrida notes too that this move may be regarded as an operation of that same logocentric orientation that in general leads Husserl to subordinate the reflection on signs to logic and to undertake such reflection only within his *Logical Investigations*: Husserl's logocentrism would divert his analysis too quickly, dogmatically, in the direction of logical, meaningful signs, i.e., expressions. Yet, on the other hand, Derrida hastens to add, Husserl's strategy can also be regarded as the very opposite of dogmatism, as a kind of critical vigilance. Specifically, it can be regarded as his refusal to introduce some presumptive—that is, presupposed—comprehension of the concept of sign in general. Thus, Husserl would in effect have foregone assuming that there is *a* concept of sign, capable then of being divided into two different kinds of signs; he would in effect have left open the possibility of there being two irreducible concepts improperly attached to the same word. Thus, there would prove to have been a curious complicity between Husserl's logocentrism and his critical vigilance: led by his logocentric orientation to seek the essence of sign in expression and meaning, he would precisely thereby have been drawn away from positing a presumptive general concept of sign. An even more critical vigilance could then also have been brought into play, one that would put the very question into question. For if one were to ask "*What is* a sign in general?" one would have presumed by the very form of the question that it is a matter of asking about the truth or essence of the sign—that is, one would not have asked whether a sign is such a thing as can have an essence. Is it perhaps the case, on the contrary, that essence

and truth are first made possible by signs and language? In this case the classical question ("What is . . . ?" "τί ἐστι . . . ?") could not but be interrupted: "For if the sign in some way preceded what one calls truth or essence, there would be no sense in speaking of the truth or the essence of the sign" (*V* 26).

Derrida's reading retraces the Husserlian text, attempting—in the words of a contemporaneous interview—" to think the structured genealogy of its concepts in a manner most faithful, most interior";[12] yet, at the same time, drawing out what is implicit in those concepts, it would submit that text to the double mark, marking those points at which the text diverges from itself, at which one may use "against the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house."[13] *Of Grammatology* provides a more precise, more nuanced statement of what deconstruction would venture: "Within the closure, by an oblique and always perilous movement, constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse, to mark the conditions, the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness, to designate rigorously their relationship [*appartenance*] to the machine whose deconstruction they permit; and, by the same stroke, designate the crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed" (*G* 25).

Let me recall—ever so briefly—the course of the reading in which Derrida doubles deconstructively the Husserlian reduction of indication.

The first stage of the reduction corresponds to the distinction between meaningful signs and indicative signs, between expression and indication. Husserl grants that normally meaningful signs are bound up (interwoven, entangled—*verflochten*) with indicative signs; or rather, since the difference proves quickly to be more functional than substantial (*V* 20), it turns out that most signs function in both ways, that in most signs the two functions are interwoven. Nonetheless, Husserl insists that the entanglement (*Verflechtung*) of meaningful signs in an indicative function is not essential: in solitary mental life (*im einsamen Seelenleben*) meaningful signs function without indicating anything. It is clear initially that with this distinction Husserl intends to mark the difference between linguistic signs (speech—*Rede*) and non-linguistic signs. And yet, as Derrida's reading underlines, the boundary shifts in the course of

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12. *Positions*, 15.
13. *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 162.

Husserl's development of the distinction, indeed to such an extent that the very sense of the distinction changes. The shift is most conspicuous in Husserl's relegation of certain aspects of speech to the side of indication, for example, in his formulation, "facial expressions [*Mienenspiel*] and the gestures that involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent" (*LU* II/1: 31). To an extent the exclusion of these aspects from the sphere of expression is determined by their lack of fusion with the meaning-intention. What for Husserl seems most decisive is their involuntary character, their lack of intention; and indeed whatever falls outside the voluntary, animating intention he will exclude from the sphere of expression. Derrida marks the scope of this exclusion: it includes "facial expressions, gestures, the whole of the body and of mundane inscription, in a word the whole of the visible and spatial as such." For: "Visibility and spatiality as such could only lose the self-presence of will and of the spiritual animation that opens up discourse" (*V* 37). Clearly, then, it is no longer a matter of a distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic but rather of a distinction within language: "For all these reasons, the distinction between indication and expression cannot rightfully be made as one between a non-linguistic and a linguistic sign. Husserl traces a boundary that passes, not between language and non-language, but within language in general, between the explicit and the non-explicit (with all their connotations)" (*V* 39). The distinction is, within language, between the voluntary, transparent, self-present and the involuntary, external, non–self-present, that is, between the pure spiritual intention (*la pure intention spirituelle*), the pure animation by *Geist*, and those aspects of speech that involve visibility and spatiality, the bodily aspects, as it were, of speech.

Thus, the reduction of indication would enforce an assimilation of language to voluntary, self-present intentional *Leben*. It would place the essence of language on the side of the spiritual, enclosing it in the citadel of *Geist*, securing it from intrusion from without. However problematic both *Leben* and *Geist* remain in Husserl's text.

The second stage of the reduction is addressed to what Husserl circumscribes as the most pervasive indicative function. This function, the intimating function (*die kundgebende Funktion*) or simply intimation (*Kundgabe*—Derrida translates: *manifestation*), is so pervasive as to be interwoven in all communicative speech: it is that function that serves to indicate to the hearer the "thoughts" of the speaker; that is, in Husserl's formulation, intimation provides a sign "for the sense-giving

psychic experiences of the speaker, as well as for the other psychic experiences that belong to his communicative intention" (*LU* II/1: 33). For Husserl it is of utmost consequence to distinguish this intimating function from the meaning function. It is, then, precisely this distinction that the second stage of the reduction would enforce.

The turn to intimation serves to show that the reduction is not a matter simply of excluding whatever belongs to the visible-spatial order. Derrida identifies what it is, instead, that determines the reduction: "One approaches here the root of indication: there is indication whenever the sense-giving act, the animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning [*vouloir-dire*], is not fully present" (*V* 41). It is just such full presence that is lacking in facial expressions and gestures, which retain a coefficient of externality, of non-presence. The lack is more radical in the case of the meaning-intention of another person: the lived experience of the other is radically non-present. Derrida concludes:

> The notion of *presence* is the nerve of this demonstration. If communication or intimation (*Kundgabe*) is essentially indicative, it is because we have no originary intuition of the presence of the other's lived experience. Whenever the immediate and full presence of the signified is concealed, the signifier will be of an indicative nature. . . . All discourse, or rather, everything in discourse that does not restore the immediate presence of the signified content, is inexpressive. (*V* 43)

What determines the reduction is the privilege accorded to presence: any moment of discourse that does not present the signified content, any moment that is irreducible to the self-present intention, is inexpressive, that is, indicative.

In order to maintain the integrity of expression, its essential distinctness from indication, it is imperative that Husserl demonstrate that speech in solitary mental life is free of intimation. His most decisive argument in this regard is the following: "In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of psychic acts, since such indication there would be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment [*im selben Augenblick*]" (*LU* II/1: 36–37; cited in *V* 54). Whatever one might suppose to be intimated in speech in solitary mental life would in fact be experienced at that very moment, in the same moment, so that intima-

tion would be superfluous, utterly without purpose (*ganz zwecklos*). Within the moment there would be no difference to be mediated by intimation, within the *Augenblick* no alterity to be bridged by an indicative function: "The present of self-presence would be as indivisible as a *blink of the eye*" (*V* 66).

Husserl cannot but exclude also the articulated sound-complex and of course the written sign, thus distinguishing essentially between the sensible sign and those acts by which expression is more than mere uttered sounds, the acts by which something is meant. Such is the third stage of the reduction: Here again the reference to speech in solitary mental life plays a crucial role. For in monologue the sensible sign itself undergoes a kind of reduction: one speaks to oneself *in silence*. Not that words disappear entirely: one could hardly conceive an expression in which words would be utterly lacking. Husserl's recourse puts into play—without further question—a very old opposition: "In phantasy a spoken or printed word floats before us, though in truth it does not at all exist" (*LU* II/1: 36). Thus is the sensible sign reduced: as mere imagined word it is assimilated to the self-present intention, while as sounded it is consigned to indication. Despite Husserl's aim of delimiting pure expression as the very essence of meaningful signification, his analysis leaves intact only the ephemeral images of words, their imaginary doubles, and displaces their originals (what one would call the real signs) to the side, the outside, of indication, thus setting the originals outside what would be the very domain of origin: "For it is clearer and clearer that, despite the initial distinction between an indicative sign and an expressive sign, only an indication is truly a sign for Husserl" (*V* 46).

The deconstructive doubling is thus such that, on the one hand, it (re)traces the Husserlian text from within, thinking the structured genealogy of its concepts in such a way as to show that the production of the essential distinctions is in effect an eidetic reduction of language, a reduction governed by the privilege of presence; while, on the other hand, it underlines that the pure expression to which language would be reduced would be only a silent soliloquy from which all real signs would have been banished, so that the effect of the Husserlian reduction would be finally to repress the sign, redoubling the metaphysical subordination of the sign to a domain of self-presence that would essentially precede all operation of signs.

Here one can begin to discern in the Husserlian project not just a reinscription of the metaphysical project in general but specifically a redoubling of the turn that marks the beginning of metaphysics. For in the reduction to a domain of pure self-present expression prior to all operation of signs, Husserl would in effect have carried out a turn to λόγοι that, as in the beginning, would serve to redouble the drive to origin. The question is whether this domain can remain intact in its prelinguistic integrity; or whether the turn—this moment of logocentrism—will not be (re)diverted to an operation of signification from which *Bedeutung*, thus adrift, would never be free. Such a diversion is broached in deconstruction as a turn to writing, to a writing that would no longer be the mere image of speech but rather its monstrous double.

Yet, the δεύτερος πλοῦς is not only a turn to λόγοι but also a doubling that matches meaning and sense, a doubling of the sense of sense. In its Husserlian reinscription this doubling appears as a parallelism between expression (purified of indication) and sense (experience). To the reduction of signification to pure expression Husserl would add a second reduction: the reduction of pure expression to an unproductive medium that would merely reflect the pre-expressive stratum of sense, of perception. Derrida's reading is concerned to mark the condition that makes this reduction possible, the condition that allows expression to be regarded as merely reflecting the pre-expressive stratum, as merely doubling in the order of ideality the stratum of sense experience. Such doubling requires that expression recreate at its proper level the presence and self-presence allegedly characteristic of the pre-expressive level of sense: "the medium of expression must protect, respect, and restore the *presence* of sense, *both* [*à la fois*] *as the object's being before us*, open to view, and *as proximity to self in interiority*" (*V* 83). What makes such restoration of presence possible is the essential connection of expression to the voice. It is the voice that preserves presence and thus lets the ideal meaning be immediately present:

> This immediate presence results from the fact that the phenomenological "body" of the signifier seems to fade away at the very moment it is produced. It seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It phenomenologically reduces itself, transforming the worldly opacity of its body into pure diaphaneity. This effacement of the sensible body and its exteriority is for consciousness the very form of the immediate presence of the signified. (*V* 86)

In the voice the signifier effaces itself for the sake of the presence of the signified meaning; such effacement is possible only because the signifier never really escapes self-presence, because in the voice self-presence is preserved: "When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of this operation that *I hear myself at the same time* [*je m'entende dans le temps*] that I speak" (*V* 87).

Again—as with the purposelessness of indication in silent monologue—it is a matter of a certain self-coincidence in the order of time, a matter of a sameness of time that would give one back to oneself in the very unity of the moment in which one would reach out. Because the unity of the moment authorizes both reductions, it is also what determines the Husserlian reinscription of the Socratic turn.

Thus, it is on the question of time that the Husserlian project in a sense—in its doublings of sense and of the sense of sense—runs aground and prompts another δεύτερος πλοῦς that would be more openly exposed to doublings, a writing amidst doublings. For what Derrida marks in the Husserlian analysis of time, what he marks as working against the classical orientation of that analysis in a way that turns it against itself, is precisely a doubling that disrupts the unity of the moment.

Derrida's reading of the Husserlian analysis of time is even more explicitly double than his reading of the reduction of indication. On the one hand, he marks the point by which Husserl's entire analysis is inseparably linked to the metaphysical privileging of presence; that point is precisely the now-point, the punctual moment. Though Husserl grants that the now cannot be isolated as a pure stigmatic moment, as a simple point, this admission does not at all prevent its determination as a point from functioning constitutively in the analyses. Though indeed there is a certain spread from the now-point into the immediate, retended past and into the immediate, protended future—

This spread is nonetheless thought and described on the basis of [*à partir de*] the self-identity of the now as point, as "source-point." In phenomenology the idea of originary presence and in general of "beginning," "absolute beginning," *principium*, always refers back to this "source-point." . . . Despite all the complexity of its structure, temporality has a nondisplaceable center, an eye or living core, the punctuality of the actual now. (*V* 69)

It is to this punctual—and, as such, self-identical—now that Husserl appeals in the phrase "*im selben Augenblick*," by which he would demon-

strate the purposelessness of intimating indication in silent monologue. It is to this self-same now that he appeals also in conjoining, by the phrase *dans le temps*, speaking with hearing oneself, conjoining them into that self-presence of the voice that would make of expression an unproductive medium merely reflecting the pre-expressive stratum of sense. Not that Husserl is in error in making this appeal: on the contrary, he is proceeding from the most secure of grounds. He is moving within the very element of philosophy: such coincidence of intuition and presence as would be the originary as such, the originary from which every as such would be determined, the ἀρχή:

> Moreover, within philosophy there is no possible objection concerning this privilege of the present-now. This privilege defines the very element of philosophical thought, it is evidence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible concept of truth and of sense. One cannot cast suspicion upon it without beginning to get at the core of consciousness itself from a region that lies elsewhere than philosophy, a procedure that would remove every possible *security* and *ground* from discourse. (*V* 70)

Derrida proposes that—on the other hand—it is precisely Husserl's own analyses that serve to cast such suspicion and to disrupt the discourse on—the discourse of—the self-identical present. What those descriptions demonstrate is that the present is essentially, constitutively, connected to the immediate past (by retention) and the immediate future (by protention):

> One then sees very quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only insofar as it is *continuously compounded* with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention). (*V* 72)

This is to say that a nonpresence is admitted into the sphere of what would be originary presence, expanding the point, which it would come to constitute precisely in disrupting its punctuality. Thus, the self-identity of the present could no longer function as a simple origin (as present origin or originary present) but would rather be *produced* through a certain compounding of presence and nonpresence, of impression and retention, of impression and protention. Hence, the very constitution of the now, the moment, takes place as a doubling of the previous nows (or the nows to come) in the present now, i.e., as reten-

tion (or protention); and as a doubling, an unlimited repetition, of the now as such, in its ideality, as the ideal form of presence. This double doubling in which time is constituted, produced—Derrida will call it *différance*—is thus more originary than the present: it is—"if one can use this language without immediately contradicting it and erasing it—more 'originary' than the phenomenologically originary itself " (*V* 75). It will always already have introduced alterity into the moment, disrupting the "*im selben Augenblick*" and the "*dans le temps*," thus disrupting too the parallelism of indication/expression/sense that would be erected on the ground of that unity. When time begins, a monstrous doubling will already have begun; and it is only by repressing such catastrophe that one can be assured of controlling the doubling of sense marked by the Socratic turn. Deconstruction would release the monster from the cave and begin to write amidst doublings.

The stratification will be ruined, its schema disrupted, the schema that comes to govern and structure almost the entire program of phenomenology from *Ideas* on, a schema with a strong affinity to the classical schema stemming from Aristotle's *On Interpretation*, in which writing, like indication for Husserl, is determined as an outside of speech, as doubling it in the visible order. For the Husserlian schema, which would determine the orders of indication, expression, and sense as distinct, parallel strata, requires precisely those reductions—the reduction of indication and the reduction of expression to an unproductive medium—that are shown by Derrida's reading to rely on the unity, the self-identity, of the present. As soon as the appeal to the self-presence of the "*im selben Augenblick*" is interrupted by the deconstruction of the Husserlian time-analysis, the distinctness and parallelism between indication and expression is ruined: indication—especially in the form of intimation—cannot be kept out of expression, not even in silent monologue. Correspondingly, as soon as the appeal to the "*dans le temps*" that would unite speaking with hearing-oneself-speaking is interrupted, the reduction of expression to an unproductive medium that would merely image sense—in a doubling both controllable and thematizable as such (*Experience and Judgment* would broach such a thematization)—is likewise ruined.

What is at issue at both levels is self-affection. There is no disputing the uniqueness of the voice as a form of self-affection: one can hear-oneself-speak "without passing through an external detour, the world, the non-own [*non-propre*] in general" (*V* 88). There is marked contrast,

for instance, with seeing oneself or touching oneself, for in these instances the exterior belongs inseparably to the field of the self-affection; whereas the voice in its purity would return one to oneself this side of any exteriority, fashioning a sphere of self-doubling that would open only upon meaning in its ideality, upon the universal (*das Allgemeine*):

> As pure self-affection, the operation of hearing-oneself-speak [*s'entendre-parler*] seems to reduce even the inward surface of one's own body; in its phenomenon it seems capable of dispensing with this exteriority within interiority, this interior space in which our experience or image of our own body is spread forth. This is why hearing-oneself-speak is experienced as an absolutely pure self-affection, in a self-proximity that would be the absolute reduction of space in general. It is this purity that makes it fit for universality. (*V* 88–89)

For Derrida there is no question of retracting the results of Husserl's minute, rigorous, and quite novel analyses: the uniqueness of the voice and its distinctive capacity for universality is to be acknowledged. Derrida insists even that vocal self-affection is "no doubt the possibility for what is called *subjectivity* or the *for-itself*," that, even further, "the voice *is* consciousness" (*V* 89). Yet, because the voice is submitted to time, to the production that cannot but introduce alterity into the moment, vocal self-affection cannot be—despite its capacity to reduce exteriority—a matter of pure undivided hearing-oneself-speak. Alterity will always already have been operative in the production of vocal self-presence, dividing one from oneself in advance of the very production of one-self, of subjectivity, of consciousness. In vocal self-affection it is not as though there is first a being (the self, subjectivity, consciousness), which then comes to affect itself through the circuit of hearing-oneself-speak. There (is) the (movement of) self-affection—the parentheses marking here the erasure that writing amidst doublings must bring into play. It is from the differential operation of self-affection that the self-coherent self, the self itself, would be produced:

> The movement of *différance* is not something that happens to a transcendental subject. It produces the subject. Self-affection is not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that would already be itself (*autos*). It produces the same as self-relation within self-difference, the same as the non-identical. (*V* 92)

The production of time is also a matter of self-affection. Referring to Heidegger's analysis in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Derrida writes: "The 'source-point,' the 'originary impression,' from which the movement of temporalization is produced [*à partir de quoi se produit*...] is already pure self-affection" (*V* 93). The structure of this self-affection, of the production of time, of temporality, is not only complex but also such as to interrupt the very language that the analysis nonetheless requires, thus also such as to demand, then, a different writing, a writing of difference, a writing amidst doublings. The analysis extends that of the retentional and protentional structures and involves—to proceed very schematically—three points. First: temporality is *pure production*. There is not some being in which temporality would then come to be produced: there (is) simply production of temporality without any being in which it would inhere. Second: the now, the "originary" impression, *engenders itself*. It is not produced by any being, not produced by anything. Such is its "absolute novelty": to be engendered by nothing, to engender itself without having somehow been there in advance of the self-affective engendering. If one steadily erases (unsaying in the very saying) such locutions as "being there" ("there is") and "in advance," one may say: the now produces itself in a doubling in which there is no original in advance of the double it produces. Third: this self-engendering doubling is (also) a self-differing, that is, the now doubles itself in such a way as to become a not-now to be retained in another now. Thus Derrida refers to

> the process by which the living now, producing itself by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now, be retained [*se retenir*] in another now. . . . Such a process is indeed a pure self-affection in which the same is the same only in affecting itself from the other [*s'affectant de l'autre*], only by becoming the other of the same. This self-affection must be pure, since the originary impression is here affected by nothing other than itself, by the absolute "novelty" of another originary impression that is another now. (*V* 94–95)

Because the production of time is pure self-affection (the double doubling of self-differing self-engendering), all language, taking its resources from beings, fails to say such doublings otherwise than by metaphor:

> But one has always already drifted into ontic metaphor. . . . The word "time" itself, as it has always been understood in the history

of metaphysics, is a metaphor that *at the same time* [*en même temps*] both indicates and dissimulates the "movement" of this self-affection. (*V* 95)

This peculiar metaphoricity, this transfer between being and time, is decisive for writing amidst doublings.

The double doubling of temporality and its redoubling in the sphere of the voice disrupt, then, the Husserlian schema that would determine the orders of indication, expression, and sense as distinct, parallel strata, that is, as simple, controlled doubling:

Also, just as expression does not come to be added like a "stratum" to the presence of a pre-expressive sense, so likewise the outside of indication does not come to affect accidentally the inside of expression. Their intertwining (*Verflechtung*) is originary. (*V* 97)

Between the orders of sense, expression, and indication the doublings of time and the voice would release: doublings. Thus would be prompted a δεύτερος πλοῦς as writing amidst doublings, writing those doublings as, for instance, *la différance*, as *le supplément d'origine*, but also as *mimesis* and as *doublings*. Perhaps most notably, as the doublings of *Geist*: the doublings by which spirit is haunted by spirit and ventriloquized by a phantom whose separation from what would be spirit itself cannot be secured and controlled,[14] almost a parody of spirit's return to itself. Such writing amidst doublings one could call ghost writing.

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14. See Jaques Derrida, *De L'Esprit: Heidegger et la question* (Paris: Galilee 1987), esp. 66.