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Peace and Legitimacy

Significant change in the foreign policy arena of a given state is likely to be generated by crisis or war, which are generally radical and sudden situations that involve the highest of stakes and the very essence of a state's national interest.

I will maintain that significant change in foreign policy may also be induced by the reduction and termination of a conflict, and especially by the initiation of a peace plan or by a positive response to a peace initiative on the part of the adversary. Peace initiatives and peace agreements constitute a drastic and often sudden breakpoint in pattern behavior along the peace-war continuum of a state's relations with any other actor(s) when: the stakes are the highest, most central to basic values and interests, and have the potential to spill over into the widest range of associated areas. This argument is especially appropriate to protracted conflicts, and "do not allow for any change in the fundamental grievances and continuously act to reduce the chances for any resolution of the issues." Because peace would so profoundly change the nature of interstate relations in situations of protracted conflict, "peace in this situation would constitute a breakpoint."[1]

The initiating of a peace proposal by one side and a positive response to it by the other side can constitute a significant change in foreign policy. However, a peace proposal that is not reciprocated positively by the adversary will not necessarily result in the expected change in the foreign policy of the initiator if it is compelled to relinquish its proposal. However, rejecting conciliation when it is supported by domestic demand not only disrupts the prospects of making peace but also may undermine political stability.

The initiating of a peace proposal may occur for the following reasons: (1) conflictual foreign policy does not achieve the desired aims, and decision-makers believe that by shifting from war to peace they could attain these aims; (2) continuation of conflict relations becomes too costly in terms of human and nonhuman resources, and therefore peace appears to be more rewarding than war; (3) peace is perceived to bring direct and indirect benefits (political, economic, or military); (4) leadership's compliance with external or domestic pressures to peaceful change in foreign policy. The external pressures are constraints

or inducements exerted by other states; domestic pressures are demands that come from people in the ruling elite, or from competing elites, interest groups, or the unorganized public.

Peace as a Problem for Decisionmakers

The shift from war to peace is often difficult for policymakers to contemplate or carry out, even when they favor such a course of action. This is particularly true in the case of protracted conflict. In this situation, continuing with a familiar state of hostility is easier than dealing with the unknown: "continuing a state of hostility can offer what looks like escape from a painful process of change."[2]

A shift from war to peace poses potential problems for decisionmakers. These involve not only recognition and interpretation of a new situation but also reassessment of basic attitudes and values, as well as issues of legitimacy and consensus building. When the adversary in such a conflict signals a desire to move toward peace, the question will arise as to whether his proposal of peace is sincere. Decisionmakers in a protracted conflict tend to perceive the behavior of their enemy in a manner consistent with their basic attitudes: the enemy is expected to be hostile. The truth or relevance of information not consistent with this basic belief tends to be ignored, reinterpreted, or questioned. In a similar way, information about the enemy that supports or reinforces earlier and fixed beliefs and expectations is most readily accepted and acted on.[3] "When the other party is viewed within the framework of an 'inherent bad faith' model, the image of the enemy is clearly self-perpetuating, for the model itself denies the existence of data which could invalidate it."[4] Such cognitive dynamics lead decisionmakers to dismiss conciliatory moves by the enemy.[5] The strong feelings of mutual distrust in a protracted conflict may bring the decisionmakers to regard any openness by the enemy as deception, as a tactic designed to give the enemy an advantage.

Since any attempt by the enemy to act in a conciliatory manner is inconsistent with a definition of the enemy as evil, decisionmakers have to change their attitudes and beliefs about the enemy as a precondition to reacting properly to peace initiatives. But since attitudes about enemies will be resistant to change in high-dissonance situations, the possibility of attitude change toward enemies depends on many factors, including type of conflict situation; the role of conflict in a society and culture; historical context; type of required political, ideological, or territorial concessions; idiosyncratic factors like personality and pathology, as well as individual learning capacity and adaptability; open or closed belief systems or political systems; and individual and national costs and benefits of changing attitudes versus not changing them.[6]

Resistance to a change in attitudes will be lower under the following conditions: (1) when decisionmakers feel that the shift from war to peace is their own project, not one devised and operated by outsiders; (2) when decisionmakers see the change as reducing rather than increasing their present burden; (3) when decisionmakers believe that the change accords with values and ideals that they have long acknowledged; (4) when decisionmakers feel that their autonomy and their security are not threatened by the change; (5) when decisionmakers are able to empathize with opponents, to be aware of valid objections, and to take steps to relieve unnecessary concerns; (6) when decisionmakers begin to trust one another; and (7) when the new policy is left open to reconsideration and revision if experience indicates that changes are desirable.[7]

Problems of attitude change on shifting from war to peace are the most difficult for decisionmakers involving uncertainty and value-complexity. George defines uncertainty as "the lack of adequate information about the situation at hand and/or the inadequacy of available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action."[8]

Any possibility of shifting from war to peace creates a situation of inadequate information not only about the situation and the enemy's intentions but also about the development of the peace process in the desired direction. Uncertainty of this kind complicates the task of making accurate assessments of the situation, as well as reliable cost-benefit appraisals of the alternative courses of action.[9]

Receptivity to a shift from war to peace is further complicated by value-complexity, defined as "the presence of multiple, competing values and interests that are imbedded in a single issue."[10] In such situations, each value or interest may constitute a constraint on the achievement of others, thereby necessitating trade-offs between them. Value-complexity problems are likely to occur when a state lacks sufficient resources for simultaneous realization of contradictory values. In this situation, decisionmakers find it hard, if not impossible, to formulate a single criterion of utility for judging all the competing values and interests. This forces decisionmakers to confront a value trade-off problem. They must try to order "value priorities and decide which of the competing values and interests to pursue in the given situation at the expense of other values and interests that are also at stake."[11]

Value-complexity often creates an uncomfortable situation for the decisionmaker, especially when it causes him to experience a psychological state of distress because of inconsistency in his value system. The underlying assumption is that people's beliefs and values are highly interconnected and mutually coherent. When a certain threshold of inconsistency is crossed and the decisionmaker is aware of it, or when the issue concerning the value imbalance becomes personally most important to the decisionmaker, then he may employ

different strategies to reduce or to eliminate these inconsistencies in order to create and preserve a consistent and balanced value system.[12]

The value-complexity problem in peacemaking emerges when the decisionmaker has to make painful concessions for the sake of peace. The decisionmaker is called upon to choose which values and interests to sacrifice for the sake of peace, or to sacrifice peace in order to prevent damage to other values and interests. Value trade-off decisions in peacemaking cause the decisionmaker to experience a psychological state of distress because of an inconsistency in his value system.

For example, in September 1978, Israel's decisionmakers recognized that they could not reach a peace agreement with Egypt and at the same time maintain the Sinai and the settlements there; Egypt's president realized that he could not have the Sinai back without signing a peace agreement with Israel. Value-complexity problems in peace negotiation become even more complicated when one side perceives that its concessions are tangible whereas the other side's are not.

Legitimacy for a Policy of Peace

Precisely because it is so different to change attitudes, to use objective analysis in dealing with value-complexity, and to minimize the uncertainty in shifting from war to peace, decisionmakers are expected by other actors and groups in the political system to reconcile competing values and interests in an acceptable way.[13] Under these circumstances and especially in democratic regimes, decisionmakers face problems of developing legitimacy and consensus on behalf of new policies. The need for legitimacy and consensus is even more crucial if one has to make tangible concessions—territorial, economic, or strategic—in order to shift from war to peace.

Proponents of peace are psychologically vulnerable to domestic criticism that argues that making concessions endangers the security and survival of the nation and betrays the national interest. Continued political pressure by domestic opponents of a peace policy may weaken the leaders' determination to make concessions for accomplishing peace.[14]

Mobilization of legitimacy, I would suggest, is requisite not only to the effective formulation and implementation of a peace policy, but also to enhance decisionmakers' self-confidence in the peace policy, to maintain their desired identity images, and to improve their own performance in the peace process. The decisionmakers must achieve a fundamental, stable, and comprehensive national consensus, encompassing substantial proportions of ruling elites, competitive elites, interest groups, and public opinion.

Although the literature on legitimacy has focused largely on the context of political regimes, here I will "conceptually stretch" the notion of legitimacy to apply it to issues of policy. The concept of "policy legitimacy" is relevant

and useful especially in the context of shifting from war to peace. Academic consensus recognizes that legitimacy is conferred when a society deems its ruling institutions to possess the quality of "oughtness": a legitimate government is one that is perceived as morally proper for a society.[15] On the other hand, legitimacy is not simply conferred; it is also a function of the regime's ability to persuade both other elites and the populace as a whole that it is worthy of fulfilling the governing function. "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."[16]

Luhmann, however, relates legitimacy to policymaking. He defines legitimacy as the population's "willingness to accept, within certain limits of toleration, decisions which are yet undetermined in their nature." Acceptance of decisions becomes the norm that the citizens are expected to comply with.[17] Legitimacy may also involve efficiency of policy and actual performance.[18] The acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy is acknowledged as a fundamental requirement of all political regimes. The process by which this is achieved is known as "legitimation."[19]

The legitimacy of a political regime may be a necessary condition for achieving legitimacy for its policies, but by no means is it a sufficient condition. Legitimacy for policy involves a need to "legitimate specific acts of the regime by means of political formula," or, in other words, to provide the regime with supporting political conditions for effective policy.[20] Legitimation for policy, that is, requires some degree of success in convincing others in the society that a given policy is worthy of adoption and that the government is capable of executing it effectively. The problem of legitimacy for policy usually has a multiple character, requiring legitimacy for formulation as well as implementation of policy.

Four stages can be distinguished in the peace process, in which legitimacy is of particular importance: (1) the initial stage, when peacemaking is first considered; (2) the formulation stage of the peace policy including the negotiations; (3) the stage of making the ultimate decision—signing of the peace treaty; (4) the stage of implementation of the peace treaty.

The first stage is a predecisional one, in which the decisionmaker is still considering the option of making peace versus the option of continuing the conflict. In this situation, when consultation and discussion are limited to a few people, characterized by quiet and secret diplomacy, acquiring legitimacy is not urgently needed, but its consideration is most important. The hope that the public will show massive support for the shift from war to peace, or at least that no difficulties are expected in gaining domestic support, may ease the decisionmaker's doubts about the idea of peacemaking.

In the second stage, which is still predecisional, legitimacy is of particular importance. When considering a peace policy and alternative peace plans,

the decisionmaker, even if he has the utmost conviction in the rightness of his peace policy, should be aware that he needs legitimation of it, within the governmental apparatus, ruling elites, interest groups, and public opinion, to formulate his peace policy effectively. The decisionmaker should realize that large sections of his constituencies are not yet ready for peacemaking, in general, or for his specific peace plan, in particular; and therefore, he must act to persuade them of the justice and the wisdom of his peace policy. This stage in the legitimation of the peace policy is very delicate, and the decisionmaker will probably need to make some changes in his peace policy to pacify different groups in order to secure their support.

The third stage in the peace process is the decisional stage, in which the peace treaty is achieved. This stage is crucial in terms of acquiring domestic support. The peace treaty is the final outcome of a long process of decision-making and negotiation, and the decisionmaker has to gain support for the peace treaty in order to implement it. At this stage, the decisionmaker is called upon to make his utmost effort to vindicate the peace treaty. The need to explain and legitimize the benefits against the costs and risks entailed in the peace treaty has a significant impact on the peace policy and its implementation.

The fourth stage, that of implementation, is the most complicated because it requires the carrying out of tangible concessions, which are in general painful. Those charged with implementation of the peace treaty must expand enormous energy to ensure its legitimacy in order to avoid a direct confrontation with those who oppose the implementation policy.

Gaining legitimacy for one stage in the peace process is a necessary but not sufficient condition for carrying out the next stage, especially because of the different nature of each stage. The required efforts and the techniques for acquiring legitimacy also differ in each stage. The third and the fourth stages, in which concessions are decided and made, are the most difficult and require the largest efforts.

In sum, policy legitimacy is essential for conducting a policy of peace. When such legitimacy is required, governmental policy is then far less vulnerable to the multitude of domestic pressures and constraints to which it would otherwise be subject; its absence causes policymakers to face a "policy legitimacy crisis." Such a crisis is defined here as a breakdown in the performance of leadership that arises out of differences over the proper nature of policy. A policy legitimacy crisis can thus force leaders to modify or abandon important aspects of the policy they hoped to carry out. Leaders are usually given support on the assumption that they will carry out a definite policy based on their promises or on their presumed ideologies and belief systems. When promises are not realized, the authority of leaders can dissolve quickly.[21]

The legitimation of a policy of peace within the governmental apparatus, ruling elites, interest groups, and public opinion is a prerequisite to the effec-

tive formulation and implementation of such a policy. Nevertheless, there are additional reasons why decisionmakers seek the approval and respect of those to whom they are accountable. A review of the literature in social and personality psychology, as well as on social exchange theories, suggests the following reasons to be most important:

(1) Decisionmakers desire to protect and enhance their social and political image or identity. People seek the approval and respect of others as ends in themselves rather than solely for pragmatic reasons.

(2) Decisionmakers want to protect and enhance their own self-image; that is, in this context people do not seek the approval and respect of others as ends in themselves, but rather as a way of bolstering their self-confidence.

(3) Leaders also seek to gain control of desirable material resources (e.g., re-election, promotion, budget allocation, greater support).

In most situations these three motivations are closely interrelated, and it is difficult to evaluate the relative importance of each motive or of the conditions under which one becomes more dominant.[22]

The need for legitimacy, then, is not necessarily a solely political problem. The decisionmakers themselves are motivated to acquire and maintain legitimacy and respect from those to whom they are accountable for social, personal, and political reasons. Legitimacy for a peace policy is required to secure support for the policy change, but it is also necessary because decisionmakers need legitimacy for personal reasons. The risks and costs involved in making peace, the problems of uncertainty, value-complexity, changing attitudes, ideologies, and belief systems make it even more important for decisionmakers to secure support. If decisionmakers feel that others in the ruling elites, competing elites, and interest groups, and even in the general public, share their attitudes and identify with their responsibility for making drastic and risky decisions, then their willingness to change policies is enhanced. Moreover, maintaining the approval of others for a policy of peace enables decisionmakers to gain control of the necessary resources, such as budget allocation, raising of taxes, personnel changes, and so on. Individual decisionmakers' cognitive style, interpersonal needs, and feelings of self-esteem and security will influence differently their need to secure policy legitimacy and the strategies they will use.[23]

Acquiring legitimacy also can highlight the decisionmaker's strength and secure the benefits of success. "Achievements are more gratifying when people are accountable, and people seem to seek out accountability when they have high outcomes expectations."[24] The need to justify decisions makes decisionmakers more sensitive, especially in negotiating peace agreements. Several

studies indicate that negotiators who need to justify bargaining outcomes to the people they represent have much more difficulty arriving at mutually beneficial compromises than do negotiators who are not under such pressure. Most likely, accountability to the people they represent, who probably favor tough negotiating positions, inhibits negotiators from making concessions, which could make them appear weak. By introducing tough positions, such negotiators not only hope to achieve better results in the negotiation, but they want to protect their public image and reputation.[25]

The Process of Legitimation

We can differentiate between a formal and informal process of legitimation. Formal legitimation includes the regular constitutional and legal stipulations regarding the formulation and execution of the peace policy, such as political consultations, debates, and votes in each necessary political forum or institution—the political party, the cabinet, the government, or the parliament. Sometimes even a referendum or election can be part of the formal process of legitimation. Generally, other than the formal process of legitimation, there is also an informal process of legitimation, which includes informal meetings with different constituencies—political and nonpolitical. Acquiring informal legitimacy may also help the decisionmakers to secure formal legitimacy. The claim that the general public supports the peace policy and that, therefore, the will of the people is correctly reflected, may be helpful in convincing the legal institutions to support the peace policy.

To obtain formal and informal political legitimacy for shifting from war to peace, the decisionmakers must be able to demonstrate knowledge and competence, specifically in terms of their ability to choose correct policies and carry them out effectively. In order to establish a substantial new pattern of relations with another state, policymakers must introduce a structured policy composed of three interrelated components: (1) the design-objective of the policy; (2) the strategy to be employed to achieve it; and (3) the tactics to be used in implementing the strategy.[26]

The design-objective of the peace policy includes the peace plan or the peace treaty (when it is realized). The strategy employed to achieve the peace plan or the peace treaty includes the means and the general methods of formulating and implementing the peace policy. The strategy includes the concessions made for the sake of peace, the other side's concessions, and the guarantees of a third party. The tactics utilized in the implementation of the strategy are the techniques used in implementing the peace policy; for example, the execution of territorial withdrawals, deployment of international forces, establishment of diplomatic relations, opening of the borders, and other normalization steps.

The legitimation efforts should focus on all these components. Securing legitimacy for the design-objective of the peace policy is a necessary but insufficient condition for legitimation of the strategy and the tactics employed in order to realize the peace policy. While the design-objective of the peace policy may enjoy support from different constituencies, the strategy and tactics employed may trigger considerable opposition, mainly because they entail the tangible and intangible costs of making peace.

Policy legitimacy demands that the peace policy be clear and communicated effectively to the population. Resistance to the peace policy can be expected if the nature of the peace is not made clear to the people who will be affected by it. And because different people will see different implications in the proposed peace, the decisionmakers should make its import and necessity clear by supplying authoritative and convincing information about the nature of the peace policy.[27]

The Means Employed

In order to legitimate his peace policy, the decisionmaker can employ different means and mechanisms. Legitimacy can be attained by persuasive arguments, emphasizing desirability and feasibility of the peace policy. It can also be gained by conscious manipulation of symbols, language, and rituals; by deployment of defensive and offensive mechanisms; and by offers of compensation.

Type and Nature of Argumentation

Decisionmakers who seek legitimacy for their peace policy have to marshal two interrelated persuasive arguments: (1) the decisionmakers must be capable of persuading constituents that the peace policy is desirable and worth pursuing because it is consistent with basic national values and interests, contributing to their advancement in an optimal fashion; and, indeed, the benefits of peace exceed their costs. This is the *normative* argument or the normative component of policy legitimation. (2) The decisionmakers must also convince others that they have the knowledge and competence to achieve the proposed peace policy. In other words, they must persuade them that they have a correct and realistic view of the conflict environment, that they correctly evaluate the other side's interest in reaching peace, and that they have the knowledge and ability to influence the course of the peace process in the desired direction. They also have to persuade others that the peace treaty they have reached is, indeed, the best in these circumstances and the concessions made were necessary. They also have to make the people believe that they did all they could to minimize the concessions offered. This is the *cognitive* argument or the cognitive component of policy legitimacy. Thus peace policy legitimacy needs normative and cognitive argumentation. While the normative argument establishes

the desirability of peace policy, the cognitive argument shows its feasibility. The specific elements of each argument vary with the differences in the level of interest and knowledge about the issue among various groups whose understanding and support are sought.[28]

Manipulation of Symbols, Language, and Rituals

Although gaining legitimacy for a policy is contingent on the perceived rationality of the proposed change, legitimacy can also be attained through the conscious manipulation of national symbols, language, and rituals. Indeed, decisionmakers who search for legitimacy may give greater emphasis to such efforts than to reasoned arguments, as they may believe that symbolic appeals will be more readily understood by important constituencies. In other words, a normative argument that justifies the desirability of the new policy from the standpoint of national values may be stressed over cognitive argumentation.

Symbols and Language

In order to attain support for a peace policy, leaders seek to identify themselves and their courses of action with approved community symbols. Symbols, that is, are used to justify or rationalize the decisions of the government. The prospect of acceptance of new policies and the associated symbols depend on the success with which already established legitimacy symbols can, in turn, be associated with them.[29]

A symbol is "any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernible from, the object itself. Literally anything can be a symbol: a word or a phrase, a gesture or an event, a person, a place or a thing. An object becomes a symbol when people endow it with meaning, value, or significance."[30] A symbol can be understood as a way of organizing a repertory of cognitions into meanings that are common to many.

Effective symbol management can serve the ends of specific peace policy. Symbols such as "national security," "new opportunities," "national pride," "peace and security," or "an opening for a new future" can serve as ways of promising legitimacy for a peace policy. Such symbols, which have been termed "condensational symbols," aim "to evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act, patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness: some one of these or all of them."[31] Edelman argues that the responses associated with symbolic stimuli vary with perceptions of threat or of reassurance. Such perceptions will depend, in turn, on the individual's particular orientation toward the symbols involved. Symbols that are the objects of positive sentiments will normally be found reassuring and will induce quiescence. Symbolic objects of strong negative effect, however, tend to arouse anxieties and to communicate threat.[32]

Individual symbolic orientations sometimes vary along two dimensions that correspond to the major orientational components identified in attitudinal research. The first is an evaluative dimension, relating to the intensity and direction of emotive sentiments toward a symbol. The second, a cognitive component, refers to the dispositional and associational meanings engaged by the symbol.[33]

In addition to basic orientations, other factors are also involved in the perception of threat or reassurance. Most prominent among these are the perceived relevance of the situation to the individual and the perceived appropriateness of the symbol to that situation in which the symbol is being related.[34] Perceived misapplication tends to dilute the potency of symbols. Merelman observes that there must be some sequence in usage if the symbol is to retain its potency. He notes that when policymakers attempt to associate symbols of legitimacy with policies they wish to implement, failure to establish and maintain the desired association cheapens the symbol and makes it less effective in all areas.[35]

Closely related to the question of maintaining continuity in symbolic usage is what Merelman has called the problem of "connotative overflow." When a particular symbol is used together with several other symbols, they may all become linked in the eyes of the general public. Not only can this limit the future applicability of the original symbol, but negative connotations may develop. Negative connotations associated with any or all of the other symbols may spill over, making both the original symbol and its application suspect.[36] Just as association with other symbols may reduce the strength of a symbol, so too can its overuse: if its use becomes too frequent, its special quality is lost. Finally, a proper feedback must be maintained. "Public acceptance and implementation, like any problem of learning, requires the continual correction for error that is provided by feedback."[37] Unless care is taken to assure appropriate feedback, the potency of the symbol is likely to be diminished.

The use of symbols is probably effective in the formulation of the peace policy, up through the stage of reaching and signing of the peace treaty. The symbol of peace may play an important role in the legitimation of the peace policy, when the desire for peace in the society is very high. However, the symbol of peace may compete with other important symbols, such as territory or security; and the decisionmakers should be aware of the need to give the symbol of peace priority. Failure to establish and maintain the desired association between the symbol of peace and all other symbols may cheapen the peace symbol and make it less effective. Negative connotations can develop between the symbol of peace and other symbols, because of the sacrifice of the other symbols; however, the decisionmakers must try to minimize this development.

In the implementation of the peace process, the negative connotations associated with any or all of the other symbols may even increase. When the cost to the other symbols becomes tangible, anxieties may arise and a perception of

threat may develop that can reduce the strength of the peace symbol. The intensity of emotive sentiments toward competitive symbols may weaken the value of peace as a symbol. The decisionmakers probably will find it difficult at this stage to use the symbol of peace effectively. At this stage, the symbol of peace needs to be reinforced even more than at the formulation stage in order to legitimize the peace policy.

Edelman argues that through language, decisionmakers can not only achieve an immediate outcome but also win the acquiescence of those whose lasting support is necessary. He identifies four different types of political language: hortatory, legal, bargaining, and administrative. The first two are relevant for acquiring legitimacy for peace policy. Hortatory language is characterized by an abundance of higher-order symbols, such as national interest, national security, justice, democracy, and freedom. These symbols evoke widespread reactive attachment. The use of this language style conveys awareness that the public has an important stake and role in crucial political decisions. More directly and clearly than any other, this language type is aimed at the mass public, specifically persuading them that policies undertaken by leaders should be accepted.

Legal language involves symbols that engage differential patterns of attachment. This language functions in two ways: it gives the constituencies a basis for assuming that a treaty or agreement, such as a peace agreement, has been precisely and objectively defined; and it provides decisionmakers with a vocabulary for justifying their actions. Although for most the mode of attachment is either apathetic or reactive, for those who use the language the orientational pattern tends to be distinctively pragmatic.[38] For example, the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on legal language in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in 1978–79 was aimed not only at making any agreement more binding legally but also at providing a vocabulary to justify the peace agreement that he signed as the best that could be achieved in the circumstances. Although Begin's insistence on legal language made the Americans, the Egyptians, and some Israelis furious, most in Israel believe that it was necessary for securing a better agreement.

Edelman asserts that accurate description of the situation is not a necessary condition for policy legitimacy: "Many publics respond to currently conspicuous political symbols: not to 'factors' and not to moral codes embedded in the character of soul, but to the gestures and speeches that make up the drama of the state."[39] Indeed, the drama of shifting from war to peace could be, in the beginning of the peace process, so exciting that the exact details are less important; however, accurate details can make the difference in reaching or not reaching legitimacy, when the peace treaty is submitted to the judgment of different constituencies.

Decisionmakers who initiate a peace policy will exploit their own symbolic resources to lend legitimacy to their policy and to undermine the credi-

bility of those who oppose it. They may say those groups are "against the national interest" when they are not acting in accordance with the peace policy. Therefore, in order to comport with the legitimacy symbols and to avoid appearing illegitimate to others, those groups who oppose the peace policy must somehow adapt the symbols.[40] Or these groups may react by seeking to redefine the issues involved—which entails introducing new symbols to attract support for their opposition. They can even argue that those who have initiated the peace policy are destroying the symbols that many believe in and value, and that therefore they are not suited to lead the nation. However, charismatic leaders often become symbols in themselves, so that people will believe in such leaders regardless of the policies they pursue. The successful charismatic politicians are likely to employ particular linguistic devices to reinforce their popular following.

Rituals

Rituals are another way of promoting support for a peace policy. "Ritual is motor activity that involves its participants symbolically in a common enterprise, calling their attention to their relatedness and joint interests in a compelling way. It thereby both promotes conformity and evokes satisfaction and joy in conformity."[41] Rituals give people a chance to enjoy a sense of involvement and to express enthusiasm. Most political rituals are patriotic ceremonies paying homage to the greatness and success of the nation and diminishing the doubts about the policies it undertakes. The shift of nations from war to peace or peace to war is typically characterized by public rites. These events are often staged by political leaders to reorient and mobilize public support for the change of policy. "Such rituals, however, not only confirm existing power relationships but can foster allegiance to symbols which guide men in creating new social realities."[42]

Defensive and Offensive Mechanisms

Defensive and offensive mechanisms of accountability or legitimation are often differentiated. For the purposes of this study, only those strategies that apply to the settings in which peace policies are made and legitimized will be raised. The relevant defensive strategies are apologies, excuses, buck passing (or shifting responsibility), and justifications. Offensive strategies are termed "enhancement" and "entitlement."

Apologies

Apologies are "admissions of blameworthiness and regret for an undesired event, such as a transgression or failure."[43] Apologies accept responsibility and acknowledge blameworthiness. By expressing apologies, the decisionmaker admits that the act in question was wrong and that he was re-

sponsible for the act; and implicit within this apology is the intention that the transgression will not occur again. Apologies are sometimes effective in controlling damage to identity and reducing punishment after transgression, but they are ineffective and counter productive for acquiring legitimacy for a peace policy. Any apology as to the essence or cost of peace means that the decisionmaker admits that the peace policy was wrong, or that it failed because of lack of skill, understanding, or other deficits.

Excuses

Excuses are accounts that attempt to minimize the decisionmaker's personal responsibility for "potentially threatening events without totally disconnecting the actor from the event."[44] As a defensive mechanism of legitimation of the peace policy excuses are not effective and often counterproductive. The decisionmaker cannot legitimize his peace policy while minimizing his responsibility for its costs.

Buck Passing or Shifting Responsibility

This defensive mechanism is an attempt by the decisionmaker to deny personal responsibility for the outcomes of the peace process. This can be done by trying to get others involved or rationalizing why others, not the decisionmaker, should make the decision. Another way of denying personal responsibility is to blame the circumstances of the decision, claiming little or no choice in the matter, or undue external pressure. Sometimes this is done without mentioning anyone specific, but more often the decisionmaker points to a person, a group of people, or an organization.[45]

Buck passing as a defensive mechanism in peacemaking is no more effective or productive than excuses. The decisionmaker can act to share his own personal responsibility with others; however, endorsing peace while running away from responsibility of its cost can be difficult. Finding others to fill the role of scapegoat for making the painful choice is possible, but will probably not be convincing. Blaming the circumstances for the sacrifice of values and interests, or claiming little or not choice, may be a better strategy for easing one's personal responsibility, but it certainly will not win over others.

Justifications

Justifications are "aimed at altering the audience's interpretation of the event itself, either by minimizing the importance of the prescriptions that were violated . . . minimizing the amount of harm done . . . or appealing to an alternative set of prescriptions that might transform the act from bad to good."[46] Justifications that aim to devalue or minimize the beliefs or interests that the decisionmaker abandons for the sake of peace are another common defensive mechanism used to legitimize a peace policy. The decisionmaker may

make the concessions seem less significant than they really are. Justifications too may be ineffective and counterproductive because they may alienate those who will be damaged as a result of ignoring their interests or values.

Enhancement

Enhancements are mechanisms that categorize and evaluate the event in as beneficial a way as possible. Bolstering is the most common form of enhancement.[47] Bolstering refers to an attempt made to magnify the attractiveness of the chosen alternative. The expected gains from the preferred alternative are played up and its potential costs and risks are played down.[48] This method appears the most obvious tactic employed by the decisionmaker in order to legitimize the peace making. While the decisionmaker may find it difficult to ignore, discount, or deny the concessions made for peace and the need to sacrifice other values and interests, he may find it easy to bolster the significance of the value of peace by stressing its benefits while minimizing its costs and risks. Exaggerating favorable consequences of peacemaking may convince the constituencies that it is well worth the costs and risks involved. Peace can be introduced and embedded in several other values, and its achievement makes the related values available. In other words, the decisionmaker argues that security, economic prosperity, and the quality of life all depend on achieving peace. Without peace, he would argue, other values could not be reached and could be damaged. The more confidence the decisionmaker has in the significance of making peace, the less necessary it is to justify and rationalize the sacrifice of other values.

Bolstering in peacemaking may also involve magnifying both the attractiveness of peace and the costs and risks of not making peace. By exaggerating the dangerous consequences that are possible in the absence of peace, the decisionmaker manages to rationalize and justify the peace policy. Bolstering of a peace policy may also entail exaggerating the remoteness of the peace commitment. The decisionmaker may claim that no immediate concessions will be required in the foreseeable future or that the execution of the concessions will take a long time. That will not only enable the enjoyment of the benefits of peacemaking without making immediate painful concessions, but also allow time to reconsider the entire peace policy if the outcome is not positive.

Entitlement

Entitlements are mechanisms that maximize the decisionmaker's responsibility for the event. They include techniques such as attributing an achievement to factors that enhance personal responsibility, or discounting factors that detract from personal responsibility, or indicating that the act was freely intended and initiated. The mechanism of entitlement involves the emphasis of a direct link between the decisionmaker and the peace policy.[49] The decision-

maker may present himself as primarily responsible for the peace process. He may introduce the peace process as his own initiative rather than as a reaction to the other side's initiative, or as a result of external constraints. Entitlement may help the decisionmaker in legitimizing the idea of peace; however, that does not absolve him of a responsibility to justify the essence of peace or the concessions made for peace and to prove his ability to control the peace process.

Compensatory Efforts

In order to legitimize the concessions made for the sake of peace, the decisionmaker can undertake policies that promise that the values and interests damaged as a result of peace policy will not be harmed in future decisions, or that guarantee his control of the development of the peace process. These means are undertaken by the decisionmaker to "compensate" for the sacrifice of values and interests for the sake of peace and are guarantees in order to minimize uncertainties.[50] The decisionmaker may also find it necessary to compensate those who will be most damaged by the effects of peace. In addition, the leadership should meet representatives of those groups that are most offended by the concessions made for peace, in order to explain to them their necessity. Resistance will be prevented so that the decisionmaker can help these groups develop their own understanding of the need for peace and its cost; and he will also help develop an explicit awareness of how they feel about it and what can be done about those feelings.

The employment of the various means of policy legitimacy differs according to each stage of the peace process, and according to the nature of the constituencies. While at the stage of formulating the peace policy (including the signing of the treaty), argumentation, symbols, language, rituals, and some of the offensive mechanisms may be sufficient for acquiring legitimacy from most of the constituencies, these probably are not enough at the stage of implementation. This later stage requires a much greater effort, as well as different kinds of techniques, especially compensatory efforts, in order to avoid physical resistance to the peace policy.

There are several prerequisite conditions for achieving legitimacy at the implementation stage. The most important element is that the decisionmaker must express a strong commitment to carry out the peace policy. Evidence of hesitation and second thoughts on his part may encourage expectations of those who oppose the peace process and fuel their hopes of stymieing it. The objectives and the required procedures of implementation must be clear not only to the decisionmaker but also to those who are in charge of policy implementation, as well as those who support or oppose it. The more explicit and specific the decisionmaker can be about the implementation process, the greater his chances of convincing others that it is consistent with their original expectations.[51] The implementation process should be consistent with the promises

made in legitimizing the formulation process. This involves demonstrating that tangible concessions are being made in exchange for the other side's concessions and that the other side is committed to the shift from war to peace.

In order to legitimize the implementation stage, the decisionmaker must make some compensatory efforts to pacify those groups that are most offended by the concessions made for the sake of peace. This compensation can be tangible or intangible, such as promises or commitments that the values and interests that are damaged as a result of the implementation of the peace policy will not be further harmed because of future decisions.

Conclusions

Significant change in the foreign policy of a given state is likely to be encouraged or set in motion by initiating peace plans or by responding positively to a peace initiative by an adversary. A protracted conflict fraught with violence makes the shift from war to peace difficult and problematic, if not a serious crisis for decisionmakers. In addition to problems of recognition, interpretation, value-complexity and uncertainty, and reevaluation of basic attitudes, a shift from war to peace also involves problems of legitimacy and consensus building. The decisionmaker can achieve legitimacy for his policy only if he succeeds in convincing enough members of his political party, cabinet, government, parliament, and the public that he has a peace policy that is soundly conceived and that the benefits of peace exceed the costs and risks of achieving it.

Although acquisition of legitimacy is contingent to some extent on the perceived rationality of the proposed shift in foreign policy, policy legitimacy can also be attained by manipulation of national symbols, language, rituals, defensive and offensive mechanisms, and compensatory efforts. The employment of these means and their effectiveness differ according to each stage in the peace process. Implementation of peace calls for greater efforts at legitimation than does formulation.