1

A Reflective Professional Psychology

PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE PROFESSION

The first time I attended the American Psychological Association Convention (APA) as a graduate student, I was impressed with the vastness of the gathering and the variety and scope of the presented programs. These feelings have not changed after nearly twenty years in the field. I have worked in psychiatric hospitals and community mental health centers; I have also been in different academic settings, teaching doctoral students in clinical psychology as well as master's level students in clinical psychology and counseling. My various roles have allowed me to look at professional psychology from different angles. The conference attendance continues to be interesting, especially when I find myself involved in a truly meaningful conversation with participants who have a keen sense of a certain professional issue. As expected, groups with particular interests tend to huddle among themselves, though one may wonder how the profession would be if we could make it a habit to talk to colleagues from specialties other than our own.

When I read the *APA Monitor*, I am struck by the breadth of the field and the range of professional activities that require those who wish to keep pace with such developments to make a real effort at staying current. The job announcements reflect the great variety of work that psychologists do, from basic research to academic teaching, from private practice to policy research and the administration of programs. Then again, one never fails to find that very specific advertisement that reads: "Faculty position open. Clinical psychologists specializing in research on the behavioral treatment of anorexia are encouraged to apply." What has happened to the generalist in each of us? Have we become so specialized as a profession that we can afford to narrow down the field in our teaching? What kinds of messages, by the way we define ourselves and the types of knowledge we hold to be important, are we giving to those preparing for entry into the profession?

As a clinical psychologist by training, I was encouraged to follow a scientist-practitioner model. During my internship days, I experienced the clinical setting as a setting for research and met a number of research-oriented practitioners. Over the years, however, I have encountered varied reactions to research among fellow psychologists. Some practitioners support it in principle but not in terms of actual participation. Many do not read the professional journals where formal research studies are published. They prefer

to read the works of master practitioners or descriptive information on particular populations and problems related to their practice. Some express the view that research reports in journals do not teach them how to become more effective practitioners. On the other hand, I have also known some psychologists in service settings who are clearly more interested in doing research than working with their clients. They long for the day when their employment contract could be modified to legitimize more time in research. My sense is that these varied attitudes toward research and practice are associated with different values and interests as well as academic cultures of origin. I have been fortunate to have encountered teachers and colleagues who seem to be as deeply committed to the advancement of knowledge as they are to the quality of their practice. There is much to be learned from these individuals who have managed to integrate the worlds of science and practice and to maintain high standards in both realms of activity.

It appears that the integration of science and practice is taken up with different approaches and degrees of commitment in the academic setting. Not being the typical academic who started a university career immediately after the completion of doctoral training, I probably had different expectations about professional education for the students. I found myself questioning whether the type of training I received, including the sequential introduction of academic coursework and practical experience, is the best way to prepare someone for professional practice. As a graduate student, I had performed well academically but found myself woefully unprepared for practice when I began my clinical internship. I saw the same struggles in the interns I supervised in the practice settings where I worked. In my subsequent academic positions, I have spent a great deal of time trying to identify processes of teaching and learning that would facilitate the integration of conceptual and practical skills in the student's development at every level of graduate education. I have listened to many opinions from colleagues and professional task forces on this matter, and I believe this is an area in need of our serious attention.

Conversations with colleagues involved in the professional education of scientist-practitioners have usually centered around issues such as what we should look for in those who seek to enter the profession; what kinds of knowledge, skills, and attitudes we should emphasize in professional education; whether there is valid support for the way we practice; and how we should evaluate professional competence or, better still, the attainment of professional wisdom. We become so immersed in these important issues that we sometimes forget to consider the societal trends and developments in the field that impact on the profession. I am aware of the concerns of practicing psychologists, having worked in mental health-service settings and continued to supervise students in field placements. There is a sense of awe that profes-

sional psychology is being pulled by forces larger than itself, such as political and economic forces behind licensing, accreditation, third-party payment, and the funding of systems of service delivery in which professional roles are sought. The complexity of issues and the heterogeneity of viewpoints and interests in the profession can be seen in the recent debates about health care reform in the United States as psychologists attempt to make a case for the profession.

It is not clear how the concerns that are discussed regularly by education and training committees in our professional organization are actually influencing the academic worldview or are considered in the day-to-day professional training provided by academic programs. By chance events, I found myself teaching in a graduate counseling program after spending many years steeped in clinical psychology. As it turned out, much of the professional worldview in counseling also fit quite well with my own. There seems to be a willingness to acknowledge the sociocultural context of professional practice and to view psychological knowledge from the standpoint of societal needs for a human-service profession. Yet I often question whether the program at my own university should continue to emphasize training in individual and family counseling in traditional facilities, when we can shift our focus to preventive interventions and program development such as in community-based integrative services. Universities, with their own institutional dynamics and constraints on teaching and curriculum, seem painfully slow in responding to societal needs.

Other types of conversations with colleagues took place by distant communication, through my writing and reading of others' reactions to my work. The latter have ranged from affirmation to surprisingly angry attacks. The attacks remind me of a debate I witnessed as a graduate student at a local professional meeting. It was between a therapist with a transactional analysis orientation and one of our own professors who represented the behavioral orientation. The arguments were sharp and the exchange unfriendly. We cheered for our own professor then, never stopping to question the completeness of the behavioral point of view in which we were so well indoctrinated. I find it discouraging when psychologists have difficulty talking to others in the profession who happen to hold different world-views. Without open listening and constructive dialogue, I am not certain how our profession can improve its vision.

Our mission as a profession has become a real challenge, with the growing complexity of human problems and the increasingly institutionalized role that society grants to psychologists. I wonder how many of us consider ourselves to be agents of social change. Being in midlife, I have to decide where and how I should make my own contributions. Someone once told me that he tried to find out who I am by looking up my APA division memberships,

only to be unable to draw a firm conclusion. The fact is, I align myself broadly with the profession—no longer with the single division representing my original specialty training—and I lend support through dues, voting, and other means to those groups that represent social interests, populations, and issues about which I care. I do not feel strange about the fact that I am a clinical psychologist with an active membership in the counseling psychology division. I believe that boundaries can become barriers that only hamper us as a profession. They prevent us from seeing clearly the common causes to which we can contribute our varied training and experience.

As an educator, I naturally identify with those who are interested in teaching. I find it helpful to talk with others who are involved in designing graduate-level professional training in psychology. This does not mean that I have little to do with those who teach in other areas. As a practitioner, I have learned to work with members of other professions, such as psychiatry, social work, and nursing. As an academician, I find my interactions with colleagues from other disciplines to be especially enriching. People from philosophy, anthropology, and sociology, for instance, have much to say about the human domain and the social sciences. Others from education, social work, and human services share many of our professional concerns.

My students have also taught me a great deal about the profession by their questions and reactions to problem situations. A common question from entry-level students concerns how one is supposed to know that a certain way of responding to a problem of practice is the most appropriate action. Other questions are related to the overwhelming number of theories and therapeutic orientations from which to derive one's basis of working as a professional. Some students find the transition from theoretical studies to internship experience rather traumatic; something seems missing, and the luxury of theoretical speculations is replaced by the urgency of decisions and actions. The occasion of starting thesis and dissertation work brings about other types of dilemmas and distress. Should one conduct a simple survey study or a neatly controlled analogue experiment, or should one risk the "imperfections" of a clinical or applied study? Would the faculty committee find it acceptable if one were to conduct a case study, using qualitative, nonstandardized methods? Not infrequently, a student would start off with what seem to be available and acceptable instruments for measuring a certain construct rather than with a phenomenon of interest and the questions one wishes to ask. A similar restrictiveness is experienced in clinical and counseling work. Well-learned formulations tend to take over and dictate the observational lenses used. Certain technologies of assessment and intervention demand such procedural compliance that they leave little room for reflection. With some reluctance, self-doubts are expressed in the form of "Tell me what to do" or, more poignantly, "What can I trust so I know what I am

doing?" At such moments, it is most helpful to stop and reflect—on the sources of our uncertainty, the way we have framed questions for ourselves, the underlying assumptions in what we think we know, and so forth.

Reflection as a self-directed activity must, at some point, come back to ourselves. This turning back to reflect on oneself, or the referring of one's experience to oneself, is called "reflexivity." In sharing some of my reflections on the profession, I should also share a little more about who I am. The fact that I am a woman, a wife, and soon a mother of two adolescents is relevant to my perspective, as is my Chinese heritage. Being a product of bicultural (and perhaps multicultural) socialization and having a husband with roots in the third world have a great deal to do with my worldview. I received my undergraduate education as a psychology major in a department that was once part of the philosophy department and was influenced by a European, historical point of view. Although I completed my graduate training in the United States and spent most of my professional life here and in Canada, I have always had the double vision of an outsider and one who has the benefit of immersion in American psychology. It has only been in recent years, however, that I have ventured to share my views on the profession.

I invite colleagues and students who will be reading this to reflect on the nature of our science and practice and the state of professional psychology. I believe that our self-understanding as a profession requires a reflexive study of the nature of the discipline and the foundations of its claims to knowledge and scientific practice. The reflexive approach to knowledge and our own ways of thought has been indicated by studies of the mind in relation to self and society (Mead 1962; Vygotsky 1978), the devices used in articulating knowledge and its context (Woolgar 1988), and the processes of systematic inquiry (Steier 1991c). Reflexivity is proposed here as a central concept in the reflective study of ourselves as a scientific and professional community, as much of self-understanding is held to be both social and personal.

SCIENCE, PRACTICE, AND PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

The emergence of professional psychology has been linked to the development of psychology as a scientific discipline and the concept of a science-based practice. Most professional psychologists in this generation have been trained under some form of the scientist-practitioner model (Goldfried 1984; Shakow 1978; Raimy 1950). There are many issues surrounding the identity of psychology as a discipline. A prevailing definition is that psychology is a social science and, more specifically, a science of human behavior. Although this may be the accepted definition in most American academic departments, it should be recognized that the very nature of psychology and its autonomy as a discipline have been the subject of debate (for example

see, Margolis, Manicas, Harre, and Secord 1986). One of the issues concerns the subject matter of psychology and how it is to be studied. If human behavior constitutes the subject matter of psychology, how broadly it is conceived and the extent to which human realities are studied in context would determine the scope of the discipline. Manicas (1986) expressed the opinion that much of Western psychology has been conceived at the individual level or reduced to biological terms and that this type of psychological science does not represent a complete study of human life in social context. A broadly conceived psychological domain would presumably call for an expansion of the prevalent approaches to knowledge in the discipline.

An issue central to the debates on the viability of psychology as a human science concerns the model of knowledge adopted by the discipline and how we choose to conduct inquiry. Cronbach (1986) questioned if psychology should aspire to be a theoretical science like physics, with a historical reliance on mathematical language and the logic of hypothetico-deductive theory testing. Others—notably Skinner (1987)—believed in psychology as an autonomous science of behavior modeled after the physical sciences. Skinner was criticized for encouraging scientism with his exclusively behavioristic stance (Mahoney 1989). The ongoing debates on the how psychology should define itself are captured, for instance, in the title of an article by Bunge (1990): "What kind of discipline is psychology: Autonomous or dependent, humanistic or scientific, biological or sociological?"

A fundamental point to be recognized is the reflexive nature of our discipline (Flanagan 1981). The fact that psychologists as humans are attempting to study humans means that the discipline must develop self-referenced knowledge and account for the contributions of the human observer in generating that knowledge. We are both the knowing subject and objects to be known. It is fortunate that, as humans, we are capable of reflexive understanding of the physical and social world in relation to ourselves. Reflexivity, which means referring back to oneself, requires stepping outside of the system we are part of (only in a manner of speaking) to study and reflect on our own involvement in it. Being reflexive involves reflecting on our accustomed ways of thought. This skill of reflection is one of the mature human abilities sometimes referred to as "metacognition." It enables us to evaluate our own condition and disposition, as well as our own ways of thinking.

What frame of mind should we use as we reflect on our science and profession? Disenchantment with our discipline's approach to knowledge and the profession's orientation to inquiry had been expressed by Koch (1981a) and Sarason (1981b), using criteria and standards that are not simply technological. Bevan (1986) commented:

> When we look at psychology and at ourselves as psychologists...we most certainly recognize that as we have advanced our academic enterprise we have also accelerated specialization and fostered a technological frame of mind at the expense of one that is broadly historical and philosophical. (393)

I agree with Bevan that to understand the evolution of the discipline and the current issues faced by the profession, we should turn to historical analysis of major trends, such as given in Koch and Leary (1985) and Leahey (1991). This is because questions about the identity of psychology and the persistent attendant philosophical issues have been variously framed and debated over time.

For example, one of the issues of contention has been the language we use for the description of human phenomena. Behavioristic emphasis in psychological science has confined description to the observer's standpoint, deemphasizing the experience and intentions of the actor. Some feel that this special use of everyday language in order to set psychology apart as a scientific enterprise is counter to a fully human discipline (Groeben 1990; Mischel 1969; Shotter 1975). If human action and human experience were considered to be the proper domain of psychology, psychology as a reductive science of behavior is called into question. Reductive methods of science require the operationalization of human events in simple, measurable, and observable units. Human intentions and experience are not readily reducible by such operational definitions and measurement or adequately described by language that is extensional rather than intensional (Margolis 1986b). If each of us were represented simply by personality traits and motivation as measured on an objective test, or described by others only with the language of a detached observer, it would not give a complete sense of who we are.

Reflexive analysis should include an examination of the interests and value orientation of psychology. Due to the very human nature of the discipline, it has the character of a normative or value-laden science rather than what is traditionally referred to as a "pure science." From a normative point of view, a scientific enterprise can be characterized by the type of interests and values it serves. According to the ideas of Habermas (1971), human knowledge interests can be distinguished into the technical (with application as goal), the hermeneutical (with understanding as goal), and the critical (with emancipation as goal). Using this typology of interests as a reference point, we can reflect on where our guild interests are directing the discipline and the profession. Among the three types of knowledge interests, the sharpest contrast seems to be between the conception of psychological science as one guided by technical rationality and the related goal of instrumental application and the conception of psychology as a human science of

understanding and emancipation. For professional psychology, the concept of a science-based practice has been historically associated with a technological conception of science. It leaves those members of the profession who are involved in such areas as psychotherapeutic practice in a peculiar position of choosing among these varied definitions of our orientation. Some have argued that psychotherapy belongs with a hermeneutic and emancipatory human science rather than a rational, technical science of behavior (Kvale 1986; Lesche, 1985). However, many of the interventions used by practitioners also involve applications of behavioral technology. The particular type of interest we actually serve may become more apparent upon reflection.

The suggestion to scrutinize ourselves as a profession, however, may not be taken seriously as long as we continue to believe that psychology is an objective science and that we can be value-neutral as scientists. White (1983) argued that some psychologists,

> living in an ahistorical and unphilosophical era, have contrived to be unaware of their own intellectual and ideological commitments buried in their work and their theories... [in] seeking to be nonideological they have been ungovernably ideological. (6)

To be a reflexive discipline and a reflective profession requires that we become more historically and philosophically informed as well as ideologically self-conscious.

Questions about our profession's values and interests cannot be separated entirely from the model of inquiry we use in research and practice or from our assumptions about the subject matter of our inquiry. The evolution of our discipline and our professional identity involves epistemological, ontological, and axiological considerations and choices. *Epistemology* is concerned with the philosophy of knowledge that undergirds our approach to inquiry. *Ontology* refers to assumptions about nature, including our own place in it. *Axiology* involves values, social as well as cognitive ones associated with epistemic preference (Howard 1985b). The interplay of these three kinds of factors in the self-determination of professional psychology and our orientation to inquiry will constitute the underlying theme of this book. Reflections on our philosophical and historical foundations will begin in chapter 2, to be followed by a consideration of the sociocultural and ideological context of professional inquiry in chapter 3.

As will be explained in chapter 2, the dominant model of knowledge accepted by modern psychology has been premised on epistemological and ontological assumptions associated with *logical positivism* and *empiricism* (Ayer 1966; Hanfling 1981). It presumes an objective science capable of generating knowledge for technical application. This model of knowledge has been challenged as changes have come about in the philosophy of sci-

ence. Increasingly, questions are raised about the philosophical assumptions underlying the methods of knowledge used by the discipline and whether they seem to be fitting with the human domain and the language-dependent nature of psychological inquiry. Epistemologically: "Is objectivity possible?" and "What types of language and tools should we use to describe psychological phenomena?" Ontologically: "What kinds of image of the human being are we promoting with our methods of knowledge?" and "Do we believe that humans act with intentions and free will?" These questions that are being raised in the changing discourse on the nature of psychological science should be of interest to those entering the psychology profession. As will also be explained in chapter 2, *social constructionism* as an emergent perspective on knowledge favors a science of understanding based on different methods of knowledge. This pluralistic view of knowledge allows us to be open to a diversity of conceptual frameworks and research orientations, the major examples of which will be described in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

Psychology is now a highly differentiated field that is increasingly pluralistic in orientation. Pluralism is regarded by some theorists and methodologists as inevitable (Cook 1985; Cook and Campbell 1979; Royce 1985). One may consider each orientation to knowledge as having its particular niche by fulfilling particular missions (Howard 1991), the type of mission chosen being a function of our values and interests. An important fact is that every major system of inquiry (referred to as a *paradigm*) is associated with particular procedures and conceptual underpinnings as well as particular norms for judging knowledge claims. The existence of multiple paradigms means that researchers and practitioners have to conduct inquiry under different and seemingly incompatible rules and criteria of knowledge. Whether this engenders a healthy tension in the field and whether a divergent pluralism can bring about progress in psychological science and practice are open to question (Hoshmand and Martin 1992). Professional inquiry may be hampered by the lack of a common understanding about criteria and values that transcend our differences. Our profession needs to engage in open dialogue about our working theories of inquiry and evolve a shared conception of how our knowledge can contribute to progress in the human realm. Some philosophers are proposing a pragmatic reconciliation of the more relativistic views associated with a pluralistic orientation to knowledge and the philosophical orientation and methodology of the dominant scientific tradition (Margolis 1986b; Okrent 1988; Rorty 1991). The prospects for a second-order or metalevel framework, which may provide a common language and methodological guidelines for dealing with issues arising from our increasingly diverse orientation to knowledge, will also be discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

We are at a time when there are not only different perspectives on the

nature of knowledge but different views on the relationship between our science and practice. Issues of an epistemogical, ontological, and axiological nature will continue to be debated as educators try to prepare the next generation of scientist-practitioners. This state of affairs can be confusing and unsettling, especially for those entering the profession. Although professional psychology has depended on the development of scientific psychology, professional practice has evolved mostly out of societal needs (Peterson 1991). The proliferation of psychological practice has, in a sense, outpaced the maturation of psychology as a scientific discipline (Sechrest 1992). This partnership of science and practice is at a critical point (see, for example, the discussion in Schneider 1990). There have been conflicts between scientific values and the values of professional practice (Garfield 1992). Our profession is continuously transformed as social changes and new challenges arise (Dorken and Associates 1986). The ability of psychological science to provide a sufficient knowledge base for solving the problems of practice and the relevance of academic research and theories to the purposes of practice are continuously questioned (Howard 1985a; Ross 1981; Sarason 1981a; Strupp 1981). As the proper role of inquiry in a practicing profession is debated, proposed revisions have yet to be implemented by the profession (Hoshmand and Polkinghorne 1992; Peterson 1985, 1991). The direction and outcome of this discourse remain to be shaped by the types of scientific worldviews and values adopted by future members of the profession. An open, reflexive stance may enable us to approach these issues and questions with thoughtfulness and to participate productively in their discussion.

A reflexive approach in this case implies self-scrutiny and awareness of the foundations and assumptive base of our discipline and profession. It involves a continuous questioning of our self-definition and professional interests. For the practicing members of the profession, a constant evaluation of our practice and how it contributes to a viable human-service discipline becomes both a challenge and a responsibility. A common ground on which to engage in such reflexive study consists in the models and methods of knowledge used by both researchers and practitioners. By examining the models and methods of inquiry shared by members of the profession (as we will do in this present volume), we can begin to understand our contradictions and congruities, our limitations and potentials. The vision of a science and practice that mutually influence and support each other may provide a general direction for a profession that is continuously evolving its identity.

ISSUES OF METHOD CHOICE

I would like to call special attention here to the question of method choice, by which I mean the choice of both conceptual and methodological means

and frameworks. As stated earlier, a person entering the profession will be faced with a diverse range of methods and orientations. Due to differences of personal history, the role models and peers in one's educational setting would likely display varied commitments to conceptual models and methodologies that reflect their personal values and worldviews. An open attitude is necessary in order for one to appreciate the existing variety of models and methods. By learning about the full range of conceptual and methodological frameworks and their strengths and limitations, one may be in a better position to make informed choices. Further reflective study could reveal the diverse paradigms from which the available concepts and methods of knowledge are derived and the fact that they are linked to particular values and philosophical commitments. These are the reasons for the focus in this volume on our orientation to inquiry, and the invitation to make thoughtful evaluations of our methods.

Method choice needs to be guided by an understanding of the philosophical foundations of a given paradigm of knowledge, its conceptual and methodological implications, the type of problems or questions it is best suited to address, and the value orientation adopted toward the subject phenomenon. It is a process that is mediated by our personal values, worldview, and interaction with significant others in our environment. An articulation of our personal beliefs and values may help clarify the basis of our choices. Reflection on our experience with the use of theories and methods can further clarify the boundaries of their application. As practicing members of the profession, we have to consider additionally the special needs and purposes in the context of working with clients. Methods of information gathering used in the practice of psychology have varied effects on our relationship with clients and how they are led to feel about themselves. For instance, a client's need to make sense of his or her situation and to have someone empathize with the problem he or she is experiencing calls for a mode of interaction that would respond to such needs. These types of considerations make it necessary for us to be selective in our approach to professional inquiry.

It appears that there are certain parameters that would constrain method choice in psychological inquiry. One is that human phenomena, the subject matter of our science and profession, are always contextualized and unstable, if not indeterminate in meaning. Much of the data come in the form of natural language and cultural practices. Being so, they must be understood in context, using processes and means that are most conducive to such understanding. Similarly, professional inquiry is a social activity that is culturally situated and personally motivated. It, too, is embedded in context. As social agents, psychologists work within the settings and roles defined by society. As human beings, we are the products of our own culture and history, social-

ized by the institutions that grant us legitimacy as professionals. Our approach to knowledge must therefore account for our own embeddedness as well as the special nature of our subject matter. What this probably means in terms of method choice is that not all methods are possible or equally appropriate for a given task of knowledge. Not all paradigms could be co-equal in value in a given context. The crucial difference is in how one arrives at one's choices. The degree of critical self-reflection that accompanies a particular choice may determine our ability to continue to seek more viable options.

Of the many factors entering into method choice, the personal judgment of the professional plays a central role. For this reason, the rest of this chapter will touch upon personal knowing and the development of professional judgments and worldviews.

PERSONAL KNOWING AND PROFESSIONAL WORLD VIEWS

Surprisingly, the professional's personal approach to knowledge in general is seldom a subject of study. Similarly, professional worldviews tend to be taken for granted rather than subject to scrutiny. On the other hand, considerable attention has been given to the nature of professional judgment in research on cognitive factors in social information processing. This research has included studies of factors that influence social information processing (Cantor and Kihlstrom 1981; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Higgins and Stangor 1988), the heuristics employed in professional decision making (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Nisbett and Ross 1980), and errors of professional judgment (Turk and Salovey, 1988). The lessons from these studies point to the fallibility of professional judgment and the need to guard against potential biases and errors. The implications of this area of research will be discussed in chapter 7. As a practicing profession, psychology must attend to the development of professional judgment in training as well as build in checks and balances in professional practice.

In attempting to improve on our professional judgment, there has been a tendency to look toward better instruments and procedures as an answer. Valid instruments of appraisal and reliable procedures of information gathering do contribute to the quality of information obtained by the professional psychologist. However, much remains to be processed and acted upon by the psychologist, based on experience and personal judgment. It is the personal knowing of the professional that is the determining factor in our judgments and actions. There is much that we need to learn about our own ways of knowing as a practicing profession. Due to the historical emphasis on formal research as a means of generating knowledge, there is at present no comprehensive framework for understanding the knowledge processes of practitioners. It is assumed that the professional psychologist trained with the scientist-

practitioner model basically endorses the epistemological assumptions and practices of the academic psychologist and researcher. This seems to be true for behaviorally oriented psychologists (Krasner and Houts 1984). Yet many practitioners claim that their clinical ways of knowing are different from what they have learned in research training. Some experience a duality in their orientation to knowledge as researcher and practitioner.

The distinctive feature of the knowledge of practice is that it is interactive and contingent on the participation of both the professional and the client. The fact that the practitioner is always a participant observer makes it untenable to maintain the assumptions of a detached observer as in the traditional research setting. Kanfer (1990) identified several additional dimensions of difference between the functioning of laboratory researchers and practitioners that may have reinforced the division between science and practice. The possibility has been proposed (Hoshmand and Polkinghorne 1992) that alternative conceptions of psychological science and the knowledge of practice may overcome this division. The common thread between inquiry for research purposes and for practice is to be found in our ways of knowing or our applied epistemology (the subject of chapter 7). A working conception of how professional knowledge is tested and refined through application may be helpful in understanding our judgments and actions in practice.

Schon (1983) offered a conception of expert practice as reflective practice, in which knowledge is critically tested and revised in the light of experience. His conception is supported by the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), who described the knowledge processes of practitioners at different levels of experience. An understanding of the knowledge of practice may enable us to place in perspective the respective roles and contributions of our academic theoretical knowledge, our experiential learning, and our practice-tested knowledge. As one undergoes professional training, it is important to reflect on one's native ways of knowing and how they evolve and change with education and the experience of professional research and practice. Due to the emphasis on objective methods and external criteria of knowing, however, there has been a relative neglect of the development of the enquirer and knower. This has been in spite of the fact that tacit dimensions of knowing are inevitably involved in all acts of knowing (Polanyi 1964, 1966). We shall therefore consider the place of personal knowing and how it enters into the development of professional worldviews.

There are several dimensions of personal knowing that are significant in the development of professional worldviews. First is personal epistemic style, which refers to one's preferred modes of knowing. Epistemic styles may be temperament based (Mitroff and Kilmann 1978) and/or a function of developmental stage (Salner 1988). Some of us learn from authoritative sources, and others, by personal experience. Some prefer working with ideas

while others prefer learning by doing. Even as we reflect, the flow from question to answer and back to question varies for each person. Some of us need more time to pause at questions. Others reach out to question only after sufficient resting at answers. Epistemic orientation seems to affect scientists' choice of formal methods of knowledge (Kratwohl 1985). Thus, it is important to understand one's own epistemic style and to complement it with those method choices that would otherwise not be considered in inquiry. Epistemic style is probably related to one's preferred scientific worldview. Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) warned that favoring a single epistemic style would deprive a scientific discipline of alternative approaches to knowledge. Kratwohl (1985) and Salner (1988) speculated that there may be a developmental progression of epistemic styles, both for the individual and for the profession at large. The maturing of our discipline and profession could very well depend on the evolution of epistemic styles adopted by the members.

A second dimension concerns the use of self as a tool of knowledge. In professional inquiry, whether in research or in practice, the self of the professional can serve as an instrument for gauging human phenomenon in interaction (Baldwin and Satir 1987; Berg and Smith 1988; Kelly 1955). Professional training should provide opportunities for refining the use of self in inquiry. In Eastern ways of thought, the self as knower is given great emphasis (Paranjpe 1988a). The self becomes knowing through the dialectic interaction with one's environment, both external and internal. Knowing is thus synonymous with action and experience. The selfhood of a developing professional should be a central area of focus for the profession.

A third dimension concerns the influence of personal worldviews on our choice of professional paradigms. Personal beliefs and values influence our choice of conceptual models and methods of inquiry in that those consistent with our personal worldviews are more likely to be preferred. A study by Kimble (1984) on the epistemic values and scientific worldviews of different groups of psychologists revealed certain distinct differences. More deeply rooted metaphysical beliefs are probably involved in the way we conduct scientific inquiry and professional practice (O'Donohue 1989). Lyddon (1989a) pointed to the relationship between personal epistemology and preference for particular counseling approaches. Individuals entering the profession should take time to discover their implicit frameworks and evaluate how new ideas are assimilated and accommodated as they undergo their professional training experience.

Personal aspects of knowing therefore affect professional worldviews at several levels. The critical question is how personal knowing becomes integrated with the development of professional knowledge. It is important not to equate personal knowledge with total subjectivity. In its ideal form, this personal knowledge should be a product of experience that reflects the benefits

of one's learning history and environment. Professional development does not occur in a vacuum. As members of a knowledge community, we participate in contributing to the knowledge claimed by the profession. Individually, we are each accountable to this community in our actions and practices. Collectively, we are engaged in a continuous process of shaping our professional worldview.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTIVE STUDY

The present chapter has touched upon many issues and developments in the field. In proposing a reflexive stance, I have organized this volume by two themes. One is a reflexive study of the models and methods of inquiry in our profession and their foundations. The other is a focus on epistemic skills and knowledge processes in the development of the professional psychologist. For the purpose of evolving an integrative understanding of the many topics we will examine in the coming chapters, I offer the following questions to guide the process of reflective study:

1. What are the forces that have shaped the models of knowledge and orientations to inquiry in our discipline and profession?
2. What are the persistent issues and problems in psychological inquiry?
3. What are the special needs in the professional context of practice and their implications for paradigm and method choice?
4. What kinds of assumptions and values should we adopt in professional inquiry?
5. What are the conceptual and methodological paradigms available for our use, and how are they related to particular perspectives of knowledge?
6. What types of epistemic skills and reflective habits do we need to develop as professional psychologists?

Question 1 will be addressed from a historical perspective, along with question 2, in chapter 2. Questions 3 and 4, the subject of chapter 3, will set the context for discussion throughout. Question 5 will be covered by a description of core ideas and conceptual systems in chapter 4 and major research paradigms in chapter 5. Question 6 is approached from several angles in the remainder of the book: in terms of methods of inquiry in chapter 6, knowledge processes in chapter 7, training in case study in chapter 8, and the development of reflective habits and research-practice integration in chapter 9. The overall question that should be kept in mind throughout concerns what kinds of models and methods of knowledge may serve professional psychology well as a human science and practicing profession.

At the end of each chapter, there are additional questions and learning

activities suggested for readers who are current students and participants in professional training programs.