

Introduction:

1 ■ National and Spatial Divisions in Israel

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In the *The Origins of the Israeli Polity*, Horowitz and Lissak (1978) describe the Yishuv, the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine, as a minority within a wider political system, yet with its own central political institutions that enjoyed a large degree of authority resembling that of a sovereign state. At the end of the British rule and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, power was transferred from these institutions to the formal government and was consolidated there. A highly centralized unitary political system quickly emerged. The system emphasized the strengthening of the state authority and statism for itself as prominent national values (Weiss 1979). Shortly after independence, the Israeli system was already recognized as the most centralized and governmentally controlled system among all Western-type democratic states (Akzin and Dror 1966), and basically remained as such until today. Sharkansky (1987, 10) indicates that the most prominent elements of the Israeli system are the size and dominance of the government and its quasi-governmental extensions, which seem to be the largest in all the democratic states.

It is not unusual for scholars to focus on the salient characteristics of their own society. Thus, Israeli social scientists have been preoccupied with studying their national politics and their powerful center, and have also devoted some attention to local politics and policy. Completely neglected, however, has been the study of the regional level, as well as the impact of both the local and regional tiers on national politics. Despite the relative weakness of the local and regional tiers, the lack of attention paid by Israeli social scientists to these two levels and to their relations with the national tier, is still notable. To cite only one example, the heavily studied area of Israeli elections is covered with research on all national (Knesset) elections, yet only a

handful of studies deal with local elections or the regional implications of elections.

It is this emphasis on the national level in the literature, followed by the relative lack of attention to the local and regional levels, that is covered in the first section of this introductory chapter to the volume. The contribution of the volume as a whole is described in the second section. In short, the contribution is that the volume represents a systematic effort to analyze the role and the growing importance of local communities and regions in Israeli society and politics. All levels—national, local, and regional—are then integrated in the third section which provides the theoretical framework for the volume. After defining the local/regional unit of analysis for each of the eight subsequent chapters of this volume, each chapter is reviewed in the fourth section with an emphasis on the conflict of the unit in question with the national level. Conclusions and policy guidelines are then drawn in the final two sections.

THE LITERATURE: NATIONAL CENTER, REGION, AND LOCAL COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL

The weakness of the local and regional tiers in Israel is reflected in the limited role of the bodies that govern the two levels. Local governments in Israel are dependent on the central government with relatively little discretion in their affairs. They are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. The ministry is also in charge of the state's intermediate regional level: six districts with minor operational functions. The main function of local governments, service delivery (especially education and health), is closely controlled and monitored by a few national ministries. These ministries, primarily Interior and Finance, determine the budget allocation from the capital to local governments. Local governments, thus, must constantly search for access to penetrate and influence these ministries and their bureaucrats. They must bargain and apply political leverage to obtain their budgets from the central government. What remains under their jurisdiction is local tax collection (especially property tax) and special local endowment funds. A very successful example of the latter is analyzed in chapter 9 on Jerusalem.

A powerful national tier complemented the weakness of the local and regional levels in Israel. This tier and its politics have been studied

extensively through four major social science theories. These theories are the structural-functional (e.g., Parsons 1951), pluralist (e.g., Dahl 1961), elite (e.g., Hunter 1953; Mills 1956), and dependency (e.g., Hechter 1975). Common to all four theories, in the Israeli context, is that they have been applied almost exclusively on the national level. The distinction among them, however, is that the functional and pluralist approaches focused on national-level social groups which shaped the policies of the Israeli social-political center; the elite and dependency approaches concentrated on the social-political center itself.

National-level social groups in Israel are primarily ethnic, class, religious, and interest groups. The functional approach views such groups as contributing individually, based on value consensus among them, to the stability of the social system as a whole (e.g., Horowitz and Lissak 1978). The autonomous groups make compromises, build coalitions and, as a result, a loosely unified consensual-democratic political center is formed. A much less stable center, with no value consensus among groups, and constantly changing power distributions according to the different issue-areas, is portrayed by the pluralist approach. In this approach, the groups cooperate and make compromises at least in a single issue-area. In other policy areas they operate separately. In a well-known study by Smootha (1978) the reference is primarily to Israel's major ethnic groups—obviously, national-level forces. But even a recent book by Yishai (1987), which follows the American tradition of interest groups analysis in the pluralist approach, focuses on Israeli groups that operate on the national level. The vast majority of these interest groups have close relations with the parties, direct or indirect lobbying in the Knesset as well as parliamentary “watchdogs” for their interests, and direct access to the executive branch. Most of the groups consistently express their particularistic interests in national-collective terms.

While the functional and the pluralist approaches claim the Israeli social-political center to be a by-product of national-level forces, applications of the elite (e.g., Shapiro 1978) and dependency (e.g., Swirski 1981) approaches view this center as an independent entity, a strong leader representing the dominant class of a basically stratified society. The elite and dependency approaches reject the functionalist view of the Israeli social system as consensual and stability-oriented. They rather emphasize its stratified class structure, its conflictual and change-oriented nature. Proponents of the elite and dependency approaches also blame Israeli scholars for their unwillingness (or

perhaps inability) to criticize the egalitarian and pluralist assumptions of their own society, which was founded on socialist-Zionist ideology (Shapiro 1985, 8). Elite theorists view Israel as governed from the center by a relatively small group that controlled the political and economic spheres through the dominant Labor party, at least until 1977 when the right-wing Likud party rose to power. Dependency theorists argue that the Israeli center is controlled by Ashkenazim, Jews primarily of European and American origin, who are in the upper level of the occupational ladder. According to dependency theorists, this dominant class established an ethnic division of labor that ensures the placement of lower-priced providers of cheap labor power, Oriental Jews from the Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East, at the bottom of the ladder (Bernstein and Swirski 1982).

Implicit or explicit in all four theories (functional, pluralist, elite, and dependency), in the Israeli context, is the utilization of Shils's concepts of "center and periphery." The concepts were applied to both the Yishuv and State periods (e.g., Galnoor 1982, 112–40; Horowitz and Lissak 1985, 40–42; Horowitz and Lissak 1989). Shils's concept of the "center" includes both values and activities supported by society. It is a general "central zone" defined in terms of dominant societal values. It is also "a structure of activities, of roles and persons, within the network of institutions" (Shils 1975, 3). Accordingly, the social-political center is part of the general "central zone" of values and the main meeting point of the activities. National-level groups are part of the activities which affect the "central zone," the value system. The "periphery," in comparison to the "center," is less attached and committed to the dominant value system. It also has less control over political resources and institutions. To enhance political integration, the "center" must penetrate the more problematic groups in the dependent "periphery," mobilize them, and obtain their support. The Israeli center, according to Galnoor (1982, 131–40), had to penetrate seven such target groups until the mid-1960s. Three of them—Israeli Arabs, Oriental Jews, and ultra-Orthodox Jews—are the focus of chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 in this volume.

Shils's broad abstract concepts had no specific spatial definitions. Yet when applied, they frequently focused on specific territorial locations and boundaries. This was especially the case in studies about centers and peripheries in Western European countries during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Gottmann 1980; Rokkan and Urwin 1982). Two important concepts in these studies were "regionalism" and

“ethnoregionalism,” which indicated group protest against the center and a demand for regional autonomy. Again, Israeli literature on the interaction between regional concentrations of local communities and national-level politics is minimal. Indeed, the political manifestations of “regionalism” and ethnic upsurge were analyzed only in two studies: one about the development towns (Gradus 1983 and 1984) and the other about the Jewish settlements on the West Bank (Goldberg and Ben-Zadok 1983). By emphasizing spatial-political explanations, these studies go beyond Israeli research on regional inequality which concentrated on socioeconomic indicators (e.g., Shachar and Lipshitz 1981). These initial studies must be developed more systematically. Such efforts are being made in this volume: in chapter 4 on the development towns, in chapter 7 on the Jewish settlements on the West Bank, and in other chapters covering other regions.

While only a few studies dealt with the regional level, a growing number of studies on local community politics in Israel appeared in the 1970s (e.g., Cohen 1974). Some of them explained the relationship between individual local communities and national politics, mainly through the mediation of the political parties (e.g., Deshen 1970; Aronoff 1974). One important study observed that in the 1970s Israeli society was transforming from a national ideologically based politics into territorially based politics (Elazar 1975). The study viewed this distinction between national and local politics as a sign of voter maturity. The distinction was indeed formalized in a 1976 local elections law passed by the Knesset. Accordingly, the mayor, who used to be elected by the local council on the base of its party list, is now elected as an individual directly by the voters. The council is elected separately and, still, through proportional representation of the parties.

The new emphasis on local issues was followed by increasing demands for local autonomy and new forms of citizen participation such as local voluntary associations, environmental groups, and local planning committees (Ben-Zadok 1986). The trend was documented in studies of citizen participation. Many of them focused on Project Renewal which is described in chapter 5 here. The project introduced strong elements and unique forms of citizen participation and local decision-making (Churchman 1987; Alterman 1988; Liron and Spiro 1988). Again, however, these forms of citizen participation, whether in individual communities or their aggregate, were not related to national politics in the literature.

CONTRIBUTION: THE LOCAL-REGIONAL FOCUS AND ITS NATIONAL CONTEXT

The contribution of this volume to the theories and concepts mentioned in the previous section is that they can all benefit by incorporating ideas from the volume about the role of local communities and regions in Israeli society and politics; something that these theories and concepts failed to do in the past. Such an effort to link local and regional forces to the larger Israeli system may facilitate better understanding of the system and, possibly, its reinterpretation. A brief review of these theories and concepts illustrates this point. The functional and pluralist approaches will clearly benefit if they break-down their homogeneous national-level units of analysis into spatial properties. Interesting differences will then emerge, for example, between Oriental Jews—one national-level ethnic group—in the development towns and the renewal neighborhoods as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Such diversity of spatial properties means that compromise and stability in the Israeli system as a whole is also achieved as a result of trade-offs among local and regional values and interests (functional). In addition, while such trade-offs may contribute to consensus in one or more issue-areas, the overall increase in bargainers, due to the local and regional interest groups, portrays a more diversified and perhaps even less stable system than previously assumed (pluralist). The contribution of the volume to the elite and dependency theories is in the identification of local communities and regions as representing the ruling or subordinated class, and by explaining why local and regional inequalities are important to understand conflict and change in Israeli society.

Turning to Shils's concepts of "center and periphery," this volume helps to define the values and political resources of spatial units. The local and regional values and interests of these units are then related to those of the "periphery" or the "center." Patterns of agreement and incompatibility are identified. Further, the specific concepts of "regionalism" and "ethnoregionalism" are elaborated here, that is, trends of regional autonomy in Israel. As for community politics and citizen participation concepts, not only is the localistic context emphasized in this volume, but a more important contribution is the discussion of aggregates of local communities and local participation activities as well as their impact on national politics.

As mentioned earlier, the overall contribution of the volume is in its systematic effort to analyze the role of local communities and

regions in Israeli society and politics. This analysis is based on the concept of “spatial sector,”¹ that is, the dual membership of the population in the spatial sector itself (all the population) and in one social group (the overwhelming majority of the population). The membership in the spatial sector is the local- and regional-level component of the concept. The membership in the social group is the national-level component of the concept. The contribution of the concept to the literature is in the intersection of the two memberships of the same population. Previous studies mainly covered only one of the two.

Gush Emunim new settlements on the West Bank, for example, are the spatial sector discussed in chapter 7. All the settlers of the Gush reside in local communities on the West Bank. This is the local- and regional-level component of the concept. The overwhelming majority of the settlers are religious Jews. This is the national-level component. The Druze communities in northern Israel, for example, although comprised of a much larger population than that of the Gush settlements on the West Bank,² are merely a spatial unit. They do not qualify as a spatial sector because their population has no membership in a clearly identified national-level social group.

In the following section, the national-level component of the concept of “spatial sector” is briefly discussed and the local- and regional-level of the concept is elaborated. The concept itself, which integrates all levels, is further analyzed.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND SPATIAL SECTORS

As indicated before, national-level social groups such as ethnic, class, religious, and interest groups shape the policies of the Israeli social-political center. These groups are clearly more vocal and successful in their claims from the system than local and regional groups. The interactions, tensions, and conflicts among these groups were conceptualized in Israeli social science as the four well-known national “cleavages”: Arab-Jewish, ethnic-class, religious-secular, and left-right.³ These cleavages are the most salient feature of Israeli society and politics. Membership in one of the social groups that each of them represents, intersects with one or two of the spatial sectors discussed in this volume (see table 1.1).

As presented in this volume, a spatial sector refers to numerous local communities contained in one or two regions of the country, or

dispersed nationwide. In one special case the sector is one city, albeit a central city (Jerusalem). The pattern of dispersion of each of the spatial sectors, the type of settlement of its communities, as well as a list of the eight sectors themselves, are presented in table 1.1. In addition, figure 1.1 presents a map of the sectors and their patterns of dispersion.

The population of each sector, its percentage of the total population and of the Jewish population, and its number of settlements, all appear in table 1.2. An important methodological limitation avoids an accurate estimate of the relative weight of the combined population of the eight sectors in the total population of Israel. That is, the populations of some sectors intersect (overlap) with each other (see table 1.2, footnote a).

A quick glance at table 1.2 reveals the salient “demographic power” of the combined population of all the sectors versus the total population of Israel. Moreover, the nationwide dispersion, rather than regional concentration, of five of the eight sectors tends to increase their social and political clout. This nationwide dispersion distinguishes these sectors from their counterparts in studies of “regionalism” and “ethnoregionalism.” This distinction is required due to Israel’s small size.⁴ Because the country is so small, sectors spread nationwide are still “sufficiently concentrated” so that they can obtain significant social and political clout.

The social and political clout of each spatial sector is strengthened through the common demographic, social, economic, and political characteristics that cut across its numerous local communities.⁵ Moreover, each of the two Arab and the two Oriental sectors is clearly of a lower socioeconomic status and represents a “periphery” in Shils’s terms. Thus, altogether these sectors and the others pose major problems for the future of Israeli society and politics. Their relationship with the society is described below.

Table 1.3 shows three major components around which a spatial sector conducts its interaction within Israeli society: the other party in the interaction, the subject of the interaction, and the sector’s mode of operation for the interaction. To begin, a spatial sector—Gush Emunim will serve as an example—might interact with four major parties. First, the sector interacts with the general Israeli polity, that is, the larger society and its central government. The term “larger society” covers all social groups including the sector’s own social group or all other religious Jews in the case of Gush Emunim. Second, the sector interacts with the general Israeli polity, the larger society and central government, excluding its own social group (which it represents). Spe-

Table 1.1. Spatial Sectors in Israel: Social Group, Dispersion, and Type of Settlement

PART. CLEAVAGE			
Chapter. Spatial Sector ^a	Social Group	Dispersion	Type of Settlement
I. ARAB-JEWISH			
2. West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs	Arabs	Regional	Rural ^b /Town/ City
3. Israeli Arabs	Arabs	Nationwide	Rural/Town/ City
II. ETHNIC-CLASS ^c			
4. Development Towns	Oriental Jews	Nationwide	Town
5. Renewal Neighborhoods	Oriental Jews	Nationwide	Neighborhood
III. RELIGIOUS-SECULAR			
6. Urban Neighborhoods	Religious Jews	Nationwide	Neighborhood
7. Gush Emunim Settlements	Religious Jews	Regional	Rural
IV. LEFT-RIGHT			
8. Kibbutzim and Moshavim	Left ^d	Nationwide	Rural
V. MULTICLEAVAGE ^e			
9. Jerusalem	Arabs Oriental Jews Religious Jews	One City	Neighborhood— City ^f

a. Each part of the book, from I to IV, represents one cleavage. Each chapter of the book, from 2 to 9 (1 is this introduction), represents one spatial sector.

b. "Rural" in this table represents mainly small size, nonurban life-style, and agricultural activity. It may also include other economic activities such as industry and services.

c. Represents Oriental Jews versus Ashkenazim.

d. A broadly defined social group based on the ideology of Labor Zionism.

e. The three cleavages are the Arab-Jewish, ethnic-class, the religious-secular (see above). They are all within one city—Jerusalem. Jerusalem, as the subject of Chapter 9, serves as a special case study in the book.

f. Largely homogeneous neighborhoods populated by Arabs, Oriental Jews, or religious Jews are common in Jerusalem. The city as a whole is a "spatial sector."

cifically, Gush Emunim, representing religious Jews, interacts with secular Jews. The term "larger society" here refers to the opposing social group, for the interaction is within the context of the national cleavage. This is the main interaction covered in the volume. That is,

Figure 1.1
General Map of Spatial Sectors in Israel




Table 1.2. Spatial Sectors in Israel: Population (1987) and Number of Settlements

Spatial Sector	Population ^a	Percentage of Total Population ^a	Percentage of Jewish Population ^a	Number of Settlements (estimate)
ARABS				
West Bank and Gaza Strip	1,383,200	24	—	460
Israeli Arabs	793,600	14	—	158
ORIENTAL JEWS				
Development Towns	756,520	13	21	33
Renewal Neighborhoods	700,000	12	19	90
RELIGIOUS JEWS				
Urban Neighborhoods	722,580	12	20 ^c	—
Gush Emunim Settlements	10,672	0.2	0.3	39
THE LEFT				
Kimbutzim and Moshavim	284,100	5	8	715
THE CITY				
Jerusalem	482,700 ^b	8	13	1
Total—Sectors ^a	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total—Israel	5,789,700	5,789,700 ^d	3,612,900 ^d	n.a.

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 1988a; various chapters in this book.

a. In this category, the population or its percentage is calculated independently for each sector regardless of its partial intersection (overlap), in some cases, with other sectors. The Total—Sectors category is therefore marked as n.a. No accurate data are available on these intersections. Cases of intersection include the Development Towns with Renewal Neighborhoods/Urban Neighborhoods; Renewal Neighborhoods also intersect with Urban Neighborhoods/Jerusalem; Jerusalem also intersects with Urban Neighborhoods and Israeli Arabs.

b. Including East Jerusalem.

c. The ultra-Orthodox alone are roughly 8 percent of the population (of Jews and Israeli Arabs).

d. The base figure for calculating the percentages.

Table 1.3. Interaction of a Spatial Sector: Other Party, Subject, and Mode of Operation*Other Party*

1. General Israeli polity, i.e., larger society and central government
2. General Israeli polity except own social group
3. A sub-group of own social group
4. Another spatial sector

Subject

1. Values
2. Interests

Mode of Operation

1. National-level (emphasis on social group and cleavage)
2. Local- and regional-level (emphasis on sector)
3. Mix of national-level and local- and regional-level

the term “larger society” usually refers to the opposing social group. Depending on the content, the term sometimes refers to the first party as above. The third possible party for the interaction with the sector is another spatial or nonspatial subgroup of the sector’s own social group. In the Gush Emunim case, that party might be any other Jewish religious element. The fourth party might be another spatial sector of a distinct social group. In the Gush Emunim case, that party might be religious urban neighborhoods, development towns, or West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs. Interactions with the third and fourth party are also covered in the volume, (and are specifically indicated in the index), yet interaction with the second party is the central subject.

The interaction between a spatial sector and the other party is frequently tense, particularly when occurring in the context of the national cleavage. The interaction evolves around two subjects: values and interests (table 1.3). Each subject represents one type of conflict. The two types, though not mutually exclusive in practice, can be distinguished analytically. The first type, “conflict of values,” is around broad normative issues, primarily ideological, political, social, cultural, and life-style issues. The second type, “conflict of interests,” is around specific policies, primarily economic, budget, and land policies. Because these policies are frequently centralized through the Israeli government, this conflict is usually between a spatial sector and the central government (which is also controlled by an opposing social group). Both types of conflict, values and interests, are an important part of the political process.

The conflicts of values and interests between a spatial sector and the larger society and central government sometimes overlap with the conflicts between Shils's "periphery and center." This is largely the case of the first four sectors in table 1.1. In other cases, such an analogy is misleading. The values or interests of a certain sector can be a part of the "periphery" or the "center." This mixture characterizes the rest of the cases in table 1.1. These sectors, though not dominant, might have a significant influence on the values and interests of the larger society and the central government. This is due to sociohistorical reasons or to Israel's parliamentary and coalition government system. As minorities, however, they still have to struggle for their positions, and frequently through the political process.

In the political process, a spatial sector might employ three modes of operation for protecting and advancing its values and interests (table 1.3). Each mode is a unique strategy which carries its own terminology. The first mode is exclusively around the sector's national-level social group and cleavage with no acknowledgment of the spatial sector. This mode is also frequently used by Israeli political parties. Israeli parties are highly centralized on the national-level, dominated by national leaders and issues, and touch upon every segment of Israeli society. The second mode of operation of the sector is exclusively within the terms of the local and regional level. In other words, the emphasis is on the sector itself. The third mode is a mix of the national-level and local- and regional-level. That is, the social group and the cleavage are explicitly employed to help the sector.

THE CHAPTERS: VALUES, INTERESTS, AND POLITICS

The conflicts of values and interests of each spatial sector with the larger Israeli society and the central government, in the context of the national cleavage, is the main subject of the chapters in this book. Each cleavage constitutes one part and each sector is one chapter in the book (see table 1.1). Part I, the Arab-Jewish cleavage, covers West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs (chapter 2) and Israeli Arabs (chapter 3). These are two sectors with all-Arab population in a Jewish state. Part II, the ethnic-class cleavage, describes the development towns (chapter 4) and renewal neighborhoods (chapter 5). These are two spatial sectors largely populated by relatively poor Oriental Jews that are in a tense relationship with the middle-class Ashkenazim who dominate the national value and economic systems despite their slight numerical disadvantage. Part III, the religious-secular cleavage, deals

with religious neighborhoods in the urban centers (chapter 6)⁶ and Gush Emunim new settlements in the West Bank (chapter 7). These are two orthodox sectors that are in conflict with the secular majority in Israel. Part IV, the left-right cleavage, focuses on kibbutzim and moshavim (chapter 8). These rural cooperative settlements, the ideological center of Labor Zionism in the past, are at odds with the new trends in the Israeli society and the ruling right-wing government. Finally, part IV analyzes Jerusalem (chapter 9) in the context of the three national cleavages that divide the city. The city as a whole serves as a special case study of a spatial sector with memberships in a number of social groups, yet still distinct vis-à-vis the larger Israeli society and the central government. Jerusalem exemplifies a degree of complexity and potential tension with no parallel in other Israeli local communities. It thus serves as an interesting concluding chapter for the book.

The chapters of the book are reviewed below in the order mentioned above. The review of each chapter, or spatial sector, begins with highlighting the conflicts of values between the sector and the larger Israeli society. It continues with the conflict of interests, primarily with the central government. Some demographic and social characteristics of the Israeli society as a whole, relevant to this conflict, appear in table 1.4. The table may provide a general comparison between the society and the specific sector reviewed. The review then continues with the politics of the sector. Observations on politics are also made throughout the discussion of the conflicts. Results of Knesset and local elections in Israel appear in table 1.5. The table also provides a more general comparison between the society and the specific sector reviewed.⁷

The book opens with the Arab-Jewish cleavage which is presented in two chapters: on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs written by Donna Robinson Divine, and on Israeli Arabs by Majid Al-Haj. The conflicts of these two spatial sectors with the larger Jewish society reflect the century-old struggle between two national movements, each with distinct cultural, religious, and ideological identities. The ultimate challenge to the fundamental tenet of Zionist ideology, the Jewish society's moral right to exist in its own state, comes from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Divine shows how two decades of passive hostility and instrumental cooperation with the Israeli occupation culminated in the civil disobedience and violent riots of the Intifada which began in December 1987. Coupled with elements of Islamic fundamentalism, the Intifada stressed again the

Table 1.4. Demographic and Social Characteristics of Israel, 1970, 1980, and 1989

Demographic/ Social Characteristic	1970	1980	1989
Population (Percent Jewish) ^a	3,022,100 (85.4)	3,921,700 (83.7)	4,559,600 (81.5)
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Arabs)	985,600 ^b	1,163,300	1,413,900
Percentage of Population in Coastal District (Haifa, Central, and Tel Aviv)	62.7	60.1	57.6
Percentage of Population in Urban Localities	88.6 ^c	89.6 ^d	89.8
Density per km ²	154.8 ^c	191.8	208.7
Number of Settlements	884	1,031	1,159
Number of Local Governments	192	210	230
Percentage Employed in Industry	24.3	23.7	21.6
Percentage Employed in Services	31.7	35.8	36.9
Percentage Employed in Professional or Administra- tive Occupations (Jews) ^e	43.0 ^f	—	51.6
Percentage of Unemployed Adults	3.8	4.8	8.9
Median Years of Schooling	8.8	10.7	11.6
Percentage with One Private Car (Jews)	15.4	35.6	42.9 ^g
Percentage of Households with Less than One Person per Room (Jews)	18.2	31.3	42.4

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 1976, 1988a, 1989, 1990.

a. Excluding the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

b. This figure is for 1967.

c. This figure is for 1972.

d. This figure is for 1983.

e. Professional—scientific, academic, professional, and technical workers. Administrative—administrators, managers, and clerical workers.

f. This figure is for 1975.

g. This figure is for 1987.

Table 1.5. Results of Knesset and Local (Council) Elections in Israel (Percentage of Valid Votes for 1977, 1978, 1983, 1984, and 1988)

	Labor	Political Bloc ^a			Other	Voting Turnout
		Likud	Religious	Local		
Knesset						
1977	24.6	35.3	13.9	—	26.5	79.2
1984	37.1	33.1	12.6	—	17.0	78.9
1988	32.5	31.1	14.6	—	21.7	79.7
Local^b						
1978	34.9	26.3	16.5	17.6	4.7	57.3
1983	36.9	23.5	19.5	16.5	3.6	58.0

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 1988a, 1988b; Goldberg 1987.

- a. The most effective way to understand Israel's diversified multiparty system is to classify the many parties and lists into major political blocs. Accordingly, the "Labor" bloc includes Mapai, later Labor party or Alignment, and Mapam, a junior partner. The "Likud" bloc includes Gahal (Herut and the Liberal party), later Likud. Each of the two blocs might also include another one or two minor parties, depending on the election year. The components of the "religious" bloc are the National Religious Party (NRP), Agudat Israel and, depending on the election year, Tami, Shas, and smaller parties. "Other" includes numerous small parties and lists that are clearly left of Labor, right of Likud, and at the center. "Local" indicates genuine local lists with no affiliation, formal or informal, to any of the parties classified under the blocs above.
- b. The results by "political bloc" include Jewish and Jewish-Arab mixed communities; communities with exclusively Arab population are not included. However, all communities are included in "Voting Turnout." The formal results of the 1989 local elections are not published yet by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The results published in the daily news papers (e.g., *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 1 March 1989) showed a significant increase in votes for the Likud and religious blocs, and a significant decrease for Labor. The voting turnout was extremely low—48%.

threat of secular life, introduced mainly through the Jewish society, to the two Arab regions that are still experiencing much ambivalence towards modernization. Modernization, followed with much reliance on education as a channel for mobility, with no parallel economic development, resulted in social turmoil for a society based on family and kin relations.

Divine argues that economic growth, a rising standard of living, and access to modern goods and services, provided temporary stability in the past but no economic security and occupational mobility in the long-run. The static economy of the Intifada and the rising unemployment further weakened the low socioeconomic status and forced the return to simple self-sufficient local and regional economies with

less reliance on manufactured goods. The Intifada increased the gaps between the economic interests of the Jewish center and the two Arab regions. Struggle for the scarce resources of water, land, and agriculture also continued. Yet the economy of the regions is still highly dependent on the center.

The conflict is heightened due to the strategic-security function of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the state. In the geography of a small country like Israel, the two regions are peripheral. But their proximity to the denser metropolitan areas of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa is a major threat to Israel's national security.

To a large extent, according to Divine, the Intifada was the result of the basic contradictions in policies and the lack of consensus among the government agencies in charge of the two occupied regions. Nonetheless, it did not foster a united policy among the military administration in the regions, the civil administration, and the different ministries of the government. At the same time, the Intifada created new opportunities for the Palestinians. They began to rely more and more on local economic resources. It also opened new channels of political behavior for people with no citizenship and equal rights. The young Palestinian generation and its leaders became more politically aware and clashed directly with the Jewish center. The ultimate demand of the two peripheral regions, for self-determination and home rule, became more vocal and effective.

Unlike their counterparts in the occupied regions, Israeli Arabs enjoy the formal rights of their citizenship and cooperate, at least instrumentally, with the larger Jewish society. The latter, however, considers them as a "hostile minority" and a threat to national security, which the Arabs view as an excuse for the discriminatory policies against them. In his chapter, Al-Haj notes the growing national consciousness among Israeli Arabs since the 1970s and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1980s. Interestingly, these trends are intertwined with the realistic desire to link their future more firmly to the state. They remained excluded, however, from the modern nation-state building process. Moreover, they are still ambivalent towards the modern Western values which are dominant in the Jewish society; despite their significant level of individual modernization reflected in their rising level of education and standard of living.

The ethnic stratification of the Israeli society placed clear limits on the lower socioeconomic status of the Arab minority. The class gaps between Arabs and Jews have remained. The attempts of the Arabs to reduce the gaps concentrated on their local-level interests.

They requested from the central government higher budget allocations for local services and education as well as for local planning and construction.

Israeli Arabs focused on local-level interests because they had little share in the values of the Jewish majority and in the national power structure. With no other choices, politics became locally oriented. The conflict with the Jewish center around local interests characterized all the strategies of political mobilization employed by Israeli Arabs in order to penetrate the Israeli power structure and to bargain over resources. Three such strategies are conceptualized by Al-Haj. The first, parliamentary politics, delivered minor returns. The second, local politics, became a central activity and a very important means for political mobilization. The third strategy, mobilization through extraparliamentary national organizations, is gradually gaining importance. This strategy relies on the expertise of Arab professionals and is focused on social services, education, local planning, construction, and industrialization.

For the time being, according to Al-Haj, the attempts of Israeli Arabs for greater integration and equality have failed to meet their expectations and needs. They have only five Knesset members and one of sixty senior government positions. The national Jewish center is practically closed to them. Their communities remained segregated from the Jewish society. Most of their political energy is now geared towards their community-level needs. However, because they are still dependent on the Jewish center, they will continue their national-level parliamentary activity. They will also continue to search for overall political solutions, including some arrangement for autonomy within the state.

The ethnic-class cleavage is discussed in two chapters: on the development towns written by Efraim Ben-Zadok, and on the neighborhoods of Project Renewal by Hana Ofek. Both authors note the difficult transition of the Oriental immigrants from the traditional Islamic societies of North Africa and the Middle East to Israel, a new society dominated by the relatively modern Western values of European Jews. The traditional family, community, religious, and cultural patterns of the immigrants were repressed to build a homogeneous national culture based on secular modern values. The Western-oriented "melting pot" ideology resulted in a limited integration process. But since the early 1970s, cultural pluralism was accepted as less threatening to the political system. Oriental ethnicity and pride has surfaced and became more pronounced. Opening up to more cultural pluralism

and to the Middle Eastern patterns of the region, the Ashkenazim became more tolerant of the Middle East culture of the region represented by Orientals. The latter continued to adopt Western patterns. The mutual cultural infusions, concludes Ben-Zadok, will probably reduce the conflict of values in the future.

Nevertheless, the development towns and renewal neighborhoods are still relatively isolated and homogeneous communities experiencing "negative selection" of population and with limited opportunities for class and cultural exchange. The integration ideology of the establishment lagged behind in its implementation. This point is especially ironic for the development towns, which were planned as a part of the pioneering building of a new society. In the renewal neighborhoods, the residents' perception of the gaps between them and their middle-class neighbors and on the favorable treatment of Soviet immigrants may provoke waves of protest.

The conflict around class and economic interests, however, may intensify in the future according to both authors. Despite the progress, socioeconomic disparities have remained between each of the two spatial sectors and the larger Israeli society. The development towns and renewal neighborhoods are mainly populated by lower- and working-class Oriental Jews; Ashkenazim tend to be middle-class. The disparities are in the very indices that constitute the concept of "class" in the two chapters, that is, education, income employment, housing, and standard of living. Disparities in these indices were already observed in the 1950s when the ethnic-class division was formed. Currently, Orientals still rank lower on these indices and hold blue-collar, service, and small-business jobs. Ashkenazim still control Israel's public and private sectors and hold key positions in the parties, academia, and the arts.

Much of the class gaps originate in the local economic problems that the development towns and renewal neighborhoods are still experiencing. The class gaps will not be closed without community- and neighborhood-based comprehensive policies to solve the continuous problems of lagging industrial growth, unemployment, the budget deficit, and inadequate housing. Such policies are largely funded by the central government in Israel. The two sectors are dependent on the government and must bargain for their economic interests.

The ethnic-class gaps described above became the center of the electoral debate in the 1970s. Feelings of injustice and discrimination were eventually infused into the political process. Consequently, the Labor bloc suffered a sharp decline in votes, while the Likud, in turn,

enjoyed a significant rise in the two sectors. In the development towns this process involved a dramatic "ouster of the old guards." The older immigrant leadership was replaced by younger and educated leaders, products of the Israeli school system, who quickly climbed through the open-mobility ranks of the right-wing party. The results were striking: in 1990, fourteen Knesset members and three ministers of the right-wing cabinet were residents of the development towns. Clearly, the periphery of the past is becoming a major political center of the present. Moreover, cooperating as one forum across party lines, the towns' representatives are aggressively promoting the local and regional economic interests of their communities through the legislative process. Grassroots support and demands to respond to community needs also increased significantly the vote for local lists in the towns. Similarly, such trends of local autonomy were expressed in a clear rise in resident participation in planning and policymaking in the renewal neighborhoods. As part of the decentralization plan of Project Renewal, the residents contributed directly to design policies that effectively reduced the socioeconomic disparities between their neighborhoods and the larger society. The interests of the neighborhoods are represented by a few Knesset members.

The religious-secular cleavage is reviewed in two chapters: the ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods in the urban centers written by Yosseph Shilhav, and Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank by Giora Goldberg. In contrast to the larger Israeli society, the ultra-Orthodox subculture blatantly rejects modern values and life-styles as well as the technology, such as television, that transmits their messages. At the same time, the ultra-Orthodox exploit all value-neutral components of modernity such as computers. Shilhav opens by explaining this point, which may seem contradictory to a secular person, yet it is ideologically consistent to a religious one. A similar logic is expressed in the relations of the ultra-Orthodox with the Zionist ideology and its Jewish state. While the ultra-Orthodox clearly reject these as a secular intervention in their spiritual messianic world, they exploit every means to pursue their interests within the very system which they disqualify.

In accordance with this dual behavior, they have less interest in the acute national issues of defense, security, or foreign affairs. But they maintain functional and instrumental relations with the state to ensure budgets for the school, social, welfare, and religious needs of their local communities. In these state-funded self-segregated homogeneous communities, they strictly preserve their faith and life-style.