

ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE HIDDEN THEME OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN GERMAN IDEALISM

The following monograph explores the topic of the other within German Idealism, in particular, the thought of Fichte and Hegel. Few studies recognize that German Idealism deals with intersubjectivity. The philosophies of Fichte and Hegel supposedly represent the culmination of idealistic metaphysics, and it is far from clear whether it is possible for idealism to raise, much less give an adequate account of, intersubjectivity. That is because the general principle of idealism, whether ontological or methodological, is said to be “no object without a subject,” or that objectivity is dependent on and relative to subjectivity. If the interpersonal other were an object, he/she would be dependent on, and in some sense derivative from, primal transcendental subjectivity. Thus the other would not be genuinely other. If the other is genuine, it must be transcendent to consciousness, and cannot be reduced to primordial self-identity or immanence.

Owing to its Cartesian heritage, idealism seems haunted by solipsism.¹ Since “everyone knows” that Fichte and Hegel are idealists, intersubjectivity seems excluded a priori—at least that is how the story usually goes. On the other hand, if they do raise and deal with intersubjectivity, that is an anomaly in tension with or in violation of their fundamental philosophical position. If so, this is an anomaly that calls for inquiry and explanation. What is intersubjectivity doing in a supposedly idealist philosophical program? How and with what justification does it arise there?

The theme of intersubjectivity in German idealism is all but unnoticed, not only in the English speaking world, but even in meticulous German scholarship as well. To be sure, Fichte and Hegel do not speak of intersubjectivity per se, but instead speak of recognition (*Anerkennung*). The recognition of the significance of “recognition” is so recent that the term *Anerkennung* is not indexed or even mentioned in Glockner’s *Hegel Lexicon*. Only in the last ten years has the topic of recognition surfaced in the German Hegel discussion, and appropriate studies have appeared.² There are only a few articles on it in English.³

This recent interest in *Anerkennung* is due in part to the emergence of the problem of the other, not simply as a problem of intersubjectivity, but as

a problem which threatens to undermine philosophy itself as traditionally conceived. Yet few have done more to raise the problem of the other in this global sense than have Fichte and Hegel. It is no exaggeration to say that the problem of the other and the related problem of otherness, first becomes explicit in these philosophies. Recent interest in the problem of the other and the related problem of difference, stands in the long shadows cast by Fichte and Hegel, and its relation to them is at best ambiguous. On the one hand, current philosophical consensus repudiates their thought as “metaphysics,” and on the other, it continues to borrow substantially from them, often without acknowledgment.

Another reason to study recognition is to clarify one of Hegel’s central concepts—that of *Geist*. In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the central concept of *Geist* first emerges as the result of reciprocal recognition. The concept of recognition provides the existential phenomenological genesis of Hegel’s concept of *Geist*, an I that is a We, and a We that is an I.⁴ It is significant that *Geist* originates in recognition, for this suggests that *Geist* is a fundamentally social concept. But the heretofore dominant interpretations treat *Geist* as simply another term for a transcendental or absolute ego,⁵ and thus suppress its intersubjective dimension. In the *Phenomenology* at least, the intersubjective-social dimension of *Geist* is the bearer of the transcendental dimension, and the latter is an abstraction from the former.⁶ For this reason interpretations which see Hegel’s philosophy as simply transcendental philosophy must be called into question. If *Geist* has its genesis in intersubjective recognition, then *Geist* is not an example of transcendental philosophy, but instead its transformation.

Existing English translations of Hegel obscure this departure from, or transformation of, transcendentalism. There is no single English term that is equivalent to *Geist*, which gets translated sometimes as mind (*mens*) and sometimes as spirit. The two English translations of the *Phänomenologie* reflect this ambiguity in their respective renderings of the title: the *Phenomenology of Mind* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The translation of *Geist* as “mind,” although correct in conveying the Latin lineage, suffers the drawback that it calls up the very Cartesian foundationalist metaphysical connotations that Hegel seeks to overcome—namely abstract, formal, disembodied, worldless subjectivity. Moreover it utterly fails to convey the intersubjective-social meaning that Hegel also intends. The attempt to correct this omission by translating *Geist* as “spirit” suffers the drawback of being either too narrowly theological (e.g., Holy Spirit) or conveying far too weak a sense of the social (e.g., team spirit, which is not a normative or ethical concept), and it suppresses the first person sense which is also an element of Hegel’s concept.

Given the absence of an equivalent synthetic concept for *Geist*, English translations vacillate between “mind” and “spirit,” as in the following translation of the *Encyclopedia* by William Wallace:

The absolute Mind (*Geist*) while it is a self-centered identity, is always also identity returning and ever returned into itself. If it is the one and universal substance, it is so as a spirit (*geistige*), discerning itself into a self and consciousness. Religion, as this supreme sphere may in general be designated, if it has, on the one hand, to be studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject, must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit (*Geist*) which as spirit (*Geist*) is in its community.⁷

In the first sentence *Geist* is rendered by mind, a translation that suggests a Cartesian metaphysical-transcendental reading. Yet in the last sentence *Geist*, rendered as spirit, is an intersubjective conception, namely, *Geist in seiner Gemeinde*. The English reader, deprived of the interpretive work of the translator, fails to appreciate that *Geist* is being translated in two different ways, as mind and as spirit. The passage, obscure in itself, is given a misleading clarification by the translation.

These translation difficulties point to deeper philosophical problems. H. G. Gadamer observes that translations of Hegel into foreign languages have been only partially successful: "There is good reason for the fact that translations of him [Hegel] into the major cultural languages first appeared in this century—translations which, without recourse to the original German text, are only half successful in communicating Hegel's thought. The linguistic potentialities of these other languages do not permit a direct duplication of the multiple meanings contained in such concepts as *Sein*, *Dasein*, *Wesen*, *Wirklichkeit*, *Begriff*, and *Bestimmung*. Thinking in the possible translation of these thus inevitably leads one astray into the conceptual horizons of the Scholastic metaphysics and the more modern developments of their concepts."⁸ In Gadamer's view, the conceptual horizons of metaphysics, enshrined in Latin and its linguistic offspring "provides the linguistic foundation for the translation of Hegel into Italian, Spanish, French or English."⁹ Consequently it is no accident that Hegel tends to be regarded in English speaking circles as the culmination of the metaphysical tradition. Those who rely exclusively on translations tend to pick up only the associations with classical metaphysics—i.e., the common elements of the House of Being or metaphysics present in Western languages—and miss the countervailing nuances of the German language which signal Hegel's breaking up and departure from the metaphysical tradition. Hegel's speculative dialectical critique of metaphysics gets lost in the translation. This concealment of Hegel's concrete meaning in metaphysically-determined translation, lies behind the dominant interpretation of *Geist* as mind and the suppression of its social-intersubjective sense.

Even German scholarship is unclear concerning the meaning and significance of Hegel's concept of *Geist*. For example, H. F. Fulda's article on Hegel's concept of *Geist* in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, exhibits two different senses, the logical and the intersubjective, without mentioning, much less dealing with, the problem of their relation. Fulda

identifies the logical sense of *Geist* as an identity that divides itself and opposes itself to itself, and then overcomes this disunity by restoration of identity and self-sameness. The following text exhibits this pattern:

This substance is, as subject, pure simple negativity. For this reason it is the division of what is simple, or the doubling which sets up opposition and then again negates this indifferent diversity and its opposite. Only this self-restoring self-sameness, or the reflection in otherness in itself—and not an original unity as such or a pure immediacy as such—is the true. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also at its beginning. And only by being worked out to its end is it actual.¹⁰

In this passage the other has no independent status. It is the result of the logical operation of negation which divides the primal simple unity. Since negation is determination, the other is a determination (= negation) of the original substantial unity, or self-othering. The other is logically derivative from and subordinate to unity and self-identity. But the other is also an instrument or means to the restoration of identity. For by cancelling or eliminating the other (as negation of identity), negation of negation restores the original identity.

The following passage from the *Encyclopedia* likewise exhibits the logical concept of *Geist* as self-mediating: “The appearance that *Geist* is mediated by an other is overcome by *Geist* itself, since *Geist* has as it were the sovereign ingratitude to sublimate and mediate that through which it appears to be mediated. It reduces such instrumentalities to elements which have existence only through *Geist* itself, and in this way *Geist* makes itself completely independent.”¹¹ Thus mediation turns out to be self-mediation and apparent determination by other is really *self*-determination. The other of *Geist* turns out to be posited and mediated by *Geist*. “What appears to be external to it or an activity opposed to it, is its own doing...”¹² On this reading the other is a self-othering (negation) of *Geist*, to be overcome by a further negation of negation. The negation of negation reinstates self-sameness by eliminating otherness. In this reading *Geist* is a logical-metaphysical principle.

However Fulda notes that for Hegel *Geist* has a second intersubjective sense. “The paradigmatic phenomenon of *Geist*...is for Hegel therefore not the ego or self-consciousness. Rather it is the relation of self-conscious individuals which are crucial to each other, since they give of themselves without reserve and at the same time know that the others on which they depend are nothing alien. Where Fichte posited the ego as absolute, Hegel posits this process of self-abandonment and finding of self in other.”¹³ Clearly this passage employs the concepts of other and mediation in a different sense from the first. The other here is an interpersonal other, another self-consciousness. This other is not simply a negation, or derivative from negation. And self-

recognition in other is not simply a matter of determinate or double negation. Rather, determinate negation is an element in self-recognition in other. Self-knowledge here does not involve simple self-sameness or self-identity, but rather mediation by other. Thus Fulda observes, "It ceases to be simple self-knowledge and becomes instead, self-knowledge in self-externalization... [Entäußerung]"¹⁴ This self-externalization presupposes and requires an intersubjective other.

Fulda does not recognize or call attention to any problem here, but the question is how these two senses of *Geist* are related, and whether they are compatible. Are all cases of reference to other, mediation by other, ultimately cases of self-reference and self-mediation? Such a claim conceals the theme of intersubjectivity and appears to reduce the other to a mere illusion or semblance. This is the conclusion drawn not by an existentialist critic such as Kierkegaard, but rather by Hegel's champion and defender, J. N. Findlay.

Findlay claims that Fichte's concept of the absolute ego is the background for Hegel's concept of *Geist*. In view of the self-positing of the ego, the chief question, says Findlay, is why the ego should posit anything other than itself, particularly an other that confines, bounds, vexes and bewilders it.¹⁵ The answer lies in what Findlay calls an elaborate "myth of a barrier," or non-ego. "The Ego posits a resistant environment precisely because it *requires* such an environment to elicit its own activities, and to bring them to consciousness."¹⁶ However, having completed this strange story, Fichte proceeds to retract it. "He drops the myth of a barrier: the existence of the Ego's object-positing activity cannot be explained by an impact or resistance, but must be a consequence of the Ego's own absolute activity."¹⁷ The other turns out to be a myth, an illusion. "Since our rationality makes us look in the data of experience for what is universal, unifying and intersubjective, we must proceed *as if* such universality, unity and intersubjectivity were there to be found..."¹⁸

Although Findlay was an important interpreter and defender of Hegel, his interpretation of the other as a qualified illusion goes too far in the direction of metaphysical idealism and confirms the existentialist criticism that idealism is unable to take the other or otherness seriously.¹⁹ The other is at best only ambiguous, never receiving consistent expression or treatment. It is not a central theme, but only a muted sub-theme in the system of identity. The other is not regarded as posing any problems in principle for idealism, because the other is a category, a part of the system. And so it is in the final analysis *not* other, but rather an expression of identity and self-sameness.

Thus several questions arise from the foregoing discussion. If Fichte and Hegel raise and treat intersubjectivity, how is this understood? If they raise the issue of the other, how does it accord with the putative idealist tendency of their thought? Does not their alleged metaphysical idealism override the other and reduce it to self-sameness and identity? Such is the received opin-

ion. On the other hand, if no such reduction occurs, then with what justification is label of idealism pinned on these thinkers? Has the fundamental tendency of their thought yet been identified? On such an apparently elementary question there is scarcely any consensus.

Moreover, the recognition that Fichte and Hegel raise and treat intersubjectivity within a supposedly idealist framework does not make the interpretive task any easier, but serves to intensify the perplexity. My thesis is that Fichte and Hegel do raise and treat the topic of intersubjectivity, and begin a massive transformation of philosophy into social and historical modes of thought. The implications of this transformation are still being worked out and are controversial. This story, obscure and only recently surfacing in German scholarship, has been almost completely neglected and passed over in English. Uncovering this story and exploring some of its ramifications is the task of this study.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND GERMAN IDEALISM

The careers of German Idealism and phenomenology are intertwined and interrelated. On the one hand, German Idealism requires and anticipates aspects of the phenomenological method. In order to overcome Kant's a-historical formal transcendentalism, German idealism finds it necessary to introduce a phenomenological or descriptive moment into philosophical method. This is due in part to a crisis in foundations,²⁰ the recognition of the absence of unproblematic first principles and criteria. Both Fichte and Hegel confront the question, how to philosophize in the absence of a criterion? Such a situation compels philosophy to delve beneath the traditional theories of epistemology and ontology to concrete human existence and interests. This move discloses that reason itself is historical and social. The phenomenological description of ordinary consciousness (the natural attitude) begins with Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, continues in his practical philosophy and popular writings, and culminates in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

On the other hand, Husserlian phenomenology, as it pursues the question of the ontological interpretation of its method, raises the issue of the relation between thought and being, or the ontological significance of phenomenological descriptions. Husserl was accused by his followers of either being naive about, or indefinitely postponing, the ontological question. When that question is faced, phenomenology is transformed into existential phenomenology. Husserl's late discovery of the life-world as the concrete a priori foundation of theoretical sciences, constitutes an anti-foundationalist departure from Cartesianism.²¹ Husserl's call for an ontology of the life-world articulates the need for a new phenomenological ontology that deals, among other things, with the problem of the other. The discovery of the life-

world as the a priori condition of science and the world of science, reopens and confronts fundamental questions of reason, as Husserl acknowledged.²²

Those problems were also the concern of German Idealism. For, from Fichte on, the historical and social character of philosophical reason was recognized. This called forth efforts to treat the basic problems of reason within a genetic history. In that transcendental-genetic history, reason develops as the unifying subject of the various standpoints and categories, a process Hegel describes as the development of substance into subject. This raises the possibility that Hegel's *Phenomenology* may anticipate, if not actually provide, an ontology of the life-world that Husserl called for, but did not live to complete.

The last claim would be disputed by many, but by no means all, in the phenomenological tradition.²³ Although Hegel may have published a book with phenomenology both in the title and as the subject, it is a "different sort of phenomenology" from the Husserlian. For example, Heidegger denied that Hegel's *Phenomenology* is phenomenology. Rather it is metaphysics, the *parousia* of the absolute. This recalls the existential critique of Hegel, which can be traced to Kierkegaard.²⁴ Heidegger's denial that Hegel is 'doing phenomenology' is an oversimplification.²⁵ Moreover, Heidegger's relation to Hegel is complex and underwent a change from earlier rejection to later appreciation, even though their projects are different. These topics lie beyond the scope of this study.²⁶

Nevertheless, Hegel's considerable influence on the phenomenological movement should not be overlooked. The appropriation of Hegel was itself a major event in the so-called 'existential turn' of phenomenology during its French phase. Kojève's lectures on Hegel are an important bridge between, and synthesis of, Hegel and existential phenomenology. These lectures were extremely influential on Sartre and others. Kojève identified master and slave, lordship and bondage, and death as central themes of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.²⁷ Sartre appropriated Hegel as filtered through this discussion and claimed that Hegel was far more significant for the topic of intersubjectivity than Husserl.

Ricoeur speaks of this Hegelian influence on phenomenology as due to the "implicit phenomenology" of Hegel's philosophy of existence.²⁸ Sartre goes further: he credits Hegel with making the real breakthrough to intersubjectivity as an internal relation. Hegel, says Sartre, shows that the self depends on the other to mediate its own "internal" self-relation. The autonomous self is nevertheless shaped by and must deal with the pervasive presence and influence of the other. Thus for Sartre, Hegel's *Phenomenology* and his account of the other are not merely important resources for phenomenological philosophy; Hegel's account of intersubjectivity is superior to Husserl's. To be sure, Sartre's Hegel is a 'left-Hegelian,' i.e., Sartre's appropriation of Hegel is piecemeal, embracing the *Phenomenology* but not the *Logic*.

Phenomenology in German Idealism

German idealism requires a phenomenological moment for several reasons. Perhaps the most important is to overcome the abstract formalism of Kant's transcendental philosophy. Kant's appeal to transcendental subjectivity—the ultimate condition of possibility of knowledge—is problematic and unstable, and called forth skeptical criticism.²⁹ The central problem is that Kant cannot, within the boundaries of knowledge set forth in the first Critique, explain how it is possible to draw those very boundaries.³⁰ This is due in part to his restriction of experience to sensible intuition and his denial of intellectual intuition. This restriction raises difficulties for Kant's conception of transcendental freedom. The problem is that transcendental freedom is only a possibility left open by the First Critique. It can be *thought*, but not *known*, and it is far from clear how the self-consciousness of freedom is possible. The official Kantian doctrine seems to be that freedom must be postulated, because it cannot, strictly speaking, be known (i.e., be an object).

Kant's transcendental philosophy is a restricted, mundane transcendental philosophy, carried out on the presupposition of the life-world.³¹ But Kant never got beyond transcendental justification of the categories of Newtonian science, and so never reached, much less developed, an ontology of the life-world. Although Kant justifies science, he begs the question concerning the scope of experience by rendering alternative forms of experience (e.g., the aesthetic, the moral and religious) non-cognitive. For this reason, Hegel observes that Kant's restriction of experience to scientific knowledge is too narrow.

The 'phenomenological moment' of German idealism refers to the suspension of metaphysical debates as well as Kant's restriction of cognition to scientific experience.³² It includes the expansion of experience in post-Kantian thinkers to include, in addition to theoretical-scientific experience, aesthetic, moral, social-intersubjective, and religious experience as well as the 'philosophical experience' required to do critical philosophy itself.³³ The phenomenological principle of evidence, or act-object correlation, is broader than Kant officially acknowledges. Moreover, Fichte claimed that Kant tacitly presupposes this broader sense of experience and evidence as a condition of possibility of his own critical philosophy.

Fichte developed further Kant's suggestions about the interests of reason. He moved the concept of interest from a topic buried in Kant's discussion of the antinomies to center stage, and thereby inaugurated an existential-pragmatic turn within German Idealism. Fichte's *First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge*³⁴ shows that there are two types of philosophical explanation that have mutually exclusive first principles, namely, idealism (Kant) and materialism (Spinoza). A first principle can neither be demonstrated nor derived from anything prior. However, since there are two possi-

ble, equally immediate or self-evident first principles, the impasse between them is theoretically undecidable. The foundationalist project shipwrecks on the irreducible plurality and opposition between first principles.

Fichte's critique of foundationalism raises the problem of the beginning or starting point. Foundationalist Cartesian transcendentalism separates the transcendental consciousness from the empirical and identifies the former as the starting point. Skepticism about the transcendental subject undermined this sort of transcendentalism. However, when the life-world lying beneath Kant's transcendental constructions is uncovered, not only is the scope of experience enlarged, the transcendental itself undergoes modification. It becomes embodied in the life-world. But this very embodiment of the transcendental calls into question its ability to serve as foundation or starting point, i.e., *episteme* is founded upon *doxa*. The transcendental subject is displaced from an a priori starting point, and becomes instead a subject which emerges and develops in history. Thereby it ceases to be a purely transcendental subject and becomes social, and socially mediated. Thus the starting point of philosophy shifts from a regressive transcendental inquiry into a-historical a priori conditions, to a phenomenological investigation of the natural attitude.³⁵

Fichte claims the impasse concerning first principles cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. It can be settled, if at all, only by appeal to interests: what sort of philosophy one chooses depends upon the sort of human being one is. This turn to human interest is one example of a phenomenological moment in German Idealism. But when philosophical attention is directed to human interests, the problem of the other is not far behind, as Fichte shows:

There are a few questions which philosophy must answer before it can become *Wissenschaft* and *Wissenschaftslehre*.... Among these questions are the following: ...How does the human being come to assume and recognize that there are rational beings similar to it outside of it, since such beings are not at all immediately or directly given to or present in its pure self-consciousness?... The relation of rational beings to each other I term *Gesellschaft*. But the concept of *Gesellschaft* is not possible except on the presupposition that there actually exist rational beings outside of us.... How do we come to such a presupposition...?³⁶

We shall consider Fichte's answer to this question below. For the present it is sufficient to note that talk of transcendental constitution, and imposition of order on the world, reflects a subjective idealism that ill accords with ordinary interpersonal experience, the moral imperative, or religion. Taking the life-world context of the transcendental subject into account means removing the abstraction which makes that subject appear disembodied, a-historical and solipsistic, and finding it situated within and shaped by the social and the historical. Given such concrete re-contextualization, it is inevitable that the

problem of the other becomes an explicit topic and calls for fundamental changes in the concepts of subjectivity and experience. This happens in the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel. Fichte's pragmatic history of spirit implicitly, and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* explicitly, are social phenomenologies, or archeologies, of so-called "pure reason." Reason is herein conceived as social. Intersubjectivity, ethics and religion figure prominently in the de-centering and transformation of the transcendental subject.

THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

The "problem of the other" has dominated the philosophical landscape for the last twenty years. Michael Theunissen characterizes the history of this development thus:

...the problem of the other has been thought through in former times and has at times been accorded a prominent place in ethics and anthropology, in legal and political philosophy. But the problem of the other has certainly never penetrated as deeply as today into the foundations of philosophical thought. It is no longer the simple object of a specific discipline but has already become the topic of first philosophy. The question of the other cannot be separated from the most primordial questions raised by modern thought.³⁷

There is sharp disagreement concerning the exact nature of the problem and its significance. For example the choice of specific terminology such as "alien" or "alter ego," on the one hand, or "Thou" on the other, already implies a decision concerning what the other is. From the standpoint of transcendental philosophy and existential philosophy, the other has negative significance, i.e., it is the alien ego, the inaccessible subject of the look, etc. To be sure, there are radical differences concerning the sense of this negation. Some maintain that the other is simply another instance of general epistemological worries about knowledge, objectivity, transcendence, and presents no special problems.³⁸

Others, like Emmanuel Levinas, challenge transcendentalism's claims concerning the primacy of cogito, methodological or ontological. The original being of the other is the Thou who summons the self to responsible dialogue. This sense of other is neglected and passed over by traditional and by existential ontologies. The intersubjective other presents a new issue which calls into question traditional epistemology and ontology. To be sure, ontology has not been a failure on its own terms: it has comprehended the other, but at the price of reducing the other to the same, the particular to the universal. Levinas writes that "Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and

neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being.”³⁹ The universality at which ontology aims, strips the other of its alterity and reduces it to the same (i.e., the universal).

For Levinas, Hegel is the arch-offender, because he allegedly subordinates infinity to totality. Levinas believes that Hegel falls under his criticism that philosophy is essentially egology, and that ontology dominates the other by reducing it to the same. “Hegelian phenomenology, where self-consciousness is the distinguishing of what is not distinct, expresses the universality of the same identifying itself in the alterity of objects thought and despite the opposition of the self to self.... The difference is not a difference; the I, as other, is not an other.”⁴⁰ Levinas finds Heidegger even less satisfactory, since Heidegger’s pursuit of the *Seinsfrage* through *Dasein* analysis affirms the priority of Being over existents. “In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with Being, the Heideggerian ontology affirms the priority of freedom over ethics.”⁴¹

These examples are not accidental or merely contingent. Levinas’ thesis is that “the relation with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such, but the reduction of the other to the same.... Thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other.... Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power.”⁴² From this critique it seems to follow that there can be no social ontology, because ontology subverts the very conception of the social that is its object.

Levinas’ philosophy enters a protest on behalf of the other, and seeks to reverse the situation presented by ontology: infinity must be distinguished from totality, and ethics must take priority over ontology. The primacy of the ethical comes out in Levinas’ concept of the face, an infinity which is irreducible to totality. “The way in which the other presents himself, *exceeding the idea of the other in me*, we here name face.”⁴³ Because the other exceeds my idea of him, he can put my freedom in question and make the fundamental demand, “You shall not kill.” Levinas explains “The notion of the face...brings us to a notion of a meaning prior to my *Sinngebung* and thus independent of my initiative and power.”⁴⁴

Amid such divergent estimates concerning the nature and significance of the problem of the other, two points need stressing: First, this controversy shows that the other has emerged as a fundamental problem of contemporary philosophy, but there is little consensus concerning its significance. To the extent that we identify first philosophy with traditional metaphysics, or with its successor transcendental philosophy, first philosophy appears to exclude the other, and vice-versa. For if the other is neither a percept nor a concept, neither an object, nor reducible to the immanence of pure transcendental constitution, how can there be social ontology or an ontology of intersubjectivi-

ty? On the other hand, isn't Levinas' attack on the ontologies of the other *itself an ontology*? Steven Smith observes that Levinas' phenomenological ontology of the other is in fact anti-phenomenological and anti-ontological.⁴⁵ But this makes it appear that Levinas must appropriate what he rejects in order to make his case. Thus he seems to be playing Hegel's game of dialectical opposition.⁴⁶

Second, whenever the problem of the other is taken seriously, Hegel sooner or later becomes a topic of discussion. Classical ontology may not have done justice to alterity, but Hegel claims to have developed an ontology which gives difference its due. Thus Hegel not only shares Levinas' critique of classical ontology, but his concept of *Geist* may also represent an alternative social ontology. Levinas' charges that philosophy is an egology, that ontology reduces the other to the same, were anticipated and brought forth as a critique of idealism in Hegel's day by F. H. Jacobi.⁴⁷ According to Jacobi, idealism is the doctrine that the self can know only the products of its own activity. This makes self-knowledge the constitutive principle of all knowledge, and leads to a speculative egology that dissolves all reality into the self's representations. We do not know any reality that exists apart from the self's activity, be it nature, other minds, or God.

Hegel's response was to develop an account of intersubjectivity and to formulate an alternative to traditional ontology. Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a pre-categorical ontology of the *Gestalten des Bewusstseins*, that serves as the phenomenological introduction to the concrete identity that requires difference, and receives categorical articulation in the logic.⁴⁸ Hegel would probably regard Levinas as a latter-day Jacobi. Levinas' claim that ontology is an egology that reduces the other to the same, may turn out to be not so much a criticism of Hegel, as a restatement of Hegel's criticism of the traditional concept of abstract identity, the identity that excludes or suppresses difference. Levinas' opposition to Hegel may turn out to be a restatement of both Hegel's critique of traditional metaphysics and Hegel's existential phenomenological ontology.⁴⁹

These comments are not intended to settle the issue, but rather to illustrate how the problem of the other—and Hegel—are at the center of contemporary discussions. For whether we think him successful or not, we cannot deny that Hegel remains an important party to the current discussion. Who better than Hegel has shown that first philosophy, as traditionally conceived, is committed to abstract identity that excludes difference? The problem of the other has no basis in the categories of traditional ontology. However, the other may not simply subvert philosophy, provided a way can be found to give difference its due. Such is Hegel's project from his early *Difference* essay on. Since Hegel's thought presents an important treatment of the other, an examination of the topic of recognition is long overdue in English scholarship.

PLAN AND OVERVIEW

This study takes the following form. Part One deals with Fichte, who first raised the problem of intersubjectivity within German Idealism. One reason why such a development may strike us as strange is the absence of attention to or knowledge of German philosophy in the period between Kant and Hegel, one of the most fertile periods in the history of philosophy. Although German Idealism has been traditionally and unfairly considered to represent a retrograde step from Kant to dogmatic metaphysics, it is now recognized that, in response to Kant, post-Kantian German idealism develops its own critique of traditional metaphysics and its inversion in transcendental idealism.⁵⁰ Moreover, once the fundamental problems are more clearly recognized, the commonly accepted picture of a development from Kant to Hegel must be set aside in favor of a divergent threefold response to Kant by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.⁵¹ The Other is an element in this critique, and, for Fichte and Hegel, it requires the transformation of transcendental philosophy from an a-historical a priori philosophy to a concrete social philosophy of spirit.

Chapter 2 places the problem of the Other within the context of German Idealism's genetic history of consciousness. Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* began the transformation of Kant's critical philosophy into a transcendental-pragmatic system that includes a pragmatic history of spirit. In his *Naturrecht*, Fichte introduced the concept of recognition (*Anerkennung*) as a transcendental condition of natural law. This is not a formal categorical structure a priori, but a concrete life-world a priori that involves praxis and action. The traditional concept of subjectivity is transformed into a social intersubjective concept.

A study of Fichte's thought is long overdue in English, but lies beyond the scope of this monograph. The anomaly of Fichte's thought is its development from an early (*Wissenschaftslehre* 1794) methodological idealism that asserts the primacy of subjectivity, or the ego, to the later ontological turn (after the *Wissenschaftslehre* 1804) that asserts the priority of being over the ego. This ontological turn in Fichte's later thought is not extensively recognized, much less understood. The concept of recognition, and the problem of the Other, is an important first step down this path of ontological reversal. The focus of the present monograph is on the concept of recognition, and not on the *Wissenschaftslehre* 1794, much less the development of Fichte's thought in subsequent versions of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Since the focus is on recognition, I shall consider Fichte from this perspective, and then turn to Hegel's appropriation and development of this concept, following the practice of two German studies.⁵²

Part Three deals with Hegel, focusing on his early social philosophy and the development of his phenomenological project. Chapter 4 treats Hegel's

early social theory in his theological writings. Prior to his appropriation of Fichte's concept of recognition, Hegel had already worked out analyses of domination, alienation and reconciliation in his treatment of the positivity of the Christian religion. His later accounts of master and slave, domination and servitude, continue his early themes, and transpose them into the framework of recognition. Hegel appropriates Fichte's concept of recognition (*Anerkennung*) and transforms it by integration with the themes of domination, alienation and reconciliation. He thus deepens and clarifies the intersubjective significance of his earlier social and religious themes.

Part Three is chiefly a study of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, from the vantage point of recognition. I hasten to point out that this is not intended as a commentary on or study of the *Phenomenology* as a whole. The focus is on the concept of recognition and its significance. Although my concerns are more modest than a full commentary on the *Phenomenology*, the importance of recognition in its overall argument has not been widely appreciated.⁵³ When Hegel introduces the crucial concept of spirit (*Geist*) he shows that spirit originates in and results from a process of recognition that involves struggle, domination and reconciliation. Spirit has its existential genesis in interpersonal recognition. It is an I that is a We and a We that is an I. This suggests an hypothesis to be explored, namely, that just as the I is *aufgehoben* or sublated in the We, so recognition is *aufgehoben* in *Geist*. This implies that *Geist* is a fundamentally interpersonal and social conception. This hypothesis will be explored in the following examination of the *Phenomenology*. In support of this hypothesis is the fact that when Hegel introduces the concept of absolute Spirit, it is not as a transcendent metaphysical entity, but rather as the very accomplishment of mutual-reciprocal recognition. Absolute spirit is a divine-human, theo-anthropic community (*Geist in seiner Gemeinde*). Not only is religion thereby transformed into social and historical modalities, the social-historical nature of absolute Spirit is maintained even in the concluding chapter on Absolute Knowledge. Absolute Knowledge has the structure of and involves divine-human recognition. Thus the treatment of the *Phenomenology* from the perspective of recognition is at the same time an exploration of the social, religious and historical significance of recognition as *aufgehoben* in *Geist*.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with Hegel's phenomenological project, and relate it to Husserlian phenomenology. I shall show that phenomenology is not an utterly equivocal term when used in reference to the Husserlian movement on the one hand, and Hegel on the other. There is common ground between the two, extending to the problem of the other as a life-world concern, and the need for philosophy to respond to the crisis in first principles raised by the antifoundationalist critique of traditional metaphysics.

Hegel is unique among his contemporaries, and certainly among 'typical Hegelians', in making perhaps the most serious study of skepticism of any

modern philosopher. Skepticism is the self-styled “other” of philosophy, which it accuses of being dogmatic.⁵⁴ Hegel prefers ancient skepticism to modern skepticism of the Cartesian-Humean variety; he claims the former is far more radical than the latter.⁵⁵ Modern skepticism attacks reason and its claims, but uncritically accepts immediate perception as true, and relies upon immediate certainties. In contrast, ancient skepticism turned its attack on precisely such immediate certainties, the claim of immediacy to be true, and expressed utter hopelessness about all that is taken as stable, or typical.⁵⁶ This fact—that Hegel sides with ancient skepticism against Cartesianism and its alleged immediate facts of consciousness—shows that it is a mistake to regard Hegel as a Cartesian foundationalist, or metaphysician of subjectivity.

Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is a self-accomplishing skepticism. Hegel’s phenomenology begins at the abyss where Husserl’s ends, namely the discovery of the groundlessness of the philosophical enterprise.⁵⁷ Hegel’s *Phenomenology* begins with the recognition of the absence of any assured criterion, or rather that all philosophical criteria are mere assurances, to which other, equally plausible assurances can be opposed. The classical skeptical problem of equipollence—that to every argument there is an opposing argument of equal force and validity—sets the agenda of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. It is supposed to demonstrate by its traversal of all the shapes of consciousness (*Gestalten des Bewusstseins*) that all merely immediate certainties collapse and self-destruct, leaving no alternative to mediation and holism. The truth is the whole. That is why Hegel characterizes *Phenomenology* as a self-accomplishing skepticism, that serves as the critical introduction to philosophical science. Of course Hegel is not a skeptic, but he does maintain that skepticism raises rational demands, and, as a critical moment, belongs to every genuine philosophy.

The skeptical problem of equipollence shapes Hegel’s phenomenological method, and underlies his characterization of experience as the highway of despair. Each shape of consciousness is self-subverting and undergoes a reversal or transition into its opposite. The truth of each turns out to be the opposite of what was originally intended, giving rise to a new shape. Hegel’s analysis of recognition, including the famous example of master and slave, illustrates this general skeptical-phenomenological method of tropic reversal. The truth of Mastery is servitude. Self recognition by other and freedom turn out not to exclude, but to require each other. For these reasons an examination of Hegel and skepticism is an important part of the study.

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with Hegel’s treatment of recognition (*Anerkennung*). This may appear to be a traversal of familiar territory. After all, the passages in question are among the most famous and well known in Hegelian literature. Nevertheless they have not been well translated or subjected to sufficiently detailed scrutiny, especially from a Husserlian perspective. I will show that Hegel makes an important distinction between two perspectives on

the concept of recognition. The first is an eidetics, which sets forth the general concept of recognition from the perspective of the phenomenological “We” or “for us,” the phenomenological onlookers. The second is an empirics, which treats particular forms and determinate modes of recognition from the perspective of ordinary consciousness in the natural attitude. It is important not to identify or confuse the concept of recognition with one of its possible instances or examples, e.g., master and slave. Such confusion leads many to the erroneous conclusion that master/slave exhausts Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity. This overlooks the point that the eidetic concept supports alternative modes of realization, and that master/slave is a deficient mode of recognition. The other possibilities include friendship, love, the devotion between brother and sister, and reconciliation.

Chapters 9 and 10 deal with further discussions of recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, including its social and religious dimensions. Here the hypotheses that recognition is sublated in *Geist* and that *Geist* is fundamentally social are explored and tested. Although Hegel maintains that alienation is not the final word and can be overcome, he nevertheless conceives recognition tragically, as is evident in his discussion of Greek *Sittlichkeit* as expressed in *Antigone*, and in the Christian motif of the death of God.

Chapter 11 treats Hegel’s account of absolute knowing. There are at least two divergent readings of absolute knowledge. One is the idealist reading, in which all being is reduced to a metaphysical posit of subjectivity. The other, which I shall defend, is that absolute knowledge is inherently social and exhibits an intersubjective-social structure. This is not to claim that the two models are mutually exclusive; it is to claim that Hegel does not abandon the intersubjective-social conception of reason he develops in the course of the *Phenomenology*, and that while there is no way from the idealist model to the social, the latter model nevertheless can incorporate the former. The *Phenomenology* does not conclude with an absolute idealism of pure self-reflective transparency, but with an historical recollection of the realms of spirit without which the absolute spirit would be life-less, solitary, and alone.

The study concludes with an exploration of the significance of Hegel’s recognition for the views of the interhuman in Husserl, Sartre and Levinas. It challenges Sartre’s strange appropriation of Hegel and shows how the later Sartre drew closer to Hegel in his attempt to graft Marxist social philosophy onto the existentialist individualism of *Being and Nothingness*. It also compares the social ontological conception of reason that Hegel develops with the anti-phenomenological and anti-ontological deliverances of Levinas. I argue that Levinas’ critique of ontology is already present in Hegel’s critique of classical metaphysics, and that the position Levinas urges against Hegel in *Totality and Infinity* is in fact Hegel’s own. The latter does not reduce the other to the same, but rather grants otherness its due and allows the other to be.

NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

2. Ludwig Siep, *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktische Philosophie*, (Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1979) [Hereafter cited as APP]; Andreas Wildt, *Autonomie und Anerkennung* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982); Edith Düsing, *Intersubjektivität und Selbstbewusstsein*, (Köln: Dinter Verlag, 1986); Vittorio Hösle, *Hegels System*, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1987). Although Hösle believes that Hegel deals with the problem of intersubjectivity, he does not mention or discuss Hegel's concept of recognition. Instead, Hösle seems to deal with every topic in Hegel except recognition, a remarkable omission from a book whose thesis is that Hegel raises but fails to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity. Hösle owes his readers some account of intersubjectivity to clarify his central thesis. It should be noted that Nicolai Hartmann identified intersubjective or objective *Geist* as Hegel's most original philosophical discovery without, however, calling attention to Hegel's concept of recognition as the specific contribution (*Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1923–1929).

3. H. S. Harris, "The Concept of Recognition in Hegel's Jena Manuscripts," *Hegel-Studien Beiheft 20*, (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1979), 229–248 [Hereafter cited as CR]; Robert R. Williams, "The Concept of Recognition in Hegel's Jena Philosophy," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (Fall 1982); "Hegel's Concept of Geist" in *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. Peter Stillman (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1986). In addition there is a Ph. D. dissertation "Hegel's Concept of Recognition," by Eliot Jurist, (New York: Columbia University, 1983).

4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hrsg. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952). [Hereafter cited as PhG.] There are two English translations: *Phenomenology of Mind* (J. B. Baillie, Macmillan, 1910), and *Phenomenology of Spirit* (A. V. Miller, Oxford or New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). [Hereafter cited as PhM and PhS respectively. All translations are my own.]

5. Two interpreters who find *Geist* to be a terminological variant of Kant's transcendental ego or transcendental unity of apperception are J. N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (New York: Collier MacMillan, 1962); Robert C. Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of *Geist*," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. A. MacIntyre (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972), 125–149.

6. This means that for Hegel, *Geist* is not an a priori timeless structure everywhere the same; it is also social and historical. This acknowledgement of historicity underlies Hegel's analysis of cultural alienation in his *Differenzschrift*, and his elevation of the history of philosophy to the rank of a special philosophical discipline. The distinction between an essential structure and different degrees of its realization is clearly expressed in Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, Band 1, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, Hrsg. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1955): "...what *Geist* in itself is, it has always been, the difference is only in the development of this 'in itself'" (182).

7. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie (Werke, Theorie Werkausgabe, Band 10, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970) § 554*. [Hereafter cited as *Enz. TWA Sk 10: 554*]. ET *Hegel's Logic, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, tr. W. Wallace together with the *Zusätze* in Boumann's text (1845), tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), §554.

8. "Hegel and Heidegger" in *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, tr. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 112.

9. *Ibid.* 113.

10. PhG 20. ET 10, §18.

11. H. F. Fulda, "Der Begriff des Geistes bei Hegel und seine Wirkungsgeschichte," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Hrsg. Joachim Ritter, Band III (Stuttgart: Schwabe and Co, 1971), 191ff. Fulda's reference is to Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, §381 Zusatz, TWA 10:25. Cf. also §442 Zusatz: "That the content or object is something that comes to knowing from without as a given, is therefore only an appearance, through the sublation of which *Geist* shows itself to be what it really is—namely the absolutely self-determining, the infinite negativity of what is external...the ideal [existence] which produces all reality out of itself."

12. PhG 32.

13. Fulda, "*Geist*" *op. cit.* 192. It is odd, if not astonishing, that Fulda calls the intersubjective sense of *Geist* "paradigmatic." The tendency of his article seems rather to point to the logical sense of *Geist* as the basic one.

14. Fulda, *op. cit.* 192.

15. J. N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1962), 47.

16. *Ibid.* 48.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.* [Italics in the original.]

19. Hegel criticizes such an idealism in the preface of the *Phänomenologie*: "The life of God and divine knowledge may well be spoken of as a play of love with itself. But this idea sinks into mere edification, even insipidity if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labor of the negative. In itself (*an sich*), that life is indeed one of untroubled equality and unity with itself, which is not serious about otherness [*Anderssein*], alienation, and the overcoming of alienation. But this in itself is *abstract universality*, in which the nature of divine life to be for itself...is left altogether out of account." PhG 20; ET §19, 10.

20. Kant's attack on metaphysics as science, shows that he sides with Hume's skepticism against transcendent metaphysics. Although Kant's critical solution is that only a metaphysics of experience is possible, Kant assumed that reason has an a-historical a priori structure which transcendental reflection can uncover. However, once

it is recognized that Kant's pure reason itself is historical and social, the result is an altered philosophical situation, which we now characterize anti-foundationalist.

21. See Ludwig Landgrebe, "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism," in *The Phenomenology of Husserl*, ed. R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 259–306; for the opposite view, that Husserl never abandoned his foundationalist project of phenomenologically grounding philosophy as a rigorous science, cf. H. G. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. D. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 151–181.

22. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*, tr. D. Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 9. Husserl is thinking of positivism which, by reducing all questions to questions of fact, decapitates philosophy and suppresses the fundamental problems of reason, which Husserl identifies as freedom, the scope of knowledge, value, history, God and immortality. Such fundamental concerns mean that, despite significant differences, Husserl is located within the Neo-Kantian school.

23. For a sympathetic account of the interrelations between Hegelian and Husserlian Phenomenologies, see J. N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*, [*Phaenomenologica Volume 98*] (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985).

24. Existentialism is notorious for neglecting the intersubjective and social dimensions of existence. As a philosophical movement it reinforced and rendered canonical the atomic individualism and privatism that are the targets of Hegel's critique.

25. Cf. Dennis J. Schmidt, *The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger and the Entitlements of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988). Schmidt shows that Hegel cannot be portrayed without caricature as the culmination of the metaphysical tradition, for Hegel has his own criticisms of the tradition. The tradition is no less problematic for Hegel than for Heidegger, which is why Hegel seeks to reconstruct it. Moreover, despite Heidegger's oft reiterated claims to have undermined Hegel qua metaphysics, Schmidt shows that Heidegger's attitude towards Hegel underwent a change from early rejection to later appreciation (92). The puzzle is, if, as Schmidt contends, Heidegger does not succeed in disentangling his thought from Hegel, what is the final import of his so-called destruction or overcoming of metaphysics? It would seem that it is a programmatic statement left unfulfilled, or a project more modest than it sounds since it does not include Hegel.

26. Two recent studies of Heidegger and Hegel, reach drastically different assessments of their relation. Dennis Schmidt, (op. cit.) contends that they are not mutually exclusive, and that talk of one refuting the other is out of place. On the other hand, in David Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986) develops a reading that has each refuting or undermining the other's claims. For my own modest assessment that is somewhere between these extremes, see "Hegel and Heidegger," in *Hegel and His Critics*, ed. W. Desmond (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1989), 135–157.

27. Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom, tr. J. H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969). However, Kojève's reading of Hegel is left-Hegelian, and presupposes the reduction of ontology to philosophical anthropology. Kojève thus presents a truncated account of the *Phenomenology*.

28. Paul Ricoeur, "Existential Phenomenology" in *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

29. Until the past two years, there were scarcely any treatments of the period between Kant and Hegel in English. Now some primary sources are available in translation such as *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, ed. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1985) which reveal the skeptical attack on Kant. There is also a useful historical monograph on the period, Robert Beiser's *The Fate of Reason* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

30. Kant held that actual knowledge is the surmounting of the dualism between reason and sense, or between thought and being. But Kant allows for such surmounting only in 12 cases—the 12 categories. But on such a restriction of thought-being identity to experience, Kant cannot answer the question how critical philosophy itself is possible. Cf. Hegel, *Differenz des Fichte'sche und Schelling'sche System der Philosophie, Hegel Werke: Theorie Ausgabe, Band 2*, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970); ET *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, tr. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1977), 80.

31. See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science*, op. cit. §§28–30.

32. J. N. Mohanty notes that Kant's transcendental philosophy is intended to be a defense of the truth and validity of Newtonian science. (op. cit. xxv.) He follows Husserl in interpreting Kant's transcendental philosophy as a mundane transcendental. On the other hand, Hegel uncovers a phenomenological moment in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Hegel criticizes metaphysics as a pre-critical mode of thought, and follows Kant's view that metaphysics falls within transcendental logic. Hegel writes: "According to my view, metaphysics in any case falls entirely within logic. Here I can cite Kant as my precedent and authority. His critique reduces metaphysics as it has existed until now to a consideration of the understanding and reason. Logic can thus in the Kantian sense be understood so that, beyond the usual content of so-called general logic, what he calls transcendental logic is bound up with it and set out prior to it. In point of content I mean the doctrine of the categories, or reflective concepts, and then of the concepts of reason: analytic and dialectic. These objective thought forms constitute an independent content [corresponding to] the role of the Aristotelian Categories [*organon de categoriis*] or the former ontology. Further, they are independent of one's metaphysical system. They occur in transcendental idealism as much as in dogmatism. The latter calls them determinations of being, while the former calls them determinations of the understanding." (Hegel, "Letter to Niethammer," 23 October 1812, in *Hegel: The Letters*, tr. C. Butler (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984), 277.

33. Jean Hyppolite calls attention to this enlargement in the conception of experience in Hegel's *Phenomenology*; it is the point of contact and basis of any compari-