THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SOCIETY

For much of the population [in the Ottoman Empire], nomad or settled, rural or urban, . . . cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery.

Şerif Mardin (1973:173)

At its zenith in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire embraced within its boundaries different countries, many ethnic groups, cultural divisions, religious denominations, and language groups, each related to the empire through their local communities and taxable statuses (Inalcık 1964:44). For example, the empire continued the Islamic system of taxation. Each religious group (called a *millet*), was allowed to govern itself as long as it paid taxes to the state. *Zimmi*, who were non-Muslims possessing sacred texts, for example, the Christians and Jews, had a higher tax status than Muslims. *Zimmi* were allowed to live in their denominational groups and practice self-government, but they did not share all the rights and privileges of Muslim citizens, their taxes were higher, and their status carried a number of other prohibitions. Townspeople, peasants, tribespeople, landlords, and soldiers each belonged to a particular taxable status.

Islam

Despite the multiethnic empire, from its beginnings in the fourteenth century until its demise in the twentieth, the Ottoman Empire was committed to the advancement and defense of the Islam faith. For six centuries the Ottomans were "almost at constant war with the Christian West, first in the attempt—mainly successful—to impose Islamic rule on a large part of Europe, then in the long, drawn-out rear guard action to halt or delay the relentless counter-attack of the West."[1] At the heart of this centuries-long struggle was the preservation of Islam. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Islam affected all the cultural institutions of the Turkish state.

MAP 1

Bodrum District in Relation to the Major Cities in Western and Central Turkey

N

Istanbul

Izmit

Ankara

Balikesir

Afyon

Izmir

Aydin

Isparta

Blow-up
on Map 2

BODRUM

Muğla

Antalya

E. Vedic

To the Ottoman Turk, the empire was Islam itself. It contained all the sacred places of Islam, and Ottoman chronicles referred to its territories as "the lands of Islam," its sovereign as "the Padishah of Islam," its armies as "the soldiers of Islam," its religious head as "the şeyh of Islam, and its "people thought of themselves first and foremost as Muslims." This empire was the center of the Islamic world, housing its fundamental institutions, the *caliphate* and the *Şeyhülislâm*.

In classical Islamic theory, law is the revealed will of God, "a divinely ordained system preceding and not preceded by the Muslim state, controlling and not controlled by Muslim society" (Coulson 1964: 1–2), and for over six hundred years Islamic law was the fabric that held the Ottoman Empire together. The Ottoman sultans sought to make the *Şeriat* (*Shari'a* in Arabic) the basis of private and public life. Joseph Schacht, an authority on Islamic law, says the Ottoman Empire gave the *Şeriat* "the highest degree of actual efficiency . . . it had ever possessed in a society of high material civilization since early 'Abbasid' times" (1964:84). Islamic leaders, or *ulemas*, gained significant power at that time and for the next three centuries, during the gradual decline of the empire, fulfilled important functions in both the empire's capital city, Constantinople, and throughout its dominions. *Kadıs* (Islamic judges) and *Kadı* courts were the official Ottoman courts.

The official state religion of Islam and the "popular Islam" of the Anatolian tribespeople and villagers differed considerably in the Ottoman Empire. Popular religious practices had become institutionalized in the form of dervish orders and other mystic sects. As the many parts of the empire were settled, the leaders of these orders linked ordinary Ottoman subjects to the Ottoman administrators and rulers.[2] (Only men belonged to these "secret societies"; women expressed their belief in visits to local shrines, saints' tombs, and in mourning rituals.)

By the nineteenth century, the dervish orders provided a number of important social functions. They were centers of cultural and educational training for minor state positions and for the religious establishment, and they partly controlled charitable foundations, holding in their possession vast agricultural lands and religious shrines (pious endowments known as *evkaf*), given to them as gifts. Thus, Islamic brotherhoods and the monasteries of the Turkish mystic orders controlled part (or all) of the income of hundreds of villages, mostly through ownership of village lands. Islamic values and practices, entrenched as they were in the Ottoman administrative system, reinforced Islam as the symbolic ideology of Ottoman society. Islam was the mediating link between local-level society and the political structure: Locals shared religion with the Ottoman ruling elites, and religion provided the cultural

fund that shaped ideals of political legitimacy. Thus, a universe of discourse was established through Islam, but affiliation and, of course, Islamic practices differed for the ruling elites and for the masses. A common saying, according to Mardin, was "religion and the state are twins."

Stanford Shaw, however, suggests further reasons for the continued importance of Islam in nineteenth-century Ottoman life. Instead of viewing Islam as a mode of discourse between the rulers and the ruled, Shaw suggests that, with the decay of the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the local Islamic clergy assumed administrative tasks that were neglected by state officials. *Kadıs*, *müftüs*, and *hocas* (Islamic judges and teachers) were also local administrators. *Kadıs* were heads of *Kazas* (districts), and they assessed and collected taxes, regulated markets, organized local security, and even maintained irrigation systems and roads. Thus, in the absence of all-powerful governors, the functions of "moral and spiritual guidance long exercised by the *ulemas* were developed into the kind of political influence sought after, but rarely achieved, by civil authorities" (1971:195).

In Mardin's view, local Islamic structures gained control of the countryside not because they were so powerful, but because the Ottoman administration viewed them as allies. He argues that because the Ottoman Empire protected crafts guilds (unlike feudal Europe) against the monopolistic practices of the merchants and denied independent government to towns, it "blocked the formation of oligarchies of merchant capitalists" (1969:261).

Evidence is accumulating, however, that by the nineteenth century, lively export economy from the Turkish hinterland was carried out through the ports of Constantinople and Smyrna in western Turkey, and traders had become independent of the state. Governors of *vilayets* (Veinstein 1976; Inalcık 1984) and rural notables (*ayans*) extracted large surpluses from the peasants for this trade, oppressing the peasants, which explained why the peasants would not support governors and *ayans* against the state.

In Europe, by contrast, landed gentry developed in the countryside centuries earlier (when feudalism ended), and a merchant class had evolved in the free towns and cities. Strong alliances were formed between the new merchant class and landowners as they organized to make European state institutions responsive to the needs of a growing urban/rural middle class (Tigar and Levy 1977). Landed European gentry, in their struggle for legal reform, also gained strong support from the peasantry.

In Turkey the group who finally challenged the existing central government in the nineteenth century were high-ranking Ottoman ad-

ministrators, men of the ruling elites. Unlike the Islamic clerical *ulemas*, these administrators had received a practical education. Because of their service in diplomacy and finance, the bureaucrats gained an increasing influence in the administration from the eighteenth century on. Devoted exclusively to the secular interests of the state and free from formalism and the bonds of tradition, they were ready to become faithful agents of radical administrative reform in the nineteenth century (Inalcık 1964:55).

Ottoman Administration and the "Ottoman Way"

The Ottoman ruling elites belonged to four administrative institutions: the Imperial Office (*Mülkiye*), the Military (*Askeriye*), the Bureau of Finance (*Maliye*), and the cultural/religious institution (*İlmiye*) (Shaw 1970:51, fn. 2). The Ottoman administration affected the Anatolian countryside in three ways: (1) through the Ottoman civil administration, (2) through the tax-farming system, and (3) through Islam in its official and popular forms (discussed above). To understand the structure and ideology of Ottoman society is to understand why much of the route to change came through European law instead of through reform of the existing Ottoman institutions.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, even the most liberal members of the Ottoman ruling class believed that Ottoman governing institutions had been perfected four centuries earlier.[3] Believing their ways far superior to what could be achieved in the infidel West, Ottomans saw no reason to learn anything about European culture. The more educated an Ottoman official was, the more he was convinced of Ottoman superiority. Decline or loss of territory was attributed to a failure to apply and use the institutions, techniques, and weapons that had brought Ottomans greatness in the past. As a result, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was strong bias against learning from the West.

By the nineteenth century, the ideology of this administrative system was committed to what has been called "the Ottoman way." Administrators obtained their privileges directly from the sultan, and he was directly responsible for the welfare of his peasants (Mardin 1969:259). The state did not consist of tiers of responsibility, making this system of government patrimonial rather than feudal. Combined with this patrimonial principle of government was the traditional Ottoman concept of *had* (literally: boundary. But this was a cultural concept that suggested no one could invade or critique the way another person did his job). *Had*s were inviolate, making it impossible for any official or

independent commission to investigate affairs under the jurisdiction of another. Any intervention inevitably caused a loss of status and prestige on the part of the individual concerned (Shaw 1970:52).

Given the ossification of the administrative system, with the power of the *ayan*s limited by their inability to attract peasant support, with independent burghers in free towns nonexistent, with peasants too downtrodden to envision a different world, and a complacent clergy sharing power in the countryside, the only Ottoman institution where a wider vision was possible was the military.

Educational Reform

It was via the military that European ideas of education first entered the Ottoman Empire (Lewis 1966:38–39). France became the country to which the Ottomans looked in search of models of change and reform (Berkes 1964:25–26). Sultan Selim III (reign: 1789–1807) hired several French instructors for the newly reorganized military and naval academies.

Yet the basic problems of Ottoman education remained for Sultan Mahmud II (reign: 1808–39) to define and solve. The traditional system of education was controlled by the *millet*s, Muslim and non-Muslim denominational groups recognized by the *Kur'an*. Islamic education was ruled over by the *ulema*s in *mektep* schools, and Mahmud II did not want to oppose them (Shaw and Shaw 1977:47). What he did instead was to bifurcate Ottoman education by leaving the Muslim schools alone and building up, alongside them, a new secular educational system (ibid.:47–48, 106).

Two technical schools already existed when Mahmud II began educational reforms: the naval academy, dating from 1773, and a military engineering school, founded in 1793. In the early nineteenth century, Mahmud II took the radical step of sending four male youths to Paris to study; they would become teachers in the new schools. Other students were to follow, and a large group went in 1826 (Lewis 1966:82). The outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821 meant the Ottoman government had to replace Greek interpreters with Turks at the "Sublime *Porte*" (the central headquarters of civil/bureaucratic government). At this time a translation office to teach foreign languages was opened at the *Porte*. Like the Ottoman embassies established in Western capitals earlier, this became an educational center for a new generation of "Westernized" administrators (Inalcık 1964:55; Findley 1980:124). By 1827 a new medical school was opened in Constantinople to train doctors for the new army (Lewis 1966:82). Thus, by the end of Mahmud II's reign and the beginning of the Tanzimat, there were several advanced technical schools

in operation with one thousand students enrolled at a time, a mere shadow of what was to come (Shaw and Shaw 1977:48).

Parallel secular education became the solution to avoiding direct challenges to the *ulemas'* authority over primary education. By circumventing this opposition, new secular schools for male students were developed beyond the elementary level (Shaw and Shaw 1977:47–48; Lewis 1966:83). Developed in Constantinople, they were later established in the provinces, and attracted students who did not choose a career in the Ottoman religious administrative arm, the *İlmiye*. The *mektep* system of education was very much concerned with Islamic teaching and, because of the past prominence of Islamic doctrine, very conservative. By 1838 young males between the ages of twelve and sixteen were able to attend new, essentially secular *rüşdiye* (adolescent) schools, located at two mosques in Constantinople, the Süleymaniye and the Sultan Ahmet (Lewis 1966:83). From here they could enter military academies, which were technical schools providing training for the civil service, or they could enter schools for literary education that provided studies in Arabic and French, the latter being the first European language intensively taught in Ottoman Turkey. *Rüşdiye* schools were opened for girls about 1858.

With the penetration of foreign commerce by mid-nineteenth century, and with increasing Christian missionary activity in Constantinople (which became the eastern capital of the Holy Roman Empire after Rome fell in A.D. 410 to the Visigoths), a number of foreign schools were established. These included the American secular school Robert College, established in 1863, and other denominational schools opened by French, Austrian, English, German, and Italian missionaries (Shaw and Shaw 1977:110).[4] Some were only elementary, others secondary:

> But their teachers, curriculums, lessons, and textbooks had to be certified by the Ministry of Education so that they would not teach anything that would violate Ottoman morals or politics. . . . The *millet* schools, especially after their curriculums were modernized late in the century, and the foreign schools provided a superior education to that offered in the still-developing state schools, but the general feeling of scorn for Muslims that they fostered among their students deepened the social divisions and mutual hatred that were already threatening to break up the Ottoman society and the empire. (Shaw and Shaw 1977:110)

The educational system was reformed, first at the top and then downward. The graduates of the new technical schools, referred to later

as "Men of the Tanzimat," "were created by and for the new governing order. Their graduates formed a new elite of relatively well-educated and highly motivated individuals whose main desire was to modernize the state and bring the *Tanzimat* plans to fruition" (Shaw 1968:36). Many were children of the older elites, which acted as a brake on their reformist ideas, as they themselves would be economically bankrupt if all their reforms were carried out. Their education was in the values and ideology of Europe. Thus, the "Men of the Tanzimat" dwelled in a contemporary, symbolic world vastly different from most of those they ruled, and they were much farther removed from Muslim subjects than former Ottoman administrators had been.

The Young Ottomans and the Young Turks

The existence of two separate educational systems, one Islamic, the other more secular and European, each adhering to different philosophies, textbooks, and courses of study, created a situation that divided Ottoman society and also stimulated dissent.

Western ideas of nationhood, parliament, and constitution began to spread through the Turkish intelligentsia (Ramsaur 1957:34). By the 1860s, many ideas of the newly organized groups of Ottoman youths were too radical for the central government, and outspoken critics were forced into exile in London and Paris. The Egyptian prince Mustafa Fazil, an exile in Paris, named this movement in a letter to the Belgian newspaper *Nord* when he referred to the Ottoman youth as the *jeunes Turcs* (Lewis 1966:149–50). The name was picked up and translated into Turkish in a reformist journal, the *Muhbir*. Editors tried various Turkish phrases, and finally decided on *Yeni Osmanlılar*—the Young Ottomans (p. 150).

When the first Ottoman constitution of 1876 was suspended in 1878, members of the Young Ottomans, worried about repressive measures to follow, dispersed to Paris, Cairo, London, Cyprus, and Salonika. Their criticisms of the empire were expressed mostly through literature—in newspapers, journals, plays, and poetry. For example, the idea of a *Turkish*, as distinct from an Islamic or an Ottoman, loyalty was first voiced by Ali Suavi in his journal *Ulûm* (Science), published in Paris and later in Lyons during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) (p. 151–2).

The Young Ottomans put forth three demands: (1) a return to a constitutional empire, instead of the growing autocracy of the sultan and his ministers; (2) less censorship of their newspapers, journals, and books (pp. 184–85); and (3) an outlet for their patriotism, in the form of a renewed sense of Ottoman homeland. Their loyalty was to an Ottoman

and Turkish society, and not to the multiethnic empire. Schoolboys at the Imperial Lycée of Galatasaray (subject to direct control by the Imperial Palace) by the 1880s were reading French and dreaming of freedom from the sultan's control. They now had a concept of fatherland, of how progressive reforms of society might take place, and what more humane governmental institutions would be like (p. 191).

A descendant of the Young Ottomans, some three decades later, were the Young Turks, first organized in 1889 by four students in the military medical college as a secret patriotic society (Ramsaur 1957:14). Their goal was to overthrow the sultan, Abdülhamid II, who was also the Caliph, the spiritual head of Sunni Islam. The Young Turks movement grew so rapidly that in 1896 their first attempt at a coup d'etat occurred, although it was discovered and crushed (pp. 19–20). Nevertheless, the ranks of the opposition continued to grow, both in Constantinople and among exiles in Paris (p. 22). By 1906 revolutionary cells among serving officers in the military were formed, the first being *Vatan* (fatherland), established by a small group of officers in Damascus, among them Mustafa Kemal (later known as Ataturk) (p. 95; see also footnote 2). Branches were also initiated in Jaffa and Jerusalem, among officers of the Fifth Army Corps, and among officers of the Third Army in Salonika (Lewis 1966:201). In 1906, Mustafa Kemal went to Salonika (considered the most advanced city in the empire because of its cosmopolitan population) to organize another cell of his revolutionary group (Ramsaur 1957:96). Here the name of the organization was expanded to *Vatan ve Hürriyet* (fatherland and liberty).

As revolutionary cadets became captains and majors, they joined members of a "ruling elite, prepared by education to command and to govern; their complaint was that they were not permitted to do so effectively" (Lewis 1966:201). By 1907 the center of the conspiracy had moved to the Turkish mainland, where new revolutionary groups were being formed in Macedonia and Anatolia under the Committee of Union and Progress that had originated and developed in Paris. Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary cadets "fused" with the Committee of Union and Progress in September 1907 (Ramsaur 1957:123).

In 1908, the British and the Russian sovereigns met to demand more concessions from the Ottoman Empire, as a wave of strikes spread from Anatolia to Rumelia. Soldiers—unpaid, underfed, and underclothed—were refusing to fight (Lewis 1966:202). By mid-summer the mutiny had spread among Third Army units in Macedonia, and the Second Army Corps in Edirne. The Committee of Union and Progress sent a telegram to the Yıldız Palace on July 21, 1908, demanding an immediate restoration of the constitution (p. 204). If the sultan refused, the

heir-apparent would be proclaimed as sultan in Rumelia, and an army of 100,000 men would march on Constantinople. The sultan capitulated, and on July 24 announced that the constitution was again in force: "The mutiny had become a revolution, and the revolution had achieved its goal" (p. 205).

But although the second Turkish constitutional regime lasted longer than the first, it too ended in "failure, bitterness, and disappointment, because the government degenerated into a kind of military oligarchy of Young Turk leaders" (p. 207). With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, this regime ended.

The Young Turk revolution was extremely nationalistic, and secret organizations, such as Freemason Lodges in Italy and the Bektashi dervish orders in Anatolia, had played some part in it (Ramsaur 1957:107–110). Little consideration had been given to how the non-Turkish ethnic groups in the empire would fit into the Ottoman constitutional state other than the need to become Ottomans in "a revived and powerful empire capable of holding up its head among the European nations" (p. 147). During the brief period of 1908 to 1918 when religion and nationality, freedom and loyalty, Islam and secularism were debated in books and periodicals, intellectuals and revolutionaries alike expected that Islam would remain the predominant force in the empire.

Thus Islam, as "a mental moral map" and as practice, was still an integral part of the Ottoman state and Ottoman consciousness at the start of the twentieth century, although a tremendous intellectual fervor now existed among all young urban intellectuals. Many "longed for a new life without knowing, however, what it was they wanted or how it would be realized. . . . It was a time when the empire had to exert enormous effort to recover, not only from the effects of corruption, tyranny, and economic bankruptcy, but also from moral and intellectual confusion" (Berkes 1959:20–21).

Ataturk

A complete reconstruction of the empire was considered by most intellectuals to be of the utmost urgency. During the period 1906 to 1917, when the Young Turks came to power, intense disagreement still existed among various groups concerning how the country should be reconstructed. The most conservative elites wanted to return to a total system of Islamic law within an Islamic nation. The second group, the Turkists, longed for the romantic ideal of ethnic unity of all Turks and, therefore, called for a return to the pre-Islamic past of Turkic groups (Berkes 1959:18–22). The third group, the Young Turks who had seized power, were intensely nationalistic. Some leaders among the Young Turks

began to talk about relinquishing the empire and creating a Turkish nation, and some among these began to dream that it would be secular. In contrast to the Young Ottomans' motto of "preservation of religion and state," the Young Turks' motto was "union and progress" (Mardin 1973:181).

With the treachery and then capitulation of the Ottoman leaders at the Armistice of Mondros in 1918 and the subsequent Allied occupation of the straits, the Ottoman Empire was left leaderless and defenseless. At Versailles in 1919, the greedy European nations divided up all of the former empire, including Asia Minor, the homeland of the Ottomans.

Out of the ashes arose Ataturk, the most distinguished Ottoman general and a recognized military hero. He had led Turkish troops to victory against the British at Gallipoli in 1915, had skillfully defended the Russian front in eastern Anatolia against the Western Allied forces, and also had wisely retreated from Palestine in 1918. His landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, "ostensibly to supervise the disarming of Ottoman forces in the area, but in reality to rally and organize national resistance against occupation, marks the real beginning of Turkey's War of Independence" (Reed 1980:321). He rallied an army from the Anatolian Turkish peasantry and reconquered the Turkish homeland from the French, English, and Greeks, in part because the former were tired of war. Rather than fight, the British and French withdrew, and Ataturk and his army were free to drive the invading Greek army from Izmir and Anatolia by 1922. Turkey's new frontiers and status as a nation-state were recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, thus confirming international recognition of the end of the Ottoman Empire.

Ataturk now faced an even more immense task—the creation of national institutions that would bring the Ottoman homeland into the twentieth century. The betrayal by the Islamic caliph and the Ottoman sultan at the 1915 armistice made his task easier, for now Islamic leaders were unable to gain popular support and could not rally Islamic follow-ers to oppose him. In creating new symbols and institutions for the republic, Ataturk drew on the ideas, programs, and leaders of the Young Turk period. Joseph Szyliowicz, a political scientist, found a remarkable degree of continuity (1971) existed in both the core members of bureaucracies and in the political elites surrounding Ataturk during the creation of the Turkish Republic.

The New Turkish Nationalism

Since Turkish Islam had a seriousness of purpose and a "sense of devotion to duty and of mission, in the best days of the empire, that is unparalleled in Islamic history" (Lewis 1966:13–14), the transformation

to a secular nation between 1922 and 1926 created, for many Ottoman subjects, a problem of national identity.

In Asia Minor until then, there had been no established *Turkish* identity. Until 1897 the ruling elites had been Osmanli, and "Turkishness" was despised, associated with the illiterate and ill-bred culture of Anatolian peasants (Kushner 1977:20–21). A person was an Ottoman diplomat, an Ottoman gentleman, an Ottoman soldier, a Turkoman, Yürük or Kurdish tribesman, an Arab, a "Laz," a Greek Orthodox trader, a Jewish or Armenian merchant, or a Turkish peasant (see Ramsay 1916:410–412; Mardin 1973:176). To be called a Turk was an expression of contempt. In 1908 an English observer could remark, "If you ask a Muslim in Turkey 'Are you a Turk?' he is offended and probably answers 'I am Osmanlı,' meaning 'I am an Ottoman' " (Kushner 1977:20). It was Ataturk who taught his citizens to say, "How lucky I am to be a Turk!"[5]

Under the impact of the Ataturk-led revolution, every aspect of Turkish life began anew. Language changed—a pure, genuine Turkish (*Öz Türkçe*) was distilled from the Ottoman model, and the written word was brought as close as "possible to the spoken languages of the people . . [so that it could] serve as an efficient medium of instruction in schools" (Heyd 1954:20). A committee was charged with the preparation of a new script, composed of Latin characters instead of the Arabic calligraphy. In November 1928, the new alphabet was adopted by parliament. Modern Turkish, the official language of the republic, was based on phonetic spelling, which meant it would be easier for everyone to learn (Heyd 1954:22–23). A new spelling dictionary was published in the same year, and many Arabic and Persian words were excluded. Those that remained were either Turkicized or now appeared peculiarly foreign because they lacked the characteristic Turkish vowel harmony (pp. 23–24). Western numerals replaced Arabic ones.

Symbolic aspects of Ottoman culture were disparaged in dress. Western-style hats with brims were substituted for the red Moroccan fez, the distinctive mark of the nineteenth-century Ottoman man. This particular change was significant: Muslim men do not remove headgear when praying; a hat with a brim prevents a forehead from touching the ground, an essential act in the Islamic ritual of prayer (Yalman 1973:153). In some places Islamic women covered their faces with veils or long head scarves, which was now strongly discouraged.

The Islamic educational system was suppressed. Now public education was secular and open to everyone, female as well as male. European languages were taught in the newly secularized Turkish universities. In 1922, the sultanate and caliphate were separated and the sultanate abolished. By 1926 the caliphate was abrogated as well.

Under the guidance of the League of Nations, huge population exchanges were undertaken. Greek-speaking, Christian Orthodox peoples were returned to Greece. Turkish-speaking, Islamic peoples from the Balkans, Greece, and Egypt—in fact, from all corners of the dismantled Ottoman Empire—were transported to Turkey.[6]

Ataturk also began introducing more egalitarian gender relationships. His reforms were so revolutionary that hearth, home, the business firm, and public spaces were virtually reconstructed from the bottom.

As for Islam, a secular Directorate of Religious Affairs was established, and all Sunni Muslim activities were placed under the auspices of this bureau, with the prime minister of Turkey in "firm control." Islam was now supposed to fulfill the same marginal role in public life that Christian religious practices had been reduced to in a country like France. In Europe, the Roman Catholic Church is an institution separate from the individual states. It is autonomous, owning its own institutions in the Vatican. Under Ataturk's reforms, and continuing to the present day, all Turkish Islamic institutions were excluded from ecclesiastical control to come under the control of the government of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, the concept of "laicism" was developed to describe the relationship between Islam and the state in Turkey.

Metin Heper (1985) interprets Ataturk's emphasis on Turkish republican identity as an effort to replace Ottoman "mentalities" and "representations" by a new symbolic system. It embodied some indigenous Turkic elements, but drew more directly on progressive movements that flourished in the empire in the tumultuous years after 1908. Once new values and routines were established, strong state control could loosen and be replaced with democratic practices (Heper 1985:9, 17–20). Heper acknowledges that what happened differed from Ataturk's vision and has been aptly characterized as "cyclical democracy" (Heper 1985:19, quoting Turan 1984).

Ataturk's success in establishing a secular government and legal system in Turkey in 1926 does not rest merely on force or coercion. Rather it accrued from the long and uneven participation of some elite groups (and their children) in structures that promoted non-Islamic values. The tradition of non-Islamic education that began in the 1850s, and the values promoted by secular education have had a longer history in Turkey than among comparable Islamic neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and Syria). Over five generations of families of elite reformers had experienced (in their daily and ceremonial life) some of the structures and symbols of secularism, each generation moving slightly farther from immersion in Ottoman Islamic symbols, rituals, and practices, and closer to the symbolic patterning of the world of secularism.

The Secular Legal System

When the new Turkish Republic abolished *Kadı* courts in 1924 and set up an entirely secular system of courts, administrative bodies, and a professional, secular judiciary, it was striking at the very foundations of Ottoman society and culture.

Like the secular system of education that began under the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk's secular system of government was firmly based on the European tradition. For his minister of justice, Ataturk chose Mahmut Es'ad Bey, who had been trained in law at Lausanne, Switzerland. He became chair of the committee that would overturn Islamic family law and create a new civil family law. The European model was essential to Bey's thinking:

> We are badly in want of a good scientific Code. Why waste our time trying to produce something new when quite good Codes are to be found ready made? Moreover, what is the use of a Code without good commentaries to guide in the application of it? Are we in a position to write such commentaries for a new Code? We dispose neither of the necessary time nor of the necessary precedents in practice. The only thing to do is to take a good ready-made Code to which good commentaries exist, and to translate them wholesale. The Swiss Code is a good Code; I am going to have it adopted, and I shall ask the Assembly to proceed to a vote *en bloc*, as Napoleon had his Code voted. If it had to be discussed article by article, we should never get through. (Ostrorog 1927: 87–88)

A new law school (the second in Turkey) was opened in Ankara in 1925 to train judges and lawyers in the new secular law. Ataturk himself became the first dean of the law faculty, and at the opening ceremony remarked: "The greatest and at the same time the most insidious enemies of the revolutionaries are unjust laws and their decrepit upholders. . . . It is our purpose to create completely new laws and thus to tear up the very foundations of the old legal system" (Lewis 1966:269).

By 1926 an entirely secular legal system was in place. If secular law was an alien notion for Turkish citizens of the Islamic faith, it was just as alien for Christian and Jewish subjects. Under Ottoman rule, the denominational groups called *millet*s had the right to choose their own leader, practice their own religion, and follow their own laws. Now they would lose their separate *millet* status and become individual citizens of

the Turkish nation. Their leaders would be religious leaders only; their religious courts would be replaced by secular ones.

Designated secular courts had existed since the 1840s to decide some commercial disputes and, a decade and a half later, to make decisions in criminal cases. But Islamic family law, embodied in the Şeriat, had remained unchanged. By 1926, judges were working in the new secular courts, and the decisions they made were supposed to promote the new values—Turkish nationalism, Turkish populism, and Turkish secularism.

The groups most displaced by the new legal system and its ideology were Islamic judges, Islamic clergy, and members of the "outlawed" Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats). All religious orders, endowments, and brotherhoods were disenfranchised and ordered to disband. The religious endowments became state-owned land.

Much of the rural Ottoman countryside can be characterized as ethnically parochial and conservative, with loyalties to local notables, religious leaders, tribal şeyhs, and household heads. Now the Turkish state under Ataturk planned to bring the values of the ruling elites to the periphery. Its new values for new citizens were populism, individualism, and equality of gender. These are profoundly different ideas of justice than can be found in Islamic law or under Islamic sensibilities. My research in Bodrum's villages and law courts demonstrates that these goals were mostly achieved in western Anatolia by the mid-1960s.[7]

Islamic Revival

Much of the work in reconstructing Turkish society was accomplished by Ataturk and his coterie in a period of one-party rule that in part repressed, and certainly ignored, Islamic sentiments among many groups of citizens. With his death in 1938, a transitional phase began, and by the early 1940s an interest grew among national elites to allow more democratic practices. In this period, roughly 1945 to 1960, multiparty competition began, and the first two-party elections took place in 1950. It was also in this period—twenty to thirty years after the secular state was established—that Turkey experienced a surge of renewed Islamic sentiment, a sentiment wholly or in part stimulated by political party competition to gain what they perceived as the "religious vote."[8]

Competitive political parties meant different interests could be represented in national and local elections. It also meant concessions to what politicians perceived as "Islamic values" among the lower classes

in cities and among rural peasants. Politicians in power began an extensive government-financed mosque-building program, and state-supported programs in religious instruction.[9] Although the training of religious functionaries had almost stopped for a generation during Ataturk's control, in the early 1950s it began again in special middle and secondary schools, called the İmam Hatip schools. Founded in many Turkish cities by the Ministry of Education, over 40 percent of the curriculum was devoted to the Kur'an. This included studying the sayings of the prophet, Islamic law, theology, and the Arabic and Persian languages. After the 1950s, European languages were barely taught in İmam Hatip schools, which as educational institutions were widely accepted—not just as institutions for professional religious training (as they were meant to be), but as alternatives to the state-financed, secular educational system (Heyd 1968:16).

It is still unclear if İmam Hatip schools have succeeded in producing graduates who are both "good Muslims" and "enlightened modern men" loyal to both the precepts of religion and the secular principles of the Turkish Republic. Graduates of these schools consider the Ankara Faculty of Theology neither traditional enough nor sufficiently religious to warrant enrollment. The demand was for traditional Islamic learning, and special advanced Islamic institutes (Yüksek Islam Enstitüleri) were established in Istanbul and Konya. Much more traditional, these institutes have become important in training a new generation of religious imams, whose outlook is more Islamic than Western. (ibid.; See also Reed 1986).

In addition to the Islamic schools, private instruction in religion (disapproved of in Ataturk's time) increased, often with the support of the authorities. By the 1950s the local İmam of a town or village had resumed teaching children (both boys and girls) the rudiments of Islam, the Arabic script, and the traditional recitation of the Kur'an in Arabic, often without translation into Turkish.

The heightened interest in Islam and the training of new generations in Islamic thought appear to indicate that Islam will play an increasingly important role in Turkey's cultural development. Yet it is important to recognize that Ataturk's success in establishing a secular government and legal system accrued from the long-time participation of some elite groups (and their children) in structures that promoted non-Islamic values. The tradition of non-Islamic education that began in the military academies in the early eighteenth century and the values such education promoted has had a longer history in Turkey than in other Middle Eastern Islamic countries.

The paradox cannot be ignored that secular law and courts represent a configuration of cultural ideas in opposition to Islamic culture. A secular legal system represents in theory, if not always in practice, access to state law for all citizens, not just one dominant group. It symbolizes a fundamental reorientation of values and a dissociation or disavowal of values inherent in Islam, such as male superiority and male control of the lives of females and younger males. Turkey's secular court system asserts universal legal norms of individuality and equality and, like other civil law countries, uses established norms of proof and systematic legal procedures, required by the rule of law.

Notes

1. The discussion in this and the following paragraph is based on Lewis (1966:13).

2. The discussion about dervish orders and Ottoman society is from Mardin (1971:201–206).

3. The discussion in this paragraph is based on Shaw (1968:30).

4. See also Kazamias (1966).

5. For further discussion of Turkish nationalism, see Kuran (1968) and Kushner (1977).

6. See Nansen (1922a, 1922b, 1923), Ladas (1932), and Refugee Commission Reports.

7. See Starr (1978a, 1978c, 1984, 1985) and Starr and Pool (1974).

8. See Toprak (1981) and Landau (1974).

9. The discussion in this section is based on Heyd (1968:16–18).