Chapter 1

Image and Ideology: Some Preliminary Histories and Polemics

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The story of "image" is a long one. The story of ideology is a relatively short one. At least that is the case if we are looking at etymological time lines: image has its roots in the Greek word *icon*, (εικϖν), likeness, imitation, translated as *imago* in Latin and image in English.[1] Accordingly, the word played a central role in Plato's metaphysics and thus in the establishment of Western systems of representation. Ideology, on the other hand, did not appear in English until 1796 "as a direct translation of the new French word *idéologie* which had been proposed in that year by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy" (Williams 126). Although originating in the French revolution, de Tracy's use of the term was distinctly nonrevolutionary: indeed, de Tracy wished to establish a philosophical discipline that would provide the foundation for all the sciences; it signified "the science of ideas," and its task was to observe and describe the human mind in the "same way as a natural object" (Barth 1). However, it is Napoleon Bonaparte, himself first sympathetic to the ideologues, who may be largely responsible for the devaluation of ideology, which he called "that sinister metaphysics," into a derogatory term of political denunciation.[2]

But it was not until the young Karl Marx read de Tracy's *Elements d'Ideologie* during his 1844-45 exile in Paris that the term began to assume its modern significance as a name for ideas and beliefs which were blind to the material conditions which produced them, and thus Marx and Engels came to see ideology as "illusion, false consciousness, upside-down reality" (Williams 128).[3] Evolving out of the strictly Marxist meaning, there has also arisen a less dualistic, less pejorative sense of ideology as a name for any given system of ideas and their connection to particular social classes, values, institutions, and power relations. The unresolvable debates between the two uses (and, of course, there are many variations of each) led W. J. T. Mitchell in his *Iconology* to deploy both meanings in the effort to stage a critical encounter between the divergent discourses of iconology and ideology. Despite these differences, however, what needs to be pointed out as a starting point for this volume is that the two terms

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image and *ideology* have often constituted the very system of oppositions called "Western metaphysics." That is, if "image" followed the lead of Aristotelian poetics towards a formalistic, ahistorical "image" of truth and beauty, "ideology" most often named the historical configurations and particular beliefs which the "truth" of abstract images had to overcome in the move toward a transcendent reality. Or, conversely, the abstract sciences of philosophy (logos) provided the dialectical procedures to transcend the historically contingent (ideological) status of particular images. Either way, that the deconstruction of such idealized oppositions has become one of the main critical projects of the past few decades does not conceal the fact that the ideological status of the visual as well as verbal image has received far less attention than one might suspect. Throughout the intricately complex evolution of the term *image*, its benign use in literary, artistic, and historical studies often conceals its ideological history laden as it is with conflict, war, and bloodshed. The rationale, therefore, of this book arises precisely from a need to explore critically the social, political, and cultural critique of the status of images in contemporary critical discourse.

We begin in Section I with two brief stories which we feel are paradigmatic of significant historical moments when the very relations between images and their sociohistorical and political consequences (i.e., their ideology) were crucial yet often ignored or obscured by contemporary critical studies. Two traditions, the Hellenic and the Judeo-Christian, each nurtured the term *image*, each contributed to the ambiguity of the word, and thus to the controversial views of its status, value, and significance. Our first story, therefore, is from ancient Greece and our second from the Byzantine Christian Empire. Our intention is not to outline a consistent historical trajectory nor to provide a general overview, which would be far beyond the scope of this introduction. Rather, we see these examples as critical fragments, narratives reconstructed from our own postmodernist perspective, which we feel have relevance, however indirectly, to the studies of modernist and postmodernist discourse offered by the contributors to this volume. In section II we likewise offer not an objective and descriptive overview of the articles that follow, but rather our own critical articulation of those issues and intertextual relations that we felt significantly stage the encounter between image and ideology.

I

The word *icon* (image) in the Platonic dialogues is never free of ideological contexts. Indeed, Plato's infamous indictment of the poet in *The Republic* follows clearly enough from his perception that the uncertain status of poetic images threatens the truth and order of the ideal state: the poet is a mere "manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth" (Book X 300). In Book II the argument seems equally simple if equally repressive: poets often present images of evil behavior which youths will imitate; since the young can't

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distinguish between true and false images, the poets must be censored so that the gods will be presented only in images of unchanging goodness which the young will imitate in a model education system. Indeed, Plato's position seems clear enough if we read the text alone. And that's the problem. As a consequence of interpretive methods based strictly on primary texts, Plato's banishment of the poet has been accommodated within variations of two basic interpretive histories. The first is, crudely stated, that Plato was wrong. He didn't understand poetry, and his fear of images derives from an irrational intuition of their power and omniscience; or at least Plato's rational dialectic is viewed as so totalitarian as simply not to tolerate any such irrational powers. The second, and perhaps more pervasive, pattern of interpretation has been called by Eric Havelock the "method of reduction," which basically maintains that Plato didn't quite "mean" what he actually says.[4] This long history of interpretive reductions has played an important role in the effort to save Plato by making his outrageous pronouncements more palatable to modern tastes, but none of the answers seems to hold up to close scrutiny. For most students as well as scholars, the text-based interpretations leave a sense of mystery and dissatisfaction. Why, after all, when Plato constructs the model curriculum, essentially the first university curriculum in the West with the disciplines of mathematics, physics, metaphysics, politics, and ethics, did he find the poet so "undisciplinary"?[5] Why do poetry and poetic images seem such a terrible psychic poison to him? Why does Plato seem to attack the very form and substance of the poetized statement, with its verbal images, its rhythmic cadences, its choice of poetic language? Why this tremendous range of hostility?

The felt need for something more, some other texts, some other cultural documents, suggests a crucial gap or lack in the history of the reception of the great works and "images" of Western culture. It has been only in the last few decades that those cultural gaps have received some attention in the pioneering work of Eric Havelock and, preceding him, Milman Parry. As cultural historians, these scholars open the study of Plato and Homer to the wide-ranging social and political power relations sustaining the dominant institutions of Greek culture. As such, these sources reveal that what Plato means by poetry and what we mean by poetry have very little in common. In fact, what Havelock suggests is that the *The Republic* should be viewed not as a political treatise on ideal forms of government, but rather as an attack on the whole existing educational system of Greece. The sociopolitical impact of such an attack arises from the sense that Plato is inaugurating a cultural revolution in the whole way the society organizes its knowledge, knowing, learning, power, technology in a broad-based shift from oral to literate culture.[6]

While it is of course beyond the scope of this brief sketch to elaborate on the cultural shift from oral to literate modes as Walter Ong has done,[7] we can provide evidence to suggest that poetry and poetic images were central to the

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ancient Greek educational apparatus and, furthermore, central to the maintenance of the state and the established patterns of dominance and social hierarchies. In this light, Plato's attack on the poet begins to make sense. Poetry is in its oral performance an entire technology for the preservation of useful knowledge, cultural history, and traditional practices and values as conveyed by the examples, indeed images, memorized and recited by not only the poets and rhetors but also the fathers, legislators, artisans, soldiers—virtually all significant male members of the society. Plato's attack now takes on a more radical ideological force lost by the assumption of Plato's reactionary and repressive doctrines of censorship as gleaned from the text "itself." In general, we are forced to realize that Plato assumes among his contemporaries a view of the poet and his poetic images which is wholly unfamiliar to our post-romantic ways of thinking. As Havelock explains:

> In fact, it is not too much to say that the notion of the aesthetic as a system of values which might apply to artistic composition never once enters the argument. Plato writes as though he had never heard of aesthetics or even of art. Instead he insists on discussing the poets as though their job was to supply metrical encyclopedias. The poet is a source on the one hand of essential information and on the other of essential moral training. (*Preface* 29)

As such, the actual performance of poetry was far more central to the Greek cultural pattern than we can easily conceive to be the case. Performance means oral performance, and the work of Milman Parry supplies the crucial evidence here. In the 1920s Parry documented the fact that the Homeric poems were actually heavily rhythmic, repetitious textual fragments woven together between 700 and 650 B.C. from oral narratives. The hexameter dithyrambs were actually repetitious and didactic clichés and common stereotypical images. They had to be: otherwise it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to memorize such lengthy narratives. As opposed then to our notions of poetic images as unique imaginative creations, Homer's verse was primarily constituted by the stereotypes and clichés which would later be seen as defeating the originality and creativity valued by romantic aesthetic theory.[8]

A new dimension of Plato's attack on the image now opens up to us: to attack iconic mimesis and imitation can be seen as an attack on blind memorization and identification with dominant cultural images. As Xiao-mei Chen explains, "Plato's 'frontal attack' on poetry was in fact a 'frontal attack' on the prevailing cultural tradition and its claims to truth . . . . The Platonic corpus can then be read as a representation or record of Plato's struggles to invent his own anti-canonical theory" (41).

As a way of illustrating the ideological consequences for Greek culture of this mnemonic rhetoric of images, Hesiod provides an example of the early signs of a shift from concrete oral images to abstract, literate categories.

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Whereas the Homeric narratives provided no abstract system of meanings apart from the particular images and examples of the good ways and acceptable customs of the traditional culture, Hesiod in his introduction to the *Theogony* begins to identify the source and justification for such memorization. As Eric Havelock explains:

> Homer simply invoked the Muse who is figuratively responsible for anything he says. Hesiod in effect asks, Who is the Muse? What precisely does she do? What am I doing, and how do I do it? As he asks and answers this question he begins himself to transcend the epic purpose and conception. He marks the beginning of a great transition. He has moved to define that context and purpose of poetry which for the wholly oral minstrel had been unconscious. (*Preface* 99)

As Hesiod hymns his invocation to the muses he "commemorates their birth and identifies them as the daughters of Mnemosune" (100), or memory. The Greek notion of memory suggests as well "the notions of recall and of record and of memorization. Through this allegorical parentage Hesiod identifies the technological reasons for poetry's existence: it describes the muses' function" (100). And they are not the daughters of romantic inspiration and creative invention, but rather the offspring of a far more traditional and static process of memorization of the cultural record: "their central task is not to create but to preserve" (100). And since their other parent is Zeus, their songs memorize and commemorate the order of Zeus the father as patriarchal origin of the social and political order. Poetry thus justifies the traditional phallocratic order. And Hesiod's allegory in turn suggests "for poetry precisely that central role in the maintenance of Greek culture which Plato would reject" (102).

The contrast with Homer is subtle but significant and thus worth being precise about. Whereas the Homeric epics display very little self-reflexive verse, very little interest in examining the sociocultural role of the narrator, the poet, and the rhetor, Hesiod's allegory begins at least a quest to name the sources, reasons, and roles of the poet and the Muse. In other words, in Homer's case, the presentation of the culturally acceptable "custom ways" (ethos) and laws (nomos) always proceeds by way of specific, concrete examples of such behavior. The narrative therefore serves as a model for specific practices and behaviors. Rarely does Homer reflect in more general or abstract terms upon the poet's relationship to the dominant laws and customs. In contrast, Hesiod begins just such a reflection, but he of course does not challenge the order and source which he identifies: that role falls to Plato. And since Plato is now so generally credited as the father of the dominant metaphysic called "phallogocentrism," it is a necessary corrective to see Plato within the newly emerging discursive formations of ancient Greece as playing a critical, anticanonical, and less repressive function with respect to the poet than the more ahistorical gen-

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eralizations may suggest. It is, indeed, as Chen points out from a Foucauldian perspective, primarily a consequence of "the will to power and the will to truth on the part of the dominating culture itself that has changed Platonism—a previously subversive discourse of the earlier official Homeric culture—into the subsequent orthodox discourse of the post-Platonic era" (42).

To return to the cultural circumstances of Plato's life, Homeric verse was being used as a didactic instrument so that the poetic and rhetorical performance sustained the culture through memorization of (primarily, even in Plato's life) orally transmitted information. One aspect of the cultural crisis of Plato's day was that the content of the knowledge "reposited" in the Homeric poems was no longer very adequate or useful; basically, it was outdated. For example, the famous catalogue of ships in Book II of the *Iliad* no longer served to describe the kinds of ships necessary for expeditions and shipbuilders: technological changes in the production of ships called for new knowledge, new directions in kind, method, and materials unfamiliar in Homer's day. Moreover, even the social function of the poet of Plato's day was primarily to serve as an instrument of the state, the official discourse whereby the poet (as, for example, Pindar) wrote odes to commemorate athletic and military heroes by ascribing to their feats the images of a heroic and godly genealogy: that is, to relate them to the same dominant genealogical past as was assumed to be the heritage of the rulers of the state. One of the basic problems for Plato was that there was no system of abstractions, no vocabulary or syntax even, with which to begin the process of criticism.[9] So Plato's attack on traditional static images can be seen as an effort to foster the creation of a grammar and syntax of abstract terms with which to break from the mnemonic, mimetic, imagistic mode of learning, and thus to inaugurate a "philosophical rhetoric." As Havelock explains, in Plato's move from concrete images and examples to abstract ones, Plato understood that there was a kind of "psychic pathology" enacted by didactic forms of mimesis since the best method for memorization was identification with a character in an oral story: to feel like, to "become" Achilles in the heat of battle. That is, in the Homeric *Paedeia* students invested immense psychic energy in memorizing vast amounts of verse. In order to do this, it was best if the verse were rhythmic and repetitious and the images were stereotypical clichés so as to be easily memorized. Under these conditions, there was, of course, no time or energy to stand back, to think about, to distance oneself from and criticize that which one was memorizing. In order to abstract, one must refrain from such immediacy of identification: one must separate the knower from the known, the self from the received images of the self (Havelock, *Preface* 197-233).

In the specific context of *The Republic*, then, one of Plato's first tasks was to create a sense of the self or subject independent of the object. The language that he had historically available is that of the psyche and the soul; thus, as

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Havelock explains, Plato's dialogues are instrumental in redefining the term psyche and moving it away from concrete images of "breath," "life-cloud," and "ghosts" towards a notion for signifying the autonomous self or soul. In Plato's words: "our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already" (Book VII 209). Such autonomy requires a transcendental soul and thus a whole system of terms seeking abstraction, divestment of particular images, in a turn toward, ultimately, universal essence, Being, and so forth. This assertion of the thoughtful, critical psyche had to be theoretical because one had to stand back from action and doing and become a "spectator," as indeed one of the root words of theory is "theoros" which literally means "spectator." Under the conditions fostered by such theoretical distance, one could sustain the sheer activity of thinking in order to break the habit of self-identification with the memorized images of the oral tradition. The ideological contradiction is that in his effort to break with the conservative oral tradition and the dominance of poetic images, Plato deployed images: that is, at the very heart of his logical argument, the figurative allegory of the cave must become an image of the transcendence of imagery: the literal light that the freed prisoners perceive is not the truth but merely an image of the invisible light of Being. Thus, at the very heart of Plato's doctrine of forms is a central contradiction: the forms are invisible, but the very term *form* derives from idea, *eidos*, which in turn derives from the Proto-Indo-European *weid*. The participial form of *weid-to* became *videre* in Latin, to see, to look. To see in poetic terms was "iconic," a visible image. Conversely, ideology (the supposed opposite) of Platonic forms and ideas also finds a common etymological source as it derives from *ideo* and is also linked to *weid*, and thus, however indirectly, to icon and image.[10]

Such ideological as well as etymological ambivalence in Platonic thought and Greek culture helps explain Plato's own ambivalence in the *Phaedrus* to the main tool of abstraction central to his own accomplishment: writing. Indeed, it sustains Derrida's critique of Plato's *pharmakon*—the ambivalent and polyvalent drug, remedy, poison of writing as the very instrument of Platonic thought. *Phaedrus* was composed towards the end of Plato's life when Greek culture had dramatically begun the shift from the stages of craft literacy to a more general literacy, and it is then that Plato objects to the very instruments of literate abstraction which inaugurated the more radical critique of the traditional oral modes. The irony is that Plato's own pedagogical system, the philosophical rhetoric of the dialectic, was based on spoken discourse, on dialogues. Only the invisible "soul writing" could be acceptable in that system.

With the changes in the discursive formation of Greek culture, Aristotle was more easily able to shift attention away from the critique of the dominant cultural role of the poet (indeed, the poet was far less dominant even by the end of Plato's life).[11] Accordingly, Aristotle simply converted the poem and the image and the drama into more kinds, types, "genres" of formal objects to be

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known by the inquiring subject. Thus, to end this sketch on a more polemical note, we can say that when in the *Poetics* Aristotle isolated the formal elements of Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, and Melody as part of the "natural order" of things, it was easy enough to see that the formal order of poetic images was an obvious improvement upon the chaos of historical events.[12] The anticanonical and subversive force of the Platonic corpus thereby began to acquire canonized status within the newly emerging discourse of Western metaphysics. Indeed, the poet's mimesis, now reconsidered apart from its pedagogical and cultural function in an oral culture, improves upon nature. Such improvement of the image upon the original could be partly accomplished by "ennobling" the character, raising as it were the listener/viewer's own soul, since all great poetry and tragedy is "an imitation of persons who are above the common level" (Adams 57) in which the "common level" can be read as a synecdoche for the dust of historical realities. Aristotle had thus set the stage for two thousand years of the fetishism of the autotelic image over the suffering of historical "selves."

Only a few hundred years later, we find that, even in its earliest expressions, Christianity sustained a tortuous ambivalence toward the status of the image or icon. On the one hand, Christian doctrine followed Plato in linking the verbal with the intelligible and the spiritual and thus fell at odds with the worship of "graven images," associated with the sensible, the worldly, and the corrupt. Early Christianity resisted what its patrician saints perceived as the sensual and aesthetic culture of antiquity and prohibited "pagan" rituals of venerating corporeal images. But on the other hand, Christianity followed Aristotle in valuing the divine image over the historical reality insofar as man's supreme position on earth could be justified by virtue of his having been made "in the image of God." More importantly, Christ's Incarnation was interpreted as the affirmation and celebration of image making *par excellence*, since Christ was the *Logos* having become flesh—the visible imaging the invisible, just as the light outside Plato's cave was an image of the invisible reality. Thus, for example, through the merging of Christian and Hellenic doctrine, Philo, the eminent Jewish Biblical scholar of the first century A.D., could expound his influential doctrine that the Logos was "the first Image of God" or "God's shadow," the "archetype of all other things." What followed logically was the conjoining of word and image, hence the "image-quality" of the Word, as Ladner explains, and the identification of "[sacred] ideas with [incorporeal] images" ("Concept of the Image" 79-80).[13]

Our story, however, focuses on one of the great historical battles of iconoclasm: the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy of the eighth and ninth centuries. The problem, if not the moral of this story, gained literal currency during this era on the face of Byzantine coins: the emblematic authorizing of the system of economic exchange had a twofold (or two-faced) structure represented by

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images of Christ and the emperor on the coins (Ladner, "Concept of the Image" 111). Indeed, the concept of the ruler as an image of God had entered patristic thought by way of the Greek Pythagoras's early formulation of the political content of the religious image. That influence was so pervasive that despite their fundamental differences, the Byzantine iconoclasts and iconophiles both agreed on one point: they did not question the use of imperial images and their adoration. And in neo-Pythagorean political treatises, the concept of man's similitude to God was transformed into a practical political model whereby the emperor was the imitator of God and the ordinary man was subjugated to the position of "the image of the royal archetype." In defining the nature and purpose of religious images, theologians repeatedly made connections between imperial images and those of Christ.[14]

The iconoclastic battle, however, can be seen as a battle of the opposing sides of the coin: the church and the state.[15] Despite being waged in a theological vocabulary, the social and political consequences of these debates precisely determined the range of the emperor's dominion. Indeed, ambitious rulers consolidated and justified their political designs under the banner of iconoclasm. The problem as perceived by the Byzantine emperors was that they felt threatened by the power of the church, specifically monks and monasteries—the owners of holy images. The emperors tried to assert imperial authority through the suppression of icons and the encouragement of "non-religious art," that is, imperial imagery, to substitute for "the sacred images of Christian tradition" (Ladner "The Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy" 43). Such holy images were powerful means of propaganda, since they generated that magic aura attracting pilgrims and their endowments to monasteries and to the monks, the guardians of the magic spell of icons,[16] the "custodians of images," as Arnold Hauser calls them (140). The political and ideological issues also had a rudimentary economic dimension: since monasteries were free of taxation, they deprived the emperor of revenue and public support.

It was Leo III, then, who during his reign from 717 to 741, began the iconoclastic campaigns which became more vigorous and systematic during the reign of his son, Constantine V. The first Iconoclastic Synod of Hiereia met in 754 during Constantine's reign (741-775) with the task of formulating rigorous conservative measures against the worship of images: in short, they outlawed all religious "images."[17] This first phase of the Iconoclastic Controversy culminated in the Second Council of Nicea in 787, whose deliberations led to an edict which temporarily restored the worship of holy images. The ideological victory of the Second Council can be largely attributed to the *Orations* of St. John of Damascus. Although St. John was dead by 753, when he was anathematized by the Iconoclastic Council, his eloquent analysis and defense of images became the major text forming the crux of the arguments put forth by the Second Council. For our purposes, the significance of St. John is that he encapsulates in ger-

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minal form the heart of the ideological controversies over the crisis of representation in the twentieth century.[18]

What St. John provided was a far more theoretically self-conscious and elaborate critique and defense of the image than had hitherto existed. What St. John's orations emphasize, first and foremost, is the notion of representation as a hierarchical system which privileges some forms of imaging over others, the supreme kind being the "natural" image identical to the prototype. He thereby ties image to divine power in the very definition of the image as "a likeness, example, effigy of that which it represents" (Earl 31), and as such it is an emanation of that thing represented, sharing its power and glory:

> If power is not divided nor glory distributed, honouring the image becomes honouring the one who is depicted in the image . . . . Material things in themselves demand no veneration, but if the person who is represented is full of grace, the material becomes partaker of grace metaphorically, by faith. (qtd. in Barnard 96)

Thus the visible, as image of the invisible, is in some measure "endowed sacramentally" with the virtue of the invisible (Martin 119). The political consequences of this definition emerge when we consider that St. John provided a practical model whereby one could "measure" the relative status of subjects and images. That is, he devised an elaborate neo-Platonic ladder of revelation with six gradations of types of images extending from the visible to the invisible. At the top of the hierarchy was the "natural" image which is identical to its prototype as, for example, Christ is the "actual self-existent image" of God.[19] This kind of image had to be differentiated from man as the "artificial" or "potential" image of God. At the second highest stage, an image may be a prophecy, a "plan of future undertaking, like the foreknowledge in the mind of God." Thirdly, an image could be an "imitation" in the sense of man being made in the image of God, but the "created cannot be strictly an image of the uncreated" Divine power. Fourth, an image could be an analogy or allegory. The examples St. John offers in the third *Oration* are those instances when the sun, the rose, the tree, the flower, the scent can be conceived as "images of the Holy Trinity." The fifth kind of image is the "type" or *figura*, a foreshadowing of something else: "the bush and the fleece, the rod and the urn foreshadow the Virginal Mother of God." Finally, the sixth and the lowest form of image is that which is made by man such as a "pictorial book or record" or a history as the "recollection of past events" (Martin 118-19).

Our reasons for briefly explicating this hierarchy is to demonstrate that St. John has inscribed within a discourse on images many of the issues that later on became fundamental to Renaissance, Enlightenment, and modern aesthetic theory: imitation, analogy, allegory, metaphor, type, *figura*. But in the case of St. John, the ideological consequences are more self-evident: when a church father

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"measured" a man's behavior against the hierarchy of images, he could be excluded from the community if his evil acts/images fell below the lowest, sixth level. Moreover, artistic performance (painting, sculpture, drama) was often described metaphorically to designate those acts and images through which human beings, mostly male, could assimilate to God, and thus, practically speaking, find themselves placed within the socioreligious hierarchies of the community.[20] It is as if the terms for an aesthetic theory are emerging in a cultural context in which there is as yet no separate aesthetic realm so that the social and ideological consequences of the theory are more self-evident.[21] Moreover, St. John's *Orations* are significant in that they extend the term *imago* in ways that include not only visual representations but also verbal ones.[22] Drawing upon these conceptions of St. John, it was possible for the Second Council to plead that if images were to be banned then so would be their literary as well as political counterparts. St. John's defense, as James Earl points out, "rested upon this *reductio ad absurdum,* and also upon the mystical nature of the *imago* in all its physical, literary, and spiritual manifestations" (30).

What remains perhaps an even more significant legacy of St. John's influential discourse on images is that underlying the hierarchical ladder of revelation was a paradigmatic image of time and history that was, ironically, ahistorical. In at least three of the six kinds of images, the dynamics of representation at work is that of typology, a basic principle of the repetition of dominant images which informs the logic of icons. In typological interpretation, the Old Testament is seen as a "prefiguration of the New Testament and its history of salvation" (Auerbach 30). Thus the original event or persona is often called the "type" or *figura* (from which "figures" of speech are derived) and its "fulfillment," the antitype. Figural interpretation, as Erich Auerbach puts it, "establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first" (53). The "logic" sustaining this causal relation between "first" and "second" order images requires that the first "event" or image cannot be a mere accidental or random historical action. Any version of contextualized or fragmentary history is therefore effaced in the name of a formalistic cycle of imaginary types both authorized and fulfilled by the requirements of its own ethnocentric system of images. As a privileged form of Truth, the image becomes a vehicle for annihilating time and transcending history; thus the study of Byzantine iconography reveals the shift from an historical interest in representation to a purely speculative one.[23] For example, in St. John's definition, images or icons can be regarded, according to James Earl, as "typological structures" (16). The extension of this basic dynamics of "figure and fulfillment" offered then a conceptual framework which was applied to individual Christian moral behavior as well as to historical explanation and justification. In celebrating the Mass, for example, the individual Christian participated in "a cosmic

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drama, a re-enactment of the life and passion of Christ, and at the same time all salvation history—a re-enactment which parallels, fulfills, and participates in these larger aspects of history" (Earl 18). Thus, in the adoration of an icon or *imago,* the individual would "remember" the martyr and so close the temporal gap separating him and the new saint just as in partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, the Christian would transcend time and place and politics and history. Beginning with St. John's iconological definition of the human being as a *potential* image of God—a "disposition still to be fulfilled" (Ladner *Ad Imaginem Dei* 12-13)—we find not only those justifications which have propelled reformation movements but also those justifications for acts of persecution, exploitation, and conquest in the name of man's *homoiosis*, likeness or similitude to God.[24] The paradigmatic nature of this medieval iconology has thus been carried forward most obviously in the Puritan's typological conversion of the New World[25] as well as the Jewish conversion of the Exodus story into the typological justification for the settlement of Israel. But in general (to once again conclude on a polemical note) typological interpretations of human history have played a larger if unconscious role in the colonialism and imperialism which have given shape to Western culture of the twentieth century.

II

While the etymological ties between image and ideology suggest the dissolution of any clear opposition between autotelic images and sociopolitical ideologies, the essays that follow likewise suggest the impossibility of any clear opposition between modernism and postmodernism. The designation of "modern/postmodern discourse" reflects our general sense that neither term by itself adequately refers to an historical/ideological period or mode.[26] As the essays illustrate, literary and cultural modernism is not nearly so monological as it is often conceived to be by postmodernist definitions. According to such definitions, the modernist literary revolution against the positivist epistemology of bourgeois humanism ended in an apolitical reification of an artistic/aesthetic order and form ranging from Arnold's "the best that is known and thought," to Eliot's "ideal order," to what Joseph Frank called "spatial form" as epitomized by the New Critics' intrinsic formalism. The ahistorical consequences of these modernist doctrines occurred in spite of their own intended political value as a resistance to a massively corrupt and materialistic culture. The postmodern then allegedly follows as a fracturing, dispersal, and dissemination of any such idealized order. Thus the ideological and political valence of postmodern discourse is most often seen to emerge from the fracturing and rupturing of dominant images, meanings, authorities, and subjectivities.

The specific focus of our volume, "image and ideology," provides a tactical site for an entry into such debates over the political and ideological work of critical practice as it emerges from the status accorded modern/postmodern dis-

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course. Our central focus is crucial in that it is precisely the valorizing of the autonomy of the image, whether as the "spatial form" represented by the "verbal icon" of New Critical texts, or the Imagists' "art for art's sake" aestheticism, or in the general humanist images of the paternal "Sameness" of the human nature of "Man" as a source of cultural stability, that has dictated the terms for the reception of the texts of the modernist era into the classroom as well as the scholarly enterprise. Moreover, the focus on image and ideology in these chapters draws out the central role that the "image" has played in the West as a mode of representing "truth" as a transcendence of the specifically ideological and historically contingent.

Another centrally related claim of this book is that implicit in all the familiar epistemological, historical, or psychological accounts of what Fredric Jameson has called the "crisis in representation" is, perforce, a crisis in the status of the visual and verbal image, a crisis with deep historical roots, nonetheless foregrounded by postmodernism.[27] As W. J. T. Mitchell argues, "the cliché of postmodernism is that it is an epoch of the absorption of all language into images and 'simulacra'" ("Iconology and Ideology" 326). Jameson's description of postmodernism likewise focuses on the status of the image: "In the form of the logic of the image or the spectacle of the simulacrum, everything has become 'cultural' in some sense. A whole new house of mirrors of visual replication and of textual reproduction has replaced the older stability of reference and of the non-cultural 'real'" (Jameson, "Hans Haacke" 42). Jameson's "images" suggest that the older, stable "mirror theory" of correspondence, objectivity, reference, and reality has been culturally displaced by a destabilizing "house of mirrors," or horrors, that leave us exasperated, as Jameson often seems to be, with the unending powers of postcapitalist appropriation, commercialization, and complicity.

On the one hand, a view of the postmodern as an aesthetic and cultural period displacing modernism has its clear social gains if we concur that postmodernist politics is "a politics of difference, wherein many of the voices of color, gender, and sexual orientation, newly liberated from the margins, have found representation under conditions that are not exclusively tailored to the hitherto heroicized needs and interests of white, male intellectuals and/or white, male workers" (Ross xvi). But despite such significant gains, we should remain wary of the implications of postmodernism as a strictly linear displacement of modernism: a metanarrative that totalizes a particular view of history within a plotted, linear series of events. Such a metanarrative informs Jameson's influential "cognitive mapping" of the chronological shift from modernism to postmodernism by reference to the mode of production. In his often-cited 1984 essay, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," he draws on Ernest Mandel's socioeconomic analysis in *Late Capitalism*. In short, this model enables him to map the sequence whereby market capitalism (roughly,

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1700-1850) produced realism, monopoly capitalism in the age of imperialism produced modernism, and multinational capitalism produced postmodernism. According to such a totalizing model, as Douglas Kellner has remarked, "the era of high modernism is over, its great individual authors have vanished, its styles are exhausted, and its monumental works are no longer possible" (*Postmodernism* 32). But however true the diachronic historical assessment of the "exhaustion" of the modernist idiom, the postmodernist mode is neither total nor dominant except with respect to particular cultural sectors and audiences. As Kellner has argued: "In fact, both processes [modernism and postmodernism] are conceivably happening at once making it questionable to affirm unambiguously that postmodernism is a new cultural dominant" (30-31).[28]

The contributors to this book question such totalizing metanarratives. Nevertheless, these critical interrogations do not always condemn the effort to conceptualize in more general and systematic (if fallible) ways so long as such broader perspectives do not negate or efface marginalized peoples. In this light, Linda Nicholson proposes a view of a "carefully constructed postmodernism" that recognizes both the problems of foundationalism and of fragmentation: "postmodernism must reject a description of itself as embodying a set of timeless ideals contrary to those of modernism; it must insist on being recognized as a set of viewpoints of a time, justifiable only within its own time" (11). Read in this way, the wide-ranging and cross-cultural terms of image and ideology, for example, may remain justifiably general categories "for our time" despite the inevitable differences in the way such categories may be interpreted. Moreover, even the referential multiplicity inscribed in most uses of the words *our* and *time* need not efface all efforts to construct models of historical continuities between, say, the nineteenth-century culture of Marx's "time" and our postmodernist moment.

The anti-foundationalist stance advocated by the contributors to this book therefore entails a twofold critical view: on the one hand, they recognize the increased bricolage of postmodernist and modernist images, but they also wish to resist a passive acquiescence to the unfocused and nebulous play of indeterminacy. The authors enact such critical resistance while also avoiding the latent nostalgia that accompanies the loss of any widespread, socially sanctioned belief in the sufficiency of the mirror image of representation.[29] The provisionality of postmodern cultural criticism leads, then, to the important ideological questions of power and politics: whose images, whose history, whose interests are being served?

Indeed, the politically self-conscious practice of postmodern iconology as recommended by the contributors helps us realize that we must struggle as well against the etymology of the very word insofar as it reinscribes the mirror theory: the proper *icon* must mirror/reflect the true *logos*. That we can no longer safely refer to such metanarratives of transcendence signals the sociopolitical

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conditions of postmodern critical practice which acknowledges the fact that, as Norman Bryson says, "the image is not obliged to go out of its way to 'meet' the social formation . . . . since it is always already there at its destination; it has never been in a state of disarticulation from the society" (152). Furthermore, the enormous proliferation of both verbal and visual images in postmodern culture, and the infusion of the image with the social and the political, call for an interrogation of any separation of the visual and verbal domains.[30]

Such a politically self-conscious critique of disciplinary boundaries suggests the terrain of what Linda Hutcheon calls the "complicitous critique" of postmodern critical practice.[31] In the sociopolitical conditions of postmodern culture, oppositional practice often satirizes, critiques, and attacks in local and historical ways various forms of domination, exclusion, oppression, and nonreciprocal relations. But such critique recognizes its own complicitous status: as producers and receivers of images, we are, in Hutcheon's words, "all implicated in the legitimation of our culture" (*Politics* 15). In abdicating the rhetoric of science, totality, and transcendence, we may find ourselves with no position outside the culture from which to judge a culture's image-making practices. Rather, only differences within the social system allow for positions of rhetorical critique. In this sense, emancipatory images and rhetorics need constantly to be historically and situationally evaluated, especially with respect to marginalized and oppressed peoples, if we are to determine how we may "de-doxify" the systems of meaning, images, and representations by which we know our culture and our selves. As Steven Connor remarks: "cultural analysis always risks falling into complicity with the increasingly globalized forms which seek to harness, exploit, and administer—and therefore violently to curtail—" (244) the diversity and radical differences in the global political scene. Thus, "the task for a theoretical postmodernity of the future must be . . to forge new and more inclusive forms of ethical collectivity . . . common frames of assent" that would simultaneously acknowledge "a global diversity of voices" (244). Or, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson have cast the hope for such critical alliances: "such commonalities are by no means universal; rather, they are interlaced with differences, even with conflicts. This, then, is a practice made up of a patchwork of overlapping alliances, not one circumscribed by an essential definition" (35).

The common frame of an "ethical collectivity" in this book derives from the diverse commitments of the contributors who nevertheless jointly ally themselves with the need to articulate modern/postmodern critical practices that lead to active resistance of the oppression and domination which Paulo Freire would call the "generative theme" for our era. Thus, while the organization of this book initially seems to highlight a chronological displacement between the "modernist" texts addressed in Part II and the "postmodernist" discourses of Part III, the superficial chronology is displaced by the thematic, methodological, and political commitments of the contributors themselves. Thus, the essays

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that follow all tend to share an appraisal that, to restate a major premise, the postmodernist resistance to high modernist aestheticism has institutionalized itself within English Department curriculums as an idealized opposition, a false duality between modernist totality and postmodernist fragmentation. One of the consequences of such institutional incorporation of modernists and postmodernists has often been, as Linda Hutcheon explains, "to forget the lesson of postmodernism's complex relation to modernism: its retention of modernism's initial oppositional impulses, both ideological and aesthetic, and its equally strong rejection of its founding notion of formalist autonomy" (*Politics* 26). Such forgetting leads to the depletion of the actual oppositional political work that needs to be done. Indeed, the contributors to this volume deploy such postmodernist idioms as Foucault's genealogy of power, Bakhtin's dialogism, Kristeva's semiotic, or Baudrillard's simulations to emphasize the activity of a critical practice which mediates between the idealized poles of modernist tradition and aestheticism and postmodernist multiplicity and dispersion. In the end, the contributors are less concerned with academic definitions of what modernism or postmodernism *is* than with what the critique of the images and ideologies that sustain and surround those debates can *do*. This book thereby situates ideological articulations of images within the social and cultural codes of modern/postmodern practices. As such, postmodernist disruption emerges as a counter-dominant discourse within the modernist period and indeed within modernist texts themselves.[32]

The opening essay by Brian Caraher can thus be seen as an effort to articulate the ways in which such a traditionally modernist text as Conrad's "Youth: A Narrative" dramatizes a play of image and ideology that prefigures various modes of postmodern discourse.[33] The critical difference between modernist and postmodernist narratives "appears already contained within the discursive range of modernity." There are two interrelated dimensions to this project. The first is the recognition that the chronological displacement of modernism by postmodernism replays the modernist condition of displacing and differing "from what is regarded as ancient, classical, traditional." To conceive of modernity "as itself already over, behind, past, classic, intellectually completed" reifies the historical period as a representable discursive object that has been displaced. But that very effort entails the second recognition: such periodized objectivity "assumes or projects an ideology of representation still in need of postmodern debunking." As Caraher argues, "literary modernism at least has actually already performed a major task of the postmodern project."

"Under the pressure of postmodern concerns," Caraher thereby reads Conrad's "Youth" as a critique of the romance narrative which, insofar as it derives from an "ill-founded, egocentric, illusory" image of an idealized "East," provides an implicit justification of imperialist adventure and quest. Caraher

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derives from his specific analysis the more general claim that modernist literature itself reveals the illusions by which image structures narrative. Readers who uncritically accept the traditional plot as a relatively unproblematic "romantic quest for an image of the East and of fulfillment" thereby participate in sustaining the patriarchal and imperial ideologies that nourish those images in the first place. In contrast, a second, allegorical or "metanarrational narrative" insistently intrudes in a kind of multiple or postmodernist critique of the "ideological assumptions upon which the tale of romance is founded and structured." This second, destabilizing metanarrative highlights a more general theoretical contention: numerous modernist writers have revealed the ideological foundations of narrative structure to be colonial images. In other words, the very art of consistent storytelling itself depends upon "a covert ideology and pivotal valuation" of patriarchal and monological images of those desired others, the East, Youth, Woman, etc., that sustain the colonizing plots of white, Western men.

Caraher's formulation echoes Richard Pearce's argument with respect to Virginia Woolf. Pearce enables us to appreciate the extent to which Woolf's narratives also engage a powerful critique of those patriarchal narratives of adventure, romance, and dominance that affect not only issues of gender but also of race, class, and nationality. In particular, Pearce argues, Woolf shifted patriarchy by rejecting the monological male sentence which, as described by Gilbert and Gubar, is "the sentence-as-definitive-judgment." Woolf creates another mode of reading in another syntax which is not a monologic judgment but a dialogical breaking up of coherent images into a field of continually shifting relationships, images, points of view, a destabilizing effect similar to what is often attributed to postmodern art and literature.

And yet, as Pearce remarks, the "lady writing" must continually struggle against traditional structures of male authority. In *Mrs. Dalloway,* for example, Woolf's narrative, while throughout "open to images of relationship denied by the male hierarchy of thought," nonetheless has the ostensible structure of "an old-fashioned romance plot: the courtship of Peter Walsh." Just back from India, Peter "reflects the mentality—and authority of imperialism" and he "imposes his frame, his order, his image of unity, on the multiple, even contradictory, strands of the novel."

Such a unity of images, concluding many of Woolf's novels, is in fact a source of delight for many of her readers. But as Pearce reminds us, such readings "are not wrong." They reflect "the residual power of traditional authority" in the community of readers. So what we find is that Pearce's dialogical reading reveals a textual innovation that calls in turn for a readerly innovation. On the one hand, Woolf's textual innovation is to deploy a "new kind of authorial figure," that is, a mode of authorizing narratives without an omniscient, monologic point of view to unify the narrative flow of semiotic images. Such a mode has

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often been described as a characteristic of postmodern narrative which Pearce locates in Woolf's modernist text. The "em-bodying," as Pearce describes it, undermines the final images of unity. But to engage that undermining as postmodernist readers, we must actively participate in the dialogical play of voices, images, relationships that intersect this text with our own.

Pearce describes this embodying-disembodying play of interpretations in *The Waves* where Woolf positions Bernard so that "he literally takes on the paternalistic role of an omniscient narrator." Pearce's observation here is that Woolf makes visible the image of omniscience as one of many possibilities for readerly interaction with the text whereas in most conventional narratives the image of omniscience remains concealed. The political consequences of such a critique of dominance avoids as well what Pearce sees as "the misleading distinction between a totalizing modernism and a revolutionary postmodernism."

In the effort to avoid similar misleading distinctions, Norman Wacker opens a new way to read Pound that has explicitly political implications without simply bemoaning his connections to Mussolini and fascism on the one hand or his elite aesthetic obscurity on the other. As Wacker explains, "Pound documents the passing from one representational 'regime of truth' to a new mechanics of image and ideology which anticipates both the modernity of the cold war and the postmodernity which has decentered it." Pound's poetics becomes an act and process of articulating images so as to place "our categories of representation before our eyes" not as a neutral, theoretical position, but as a constructive archive, a "medium for rethinking of tradition" and society at moments of historical disruption. Poetic articulations can thus be read as "a celebration of improvised objects, fortuitous insight, and disruptions of fascist ideology." The articulation of images, whether of Chinese philosophers, World War II battles, or Homeric episodes, is seen not within the idiom of an allusive formalism but as the construction of a cross-cultural genealogy which, as a poem-in-process for the reader as well as the poet, breaks the hold on the dominant Western models of representing truth in images that are monological and thus in the hands of a powerful elite.[34]

Poetic images are now "charged" with "the greatest possible breadth of those normally submerged determinations which condition [their] use." That is, in Wacker's view, a reconstructive articulation of Pound's poetics reveals the ways that images are not autonomous, isolated forms, but sites for interpretation whose active political charge is an ideological construction. In thus implicating Pound's own ideological complicities within his poetics, Wacker demonstrates that we are not led, as many critics have been, to a disabling of his entire poetics as evidenced in *The Cantos* by pointing out his own failures, whether in his anti-Semitism or his political reactionism in the *Pisan Cantos*. Indeed, Wacker locates patriarchy at the very heart of Pound's *ethos* in his central image of "old men's voices" as a historical residue of a renewed tradition. As Wacker

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explains, Pound didn't recognize "sexism, racism, and imperialism in his source materials," but his poetics of disruption calls for the readerly construction of images which fracture the oppressions of the source materials and thus reject those dominant "representations of truth" which conceal their own ideological interests.

Moreover, Wacker's reading of Pound specifically marks the postmodern tendencies of his work: the tension between the verbal and the visual revealed in Pound's use of "cinematic logics" and the "semiotics of the film" registers the dramatic, *performative* potential of his socio-poetics. Thus in Pound the modernist urge to "make it new" takes on postmodern traces of "doubleness of construction in action" in that his composition reflects upon both the act of articulation and the revelation of the cultural determinants of that act. The duplicity, along with the cinematic blendings of sight and sound—"the visual echo of the aural movement"—enables Pound to fuse the ideological connotations of images and their visual impact on the reader. The intrusion of the visual upon the verbal in Pound—his efforts to "write to paint"—also identifies with the abstractionism of paintings which defy representation as reproduction, and instead create new cognitive and political spaces by isolating "expressive qualities of objects and deploy[ing] them in new constructions."

The political implications of such a revised poetics derive from the very assumptions that the meaning of images are never discretely in the text, nor ideally in the author's intention, nor merely in the reader, but rather in a dialogic engagement of many voices and positions which implicate each other. Such implications resist the apolitical status of what Jameson calls "nostalgia art," that which "gives us the image of various generations of the past as fashion-plate images that entertain no determinable ideological relationship to other moments of time: they are not the outcome of anything, nor are they the antecedents of our present; they are simply images" (Stephanson 18). In other words, even textual readings of such canonized texts are never merely "textual" or preserved within isolated academic sites such as the classroom or the scholarly journal but are implicated within a cultural system of signs and discourses. Failure to recognize those intertextual politics tends precisely to facilitate the "culture of surveillance" which ranges all the way from United States colonialism in Nicaragua to the material systems for hiring, firing, and evaluation within the academy.

Indeed, such racism and sexism sustain well the regressive force behind the use of the images, plots, and stereotypes of the "southern gothic" as a literary and social "genre" which conceals and mystifies the underlying images of misogynistic violence and horror by displacing them to "southern gothic" rhetorics of black humor and farce. As Margie Burns explains, "any awareness stimulated by the hint of very real violence . . . is displaced—trivialized—into typically 'gothic suspense' and a (feminine) morbid curiosity." Like the fate of

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the unwanted and despised spinsters that surface in many literary texts of the twentieth century, the relative spinsterhoods of Faulkner's Emily and O'Connor's grandmother serve as paradigmatic instances whereby the fates of these marginalized, elderly women emerge from narratives which construct a series of images of houses, walls, facades, barriers which "simultaneously blazon and conceal" the sites of sexual and political injustice. In Burns's words, the use of southern gothic images "transforms 'history' into an intimidation serving the interests of a privileged class." For example, gothic images of interiors actually signify "an *exteriorization*—a shunning, in which the pain and horror of real events are dislocated into imaginary gardens." In these imaginary gardens, the ideological force charges the spinstered "lady," "the old flowers of decayed femininity," with the total demoralization of social values and "good taste," charges which in turn justify her extermination under conditions not radically at odds with the more obvious forms of colonialist violence documented by Conrad's "Youth." Burns reminds us, such "imaginary gardens provide no escape from real oppression and pain, because they offer no real change."

Such change may be possible, however, if we recognize the images that sustain the ideological force of the metanarratives that justify systems of authority and oppression. Thus the essays in Part III explore the ways in which postmodern artists, like their modernist predecessors, have engaged and responded to authorial images and voices. In exploring the works of John Fowles, Gian Balsamo brings into focus the Bakhtinian point made earlier in Part II by Richard Pearce, that "the novel is revolutionary because of the variety of voices that contend ideologically with the authorial voice." Balsamo's essay also adumbrates Walter Benjamin's articulation of "historical configuration," as explored by Azade Seyhan in Part IV. Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia finds added complexity in Balsamo's reading of Fowles in that the dissonance of the "polyphonic chant" of his narrators—in *A Maggot,* for example—is related not only to the multiple levels of fictionality, but also to the dialogic modulations between "the writer's discourse" and the "social dialogue" revolving around the object of narration. Furthermore, such an interaction, transgressing those boundaries that separate aesthetic from social, political, and institutional practices, implicates the readers also, who have to ponder "the *questions* which justify [the book's] existence as a work of art." The "social dialogue" in Fowles's novels draws upon a plethora of pictorial and verbal images and their implied ideologies. Fowles, Balsamo argues, aggregates such images, but in a "congeries of disconcerting art arrangements" to disrupt, in postmodern fashion, the homogeneity between historical sources and modes of emplotment.[35]

In particular, Balsamo focuses on the politics of genre and gender in Fowles. In his displacement of the writer by the scribe in *A Maggot*, Fowles, not unlike Woolf in *The Waves,* immolates the "conventional image of the

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